CONFIRMATION OF CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS

SARMIENTO VS MISON

Mison MAY be appointed by the President without the consent/confirmation of the COA

- The proceedings of the 1986 ConCom support this. In the original text, the phrase "AND BUREAUS"
came after "heads of executive

The petitioners (Sarmiento and Arcilla) want to stop Mison from performing his functions in the Office of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on the ground that Mison's appointment as
COMMISSIONER of the BOC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it was not confirmed by the Commission on
Apppointments (COA).

- Mison says that his appointment by the President is Constitutional, EVEN WITHOUT the confirmation
of the COA.

Under Article 7, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Consti, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:

GROUP 1: Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitutio

- clearly appointed with the consent of the COA, and if the President approves the nomination, he
appoints them

GROUP 2: All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law

GROUP 3: Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint

GROUP 4: Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone

GROUPS 2, 3 and 4: contentious in the case

RATIO/DOCTRINE: Mison MAY be appointed by the President without the consent/confirmation of the
COA

- The proceedings of the 1986 ConCom support this. In the original text, the phrase "AND BUREAUS"
came after "heads of executive

-According to the ConCom records, Commissioner Regalado asked for the deletion of the phrase "and
bureaus"

- However, this STILL MEANS that the President is the one who will appoint them, but their appointment
shall no longer be subject to The Committee
 - amendment because it MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THOSE OTHER OFFICERS MENTIONED IN GROUPS 2, 3
and 4 DO NOT HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BY THE COA.

POWER OF IMPEACHMENT

Art. XI, Sec. 2

RPC 114
RPC 210
R.A. 3019
Art. XI, Sec. 3

Romulo vs. Yniguez (Feb 4, 1986)

Court will not mandamus speaker of Batasan to retrieve shelved impeachment case against Marcos

If acquitted:

o One cannot file a criminal for the same acts on which he was acquitted from on the impeachment
proceedings

o Official remains in office

Facts:
1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan
Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its
further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached.
It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.

2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the
archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved
by the Batasan.

3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out
the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the
Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of
Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided
for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the
complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and
 that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the
Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely
to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an
unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed
to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval
of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by
the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all
The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial
to proceed.

5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend
that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this
Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules
are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are
invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan
as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even
without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due
course to the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of
impeachment

NO.

1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act
of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution
beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution
and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for
impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for
recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply
with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually
be a direct order to the Batasan itself.
3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The
secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who
cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the
spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer
of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is
directed has the absolute power to execute it.

Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan (Mar 22, 1984)

If position is impeachable, that official must FIRST BE IMPEACHED before criminal case is filed against
him

Petitioner was the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. He was charged with grave coercionhe allegedly
took over a gas station. (Later, this information was amendedLecaroz allegedly ordered policemen to
sell the gas in the station and padlocked the station without any legal authority. (Note: if not mayor,
police would not have followed orders.) The information for grave coercion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Lecaroz filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case that it should have instead been filed with the
ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. When the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion, Lecaroz filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

The SC decided against Lecaroz

1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. Said court exercised jurisdiction over public
officials even for cases not related to Graft and CorruptionPD 1486 had expanded the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include offenses committed in relation to a public officials
office. The amended complaint clearly alleges this. While PD 1861 subsequently limited
jurisdiction to offenses punishable by imprisonment greater than prision correccional, the same
Decree had a proviso indicating that pending cases shall remain with the Sandiganbayan
2. Impeachment cases are the exception to the rule of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Those public
officials who are subject to impeachment, in order to be held liable in subsequent criminal
proceedings, must first be removed from office through impeachment.
 Corona vs. Senate (July 17, 2012)

Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, but the role of the judiciary in these cases is a matter
of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balances in our government.

An impeachment complaint was filed against CJ Corona alleging culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and graft and corruption [refer to the eight Articles of Impeachment]. Petitioner
argued against these proceedings in that there was grave abuse of discretion and that the petition
against him was legally infirm and the allegations, baseless. Respondents argue that subjecting the
impeachments proceedings defeats the purpose of impeachment, but the court ruled that it has
certiorari jurisdiction over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings, particularly those tainted by
GAD. However, the issue was rendered moot, given that the impeachment trial concluded and Corona
accepted the verdict.

The Court held that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, but the role of the
judiciary in these cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balances in our government. Acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government are subject to judicial review if tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

HOWEVER, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of
screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90- day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and
his own acts.

Philippine Savings Bank vs Senate Impeachment Court

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits:

I. THE FACTS

Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before the
Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the Senate, sitting
as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum,
dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch.
The subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly
owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUE

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

III. THE RULING

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the

respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on
the [merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits:

xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan
v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government
Service Insurance System v. 15thDivision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is
the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositors right to privacy in relation to
such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has presented
any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an
exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

J del Castillos Cases (Plagiarism)

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et
al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice twisted the true intents of the
following books to support the assailed decision:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of
International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.

HELD:

The court ruled in favor of Justice Castillo and held that he was not guilty of plagiarism, misconduct and
inexcusable negligence.

This cannot be a case of plagiarism because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillos
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. According to the Supreme Court, the passages
lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the state on international
law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors
works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said
authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise
her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part
cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her.

Justice Serenos Dissent:

In her dissent, she presented the portions of Castillos work and those of the original authors work ---
something that the majority did not even look at or considered in the ruling of their decision. Evidently
from these factual data, Castillo should have been guilty of plagiarism. Further, it was said that there
exists a judicial plagiarism because courts are bound by precedents and stare decisis.

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION ART 17 SEC 1-4

Gonzales vs. COMELEC (Nov 9, 1967)

when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress;
but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a
legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall
be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:

1. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is
sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.

2. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held
that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Art. XV, Sec. 1, The 1935 Constitution

ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS

Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.

*Lambino v. COMELEC

Through peoples initiative, citizens may only propose amendments, not revisions, to the Constitution

The Lambino groups proposal constitutes not an amendment but a revision. It fails to pass both the
qualitative and quantitative tests used to determine if something partakes of an amendment or a
revision. The proposal to change from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral Parliamentary
one is a revision because:

(1) it would affect a lot of other provisions in the Constitution, and

(2) it changes the underlying policy embodied in the constitution. Amendments generally do not
affect other provisions apart from the one being amended.

Moreover, the proposal submitted to the people did not even contain the text of the actual
amendment. People should know what the effects of the amendment would be prior to giving their
imprimatur to it.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

a. REQUIRMENT AS TO BILLS

ART 6 SEC 26

LIDASAN vs COMELEC

Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province

FACTS:

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed.
Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in
Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to
have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios
from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another
province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not
so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and
in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of
his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality
of RA 4790.
 Cordero vs Cabatuando

The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case,
has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid.

Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of
indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in
order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by
counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the
Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency
of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
was passed. This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and
now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of
the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by
virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando
countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the
amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether
or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants should be
allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is
satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in
the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the
trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263
would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the
function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.
 De La Cruz vs. Paras (July 25, 1983)
Still good law but VV Mendoza says this is a wrong case; Title SHOULD NOT prevail over
body. The power of regulation includes the power of prohibition
Yu note: this case is unfortunate for holding that when there is a difference in the title and in the
text of the law, the title would control. (Contrary to prior jurisprudence.)

Petitioners had been granted licenses to operate businesses, between 1958 and 1972: well-lit
night clubs with no partitions, where tables are near one another; the hospitality girls are not
allowed to engage in immoral acts and are even subjected to periodic check ups. However, an
Ordinance prohibited the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls. Pursuant to the
Ordinance, the petitioners business permits were revoked. Petitioners then assailed the validity
of the ordinance, but the CFI of Bocaue subsequently upheld its constitutionality and dismissed
the cases. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

The SC decided in favor of the petitioners.

1. The Ordinance was not a valid exercise of police power. It was overbroad: it sought not
merely regulation, but prohibitionit thus amounted to a clear invasion of personal and
property rights.
2. The amendment to RA 938, which the Municipality relied on for the Ordinance, did not
violate the One Bill-One Subject provisionbut only through statutory construction.
Initially, and as reflected in the title, City/Municipal Boards/Councils were only granted
the power to regulate certain places of amusement. The amendment included the power to
prohibit, but this change was not reflected in the title. The SC implied that the statute was
to be interpreted as just allowing Municipal corporations to regulateto save the statute
from Constitutional infirmity.

HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC

petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act
FACTS:
This case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
Sec. 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing Clause) of R.A. 9006, otherwise
known as the Fair Election Act. The Petition also seeks to prohibit the COMELEC from further
implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on the ground that these provisions
would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public
funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.
ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title rule

HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled rule that Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just
law. Because of this strong presumption, courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of
the constitutionality of legislation, as Co, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove
that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail.
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, the Court found that petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They have not put
forward any gripping justification to reverse the ruling in Farias, in which the SC have already
ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects
other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda