Dacasin vs Dacasin
Christopher J. and was followed by two more children, both girls.
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (American) and respondent Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin (Filipino), were married in Manila and they have one
daughter, Stephanie.
Later on, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court in
Illinois a divorce decree against petitioner, where it was ruled that the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
Petitioner and respondent executed an agreement in Manila for the
joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement.
Petitioner sued respondent to enforce the Agreement, and alleged
that in violation of the agreement, respondent exercised sole custody
over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others,
lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court's retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
Issue is: WON the agreement on joint custody of the child can be
enforced and WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of petitioner's suit.
Ruling: (1st: No. 2nd: Yes) The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
petitioner's suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction . . . for the purpose
of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution." Petitioner's suit seeks the enforcement not of the
"various provisions" of the divorce decree but of the postdivorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the
zone of the Illinois court's so-called "retained jurisdiction."
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in
fact or in law (under the 2nd par of Art 213 of the Family Code) is also
undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother . . . ."
Thus, the agreement's object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under
seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it
has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow
joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for
joint parental authority when spouses live together.
However, upon separation of the spouses the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any
agreement to the contrary is void.
Also, supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie,
respondent repudiated the agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondent's act effectively brought the parties back to
ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.
Thus, the court ruled, instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's
suit, to remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of
Stephanie's custody who is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing
the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the
default standard on child custody proceedings.
David vs CA
Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon Villar, who is a married man and the father of four children.
After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, which resulted to a son,
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife and,
after which, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
One summer, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., who was 6
yo, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child.
Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC rendered justice in favor of Daisie, stating that the rightful
custody of the minor is hereby given to the natural mother.
However, the CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was
not proper and that the question of custody of a minor child may be
decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation where the
parents are married to each other but are separated.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's
decision.
Issue is: WON the remedy of Habeas Corpus is proper.
Ruling: Yes. Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinnement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto."
The determination of the right to the custody of minor children is
relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other,
are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow,
however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
In this case, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child. Since petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Thus, Rule 102, makes no distinction between the case of a mother
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who is vested
with sole parental authority but is deprived of her rightful custody of
her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may
be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for
giving him custody of the child. Because again, under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for
depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially
considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her
own since they were born.
(Not very relevant to the provisions but maybe asked) although the
question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the
grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private
respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J.,
being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was
decided by the RTC, cant be taken from the mother's custody. Even
now that the child is over 7 yo, the mother's custody over him will
have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit"
and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to
have custody of her child.
Thus, the decision of CA is reversed and private respondent is ordered
to deliver the minor to the custody of his mother and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00 pending the fixing of
the amount of support in an appropriate action
 Sombong vs CA have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not
to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody
Petitioner is the mother of the child Arabella O. Sombong who was of petitioner due to her lack of a stable job and her separation from a
then only six months old and was brought to a clinic for relief of married man (wtf so sexist)
coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have Thus, petition for writ of habeas corpus by petitioner denied.
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00.
Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner's
failure to pay the fees.
Petitioner said that she allegedly paid the private respondents by
installments and despite such alleged payments the owners of the
clinic allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her.
Petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two
years, then after another 3 years.
The Office of Prosecutor, on basis of petitioners complaint, filed an
information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor. She alleged therein that Arabella was being
unlawfully detained and imprisoned.
Spouses Ty admitted that the child had for some time been in her
custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic was turned over to
someone who was properly identified to be the child's guardian. They
then disclosed the possibility of where the child may be found.
When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl
named Christina Grace Neri was found, which she claimed to be hers.
Later on, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in
Sombongs favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child.
An appeal was filed to the CA.
Issue is: WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted in pursuit
of the best interest of the child
Ruling: No. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held.
However, to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, its
requisites must be met. The first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty. Furthermore, in the second part of the
same provision, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if
the restraint is voluntary, the court held that the said writ is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her
own free will.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the
instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld
from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best
interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and
not that of the respondent.
(On 1st requisite) The evidence showed before the court doesnt
warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. In
fact, the court noticed that there was no show of emotion on the
mother when she met her lost daughter.
(2nd requisite) Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be
entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken
identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina.
Moreover, the way the respondents obtained custody isnt material
to the habeas corpus issue.
(3rd requisite) Private respondents are financially, physically and
spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina. They