MANALO v.
SISTOZA Ruling: NO
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act
6975 creating the Department of Interior
and Local Government was signed into law by
former President Corazon C. Aquino.
Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975 provided that
the appointments of PNP Chief, Senior
Superintendent to Deputy Director General,
and Director General shall be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon,
promoted fifteen (15) respondent police
officers, by appointing them to positions in the
Philippine National Police with the
rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
appointments of respondent police
officers were in a permanent capacity.
Without their names submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for
confirmation,
the said police officers took their oath of office
and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of
Budget and Management, under the then
Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized
disbursements for their salaries and
other emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought
before this Court this present original
petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to
assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made
therefor.
Issue: WON the appointments extended to
police officers require the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the
Constitution, there are four groups of officers
of the government to be appointed by the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential
appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first
category, need not be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections
26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which
empower the Commission on Appointments to
confirm the appointments of public
officials whose appointments are not required
by the Constitution to be confirmed.
1
sections notwithstanding, the rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that
when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the
removal of the unconstitutional
provisions would not affect the validity and
enforceability of the other provisions, the
statute remains valid without its voided
sections.
It is settled that the police force is different
from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the
herein respondent police officers, do not fall
under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYAO
Facts: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag
was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelecs EID by then Comelec Chairperson
Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On
March 2001, respondent Benipayo was
appointed Comelec Chairman together with
other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his
capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10,
2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees
are prohibited during the election
period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request
for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative and
criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that
her reassignment violated Section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and
other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before
the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment
and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman
and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
Issue: WON the assumption of office by
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the
President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact
appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only
to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner
Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista
Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the
COMELEC "shall be independent", this
provision should be harmonized with the
Presidents power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm
ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the
Presidents power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on
statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will
also run counter to the clear intent of
2
the framers of the Constitution.
SORIANO V. LISTA
Facts: Public respondents were promoted by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
different ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) on different dates as follows:
Reuben S. Lista Vice Admiral, Philippine
Coast Guard
Domingo T. Estera Rear Admiral, Philippine
Coast Guard
Miguel C. Tabares Commodore, Philippine
Coast Guard
Arthur N. Gosingan Commodore, Philippine
Coast Guard
Efren L. Taduran Naval Captain, Philippine
Coast Guard
Cesar A. Sarile Naval Captain, Philippine
Coast Guard
Danilo M. Vilda Naval Captain, Philippine
Coast Guard
Elpidio B. Padama Commodore, Philippine
Coast Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the
non-submission of their names to the
Commission on Appointments (CA) for
confirmation, all of the said respondent
officers
of the PCG had assumed their duties and
functions. According to petitioner, their
respective appointments are illegal and
unconstitutional for failure to undergo the
confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they
should be prohibited from discharging
their duties and functions as such officers of
the PCG.
Issue: WON the appointments of the
respondents need the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Held: NO.
The PCG is under the DOTC and no longer
part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of
captain and higher for that matter, do
not require confirmation by the CA.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
The enumeration of appointments subject to
confirmation by the CA under Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
exclusive. The clause officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain refers to military officers alone. This
is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the proposed
text
of said Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Since the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers are not
covered by the above-cited provision of
the Constitution, the same need not be
confirmed by the CA.
PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
Facts: This is a petition to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo) through Executive
Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to
Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.,
Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul
M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C.
Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as
acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments
to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. Congress
adjourned on 22 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments
to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity. the consent of
the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session,
constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the legislature
3
may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive
power to appoint are construed strictly against
the legislature. The scope of the
legislatures interference in the executives
power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive
office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the
duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.
However, even if the Commission on
Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo
should not have appointed respondents as
acting secretaries because in case of a
vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated as
Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for
a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an
alter ego of the President, such as the office of
a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on
the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the
alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have
the Presidents confidence. Thus, by
the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That
person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make
it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to
make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states
that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that
person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to
consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this
safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be
distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may
be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need
for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present
case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyos issuance of
ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
QUINTOS-DELLES V. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then
President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral
representative for women in 1988. Their
appointment was done while Congress was in
session. They were subsequently scheduled
to take their oath of office but the Commission
4
on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition
against Deles et al alleging that their
appointment must have the concurrence of the
COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the
COA. She said that her appointment does not
need the concurrence of the COA. This is in
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, which does not require her
appointment to be confirmed by the COA to
qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the
appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives should be
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the
first group abovementioned) are to be
reviewed by the COA, namely, the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. All other appointments by the
President are to be made without the
participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase
and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. The
provision of the Constitution which provides
power to the president in this regard is Section
7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
BERMUDEZ V. TORRES
Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec.
of Justice Guingona for the position of
Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty.
Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then
Representative Yap of the Second District of
Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos
to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and
assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties
and functions of the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor. Petitioner
Bermudezchallenged the appointment of
Quiaoit primarily on the ground that
theappointment lacks the recommendation of
the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section
9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that all
provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the Pres.
upon the recommendation of the Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of a
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to
the President can be held fatal to
the appointmentof Quiaoit
Held: An appointment to a public office is the
unequivocal act of designating or selecting by
one having the authority therefor of
anindividual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust.
The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act required of the appointing authority
has been complied with and its acceptance
thereafter by the appointee in order to render
it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence,
discretionary. The appointing authority has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have
the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the
Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate
5
officer, such conferment must be understood
as necessarily carrying with it an ample
discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the
head of government whose authority includes
the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Control means the authority of an empowered
officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set
aside, what a subordinate officer has done in
the performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as and
when the former deems it to be appropriate.
The Pres. has the power to assume directly
the functions of an executive department,
bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred
that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of
discretion of officials under him
or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the
Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III,
Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
should be interpreted to be a mere advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character and not
binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it
is made. The recommendation is here nothing
really more than advisory in nature. The Pres.,
being the head of the ExecutiveDepartment,
could very well disregard or do away with the
action of the departments, bureaus or offices
even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having
acted beyond the scope of his authority.
GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Gonzales III v Office of the President
FACTS:
There are two petitions that have
been consolidated because they raise
a common thread of issues relating to
the President's exercise of the power
to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which
they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
1st case ->G.R. No. 19623: Petition for
Certiorari which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the
Decisiondated March 31, 2011
rendered by the Office of the
dismissing petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of
guilt on the administrative charges of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of
Public Trust. The petition primarily
seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives
the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
seeking to annul, reverse and set
aside (1) the undated Order requiring
petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to
submit a written explanation with
respect to alleged acts or omissions
constituting serious/grave offenses in
relation to the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into with Major
General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the
April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary
Investigation,both issued by the Office
of the President the administrative
case initiated against petitioner as a
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The petition likewise
seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving
the President the power to dismiss a
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama
involving Rolando Mendoza and Hong
Kong nationals in a tourist bus.
Rolando Mendoza demanded his
reinstatement.Sometime in 2008, a
formal charge for Grave Misconduct
(robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was
filed against him and other police
officers.
Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission turned
over, upon the request of petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication
6
The administrative case against
Mendoza was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations
made by the complainant had not
been substantiated "by any evidence
at all to warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses charged.
However, upon the recommendation
of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was
approved by the Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration followed by a
Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The pleadings
mentioned and the records of the
case were assigned for review and
recommendation to Graft Investigation
and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L.
Garcia, who released a draft Order for
appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio,
who, in turn, signed and forwarded
said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's
office on April 27, 2010. Not more than
ten (10) days after, more particularly
on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed
the Order, together with the case
records, for final approval by
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
in whose office it remained pending
for final review and action when P/S
Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate
 attempt to have himself reinstated in
the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC): found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious and inexcusable negligence
and gross violation of their own rules
of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish
for more than nine (9) months without
any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to
resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases
within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking
Case was elevated to OP. OP
instituted a Formal Chargeagainst
petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the
Performance of Official Duty under
Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292 and other pertinent
CivilService Laws, rules and
regulations, and for Misconduct in
Office under Section 3 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his
office.
2nd case: the Acting Deputy Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D.
Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia,
Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark
Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder and Money Laundering
before the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the President
has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
confers upon the President the power to
appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies,
viz:
that is, when the power to remove is expressly
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies
shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least six nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of
three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
7
Such appointments shall require no
confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself
is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under
Section 244 of the same Article, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of
R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the
law without running afoul of any provision in
the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact,
the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to
appoint carries with it the power to
remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all
officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him.49 The exception to this is
when the law expressly provides otherwise -
vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. In some cases, the
Constitution expressly separates the power to
remove from the President's power to appoint.
Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President. However,
Members of the Supreme Court may be
removed after impeachment proceedings
initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI),
while judges of lower courts may be removed
only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission Section 1(2), Article
IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section
1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on
Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise
be appointed by the President, but they may
be removed only by impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the President
(Section 9, Article XI) but may also be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms
an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested
with was intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional
mandate to be a protector of the people. What
the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated
from the whims of politicians." 52 And so it was
that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution had declared the creation of the
independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, who are described as "protectors of
the people" and constitutionally mandated to
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees
of the Government Section 12, Article XI.
Pertinent provisions under Article XI
prescribes a term of office of seven years
without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a
decrease in salaries during the term of office
Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy
Section 14 and ensures the exercise of
constitutional functions Section 12 and 13.
The cloak of independence is meant to build
up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional
strength to effectively function as official critic,
mobilizer of government, constitutional
watchdog53 and protector of the people. It
certainly cannot be made to extend to
wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of
its officials to escape administrative discipline.
8
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of
shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts
of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President's exercise of such
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman
and (2) that there must be observance of due
process. Reiterating the grounds for
impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the
Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from
office for the same grounds that the
Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said
that giving the President the power to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or
compromise the constitutional independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is,
precisely, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies
and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of
their duties that their removal can only be had
on grounds provided by law.
IN RE: HON. MATEO A. VALENZUELA
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the
appointments signed by the President dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of
Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively.
These appointments appear prima facie, at
least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President
from making any appointments two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments toexecutive positions
when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the
ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art.
VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term the
President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15
of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta
were unquestionably made during the period
of the ban. They come within the operation of
theprohibition relating to appointments. While
the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason
to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban.
DE RAMA V. CA
Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court
Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service
Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De
Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy
Porta, Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory,
Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce,
Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza, Jane
Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino
Ramos, respondents.
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of
Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July
13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or
CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments
of fourteen (14) municipal employees.
Justifying his recall request on the allegation
that the appointments of the said employees
were midnight appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation
of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners
request for the recall of the appointments of
the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The
CSC upheld the validity of the appointments
on the ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office
in Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to
9
present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Issue: whether or not the recall made by
petitioner is valid.
Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to
recall an appointment initially approved, but
only when such appointment and approval are
proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and
regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that
an appointment accepted by the appointee
cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the
appointing authority and shall remain in force
and in effect until disapproved by the
Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private
respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with
the procedures/criteria provided in the
agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to
pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the
existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to
promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing
civil service law, rules and regulations.
DE CASTRO V. JBC AND ARROYO
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the
controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy. Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January
18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in
Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents
power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from presidential elections and up to the end of his
political pressures, such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some
of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC
could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another
part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires
10
the President to appoint one from the short list
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it
the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments
to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next
term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division
of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII obviously of the same character, in that they
to the appointment of Members of the affect the power of the President to appoint.
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
done so. They could not have ignored the only to appointments within the Executive
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They Department renders conclusive that Section
would have easily and surely written the 15 also applies only to the Executive
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article Department. This conclusion is consistent with
VII as being equally applicable to the the rule that every part of the statute must be
appointment of Members of the Supreme interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section that every part must be considered together
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was with the other parts, and kept subservient to
not done only reveals that the prohibition the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
against the President or Acting President absurd to assume that the framers deliberately
making appointments within two months situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
before the next presidential elections and up Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
to the end of the Presidents or Acting cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If
Presidents term does not refer to the that was their intention in respect of
Members of the Supreme Court. appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if
only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
Had the framers intended to extend the most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

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