M.H. RAKES VS. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO.

7 PHIL 329

DOCTRINE: Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the
injury complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and
immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the
person injured.

FACTS: Rakes was a laborer of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. While transporting iron rails
from a barge, a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught Rakes, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. Consequently, Rakes filed an action for damages
against Atlantic Gulf.

Atlantic, however, alleged that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking
only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side
guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Further, Rakes himself was negligent for
having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes.

HELD: YES. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden
to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers
of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On
this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the
injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
 CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
332 SCRA 356

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,
not in actions involving breach of contract.

FACTS: Eliza Sunga rode a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When the jeepney
stopped to a let a passenger alight, a truck driven by Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga suffered multiple injuries. Sunga filed a
complaint for damages against Calalas for breach of contract of carriage.The lower court
rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability.

CA reversed the ruling on the ground the ground that Sungas cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Calalas is guilty of negligence.

HELD: YES. In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to
observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
 FGU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
228 SCRA 718

DOCTRINE: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x x

FACTS: Two vehicles figured in a traffic accident. One car was owned by Lydia F. Soriano
was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car,
owned by FILCAR, and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of
the other vehicle.

Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to
the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist,
did not possess a Philippine driver's license. As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance
Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter. By way of
subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as FORTUNE as insurer
of FILCAR for quasi-delict. The lower court dimissed the case. CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner
failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.

ISSUE: Whether or not FILCAR is liable being the owner of the vehicle.

HELD: NO. To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite,
i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage
caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain
that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered
by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation
therein.
 PCIB VS. COURT OF APPEALS
350 SCRA 464

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third
person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made.

FACTS: Ford Philippines filed actions to recover from the drawee bank Citibank and
collecting bank PCIB the value of several checks payable to the CIR which were
embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate. What prompted this action was the
drawing of a check by Ford, which it deposited to PCIB as payment and was
debited from their Citibank account. It later on found out that the payment wasnt received
by the Commissioner. Meanwhile, according to the NBI report, one of the checks issued
by petitioner was withdrawn from PCIB for alleged mistake in the amount to be paid. This
was replaced with managers check by PCIB, which were allegedly stolen by the
syndicate and deposited in their own account. The trial court decided in favor of Ford.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is contributory negligence on the part of Ford.

HELD: NO. It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions
attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate
cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any,
could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties. The mere fact
that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor's confidential employee or agent, who by
virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged
paper upon the bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the
absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise
applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who
hold them in their possession.
 PICART VS. SMITH
37 PHIL. 809

DOCTRINE: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

FACTS: Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith driving an automobile came from
the opposite direction at the rate of about 10-12 miles/hour. As Smith neared the bridge, he
saw the horseman and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
course and gave 2 successive warning honks.

Amado saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. Because of this,
he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, Frank quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting
the horse. This frightened the animal and it turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. The left hind leg was hit by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the
horse died. Amado received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frank was guilty of negligence.

HELD: YES. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
 DEL PRADO VS. MERALCO
52 PHIL. 901

DOCTRINE: The contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.

FACTS: Meralco is engaged in operating street cars for the conveyance of passengers. One
Teodorico was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo St. In the
course of the trip, Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the said car, upon
reaching the car, he raised his hand as an indication to Teodorico of his desire to board the
car, in response, the latter eased up a little, without stopping. However, before Ignacio
position had become secure, Teodorico applied the power which results to the sudden
impulse to the car which caused Ignacios foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from
the handpost, he therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by
the moving car. The next day his right foot was amputated in the hospital.

Teodorico stated that he did not see Ignacio attempting to board the car; he did not
accelerate the speed of the vehicle; and he was unaware of the accident until someone
called him to stop. Meralco claimed that they exercised due diligence in preventing the
accident.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ignacios own negligence would absolve Meralco from liability.

HELD: NO. There was a breach of contractual duty, hence the defense of due diligence is
not available. As to the contributory negligence of Ignacio, SC are of the opinion that is
should be treated as mitigating circumstance. It is obvious that the plaintiffs negligence in
attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and
proximate cause of the injury was the act of Meralcos motorman in putting on the power
prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from
boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to
assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by
accelerating the speed of the car before he is safely planted on the platform. The situation
before us is one where the negligent act of the companys servant succeeded the negligent
act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate
cause of the injury.
 VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
G.R. NO. 10126, OCTOBER 22, 1957

DOCTRINE: Proximate Cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.

FACTS: Bus No. 30 of Medina Transportation owned and operated by Mariano Medina left
the town of Cavite to going to Pasay driven by Conrado Saylon. There were about 18
passengers, including the driver and conductor. At 2 in the morning while the bus was
running, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle begun to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch and turned turtle. Shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood, and
consequently about ten men came, and one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo and fueled by petroleum. When these men approached the overturned vehicle, a
fierce fire started burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fire that burned the bus is the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan.

HELD: NO. In the present case, under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark, the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. According to the witness, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver or the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.
 RAMOS VS. CA
321 SCRA 584

DOCTRINE: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under
the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. (Res Ipsa Loquitur)

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman. Except for occasional complaints of discomfort
due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as
normal as any other woman. Because of the discomforts, she was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of the stone in her gall bladder. On the day of the operation,
Erlinda was accompanied by her sister, Herminda Cruz. One Dra. Gutierrez administered
the anesthesia to the patient. As Herminda held that hand of Erlinda, she saw Dra. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient, she then noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left
hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr.
Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist.
Consequently, After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is
placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of
blood supply to the patient's brain. Elinda was rushed to ICU and stayed there for a month.
She has been in a comatose condition since then.

Ramos claimed that the incident was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the
faulty management of her airway by the private respondents during the anesthesia phase.
On the other hand, private respondents claimed that the cause of brain damage was
Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

ISSUE: WON herein private respondents are liable for the injury sustained by Erlinda.

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that private respondents were unable to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her piteous condition. Erlinda submitted herself for operation and on that
fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private
respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. During the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of operation she suffered
irreparable damage to her brain. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an
injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. The
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were
all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians in charge.
Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the
influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
 URBANO VS. IAC
157 SCRA 1

DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred

FACTS: Urbano went to his ricefield and found out that the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Javier
cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for the flooding. Urbano then
got angry and demanded Javier to pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano hacked Javier who used a bolo as a result of which the latter suffered a 2-inch
incised wound on his right palm. Javier was rushed to the hospital and treated his wound,
and the medical bills were paid by Urbano in their settlement. 22 days thereafter, Javier was
rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. He had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. It found out that Javier condition was caused by tetanus toxin from the healing
wound. The following day, Javier died. Urbano claimed that the proximate cause of the death
of Javier was his own negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latters death.

HELD: NO. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra)
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
 JARCO MARKETING CORP. VS. CA
321 SCRA 337

DOCTRINE: There is a conclusive presumption that children 9 yrs old are incapable of
contributory negligence. Since negligence required discernment as a condition of liability, a
child under nine is presumed to be lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence.

FACTS: Jarco marketing is the owner of the Department store. In the afternoon, Zhieneth,
below 7 yrs old at that time, and her mother were at the department store. While the mother
was signing her credit card slip at the counter she felt a sudden gust of the wind and heard a
loud thud. She saw Zhieneth on the floor pinned by the bulk of the stores gift wrapping
counter. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the hospital where she was operated on. She died
14 days after the accident in the hospital.

Jarco Marketing claimed that it was Zhieneths mother was negligent in exercising
care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store.
Futhermore, they also claimed that Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence since she
climbed the counter, and eventually collapse on her. They also maintained that it observed
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its
employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jarco Marketing is liable for the death of Zhieneth.

HELD: YES. Petitioner was informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the
stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done.
Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due
diligence required of a good father of a family.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed
over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the
counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have
caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court
and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence[29]on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it
was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top
laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured.
 TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY
16 PHIL. 8

DOCTRINE: While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case.

FACTS: David Taylor, 15 years of age, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years
of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine.

After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the
cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys
picked up all they could find. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps.
They opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches. David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to the boys. David was
struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye
to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is Manila Electric Road and
Light Companys negligence to secure the fulminating caps.

HELD: NO. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing
off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to
Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries
sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion
of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the
caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.

Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the
cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt
that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA
296 SCRA 711

DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.

FACTS: Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts
with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager
Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the
purpose of depositing the same to RMCs account with PBC. However, it turned out that
Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbands account instead of RMC. Lipana never
checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabuts
modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the loss suffered by RMC is PBCs
negligence

HELD: YES. The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all
the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate
copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank
with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.

The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection
and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, not the latters entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had
the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit
those funds in her husbands current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in
the latters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank tellers
aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.
 BUSTAMANTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 89880, FEBRUARY 6, 1991

DOCTRINE: The principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and
drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence."

FACTS: A collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by
Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin. The front
left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat resulting to
several passengers beiong thrown out of the bus and died as a result of the injuries. Before
the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming
from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that
the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to
give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in
order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway

ISSUE: Whether or not both of the owner and driver of the gravel and sand truck may invoke
the doctrine of last clear chance to avoid liability.

HELD: NO. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled
to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or
that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.

The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in
applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar
is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by
the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the
cargo truck from liability.
 ALLIED BANKING CORP. VS. CA
178 SCRA 526

DOCTRINE: It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the
cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned.

FACTS: Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from GENBANK in the amount of P500,000.00.
Yujuico issued a corresponding promissory note in favor of GENBANK. At the time private
respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a
member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank.

On March 25,1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No.
675 forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines. This was followed by
Resolution No. 677 issued by the Monetary Board on March 29, 1977 ordering the
liquidation of GENBANK. ALLIED acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of
GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private respondent under the promissory
note.

Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note, petitioner
ALLIED filed an action for the collection of sum of money. Private respondent sought to
implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party defendants. It was alleged in
the third-party complaint that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with
the affairs of GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his obligation
under the loan such that he should not now be held liable thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages instituted for the alleged tortious interference
of ALLIED BANK and CENTRAL BANK with the affairs of GENBANK may prosper

HELD: NO. It cannot prosper because the action has already prescribed. There can be no
question in this case that the action for damages instituted by private respondent arising
from the quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference" should be filed within four (4) years
from the day the cause of action accrued.

In the case of Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court
ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the
cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned.
Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above
discussed, however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the
Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines
while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has
prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted.
 EXCONDE VS. CAPUNO
G.R. NO. 10134, JUNE 29, 1957

DOCTRINE: The law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, civil liability for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with
them. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

FACTS: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Bilintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and
two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperia, died as a consequence. It further
appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident,
nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his
son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
Sabina Exconde, mother of the deceased, filed an action against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno for the death of her son Isidore Caperia.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Delfin Capuno can be held liable with his son Dante, for
damages caused by the negligent act of minor.

HELD: YES. Delfin Capuno, Dantes father, may be held civilly liable, jointly and severally
with his son Dante for the death of Isidoro Caperina.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,
which provides: ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
 MACARIO TAMARGO VS CA
G.R. NO. 85044, JUNE 3, 1992

DOCTRINE: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated

as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable
for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural
or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, a 10 years old minor, had shot Jennifer Tamargo resulting to her
death. Macario Tamargo, adopting parent of Jennifer and spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifers natural parents, filed a civil complaint against spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. A month after the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisuras petition to adopt
Adelberto was granted by the court. Citing the result of adoption, the spouses Bundoc
claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the spouses Bundoc ruling
that the latter were not the indispensable parties to the case. On appeal, the CA dismissed
the petition, ruling that the Tamargos had lost their right to appeal having filed the same
beyond the reglementary period. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned,
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties
in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

HELD: NO. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code
upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal
and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. Hence, spouses
Bundoc, natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
 CUADRA VS. MONFORT
G.R. NO. 24101. SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

DOCTRINE: The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault
or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the
clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which
states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage."

FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, together with three other
classmates were assigned by their teacher to weed the grass in the school premises. While
thus engage Monfort found a plastic headband and jokingly said that she had found an
earthworm and tossed it to Cuadra. The object hit the right eye of Cuadra and she rubbed
the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, Cuadras eye became
swollen and she had undergone two surgical operation but Cuadra completely lost the sight
of her right eye.

Thereafter, the parents of Cuadra filed m a suit for damagfes against Alfonso Monfort,
father of Maria Teresa Monfort. The trial ruled in favor of Cuadras and ordered Alfonso to
pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Monfort is liable for his daughters acts.

HELD: NO. Alfonso Monfort is not liable for the acts of his daughter. In the present case
there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso could have prevented the damage
by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
 ELCANO VS. HIL
G.R. NO. L-24803. MAY 26, 1977

DOCTRINE: While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus" (E)mancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."

FACTS: Agapito Elcano, son of Pedro Elcano, was killed by Reginald Hill, a minor, married
at the time of the occurrence, and son of Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence. A criminal case was filed against Reginald Hill. After due trial, he was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Thereafter, Elcano again filed a civil complaint against Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son. Reginald and Marvin Hill filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Furthermore, Marvin Hill argued that
there is no cause of action against him because he was no longer the guardian of Reginald
through emancipation by marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill is liable for the acts of his son.

RULING: YES. Marvin Hill is liable for the acts of his minor son, Reginald Hill in accordance
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is
not unusual.

However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,

the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. VS PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.
G.R. NO. 25142, MARCH 25, 1975

DOCTRINE: The terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" is
used in the sense of "employer".

FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan filed a complaint against
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Archimedes J. Balingit and Fernando Pineda. It was alleged
that Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., and
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a
result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could
not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. meanwhile, Balingit moved for the dismissal of
the case against him on the ground that that the bus company and the bus driver had no
cause of action against him. The lower court then granted Balingits motion. Both the Bus
Company and Pangalangan appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Balingit, manager of Phil-American, is liable for the acts of Pineda
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RULING: NO. No tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager

of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his
employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
 JOHNSON VS. DAVID
G.R. NO. 2789, FEBRUARY 27, 1906

DOCTRINE: Chapter 2, Title 16, Book 4 of the Civil Code provides when a person is liable
for his own negligence, as well as for the negligence of others. Said chapter also
enumerates the other persons for whose negligence be shall respond in damages.

FACTS: William Johnson was riding his bicycle and was passing over a bridge at a slow rate
of speed. He rang the bell of his bicycle to attract the attention of the Davids carriage drawn
by one horse and driven by his cochero however; Johnson was still run over by the said
carriage. As a result of the said accident, Johnson was injured and was not able to perform
manual labor for one month. Hence, Johnson filed a complaint for damages against David. It
was alleged in the complaint that the cochero was on the wrong side of the bridge at the time
of the accident and that reasonable care was not taken by Davids cochero in driving or
approaching the said bridge, by reason of which lack of care the accident happened. On the
other hand, David claimed that he is not liable for the acts of his cochero because was not
present in the carriage at the time the accident happened. The lower court ruled in favor of
Johnson and ordered David to pay for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is liable for the negligent act of his cochero done in his
absence.

HELD: NO. David is not liable for the negligent acts of his cochero. Chapter 2 of title 16,
book 4, of the Civil Code contains the provisions under which persons shall be liable for acts
of negligence, which negligence does not amount to a crime Article 1902 provides when a
person himself is liable for negligence. Articles 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, and
1910 provide when a person shall be liable for injuries caused, not by his own negligence
but by the negligence of another persons or things.

Article 1905 provides that the possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same,
is liable for the damages it may cause, even when said animal shall escape from him or stay.
No complaint, however, is made here that the injuries caused by the negligence of the
cochero were caused by the animal belonging to the defendant. This section might, under
certain conditions, render either the owner of the animal or the one using it liable for
damages. These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for injuries
resulting from acts of negligence such as are complaint of in the present cause. The
defendant not having contributed in any way to the injury complained of, he is in no wise
responsible for the same.
 CHAPMAN VS. UNDERWOOD
G.R. NO. 9010

DOCTRINE: Vehicle owner liability An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle,
and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver
cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

FACTS: Chapman visited a friend in Santa Ana and while he was about to ride a vehicle to
take him home he was struck by a car owned by James Underwood and driven by his
chauffeur. Chapman was on the correct lane. Underwood was riding in the car when the
incident happened. Apparently, the chauffeur, coming from the opposite direction and was
driving straight ahead and when the automobile about to be boarded by Chapman was in
front of him, he [the chauffeur] instead of swerving left he suddenly swerved right to the
direction of Chapman thereby hitting and running over him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Underwood is liable for the negligent act of his chauffeur.

HELD: NO. If the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must
be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. In the case at bar, it was not shown that there
was a sufficient period for Underwood to dissuade the chauffeur from the negligent act as
the swerving of the vehicle by the chauffeur was sudden.
 BAHIA VS. LITONJUA AND LEYNES
G.R. NO. 9734, MARCH 31, 1915

DOCTRINE: Under article 1903 of the Civil Code, if an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee the law presumes that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee or in supervision over him after
the selection, or both.

FACTS: Leynes rented a car from International Garage owned and operated by Ramirez. As
per the arrangement, Ramirez would also provide for the driver and a machinist. Leynes was
to used the car to transport people from fiesta for profit. The car was actually brand new and
was only used a few hours. On May 16, 2011, while driven on the road, the automobile, by
reason of a defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a
corner in the streets, and, as a consequence, ran across the street and into the wall of a
house against which the daughter of Bahia was leaning at the time. The front of the machine
struck the child in the center of the body and crushed her to death.

The action was brought against the mother of Ramirez, who bought the automobile,
and Leynes, under whose direction and control the automobile was being operated at the
time of the accident.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leynes is liable in the case at bar?

HELD: NO. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was
driving the machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips
of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated under his direction,
nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the negligence of the
chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only
establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when that liability shall cease. It
says:

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.
As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The car had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that Leynes had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
 YAMADA VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO. AND BACHRACH GARAGE AND TAXICAB CO.
G.R. NO. L-10073, DECEMBER 24, 1915

DOCTRINE: Where an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee of a

public enterprise, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both

FACTS: Yamada et al hired a taxi owned and operated by Bachrach Garage so that they
may travel to Cavite Viejo. The trip was safe going to said place but when they were going
back from said place the taxi was hit by a train owned by Manila Railroad. Yamada et al sued
the driver, Bachrach, and Manila Railroad. They claimed that the driver was negligent as he
did not slow down while he was approaching the railroad tracks. The driver said there was
no way for him to see the train coming because of the tall growing bushes and trees.

Bachrach said that it is not liable as an employer because prior to hiring the driver, the
driver has been of good record for 5 years and had had no traffic infractions prior to the
collision; and that the negligence of the driver is also imputable to Yamada et al they being
the ones in control of the vehicle; that Yamada et al should have controlled the driver and
instructed him to slow down. Manila Railroad said that it is not liable as well because its
engineers provided proper warning signals on their approach and that there were no tall
trees or bushes at the time of the accident.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable?

HELD: It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent driver should have slowed
down approaching a railroad crossing regardless if he could see a train or not regardless of
the presence of tall bushes.

Manila Railroad and its employees are not negligent as showed by the evidence
which were uncontroverted hence no liability can be had against them.

Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an employer. Although they did
establish that they have done their diligence in properly selecting their driver and in providing
said driver with a good car, they have failed to provide proper supervision and control over
their employee. Bachrach Garage did not perform its full duty when it furnished a safe and
proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one of the
essential requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and
instruction, including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation
and publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and
regulations and instructions are necessary.
 ERNESTO MARTIN VS. CA
G.R. NO. 82248, JANUARY 30, 1992

DOCTRINE: If the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

FACTS: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car while being driven by Nestor Martin, it
crashed into a Meralco electric post. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged.
Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was
rejected. It thereupon sued him for alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of Nestor
Martin. The petitioners main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ernesto Martin can be held liable?

HELD: NO. Meralco has the burden of proof or the duty to present evidence on the fact in
issue necessary to establish his claim as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. As the employment relationship
between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged
employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to prove this
negative averment.
 PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS. BAESA
G.R. NOS. 79050-51, NOVEMBER 14, 1989

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only in a situation where the
defendant, having the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so,
becomes liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence
of the plaintiff. In order that the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied, it must be
shown that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril or with exercise of due care should have been aware of it.

FACTS: Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people
boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the
5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. While they were proceeding towards
Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kp/h, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a
route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well
as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian
filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against Pantranco. Pantranco
alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. CA upheld RTCs favor
of Baesa

ISSUE: Whether or not last clear chance is applicable in the case as such PANTRANCO
shall not be liable?

HELD: Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it
may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages

For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the
peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.
 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, VS. CA AND CLARITA T. CAMACHO
G.R. NO. 104658, APRIL 7, 1993

DOCTRINE: Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and
omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the
hydro pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in the
conduct of the same.

FACTS: Clarita Camacho was the operator of a gasoline station in Baguio City where she
sells Shell products. To determine if the sales losses she incurred in the past months were
due to pipeline leakages, she requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks. Certain Jesus Feliciano came to the private respondents station
with a job order from the petitioner to perform the test. Due to the negligence of contractor
Feliciano, the water from the tank where they are conducting the test was transferred to the
tank where gasoline is sold, this occurrence led to complaints being filed against the private
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pilipinas Shell Petroleum is liable.

HELD: NO. For an employer to be liable employer-employee relation must be proved,

certain factors must be determined: The manner of selection and engagement of the putative
employee, mode of payment of wages, and the presence or absence of power to control the
putative employees conduct.

Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and
omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the
hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence.
 RADIO CORPORATION OF THE PHILS. VS. CA
G.R. NO. 81262 AUGUST 25, 1989

DOCTRINE: A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.

FACTS: Restituto M. Tobias was employed by GLOBE MACKAY in a dual capacity as a

purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In
1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for
which it lost several thousands of pesos.According to private respondent it was he who
actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T.
Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and
General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered
him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table
drawers open, and to leave the office keys. Notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator,
was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed a complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

HELD: YES. In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked,
there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article
19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application, the question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under
Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.

An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty

might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would
also be expected from such employer. But the highhanded treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
 MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT
34 PHIL 311

DOCTRINE: No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of

the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.

FACTS: When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an
hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on
the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act,
turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the
right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it
struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post
place there. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured.

ISSUE: Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was
due to the negligence of the chauffeur

HELD: NO. No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of
the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.It is,
therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable
for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with
the Legislature and not with the courts.
 REPUBLIC VS. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
G.R. NO. 84607, MARCH 19, 1993

DOCTRINE: Public officers or agents held personally liable for acts committed beyond scope
of their authority.The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable
for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named
defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals, herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their
authority, may be held liable for damages.

FACTS: The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment
by members of the militant KMP at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform
(MAR). The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called
"genuine agrarian reform".

A clash ensued thereafter. Twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead. After
almost a year, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for damages
against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel
involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court.

The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining
that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is
contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.

Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint
as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the
State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same
was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao
and her copetitioners filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State can be held civilly liable for the indemnification for deaths
during the Mendiola Massacre

HELD: NO. Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is
expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of
sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public
policythat public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign
authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently
controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of
the government. This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
 ANONUEVO V. CA
441 SCRA 24

DOCTRINE: The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. However, the existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is
the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.

FACTS: The accident in question occurred when Villagracia was traveling along Boni
Avenue on his bicycle, while Anonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his car.. The
car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Anonuevos brother, Jonathan.
Anonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc.
and Anonuevo. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Anonuevo but the latter was
subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil action ensued, the lower
court rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Anonuevo.

ISSUE: Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-
motorized vehicles

HELD: NO. Article 2185 provides: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.

Anonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a
municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
devices thereon. This view finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle of
negligence per se. The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
 REGINO VS. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
G.R. NO 156109, NOVEMBER 18, 2004

DOCTRINE: Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a
contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an
existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

FACTS: Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at PCST. Regino
went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. She was enrolled in
logic and statistics subjects under Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad.

PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the
proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts.
Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was
allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional
points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the
final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion, Regino refused to pay for the tickets.
Gamurot and Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking her tests during the final
examinations. Regino filed a complaint for damages arising from her teachers breach of
laws on human relations.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCST is liable for damages.

HELD: YES. In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly
punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life,
which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness; As a
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the
second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The
acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code.
 LAFARGE CEMENT CORP. VS. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 155173, NOVEMBER 23, 2004

DOCTRINE: Obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary.

FACTS: LaFarge and Continental (CCC) executed a Letter of Intent whereby the former
agreed to purchase the cement business CCC. Both parties entered into a Sale and
Purchase Agreement (SPA) because LaFarge was well aware that CCC had a case pending
with the SC. In anticipation of the liability that SC might adjudge against CCC, the parties,
allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the contract price for payment
to ATP, the petitioner in the case pending.

However, Lafarge refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT, despite the subsequent
finality of the Decision in favor of the latter and the repeated instructions of CCC. Fearful that
nonpayment to APT would result in the foreclosure, CCC filed a complaint against Lafarge.
Lafarge filed an Answer and prayed for damages by way of counterclaims.

Petitioners alleged that CCC, through Lim (president) and Mariano (corp. sec.), had filed the
baseless complaint. Relying on this Courts pronouncement in Sapugay v. CA, Lafarge
prayed that both Lim and Mariano be held jointly and solidarily liable with Respondent CCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano and Lim are solidary liable with CCC.

HELD: YES. In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in
a solidary or joint and several obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive
subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the
whole obligation.The fact that the liability sought against the CCC is for specific performance
and tort, while that sought against the individual respondents is based solely on tort does not
negate the solidary nature of their liability for tortuous acts alleged in the counterclaims.
 FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., VS. AMEC-BCCM
G.R. NO. 141994, JANUARY 17, 2005

DOCTRINE: Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit.

FACTS: Sometime December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints
over their radio program Expos on DZRC-AM owned by FBNI from students, teachers and
parents against AMEC-BCCM and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were
defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a
complaint for damages against FBNI. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for
allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre. The court found FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily liable to pay
AMEC moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for payment of
damages.

HELD: YES. As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily
liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the Court of
Appeals, recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had
from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who
procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements. An employer and
employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course
and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation. In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as
hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged
nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There
was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.
 YHT REALTY CORPORATION VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 126780. FEBRUARY 17, 2005

DOCTRINE: As a general rule if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the

employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him.

FACTS: Australian businessman McLoughlin was able to convince by Tan to transfer from
Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. During
his stay, Mcloughlin rented a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be
opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the
other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. Later, he discovered that
some money and jewelries inside the safety deposit box were missing. He placed another
envelope of money and was again lost. Upon confrontation, Tan admitted that she had stolen
McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez,
Payam and Lainez. McLoughlin filed a complaint for damages. The trial court found that
Lainez, Payam and Tan acted with gross negligence in the performance and exercise of their
duties and obligations as innkeepers and were therefore liable to answer for the losses
incurred by McLoughlin.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is gross negligence on the part of the petitioners in the
performance of their duties as innkeepers.

HELD: YES. Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of
Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. In
fact, they even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening
McLoughlins safety deposit box. This also proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a
person aside from the registered guest had access to the safety deposit box. The loss of
McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees.
Both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of
Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable.
 JOSE V. LAGON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MENANDRO V. LAPUZ
G.R. NO. 119107. MARCH 18, 2005

DOCTRINE: As a rule, there can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the
result of a violation of a legal duty.

FACTS: Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two parcels of land in
Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and
damages against Lagon.

In the complaint, Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late
Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land (the property). One of the provisions agreed upon
was for private respondent to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to
new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent Lapuz was
obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract was
allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, he discovered that Lagon representing
himself as the new owner of the property had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He
thus filed a complaint against the latter accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina
Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon denied
these accusations. Lagon claimed that the lease contract between Lapuz and Sepi was not
renewed.

Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, Lagon filed his
counterclaim and prayed for the payment of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lagon is liable for tortuous interference of contractual relation.

HELD: NO. The elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations are as follows:
(a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse. Here, all three elements to hold Lagon liable for tortuous interference are not
present, Lagon cannot be made to answer for Lapuz losses.
 SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE,
INC.
G.R. NO. 150255, April 22, 2005

DOCTRINE: The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act
must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.

FACTS: Schmitz Transport who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, to receive
the cargoes from the shipside and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe
Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired the services of Transport Venture
Incorporation (TVI)s tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were unloaded to the
barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strong waves caused by
approaching storm, the barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils
into the sea. Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport and TVI. The
trial court held that Schmitz Transport, Black Sea and TVI negligent for unloading the
cargoes outside of the breakwater notwithstanding the storm signal and ordered them to be
jointly and severally liable for the payment of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event, independent of
any act of negligence on the part of petitioners.

HELD: NO. That no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after the cargoes were
completely loaded is, however, a material factthe proximate cause of the loss of the
cargoes. Had the barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea
conditions notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the barge was left floating
in open sea until big waves causing it to sink along with the cargoes.41 The loss thus falls
outside the "act of God doctrine."
 QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT VS. DACARA
460 SCRA 243

DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise.

FACTS: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr while driving his automotive run into street diggings at
MatahimikStreet, Quezon City, which was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As
a result, Dacarra Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage.

Fulgencio P. Dacara filed a complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon. The latter claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the
diggings with all the necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence
and failure to exercise due care.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dacaras negligence is the proximate cause

HELD: YES. Dacara Junior was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour when he met
the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on
city streets with light traffic, when not designated through streets, as provided under the
Land Transportation and Traffic. Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a
traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
 SAN JUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
466 SCRA 78

DOCTRINE: To hold a province, city or municipality liable under Article 2189of the Civil
Code, it is sufficient that the local government unit exercises control or supervision over
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works.

FACTS: A Contract for Water Service Connection was entered into by and between the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of
K.C. Waterworks System Construction; the former engaged the services of the latter to
install water service connections.

K.C. was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and
effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila,
for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water
concessionaires.

Priscilla Chan was driving her and suddenly the left front wheel of the car fell on a
manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, she suffered
injury by reason of the accident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality of San Juan is liable

HELD: YES. The court held that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality has either control or supervision over said street or road.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
467 SCRA 569

DOCTRINE: Under Article 1266 of the Civil Code, mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an
engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation.

FACTS: Philippine National Construction Corporation executed a contract of lease with

Abarras stipulating to pay rent for the use of land. The said land is to be used by PNCC as
site for a rock crushing plant. The term of lease is for five years, commencing on the date of
issuance of an industrial clearance by the Ministry of Human Settlements.

PNCC obtained a Temporary Use Permit from the Ministry for the proposed rock
crushing project. Nine days later Abbaras wrote to PNCC, asking for the first annual rental,
and assuring that they have stopped considering proposals of other aggregates plants in
favor of PNCC. In reply, PNCC argued that the contract must commence on the date of
issuance by the Ministry of an industrial clearance in their favor. Abbaras instituted an action
against PNCC for Specific Performance with Damages

ISSUE: Whether or not PNCC should be released from its contract with Abbaras due to
unforeseen events and causes beyond its control.

HELD: NO. Article 1266 applies only to obligations to do and not to give, while obligation
arising out of said contract is an obligation to give. The court ruled that mere pecuniary
inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation. Hence, the
unforeseen events and causes beyond its control cited by PNCC are not the legal and
physical impossibilities contemplated in Art. 1266.
 PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGURO VS. SARANGAYA III
474 SCRA 191

DOCTRINE: Res ipsa loquitur presumes negligence on the part of the other party either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it.

FACTS: Spouses Sarangaya erected a commercial building fronting the provincial road of
Santiago, Isabela. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. entered into a contract of lease of the
first door with the Spouses.

Perla converted it into a two door; he had a garage where he parked a company
car which he used to supervise a branch in Pampanga. After returning from Pampanga, he
warmed up the car, small flames came out of its engine. As a result thereof, fire spewed out
of its rear compartment and burned the whole garage where he was trapped so he suffered
burns in the face, legs and arms

ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor applies.

HELD: YES. The court ruled held that it is the duty of the spouses to present controverting
evidence to rebut the presumption. In the case at bar, Pascual, as the caretaker of the car,
failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked. Further, flames spewing out of
a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event neither does an
explosion usually occur when a car engine is started.
 CHILD LEARNING CENTER INC. VS. TOGARIO
476 SCRA 236

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured

FACTS: Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution

operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. Timothy entered the boys comfort
room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He found
himself locked inside and unable to get out. When no help arrived he decided to open the
window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through
and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for
serious multiple physical injuries. An action was filed against the CLC, the members of its
Board of Directors and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.

ISSUE: Whether or not CLC is liable.

HELD: YES. The court held that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door
could not be opened from the inside. This sufficiently points to the fact that something was
wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. CLC are
clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times
in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the
door, shows that something was wrong with the door.
 MACALINAO VS. ONG
477 SCRA 740

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor creates an inference or presumption of

negligence and thereby places on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no
negligence on his part.

FACTS: Sebastian instructed Macalinao to deliver a heavy piece of machinery to

Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While delivering, the Genetrons Isuzu
Elf truck driven by Ong bumped the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred
severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of
the collision.

Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment then
to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine
General Hospital due to financial considerations. As a result, his body was paralyzed and
immobilized from the neck down. Subsequently, he died and was substituted by his parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

HELD: YES. The court held that evidence clearly shows that the road where the mishap
occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. While
ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit
the private jeepney rather than the other way around. Based on the angle at which it
stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid
the Isuzu truck.
 FAROLAN VS. SOLMAC
G.R. NO. 83589, MARCH 13, 1991

DOCTRINE: Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly
committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

FACTS: Solmac Marketing was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus
Recycling Plastic Products technically known as polypropylene film.Polypropylene is a substance
used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products.

The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December, 1981. Upon
application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority from any
government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC
presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon
examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out
that the fibers of the importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than
OPP film scrap. In other words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the
assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but
oriented polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of
Instructions (LOI).

Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by
law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned
importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages
to the private respondent.

HELD: NO. When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his
office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the
public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which
careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that
petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the
various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at
the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film products were competing with locally manufactured
polypropylene and oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to
meet local demands, hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B.
Consequently, the petitioners cannot be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing
the import goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public
officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI
658-B, was faithfully complied with.

Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if
any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public
officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.
 CHIANG KAI SHEK VS. CA
G.R. NO. 58028, APRIL 18, 1989

DOCTRINE: Moral damages is awarded in cases of illegal dismissal.

FACTS: Fausta F. Oh when she reported for work at the Chiang Kai Shek School in Sorsogon on the
first week of July, 1968. She was told she had no assignment for the next semester. Oh was shocked.
She had been teaching in the school since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years. And now,
out of the blue, and for no apparent or given reason, this abrupt dismissal.

Oh sued. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity
benefits and moral and exemplary damages.

The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. 3 On appeal, its decision
was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable while absolving the
other defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the awards made by the respondent court were warranted.

HELD: YES. Oh was arbitrarily treated by the petitioner, which has shown no cause for her removal
nor had it given her the notice required by the Termination Pay Law. As the respondent court said, the
contention that she could not report one week before the start of classes is a flimsy justification for
replacing her. She had been in its employ for all of thirty-two years. Her record was apparently
unblemished. There is no showing of any previous strained relations between her and the petitioner.
Oh had every reason to assume, as she had done in previous years, that she would continue
teaching as usual. It is easy to imagine the astonishment and hurt she felt when she was flatly and
without warning told she was dismissed. There was not even the amenity of a formal notice of her
replacement, with perhaps a graceful expression of thanks for her past services. She was simply
informed she was no longer in the teaching staff. To put it bluntly, she was fired.

For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the private respondent is entitled to moral damages. As
a proximate result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and even besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three decades. We
also find that the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages because the
petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed her.
 SUARIO VS. BPI
G.R. NO. 40459, AUGUST 25, 1989

DOCTRINE: Moral damages would be recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the
employee was not only effected without authorized cause and/or due process for which relief is
granted by the Labor Code but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive
to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy-for which the
obtainable relief is determined by 'the Civil Code (not the Labor Code).

FACTS: Suario is a loyal employee of BPI and assigned as Credit Investigator. During his
employment, he pursued his studies of law without adverse comments from BPI. Sometime in 1976,
he requested from the then Asst. VP and Brand manager for a 6 month leave of absence without pay
purposely to take the 1976 pre-bar review in Manila. In May of the same year, Suario received a
verbal notice from the new Branch Manager, Casino, that BPIs head office approved only a 30 day
leave of absence without pay. Former VP Guilatco, then assigned in Head Office as VP, advised
Casino to inform Suario to just avail the 30 day leave first and then proceed to Manila for the review.

Thereafter, Suario wrote a formal letter to the President of the respondent bank, asking for a
formal reconsideration and caused the same to be received by Mr. Vicente Casino. During the first
week of August, 1976, the complainant received a letter from the Asst. Manager/Cashier, Mr. Douglas
E. Aurelio, ordering the complainant to report back for work since the complainant's request was
allegedly disapproved and that failure to report back for work would be a conclusive proof that the
complainant is no longer interested to continue working and therefore considered resigned. Upon
receipt of the letter, complainant's review was unduly interrupted since sleepless nights were spent in
order to arrive at the proper decision and that the complainant has decided not to report back. On the
last week of August, 1976, the complainant received another letter attaching a xerox copy of the
application for a Clearance to terminate on the ground of resignation/ or abandonment. Labor arbiter
ordered BPI to pay Suario separation pay but dismissed claims for damages on the ground of lack of
merit. NLRC affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees in addition to his separation pay.

HELD: NO. It is now well settled that money claims of workers provided by law over which the labor
arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction are comprehensive enough to include claims for moral
damages of a dismissed employee against his employer. (Vargas v. Akai Phil. Inc., 156 SCRA 531
[1987])

On the issue whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for moral damages, we are
constrained to decide in the negative.

Any award of moral damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the Labor
Code but should be grounded on the Civil Code. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the
premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee
without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant
of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended
by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy; and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety,
etc., resulted therefrom.
 PANTRANCO VS. BAESA
G.R. NO. 79050-51, NOVEMBER 14, 1989

DOCTRINE: Plaintiffs failure to present documentary evidence to support their claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim does not bar recovery of the damages, if such loss
may be based sufficiently on their testimonies.

Facts: : Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of
about 20 kp/h, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the
jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David
Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against Pantranco. Pantranco alleged David Ico's
negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver. CA upheld RTCs favor of Baesa

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning capacity.

HELD: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in fixing the amount of
damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims. While it is true that private
respondents should have presented documentary evidence to support their claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof does not necessarily bar the
recovery of the damages in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the earning
capacity of David Ico, and the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from
which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning
capacity of the three deceased victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of
a deceased victim, the court can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment
and the state of his health at the time of death.

In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the time of his death in 1981
and was driving his own passenger jeepney. The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty
(30) years old at the time of their death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and the
proprietor of the Cauayan Press, printer of the Cauayan Valley Newspaper and the Valley Times at
Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and at the time of her death, was the
company nurse, personnel manager, treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela.
Respondent court duly considered these factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies of Fe
Ico and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of David
Ico and the spouses Baesa.
JOSE MECENAS, ET AL. VS CA
G.R. NO. 88052 DECEMBER 14, 1989

DOCTRINE: Article 2332 of the Civil Code provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court
may exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.

FACTS: On the evening of April 22, 1980, M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker of Philippine
registry owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and M/V "Don Juan," an interisland
vessel, also of Philippine registry owned and operated by the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. (Negros
Navigation) collided. When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility
good. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished.
Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto and Sofia
Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search. Petitioners then filed a complaint
against Negros Navigation and Capt. Roger Santisteban, the captain of the "Don Juan" without,
however, impleading either PNOC or PNOC Shipping. Petitioners alleged that they were the seven
(7) surviving legitimate children of Perfecto and Sofia Mecenas and that the latter spouses perished in
the collision which had resulted from the negligence of Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban.
Petitioners prayed for actual damages of not less than P100, 000.00 as well as moral and exemplary
damages.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The trial court ordered Negros
and Capt. Santisteban to pay the petitioners, jointly and severally, of damages in the sum of P400,
000.00 for the death of their parents. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification.
Instead of P400, 000.00, the CA awarded P100, 000.00 only as actual and compensatory damages.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to an exemplary and moral damages.

RULING: YES. The SC held that petitioners are entitled to moral damages based upon a breach of
the contract of carriage, the carrier under our civil law is liable for the death of passengers arising
from the negligence or willful act of the carrier's employees although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or even in violation of the instructions of the carrier.

Further, the SC held that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are liable for gross
negligence in connection with the collision of the "Don Juan" and "Tacloban City" and the sinking of
the "Don Juan" leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. The grossness of the negligence of
the "Don Juan" is underscored when one considers the foregoing circumstances in the context of the
following facts: Firstly, the "Don Juan" was more than twice as fast as the "Tacloban City." Secondly,
the "Don Juan" carried the full complement of officers and crew members specified for a passenger
vessel of her class. Thirdly, the "Don Juan" was equipped with radar which was functioning that night.
Fourthly, the "Don Juan's" officer on-watch had sighted the "Tacloban City" on his radar screen while
the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. In the total set of circumstances which existed in the
instant case, the "Don Juan," had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have
easily avoided the collision with the "Tacloban City," Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have avoided
the collision even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely. Capt. Santisteban , on the other hand,
at the time of collision, failed to institute appropriate measures to delay the sinking MS Don Juan and
to supervise properly the execution of his order of abandon ship.
SIMEX INTERNATIONAL (MANILA) INCORPORATED VS CA
G.R. NO. 88013 MARCH 19, 1990

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of the Civil
Code specifically provides that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated." That is why the determination of
the amount to be awarded (except liquidated damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court,
according to "the circumstances of each case."

A corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a good
reputation that is debased, resulting in its social humiliation.

FACTS: Simex is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food products. It maintains a
checking account with Traders Royal Bank. Simex issued checks against its account with Traders in
favor of its creditors. Later on said checks were dishonored by Traders due to insufficiency of funds.
As a consequence, Simexs creditors withheld delivery of the its order and the creditors demanded
that they be paid in cash or certified checks. Simex complained to Traders and it was later on
discovered that its latest deposit worth P100, 000.00 was not credited to its account. The error was
then rectified and the dishonored checks were paid after they were re-deposited.

Thereafter, Simex demanded reparation for Traders gross wanton negligence but the latter
refused. Simex then filed a complained against Traders claiming that it suffered moral damages in the
sum of P1, 000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P500, 000.00, plus 25% attorney's
fees, and costs. The trial court as well as the CA rendered judgment holding that moral and
exemplary damages were not called for lack of bad faith but ordered Traders to pay nominal damages
in the amount of P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. The CA also provided that that
the claimed losses are purely speculative and are not supported by substantial evidence. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Simex is entitled to moral and exemplary damages for Traders negligence.

HELD: The SC court held that Simex is entitled to moral damages rather than nominal damages. The
error omitted by Traders should not have been committed in the first place. Traders have not even
explained why it was committed at all. It is true that the dishonored checks were "eventually" paid
however; this took almost a month when, properly, the checks should have been paid immediately
upon presentment. Hence, the initial carelessness of Traders, aggravated by the lack of promptitude
in repairing its error, justifies the grant of moral damages. This rather lackadaisical attitude toward
Simex constituted the gross negligence, if not wanton bad faith.

The SC further adjudicated that Simex is also entitled to an exemplary damages. The point is that as
a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship. In the case at bar, it is obvious that Traders was remiss in that
duty and violated that relationship. What is especially deplorable is that, having been informed of its
error in not crediting the deposit in question to Simex, Traders did not immediately correct it but did so
only one week later or twenty-three days after the deposit was made.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. (RCPI) VS RUFUS RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 83768. FEBRUARY 28, 1990

DOCTRINE: For recovery of damages, Article 2217 of the New Civil Code applies. It is provided
therein that: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendants wrongful act or omission."

FACTS: Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent
two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one addressed to Mohamed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan
Socialist Union, and the other to Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The cablegrams
were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destinations. The telegram to Taha
advised him of Rodriguezs pending arrival in Khartoum on September 18, 1978, while the telegram
to Merger advised her of the scheduled WALS conference in Khartoum. Rodriguez left the Philippines
on September 15, 1978. When he arrived in Khartoum, Sudan however, nobody was at the airport to
meet him. Due to the lateness of the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. Because of the non-
receipt of the cablegram, Taha was not able to meet him. Worse all preparations for the international
conference had to be cancelled. Furthermore, Fernando Barros, the Vice-President, arrived the next
day from Chile, followed by the other officers from other countries except Diane Merger, the
organizations secretary. It turned out that the wire sent by Rodriguez to Merger was delivered to the
address on the message but the person who delivered it was told that the addressee was no longer
staying there. This fact was not accordingly reported to Rodriguez in Metro Manila. The undelivered
cablegram was not returned by the correspondent abroad to Globe for disposition in the Philippines.

Rodriguez then filed a complaint for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages against
RCPI and Globe.

ISSUE: Whether or not RCPI is liable for moral, exemplary actual damages plus attorneys fees.

HELD: The SC held that Rodriguez suffered a certain degree of mental anguish, fear and anxiety
considering his experience at the airport of a foreign country. His suffering was caused by the non-
appearance of Taha who did not receive the telegram sent by Rodriguez due to the gross negligence
of RCPI. There is moreover, the dismay arising from the fact, that after so much preparation and
travel on the part of Rodriguez, his pains were all for nothing. Hence, RCPI is liable for moral
damages.

The award of exemplary damages is not proper considering that there is no showing that RCPI acted
in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."

RCPI is also liable for actual damages for its failure to substantiate its allegations that Rodriguezs
respondents expenses were actually paid by the organization and the Sudanese government with
clear proof.

Finally, as for attorneys fees, the SC held that for the trial courts failure to justify its payment by
RCPI, therefore, the award of attorneys fees as part of its liability should be disallowed and deleted.
ZENITH INSURANCE CORP. V COURT OF APPEALS, LAWRENCE FERNANDED
G.R. NO. 85296, MAY 14, 1990

DOCTRINE: In awarding moral damages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that
the breach was wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.

FACTS: On January 25, 1983, private respondent Lawrence Fernandez insured his car for "own
damage" under private car Policy No. 50459 with petitioner Zenith Insurance Corporation. On July 6,
1983, the car figured in an accident and suffered actual damages in the amount of P3, 640.00. After
allegedly being given a run around by Zenith for two (2) months, Fernandez filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for sum of money and damages resulting from the refusal of Zenith to
pay the amount claimed.
On June 4, 1986, a decision was rendered by the trial court ordered the insurance company to pay
the insured the damage incurred plus interest at the rate of twice the prevailing interest rates, moral
damages (20,000, that is twice the amount the insured prayed for), exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zenith is liable for the moral and exemplary damages twice the prevailing
interest.

HELD: NO. In case of unreasonable delay in the payment of the proceeds of an insurance policy, the
damages that may be awarded are: 1) attorney's fees; 2) other expenses incurred by the insured
person by reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of payment; 3) interest at twice the
ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board of the amount of the claim due the injured; and 4) the
amount of the claim. (Insurance Code Sec. 244)

The act of petitioner of delaying payment for two months cannot be considered as so wanton
or malevolent to justify an award of P20, 000.00 as moral damages, taking into consideration the
actual damage. The reason for petitioner's failure to indemnify private respondent within the two-
month period was that the parties could not come to an agreement as regards the amount of the
actual damage on the car.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 83033, JUNE 8, 1990

DOCTRINE: In cases of breach of contract, moral damages can be awarded only where the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Mere negligence, even if thereby the plaintiff suffers
mental anguish or serious fright is not ground for awarding moral damages.

FACTS: Annette Pastoral, Joy Ann Pastoral, and Marilou Velisano, who are among the private
respondent herein, were gifted on their graduation with their first trip abroad, to Hongkong, Tokyo and
the United States, by their parents. Accompanied by their grandmother, Concepcion Salonga, they
flew on April 23, 1978, to Hongkong, where they were to await their plane tickets for the rest of their
trip. On April 26, 1978, Erlinda Pastoral and her uncle, Serafin Salonga, went to the Office of the
petitioner's agent, the Inter-Pacific Transit, Inc., in Manila to purchase the said tickets and assured to
be given that same day for them to fly to Tokyo the following day.
The Hong Kong office of the Northwest Orient Airlines found, however, that ITI had made a mistake in
the computation of the price of the tickets-in fact, two mistakes. As a result, they withheld the tickets
of the four and as Annette and Marilou politely requested to check the Manila office they were
arrogantly rejected in the presence of many persons. As the flight was scheduled at one o'clock that
same afternoon, the girls had no choice but to pay the total differential fare of $ 1,046.40. In Tokyo
they were forced to stay in a cheap hotel and Marilou and Concepcion got sick prompting their
grandfather Benjamin Salonga to fly to Tokyo. They filed a case to NOA. RTC ruled in thie favor and
CA, affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Northwest Orient Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages?

HELD: YES. In the case of Sabena Belgian World vs. Court of Appeals 5 affirmed the doctrine that: In
cases of breach of contract, moral damages can be awarded only where the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Mere negligence, even if thereby the plaintiff suffers mental anguish or
serious fright is not ground for awarding moral damages.

The Supreme Court take cognizance of the cavalier treatment of the two girls at the Hong
Kong NOA office requires a brief comment. The Court feels it is about time foreigners realized that
Filipinos, whatever their station in life, are entitled to the same civility accorded other persons when
they are in an alien land. We cannot be dismissed or disdained on the basis of our nationality, which
is as proud and as respectable as any other on this earth. The haughty attitude of some foreigners
who seem to think they belong to a superior race has irked not a few Filipino travelers. Let it be
stressed to our credit that we are not impressed at all by such self-importance. Airlines should
especially advise their personnel against superciliousness when dealing with citizens of the
Philippines and are cautioned that this Court will not countenance that kind of conduct. We hold that
the acts of the petitioner assessed in their totality, constituted more than mere negligence and
assumed the dimensions of bad faith
CARIAGA VS. LTB CO.
G.R. NO. L-11037, DECEMBER 29, 1960

DOCTRINE: Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerated the instances when moral damages may be
recovered. Plainti's claim for moral damages not falling under any one of them, the same cannot be
granted

FACTS: At about 1:00 p.m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of the Laguna Tayabas Bus hereinafter
driven by Alfredo Moncada, left for Liliw, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year medical student
of the University of Santo Tomas, as one of its passengers. At about 3:00 p.m., as the bus reached
that part of the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad track, it
bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of
the latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the body of the bus was wrecked, the driver
of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers, Edgardo among them, were severely injured.
Eduardo then was first rushed to San Pablo Hospital, then to Delos Santos where he was operated
by Dr. Gustilo and to UST Hospital where another operation took place. The hospital bills were
covered by LTB Bus but Edgardos parent filed a case for damages. RTC held LTB no liable and CA,
affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not LTB is libale for moral and exemplary damages?

HELD: NO. As the court stated, plaintiffs' claim for moral damages cannot also be granted. Article
2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be covered and the case
under consideration does not fall under any one of them. The present action cannot come under
paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one of the quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such
because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the LTB and Edgardo Cariaga. Neither could
defendant LTB be held liable to pay moral damages to Edgardo Cariaga under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said defendant did not act
fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith.

The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without
merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the present action is based upon a
breach of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they premise
their claim upon the negligence or quasi-delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they were not
themselves injured as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and train owned by the Manila
Railroad Company.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. V. CA
31 SCRA 511, FEB. 18, 1970

DOCTRINE: Life expectancy of victim as basis in fixing amount recoverable.Life expectancy of the
victim is, not only relevant, but also an important element in fixing the amount recoverable as
damages.

FACTS: A passenger bus owned and operated by the defendant and driven by Laureano Casim, left
Lingayen, Pangasinan to head to Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio
Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the bus. The bus frontally hit the rear
side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload
and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding
end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the bull cart, penetrated through the glass
windshield and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his
seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of his
face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among
other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite
direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by
Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to
the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men
who rode on the bull cart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the provincial hospital of
Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio
Quintos, Jr. died.

Surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr. brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. They sued the latter for breach of the contract of carriage between said petitioner and the
deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr,, to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including
attorneys fees. Said petitioner defendant in the court of first instancecontended that the mishap
was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the
negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the
deceased.

ISSUE: Whether the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in not acting in accordance
with Alcantara v. Surro

HELD: NO. The case cited is not controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the
parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its
award of damages.

There can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the
measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount
recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of
the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor. Other factors that are
usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or ; (2) loss of support); (3) loss of service (4)
loss of society; (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral expenses.
GATCHALIAN V. DELIM
203 SCRA 126, OCT. 21, 1991

DOCTRINE: Damages may not be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

FACTS: ReynaldaGatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondents Thames minibus at a

point in Sa n Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while
the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, La Union, a snapping sound
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement
flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several
passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. While injured passengers were confined in
the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization
and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense
in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers,
including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit.

Gatchalian filed an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She
alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a
conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and
an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away
from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and
other opportunities; P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead;
P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorneys fees. In defense, respondent averred
that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure.

ISSUE: Whether compensatory damages should be awarded.

HELD: NO. The first item in that claim relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize
because of the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day that the mini-bus
went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a
substitute teachers job, a job which she had held off and on as a casual employee. The Court of
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public
school since, being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of
vacancies for substitute teachers.

Petitioners claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is
violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due
and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition
that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving rise to a legitimate claim for
restoration to her condition ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the
victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
KOREAN AIRLINES CO. LTD. V. CA
234 SCRA 717, AUG. 3, 1994

DOCTRINE: Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant
and there is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.

FACTS: Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive electrician, was contracted for employment in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, for a period of one year through Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. Lapuz
was supposed to leave on November 8, 1980, via Korean Airlines. Initially, he was wait-listed, which
meant that he could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at
the airport before departure. When two of such passengers did not appear, Lapuz and another person
by the name of Perico were given the two unclaimed seats.

According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with one suitcase and one shoulder bag at the check-
in counter of KAL. He passed through the customs and immigration sections for routine check-up and
was cleared for departure as Passenger No. 157 of KAL Flight No. KE 903. Together with the other
passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of the KAL aircraft for boarding.
However, when he was at the third or fourth rung of the stairs, a KAL officer pointed to him and
shouted Down! Down! He was thus barred from taking the flight. When he later asked for another
booking, his ticket was cancelled by KAL. Consequently, he was unable to report for his work in Saudi
Arabia within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost his employment. KAL, on the other hand,
alleged that on November 8, 1980, Pan Pacific Recruiting Services Inc. coordinated with KAL for the
departure of 30 contract workers, of whom only 21 were confirmed and 9 were wait-listed
passengers. The agent of Pan Pacific, Jimmie Joseph, after being informed that there was a
possibility of having one or two seats becoming available, gave priority to Perico, who was one of the
supervisors of the hiring company in Saudi Arabia. The other seat was won through lottery by Lapuz.
However, only one seat became available and so, pursuant to the earlier agreement that Perico was
to be given priority, he alone was allowed to board. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 30, adjudged KAL liable for damages.

ISSUE: Whether there was error in the findings of the lower courts as to the award of damages

HELD: NO. The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903.
His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as
a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between
them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.

This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation.The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by the
carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
CACHERO VS. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB
G.R. NO. L-8721, MAY 23, 1957

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the
contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code.

FACTS: Atty. Tranquilino F. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and
owned by the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. Gregorio Mira Abinion bumped said taxicab against a
Meralco post, with the result that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to
the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight in nature. On January 6, 1953, plaintiff wrote a
letter to the defendant, demanding payment for the sum of P79, 245.65 covering actual transportation
and medical expenses, monetary loss, compensatory and exemplary damages. Defendant offered to
settle the case amicably, but the parties were not able to agree on the settlement amount. Plaintiff
instituted an action for damages. CFI awarded plaintiff: (1) P700 for medical and transportation
expenses, (2) P3,200 unearned professional fees, and (3) P2,000 moral damages. Cachero filed this
instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cachero is entitled to an award of moral damages.

HELD: NO. A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that his action against the defendant is
predicated on an alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him
"safely and without mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant's
taxicab that plaintiff used when he received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even
been made a party defendant to this case.

ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; xxx With
regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection with this case any
"criminal offense resulting in physical injuries". The one that committed the offense against the plaintiff
is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and punished therefor. We,
therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of
the Civil Code. The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi delict causing physical injuries".
Thus, the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages by the trial Court has to be eliminated, for
under the law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.
FORES VS. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. L-12163, MARCH 4, 1959

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the
contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code.

FACTS: Ireneo Miranda was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the
vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control
thereof, causing it to swerve and to his the bridge wall. Miranda suffered a fracture of the upper right
humerus. He was laterv subjected to a series of operations. The driver was charged with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly. Paz Fores denies liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending that a day before
the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE: Whether or not Miranda is entitled to an award of moral damages.

HELD: NO. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be
discarded. The exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does
not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the
case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the
Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith
or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear provisions
of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
PAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PANTEJO
G.R. NO. 120262. JULY 17, 1997

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action
and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

FACTS: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in
Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to
typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.To accommodate the needs of its
stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance. Respondent Pantejo requested instead
that he be billeted in a hotel at PALs expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but
PAL refused. Thus, Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger.When
the flight for Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of his
co-passengers, were reimbursed by PAL. For the ordeal and anguish Pantejo undergone, he filed an
action for damages. In ruling for Pantejo, both the trial court and CA found that herein petitioner acted
in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel
expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pantejo is entitled to moral damages.

HELD: YES. The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the former
liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in
Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the interest
of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience,
amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. It is high time that
the travelling public is afforded protection and that the duties of common carriers, long detailed in our
previous laws and jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued in our Civil Code
in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.
Sarkies Tours Philippines vs. IAC
124 SCRA 588

DOCTRINE: Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them.

FACTS: Fatima Fortades boarded a bus on her way to Legazpi City, Albay. Her personal belongings
were kept in the compartment of the bus, subsequently, it was discovered that her personal
belongings were missing and could have dropped along the way. Fatima suggested retracing the
route to try to recover the lost items, but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legazpi City.

Fatima file a case to recover the value of the lost items, as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. She claimed that the loss was due to the bus companys
failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of Fatimas luggage and dealt with them in bad
faith from the start.
Sarkies on the other hand,denied liability for the loss on the ground that Fatima allegedly did not
declare any excess baggage upon boarding its bus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sarkies is liable for damages.

HELD: YES. The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioners negligence in not ensuring that
the doors of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of
care, almost all of the luggage was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.
Prudenciado versus Alliance Transport System
DOCTRINE:
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave
negligence.

FACTS:
Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was driving her car along Arroceros Street to go to the Philippine Normal
College Compound where she would hold classes and suddenly, Jose Leyson who was driving
People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport System, Inc., bumped and struck Dra.
Prudenciado's car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body.
This prompted Dra. Prudenciado to institute an actionagainst Alliance Transport System and Jose
Leyson with the Regional Trial Court for exemplary damages.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Alliance Transport System is liable for exemplary damages

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The court held that based from the evidence
adduced by Dra. Prudenciado, it is apparent from the facts, conditions and circumstances that Jose
Leyson, the driver of Alliance Transport System was running at high speed after turning to the right
along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear. Failing to notice
petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the
collision.

Mecenas Versus Court of Appeals

Doctrine:
The test in determining whether a carrier is liable for exemplary damages Whether or not the
Captain of the vessel acted recklessly or negligently.

Facts:
MT Tacloban, a vessel owned by Philippine National Oil Company and MV Don Juan owned by
Negros Navigation Incorporated with 750 passengers collided at Talbas Strait in the Island of
Mindoro. As a result of the collision, most of the passenger of MV Don Juan Died.
Among the passenger who died are the children of Spouses Perfecto and Sofia Mecenas
whose body were never found despite efforts by the Spouses. The latter instituted an action against
Negros Navigation and the Captain of the said vessel

Issue:
Whether or not Negros Navigation is liable for exemplary Damages

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The court held that the test in determining whether
a carrier is liable for exemplary damages Whether or not the Captain of the vessel acted recklessly
or negligently. In the case at bar, it held that the Santisteban was negligent since he was playing
mahjong before and during the time of collision.
The court further held that based on the evidence adduced, Don Juan was carrying more
passenger than she had been certified as allowed to carry. Hence, Negros Navigation and Captain
Santisteban are liable for exemplary damages on account of their negligence.

ALITALIA VS. IAC

192 SCRA 9

DOCTRINE: Nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

FACTS: Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in UP, and a research grantee of the Philippine
Atomic Energy Agency was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department of Research and
Isotopes of the United Nations in Ispra, Italy. Dr. Pablo booked on petitioner airline, ALITALIA.She
arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting. She was however told by the ALITALIA personnel
there at Milan that her luggage was delayed and was on the succeeding flight but the other flights
arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board, which unfortunately contained her scientific
papers. By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate her bags herself but to no avail.
Completely distraught and discouraged, she returned to Manila without attending the meeting in
Ispra, Italy.Once back in Manila she demanded that ALITALIA make reparation for the damages thus
suffered by her. She rejected Alitalias offer of free airline tickets and commenced an action for
damages. As it turned out, the luggage was actually forwarded to Ispra, but only a day after the
scheduled appearance. It was returned to her after 11 months. The trial court ruled in favor of Dr.
Pablo awarding P20,000 as nominal damages and the Appellate Court not only affirmed the Trial
Court's decision but also increased the award of nominal damages to P40,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Pablo is entitled to nominal damages.

HELD: YES. The opportunity to claim this honor or distinction to present a paper in such a prestigious
gathering was irretrievably lost to Dr. Pablo because of Alitalia's breach of its contract.Apart from this,
there can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned
to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time
when, having gone to Rome, she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in
theconference. As she herself put it, she "was really shocked and distraught and confused."Certainly,
the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to
that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.

SALUDO JR. V. CA
207 SCRA 498

DOCTRINE: Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that nominal damages are not
intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done but the amount of which the
evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according
to the circumstances of the case.

FACTS: Crispina Galdo Saludo died in Chicago, Illinois. Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of
Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment of the remains from
Chicago to the Philippines. Pomierski brought the remains to Continental Mortuary Air Services
(CMAS) at the Chicago Airport which made the necessary arrangements such as flight transfer with
PAL thru the carriers agent Air Care International. Maria Salvacion, the daughter upon arrival at San
Francisco, went to the TWA to inquire about her mothers remains. But she was told they did not know
anything about it. She then called Pomierski that her mothers remains were not at the West Coast
terminal. Pomierski immediately called CMAS which informed that the remains were on a plane to
Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched. CMAS
called and told Pomierski that they were sending the remains back to California via Texas. Petitioners
filed a complaint against TWA and PAL for the misshipment and delay in the delay of the cargo
containing the remains. Petitioners alleged that private respondents received the casketed remains of
Crispina only October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the issuance of PAL Airway Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners mother was
due to the fault of respondent airline companies

HELD: NO, but TWA was held to pay petitioners nominal damages of P40,000 for its violation of the
degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier Ordinarily, a receipt is
not essential to a complete delivery of goods to the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is
competent and prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of lading,
when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the
goods described therein for shipment. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the NCC applies. The facts show
that the Saludos right to be treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence
required by law to be exercised by every common carrier was violated by TWA and this entitles them,
at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear
that nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done but
the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the
discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. In the exercise of the Courts
discretion, the Court find an award of P40,000.00 as nominal damages in favor of the Saludos to be a
reasonable amount under the circumstances of the present case.

Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways

16 SCRA 431

Doctrine: Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the public good when
moral damages are awarded, may likewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant
acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner

Facts: Reservations for first class accommodations of Pan American World Airways from Tokyo to
San Francisco for then Senator Fernando Lopez and family. First class tickets for the
abovementioned flight were subsequently issued by PAN AM after it was fully paid before the tickets
were issued. As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines arriving in
Tokyo. As soon as they arrived, Sen. Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine Embassy to
contact PAN AMs Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations for that evenings flight. For
the given reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up, however, PAN AMs Tokyo office
informed Minister Busuego that PAN AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip
as first class passengers. Due to pressing engagements awaiting Senator Lopez and his wife in the
United States, Sen. Lopez and party were constrained to take PAN AMs flight from Tokyo to San
Francisco as tourist passengers. Senator Lopez however made it clear, as indicated in his letter to
PAN AMs Tokyo office on that date, that they did so under protest and without prejudice to further
action against the airline. Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against
PAN-AM in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant

Issue: Whether or not PAN AM was guilty of bad faith and is liable for the damages caused to the
passenger-plaintiffs.

Held:YES. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
Self enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill will, may well have been the motive, but it
is malice nevertheless. PAN AMs employees admitted, by its own evidence, first cancelled the
Lopezes reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from the latter
or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class
reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so misleading the Lopezes into purchasing first class
tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had
none, Pan Am wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its contracts
with the Lopezes should there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time.
At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by Pan Am, there would at least be negligence so
gross and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith. First, moral damages are recoverable in
breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil
Code). Second, in addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code).