3:16-cv-01901-JAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
J.S., A MINOR CHILD, BY AND : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv-01901-JAM
THROUGH IS MOTHER AND NEXT :
FRIEND, STEPHANIE SANS :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
GLASTONBURY BOARD OF :
EDUCATION and CONNECTICUT :
STATE DEPARTMENT OF :
EDUCATION :
Defendants, : AUGUST 29, 2017

MOVANTS OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Movant-Father, Peter T. Szymonik, respectfully objects to the Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgement dated August 14, 2017, which the Movant received from mothers counsel

on August 25, 2017. Movant moves this honorable court to strike Plaintiffs motion as it

represents an abuse of process and was filed on his childs behalf with the Movants knowledge,

involvement or consent as a fit parent. Movant so requests as the motion was improperly filed in

violation of the Movants fundamental civil and constitutional rights as an equal custodial and

decision making parent under state and federal law; in violation of the Movants liberty interest

right to equally advocate for and to equally represent the interests of his son with a federally

protected disability; filed in ongoing defiance of the parenting and decision making orders issued

by the State of Connecticut Superior Court for Family Matters; and in violation of the Movants

rights to advocate for and represent his disabled sons interests under the American With

Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Americans With Disabilities Act Amendment Act (ADAAA.)

In support thereof, Movant represents as follows:

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I. BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

This matter involves the manipulation and exploitation of a child with autism by his troubled

mother and deliberate harm done to his education by her. The mother has a long history of

attacking and suing public school systems alleging violations of IDEA. Mother has now done so

by exploiting her own disabled child and his disability.

Mothers divorce counsel has personally aiding and abetting the mother by personally

injecting himself into the litigation. Mothers counsel has done so by opting to personally

involve himself with the minor child and the childs educational issues absent any legal or other

authority to do so, and over the Movants direction and instruction that mothers counsel

immediately cease and desist. Movant raises the issue of standing and notices the court both the

mother and her divorce counsel have engaged in fraud before the court.

Mothers counsel does not have clean hands in the matter before the court as the result of his

unethical, unprofessional and potentially criminal misconduct with the minor child. Mothers

counsel has deliberately attempted to interfere with and harm the childs education. Mothers

counsel has deliberately exposed the child to risk of injury in order to promote his claims and his

presentations before the court. Mothers counsel has deliberately worked to exploit the childs

autism and intellectual disability in order to adversely influence and manipulate the child.

Mothers counsel has done so in order to promote his own personal agenda and his own personal

financial interests in the matter before this and other courts. Mothers counsel has deliberately,

purposely and willfully influenced the child against his school system and encouraged the childs

refusal to attend school while at the same time attempted to find fault the Glastonbury School

System for a situation of counsels own manufacture, rising to the level of fraud and lack of

candor before the court.

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On January 23, 2017, Movant filed a detailed Motion to Dismiss, to review attorney

misconduct and for sanction documenting the history and events of this matter. Movant did not

receive a reply, ruling, notice of hearing, or any other notices from the court following the filing

of this motion. Movant refers the court to his January 23, 2017 motion in support of this motion.

I. RESPONSE

Plaintiffs motion alleges that the minor childs due process rights were violated because

the hearing officer barred the testimony from the child with a federally protected disability. This

claim is knowingly and deliberately disingenuous. The childs due process rights (and rights

under the federal ADA and ADAAA and IDEA), are exclusively exercised through his parents.

The child has no right or authority of any kind under any state or federal law to make a decision

as to whether or not he will testify in a due process hearing, or in any other legal proceeding.

The mother in this matter enjoys no legal right or authority of any kind under state court orders

or any state or federal law to unilaterally decide whether or not the child will testify. The mother

in this matter enjoys no legal right or authority of any kind to attempt to force the child to testify

over the Movants objections and over the fathers decision and direction that the child does not.

Mother has no right or authority of any kind to attempt to force the child to testify without first

consulting with the Movant and following the state court ordered dispute resolution and

educational decision making process. By her own admission under sworn testimony, mother

acknowledged that she did not do so.

Mother enjoys no right, authority or standing of any kind to unilaterally approach the

federal court or to engage the federal court machinery on behalf of the minor child. The minor

child enjoys no right or authority of any kind under any state or federal law to engage the federal

court machinery on his own behalf absent the consent of both of his parents.

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Mothers counsel has no right or authority of any kind under any state or federal law to

meet with the minor child in his mothers home without the Movants consent and over the

fathers repeated and formal written notices that the mothers counsel immediately cease and

desist from involving himself with the minor childs education and medical care.

Mothers counsel has no right or authority of any kind to meet with the minor child in his

mothers home in order encourage and coerce the child with a federally protected disability to

testify against his school system and against his educators. Or to adversely influence the child

by making representations to the child that if the child repeats what his mother and her divorce

counsel wish him to say, and that if he repeats the accusations they manufactured against the

school system, that the childs new school system will make friends for him or provide him

with a better education.

The right and authority of fit parents to make educational, medical and other decisions

regarding the care, custody and control of their minor children has been guaranteed and upheld

by every ruling of the SCOTUS going back over 150 years. The decision as to whether or not

the child should or will testify is not up to the child, but solely and exclusively a decision to be

by his parents, and both of his parents.

If Plaintiff were to prevail in this claim, then the court would necessarily and improperly

be denying the Movant his due process rights, his federally protected right as a fit and decision

making parent, and his fundamental right to advocate for and represent the interests of his child

a violation which has already occurred and continues to occur on the state level and which is the

issue of an state level appeal, several ongoing federal civil rights investigations, as well as a

criminal investigation. The court should no more entertain this argument than an argument that a

child gets to decide when and if and under what conditions they attend school, or if their parents

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should follow court orders.

Movant notes to the court that the hearing officer rightfully questioned the highly unusual

nature of the request that the child be allowed to testify against his educators and school system.

As reflected in transcripts, the hearing officer noted that in his 25+ year history of overseeing

due process hearing complaints, only once before had he entertained a request or allowed a child

to testify and that was under highly unusual circumstances and in camera.

It is simply outrageous that any competent attorney would attempt to force or claim that a

child with an intellectual disability should testify in a legal proceeding against their school

system over his parents objections. This is indicative of the larger and underlying issue before

this and other courts regarding the presentations made by the mother and her divorce counsel to

this and other courts regarding their self-manufactured and self-serving claims.

In a horrific manner, mothers counsel attempted to force the childs testimony after the

hearing officer granted the Movants request to intervene in the due process hearing. Mothers

counsel met with the child in his mothers home and attempted to force the issue of the child

testifying over the Movants strong written objections. As a direct result of mothers counsels

actions and his personal involvement with the child, mothers counsel no longer had clean hands

in the matter before the hearing office (or this court.) Mothers counsels actions were further

directly contrary to the goal of returning the child to full time school attendance and exposed the

child to very real risk of injury, on top of the educational injury he had already caused the child

to suffer.

The proverbial elephant before the court is that childs mother, as a special education

teacher herself, allowed and caused her won disabled son to miss and skip over 200 days of

school when with her. Mother did not require that her own disabled son attend school every day.

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She instead rewarded the child for his chronic school truancy by taking him on shopping trips,

buying him gifts and taking him out to eat. Mothers counsel was well aware of this. Mothers

counsel did not advise her to ensure the child attended school. Instead, mother counsel

personally encouraged, defended and promoted this behavior and conduct on the part of his

client, while then turning around and attempting to fault the school system (and the Movant) for

the childs lack of school attendance.

Plaintiff claims that their due process rights were violated as a result of the hearing

officer failing to admit relevant evidence. Movant notes that during the course of the almost

yearlong due process hearings, mothers counsel deliberately altered and attempted to submit

knowingly fraudulent and self-manufactured evidence. This in the form of altered and partially

represented homework assignments which were not properly indexed and outside the scope of

the hearings. Mothers counsel was repeatedly afforded an opportunity to remedy yet failed and

refused to do so causing the hearings to be continually delayed. Movant notes that the Boards

counsel raised the issue of lack of candor on the part of mothers counsel.

Plaintiff cites that IDEA provides that a district court (b) shall hear additional

evidence at the request of a party; and as part of independent review of an administrative

finding. Plaintiff then claims that the hearing officers final decision prejudiced the Plaintiff

and the childs rights, again referencing the hearing officer denying the Plaintiffs request that

the child testify. Once again, mothers counsel has made representations to the court as if the

Movant and his fundamental rights to make decisions for his son are not relevant and do not

matter. Mothers counsel is well aware that the Movant directed in writing that his son not

testify against his school system given the extreme emotional, educational, medical and other

very real harm this would subject his disabled son to. Mothers counsel recklessly proceeded

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ignoring the Movants direction to him. Mothers counsel to this day continues to proceed in

spite of being made well aware of the injury he caused to the child and the harm he caused to

the childs education.

Movant explained and documented in his January 23. 2017 motion that the mother in this

matter enjoyed, and enjoys, no legal right or authority of any kind to unilaterally decide whether

or not the parties child would or would not testify. She has in fact violated (and continues to

violate) the Movants fundamental civil liberty interest rights, his due process rights, his parental

rights and his rights to advocate for his minor child under the ADA, ADAAA, and IDEA.

Therefore and perhaps paradoxically, it is the mother herself who is violating the childs

due process rights. Mother is doing so by continuing to pursue legal and other actions in a

manner which assumes that the Movant does not exist and that he has no rights to advocate for

his childs interests in this or other legal proceedings. Proceedings which the mother has

fraudulently initiated to promote her personal agenda against public school systems now using

her own disabled child to do so. Mother (and her divorce counsel) are free to pursue her own

legal interests., Mother is not free to pursue on behalf of her child on the knowingly false belief

and claim that she, and she alone, exclusively represents the childs interests and in a unilateral

and authoritarian manner.

Under federal law, this would not even be the case if the Movant were not a custodial

parent. In this case, Movant is an equal custodial and decision making parent as per state court

orders and as per state and federal law. Movant enjoys the right to have an equal say as to

whether or not his son should approach a federal court to claim his due process rights were

violated. Yet mother continues to pursue in direct violation of the Movants fundamental rights

and parental authority and absent making any effort to engage in the dispute resolution and

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decision making process established by the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut.

The Board of Education (and State of Connecticut) have further violated the Movants

fundamental rights to advocate for his child, and through him, the minor childs due process

rights, by also acting as if the Movant does not exist and has no rights or say in decisions related

to his minor child.

In Plaintiffs own motion, Plaintiff cites Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch.

Dist. RE-1 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017), citing that a school must offer an IEP reasonably

calculated to enable a child to make process appropriate in light of the childs circumstances.

In this matter, the question of whether or not the childs IEP allowed the child to make

educational process was directly impacted and purposely undermined by the actions of the

childs mother and her divorce counsel. As they wanted, allowed and encouraged the child to

skip and miss over 200 days of school in order to undermine his IEP and to allow the childs

education to be adversely affected in support of their self-manufactured claims against the school

system. Actions which they then attempted to blame the school system for. As such, mothers

claim in this regard reflects fraud before the court.

Plaintiff furthers cites the same case stating that the appropriateness of school systems

education program will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also the

input of the childs parents or guardians. Parents plural. Mother and the Movant-Father.

Treating divorced parents differently than married parents in this regard would represent

a violation of equal protection. Faced with a situation where two married parents may disagree in

regards to the appropriateness of an IEP, a school system would not act until and unless there

was agreement between the parents to proceed, the school system would not chose or take sides.

In this matter, a state court made it very clear what process must be followed to ensure both

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parents enjoy the equal right to present their childs interests and to equally be able to advocate

for their child again in order to ensure that both parents fundamental civil liberty interest and

rights to represent their child and his interests are protected.

Plaintiff claims that the hearing officer failed to adequately address essential elements of

the Plaintiffs due process complaints based on lack of or faulty performance and metrics data.

Once again, the mothers claims are knowingly disingenuous as the mother and her divorce

counsel personally and deliberately worked to refuse and undermine each and every effort made

by the District to properly test and evaluate the child. Movant notes to the court that every

school system evaluation request was signed and approved by the Movant the mother refused

to do so or claimed the forms were never sent or provided to her, when they were. Mother

further undermined every effort the school system made to evaluate the child by deliberately

refusing to send the child to school on days he was to be tested and evaluated by the school

system and in order to undermine and prevent the school systems testing and evaluation efforts.

Plaintiff further claims that The District modified and altered the childs testing and

classwork so that he could complete the materials. Movant notes the mother and her divorce

counsel altered and modified the evidence presented before the hearing officer. Mother

deliberately withheld the childs home work from him. Mother did so to prevent the child from

completing his homework and to adversely impact his grades. By her own admission, mother

kept the childs homework assignments from him and the school system for use as evidence

against the school system.

Movant agrees that the District should not have graded the child based solely on the days

he did attend school and solely on the classwork he did perform, although the Movant

appreciates the reasons behind this. The District should have properly graded the child based on

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the fact that he was missing more than half of his days of school, and over 200 days of school,

when with his mother. The District should have taken appropriate legal action in support of the

Movant and his right to educate and parent his child in support of the IEP.

II. ONGOING ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

The American Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct Disciplinary Rule 5-

103(A)(1) states that a lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the case of action or

subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may: (1) Acquire a lien

granted by law to secure his fee or expenses. When the attorney enters into a business

transaction with his client, the burden of proof is on the attorney to show the fairness of the

transaction and that it did not proceed from undue influence. In addition to showing consent after

full disclosure, another important factor in determining whether a transaction is fair is a showing

by the attorney that the client had independent legal advice before completing the transaction.

Movants notes to the court that the Connecticut Professional Code of Attorney Conduct

Rule 1.8 states that: Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions: (a) A lawyer shall

not enter into a business transaction, including investment services, with a client or former client

or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a

client or former client unless: (1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the

interest are fair and reasonable to the client or former client and are fully disclosed and

transmitted in writing to the client or former client in a manner that can be reasonably understood

by the client or former client; (2) The client or former client is advised in writing that the client

or former client should consider the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity

to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in the transaction; (3) The client or former client

gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or former client, to the essential terms of

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the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is

representing the client in the transaction; (4) With regard to a business transaction, the lawyer

advises the client or former client in writing either (A) that the lawyer will provide legal services

to the client or former client concerning the transaction, or (B) that the lawyer will not provide

legal services to the client or former client and that the lawyer is involved as a business person

only and not as a lawyer representing the client or former client and that the lawyer is not one to

whom the client or former client can turn for legal advice concerning the transaction.

Movant notes that in this matter, mothers counsel secured a mortgage lien and assumed a

proprietary financial interest in the matter before this and other courts on April 30, 2015. The

mortgage lien was recorded by the Town of Glastonbury on May 28, 2015. Movant notes that

just two weeks after this transaction, the mother started violating court parenting orders, denying

the Movant any contact with or ability to parent his own disabled son. Mother cut off all

communication with the child and refused to send the child to summer school. Mother launched

her campaign of alienating and turning the child against his school system and disrupting his

education. All with the direct personal aid involvement of her divorce counsel. This is not

purely coincidental.

Movant illustrates to this court that there is no evidence of any kind to support the belief

that the mortgage lien transaction did not violate the federal and state professional rules of

conduct. In point of fact, the lien was not signed executed by an independent legal advisor,

rather the document was signed and executed by mothers counsels own wife.

Movant notes that by assuming a mortgage lien against his mothers home, and then

involving himself in a filing on the minor childs behalf and in the childs name before the

federal court, mothers counsel has necessarily violated the federal rules of conduct. Mothers

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counsel did so by assuming an adverse ownership, possessory, security and other pecuniary

interest in the childs matter and in the childs name. A transaction which the disabled child was

not properly represented in, and could not, under any circumstances, legally enter into as a minor

or be provided informed consent of, or understand the consequences of.

It is for these very reasons that divorce attorney must and may not directly involve

themselves with the parties children. It is for these reasons that professional and ethical

standards of conduct exist and MUST be immediately enforced when violations are brought to a

courts and judges attention.

III. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST

Movant respectfully moves this court to dismiss the matter before this court unless the

Mother can present clear evidence to the federal court that she has complied with, and followed,

the parenting, decision making and conflict management orders issued by the State of

Connecticut Superior Court for Family Matters issued on October 11, 2015 (Hon. J. Carbonneau)

and on January 6th, 2017 (Hon. J. Suarez) and ensured that the Movants equal rights as a

divorced parent to the care, custody and control of his minor children, the Movants equal ability

to advocate for his disabled child, are not infringed by her actions or filings.

Movant respectfully moves this court to halt all proceedings and to order an evidentiary

hearing to review evidence and to hear testimony related to the claim of attorney misconduct on

the part of Mr. Yagaloff and to issue a ruling after a review of the evidence, which may include

sanction against Mr. Yagaloff for his flagrant misconduct and fraud before the court.

Movant respectfully moves this court to order that the State of Connecticut Attorney

Generals Office immediately undertake any and all legal or other action as may be necessary to

ensure that the Movants fundamental civil liberty interests in his children and his constitutional

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rights as a fit and equal parent are protected and upheld by the state. Up to and including taking

any and all necessary steps and legal actions to ensure that the Movants constitutionally

protected rights to the equal care, equal custody, equal access to, and equal control of his minor

children as a fit parent under the state and federal Constitutions is upheld, enforced and restored

by the state and without imposing any further burdens on the Movant, his children or his family

members.

By_____________________
Peter T. Szymonik
Movant-Father
Email: szymonik@gmail.com
142 Chimney Sweep Hill Road
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Tel. (860) 614-7721
Fax. (860) 812-2092

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ORDER

The foregoing motion having been heard, it is hereby ordered that:

Judge/Clerk Dated:

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 29,2017, a copy of the foregoing Motion to was
served via prepaid postal mail, electronic fax and email, to the following:

Keith Yagaloff
1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074
Email: keith@yagaloff.com
Tel. (860) 432-5400
Fax. (860) 432-5402
Counsel for Plaintiff (through Mother)

Leander Altifois Dolphin

Shipman & Goodwin LLP
One Constitution Plaza
Hartford, CT 06103
Email: ldolphin@goodwin.com
Tel. (860) 251-5086
Fax. (860) 251-5216
Glastonbury Board of Education

Peter J. Maher
Shipman & Goodwin LLP
One Constitution Plaza
Hartford, CT 06103
Email: pmaher@goodwin.com
Tel. (860) 251-5507
Fax. (860) 251-5215
Glastonbury Board of Education
Ralph E. Urban
Attorney Generals Office Elm Hartford
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06141
Email: ralph.urban@t.gov
Tel. (860) 808-5210
Fax. (860) 808-5385
Connecticut Department of Education
By__/s/ Peter T. Szymonik_______
Peter T. Szymonik
Email: szymonik@gmail.com
142 Chimney Sweep Hill Road
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Tel. (860) 614-7721
Fax. (860) 812-2092

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EXHIBITS

1. Mortgage Deed dated April, 30 2015

2. May 8, 2015, OurFamilyWizard Decision
3. November 19, 2015 Fathers Objection
4. February 29, 2016 Notice to Yagaloff
5. March 10, 2016 Notice to Yagaloff
6. July 10, 2016, Notice to Yagaloff
7. October 9, Motion to Articulate
8. November 30, 2016 Brief

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Peter T. Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

Hearing Officer Rosado

PO Box 732
Granby, CT 06035 19 November 2015

Re: Glastonbury/J. Sz., Case No. 16-0170

PARENTS RESPONSE TO OBJECTION

Hearing Officer Rosado,

I am responding to Ms. Sans objections submitted to you today as follows:

1. Ms. Sans desire to call our son as a witness does not override my parental decision that
he is not called as a witness.

2. As there exists a parental dispute around this issue, the method to resolve the dispute,
and the steps Ms. Sans has been ordered to follow to resolve it, is clearly defined in our
court orders from October 2013 and are in the Hearing officers possession for
reference.

3. Ms. Sans has made no effort to resolve the dispute in accordance with court orders.

4. Ms. Sans has instead improperly approached and seeks validation from the Hearing
Officer for her contemptuous actions and requests, which should not be aided and
abetted by the Hearing Officer.

5. Next Monday, Father enjoys his custody and parenting time with his son. As such,
father enjoys parental decision making on that day. Fathers parental decision is that
the child my attend school next Monday, and not be brought to the hearing, and
especially considering that the child has already missed 27 days of school when with his
mother, unexcused.

6. The child alleged desire to testify does not override his Fathers parental decision that
he does not.

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Peter T. Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

7. There is no independent variable proof of kind available to the Hearing Officer that any
medical provider or other reputable source supports Ms. Sans claim that the child
desires to testify against his teachers and school system.

8. Common sense would dictate that a child would not, and especially a child with special
needs.

9. Ms. Sans representations must take in consideration of the fact, and evidence
presented to the Hearing Officer in the form of court motions filed and still pending,
that Ms. Sans has denied the child any access to his family members and Father since
June in violation of court orders and also in an act of criminal custodial interference.

10. As such, there is every reason to believe that Ms. Sans, as a special education teacher, is
purposely and willfully manipulating her son with Aspergers Syndrome, taking
advantage of his condition. That she is doing so in order to promote he own personal
agenda to alienate the child from his family and school system. That she is doing so in a
manner harmful to our son, as directly contrary to her claims that she is trying to get
him to attend school.

11. The Hearing Officer has no verifiable or independent evidence of any kind to support
Ms. Sans claim that our son is properly able to advocate for himself or to properly
express himself based solely on his age.

12. Ms. Sans makes and knowingly inaccurate representation in that the child 14 years
old when he is not. The child 14 years and three months old.

13. It should be noted by the Hearing officer that Ms. Sans started alienating the child and
keeping him from his family members and all contact with him on June 19th, a little
before his 14th birthday, and knowing she would inappropriately use his age as a basis to
force him to testify for her.

14. The Hearing Officer has been presented with ample evidence to support the claim that
the child is under duress and being subjected to undue influence by his mother as
documented by emergency court motions filed and still pending and provided to the
Hearing officer for consideration and review in regards to the mothers intent.

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Peter T. Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

15. It is common knowledge that any child asked to testify against his teachers would suffer
anxiety and embarrassment and not be inclined to attend school and face those same
teachers afterwards.

16. Ms. Sans has repeatedly claimed that the child does not attend school due to anxiety
and yet her desire to place the child in this comprising situation is directly contrary to
her claim that she is making efforts to get our son to attend school.

17. Ms. Sans desire to release highly sensitive and confidential medical, DCF, and other
records into evidence and as part of the hearing, is most certainly a medical and
educational decision which would directly impact the child, his right to privacy and his
confidentiality, which the Hearing Officer has already expressed is paramount.

18. Ms. Sans enjoys no legal, statutory or other any right to do so over the Fathers equal
(and in some cases greater) objections raised as a party to this case and as is his right
under IDEA, state and federal law.

19. The Hearing Officer has already ruled that consent(s) [plural] MUST be obtained for
such releases from both parents.

20. The Hearing Officer, given the circumstances of this matter, must at all times recognize,
consider and protect the rights of both parents in this matter and recognize those
rights under applicable state and federal, Constitutional and 14th Amendment Rights,
and precedent in cases involving divorced parents most notably considering and
following the very clear instructions (and restrictions) around each parents ability to
enjoy those rights as per court orders, and so as to not undermine them and in a
dangerous manner.

21. In this situation, the Father is clearly interested in protecting the childs emotional and
medical wellbeing and his sons rights to privacy and confidentiality.

22. The Father has expressed his expert knowledge of his son and his condition and
expressed a grave concern that exposing his son to the anxiety and embarrassment
caused by forcing him to attend such hearing would very likely cause his son extreme
emotional, medical and other harm which may be irreversible.

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Peter T. Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

23. As such, the Hearing Officer should err on the side of caution, and absent any
independent validation that such harm would not result, and from a medical profession
with expert knowledge of the child and his condition.

24. The Mother is well able to present her case, absent the childs involvement, and absent
the introduction of HIPAA protected documentation, medical files, and sealed
information from DCF and other state agencies, and information which is solely related
to parents family court matter - and in light of the long list of evidence list she has
presented and the witnesses she intends to call.

For this and other critical reasons already cited and documented by the Father, the
Father moves the Hearing Officer to deny Ms. Sans objections and issue the protection
requested and required for the child.

Thank you,

Peter T Szymonik

cc: Ms. Leander Dolphin

Ms. Anita Russell
Ms. Mary Jean Scherbert
Ms. Carol Leddy
Ms. Gail Mangs
Ms. Stephanie Sans

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Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

Mr. Keith Yagaloff

Law Office of Keith Yagaloff & Associates
1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074 29 February 2016

Via email to: keith@yagaloff.com

Re: Notice

Dear Mr. Yagaloff,

I have reviewed the events of the morning February 18th and the issue of you knowingly
exposing my son with special needs to risk of injury as defined under Connecticut General
Statute 53-21 with counsel and the Glastonbury Police. My compliant is being reviewed along
with the recording of the incident, which reflects that you were in fact Ms. Sans home and in
the presence of my son again that morning.

You are again being instructed to immediately cease and desist from involving yourself
in my sons educations, their school meetings and their medical care. You are immediately to
cease and desist from any and all involvement with my sons as your conduct is and has exposed
them to fear, trauma and harm.

As per my February 15th, 2015 communication to you and others you are to
immediately cease and desist from your personal interference with my family and your ongoing
threats, harassment, intimidation and acts of conspiracy against myself, my family members
and my sons.

If any of this if unclear to you, please have your counsel contact me.

Thank you,

Peter T Szymonik

1
Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

Mr. Keith Yagaloff

Law Office of Keith Yagaloff & Associates
1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074 10 March 2016

Via fax and email to: keith@yagaloff.com

Re: Notice to Cease and Desist

Dear Mr. Yagaloff,

Please consider this formal notice of the following:

1. On February 3, 2015, you were noticed, along with several other people, to immediately
cease and desist from activities designed to threaten, harass and interfere with myself
and my family members in a manner which rose to the level of conspiracy.

2. In spite of this warning, you opted to share confidential and privileged information with
these third parties in an unethical, and potentially unlawful manner with the intent to
cause harm to myself and my family.

3. Last November, you openly threatened me following a due process hearing. You
threatened both myself and my wife with issues related to our family matters, when my
family counsel only authorized you to discuss due process hearing issues with me.

4. On December 11th, you again attended, disrupted and interfered with a school meeting
in spite of being noticed that a decision was made that you not attend. You again
approached and attempted to engage with me and my wife after the meeting when
asked not to do so. You again made threatening statements to us and about our son.

5. On December 14th, you were noticed in regards to your ongoing ethical violations
regarding communications and other legal boundaries in regards to the family matter, a
DCF hearing, the appeal issue and the school due process matter.

6. You were noticed in regards to the legal paradox you created due to your opening the
family matter in November, while at the same time being involved in an active due

1
Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

process hearing. A due process hearing which you opted to become involved in without
any prior notice and less than 24 hours prior to the start of the hearings.

7. On January 22, 2016, you were noticed and advised to remove yourself from either the
family matter, or the due process hearing. This in order to resolve the legal paradox you
created and to address the legal peril you placed yourself in as a result of your actions,
including your ongoing involvement in my sons school meetings.

8. Instead of resolving the paradox, you opted to knowingly make a false statement during
court hearings held in February that I somehow threatened you and demanded that
you remove yourself from both matters, when I did not.

9. Your false statement before the court repeated a similar complaint filed by the law firm
of Shipman & Goodwin in regards to your knowingly making false statements to a due
process Hearing Officer, also in violation of the Professional Rules of Conduct

10. You were noticed and advised of my intent to sue you in civil and/or federal court for,
and in part: conspiring to interfere with me and my family with the intent to cause
harm; your efforts to interfere with and deny my parental, civil and Constitutional
rights; your ongoing and blatant disregard for court decision making and other orders;
your unethical personal involvement with my sons and your exploitation of them; and
the emotional, financial and other harm you have caused me, my sons, and my family as
a result of your egregious behavior and outrageous conduct and ongoing conspiracy.

11. On February 1, 2016, a Motion for Review was filed and accepted by the court, a copy of
which was forwarded to the Chief Court Administrators Office. Said motion was filed
with a corresponding Request for Leave, which you opted not to respond to. The
Motion for Review detailed your ongoing unethical conduct and remains pending before
the court. The complaint is supported by recordings of the events mentioned.

12. You have been repeatedly noticed that in accordance with court decision making orders
that a decision has already been made, and with input from the court ordered conflict
manager that you not attend school meetings and to cease your personal
involvement with my sons, their educations and their medical care.

2
Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

13. On February 18th, and in open defiance of all prior notices sent to you you again opted
to attend and interfere with a school meeting. This time conspiring and exploiting my
sons condition in a manner which exposed him to harm and risk of injury, against my
direction as a decision making parent, against the instruction of the school system, and
against the advice of professionals present at the meeting.

14. On February 29th, you were noticed and informed of an intent to pursue charges against
you for knowingly exposing my son with autism to harm and risk of injury. You were
again noticed to immediately cease and desist from involving yourself in my sons
educations, their school meetings and their medical care, in any manner.

Please afford this communication the gravity it requires of you. And if it remains unclear,
you are not to attend or further involve yourself in any pending or future school meetings.

Your very personal, undue, unethical, unprofessional and potentially unlawful involvement
with my sons and my family have cost the Town of Glastonbury well over $100,000 to
respond to, in addition to what you cost myself and my family. Behavior which far exceeds the
boundaries of proper legal representation of your client.

Thank you,

Peter T Szymonik

cc: Glastonbury Police Department

Mr. Richard Johnson, Town of Glastonbury

Ms. Anita Russell, Glastonbury Public Schools

Ms. Susan Karp, Glastonbury Board of Education

Rep. Prasad Srinivasan

Rep. Mark Tweedie

Sen. Stephen Cassano

3
Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

Mr. Keith Yagaloff

Law Office of Keith Yagaloff & Associates
1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074 10 July 2016

Via email and fax to: keith@yagaloff.com

Re: Legal Notice and Warning

Dear Mr. Yagaloff,

Denial of Rights Under the Color of Law.

18 U.S.C. 242; 18 U.S.C. 245; 42 U.S.C. 1983

Federal law provides that it is a crime to violate the Rights of a citizen under the color-of-law.

You can be arrested for this crime and also be held personally liable for civil damages.

18 USC 242 provides that whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.

18 USC 245 provided that Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, intimidates or
interferes with any person from participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege,
program, facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States; [or] applying for or
enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any agency of the United States; shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

42 USC 1983 provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.

You are hereby afforded warning and notice that you may be in violation of Federal Law
and subject to arrest and/or civil damages. Federal law also provides that you can be held
personally responsible and liable, as well as your law firm.

You are advised to immediately cease and desist as per prior notices sent to you.

1
Peter Szymonik tel. (860) 614-7721
142 Chimneysweep Hill Road fax. (860) 812-2092
Glastonbury, CT 06033

You are advised to immediately cease and desist from your actions and personal
involvement with myself, my sons and my family which have and continue to deny me my
parental and other rights under federal law, and to immediately seek legal counsel if you do not
understand the law.

Thank you,

Peter T Szymonik

cc: Attorney Alisha Mathers

Lt. W. Craig Sanderson, Glastonbury Police, Investigations Division

2
HHD-FA06-4027147-S : SUPERIOR COURT

STEPHANIE SANS (f/k/a SZYMONIK) : J.D. OF HARTFORD

V. : AT HARTFORD

PETER T. SZYMONIK : NOVEMBER 30, 2016

DEFENDANTS BRIEF AS PER ORDER

Defendant in the above referenced matter, in his individual capacity (having a Pro Se
appearance in addition to the representation of counsel), respectfully responds to the Courts
order of November 10, 2016 (454.00) requesting briefs from the Defendant and Plaintiffs
counsel regarding the issue of whether or not the Defendants filing of an appeal (452.00) of
Judge Nastris Memorandum of Decision on Motion (446.00) stays the matters hearings.

I. BRIEF HISTORY
In February 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Review of Attorney Conduct (424.00)
and Amendment to Motion (425.00.) (Defendant also filed a Motion for Protective Order citing
attorney misconduct in October 2015, which the Court did not accept or act on.)
Defendant asked the Court respond to a very concerning, unusual and unprecedented
situation adversely impacting his minor child with autism. The issue is also of substantial public
interest and as it impacts numerous state and federal agencies and also Public Acts.
Defendants complaint regards Plaintiffs counsel injecting himself into the matter before
the Court by personally involving himself with the minor children, their parenting, their
educations and their medical care --- during the course of the open and active family matter.
These actions on the part of Plaintiffs counsel represent open defiance of the Courts
parenting and decision making orders. Counsel has actively participating in efforts to deny the
Defendant his access and ability to parent his sons. Counsel has involved himself in Plaintiffs
efforts to remove the minor child with autism from his school system. All of this against the
Defendants wishes as an equal custodial and decision making parent. This has been to the
minor childrens extreme detriment harming their educations and their wellbeing.
The minor children experienced none of the chronic truancy and delinquency issues they

1
are currently suffering when they benefitted from joint physical custody and support from both
parents and all of their family members, and prior to February of 2015. All of the childrens
issues and problems started when the Plaintiff opted to ignore this Courts parenting orders and
launched her campaign to remove the child with autism from his school system in violation of
this Courts orders -- with her divorce counsels direct aid and assistance. This being the
change in circumstance the Court has been seeking.
In September of 2016, a separate and distinct hearing was held before Judge Nastri. This
hearing was ordered solely to establish whether Plaintiffs counsel would be a witness in this
matter. Defendant appealed Judge Nastris Memorandum of Decision on Motion, raising the
question asked by the Court and which this brief responds to.

II. LACK OF CANDOR BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL

The Attorneys Oath states as follows:
You solemnly swear or solemnly and sincerely affirm, as the case
may be, that you will do nothing dishonest, and will not
knowingly allow anything dishonest to be done in court, and that
you will inform the court of any dishonesty of which you have
knowledge; that you will not knowingly maintain or assist in
maintaining any cause of action that is false or unlawful; that
you will not obstruct any cause of action for personal gain or
malice; but that you will exercise the office of attorney, in any
court in which you may practice, according to the best of your
learning and judgment, faithfully, to both your client and the
court; so help you God or upon penalty of perjury. (General
Statutes 1-25 and annotations.)

In his brief, Plaintiffs counsel continues to knowingly make false representations

designed to mislead the Court in a dishonest manner. Plaintiffs counsel states that:
on July 14, 2016, the court, Suarez J., granted the defendants
motion for review of attorney conduct, limited to the single
issue of whether, pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, the plaintiffs counsel should be
disqualified from presenting plaintiff because he is allegedly a
necessary witness in the haring.

Plaintiffs counsel omits mention that the Defendant cited Judicial Canons and
requirements on the part of the judicial authority when an issue of attorney misconduct is

2
brought to judicial attention.
Plaintiffs counsel is aware from hearing and prior filings the representation in his brief in
regards to what the Court (Hon. J. Suarez) ordered on July 14th is false. The Court did not order
a separate and distinct hearing before Judge Nastri to examine whether or not Plaintiffs counsel
was a necessary witness or if Plaintiffs counsel would be disqualified. The hearing was not held
to respond to the entirety of Defendants complaints and motions before the Court.
The sole issue before Judge Nastri was whether or not Plaintiffs counsel was a witness
in the family matter (not a necessary witness.) The Court instructed that it would determine how
to proceed after this was first determined by Judge Nastri.

III. PLAINTIFFS PRACTICE BOOK REFERENCES

Plaintiffs counsels conduct has presented the Court with a highly unusual situation, and
situation which would not exist had Plaintiffs counsel adhered to his professional and ethical
obligations and conduct reasonably expected of counsel. Plaintiffs counsel created a bed of his
own making and the process created the situation the Court and parties are now facing.
The highly unusual nature of Plaintiffs counsels conduct is best reflected in the fact that
no attorney, law librarian, legal scholar, or other authority the Defendant canvassed in his
research for this brief, has ever heard of, or could provide any reference to, any case, any
citation, any precedent, in any state where a divorce counsel personally involved themselves
with the parties minor children (and their educations and medical care) during the course of an
active family matter. The Court should note that the Plaintiff apparently also cannot
provide such reference, as it does not exist.
The Practice Book, Professional Rules of Conduct and state statute, therefore necessarily
do not (and cannot) provide the Court with guidance as to how the Court should proceed in such
a situation, given that the situation is simply outrageous, and well beyond the scope and realm
of what may be deemed normal, rational, ethical, professional, reasonable or logical thought.
In Plaintiffs Brief, it is Plaintiff s counsel has authored the document making
representations in his own defense and his own self-interest, through the Plaintiff. (Plaintiff
herself was not even present in the hearing!) A reversal of roles which would not be tolerated or
deemed acceptable in any other Court, for any reason.
Plaintiffs counsel cites Practice Book Sec. 61-11 regarding the application of stays on

3
appeals. However, these sections do not apply as the Defendant has not appealed orders related
to the family matter or seeking to stay execution of any order related to the family matter. The
issue on appeal is one solely related to a complaint of attorney misconduct raised in accordance
with Judicial Canons.
The issue of attorney misconduct was reviewed in a separate and distinct hearing and
before another judge --- and most notably, in order to avoid a mistrial.
Defendants appeal is currently solely related to the separate and distinct issue of
attorney misconduct and the finding made by Judge Nastri in that separate t hearing and not an
order made in the family court matter.
The Courts current parenting orders are not being challenged or being appealed by the
Defendant. Yet this is the assumption Plaintiffs counsel is attempting to use. As such, the
references to Section 61-11 cannot and do not apply. Perhaps ironically, Defendants primary
argument before the Court is that the Courts October 2013 parenting and decision making orders
have not been enforced since February of 2015, and that they should be. As if they were, all of
the issues currently before the Court, and impacting the minor children, would be resolved.

IV. MISTRIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Connecticut Practice Book and Blacks Legal Dictionary define the basis of a
mistrial being any conduct inside or outside the courtroom which results in substantial and
irreparable prejudice to a defendants case.
At the start of a hearing held on July 14, 2016, the Court, for the first time since October
2015, heard and appreciated the extent and gravity of the Defendants complaint and concerns.
The Court, of its own accord, acknowledged that presentment of evidence related to
Plaintiffs counsels personal involvement with the minor child with autism, will leave [sic]
to a mistrial.

THE COURT: -- and Im going to decide after hes through as to how

to proceed, whether to give an evidentiary hearing, whether to
refer this to a disciplinary action, or to refer this to some other
Judge to decide this limited issue thats before the Court --
MR. SZYMONIK: Thank, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- because, quite frankly, sir, I think that if you

4
 were allowed to put on evidence in this that, in your motion, it
may taint the proceeding thats before me. So I really am trying
very carefully to avoid that --
MR. SZYMONIK: Understood.
THE COURT: -- because that will leave to a mistrial, and were
going to have to start all over again.
MR. SZYMONIK: Understood.

However, the Court unfortunately did not recognize that such evidence supporting
grounds for a mistrial resulting from Plaintiffs counsels involvement was already present
before the Court in the form of sworn testimony from a Department of Children and Families
social worker, Ms. Nadege Lys.
Ms. Lys testified during a hearing held on February 9, 2016. Ms. Lys testified that she
interviewed the child with autism as part of her investigation into educational neglect and the
childs chronic truancy from school when with his mother. Ms. Lys testified that she conducted
the interview in the Plaintiffs home. And that the Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs counsel, were both
seated next to the child:

Q And you indicated that you interviewed Jason at his home?

A Yes.

Q Whose home was that?

A That was Moms home.

Q And did you interview the child alone?

A No.

Q Mother was present?

A Mother was present, and so was counsel.

THE COURT: And so was who?

Further,
BY ATTY. MATHERS (CONTINUED):

Q Counsel? Im sorry. Counsel was present?

5
 A Yes, Mothers counsel was present at her request.

Q And how long did that interview last?

A Roughly, maybe 30 to 45 minutes with the child.

Q In the presence of Mom and her attorney?

A Yes.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. MATHERS:

Q Do you recall specifically the date that you went to meet with
Jason, Mother and Attorney Yagaloff?

A No. Its in my documents. I can --

THE COURT: Im sorry, maam. What --

THE WITNESS: I dont recall the exact date, but its in

my document that I brought with me.

THE COURT: Okay.

Q If it would refresh your recollection to look at the document,

would you be able to then tell us?

A It would. It would; 10/28/2015.

Q Okay, and during your meeting with Jason, how did he appear,
physically? What was his demeanor?

A He appeared to be in good spirits.

Q And during your meeting, were you -- did the discussion -- was
it strictly between you and Jason, or did -- when the meeting occurred
with you, Jason, Mom and Moms attorney, during that meeting, did
either Mom or her counsel chime in, in the presence of the child?

A Towards the end of it, yes.

Q And who chimed in towards the end of the meeting?

A It was mutual.

Q Mutual? Im sorry, between Mom and her counsel?

A Yes.

Q In the presence of the child?

6
 A To clarify certain things, yes.

Q In the presence of the child?

A Yes.

Q And what clarification did Ms. Sans offer?

A I would have to look at my notes.

THE COURT: If its going to refresh your recollection, you

could look at it, but please read it to yourself, and then, look up
and tell us if your recollection has been refreshed.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Yes, I had asked if there were any major
events that took place when the visits initially stopped, and the
child had said no, and then, both Mom and Attorney Yagaloff
clarified for me that there were no major events that took place in
June when the visits stopped.

V. UNDERLYING ISSUE
In July of 2016, the Court necessarily and appropriately halted hearings in order to avoid
a mistrial. The Court ordering a separate hearing before another judge to examine evidence
related to the Defendants complaint. The Court directed that this separate hearing solely to
establish whether Plaintiffs counsel was a witness (not a material witness), and that the Court
would determine how to proceed after this determination was made by another judge.
In spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Judge Nastri found that Plaintiffs
counsel was not a necessary witness and would not be disqualified. Defendant notes to the Court
that even if this should stand on appeal -- Judge Nastri did not resolve the underlying issue of
whether or not Plaintiffs counsels personal involvement and influence on the parties minor
child with autism has spoiled the matter before the Court. Nor has Judge Nastris ruling
addressed the issue that Plaintiffs counsel does not have clean hands in the matter.
Defendant represents that allowing hearings to continue with both the appeal, and this
underlying issue, remaining unresolved would be contrary to the Courts own direction and
highly prejudicial to the Defendant.
Proceeding with hearings would present grounds for an immediate mistrial. This
especially in light of the evidence already before the Court in regards to Plaintiffs counsels
involvement with the minor children and the necessary impact counsels direct personal
involvement with the child has had on the child, on his education and to his wellbeing.

7
 Most concerning, if the Court allowed hearings to proceed and entered a judgment
detrimental to the Defendant, and the Appeals Court sub sequentially find for the Defendant in
regards to his appeal, the Court would have necessarily allowed hearings to continue with a
counsel who should have been disqualified, if not reprimanded and/or sanctioned.
In this scenario, the harm done to the Defendant (and his minor children) would be
irreparable. No reasonable or adequate remedy would be available to the Defendant or his
minor children, and in addition to the damage already done them since February of 2015.

VI. SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC POLICY INTEREST

The implications of a trial court establishing that a divorce counsel may involve
themselves with the parties minor children during the course of an active and open family
matter, and especially influencing a child with autism and limited capacity, represents a matter of
substantial public and state interest.
This finding and the precedent being set by the trial court would necessarily completely
nullify and invalidate the intent of Public 14-3 (for whose passage the Defendant was recognized
for on the floor of the State Senate) as well as Public 14-207, and in an unconstitutional manner.
Defendant notes that in his Motion for Review filed with the Appeals Court, the
Defendant specifically asked the reviewing court to stay trial court proceedings, in part, for very
these reasons and grounds.
Chapter 83 of the Connecticut Practice Book and CT General Statute 52-265a therefore
fully and completely apply to the Defendants appeal, including Section 84-3 Stay of Execution,
pending a response, and direction, from the reviewing court.

IV. FEDERAL CASE EDUCATIONAL REFERENCE

Defendant encourages the trial court to view a video of a federal hearing in the case of
Hope v. Pelzer held on October 9, 2016 in the Ninth Circuit of Appeals. This directly related to
the situation before this Court and to the question posed by the Court in this matter:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/01-309.ZS.html

In the above referenced matter, the State of California attorney argues that state social
workers who committed perjury as part of a child removal case were justified in doing so,

8
because there was no state statute prohibiting them from doing so.

The judges were shocked at this representation with Judge Trott stating: There doesnt
have to be case law. There can be other ways to show that its clearly established. Thats not an
absolute requirement. There doesnt have to be case on all fours.

In this matter, Plaintiff s counsel (and Judge Nastri) are inexplicability attempting to
represent that counsels personal involvement with the minor child is not misconduct, has not
turned him into a witness, has no impact on the matter before the Court in this matter, and should
not prevent hearings from proceeding solely because there is no state statute or Practice Book
reference which states that counsels conduct is prohibited. The Defendant furthers calls to this
Courts attention the observation of Judge Trott as follows:

As early as the 1940s, The United States Supreme Court has held that theres
an absolute liberty interest, a fundamental liberty interest, that parents have in the
care, custody, and control of their children. Thats been on the books forever. They have
that fundamental, Constitutional right that cannot be impaired without due process of
law. Judge Trott, 2016

V. JURISPRUDENCE ARGUMENT

Defendant recognizes that the trial court enjoys broad discretion. However, in situations
where there is any ambiguity and no clear reference in law and statute, judges are required to use
reasonable jurisprudence. This requires the application and articulation of logical and rational
thought, unbiased reasoning and to err on the side of caution to prevent potential harm.

The Court (and Officers of the Court) are obligated to act in a manner which upholds,
enforces and protects not only the Courts existing parenting orders, but also recognizes and
protects the parties fundamental civil, due process and constitutional rights as fit parents,
including the constitution right to make decisions for their children. (See above.)

Any and every effort and argument made by the Plaintiffs counsel to undermine
and ignore such orders and rights, must be refused and denied by the trial court.

In asking the Defendant and Plaintiffs counsel to provide briefs, the Court has

9
recognized that there is no clear procedural reference in the Practice Book or state statute
covering a situation where a divorce counsel becomes personally involved with, and influences,
the parties minor children during the course of an active and open family matter, and especially
a child with special needs and limited capacity.

Plaintiffs counsels Practice Book references are cursory, irrelevant to the issue before
the Court and question posed, and not proper or applicable citation.

As a relevant point in fact, the trial court stating that state and federal law allows a
parent to bring an advocate of their choosing to a school meeting is legally correct. However,
this does not address the issue in this scenario, which involves two parents and their equal
decision making rights. It does not respond to the scenario which one parent is engaging their
divorce counsel with their minor child in order to trample, ignore and impede the equal decision
making rights of the other parent.

This because the law cited did not anticipate and does not cover the situation of a counsel
in an active family matter court becoming personally involved in the parties children and their
educations or necessarily influencing and impacting the litigation before the Court.

The Court must err on the side of caution and rely instead on jurisprudence. It must take
steps necessary to protect the Defendants equal rights as a joint custodial and equal decision
making parent, and that his decision that Plaintiffs counsel not involve himself with his children,
not participate or interfere with their school meetings, and not involve himself in removing the
child from his school system all in direct violation of Court orders.

The Courts belief that the Plaintiff is free to involve any attorney would only be valid
if the advocate the Plaintiff chose to involve in school meetings was engaged and involved in
accordance with the Courts standing decision making orders and in a manner which did not
ignore and trample the Defendants equal parenting, decision making and constitutional rights.

If she did so, Plaintiffs rights would not be infringed in any way, nor would any state or
federal law be violated, nor would the Defendants rights be violated. As the Superior Court for
Family in Hartford made it very clear how both parties must exercise their rights.

Evidence and testimony already before the Court reflects that the Defendant has used the

10
process ordered. He proposed to the Plaintiff that her counsel not be involved with the children
or their educations. Plaintiff did not respond within 72 hours. Therefore, Defendants decision
that her counsel not involve himself in school meetings or the childrens educations stands.

Notice of this decision, along with supporting evidence that the Court ordered process
was followed has been provided to the Plaintiff as well as Plaintiffs counsel, and ignored.
Plaintiffs counsel has no right or authority or any kind, under any state or federal law, or under
any Practice Book citation, to defy or work undermine such decision.

There is no valid Practice Book or state statute reference or citation allowing Plaintiffs
counsel to do so. As such involvement on the part of Plaintiffs counsel defies all common
sense, all jurisprudence and every known professional and ethical standard for attorney conduct.
The fact that there is no specific Practice Book or state statute reference stating that hearings may
not proceed or be halted in this situation, does not impart a finding that they should.

Plaintiff counsel makes reference to Judge Nastris finding that only a trial judge can
determine materiality and relevance. Yet this is the very issue on appeal and now before the
reviewing court. Defendant acknowledges and recognizes that the trial court judges enjoy wide
discretion, however, such discretion comes an obligation not abuse such discretion, and
especially when it relates to evidence before the trial court.

A trial court judge may not, for example, represent that a bloody knife is a clean sock. A
trial court judge may not represent that an attorney attended school meetings solely as an
advocate and solely to gather information, when the evidence before the Court clearly reflects
that the attorney disrupted the school meetings, was sitting next to the child, attempted to force a
minor child with autism to testify against his educators over his parents and the school systems
objections, and attempted to make a medical decision for the child over a parents objection.

A trial court judge may not misrepresent the dates and time periods of electronic
evidence. A trial court may not order an evidentiary hearing, only to then improperly conclude
the hearing prior to the parties resting their cases, issuing a finding on issues which were not
before the judge. Such actions represent grave procedural, factual and other error on the part of
the trial court. Errors which the Appeals Court has been asked to review in accordance with due
process and statutory right.

11
 IV. CONCLUSION
Proceeding with hearings in the family matter would, by the Courts own representation,
require a mistrial unless the underlying issue before this Court and the issue before the
reviewing court are first fully addressed and resolved.
A solution to avoid a mistrial may be for the Court to proceed with the hearing, but to
prohibit the involvement of Plaintiffs counsel until the distinct and separate issue of Plaintiffs
counsels role as a witness is first resolved by the reviewing court. This would not be
disqualification of counsel, per se, rather more akin to sequestering a prospective witness until
the status of the witness is established. The Court should again note that this situation is the
result of Plaintiffs and her counsels own cause and manufacture and the Court should take
necessary steps to ensure the Defendant is not further burdened or harmed by their actions.

Plaintiff is free to engage other counsel in the interim. Even if the trial court should find
that an automatic stay of execution does not apply, this is not the question the Court has asked, as
the Defendant is not challenging an order which involves a stay of execution.

The question the Court has asked is if the Defendants appeal of Judge Nastris finding
impacts and requires hearings in the family matter to be halted. The Court has already
established the continuation of the hearings would result in a mistrial, given the evidence before
the Court. For this and other reasons, the hearings must necessarily be suspended until and
unless the issue still before the trial court and now the reviewing court, are first properly
addressed and resolved.

THE DEFENDANT

PETER T. SZYMONIK

By:
PETER T. SZYMONIK
142 Chimney Sweep Hill Road
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Tel. 860-614-7721
Fax. 860-812-2092

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion was sent by fax and/or email prepaid to the
following counsel of record this, the 30th day of November, 2016:

Keith Yagaloff, Esq.

1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074
tel. (860) 432-5400
fax. (860) 432-5402

Peter T. Szymonik

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