INSURGENCY

Insurgency war must first be strategically and tactically understood before it can be effectively
countered. The enemy must first be seen before he can be fought; one must be able to accurately
plan before he can train.

INSURGENCY
As an antidote to the various misconceptions he saw developing in the mid-1960’s, Sir Robert
Grainger Ker Thompson observes that, in spite of their “grandiloquent and misleading titles,” an
insurgency is not a people’s revolutionary war. Citing government intelligence figures,
Thompson indicates that by 1965 the number of insurgents and their supporters active in South
Vietnam never exceeded 1 percent of the total population. With this in mind, he concludes that
the insurgency was not qualified to be a people’s revolutionary war, but only a “revolutionary
form of warfare designed to enable a very small ruthless minority to gain control over the
people”.
Robert Thompson’s practical views about insurgency warfare, particularly from that period,
remain the most definitive. Thompson refrains from mixing terminology, and, although he does
not provide a specific definition of insurgency war, his illustrations of insurgency tendencies and
peculiarities better explain an important strategic concept that otherwise appears useless.
A first objective must then be to reach a more precise understanding of insurgency without
confusing terminology.
From this, and in a modern spirit of insurgere, comes a working definition and explanation of
insurgency war:
Insurgency is a political-military conflict waged against a specific faction(s), implementing
irregular military actions in support of a unified political outcome, short of revolution and civil
war.
While regular military forces may be employed, irregular operations rooted in political
subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations, play an integral, if not primary, role in
the outcome. Political subversion, selective terrorism and guerrilla operations are then tactics
that, when combined, may or may not represent an insurgency.
Insurgency is a strategic political development that implements these tactics as a means to
sustain itself until further development can occur. Consequently, an insurgency, as a TYPE of
war, may lead to and be part of a large conventional conflict, revolution, or civil war.
Insurgency, as a METHOD of war, implies the attempt to use violence and irregular forms of
warfare against a particular faction(s) for the express purpose of political-military gain, which
may later lead to inclusion with, or the overthrow of, existing regimes.
The object of insurgency is to force political-social upheaval, in an organized fashion, for the
express purpose of validating a cause, and therefore justifying its violent means. Insurgencies do
not have the capacity to be a revolution or a civil war, but with staying power and continued
support can ignite either.
Therefore, an insurgency is neither revolution nor civil war. As well, there are three major
elements identified as tools used in an insurgency: political subversion, selective terrorism, and
guerrilla operations. Any other aspect, political or military, that might be attributed to an
insurgency will likely fall under one of these three major tactical elements.
Thompson has stated with consistency that the first phase of an insurgency always begins with
subversive activity. He goes as far as to state that “insurgency is a measure both of the success
and of the failure of subversion”. If the subversion is successful enough to continue the
insurgency, but not successful enough to achieve the objective by subversion alone, then the
insurgency moves to a second phase: open insurgency or the armed struggle.
GUERRILLA TERRORIST
OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

POLITICAL SUBVERSION
The second phase consists of the use of guerrilla operations combined with terrorist activities and
will typically result in a protracted struggle.
When Thompson spoke about insurgency, he spoke directly about communist insurgency, and
thus communist subversion. From his experiences in both war and politics, in Malaya and in
Vietnam, one might believe that he was led to this understanding for obvious reasons. Not unlike
many others of the time, Thompson believed that insurgency was a unique tool of the
communists, and therefore fashioned to a unique communist design.
However, the working definition provided here does not perceive insurgency as being of any
particular origin nor specifically fashioned out of any political dogma. Insurgency possesses
certain universal qualities that set it apart as a separate strategic concept from revolution and
civil war. While revolution is non-indigenous and civil war is indigenous, insurgencies can be
either.

TYPOLOGY OF INSURGENCY
While political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations are all key elements in an
insurgency, political subversion is unquestionably the one element that must exist for the other
two elements to have any unified effect. As well, the extent of the political organization of the
subversives will likely predict how competent and effective the entire insurgency will turn out to
be. The heart of an insurgency is thus the political capability of the subversives, the quality
of their organization, and the extent of the roots they set down. To establish a valid
insurgency, the subversive organization must acquire the necessary resources and support from
both internal and external factions. Just how well this support is managed will determine whether
a second phase will be required, or is even possible.
Political subversion attempts to accomplish four specific things:
• first, to build and test the political infrastructure needed to wage a successful insurgency;
• second, to generate political clout both internally and externally;
• third, to support a second phase of open insurgency;
• and fourth, if it intends to go beyond insurgency war, to plan for government after revolution
or civil war is achieved.
Those insurgencies resulting in either revolution or civil war represent some of the most skilled
and resourceful political organizations. These groups will not appear fanatical in their actions,
only ardent in their resolve. While such intent seems “revolutionary” to outsiders, it is purely
“evolutionary” to the insurgent. It is this outlook which provide the potential for success, and is
the catalyst for growth.
The crossover to violence is accomplished during the early stages of an insurgency by the use of
terrorism. This is the heavy-handed persuasion used by political subversives as a means of
drawing closer attention to their cause; and, when truly selective, it is capable of removing
strategic targets that prove to be an obstruction.
Indiscriminate terrorism has never been the friend of an insurgent movement. But when
implemented correctly and with precision, the results usually favor the subversive political body.
Thompson indicates that even in a “pre-insurgency” time of murder and terrorism, the “normal
processes of law and order will fail to cope with the situation; the police are unable to effect
arrests for lack of witnesses, or the crime itself may not even be reported.” A strong history and
willingness on the part of the subversives to perform vendetta and reprisal killings typically
silences the majority of the population.
If the government is internally crippled or substantially unsupported and weak, the insurgency
will not need to progress to the second phase. A government of this hobbled nature will succumb
to insurgent pressure. It is important to note here that this does not qualify the insurgency as
revolution. While an insurgency may usurp authority if the government falls, assumption of
responsibility may not have been the actual intent of the original subversion. The insurgents may
get hold of governmental reins before they are actually willing or even capable of successfully
governing. These subversives will usually weaken and fall to other factions. A potential merry-
go-round of insurgencies can exist under such a state.
Since the object of an insurgency is not necessarily the establishment of a new state—the ousting
of either external colonial factions or internal civil antagonists—the attempt must then be for the
subversives to strengthen their cause. This is done through the use of guerrilla operations in the
second phase.
Phase I Phase II
POLITICAL
SUBVERSION GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS
SELECTIVE
TERRORISM
During this period, selective terrorist activities may heighten, and political subversives will
continue to expand their control in populated areas where support will strengthen guerrilla
operations. Because the insurgents expect a protracted struggle, a careful search for BASE
AREAS is undertaken.

BASE AREAS
Two types of base areas exist—one controlled by the guerrillas, the other by the political
subversives. The first is the JUNGLE base area which provides the guerrillas with sanctuary,
supplies, and war material—in essence, a logistics base for military support. The other base of
support comes from the population and is controlled by the insurgent political organization and
its terrorist arm. The purpose of these base areas is to sustain recruiting efforts and supply lines
for the duration of the protracted struggle.