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71,JUNE18,1976 491
Bonillavs.Barcena
No.L41715.June18,1976. *
ROSALIOBONILLA(aminor)SALVACIONBONILLA(a
minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors, petitioners,vs.LEON BARCENA,
MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIANTAMAYOandHON.LEOPOLDOGIRONELLAof
theCourtofFirstInstanceofAbra,respondents.
Pleadings and practice;Parties;Substitution of parties in
caseofdeathofplaintiffduringpendencyofproceedingsinaction
which survives death of said plaintiff.While it is true that a
personwhoisdeadcannotsueincourt,yethecanbesubstituted
byhisheirsinpursuingthecaseuptoitscompletion.
Same;Same;Duty of attorney upon death of party.The
Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who
diedduringthependencyoftheproceedingcanbesubstituted.
UnderSection16,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwheneverpartyto
apendingcasediesxxxitshallbethedutyofhisattorneyto
inform thecourtpromptlyofsuchdeathx xxand togivethe
nameandresidenceofhisexecutor,administrator,guardianor
otherlegalrepresentatives.
___________________
FIRSTDIVISION
*
492
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
92
Bonillavs.Barcena
Same;Same;Duty of court upon death of party.Under
section17,Rule3oftheRuleofCourtafterapartydiesandthe
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
propernotice,thelegalrepresentativeofthedeceasedtoappear
andbesubstitutedforthedeceased,withinsuchtimeasmaybe
grantedxxx.
Same;Same;Duty of court where legal representative of
deceasedpartyfailstoappear.UnderSection17,Rule3ofthe
Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased.
Same;Same;Dutyofcourtwhererepresentativeofdeceased
partyminors.UnderSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,
thecourtisdirectedtoappointaguardianadlitemfortheminor
heirs.
Same;Same;Actiontoquiettitletopropertyasactionwhich
survives death of a party; Test to determine whether action
survivesornot.Thequestionastowhetheranactionsurvives
ornotdependsonthenatureoftheactionandthedamagesued
for.Inthecausesofactionwhichsurvive,thewrongcomplained
affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
theinjuriestothepersonbeingmerelyincidental,whileinthe
causesofactionwhichdonotsurvive,theinjurycomplainedofis
totheperson,thepropertyandrightsofpropertyaffectedbeing
incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the
deceasedplaintiffwhichisanactiontoquiettitleovertheparcels
oflandinlitigationaffectsprimarilyandprincipallypropertyand
propertyrightsandthereforeisonethatsurvivesevenafterher
death.
Succession;Rights to succession transmitted from the
moment of death of decedent.Article 777 of the Civil Code
providesthattherightstothesuccessionaretransmittedfrom
themomentofthedeathofthedecedent.Fromthemomentof
thedeathofthedecedent,theheirsbecometheabsoluteowners
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto
exceptbythemethodsprovidedforbylaw.Themomentofdeath
isthedeterminingfactorwhentheheirsacquireadefiniteright
totheinheritancewhethersuchrightbepureorcontingent.The
rightoftheheirstothepropertyofthedeceasedvestsinthem
evenbeforejudicialdeclarationoftheirbeingheirsinthetestate
orintestateproceedings.
PETITIONforreviewoftheorderoftheCourtofFirst
InstanceofAbra,Gironella,J.
493
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 493
Bonillavs.Barcena
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
FedericoParedesforpetitioners.
DemetrioV.Preforprivaterespondents.
MARTIN,J.:
This is a petition forreview oftheOrder oftheCourt of
1
___________________
1
WhichthisCourttreatsasspecialcivilactionasperitsResolutiondatedFebruary
11,1976.
2
Section 16.Duty of Attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party.
Wheneverapartytoapendingcasedies,becomesincapacitatedorincompetent,itshall
bethedutyofhis
494
494 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bonillavs.Barcena
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for
reconsiderationfiledbycounselfortheplaintiffforlackof
merit.OnSeptember1,1975,counselfordeceasedplaintiff
filed a written manifestation praying that the minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to
substitutetheirdeceasedmother,butthecourtdeniedthe
counselsprayerforlackofmerit.Fromtheorder,counsel
for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claimingthatthesameisinviolationofSections16and17
ofRule3oftheRulesofCourtbutthesamewasdenied.
Hence,thispetitionforreview.
TheCourtreversestherespondentCourtandsetsaside
itsorderdismissingthecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.856and
its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said
orderofdismissal.Whileitistruethatapersonwhoisdead
cannotsueincourt,yethecanbesubstitutedbyhisheirsin
pursuingthecaseuptoitscompletion.Therecordsofthis
caseshowthatthedeathofFortunataBarcenatookplace
onJuly9,1975whilethecomplaintwasfiledonMarch31,
1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on
March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her
person.Ifthereaftershedied,theRulesofCourtprescribes
the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendencyoftheproceedingcanbesubstituted.
___________________
attorneytoinformthecourtpromptlyofsuchdeath,incapacityorincompetency,and
togivethenameandresidenceofhisexecutor,administrator,guardianorotherlegal
representative.
Section 17.Death of party.After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished,thecourtshallorder,uponpropernotice,thelegalrepresentativeofthe
deceasedtoappearandtobesubstitutedfordeceased,withinaperiodofthirty(30)days,
orwithinsuchtimeasmaybegranted.Ifthelegalrepresentativefailstoappearwithin
saidtime,thecourtmayordertheopposingpartytoprocuretheappointmentofalegal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representativeshallimmediatelyappearforandonbehalfoftheinterestofthedeceased.
Thecourtchargesinvolvedinprocuringsuchappointment,ifdefrayedbytheopposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administratorandthecourtmayappointguardianadlitemfortheminorheirs.
495
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 495
Bonillavs.Barcena
UnderSection16,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwhenevera
partytoapendingcasediesxxxitshallbethedutyofhis
attorneytoinformthecourtpromptlyofsuchdeathxxx
and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives.
Thisdutywascompliedwithbythecounselforthedeceased
plaintiffwhenhemanifestedbeforetherespondent Court
thatFortunataBarcenadiedonJuly9,1975andaskedfor
the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution,dismissedthecomplaintonthegroundthata
deadpersonhasnolegalpersonalitytosue.Thisisagrave
error.Article777oftheCivilCodeprovidesthattherights
tothesuccessionaretransmittedfromthemomentofthe
deathofthedecedent.Fromthemomentofthedeathofthe
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The 3
momentofdeathisthedeterminingfactorwhentheheirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such
right bepure or contingent. Theright of theheirs to the
4
propertyofthedeceasedvestsinthemevenbeforejudicial
declarationoftheirbeingheirsinthetestateorintestate
proceedings. WhenFortunataBarcena,therefore,diedher
5
3
Buanvs.HeirsofBuan,53Phil.654.
4
Ibarlevs.Po,92Phil.721.
5
Morales,etal.vs.Ybanez,98Phil.677.
496
496 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bonillavs.Barcena
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
6
deceasedplaintiffwhichisanactiontoquiettitleoverthe
parcelsoflandinlitigationaffectsprimarilyandprincipally
property and property rights and therefore is one that
survivesevenafterherdeath.Itis,therefore,thedutyof
the respondent Court to order the legal representative of
thedeceasedplaintifftoappearandto besubstitutedfor
her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being
informedbythecounselforthedeceasedplaintiffthatthe
latterwasdead,wastodismissthecomplaint.Thisshould
nothavebeendoneforunderthesameSection17,Rule3of
theRulesofCourt,itiseventhedutyofthecourt,ifthe
legalrepresentativefailstoappear,toordertheopposing
partytoprocuretheappointmentofalegalrepresentative
ofthedeceased.IntheinstantcasetherespondentCourt
did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceasedbecausehercounselhasnotonlyaskedthatthe
minor children be substituted for her but also suggested
thattheirunclebeappointedasguardianadlitemforthem
becausetheirfatherisbusyinManilaearningalivingfor
thefamily.But therespondent Court refusedtherequest
forsubstitutiononthegroundthatthechildrenwerestill
minorsandcannotsueincourt.Thisisanothergraveerror
because the respondent Court ought to have known that
underthesameSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,the
court is directed to appoint a guardianad litemfor the
minorheirs.Preciselyintheinstantcase,thecounselfor
the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent
Courtthattheuncleoftheminorsbeappointedtoactas
guardianadlitemforthem.Unquestionably,therespondent
Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
withtheclearprovisionoftheRulesofCourtindismissing
thecomplaintoftheplaintiffinCivilCaseNo.856
___________________
6
IronGateBankvs.Brady,184U.S.665,22SCT529,46L.ed.739.
7
Wenbervs.St.PaulCityCo.,97Feb.140R.39CCA.79.
497
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 497
Bonillavs.Barcena
andrefusingthesubstitutionofpartiesinthecase.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the
respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case
No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the
motionsforreconsiderationoftheorderofdismissalofsaid
complaintaresetasideandtherespondentCourtishereby
directedtoallowthesubstitutionoftheminorchildren,who
arethepetitionersthereinforthedeceasedplaintiffandto
appoint a qualified person as guardianad litemfor them.
Withoutpronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee(Chairman),Makasiar,EsguerraandMu
ozPalma,JJ.,concur.
Orderssetaside.
Notes.a)Duty of attorney for deceased partyUnder
Sec. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court it is the duty of the
attorneyforthedeceaseddefendanttoinformtheCourtof
his clients death and furnish it with the name and
residence of the executor, administrator, or legal
representativeofthedeceased.Thisrulemusthavetaken
into consideration the fact that the attorney for the
deceasedpartyisinabetterpositionthantheattorneyfor
the other party to ascertain who are the legal
representative or heirs of his deceased client. This duty
should not be shifted to the plaintiff or his attorney.
(Barramedavs.Barbara,L4227,January28,1952).
1. b)Legalrepresentativetakesplaceofdeceasedparty.
Whenthetrialcourt is apprisedofthedeathofa
party, it should order, not the amendment of the
complaint, but then appearance of the legal
representativeofthedeceasedasprovidedinsection
17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt.Anordertoamend
thecomplaint,beforethepropersubstitutionofthe
deceasedpartieshasbeeneffected,isvoid.Insucha
case the order of the court, dismissing the
complaint, for plaintiffs noncompliance with the
order to amend it, is likewise void. (Casenas vs.
Rosales,L18707,February28,1967).
o0o
498
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 239
Peoplevs.Bayotas
G.R.No.102007.September2,1994. *
ENBANC.
*
240
2 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
40
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Law;b)Contracts;c)Quasicontracts;d)xxxxxxxxx;e)
Quasidelicts.
Same;Same;Wherethecivilliabilitysurvives,anactionfor
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separatecivilactionandsubjecttoSection1,Rule111ofthe1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.Where the civil
liabilitysurvives,asexplainedinNumber2above,anactionfor
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administratorortheestateoftheaccused,dependingon
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explainedabove.
Same;Same;Privateoffendedpartyneednotfearaforfeiture
of his right to file the separate civil action by prescription.
Finally,theprivateoffendedpartyneednotfearaforfeitureof
hisrighttofilethisseparatecivilactionbyprescription,incases
whereduringtheprosecutionofthecriminalactionandpriorto
its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together
therewiththecivilaction.Insuchcase,thestatuteoflimitations
onthecivilliabilityisdeemedinterruptedduringthependencyof
thecriminalcase,conformablywithprovisionsofArticle1155of
theCivilCode,thatshouldtherebyavoidanyapprehensionona
possibleprivationofrightbyprescription.
Same;Same;Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complainedof,i.e.,rape.Applyingthissetofrulestothecaseat
bench,weholdthatthedeathofappellantBayotasextinguished
hiscriminalliabilityandthecivilliabilitybasedsolelyontheact
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissedwithoutqualification.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
RoxasCity,Br.16.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
ROMERO,J.:
InCriminalCaseNo.C3217filedbeforeBranch16,RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape
241
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 241
Peoplevs.Bayotas
and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appealofhisconviction,Bayotasdied onFebruary4,1992
at theNational Bilibid Hospital dueto cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
SupremeCourtinitsResolutionofMay20,1992dismissed
thecriminalaspectoftheappeal.However,itrequiredthe
SolicitorGeneraltofileitscommentwithregardtoBayotas
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
Inhiscomment,theSolicitorGeneralexpressedhisview
thatthedeathofaccusedappellantdidnotextinguishhis
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged.TheSolicitorGeneral,relyingonthecaseofPeople
v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be
1
resolvedforthepurposeofreviewinghisconvictionbythe
lowercourtonwhichthecivilliabilityisbased.
Counsel for the accusedappellant, on the other hand,
opposedtheviewoftheSolicitorGeneralarguingthatthe
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties.Insupportofhisposition,saidcounselinvoked
therulingoftheCourtofAppealsinPeoplev.Castilloand
Ocfemia whichheldthatthecivilobligationinacriminal
2
casetakesrootinthecriminalliabilityand,therefore,civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgmentisrendered.
Wearethusconfrontedwithasingleissue:Doesdeathof
theaccusedpendingappealofhisconvictionextinguishhis
civilliability?
In the aforementioned case ofPeople v. Castillo, this
issuewassettledintheaffirmative.Thissameissueposed
thereinwasphrasedthus:DoesthedeathofAlfredoCastillo
affectbothhiscriminalresponsibilityandhiscivilliability
asaconsequenceoftheallegedcrime?
Itresolvedthisissuethruthefollowingdisquisition:
__________________
1
Nos.L33252,L33253andL33254,81SCRA120.
2
No.22211R,November4,1959,56O.G.No.23,p.4045.
242
242 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Article89oftheRevisedPenalCodeisthecontrollingstatute.Itreads,inpart:
ART.89.Howcriminalliabilityistotallyextinguished.Criminalliability
istotallyextinguished:
1.Bythedeathoftheconvict,astothepersonalpenalties;andastothe
pecuniarypenaltiesliabilitythereforisextinguishedonlywhenthedeathofthe
offender occurs before final judgment; With reference to Castillos criminal
liability,thereisnoquestion.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
Thecivilliability,however,posesaproblem.Suchliabilityisextinguished
onlywhenthedeathoftheoffenderoccursbeforefinaljudgment.Saddledupon
usisthetaskofascertainingthelegalimportofthetermfinaljudgment.Isit
finaljudgmentascontradistinguishedfromaninterlocutoryorder?Or,isita
judgmentwhichisfinalandexecutory?
Wegotothegenesisofthelaw.ThelegalpreceptcontainedinArticle89of
theRevisedPenalCodeheretoforetranscribedisliftedfromArticle132ofthe
SpanishElCodigoPenalde1870which,inpart,recites:
Laresponsabilidadpenalseextingue.
1.Porlamuertedelreoencuantoalaspenaspersonalessiempre,yrespectoalas
pecuniarias,solocuandoasufallecimientonohubiererecaidosentenciafirme.
xxxxxxxxx
Thecodeof1870xxxitwillbeobservedemploysthetermsentenciafirme.Whatis
sentenciafirmeundertheoldstatute?XXVIIIEnciclopediaJuridicaEspaola,p.473,
furnishesthereadyanswer:Itsays:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas
pornohaberseutilizadoporlasparteslitigantesrecursoalgunocontraelladentrodelos
terminosyplazoslegalesconcedidosalefecto.
Sentencia firme really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because,itisonlywhenjudgmentissuchthat,asMedinayMaranonputsit,
thecrimeisconfirmedencondenadeterminada;or,inthewordsofGroizard,
theguiltoftheaccusedbecomesunaverdadlegal.Priorthereto,shouldthe
accuseddie,accordingtoViada,nohaylegalmente,entalcaso,nireo,nidelito,
ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase. And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, there
cannotbeany
243
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 243
Peoplevs.Bayotas
determinationbyfinaljudgmentwhetherornotthefelonyuponwhichthecivil
action might arise exists, for the simple reason that there isnoparty
defendant. (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Franciscoholdsthesameview.Francisco,RevisedPenalCode,BookOne,2nd
ed.,pp.859860)
ThelegalimportofthetermfinaljudgmentissimilarlyreflectedintheRevised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term final
judgmentinthesensethatitisalreadyenforceable.Thisalsobringstomind
Section7,Rule116oftheRulesofCourtwhichstatesthatajudgmentina
criminalcasebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodforperfectinganappeal
orwhenthesentencehasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthe
defendanthasexpresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.
Byfairintendment,thelegalpreceptsandopinions herecollectedfunnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgmenthasnotbecomeexecutory,itcannotbetruthfullysaidthatdefendant
isdefinitelyguiltyofthefelonychargedagainsthim.
Notthatthemeaningthusgiventofinaljudgmentiswithoutreason.For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved,thedecisiontoberenderedmust,ofnecessity,coverboththecriminal
and the civil aspects of the case. People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2
O.G.,No.100,p.964.Seealso:Peoplevs.Moll,68Phil.,626,634;Francisco,
CriminalProcedure,1958ed.,Vol.I,pp.234,236.Correctly,JudgeKapunan
observedthatasthecivilactionisbasedsolelyonthefelonycommittedandof
whichtheoffendermightbefoundguilty,thedeathoftheoffenderextinguishes
thecivilliability.IKapunan,RevisedPenalCode,Annotated,supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillos criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that
criminalliability.Butthen,ifwedismiss,aswemust,thecriminalactionand
let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation
wherebywewillbecalledupontoclampcivilliabilityinacasewherethesource
thereofcriminalliabilitydoesnotexist.And,aswaswellstatedinBautista,
etal.vs.Estrella,etal.,CAG.R.No.19226R,September1,1958,nopartycan
befoundandheldcriminallyliableinacivilsuit,whichsolelywouldremainif
wearetodivorceitfromthecriminalproceeding.
ThisrulingoftheCourtofAppealsintheCastillocase was 3
adoptedbytheSupremeCourtinthecasesofPeopleofthe
_____________
3
Supra.
244
244 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., People of the 4
Philippinesv.Satorre bydismissingtheappealinviewof
6
thedeathoftheaccusedpendingappealofsaidcases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in
theAlisoncase:
ThedeathofaccusedappellantBonifacioAlisonhavingbeenestablished,and
consideringthatthereisasyetnofinaljudgmentinviewofthependencyofthe
appeal,thecriminalandcivilliabilityofthesaidaccusedappellantAlisonwas
extinguishedbyhisdeath(Art.89,RevisedPenalCode;ReyesCriminalLaw,
1971Rev.Ed.,p.717,citingPeoplev.CastilloandOcfemiaC.A.,56O.G.4045);
consequently,thecaseagainsthimshouldbedismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
ofBuenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of
7
Appeals ruleddifferently.Intheformer,theissuedecided
8
bythiscourtwas:Whetherthecivilliabilityofoneaccused
of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claimthereforagainsthisestate.Itwasthecontentionof
the administratorappellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal
and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However,thiscourtruledtherein:
Weseenomeritinthepleathatthecivilliabilityhasbeenextinguished,in
viewoftheprovisionsoftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesof1950(Rep.ActNo.
386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointedoutbytheCourtbelow,Article33oftheCivilCodeestablishesacivil
actionfordamagesonaccountofphysicalinjuries,entirelyseparateanddistinct
fromthecriminalaction.
__________________
4
L30612,April27,1972,44SCRA523.
5
No.L28397,June17,1976,71SCRA273.
6
No.L26282,August27,1976,72SCRA439.
7
No.L24098,November18,1967,21SCRA970.
8
No.L40336,October24,1975,67SCRA394.
245
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 245
Peoplevs.Bayotas
ART.33.Incasesofdefamation,fraud,andphysicalinjuries,acivilactionfordamages,
entirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecriminalaction,maybebroughtbytheinjured
party.Suchcivilactionshallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalprosecution,andshall
requireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas civil action for
damageswastobeconsideredinstitutedtogetherwiththecriminalactionstill,
since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
actionoftheoffendedpartyunderArticle33mayyetbeenforcedseparately.
InTorrijos,theSupremeCourtheldthat:
xxxxxxxxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinctionofthecriminalliabilityunderArticle89,onlywhenthecivilliability
arisesfromthecriminalactasitsonlybasis.Stateddifferently,wherethecivil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinctionofthelatterbydeath,ipsofactoextinguishestheformer,provided,of
course,thatdeathsupervenesbeforefinaljudgment.Thesaidprincipledoesnot
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originallyfromthecrimeitselfbutfromacivilcontractofpurchaseandsale.
(Italicsours)
xxxxxxxxx.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liabilityoftheaccusedwhowaschargedwithestafacould
likewisetraceitsgenesistoArticles19,20and21ofthe
Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the
contract of sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently,
while the death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminalliabilityincludingfine,hiscivilliabilitybasedon
thelawsofhumanrelationsremains.
Thusitallowedtheappealtoproceedwithrespecttothe
civilliabilityoftheaccused,notwithstandingtheextinction
ofhiscriminalliabilityduetohisdeathpendingappealof
hisconviction.
Tofurtherjustifyitsdecisiontoallowthecivilliabilityto
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since
246
246 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the
9
dismissalofallmoneyclaimsagainstthedefendantwhose
deathoccurredpriortothefinaljudgmentoftheCourtof
FirstInstance(CFI),thenitcanbeinferredthatactionsfor
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal,
whenthedeathofthedefendantsupervenesaftertheCFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this
tribunal,thenameoftheoffendedpartyshallbeincluded
in the title of the case as plaintiffappellee and the legal
representativeortheheirsofthedeceasedaccusedshould
besubstitutedasdefendantsappellants.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from
Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the
survivalofthecivilliabilitydependsonwhetherthesame
canbepredicatedonsourcesofobligationsotherthandelict.
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solelybasedthereon,i.e.,civilliabilityexdelicto.
However,theSupremeCourtinPeoplev.Sendaydiego,et
al. departedfromthislongestablishedprincipleoflaw.In
10
Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.81337,August16,
248
248 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
wereareaffirmanceofourabandonmentofthesettledrule
that acivil liability solelyanchoredonthecriminal(civil
liabilityex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the
entireappealduetothedemiseoftheaccused.
Butwasitjudicioustohaveabandonedthisoldruling?A
reexaminationofourdecisioninSendaydiegoimpelsusto
reverttotheoldruling.
TorestateourresolutionofJuly8,1977inSendaydiego:
Theresolutionofthecivilactionimpliedlyinstitutedinthe
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latters
extinctionduetodeathoftheaccusedpendingappealofhis
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section21,Rule3oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
Article30oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Whenaseparatecivilactionisbroughttodemandcivilliabilityarisingfroma
criminal offense, andnocriminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficienttoprovetheactcomplainedof.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
supporttotherulinginSendaydiego.Nowhereinitstextis
thereagrantofauthoritytocontinueexercisingappellate
jurisdictionovertheaccusedscivilliabilityexdelictowhen
his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizesisanalternativeandseparatecivilactionwhich
may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event thatnocriminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidenceneededtoprovethecriminalactwillhavetobe
that
___________________
1991,200SCRA644;Dumlaov.CourtofAppeals,No.L51625,October5,1988,166
SCRA 269;Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L75357,
November27,1987,155SCRA712;Peoplev.Salcedo,No.L48642,June22,1987,151
SCRA220;Peoplev.Pancho,No.L32507,November4,1986,145SCRA323;Peoplev.
Navoa,No.L67966,September28,1984,132SCRA410;Peoplev.Asibar,No.L37255,
October 23, 1982,117 SCRA 856;People v. Tirol, No. L30538, January 31, 1981,102
SCRA558;andPeoplev.Llamoso,No.L24866,July13,1979,91SCRA364.
249
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 249
Peoplevs.Bayotas
which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonabledoubt.CitingorinvokingArticle30tojustifythe
survivalofthecivilactiondespiteextinctionofthecriminal
would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liabilityexdelictosurvivesuponextinctionofthecriminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction.Thisisbecausewhetherassertedinthecriminal
actionorinaseparatecivilaction,civilliabilityexdelictois
extinguished by the death of the accused while his
convictionisonappeal.Article89oftheRevisedPenalCode
isclearonthismatter:
Art. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished.Criminal liability is
totallyextinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniarypenalties,liabilitythereforisextinguishedonlywhenthedeathofthe
offenderoccursbeforefinaljudgment;
xxxxxxxxx.
However, the ruling inSendaydiegodeviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liabilityexdelictotosurvivebyipsofactotreatingthecivil
actionimpliedlyinstituted with the criminal,as one filed
under Article 30, as thoughnocriminal proceedings had
beenfiledbutmerelyaseparatecivilaction.Thishadthe
effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which
does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. One would be hard put to pinpoint the
12
JusticeBarredoinhisconcurringopinionobservedthat:
12
x x x this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense
withouttheneedofanycriminalproceedingtoprovethecommissionofthecrimeassuch,thatis
withouthavingtoprovethecriminalliabilityofthedefendantsolongashisactcausingdamageor
prejudicetotheoffendedpartyisprovenbypreponderanceofevidence.
250
250 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
pronouncementoftheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused.This
isbuttorenderfealtytotheintendmentofArticle100of
theRevisedPenalCodewhichprovidesthateveryperson
criminallyliableforafelonyisalsocivillyliable.Insuch
cases,extinctionofthecriminalactionduetodeathofthe
accusedpendingappealinevitablysignifiestheconcomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolvesallthings.
Insum,inpursuingrecoveryofcivilliabilityarisingfrom
crime,thefinaldeterminationofthecriminalliabilityisa
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
suchthatwhenthecriminalactionisextinguishedbythe
demise of accusedappellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springsoutofandisdependentuponfactswhich,iftrue,
wouldconstituteacrime.Suchcivilliabilityisaninevitable
consequenceofthecriminalliabilityandistobedeclared
and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under
Article30oftheCivilCodewhichreferstotheinstitutionof
a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminalproceeding.TheSendaydiegoresolutionofJuly8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinctionwhenitallowedthesurvivalofthecivilaction
for the recovery of civil liabilityex delictoby treating the
sameasaseparatecivilactionreferredtounderArticle30.
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated
underArticle30.
Ironicallyhowever,themaindecisioninSendaydiegodid
not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding.Thus,itwasheldinthemaindecision:
Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminalliabilitywhich is thebasis ofthecivil liability forwhichhis estate
wouldbeliable. 13
Inotherwords,theCourt,inresolvingtheissueofhiscivil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego,onthebasisofevidenceadduced,wasindeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged.Thus,it
________________
Supra,p.134.
13
251
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 251
Peoplevs.Bayotas
upheldSendaydiegosconvictionandpronouncedthesame
as thesourceof his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminalactionalreadyextinguishedwhichservedasbasis
forSendaydiegoscivilliability.Wereiterate:Upondeathof
theaccusedpendingappealofhisconviction,thecriminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there isnolonger a
defendanttostandastheaccused;thecivilactioninstituted
therein for recovery of civil liabilityex delictoisipso
factoextinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwasalsoinvokedto
serve as another basis for theSendaydiegoresolution of
July8,1977.IncitingSec.21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,
theCourtmadetheinferencethatcivilactionsofthetype
involvedin
Sendaydiegoconsist of money claims, the recovery of
whichmaybecontinuedonappealifdefendantdiespending
appealofhisconvictionbyholdinghisestateliabletherefor.
Hence,theCourtsconclusion:
Whentheactionisfortherecoveryofmoneyandthedefendantdiesbefore
final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecutedinthemannerespeciallyprovidedinRule87oftheRulesofCourt
(Sec.21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt).
Theimplicationisthat,ifthedefendantdiesafteramoneyjudgmenthad
beenrenderedagainsthimbytheCourtofFirstInstance,theactionsurvives
him.Itmaybecontinuedonappeal.
Sadly,relianceonthisprovisionoflawismisplaced.From
the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
inSendaydiegocannotbesanctioned.Ascorrectlyobserved
byJusticeRegalado:
xxxxxxxxx.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
bothTorrijosandSendaydiegowhich, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
alreadypassedbeyondthejudgmentofthethenCourtofFirstInstance(now
the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellatejurisdictionthereover despitetheextinguishmentofthecomponent
criminalliabilityofthedeceased.Thispronouncement,whichhasbeenfollowed
in the Courts judgments subsequent and consonant
toTorrijosandSendaydiego,shouldbeset
252
252 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
asideandabandonedasbeingclearlyerroneousandunjustifiable.SaidSection
21ofRule3isaruleofcivilprocedureinordinarycivilactions.Thereisneither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actionsinstitutedtogetherwithandaspartofcriminalactions.Noristhereany
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinarycivilactionuponthedeathoftheoffender.xxx.
Moreover,thecivilactionimpliedlyinstitutedinacriminal
proceedingforrecoveryofcivilliabilityexdelictocanhardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referredtoinSec.21,Rule3enforceablebeforetheestateof
thedeceasedaccused.
OrdinarymoneyclaimsreferredtoinSection21,Rule3
mustbeviewedinlightoftheprovisionsofSection5,Rule
86 involving claims against the estate, which
inSendaydiegowas held liable for Sendaydiegos civil
liability.WhatarecontemplatedinSection21ofRule3,in
relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, are contractual money
14
_________________
SEC.5.Claimswhichmustbefiledunderthenotice.Ifnotfiled,barred;exceptions.
14
Allclaimsformoneyagainstthedecedent,arisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,
whether thesame be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent,mustbefiledwithinthetimelimitedinthenotice;otherwisetheyarebarred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administratorcommencesanaction,orprosecutesanactionalreadycommencedbythe
deceasedinhislifetime,thedebtormaysetforthbyanswertheclaimshehasagainstthe
decedent,insteadofpresentingthemindependentlytothecourtashereinprovided,and
mutualclaimsmaybesetoffagainsteachotherinsuchaction;andiffinaljudgmentis
renderedinfavorofthedefendant,theamountsodeterminedshallbeconsideredthetrue
balanceagainsttheestate,asthoughtheclaimhadbeenpresenteddirectlybeforethe
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approvedattheirpresentvalue.
AsexplainedbyJ.Regaladointhedeliberationofthiscase.
15
253
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 253
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of
what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses forthe last illness, judgments
for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied.Itisclearthatmoneyclaimsarisingfromdelictdo
notformpartofthisexclusiveenumeration.Hence,there
could benolegal basis in (1) treating a civil actionex
delictoasanordinarycontractualmoneyclaimreferredto
inSection21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtand(2)allowing
ittosurvivebyfilingaclaimthereforbeforetheestateof
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
deathoftheaccusedpendingfinalityofhisconviction.
Accordingly,werule:iftheprivateoffendedparty,upon
extinction of the civil liabilityex delictodesires to recover
damagesfromthesameactoromissioncomplainedof,he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on 16
CriminalProcedureas
__________________
instituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedlyinstitutedwiththe
criminalaction,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilaction,reserveshisrightto
instituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction.Suchcivil
actionincludesrecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,anddamagesunder
Articles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesarisingfromthesameact
oromissionoftheaccused.
Awaiverofanyofthecivilactionsextinguishestheothers.Theinstitutionof,orthereservationofthe
righttofile,anyofsaidcivilactionsseparatelywaivestheothers.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonableopportunitytomakesuchreservation.
In nocasemaytheoffendedparty recoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromission ofthe
accused.Whentheoffendedpartyseekstoenforcecivilliabilityagainstthe
accusedbywayofmoral,nominal,temperateorexemplarydamages,thefilingfeesforsuchcivil
actionasprovidedintheseRulesshallconstituteafirstlienonthejudgmentexceptinanawardfor
actualdamages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information,thecorrespondingfilingfees
254
254 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
amended)fileaseparatecivilaction,thistimepredicated
notonthefelonypreviouslychargedbutonothersourcesof
obligation.Thesourceofobligationuponwhichtheseparate
civilactionispremiseddeterminesagainstwhomthesame
shallbeenforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises
fromquasidelictormay,byprovisionoflaw,resultinan
injurytopersonorproperty(realorpersonal),theseparate
civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator oftheestateoftheaccusedpursuanttoSec.
17
1,Rule87oftheRulesofCourt:
SECTION 1.Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executororadministrator.Noactionuponaclaimfortherecoveryofmoneyor
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator;butactionstorecoverrealorpersonalproperty,oraninterest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, andactions to recover
damagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty,realorpersonal,maybecommenced
againsthim.
ThisisinconsonancewithourrulinginBelamala where 18
weheldthat,inrecoveringdamagesforinjurytopersons
thruanindependentcivilactionbasedonArticle33ofthe
CivilCode,thesamemustbefiledagainsttheexecutoror
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
againsttheestateunderSec.5,Rule86becausethisrule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expensesforthelastsicknessofthedecedent,judgmentfor
moneyandclaimsarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurelypersonalobligationsotherthanthosewhichhave
theirsourceindelictortort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of
alsoarisesfromcontract,theseparatecivilactionmustbe
filedagainsttheestateoftheaccused,pursuanttoSec.5,
Rule 86 of shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filingthereofincourtfortrial.
__________________
Justice Regalado cited the Courts ruling inBelamalathat since the damages
17
sought,asaresultofthefelonycommittedamountstoinjurytopersonorproperty,realor
personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed against the
executor/administratorandnotagainsttheestate.
Ibid.
18
255
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 255
Peoplevs.Bayotas
theRulesofCourt.
Fromthislengthydisquisition,wesummarizeourruling
herein:
1. a)Law 20
2. b)Contracts
_______________
Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: The civil liability may still be
19
pursuedinaseparatecivilactionbutitmustbepredicatedonasourceofobligationother
thandelict,exceptwhenbystatutoryprovisionanindependentcivilactionisauthorized
suchas,toexemplify,intheinstanceenumeratedinArticle33oftheCivilCode.Justice
Regaladostressedthat:
Conversely,suchcivilliabilityisnotextinguishedandsurvivesthedeceasedoffenderwhereitalso
arisessimultaneouslyfromorexistsasaconsequenceorbyreasonofacontract,asinTorrijos;orfrom
law,asstatedinTorrijosandintheconcurringopinioninSendaydiego,suchasinreferencetothe
CivilCode;orfromaquasicontract;orisauthorizedbylawtobepursuedinanindependentcivil
action,asinBelamala.Indeed,withouttheseexceptions,itwouldbeunfairandinequitabletodeprive
thevictimofhispropertyorrecoveryofdamagestherefor,aswouldhavebeenthefateofthesecond
vendeeinTorrijosortheprovincialgovernmentinSendaydiego.
SeeArticles19,20,21,31,32,33,34,2176oftheCivilCode;seerelatedprovisions
20
oftheRulesonCriminalProcedure,asamended,particularlySec.1,Rule111.
256
256 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bayotas
1. c)Quasicontracts
2. d)xxxxxxxxx
3. e)Quasidelicts
Applyingthissetofrulestothecaseatbench,weholdthat
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complainedof,i.e.,rape.Consequently,theappealishereby
dismissedwithoutqualification.
WHEREFORE,theappealofthelateRogelioBayotasis
DISMISSEDwithcostsdeoficio.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa(C.J.),Feliciano,Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,
Davide,
Jr.,Bellosillo,Melo,Quiason,Puno,Vitug,KapunanandM
endoza,JJ.,concur.
Cruz,J.,Onleave.
_______________
ART.1155.Theprescriptionofactionsisinterruptedwhentheyarefiledbeforethe
21
court,whenthereisawrittenextrajudicialdemandbythecreditors,andwhenthereis
anywrittenacknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor.
AsexplainedbyJ.Vituginthedeliberationofthiscase.
22
257
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 257
Republicvs.CourtofAppeals
Appealdismissed.
Note.eoutcomeorresultofthecriminalcasewhether
anacquittalorconvictionisinconsequentialandwillbeof
nomomentinacivilactionfordamagesbasedonArticle33
oftheCivilCode.(DiongBiChuvs.CourtofAppeals,192
SCRA554[1990])
o0o
172 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
G.R.No.169793.September15,2006. *
VICTORIANOM.ENCARNACION,petitioner,vs.NIEVES
AMIGO,respondent.
Actions;Ejectment;WordsandPhrases;AccionInterdictal,
Accion Publiciana, and Accion Reinvindicatoria, Explained
and Distinguished.In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:
1.Accion interdictal,or an ejectment proceeding which may be
eitherthatforforcibleentry(detentacion)orunlawfuldetainer
(desahucio),whichisasummaryactionforrecoveryofphysical
possessionwherethedispossessionhasnotlastedformorethan
one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2.Accionpublicianaortheplenaryactionfortherecoveryofthe
realrightofpossession,whichshouldbebroughtintheproper
RegionalTrialCourtwhenthedispossessionhaslastedformore
than one year; and 3.Accion reinvindicatoriaoraccion de
reivindicacion,whichisanactionfortherecoveryofownership
whichmustbebroughtintheproperRegionalTrialCourt.
Same;Same;The material element that determines the
properactiontobefiledfortherecoveryofthepossessionofthe
property is the length of time of dispossession.Based on the
foregoingdistinctions,thematerialelementthatdeterminesthe
properactiontobefiledfortherecoveryofthepossessionofthe
propertyinthiscaseisthelengthoftimeofdispossession.Under
theRulesofCourt,theremediesofforcibleentryandunlawful
detaineraregrantedtoapersondeprivedofthepossessionofany
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth,oralessor,vendor,vendee,orotherpersonagainstwhom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
aftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representativesorassignsofanysuchlessor,vendor,vendee,or
otherperson.Theseremediesaffordthepersondeprivedofthe
possessiontofileatanytimewithinoneyearaftersuchunlawful
deprivationorwithholdingofpossession,anactionintheproper
MunicipalTrialCourtagainstthepersonorpersonsunlawfully
withholdingordeprivingofpossession,oranypersonorpersons
_______________
FIRSTDIVISION.
*
173
VOL.502,SEPTEMBER15,2006 1
73
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
claimingunderthem,fortherestitutionofsuchpossession,
togetherwithdamagesandcosts.Thus,ifthedispossessionhas
not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is
properandtheinferiorcourtacquiresjurisdiction.Ontheother
hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the
properactiontobefiledisanaccionpublicianawhichshouldbe
broughttotheproperRegionalTrialCourt.
Same;Same;Pleadings and Practice;Jurisdictions;Well
settledistherulethatjurisdictionofthecourtoverthesubject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaintatthetimeofitsfiling,irrespectiveofwhetherornot
theplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallorsomeoftheclaims
assertedtherein.Wellsettledistherulethatjurisdictionofthe
courtoverthesubjectmatteroftheactionisdeterminedbythe
allegationsofthecomplaintatthetimeofitsfiling,irrespective
ofwhetherornottheplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallor
some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearingfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint.Theaverments
thereinandthecharacterofthereliefsoughtaretheonestobe
consulted.Onitsface,thecomplaintmustshowenoughground
for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.
Same;Same;Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independentlyoftitleandreferslikewisetoanejectmentsuitfiled
aftertheexpirationofoneyearfromtheaccrualofthecauseof
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that
thepetitionerbecametheownerofthepropertyonApril11,1995
byvirtueofthewaiverofrightsexecutedbyhismotherinlaw.
HefiledthecomplaintforejectmentonMarch2,2001afterhis
February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the
lattervacatethepremisesremainedunheeded.Whileitistrue
that the demand letter was received by the respondent on
February12,2001,therebymakingthefilingofthecomplaintfor
ejectmentfallwithintherequisiteoneyearfromlastdemandfor
complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that
petitionerbecametheownerofthesubjectlotin1995andhas
been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof.
Fromthedateofthepetitionersdispossessionin1995uptohis
filingofhiscomplaint
174
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
74
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The
length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his
propertymadehiscauseofactionbeyondtheambitofanaccion
interdictalandeffectivelymadeitoneforaccionpubliciana.After
thelapseoftheoneyearperiod,thesuitmustbecommencedin
theRegionalTrialCourtviaanaccionpublicianawhichisasuit
for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil
proceedingtodeterminethebetterrightofpossessionofrealty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed
aftertheexpirationofoneyearfromtheaccrualofthecauseof
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
BernardD.Vitrioloforpetitioner.
ConstanteA.Foronda,Jr.forrespondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
AssociateJusticesEdgardoP.CruzandJoseC.Mendoza.
175
VOL.502,SEPTEMBER15,2006 175
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
soldthesametoNicasioMallapitan onJanuary18,1982.
OnMarch21,1985,MallapitansoldthelandtoVictoriano
Magpantay.Afterthedeathofthelatterin1992,hiswidow,
Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver on 2
April11,1995wavingherrightoverthepropertyinfavorof
her soninlaw, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion.
Thereafter,thelattercausedthesubdivisionofthelandinto
twolots andtheissuanceoftitlesinhisname onJuly18,
3
1996. 4
RespondentNievesAmigoallegedlyenteredthepremises
andtookpossessionofaportionofthepropertysometimein
1985withoutthepermissionofthethenowner,Victoriano
Magpantay.Saidoccupationbyrespondentcontinuedeven
after TCT Nos. T256650 and T256651 were issue to
petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a
letter dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the
5
respondentvacatethesubjectproperty.Asevidencedbythe
registryreturnreceipt,thedemandletterwasdeliveredby
registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001.
Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent
stillrefusedtovacatethesubjectproperty.Thereafter,on
March2, 2001, petitionerfileda complaint forejectment, 6
_______________
2
ExhibitC,Records,p.206.
3
LotNo.2121B1coveredbyTCTNo.T256650(ExhibitF,Records,p.213)andLot
No.2121B2coveredbyTCTNo.T256651(ExhibitG,Records,p.214).
4
MTCCDecision,CARollo,pp.6566.
5
AnnexKoftheComplaint,Records,p.26.
6
Records,pp.15.
7
Id.,atpp.3233.
176
176 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
On October24, 2001, the Municipal TrialCourt inCities
renderedjudgment,whichreads:
WHERE[FO]RE,therebeingapreponderanceofevidence,aJUDGMENTis
herebyrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffVICTORIANOM.ENCARNACIONand
againstthedefendantNIEVESAMIGOE(sic)asfollows:
1. a)ORDERINGthedefendanttovacatetheportionoftheparcelsofland
described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T256650 and T
256651heisnowoccupyingandsurrenderittotheplaintiff;
3. c)ORDERINGthedefendanttopayrentalsequivalent[to]P500.00per
monthfromFebruary,2001untiltheportionofthelandoccupiedby
himissurrenderedtotheplaintiff.
COSTSagainstthedefendant.
SOORDERED. 8
Aggrieved,petitionerfiledapetitionforreview underRule 10
42oftheRulesofCourtbeforetheCourtofAppealswhich
promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to
the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
_______________
8
CARollo,p.70.PennedbyJudgeBernabeB.Mendoza.
9
Id.,atp.31.PennedbyJudgeHenedinoP.Eduarte.
10
Id.,atpp.615.
177
VOL.502,SEPTEMBER15,2006 177
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to
Branch20,RegionalTrialCourtofCauayan,Isabelaforfurtherproceedings.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED. 11
Hencethepresentpetitionraisingthesoleissue:
[WHETHER]THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINHOLDINGTHATTHE
PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT
UNLAWFULDETAINERASDETERMINEDBYTHEALLEGATIONSINTHE
COMPLAINTFILEDBYPETITIONER. 12
Thepetitionlacksmerit
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the
recoveryofpossessionofrealpropertyare:
3. 3.Accion reinvindicatoriaoraccion de
reivindicacion,whichisanactionfortherecoveryof
ownership which must be brought in the proper
RegionalTrialCourt. 13
Rollo,p.41.
11
Id.,atp.17.
12
767768.
178
178 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the
remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
grantedtoapersondeprivedofthepossessionofanyland
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth,oralessor,vendor,vendee,orotherpersonagainst
whomthepossessionofanylandorbuildingisunlawfully
withheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherightto
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied,orthelegalrepresentativesorassignsofanysuch
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies
affordthepersondeprivedofthepossessiontofileatany
time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholdingofpossession,anactionintheproperMunicipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. Thus, ifthe
14
RULESOFCOURT,Rule70,Sec.1.
14
179
VOL.502,SEPTEMBER15,2006 179
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
avermentsthereinandthecharacterofthereliefsoughtare
theonestobeconsulted. Onitsface,thecomplaintmust
15
_______________
15
Herrerav.Bollos,424Phil.851,856;374SCRA107,111(2002).
16
Lopezv.David,Jr.,G.R.No.152145,March30,2004,426SCRA535,540.
17
Id.,atp.543.
180
180 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
Previously,wehaveheldthatiftheownerofthelandknew
thatanotherpersonwasoccupyinghispropertywaybackin
1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for
ejectmentin1995,theproperactionwouldbeoneforaccion
publicianaand not one under the summary procedure on
ejectment.AsexplainedbytheCourt:
WeagreewiththeCourtofAppealsthatifpetitionersareindeedtheownersof
thesubjectlotandwereunlawfullydeprivedoftheirrightofpossession,they
should present their claim before the regional trial court in anaccion
publicianaor anaccion reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial
courtinasummaryproceedingforunlawfuldetainerorforcibleentry.Foreven
ifoneistheowneroftheproperty,thepossessionthereofcannotbewrested
fromanotherwhohadbeeninphysicalormaterialpossessionofthesamefor
morethanoneyearbyresortingtoasummaryactionforejectment. 18
Hence,weagreewiththeCourtofAppealswhenitdeclared
that:
Therespondentsactualentryonthelandofthepetitionerwasin1985butit
was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his
ejectment case. The respondent should have filed anaccion publicianacase
whichisunderthejurisdictionoftheRTC.
However,theRTCshouldhavenotdismissedthecase.
Section8,Rule40oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
SECTION8.Appealfromordersdismissingcasewithouttrial;lackofjurisdiction.Ifan
appealistakenfromanorderofthelowercourtdismissingthecasewithoutatrialonthe
merits,theRegionalTrialCourtmayaffirmorreverseit,asthecasemaybe.Incaseof
affirmanceandthegroundofdismissalislackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,the
RegionalTrialCourt,ifithasjurisdictionthereover,shalltrythecaseonthemeritsasif
thecasewasoriginallyfiledwithit.
_______________
Go,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.142276,August14,2001,362SCRA755,769.
18
181
VOL.502,SEPTEMBER15,2006 181
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
Incaseofreversal,thecaseshallberemandedforfurtherproceedings.
Ifthecasewastriedonthemeritsbythelowercourtwithoutjurisdictionoverthesubject
matter,theRegionalTrialCourtonappealshallnotdismissthecaseifithasoriginal
jurisdictionthereof,butshalldecidethecaseinaccordancewiththeprecedingsection,
withoutprejudicetotheadmissionofamendedpleadingsandadditionalevidenceinthe
interestofjustice.
TheRTCshouldhavetakencognizanceofthecase.Ifthecaseistriedonthe
meritsbytheMunicipalCourtwithoutjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,the
RTC on appeal maynolonger dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof.Moreover,theRTCshallnolongertrythecaseonthemerits,butshall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court,
without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
evidenceintheinterestofjustice. 19
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionofthe
CourtofAppealsdatedJune30,2005inCAG.R.SPNo.
73857orderingtheremandofCivilCaseNo.Br.201194to
theRegionalTrialCourtofCauayan,Isabela,Branch20,
forfurtherproceedings,isAFFIRMED.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban(C.J., Chairperson),Austria
Martinez,Callejo,Sr.andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.Where the ejectment suit was filed before the
RegionalTrialCourtandnottheMunicipalTrialCourtbut
the defendant did not move to dismiss the complaint for
lackofjurisdictionandinsteadfiledhisanswerandwentto
trial,
_______________
Rollo,pp.3840;emphasissupplied.
19
182
182 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
GuiguintoCreditCooperative,Inc.(GUCCI)vs.Torres
estoppelbylachessetin.(Velarmavs.CourtofAppeals,252
SCRA406[1996])
Inordertoavoidfurtherinjusticetoalawfulpossessor,
an immediate execution of a judgment of eviction is
mandatedandthecourtsdutytoordersuchexecutionis
practically ministerial. (Puncia vs. Gerona,252 SCRA
425[1996])
o0o
646 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
A.M.No.P991337.April5,2000. *
_____________
ENBANC.
*
647
VOL.329,APRIL5,2000 647
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
decisionsareemptyvictoriesoftheprevailingparties.They
mustthereforecomplywiththeirmandatedministerialdutyto
implement writs promptly and expeditiously. As agents of the
law,sheriffsarecalledupontodischargetheirdutieswithdue
careandutmostdiligencebecauseinservingthecourtswritsand
processesandimplementingitsorder,theycannotaffordtoerr
without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administrationofjustice.
Same;Same;Same;The officers charged with the delicate
taskoftheenforcementand/orimplementationofthejudgment
must,intheabsenceofarestrainingorder,actwithconsiderable
dispatchsoasnottoundulydelaytheadministrationofjustice;
otherwise,thedecisions,ordersorotherprocessesofthecourtsof
justice and the like would be futile.In Moya vs. Bassig, we
dismissedDeputySheriffRenatoA.Bassigfromtheserviceon
thefindingthathefailedtoenforceawritofexecutionforthe
sale at public auction of property of the judgment debtor,
brushingasidehisexplanationthattherewasapendingappeal
filedbythejudgmentdebtorwiththeCourtofAppeals.Incalling
forrespondentBassigsseparationfromtheservice,wejustified
thesameinthiswise:Itisindisputablethatthemostdifficult
phaseofanyproceedingistheexecutionofjudgment.Hence,the
officerschargedwiththedelicatetaskoftheenforcementand/or
implementationofthesamemust,intheabsenceofarestraining
order,actwithconsiderabledispatchsoasnottoundulydelay
theadministrationofjustice;otherwise,thedecisions,ordersor
other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be
futile.Stateddifferently,thejudgmentifnotexecutedwouldbe
justanemptyvictoryonthepartoftheprevailingparty.
ADMINISTRATIVEMATTERintheSupremeCourt.Grave
Misconduct.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
JoseP.O.AlilingTVforcomplainant.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
movedfortheissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunction
whichtheRegionalTrialCourtgrantedinitsdecision dated 2
Vicente.However,thelatterrefusedtosurrenderpossession
ofthepremises.Thispromptedthecomplainanttofilean
urgent motion for execution pending appeal with the
Regional Trial Court which granted the motion in an
order dated September 1, 1997, the decretal portion of
6
whichreads:
Premisesconsideredandfindingthemotionforexecutiontobemeritoriousand
in order, the same is granted. Let the corresponding writ of execution in
accordancewiththedecisionofthisCourt,affirmingintotothedecisionofthe
trialcourt,infavoroftheplaintiffappelleebeissued.
NotwithstandingtheSeptember1,1997orderanddespite
repeatedfollowupsmadebycomplainantforaboutone(1)
_____________
1
DocketedasCivilCaseNo.971067.
2
Rollo,AnnexA.
3
PennedbyJudgeLuciaViolagoIsnani,nowretired.
4
Rollo,AnnexB.
5
Rollo,AnnexC.
6
Rollo,AnnexE.
649
VOL.329,APRIL3,2000 649
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
month after the Regional Trial Court had rendered its
August 4, 1997 decision, respondent failed to execute the
judgment, thus prompting the complainant to file an
administrativecomplaintagainstrespondent.
OnAugust14,1997,thedefendantVicentefiledwiththe
Court ofAppealsa petitionforcertiorari,prohibitionand
mandamus assailing the September 1, 1997 order of the
Regional Trial Court. On October 9, 1997, the Court of
Appealsdismissedthepetition.
In his defense, respondent claims that he held in
abeyance the execution of the Regional Trial Courts
judgment (1) upon learning ofthe pendency of an urgent
motion to reconsider, the September 1, 1997 order of the
Regional Trial Court (granting complainants motion for
executionpendingappeal)and(2)byreasonofthereraffle
of the case after Judge Lucia Violago Isnani inhibited
herselffromfurtheractingthereon.
This Court agrees with the Office of the Court
Administratorsrecommendationthatrespondentsheriffbe
held administratively liable for delaying without valid
reasontheexecutionofthedecisionoftheRegionalTrial
CourtinCivilCaseNo.971067.
Section21,Rule70ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure
provides:
Sec.21.ImmediateexecutiononappealtoCourtofAppeals,orSupremeCourt
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediatelyexecutory,withoutprejudicetoafurtherappealthatmaybetaken
therefrom.
UnlikeRule70ofthe1964RevisedRulesofCourtwhere
thedefendant,afterperfectinghisappeal,couldpreventthe
immediateexecutionofthejudgmentbytakinganappeal
andmakingaperiodicdepositofmonthlyrentalsduringthe
pendency of the appeal thereby preventing the plaintiff
fromtakingpossessionofthepremisesinthemeantime,the
presentwordingofSection21,Rule70explicitlyprovides
thatthejudgmentoftheregionaltrialcourtinejectment
cases
650
650 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
appealedtoit shallbeimmediatelyexecutoryandcanbe
enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher
court.
Consequently, respondents claim that the pendency of
defendantVicentesmotionforreconsiderationandthere
raffleofthecasetoanothersaladoesnotjustifyhisfailure
toenforcethewritofexecutionissuedbythecourt.Whena
writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty to
proceedwithreasonablecelerityandpromptnesstoexecute
itaccordingtoitsmandate. Hehasnodiscretionwhether
7
ornottoexecutethejudgment. 8
Sheriffsplayanimportantroleintheadministrationof
justice. They are tasked to execute final judgments of
courts.Ifnotenforced,suchdecisionsareemptyvictoriesof
the prevailing parties. They must therefore comply with
9
InMoyavs.Bassig wedismissedDeputySheriffRenato
11
A.Bassigfromtheserviceonthefindingthathefailedto
enforceawritofexecutionforthesaleatpublicauctionof
property of the judgment debtor, brushing aside his
explanationthat there was a pending appeal filedby the
judgment
_______________
7
Onquitvs.BinamiraParcia,297SCRA354[1998];Villarealvs.Rarama,247SCRA
493[1995];Padilla vs. Arabia,242 SCRA 227[1995];Young vs. Momblan,205 SCRA
33[1992].
8
Aristorenasvs.Molina,246SCRA134[1995];SmithBell&Companyvs.Saur,96
SCRA667[1980].
9
Dilanvs.Dulfo,A.M.No.P991293,March11,1999,304SCRA460.
10
Mamanteo vs. Magumun,A.M. No. P981264, July 28, 1999,311 SCRA 259,
citingBernasal,Jr.vs.Montes,280SCRA181[1997].
11
138SCRA49[1985].
651
VOL.329,APRIL5,2000 651
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
debtorwiththeCourtofAppeals.Incallingforrespondent
Bassigsseparationfromtheservice,wejustifiedthesame
inthiswise:
It is indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the
executionofjudgment.Hence,theofficerschargedwiththedelicatetaskofthe
enforcement and/or implementation of the same must, in the absence of a
restrainingorder,actwithconsiderabledispatchsoasnottoundulydelaythe
administrationofjustice;otherwise,thedecisions,ordersorotherprocessesof
the courts of justice and the like would be futile. Stated differently, the
judgment if not executed would be just an empty victory on the part of the
prevailingparty.
In this case, respondent sheriffs folly isnoless different,
thus warranting the same punishment meted out to the
deputysheriffinvolvedintheBassigcase.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES respondent
Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City from the service for grave misconduct, with
forfeitureofallretirementbenefitsandleavecredits,ifany,
and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in
any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.
SOORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.(C.J.),Bellosillo,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,
Panganiban,Quisumbing,Purisima,Pardo,Buena,Gonzag
aReyes,YnaresSantiagoandDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Respondent Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab dismissed from the
serviceforgravemisconduct.
Notes.Personalfeelingsofsheriffs,suchascompassion
and sympathy, must never be allowed to compromise the
publictrustcharacteroftheirofficewhichbindsthemtoa
continuing accountability to the people. (Zamora vs.
Jumamoy,238SCRA587[1994])
652
652 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Orosavs.CourtofAppeals
Asheriffshoulddepositincourtthemoneyhecollectsin
satisfactionofajudgmentinsteadofdeliveringitdirectlyto
the prevailing party. (Borja, Sr. vs. Angeles,244 SCRA
706[1995])
o0o
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated March 14, 2002 and
the Resolution[2]dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62322. The Court of Appeals
had affirmed the Orders dated September 13, 2000[3] and
October 23, 2000[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legaspi City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 9879, which
dismissed petitioners appeal from the Decision[5] dated July
5, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daraga,
Albay in Civil Case No. 945 and denied his motion for
reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.[14]
SO ORDERED.[15]
SO ORDERED.[18]
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
THE SALE OF SUBJECTLAND TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS NULL AND VOID.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MERITORIOUS
CAUSE OF ACTION OF PETITIONER AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[19]
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E RT I FI CATI O N
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645 in place of
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on official leave.
**
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
***
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635 in view
of the retirement of Associate Dante O. Tinga.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 103-110. Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. with
Associate Justices B. A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and Josefina Guevara-Salonga
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 115-116.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 59.
[4]
Id. at 70.
[5]
Id. at 52-57. Penned by Judge William B. Volante.
[6]
Id. at 25-26.
[7]
Id. at 27.
[8]
Id. at 28-29.
[9]
Id. at 33-36. Penned by Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes.
[10]
Id. at 37-38.
[11]
Id. at 39.
[12]
Id. at 71.
[13]
Id. at 46-47.
[14]
Id. at 57.
[15]
Id. at 59. Penned by Judge Gregorio A. Consulta.
[16]
Id. at 60.
[17]
Id. at 70.
[18]
Rollo, p. 109.
[19]
Id. at 171.
[20]
G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 377.
[21]
Id. at 384.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Banting v. Maglapuz, G.R. No. 158867, August 22, 2006, 499 SCRA 505, 518.
[24]
Ko v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. Nos. 169131-32, January 20, 2006, 479
SCRA 298, 303.
[25]
Favila v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 126768, June 16,
1999, 308 SCRA 303, 313.
[26]
Ko v. Philippine National Bank, supra at 303-304.
[27]
Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No
165580, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714.
[28]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April
17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 197.
[29]
Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20, at 385.