United Nations A/70/132

General Assembly Distr.: General

2 July 2015

Original: English

Seventieth session
Item 130 of the preliminary list*
Investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting
in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjld and of the members
of the party accompanying him

Letter dated 2 July 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to

the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 69/246 concerning

the investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death
of Dag Hammarskjld and of the members of the party accompanying him. In
accordance with paragraph 1 of that resolution, I appointed the Independent Panel of
Experts, on 16 March 2015, to examine and assess the probative value of new
information relating to the deaths of the former Secretary-General and those
accompanying him. In the present letter, I will report on the progress made as
requested in paragraph 3 of resolution 69/246.
At the outset, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Head of the Panel,
Mohamed Chande Othman of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the
other members of the Panel, Kerryn Macaulay of Australia and Henrik Larsen of
Denmark, for their excellent contribution to the search for the truth about the events
of 17 and 18 September 1961. The report of the Panel constitutes an indispensable
step towards fulfilling our shared responsibility to establish the facts after these
many years. I have the honour to attach herewith a copy of the report of the Panel as
well as the transmittal letter of the Head of the Panel. I will make the present letter,
the letter of the Head of the Panel, the report of the Panel and its appendices public
subject to minor redactions to protect the personal medical information of the
victims and the privacy of eyewitnesses interviewed by the Panel.
I have the further honour to briefly elaborate on the salient features of the
report of the Panel and its key findings and conclusions. In accordance with its
mandate, the Panel reviewed and summarized the new information made available
to it and assessed its probative value. I am pleased that the Panel has determined not
only whether the new information has probative value, but also the degree to which
it has such value, based on four categories: nil, weak, moderate and strong. It is my
considered view that these categories provide a basis on which a distinction can be
made between the new information that deserves further pursuit in the search for the
truth and the new information that does not.

* A/70/50.

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A/70/132

I am grateful to the Head and the members of the Panel for their travel to
Lusaka and Ndola in Zambia. I also wish to thank the 12 surviving eyewitnesses
whom they interviewed and who generously shared their time and recollections of
the final stages of flight SE-BDY. The work of the Panel was facilitated by the
information conveyed by the Hammarskjld Commission in its report as set out in
the annex to my note of 21 March 2014 (A/68/800). It is a testament to its due
diligence and best efforts that the Panel sought and successfully obtained additional
new information from the relevant national and private archives and from other
prominent sources, including the former Hammarskjld Commissioners as well as
various researchers and technical experts. I also welcome the proactive approach of
the Panel in reaching out to all Member States and in following up with requests for
specific information to certain Member States that may have relevant records or
other relevant information in their possession. This not only served to focus the
efforts of the Panel on materials whose existence appears to be substantiated by the
new information made available to it, but also helped to narrow the scope of the
possible causes to those the plausibility of which the Panel deemed to have
sufficient probative value.
I appreciate the efforts of Member States to cooperate with the Panel and wish
to convey my gratitude to the Member States concerned for their willingness to
provide or make available new information to the Head and/or members of the
Panel. I note, however, that in some cases, Member States have not provided a
substantive response, have not responded at all or have maintained the classified
status of the documents in question despite the passage of time. I intend to follow
up with the Member States concerned. In its report, the Panel also stated that
despite the submission of other specific information requests by the Panel to
certain Member States, those States that have responded have advised that they were
unable to locate any documents responsive to the requests. The Panel is explicit in
its conclusion that this is a line of inquiry that the Panel considers has not yet been
exhausted. I understand this to mean that there is a possibility that unreleased
classified material relating to the crash of SE-BDY may still be available. In this
regard, I urge the Member States concerned to continue their search for relevant
documents and information and to respond as soon as possible to the pending
requests for specific information.
With regard to the examination and assessment by the Panel of the probative
value of the new information made available to it, I note that new information
relating to the cause or causes of death appears to uphold the propriety, findings and
conclusions of the original 1961 post-mortem examination of the passengers of
SE-BDY. This would appear to confirm that 15 passengers on board SE-BDY died
of multiple injuries or presumed multiple injuries sustained in the crash and that the
sixteenth passenger died of similar causes, albeit five days later. The lack of
probative value of the other new information relating to the cause or causes of death
effectively puts to rest the claims that Dag Hammarskjld was assassinated after
surviving the crash.
Similarly, the Panels assessment of the new information relating to sabotage
or hijacking as possible causes of the crash also appears to put these two hypotheses
to rest, absent any additional new information that may emerge. The Panel also
found that claims made by mercenaries, or their interlocutors, and other agents that
they shot or otherwise forced down SE-BDY in an aerial attack lacked credibility.
Finally, while the Panel did not receive any new information that was specifically

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related to pilot error, I note the statement by the Panel that this does not prejudice
the probative value of the existing information concerning that hypothesis of the
cause of the crash.
The Panel assigned moderate probative value to the following new information
relevant to the hypothesis of an aerial attack or other interference as a possible
cause or causes of the crash:
(a) Nine new eyewitness accounts that they observed more than one aircraft
in the air at the same time as SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, and that any
additional aircraft were jets, or that SE-BDY was on fire before it impacted the
ground or that it was fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by other aircraft
present;
(b) The claims by two persons regarding hearing alleged intercepts or
reading transcripts of intercepts of radio transmissions relating to a possible aerial
or ground attack on SE-BDY;
(c) Additional information that has emerged on the air capability of the
provincial government of Katanga in 1961 and its use of foreign military and
paramilitary personnel;
(d) The possibility that communications sent from the CX-52 cryptographic
machine used by Mr. Hammarskjld were intercepted;
(e) The possible role of crew fatigue as a contributing factor to the crash of
SE-BDY under one or more of the hypotheses of the possible causes of the crash;
and
(f) Additional information that calls into question the official account of the
time of discovery of the crash site and the behaviour of various officials and local
authorities.
As such, the Panel ultimately found significant new information that it
assessed as having sufficient probative value to further pursue aerial attack or other
interference as a hypothesis of the possible cause of the crash. In particular, the
Panel specifically concluded that the new eyewitness testimony, the claims of
alleged intercepts and the new information concerning the air capability of the
Katangan forces, as mentioned in (a) to (c) above, may also provide an appreciable
lead in pursuing the truth of the probable cause or causes of the air crash and tragic
deaths.
It is my view that a further inquiry or investigation would be necessary to
finally establish the facts. Such an inquiry or investigation would, however, be in a
better position to reach a conclusive finding regarding the tragic events of 17 and
18 September 1961 with the benefit of the specific information requested by the
Panel from the Member States concerned. I therefore urge Member States, once
again, to disclose, declassify or otherwise allow privileged access to information
that they may have in their possession related to the circumstances and conditions
resulting in the deaths of the passengers of SE-BDY. This would be of particular
relevance in regard to new information that the Panel has assessed as having
moderate probative value.
To this end, I have requested my Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
the United Nations Legal Counsel, to engage with the Member States concerned to

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follow up on the unfulfilled aspects of the Panels requests for specific information
and to receive and review any additional new information provided by Member
States or by other sources in a focused and concerted examination of whether it
alters the probative value of the information currently in our possession. The Legal
Counsel would also advise me on developments that require the attention or action
of the General Assembly. I will report to the Assembly on any further progress made
before the end of its seventieth session.
In this connection, and in line with the recommendation of the Panel to
maintain contact with the various national and privately held archives, I have also
asked the Legal Counsel to explore the feasibility of the establishment of a central
archival holding or other holistic arrangement that would enable access by
electronic or other appropriate means to those records and archives by the United
Nations and any other authorized parties with a view to ensuring their continued and
enhanced preservation and access.
In conclusion, it is imperative that we heed the words of the Head of the Panel
in his transmittal letter of 11 June 2015, wherein he states that the final revelation
of the whole truth about the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic
death of Dag Hammarskjld and of members of the party accompanying him would
still require the United Nations, as a matter of continuity and priority, to further
critically address remaining information gaps, including in the existence of
classified material and information held by Member States and their agencies that
may shed further light on this fatal event and its probable cause or causes.
It is therefore our shared responsibility to pursue the full truth concerning the
conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjld and
the others accompanying him. To that end, I recommend that the General Assembly
remain seized of this matter. This may be our last chance to find the truth. In our
renewed commitment in this regard, I call on the Assembly to reiterate its message
to Member States, further to paragraph 2 of its resolution 69/246, to ensure that any
relevant records that remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact, are
declassified or otherwise made available for review either by the Secretariat of the
United Nations or by any eminent person or persons whom the Assembly may wish
to entrust with this mandate.
I consider this our solemn duty to my illustrious and distinguished
predecessor, Dag Hammarskjld, to the other members of the party accompanying
him and to their families.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon

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Letter of transmittal

Letter dated 11 June 2015 from the Head of the Independent Panel of Experts
established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/246 addressed to the
Secretary-General

In my capacity as Head of the Independent Panel of Experts established

pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/246 and on behalf of the other members
of the Panel, Kerryn Macaulay and Henrik Larsen, I have the honour to submit the
Panels report on our examination and assessment of the probative value of new
information related to the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjld and the members of
the party accompanying him, as well as our key findings, conclusions and
recommendations.
We are honoured to have been appointed by you pursuant to the request of the
General Assembly in its resolution 69/246 and have carried out our mandate mindful
of the historical significance of that resolution in the search for the truth about the
conditions and circumstances resulting in the death of the late Secretary-General
and of the members of the party accompanying him.
In accordance with the terms of reference that you had issued, the Panel
commenced its work on 30 March 2015 and, in the period since, has reviewed the
report and materials submitted by the Hammarskjld Commission, as well as other
information received from Member States and other sources. We travelled to
Zambia to interview new witnesses and to Belgium, Sweden and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to visit various governmental and
non-governmental archives. We proactively sought information from all Member
States and submitted specific information requests to certain Member States.
As a result of the foregoing mandate and activities, the Panel received a large
amount of new information in addition to what the Secretary-General received from
the Hammarskjld Commission. We have reviewed and summarized all new
information made available to the Panel and have assessed that some but not all of it
has probative value. On the basis of the relevance, authenticity, credibility and/or
reliability of the new information, and bearing in mind the relationship that each
piece of information has to the totality of information, the Panel has also assessed
the degree of probative value of each piece of new information as nil, weak,
moderate or strong.
It is the Panels ultimate conclusion that the final revelation of the whole truth
about the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag
Hammarskjld and of members of the party accompanying him would still require
the United Nations, as a matter of continuity and priority, to further critically
address remaining information gaps, including in the existence of classified material
and information held by Member States and their agencies that may shed further
light on this fatal event and its probable cause or causes.
Without prejudice to your prerogatives as Secretary-General and to the
ultimate decision of the General Assembly, the Panel has also made several
recommendations for your consideration concerning the preservation of the archives
in a holistic manner; the continuation of your efforts to obtain classified records or
documents from the Member States concerned; and the disposition of any new
information that is received after the completion of the Panels mandate.

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It has been a distinct privilege to assist you in this important endeavour. We

wish to extend our gratitude to the Deputy Secretary-General for his unwavering
support. We also greatly appreciated the assistance of the Office of Legal Affairs, in
particular the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Stephen Mathias, and
Mona Khalil, Senior Legal Officer. Most of all, we are grateful for the excellent
secretariat support provided by the Secretary of the Panel, Matthew Willis, and the
Assistant to the Panel, Leslyn Raphael, as well as the United Nations Resident
Coordinator in Zambia, Janet Rogan, and the United Nations country team in
Zambia.
We also wish to place on record our deep appreciation to Member States for
their constructive cooperation and hope that they will continue their own efforts to
bring forth documents and other material relating to the death of the late Secretary-
General and the others accompanying him, in accordance with General Assembly
resolution 69/246.
We are grateful to the witnesses who graciously gave us their time and shared
their recollections of the events.
We are beholden to the many experts and specialists who generously gave the
Panel their time and indispensable expertise without any compensation. We must
also thank Susan Williams and the Hammarskjld Commission for their efforts in
bringing this matter to the attention of the international community.
Finally, we extend our profound respect to the families of those who perished
in the plane crash and for their patience in waiting for the truth about what
happened on that fateful night. We hope that our efforts help to shed light in that
regard.

(Signed) Mohamed Chande Othman

Head of the Independent Panel of Experts

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Report of the Independent Panel of Experts established

pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/246*

Contents
Page

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II. New information about the causes of death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III. New information from eyewitnesses to the final stages of flight SE-BDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
IV. New information about an aerial or ground attack or other external threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
V. New information about sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
VI. New information about hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
VII. New information about human factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
VIII. New information about the activities of officials and local authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
IX. Summary of key findings and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendices
1. General information request from the Panel to all Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2. Specific information request from the Panel to the Government of Belgium and the response
thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3. Specific information request from the Panel to the Government of France and the response
thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4. Specific information request from the Panel to the Government of Germany and the response
thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5. Specific information request from the Panel to the Government of the Republic of South
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6. Specific information requests from the Panel to the Government of the United States and the
response thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7. Specific information request from the Panel to the Government of the United Kingdom and
the response thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

__________________
* The present report is being issued without formal editing.

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I. Introduction
Background
1. Having received the report of the Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the
Death of Dag Hammarskjld (Hammarskjld Commission), the Secretary-General
submitted to the General Assembly, on 21 March 2014, that report along with a note
providing his assessment that it includes new evidence related to the tragic death of
former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of the members of the party
accompanying him (see A/68/800 and A/68/800/Add.1). The Hammarskjld
Commission was a private and voluntary body of four renowned international jurists
invited by an enabling committee to principally examine and report whether, in their
view, evidence now available would justify the United Nations in reopening its
inquiry.
2. Having acknowledged the report and considered the assessment of the
Secretary-General, the General Assembly requested in its resolution 69/246 of
29 December 2014 the Secretary-General to appoint an independent panel of experts
to examine new information and assess its probative value. In that resolution, the
General Assembly encouraged Member States to release any relevant records in
their possession and to provide to the Secretary-General relevant information related
to the tragic deaths. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General announced the
appointment, on 16 March 2015, of the Independent Panel of Experts (the Panel) to
examine and assess the probative value of new information related to the conditions
and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjld and of the members of the party accompanying him. He appointed as
the Head of the Panel, Mohamed Chande Othman, the Chief Justice of the United
Republic of Tanzania, as well as Kerryn Macaulay (Australia), an aviation safety
expert, and Henrik Larsen (Denmark), a ballistics expert. The Panel carried out its
work from 30 March to 12 June 2015. This report presents the Panels summary, and
assessment of the probative value, of the new information made available to it, as
well as its findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Previous official inquiries

3. The events subject to the Panels mandate were first examined by the
Investigation Board of the Department of Civil Aviation of the Federal Government
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (the Rhodesian Civil Aviation Board of Investigation),
from 19 September to 2 November 1961. That investigation was followed by a
Federal Commission of Inquiry established under the Federal Commission of
Inquiry Act of 1955 (the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry), whose report was
made public on 19 February 1962. Thereafter, pursuant to its resolution 1628 of
26 October 1961, the General Assembly established a UN Commission of
Investigation (the UN Commission) to conduct an international investigation into
the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic deaths. Following the
publication of the UN Commissions report (A/5069), the General Assembly, in its
resolution 1759 of 26 October 1962, took note of the report and requested the
Secretary-General to inform it of any new evidence that may come to his attention.

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Mandate and definitions

4. Pursuant to General Assembly 69/246 and the terms of reference issued by the
Secretary-General, the Panels mandate was to examine and assess the probative
value of new information related to the conditions and circumstances resulting in
the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of the
members of the party accompanying him. In particular, the Panel was tasked to
review the report and source materials of the Hammarskjld Commission, as well as
any relevant records released by Member States or other relevant information that
might be provided by Member States or other sources; to interview witnesses and
other persons who provided new information, as well as experts who can
authenticate or explain technical aspects of that information; to visit the site where
the incident occurred, if necessary and appropriate; and to produce a report on its
findings, including with new statements from witnesses interviewed by the Panel
and any new records or information provided by Member States or other sources.
5. With regard to the scope of its assessment, the Panel defined new
information as that relating to the tragic deaths which, by virtue of its content or the
timing of its availability, was not available to the UN Commission at the time of its
investigation, as well as information that was available to the UN Commission but
can now be seen in a new light due to the emergence of new material, scientific or
technical developments or best practice.
6. The Panel defined probative value for the purpose of its assessment as
whether and to what to degree the (new) information tends to prove or disprove,
either by itself or in combination with other information, the existence or
nonexistence of a fact or facts related to the conditions and circumstances resulting
in the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of the
members of the party accompanying him. In order to make such an assessment, the
Panel took into account one or more of the following, non-exhaustive criteria, as
applicable to the particular piece or pieces of information: the authenticity of the
information (including consistency and contemporaneousness), type of information
(e.g. primary, secondary, hearsay or circumstantial), its credibility (including its
consistency with other information or established facts), expert technical
assessments and the degree to which it is corroborated by other material.
7. With regard to assessing the probative value of the new information, the Panel
used four value categories: nil, weak, moderate and strong. The selection of four
categories was dictated by the nature, content, source and wide-ranging character of
the new information. Of note, although an item of new information may have been
assessed as weak and thus would need more information to assist in proving in and
of itself the existence or non-existence of a fact or facts, such items were also
viewed and assessed in the context of the totality of the information relating to the
issue. In this context, the assessment of the probative value of a piece or pieces of
information is not necessarily static, and can change depending on the emergence of
additional new information at a later date.
8. The Panel was not mandated to carry out an investigation or to reach any
findings of law.

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Methodology and activities

9. The Panel organized its work according to three phases. In the first phase, it
conducted a desk review of old and new information about the conditions and
circumstances resulting in the tragic deaths, including that contained in the reports
of the prior official inquiries (the Rhodesian Civil Aviation Board of Investigation,
the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry and the UN Commission); the Hammarskjld
Commission report and source materials; relevant files and records in the UN
archives; and contextual information about events in and around the Congo in the
early 1960s. In addition, and further to General Assembly resolution 69/246, which
encouraged Member States to release any relevant records in their possession and to
provide to the Secretary-General relevant information related to the tragic deaths,
the Panel submitted, on 8 April, a general request to all Member States inviting
them to share any such records or information with the Panel (see appendix 1).
10. To assist with its subsequent assessments of the probative value of the new
information made available to it, the Panel also submitted during this phase more
specific information requests, on 23 April 2015, to the Governments of Belgium,
France, Germany, the Republic of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United
States (see appendices 2 to 7). In addition, to the extent possible the Panel met with
representatives of those Member States to explain its requests. Further, the Panel
engaged extensively with the Government of Sweden in the course of its work.
11. In the second phase, the members of the Panel travelled to various locations,
from 28 April to 10 May, to gather and review information relevant to its
assessment. The travels included to London to meet with the former head of the
erstwhile Hammarskjld Commission, Sir Stephen Sedley; to Oxford to review the
papers of the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
Roy Welensky, at the archives of the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford;
to Lusaka and Ndola to interview eyewitnesses to the final stages of flight SE-BDY;
to Brussels to review material at the State Archives of Belgium; and to Stockholm to
review materials at the National Archives of Sweden and the Royal Library of
Sweden, as well as to meet with former Hammarskjld Commission member, Hans
Correl, and voluntary Swedish researchers, Goran Bjrkdahl and Hans Kristian
Simensen. The Panel considered that searches for and reviews of the materials at the
national archives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
were covered by its respective specific information requests to those Governments
and the research of other persons with whom the Panel consulted.
12. Also during this phase, the Panel met in New York with former Hammarskjld
Commission member, Richard Goldstone, and United Kingdom academic and
historian, Dr. Susan Williams, whose book, Who Killed Hammarskjld?: The UN,
the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa (2012) inspired the establishment of
the Hammarskjld Commission and served as a source from which that Commission
drew material.
13. In the third phase, the Panel summarized the new information, carried out
assessments of its probative value and drafted a report on its findings. In assessing
the probative value, the Panel relied on a range of approaches particular to the type
and nature of the information. This included, inter alia, drawing from technical
assessments provided by expert specialists. The Panel obtained, in this regard,
expert assessments related to medico-legal information from the Deputy Chief
Forensic Pathologist of the Institute of Forensic Pathology, University of Southern

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Denmark, Professor Peter Juel Thiis Knudsen; the Chief Forensic Pathologist of
Ontario and Professor of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology at the University of
Toronto, Professor Michael S. Pollanen; and the Director of the Centre for Forensic
and Legal Medicine at the University of Dundee, Professor Stewart Fleming. In
regard to ballistics information, the Panel obtained assessments from Detective
Inspector and Firearms Examiner at the National Centre of Forensic Services in
Denmark, Egon Poulsen, and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), who in turn consulted with the United States National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB).

Structure of the report

14. This report presents a substantive summary of the new information made
available to the Panel relating to the conditions and circumstances resulting in the
tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of the members of
the party accompanying him. Furthermore, it sets out the Panels assessments of the
probative value of that new information.
15. More specifically, the first section summarises and assesses new information
related to the cause or causes of the tragic deaths, organising it around two
categories: death due to multiple injuries or presumed multiple injuries resulting
from the aircraft crash and death purportedly resulting from some other cause or
causes. The report then reviews and assesses new information from eyewitnesses to
the final stages of the flight of SE-BDY, in particular as it relates to possible
external interference resulting in the aircraft crash. It then summarises and assesses
the probative value of the new information related to four hypotheses for the cause
of the crash of SE-BDY, these being pilot error, external attack or threat, sabotage
and hijacking. The Panel did not receive any new information that was related, in
and of itself, to pilot error, or what the UN Commission described in its report as
human failure, as a possible cause of the crash. This does not prejudice the
probative value of the existing information concerning that hypothesis of the cause
of the crash. The next section provides a summary and assessment of new
information related to the possible role of human factors in the crash that is of
probative value in respect of the various hypothesis for the cause of the crash. The
penultimate section of the report reviews and assesses new information about the
activities of officials and local authorities. The final section sets out a summary of
the Panels overall findings, conclusions and recommendations.
16. The Panel wishes to note that it considered it necessary, to provide consistency
of presentation with the reports of the official inquiries and the Hammarskjld
Commission, and to ensure the coherency of this report, to arrange the new
information around the issues or clusters of subjects around the causes or probable
causes of the aircraft crash as considered in the reports of the earlier inquiries and
on which new information has been made available to the Panel. Such an approach
is intended to facilitate a better appreciation of the substance and relevance of the
new information and should not be understood as an endorsement of any particular
theory of the cause or causes of the aircraft crash or the tragic deaths.
17. The Panel also wishes to note that it has made its best efforts to summarize, as
accurately and concisely as possible, within the short period of its mandate, the new
information made available to it from among the volumes of information provided
by the United Nations Secretariat, including the report and source materials

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conveyed to the Secretary-General by the Hammarskjld Commission, as well as by

Member States, national and private archives and a variety of other sources.
Moreover, the Panel notes that its summaries reflect the information it has received
and, while it did not have sufficient time or resources to verify the veracity of every
aspect of the information provided to it, the Panel has nonetheless sought to the
extent possible to assess the authenticity and credibility of that information in its
assessment of the probative value thereof.

II. New information about the causes of death

18. Since the conclusion of the UN Commission in 1961, new information that has
surfaced attempts to interrogate some of the causes of death of the persons on board
the aircraft, as established in the post-mortem medical examinations conducted by
the Rhodesian authorities. There is also a nexus between the causes of death and the
air crash, in terms of whether they occurred during or after the crash. In assessing
the probative value of the new information, the Panel organized the material around
two categories of causes of death, namely, (a) death due to multiple injuries or
presumed multiple injuries resulting from the aircraft crash and, (b) death
purportedly resulting from some other cause or causes. On the former, post-mortem
medical examinations conducted by pathologists in Northern Rhodesian, from 21 to
24 September 1962, and under the Inquests Ordinance, reveal that, with the
exception of a UN Security Officer (AAA), who died on 23 September 1961, and
whose cause of death was attributed to renal failure due to extensive burns
following the aircraft crash, the cause of death of the fifteen other persons on board
the aircraft was found to be multiple injuries or presumed multiple injuries arising
from the air-crash.
19. The autopsy reports should be read together with the Report on the Medical
Investigation of the Accident to Transair DC6B on the night of 17-18 September
1961, prepared by Drs. H. Douglas Ross, P.J. Stevens and J. Hillsdon Smith for the
Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry. With regard to the latter, a claim on the cause of
death presented in the new information is to the effect that Hammarskjld suffered a
fatal gunshot injury to the forehead after the air crash, and another allegation that
the extensively incinerated body of one the Swedish soldiers accompanying him
(BBB) had a bullet wound in the left leg.

Bullet wounds and other injuries

20. The new information on the claim that Hammarskjlds body had a round hole
in the forehead was revealed in an interview published in Swedish newspaper
Aftenposten, on 28 July 2005. Therein, Major-General (Rtd.) Bjorn Egge (deceased),
a Norwegian military officer deployed to the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(UNOC) at the time of the tragic deaths, and who was specifically sent by the UN to
Ndola immediately after the air crash to collect Hammarskjlds cypher machine
and briefcase, asserts that when he viewed Hammarskjlds non-scorched body at
Ndola Hospital, he saw a round hole in the forehead. The inference sought to be
drawn from the above was that the former Secretary-General had not died in or as a
result of the air-crash, but had survived it and been shot and killed thereafter.
Relying on information from the book, Drommenes palass: Trygve Lie og Dag
Hammarskjld-en berating [Palace of the Dreams: A story on Trygve Lie and Dag
Hammarskjld] (2000), by Bodil Katarina Naevdal, Egge further stated that in one

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of the photos taken of the body, this hole had been heavily retouched such that it is
not discernible.
21. Neither the reports of the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry or the
UN Commission indicate whether or not these inquiries were aware of or had
considered Egges claim. Similarly, there is no indication that Egge shared, with any
United Nations official, his alleged observations about Hammarskjlds forehead at
Ndola Hospital at that time or immediately thereafter.

Assassination on the ground by mercenaries

22. This information sits alongside additional claims by a number of former
mercenaries alleged to have said or admitted to having shot dead Hammarskjld or
some of the members of the party accompanying him, at the crash site after the
aircraft had come down. One piece of new information disclosed by Keith Howard
Osmond is that, in June 1999, following a Duke of York School class reunion on
12 August 2013; he met his schoolmate, Colin John Cooper, at the Holiday Inn, in
Taunton, United Kingdom. The latter had confided in him that the crash was staged,
and that he and a South African mercenary he referred to as Swanepoel had been
detailed to ensure that Hammarskjld had died in the crash. He further stated that
upon hearing the aircraft crash, he and several colleagues jumped into a land rover
and made their way to the crash site, where they were the first persons to arrive.
Swanepoel went on to say that Hammarskjld and two of his bodyguards had
survived the crash, and that he allegedly shot and killed Hammarskjld and the two
other survivors. Then Swanepoel and his colleagues apparently riddled the wreckage
with bullets. Cooper is also alleged to have stated that he was paid a Coca-Cola
bottle full of diamonds for his services.
23. Questioned earlier by Norwegian Police at Oppegard Bailiffs Office, in
November 2005, Cooper told them that he applied to be a mercenary in Katanga,
and that when he was in Elizabethville he had shared a hotel room with a South
African mercenary with a police or military background by the name of Swanepoel.
One night when Swanepoel was drunk and emotional, he boasted that he had
participated in killing Hammarskjld after the crash and shot his bodyguard, who
had hitherto survived, as he tried to pull himself out of the site; as well as that
everyone on board the plane, including Hammarskjld, had many bullet wounds.
Information made available to the Panel indicates that the Katangese authorities had
in their service an estimated 500 mercenaries at the time of the crash. Mercenaries
were also present at Ndola airport, on 17 September 1961.
24. The material provided to the Panel by the Hammarskjld Commission contains
information that a person by the name of John Benjamin Ebrnezar Swanepoel was
questioned by a UN investigation Officer, Major A. Erikson, on 26 December 1962.
J.B.E. Swanepoel told the investigator that he was an employee of the Katangese
Gendarmerie and that had re-entered Katanga in mid-July 1961 and stayed until
October 1961, after which he was hospitalized in Kolwezi following the sustainment
of an injury incurred during a hunting expedition. It also contains an attestation that
J.B.E. Swanepeol was repatriated by the United Nations from Elizabethville, on
21 March 1963. The Panel is not in a position to determine from the information
made available to it whether J.B.E Swanepoel was one and the same person referred
to by Colin John Cooper or Keith Howard Osmond.

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25. In connection with its assessment of the probative value of the new
information, the Panel sought the assistance of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa with identifying and assessing the authenticity of the information
implicating Swanepoel. More specifically, the Panel requested, on 23 April 2015,
that the competent South African authorities search for and share with it any
information they may have in their possession relating to the claim, as well as any
other relevant information they may have about the existence and activities of one
or more South Africans working as mercenaries in Katanga in 1961 with the name
Swanepoel (see appendix 5). At the time of writing, the Panel was yet to receive a
response.
26. That said, considering the contradictory and highly divergent accounts given
by Osmond and Cooper, which goes to the root of the issue; their imprecise and
vague identification of a mercenary by the name of Swanepoel, a common name in
South Africa; and as we shall soon highlight, the findings and conclusions of the
post-mortem medical examinations, including the expert forensic opinion, the Panel
found that the probative value of the new information alleging that mercenaries
named Swanepoel or Cooper shot dead Hammarskjld at the crash site is of nil
probative value.

Hammarskjld: found alive or dead

27. In October 2010, John Ngongo, an eyewitness to the tragic event, provided a
statement to Swedish researcher, Goran Bjrkdahl, stating that he had been in the
bush with a now-deceased colleague learning how to make charcoal on the night of
the crash. He recalled that the aircraft had crashed 300 metres from their shelter. At
around dawn they went to the crash site, where he saw a man leaning against an
anthill with his hands behind his head. He seemed to be alive but struggling to
survive. No injuries were noticed on his body.
28. In a statement given to Swedish researchers, H.K. Simensen and
K.G. Hammer, over a year later, on 15 December 2011, he stated that the person he
had seen lay dead. In a later statement made to Bjrkdahl on 23 February 2011, he
gave the distance between the wreckage and where he was as 500 metres and that
the person he had seen was not alive. In yet another statement, this time to the
Hammarskjld Commission, on 13 June 2013, Ngongo stated that the person he saw
was in the backward lying position with his hand back (behind his head) and,
although it was a bit of a distance, he believed the person was dead.
29. Much as it cannot be disputed that Ngongo was at the crash site; considering
that he went there at around 0500 hours, some five hours after the incident; the
material contradictions between his first statement and the subsequent statements
about whether or not the person he saw was alive or dead; the smouldering state of
the wreckage, the ensuing explosions and the safety risk involved in approaching it;
the improbability that at that time he know who Hammarskjld was; and the medical
information that he had died instantaneously, the Panel assigned nil probative value
to his original claim that the person he saw at dawn at the crash site was alive or
struggling to be alive.

Bullet injury to one of the soldiers

30. An Assistant Inspector in the Northern Rhodesia Police Force at the time of
the tragic event, Adrian Eden Begg, informed the Hammarskjld Commission, on

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25 January 2013, that when he visited the crash site to assist in the search of the
wreckage, on 19 September 1961, he discovered the body of a Swedish soldier
concealed beneath the debris, whom he thought was a soldier (BBB) and whom he
photographed. The body was extensively burnt and appeared to have a bullet wound
in the left thigh. The remains of a 9-mm sub-machine gun were in the wreckage
nearby. He believed that the leg injury might have been caused either by the
explosion or discharge of ammunition carried by the soldier.
31. Begg also claimed that while he was at the crash site he photographed the
soldiers body. In fact, the photograph he had taken was the body of another victim
of the crash (CCC), who wore a blue and white United Nations arm band on his left
arm, and not that of the Swedish soldier (BBB).
32. The post-mortem examination of the person that Begg actually saw and
photographed (CCC) noted his cause of death as due to multiple injuries due to the
crash. He had a fracture of the right femur, and the right lower leg had very great
loss of tissue on the lower half, posterially, medially and laterally and his ankle
joint had a fracture dislocation. On the left leg, there was a gaping wound of the
lateral aspect of the mid-thigh, but the femur was intact.

Post-mortem medical examinations

33. In assessing the probative value of the new information related to the cause of
death, the Panel noted that both the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry and the
UN Commission placed significant reliance on the findings of the post-mortem
examinations and the Medical Investigation Report prepared by Drs. Ross, Stevens
and Smith. The Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry was of the view that
Hammarskjld, who was thrown clear of the aircraft and out of the area of fire, and
eight of the other persons on board were killed in the crash. Some of the others
(with the exception of AAA) who were not killed by impact were at least rendered
unconscious and unable to escape. It was the Rhodesian Commissions finding that
Hammarskjld had died instantaneously. Bullets and other projectiles discovered in
the bodies of two of the Swedish soldiers (DDD and BBB) were found to have
resulted from ammunition carried by the soldiers that exploded as a result of the
fire. The ballistics examination also revealed that none had passed through a
rifled barrel of a gun. The UN Commission expressed similar views about the
matter.
34. After a study of available medical information, and in an opinion given on
11 May 2011 to Dr. Williams, Fellow of the Royal College of Pathologists (United
Kingdom), Dr. Robert Ian Vanhegan, opined that no foreign bodies were found in
Hammarskjlds X-rays, which would have shown metal fragments such as bullets,
and that there was no medical evidence of a penetrating head wound. Dr. Vanhegan
was of the view that the orientation of the bullets found in tissues in the two soldiers
(DDD and BBB) did not suggest they had been fired from a gun and did not show
any rifling marks. He concluded that there was no evidence from the post-mortem
examinations of all of the bodies that any person was deliberately shot or that
gunfire played a part in causing the air crash.
35. The Hammarskjld Commission also sought the expert opinion of three
distinguished pathologists, namely, Professor Lennart Rammer of Linkoping;
Professor Christer Busch of Uppsala and Dr. Deryk James of Cardiff. In their joint
opinion, rendered on 24 July 2013, they concluded (after studying the available

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medical and other relevant information but without having the benefit of the autopsy
X-rays) that there was no evidence from the autopsy reports that Hammarskjld had
been shot, subjected to explosion or exposed to smoke. In their opinion, the
post-mortem examinations strongly indicated that the most important cause of death
was the crush injury to the chest with multiple fractures of the ribs, sternum and
thoracic spine, with bleeding into the pleural cavities; all of which would have led
to respiratory failure due to unstable chest wall (flail chest). It was their opinion
that the appearance of the injuries strongly suggested they were caused by
decelerating force during ejection from the aircraft and the subsequent impact of the
body against the ground. The presence of injuries also suggested that Hammarskjld
was alive when the injuries were sustained. In their view, survival would have been
expected to be only brief, though it was not possible to give a definite estimate, and
that Hammarskjld was probably unconscious from his head injury after the impact.
36. Given the claims arising out of the new information on the cause of death; the
nexus of that issue with the air-crash, and the questions raised on the propriety of
the original post-mortem medical examinations by Drs. Ross, Stevens and Smith,
the Panel found it appropriate to seek the opinion of three independent and
renowned forensic experts.
37. The Deputy Chief Forensic Pathologist of the Institute of Forensic Pathology
at the University of Southern Denmark, Professor Peter Juel Thiis Knudsen, came to
the conclusion that there were compelling indications, if not evidence, that
Hammarskjld was alive when he suffered the fractures; and that a gunshot wound
to the head, particularly one that was inflicted before the aircraft crashed, is very
unlikely. He was of the view that, judging from his injuries, it is unlikely
Hammarskjld should have survived the crash for more than a few seconds at most,
and a gunshot wound to the head after he died is also very unlikely and contradicted
by the autopsy findings. He opined that the suspicion of a gunshot wound to the
head is purely speculative and supported in no way by the autopsy. He concluded
his opinion with a caveat that the lack of gunshot wounds to Hammarskjlds body
or the other deceased persons, with the exception of the wounds from exploded
cartridges, does not exclude the possibility that the aircraft was shot down.
38. Chief Forensic Pathologist of Ontario and Professor of Laboratory Medicine
and Pathobiology at the University of Toronto, Professor Michael S. Pollanen, was
also of the opinion that the deaths of all of the occupants in the aircraft can be
explained by injuries sustained in the crash or post-crash fire; that there is no
medical evidence Hammarskjld sustained one or more gunshot wounds to the head
and that the metallic debris embedded in the two soldiers aboard the aircraft,
including bullets and fragments of cartridge cases, are explained by post-crash
thermal ignition of live ammunition contained in the aircraft, ignited by the
post-crash fire, rather than from gunshot wounds. Further, he assessed that the
deaths did not occur prior to the aircraft crash, in that the injuries of the aircrafts
occupants were sustained in the air crash and occurred while they were alive and
explained the deaths. He was of the further opinion that the autopsy reports do not
provide any evidence to determine what caused the aircraft to crash. He opined that
there are no medical or scientific grounds for exhuming Hammarskjlds body or that
of any of the deceased. Pollanen agreed with the findings and conclusions reached
by Drs. Ross, Stevens and Smith, which were arrived at after a pathological
examination of the bodies at the crash site, radiological examinations, external and
internal examinations, and laboratory examinations (histology and toxicology).

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39. The new information, including that by Egge, also endeavours to cast doubt on
the propriety of the autopsy reports, which Egge claimed had been removed from
the case documents when he visited Ndola Hospital immediately after the crash. In
the Panels view, the verified existence of the autopsy records among the Roy
Welensky papers in the archives of the Bodleian Library; of the autopsy records in
the archives of Dr. J. Hillsdon Smith at the Ontario Chief Pathologists Office in
Toronto; and those of Dr. Hugh Douglass Ross at the University of Dundee fatally
undermine any probative value that that claim may have had. With regard to the
availability and accessibility of medical archives, the Panel wishes to commend the
decision of the Government of Sweden to declassify the Medical Information Report
held at the National Archives of Sweden. Similarly, the Panel appreciated the
decision of the University of Dundee to authorise the release and make available to
the Panel for its review the relevant medical records held in its archives.
40. Commissioned by the Panel to examine the archives of Dr. Ross, held at the
University of Dundee Archive Services, the Director of the Centre for Forensic and
Legal Medicine at the University of Dundee, Professor Stewart Fleming, identified
two pieces of primary medico-legal evidence, namely, a complete set of original
X-ray, consisting of 200 X-ray films of all 15 victims of the air-crash and X-rays of
the ankle fracture of Sergeant Julien; and a large chart entitled Analysis of
Pathological Findings on Victims of Accident of UN Aircraft at Ndola on 17/18
September 1961 (the Chart), which consists of a record of the pathologists notes
from the autopsy examinations of all 16 victims that are believed to have been
written contemporaneous to the post-mortem examinations.
41. Having examined the primary evidence, in particular all of the 200 X-rays, and
checked the traumatic injuries against those recorded in the Chart and in the
Medical Investigation Report, Professor Fleming opined that all injuries were
correctly recorded by the pathologists at the time of the post-mortem examinations.
Furthermore, in regard to Hammarskjld, he was of the view that the severity of the
chest trauma was evident in his X-rays and was due to crash injury to the chest.
Based on these findings and Dr. Rosss post-mortem description of the thorax,
vertebrae, neck and head of the victim, he was led to the conclusion that death was
due to ventilatory failure brought about by a crush injury to the chest. He considered
that survival following the accident would have been brief and that the victim would
almost certainly have been unconscious as a consequence of the head injury
described in the Medical Investigation Report. After studying Hammarskjlds skull
X-rays, he concluded with certainty that there was no bullet wound to
Hammarskjlds forehead, as had been claimed by Egge.
42. The Medical Investigation Report acknowledges that Egge officially identified
Hammarskjlds body at Ndola Hospital. His corpse was also viewed by Knutt
Hammarskjld, his nephew. Considering the relevant information; the non-immediate
reporting by Egge to United Nations authorities who had purposely sent him to
Ndola, or to his Norwegian military supervisors, about what he alleged to have seen
on Hammarskjlds forehead at Ndola Hospital; the unexplained delay in disclosing
the alleged new information; the concurrence of the opinion of forensic experts
consulted by the Swedish Royal Medical Board (Dr A. Frykholm and Dr N. Ringertz)
as part of the UN Commissions investigation; and the respective experts consulted
by Dr. Susan Williams, the Hammarskjld Commission and this Panel, who
essentially agree on the correctness, propriety and conclusions of the original
autopsy reports prepared by Drs. Ross, Stevens and Smith, the Panel is of the view

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that Egges claim that Hammarskjld had a bullet hole in his forehead has nil
probative value.
43. Further, considering the mistake by Begg in the identification of the victim,
and the belief that the person he saw had bullet wounds, which is in variance with
the autopsy report, the Panel found the new information provided by him as having
nil probative value.
44. For completeness, it may be added that while the respective forensic experts
consulted by the Hammarskjld Commission and by the Panel generally also agree
that the post-mortem examinations conducted by Drs. Ross, Stevens and Smith were
rather brief and the details of the appearance, size and position of some of the
injuries were described more in summary than they would have been if conducted
according to current forensic standards, they also underscored the point that they
were of good quality, professional, and that they accurately and completely
documented all of the injuries that can also be seen in their respective X-rays, and
were probably in line with what were then the prevailing standard.
45. With regard to the additional claim supported by Egge that one of
Hammarskjlds photographs was heavily retouched to cover up a bullet wound to
his forehead, the Panel was unable to locate the original photographs or the
negatives of Hammarskjld forehead or body taken either at the crash site or at the
Ndola Hospital Mortuary to enable a technical assessment of such a claim.
Moreover, the Panel was unable, due to a lack of complete identifying information,
to ascertain the authority and expertise of the scholar referred to in the Aftenposten
newspaper article and on whom Egge based his assertion. Dr. Vanhegan, who had
viewed three of Hammarskjlds photographs, expressed the view that it is not
possible to determine how the body lay at the time it was found, nor how near it was
to the point of impact of the aircraft when it crashed. Considering all of the above,
and the nature of the unsubstantiated allegation, the Panel found that the probative
value of the new information claiming that one of the photographs of Hammarskjld
was heavily doctored to be weak.

III. New information from eyewitnesses to the final stages of

flight SE-BDY
46. Since the conclusion of the UN Commission, a total of 12 witnesses to the
final stages of the flight of SE-BDY who did not provide information to that inquiry,
or any of the other official inquiries, have provided statements about what they
observed on the night of 17-18 September 1961. Those statements were first
obtained through interviews by private and voluntary researchers and then, in the
case of seven of the witnesses, again by the Hammarskjld Commission in May
2013. While the statements of all 12 witnesses were made available to this Panel, it
interviewed six of the new witnesses itself in Zambia, in May 2015. The remaining
six of the 12 new witnesses were not interviewed by the Panel because they had
either passed away, were unavailable due to health reasons or had previously
provided statements that were based solely on hearsay. The new witnesses cited as
reasons for not testifying at either the UN Commission or the other official inquiries
that they were not made aware at the time that witnesses were being sought or they
were reticent to do so for fear of some form of recrimination.

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47. Of the 12 new witnesses, five (Custon Chipoya, Kankasa, Mwebe, Ngongo and
Ngulube) referred in their statements to having observed more than one aircraft in
the air at the time they believe they saw a large aircraft, assumed to be SE-BDY,
making an approach to land at Ndola on the night of 17-18 September 1961. Seven
of the witnesses (Custon Chipoya, Kankasa, E. Mulenga, S. Mulenga, Mwebe,
Ngongo and Ngulube) claimed that the large aircraft was on fire prior to crashing to
the ground. Despite being just two to three kilometres from the crash site, two
witnesses (Mwansa and Chimema) stated that they did not observe a second aircraft
(or third, for that matter) or signs of a fire on the one aircraft they did see in the air.
48. The Panel noted from its review of all of the witness statements, including
those provided by witnesses who testified at the official inquiries, in 1961 and 1962,
that much of the content of the new witness statements is not entirely new in that
several of the witnesses who testified at the official inquiries also reported
observing one or more aircraft in the air in addition to SE-BDY as the DC6 was
manoeuvring to land at Ndola. Some of these witnesses also reported observing
what they believed was SE-BDY on fire while still airborne. The Panel nevertheless
considered the contents of the statements made by the new witnesses as new
information on the basis that it is from sources not heard by the UN Commission or
the official inquiries that preceded it.
49. In addition, the Panel revisited the statements of what the Rhodesian
Commission described as the African witnesses, assessing that the testimony they
provided was either treated unfairly or inconsistently, was at times held as
unreliable without sufficient reasons, was regarded with extreme suspicion because
of the holding by the witnesses of nationalistic or political feelings or because the
witnesses were disregarded merely for not reporting immediately to the authorities
what they saw even though they satisfactorily explained their reasons for not doing
so. In that connection, the Panel agreed with the Hammarskjld Commission that,
with respect, the UN Commission appears to have been conservative in the selection
of witnesses it heard and that it relied too heavily on the Rhodesian Commission of
Inquiry in this regard, which the Hammarskjld Commission described as a less
reliable predecessor. For these reasons, the Panel considered that the information
provided by such witnesses was old information that could now be seen in a new
light for the purposes of the Panels assessment.

Summary of the new witnesses observations

50. The following is a summary of the observations provided by the 12 new
eyewitnesses to the final stages of flight SE-BDY, as presented in statements to the
Hammarskjld Commission, private researchers and, in the case of six witnesses
(Custon Chipoya, Kankasa, E. Mulenga, S. Mulenga, Mwebe and Ngulube), the
Panel itself. The summaries are organised around the locations from which the
witnesses made their observations on the night of 17-18 September 1961.
51. Four new eyewitnesses to the final stages of the flight of SE-BDY were
charcoal burners attending to their kilns in the forest near the crash site on the night
in question. The first of these (Ngongo) reported that sometime after 2000 hrs (local
time) he observed a large aircraft in the air with a second aircraft flying in close
proximity to it. He described the second aircraft as a small jet based on the sounds
he heard. He recalled seeing that the large aircraft was on fire, in particular the
engine and wings, before it crashed. He noted that he heard the second aircraft leave

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the area after the large aircraft had impacted the ground. The witness claims to have
gone to the crash site at dawn. Upon arrival, he observed that there was nobody
around and that the aircraft wreckage was smouldering. He claims to have seen the
body of Hammarskjld set against an anthill.
52. The second new eyewitness (Custon Chipoya) recalled that around midnight
he witnessed a large aircraft circling in the air. As it circled for the third time, he
saw a small aircraft he described, because of its speed and sound, as a jet. The
witness then described seeing fire going from the small aircraft toward the large
aircraft. He heard a big bang, following which the large aircraft caught fire and then
crashed. The witness claims to have gone to the crash site at dawn, where he
observed police and soldiers present. He reported that many of the bodies of the
victims had already been removed, including that of Hammarskjld, as had parts of
the aircraft wreckage.
53. The third of the new eyewitness in the forest on the night in question (Moses
Chimema) recalled observing a large aircraft in the sky, sometime between 1900 and
2200 hours. He went on to recount that the aircrafts wing bashed into trees as it
turned and then crashed. The witness made no comment in his statements about
having seen the aircraft on fire while it was airborne. Having gone to the crash site
at 0900 hours on 18 September, he observed that the aircraft was still burning and
that there were police present.
54. The fourth new eyewitness at this location (Lumayi Chipoya) stated that she
saw a helicopter with smoke coming out of its tail circling in the area two or three
times, after which it fell down. The witness recalled that she visited the site
shortly after the crash, where she observed police and soldiers present.
55. Two of the 12 new eyewitnesses (Kankasa and Margaret Ngulube) were
located at Twapia (7 km south-east of the crash site), under the flight path of aircraft
approaching to land on runway 10, the runway in use at Ndola airfield on the night
of 17-18 September 1961. The first of these (Kankasa) recounted being called by
her husband, sometime between 2100 and 2200 hours, to quickly come out of the
house to see something happening in the sky. Upon doing so, the witness saw what
she said looked like two army jets pass overhead the house heading toward the
airport. She did not see the large aircraft while it was airborne, but saw flames in the
distance in the direction of the crash site. She did not visit the crash site.
56. The second new eyewitness who was at Twapia (Margaret Ngulube) recalled
seeing two aircraft in the area, one being smaller than the other, between 1800 and
2100 hours. She noted that both aircraft were heading toward the airport from the
west when she saw them. As the small aircraft passed the large aircraft, the wings of
the large aircraft caught fire and then dropped down. The witness stated that she is
not sure where the smaller aircraft went after the large aircraft had disappeared out
of sight. She did not go to the crash site.
57. Three of the new eyewitnesses were located at Chifubu (10 km north-east of
the crash site and five km north-east of the outbound leg of the instrument approach
to Ndola airfield). The first of these (Safeli Mulenga) saw an aircraft coming from
the Congo, between 2000 and 2100 hours, that was larger than normal in size. He
observed the aircraft circling and, on its third round, turning toward the airfield. The
witness stated that the top of the aircraft, but not the wings, then caught fire. He
remarked that it looked as though the fire had come from somewhere else and was

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like lightning. The witness did not observe any other aircraft in the air that
evening. He went to the crash site one or two days after the crash, where he
observed markings on the ground where the bodies had been.
58. The second eyewitness located at Chifubu (Emma Mulenga) recalled
observing an aircraft come from the west, sometime between 1900 and 2000 hours,
which caught her attention because it was circling. On its third orbit, she saw a
flash, like lightning, hit the aircraft from above. The top of the aircraft then caught
fire. The fire increased in intensity as the aircraft dropped out of the sky. The
witness did not hear any other sound or see any other aircraft in the vicinity. She did
not go to the crash site.
59. The third eyewitness at this location (Dickson Mwebe) recalled seeing an
aircraft approach the airfield from the east and start to circle at what he estimated to
have been between 1900 and 2000 hours. On its second round, the aircraft was
joined by another, smaller aircraft that he described as a jet because of its speed and
sound. Soon thereafter, the witness saw a flash emanate from the small aircraft
toward the large aircraft, hitting the top of the wings of the large aircraft and
causing it to catch fire. The small aircraft then departed the area toward the
northwest. The witness went to the crash site at approximately 0600 or 0700 hours,
on 18 September, where he observed police and soldiers at the site. He noted that
the site was cordoned off with red tape and that there was red paint on some of the
trees. A body was lying near an anthill.
60. Three new witnesses in other locations also provided statements. The first of
these (Joseph Kalupentala) recounted a story told to him in 1987 by his then boss
(Chikabouya), in which the boss stated he was detained and threatened by armed
white soldiers when he visited the crash site on the night of 17-18 September. The
witness described himself as a smuggler at that time. He stated that his boss had
added that the soldiers were Belgian and had shot down the aircraft.
61. Another of the eyewitnesses in this group (Douglas Mwansa) stated that at
some stage while he was in his house in Kamensho Mpanshi (3 km south-west of
the crash site), on the night of 17-18 September 1961, he heard an aircraft
approaching from the west. After briefly departing, the aircraft returned heading in
the opposite direction, following which he heard an explosion. Upon hearing this,
the witness immediately ran outside, where he found his wife pointing in the
direction of the crash. The witness did not offer any further information about his
observations of the crash sequence, describing his location as being a bit far from
the crash site. He claimed to have gone to the site at around 0700 hours on
18 September, where he observed police present. Further, he noted that the site was
cordoned off and that the bodies had been removed.
62. The third eyewitness in this group (Abraham Kunda) observed an aircraft
circling in the sky three times on the night of 17-18 September. He noted that soon
thereafter the airport lights went out for the remainder of the evening. At around the
time the lights went out, the aircraft was heading toward Ndola Hill (12 km west of
Ndola airfield). The witness then went back into his house, which was located at
Masala, an area he described as being 200 to 300 yards from the airport. He
visited the crash site sometime on the afternoon of 18 September, but did not
provide any observations of that visit.

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Factors affecting the probative value of the new eyewitness statements

63. Significant events, such as that which occurred on the night of
17-18 September 1961, can leave a vivid and lasting impression on eyewitnesses to
those events. The reliability of eyewitness testimony, and thus its probative value,
generally depends on a number of variables, these being: the extent of the
opportunity for observation or identification; whether the conditions and
circumstances for observation were favourable or not; and the impact that the
passage of time may have on human memory and recollection of past events. While
it is possible for a witnesss account of his or her visual observation, recognition or
identification to be given honestly and with strong conviction, the probative value
of the information in the statements of the new witnesses must be assessed in light
of the foregoing factors.
64. Regarding the considerable variations in the witnesses statements about the
times at which the various events they recall seeing or hearing occurred, both
among themselves and as compared with other information available, the Panel did
not place significant weight in its assessments of probative value on this aspect of
their testimony. This was arrived at on the basis that many of the witnesses relied on
imprecise indications of time, such as the observance of habits in their work and
domestic life, as opposed to clocks or watches.
65. The UN Commission established, based primarily on the time the victims
watches stopped, that the crash occurred shortly after midnight, when the moon was
within minutes of dipping below the horizon. According to meteorology information
and multiple witness statements, it was a clear and almost calm night. Nevertheless,
the Panel considered the possibility that the ability of witnesses located further from
the crash site than others to accurately identify some of the details they described
may have been affected. Conversely, those witnesses who were nearer the crash site,
in particular those who were tending to their charcoal kilns in the forested area in
which the aircraft crashed, may have been better placed to hear and observe the last
moments of the crash sequence yet may not have had complete field of vision
because of the surrounding forest canopy and close proximity of SE-BDY.
66. The Panel assessed that the variations in the number of aircraft observed by
the witnesses does not necessarily mean that some witnesses observations were
accurate and others were not. Factors such as the time at which they observed the
sequence of events and their location may have influenced what they saw in regard
to the number of aircraft in the area at any given time. Further, while not very
familiar with the specific technical aspects of aircraft and aviation, nearly all of the
witnesses stated that they had regularly observed aircraft manoeuvring in and
around Ndola airport in the past. As such, some witnesses offered their views, based
on their experience, about whether any of the aircraft they observed on the night in
question were jets.
67. While noting that some caution must be applied to the eyewitness information
because of factors such as those described in the preceding paragraphs, the majority
of witnesses provided first-hand accounts of what they genuinely believed they had
observed and must be afforded the opportunity to have aspects of their observations
tested against the body of available information.
68. Moreover, in some cases, the observations of the new eyewitnesses related to
different issues or events under consideration by the Panel and, therefore, aspects of

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their information were assessed by it according to the criteria outlined earlier, as

having a higher or lower probative value than other aspects of the same body of
information they provided.
69. Recalling its mandate to examine and assess the probative value of new
information related to the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic deaths
of those on board SE-BDY, and considering the content of the witnesses statements,
the Panel considered the degree to which the information provided by the new
witnesses helps to establish the following: that there was more than one aircraft in
the air at the time SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present
other than SE-BDY was a jet, that SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the
ground and whether SE-BDY was fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one
or more other aircraft. On these questions, the Panel found that the probative value
of the new information provided by nine witnesses is moderate, and that of three
witnesses (Lumayi Chipoya, Kalupentala and Kunda), whose purported observations
were grossly inconsistent with other available information or based almost entirely
on hearsay, is nil.
70. The Panel will return to the witnesses observations about the crash site in the
section in this report titled new information about the activities of officials and local
authorities.

IV. New information about an aerial or ground attack or other

external threat
71. The UN Commission of 1962 stated in its report that it carefully examined
the possibility of SE-BDY having been shot down by another aircraft or by an attack
from the ground. Further, it considered the possibility that the crash may have
resulted from evasive action or from momentary distraction of the pilot by an attack
of feigned attack from the air or from the ground. The Commission found in this
regard, no evidence to support such a hypothesis; although it could not rule out
the possibility such an attack had taken place. Since then, several pieces of new
information related to the hypothesis that another aircraft shot down SE-BDY or
otherwise threatened the aircraft in a manner that caused it to crash have come to
light. Further, the Panel noted also that the Commission had been informed that no
radar watch was maintained in the Ndola area during the evening and night of
17 September 1961 and, therefore, the possibility of an unknown aircraft cannot
be entirely excluded.

Interception of radio communications I

72. Among the new information are statements made by former United States
Navy Commander, Charles Southall, to Dr. Williams and the Hammarskjld
Commission on several occasions between 2009 and 2013 about having heard a
recording or read a transcript of radio communications in which a pilot purportedly
reports sighting and then shooting down an aircraft, assumed to be SE-BDY, on the
night of 17-18 September 1961. While some minor details vary slightly between his
various accounts of the communications, the Hammarskjld Commission quotes
Southall as having heard or read the following:

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I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. Im going to go
down to make a run on it. Yes, its the Transair DC6. Its the plane. Ive hit it.
There are flames. Its going down. Its crashing.
73. Southall goes on to state that his Communications Watch Officer or another
officer present at the time he encountered the communications told him that a
Belgian pilot known as the Lone Ranger, flying a Fouga Magister aircraft used by
Katangese forces, made the transmission and that the pilot must be waiting for
Hammarskjlds plane. Southall stated that he cannot recall whether he received
the information by listening to an audio recording or reading a transcript thereof. He
recalled hearing or seeing the information approximately seven minutes after the
time of the actual transmission, based on the relay factor. He further stated that he
is not sure whether the information was in French or in English, as he was fluent in
both languages.
74. Southall stated that he heard the recording while stationed at a naval
communications facility of the National Security Agency (NSA), located near
Nicosia (approximately 5,000 km north of Ndola), Cyprus. He described his
position at the station as that of a processing and reporting officer and advised
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) shared the facility with the NSA, although
the working areas of the two agencies were separate. While Southall usually only
worked during daytime hours, on this particular day his Communications Watch
Officer telephoned him at his accommodation, sometime between 1900 and 2100
hours (local time in Cyprus), to encourage him to come to the facility at about
midnight [because] something interesting is going to happen. It was shortly after
midnight when Southall heard the intercept at the station. He stated that the
communications intercept was made by the CIA and passed to the NSA working
area, where he was in the company of four or five others when he heard the
recording or read the transcript, including that of junior officer and friend, Tyler Wat.
75. Southalls recollections of the events of that night appear to have surfaced
when he was contacted by an analyst at the United States Department of State,
Karen Engstrom, on 8 December 1992, in connection with a request from the
Government of Sweden for assistance with its national investigation into the
circumstances of Hammarskjlds death. That investigation was headed by Swedish
diplomat, Bengt Rosio.

Interception of radio communications II

76. In other new information of a similar nature, former United States Air Force
Security Services Officer, Paul Abram, stated in an interview with the Panel, on
26 May 2015, that he heard transmissions related to the shooting down of an aircraft
in or near the Congo, on the night of 17-18 September 1961. Abram was attached to
an NSA listening post in Iraklion (over 5,000 km north of Ndola), Greece, at the
time, where, he advised, he would typically be provided with approximately five to
six frequencies to monitor at once. He recalled that the prime targets included
military activities in the Congo, such as troop movements and arms sales. Abram
claimed that a few days earlier he was provided with the expected flight plan of
SE-BDY, which included information about the aircraft type and plane number, as
well as its destination of Ndola.
77. Based on the radio chatter he overheard on the evening of 17-18 September,
he believed he was listening to the activities of an American ground force.

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Sometime later in the evening, he heard someone say over the radio: Here comes
the plane the plane is well lit, followed by someone on another frequency in a
voice he assessed based on the accent as non-American (but not French or Spanish,
he later provided), saying the Americans just shot down a UN plane. He stated
that the transmissions were followed by a significant increase in radio chatter.
78. Abram did not believe he heard any communications from SE-BDY during the
period in question. He was not certain about the time he heard the transmissions, but
advised he was working the late shift at the listening station at the time. The view he
provided was that the UN aircraft, which he assumed was the aircraft on which
Hammarskjld was travelling, had been shot down by ground fire. He assessed the
use of ground fire based on having heard the transmissions on a high frequency
(HF) radio network.
79. While Abram advised that he was the only officer at the station to have
listened to the intercept in real time, he immediately notified others around him
about what he had just heard. Abram claimed that other officers at the post
subsequently listened to a replay of the intercept, which they processed and
forwarded to the relevant recipients. In a book he authored in 2013 titled, Trona
Bloody Trona about a union strike, Abram provided general information regarding
the circumstances of Hammarskjlds death, but did not describe in detail what he
claimed to the Panel to have heard on the night in question. It appears that Abram
first provided the additional information when he contacted the Hammarskjld
Commission, in 2014, by which time that body had concluded its work.

Assessment of authenticity
80. With a view toward exploring further some of the details of Southalls
statements, and to assess the clarity and consistency of his recollections, the Panel
contacted Southall and requested an interview. He replied that he was unable to
oblige due to health reasons.
81. Further, the Panel requested that the competent United States authorities
search for and share with it any relevant information they may have in their
possession pertaining to records or transcripts of radio traffic intercepted or received
on the night of 17-18 September 1961 concerning the landing or approach of an
aircraft at Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, as well as potentially related records of
correspondence between Washington, D.C., and the United States embassies in
Cyprus and Greece, respectively, around the time in question (see appendix 6). The
Panels request was informed by a negative response from the NSA to a Freedom of
Information Act request submitted by the Hammarskjld Commission, dated 16 July
2013, in which the NSA advised that two files in its possession were responsive to
the Commissions request (see A/68/800, para. 15.11). The NSA went on to state
that the files could not be released because doing so could reasonably be expected
to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security and because the
agency is authorized to protect certain information concerning its activities
having determined that such information exists in these documents.
82. In addition, an article published in the Swedish newspaper SvD Nyheter, on
21 November 2014, reported that the Government of the United States afforded to
the Foreign Minister of Sweden at the time, Carl Bildt, access to the two
responsive files following informal talks between the two Governments. The
article quotes Bildt as saying that the information contained in them is trivial and

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unimportant. In response to the Panels request for the same information, one
member of the Panel was afforded full access to the two responsive files on the
basis of established bilateral security information-sharing arrangements between the
Governments of the United States and Australia, her State of nationality. The Panel
member examined the information in the two files shown to her and assessed that it
would not help establish the facts of the cause of the plane crash or the cause of the
deaths of former Secretary-General Hammarskjld or the others accompanying him.
She also assessed that it did not contain any information relating to the interception
of communications about an attack on SE-BDY.
83. Further to its request for the information in the two responsive files to be
made available to it, the Panel also requested that the searches by the Government
of the United States include the master schedules (which is to say the inventories of
files and records) of the CIA, FBI and NSA. The Panel went on to express the hope
that any relevant classified documents located can now be declassified, in whole or
in part, and shared with it. In response, the Government of the United States
informed the Panel, in a letter dated 9 June 2015, that its search had not found any
documents matching the description of the materials requested by the Panel, and
that this effort included a search of NSA and CIA records (see appendix 6).
84. Also in connection with its assessment of the authenticity of the information,
the Panel requested that the Government of the United States provide information it
may have in its possession about whether Southall served in the United States Navy
and Abram in the United States Air Force, respectively, and, if so, whether they
were based at the listening stations in Cyprus and Greece, respectively, undertaking
work with the National Security Agency in the capacity they stated at the time in
question. In its response to the Panel of 9 June 2015, the United States Government
confirmed, based on information held by the Department of State, that Southall was
an active member of the United States Navy at the time, but it did not provide any
further information regarding whether he was stationed in Cyprus or about the
capacity in which he was serving with the Navy. At the time of writing, the results
of a search by the Department of Defense for information responsive to the Panels
questions about Southall and Abram remained pending.
85. At the request of the Panel, Abram provided to it copies of his service
discharge record, which state that he was in the United States Air Force at the time
in question working as a voice intercept procedure specialist and interpreter.
The Panel assessed, based on that document, that Abrams claim to have been
employed by the United States Air Force at the time of the crash of SE-BDY
performing in the special duties in which he claims to have been engaged, appear to
be valid. However, while a copy of a second document provided by Abram titled
Education Service Program noted that the last civilian school he attended was
Iraklion Greece, no dates were annotated in the date attended. The Panel was
therefore unable to confirm whether Abram was posted to Iraklion at the time of the
events on 17-18 September 1961.

Type of information
86. With regard to the type of the information provided by Southall and Abram,
both stated that they were in the company of others when they listened to, or in the
case of Southall, perhaps read, the radio communications on the night of
17-18 September 1961. Southall made several attempts in the 1990s to have a

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colleague purportedly also present at the station, Tyler Wat, provide his account of
events. According to correspondence, dated 28 July 1993, between Southall and
Wat, who was by then a diplomat at the United States embassy in Rome, Wat told
United States correspondent, Staffan Torsell, that he had no special memory of an
incident on the night of 17-18 September 1961. It does not appear that Southall has
had any further success in his efforts to make contact with other colleagues who
were present at the time or in establishing whether any of those colleagues have
similar recollections as him of the evening. The Panel was informed that Wat has
unfortunately passed away. Without additional information corroborating Southalls
claim to have listened to or read a transcript of a radio communication intercept, the
new information he provided stands as solitary witness information. Similarly,
without independent corroborating information from colleagues at the Iraklion
listening station or some other source, Abrams statement also stands as solitary
witness information.

Credibility of the information

87. Turning to an assessment of the credibility of the information, the Panel noted
that Southall stated his Communications Watch Officer contacted him by telephone
at his accommodation between 1900-2100 hours local time (1700-1900 Zulu) on the
night of 17 September, and encouraged him to return to the communications facility
at about midnight to witness something interesting. According to the transcripts
of Salisbury Flight Information Centre recordings, SE-BDY first broke radio silence
inflight at 2002 Zulu (2202 hours local time in Cyprus and Ndola), when the crew
contacted the Centre on HF radio to report, among other things, its current position
and estimated time of arrival at Ndola. The Panel could not find in the material
before it indications that the crew or passengers of SE-BDY conveyed to anyone
prior to that the estimated time of arrival in Ndola. On the contrary, the crew sought
to conceal its route and estimated time of arrival by submitting a flight plan with the
destination of Luluabourg (1,200 km north-west of Ndola) instead of Ndola and by
taking an indirect route, the particulars of which were reportedly closely held
among the crew. Further, UN staff at Leopoldville did not report any
communications between their station and SE-BDY or between any other station
and SE-BDY during its flight to Ndola. There is no information that Hammarskjld
transmitted or received any communication through the cryptographic machine
carried on board the aircraft during the flight. The Panel therefore found it
unexplained how the Communications Watch Officer could have known in the
mid-evening the estimated time of arrival at Ndola of SE-BDY.
88. Regarding Abram, his recollection of events to the Panel was consistent with
information he provided earlier to other parties, namely the media and the
Hammarskjld Commission (after it had concluded its work). Further, his statement
that his duties included shift work could support his claim to have been present at
the listening post late in the evening on the night in question.

Expert technical assessment

89. To assist with an examination of the technical feasibility of, among other
things, the information in Southalls statements, the Hammarskjld Commission
engaged aircraft accident investigator and former fighter pilot, Sven Hammarberg.

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90. Hammarberg considered the remark made by Southall in his statement to the
Hammarskjld Commission that, its quite chilling; you can hear the gun cannon
firing. In noting that both the radio transmit button and the trigger for the aircraft
weapons system are located on the flight control stick in the Fouga Magister,
Hammarberg questioned the ability of the pilot to transmit on the radio and fire the
cannon simultaneously. He does note, however, that it was possible, though
unorthodox, for a non-flying crew member to make radio transmissions using
buttons on the joystick. Southalls recollection of the use of first person (I) by the
person making the radio transmissions suggests, however, that that person and the
individual firing the aircraft weapons were one and the same. Moreover, if Southall
obtained the information on which his observations are based from a transcript as
opposed to an audio recording, he could not have heard gunfire.
91. Hammarberg also considered the feasibility of intercepting, in Cyprus, radio
transmissions made in Ndola. He stated in this regard that the radio equipment on
board the Katangese Fouga Magister was limited to very high frequency (VHF)
systems only which, due to the propagation properties of such frequencies, are
limited to line-of-sight ranges (approximately 140 km between a ground station and
an aircraft flying at 5,000 feet). Receiving such transmissions in Cyprus or Greece
would thus have required an intermediate receiving and relay station in order to first
receive, then re-transmit a recording or transcript of such communications in Ndola
to the distant listening stations. If the communications were on HF, on the other
hand, it would be possible without the need for a relay station to intercept them in
Cyprus and Greece.
92. The Panel sought its own expert assessment of the possibility that radio
communications in Ndola could have been intercepted by a listening station over
5,000 km away, or whether it was at least possible to receive a recording of
intercepted communications at such a facility over that distance. Chartered
Professional Engineer and member of the Air Navigation Commission of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Jeff Bollard, concurred with
Hammarbergs findings.
93. To the question of how the VHF communications may have been relayed to the
listening stations, the Panel noted that Royal Rhodesian Air Force Squadron Leader,
John Mussell, reported to the UN Commission, American Dakotas were sitting on
the airfield [in Ndola] with their engines running on the evening of 17 September,
potentially providing a rebroadcast capability. However, the United States Air Force
Air Attach in Pretoria, Lieutenant Colonel Don Gaylor, gave evidence to the
Rhodesian Civilian Aviation Board of Investigation stating that no transmissions
had been made from these aircraft after 1200 Zulu (1400 local time Ndola), on
17 September, until he participated in the search the following day, and that he was
not in contact with SE-BDY during its flight. Nevertheless, the UN Commission
considered the possibility that other aircraft either on the ground at Ndola or in the
air in the vicinity of Ndola could have acted as a relay station for VHF
communications to provide intelligence on the whereabouts of SE-BDY, or simply
to intercept information about the events of the evening. While it found no such
evidence, it could not rule out the possibility.

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Probative value
94. In summary, while some of their accounts differ in detail, Southall and Abram
claim to have listened to or read a transcript of radio transmissions late on the
evening of 17-18 September 1961 relating to what they believe was a shooting
attack resulting in the crash of SE-BDY. Aspects of the authenticity of their claims
have yet to be substantiated, including whether they were physically present in the
respective locations at the time of the events and had responsibilities which would
have afforded them access to such information. Neither the Hammarskjld
Commission nor the Panel have been able to identify and obtain corroborating
information from any other persons present at the respective listening posts that
night. In addition, the Government of the United States has not provided supporting
evidence of any records of radio transmissions or related documents. Some
questions also remain for the Panel regarding the credibility of the information with
respect to matters of timing in Southalls claims. This notwithstanding, it is
considered technically feasible that listening posts at both Cyprus and Greece could
have directly intercepted HF transmissions or indirectly intercepted VHF
transmissions relayed via an intermediary station, potentially including Ndola, on
the night of 17-18 September 1961.
95. Overall, the Panel assessed the probative value of the new information
provided by Southall and Abram, in so far as it helps to establish that SE-BDY was
subjected to an aerial or ground attack as moderate.

Eyewitness observations at the crash site

96. Other new information potentially related to the possibility SE-BDY was
subjected to an external attack includes several new witness accounts from those
who report having visited the crash site and seen bullet holes or other unexplained
holes in the wreckage of SE-BDY. In a written submission to the Hammarskjld
Commission, dated 5 September 2012, a foreign correspondent for the Associated
Press of New York, Errol Friedman, who was dispatched to Ndola to cover the
planned meeting between Hammarskjld and Moise Tshombe, states that he went on
the morning of 19 September to the crash site, where he observed that it was clear
that a catastrophic accident had occurred with large pieces of aircraft scattered in a
plantation of trees and occasional open areas. Further, he observed that all of the
bodies had been removed from the site. Friedmann stated in his submission that the
media representatives noted that there was no sign of bullet or cannon holes in any
of the major sections of the aircraft that lay scattered around.
97. It is not clear from his statement whether the last comment was based on his
own direct observations or those of his media colleagues. Further, the Panel noted
that Friedman first saw the wreckage after it was officially located and at a time
when it was known to already be extensively burnt. In light of the fact that the
information provided by Friedman is not contemporaneous and appears to have been
obtained from media representatives as opposed to via his own first-hand
observations, the Panel assessed its probative value regarding whether it helps to
establish that there were no bullet holes in the wreckage of SE-BDY as weak.
98. New information provided to Dr. Williams by a former Public Relations
Officer of a mine at Bancroft (now Kirilibombwe), Wren Mast-Ingle, on 12 January
2012, is to the effect that, on 18 September 1961, while travelling in his motor bike
from Luanshya in the direction of Bancroft on the Ndola-Kitwe road, he heard

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SE-BDY crash. After deciding to go to the crash site to investigate, Mast-Ingle

claims to have encountered at the site six to eight men in combat-like fatigues
aboard two jeeps, who ordered him to leave the area. From approximately 20 metres
away from the wreckage, Mast-Ingle purportedly observed a row of fist-sized bullet
holes sprayed across the fuselage, which was attached to the wing of the aircraft. He
described in his statement, big gashes in the plane: holes the size of my fist. The
upside of the wing was towards me. I was just behind the wing about 20 metres
from the aircraft and the holes swept from underneath the wing to the fuselage
as if it had been sprayed with bullets and there was a whole row across the
aircraft more than five or six. He went on to state that he did not report the
information to officials at the time as it was advisable to avoid getting involved in
the political maelstrom. He also stated that the aircraft was not burnt.
99. Regarding an assessment of the information, the Panel noted Mast-Ingles
claim that he arrived at the crash site around dusk and, although he is somewhat
unsure about the precise time of his arrival, he stated it was definitely not in
keeping with the official story, which is to say not shortly after midnight as held by
official records of events as the time SE-BDY crashed. In that regard, Mast-Ingles
account, or this part of it at least, is inconsistent with the official record regarding
the time of the crash, although that does not necessarily preclude the possibility that
his claim to have travelled to and observed the crash site is not otherwise credible.
100. Further, Mast-Ingle recounted that the aircraft wreckage was not burnt when
he visited the crash site. The Panel noted however that at the time SE-BDY
impacted the ground, it was carrying a significant amount of fuel and the crash
sequence resulted in major disruption to the airframe and other major aircraft
components. The Panel considered it almost certain that, sometime during the crash
sequence, an intense fuel-fed fire would have been triggered. Moreover, the
majority of the witnesses who observed the crash sequence or who travelled to the
site either before the official time the wreckage was located or shortly thereafter
variously described seeing the aircraft on fire in the air; a glow or explosion
coincident with the crash, or observing the wreckage to have been extensively burnt.
Another new witness, a reporter for the Northern Star newspaper, Marta Paynter,
visited the crash site sometime after 1510 hours local time on the afternoon of the
18 September and also described seeing that the aircraft was extensively burnt.
101. The accuracy of Mast-Ingles recollection of certain aspects of the crash site,
in particular the time he visited the scene and whether the aircraft was burnt or
burning, appear to the Panel to be inconsistent with other information made
available to it about the circumstances. The Panel noted also that the recollections,
made more than 50 years after the event, are not contemporaneous. However, the
Panel accepted that the holes could, at the time of his observations, have been
located in an as yet unburnt portion of the aircraft wreckage. In light of these
factors, the Panel assessed the probative value of the information provided by Mast-
Ingle, in particular regarding the degree to which it helps to establish that parts of
the aircraft had been sprayed with bullets, as weak.
102. In other new information about the state of the wreckage, Richard Martin
Ridler claimed in a statement made to the Hammarskjld Commission, on 10 April
2013, that his (now deceased) uncle, James Ian Cunningham Waddicar, told him he
saw the wreckage of SE-BDY riddled with bullet holes. Waddicar was a Royal Air
Force officer working in Ndola for the British Government training communities in

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animal husbandry methods at the time of the crash. He neither gave an indication of
the size of the holes nor their distribution, but conveyed the impression that they
had been made by a machine gun.
103. The Panel noted that the information provided about Ridlers uncles
observations is hearsay conveyed many years after the event. Further, there is no
precision in the information about whether Waddicar made his observations at the
crash site or perhaps later in the hangar at Ndola airport, where the wreckage was
relocated for further examination, nor about the timing of those observations. While
acknowledging that he had previous experience in the Royal Air Force, it is not
clear whether he would have been in a position to make an authoritative assessment
of the cause of any holes in the wreckage. The Panel assessed the probative value of
the information provided by Ridler, in so far as it helps to establish that there were
bullet holes in the wreckage, as nil.

Expert technical ballistics analysis relating to an aerial attack

104. For its probative assessment of the various pieces of new information in this
section, the Panel also drew on expert ballistics assessments. Before coming to that,
the report of the UN Commission noted that no signs of a pre-crash explosion or
traces of a rocket were found in or near the wreckage and that other bullet-like
holes had been examined and excluded to the satisfaction of experts. In addition, the
UN Commission considered that the configuration of the aircraft and the shallow
swathe cut through the trees was consistent with an aircraft flying in a controlled
state on a shallow descent preparing to land, rather than that of an aircraft under
attack or out of control because of damage caused by an exploded bomb or other
form of weaponry, or due to taking evasive action from an aerial threat.
105. As part of the investigation conducted by the UN Commission, Swiss
criminologist, Dr. Max Frei-Shulzer, was retained to examine the wreckage of
SE-BDY for evidence of the remains of foreign bullets, as well as a bomb, infernal
machine or the like. He did this by visually inspecting and melting down pieces of
the aircraft wreckage to separate the aluminium airframe material from any other
metals present. Dr. Frei-Shulzer reported that the aluminium remaining after the
melting process totalled 3,189 lb (1,446 kg) (the Panel was unable to establish the
proportion of total aircraft wreckage material available that this constituted). His
testing did not reveal any traces of metals related to foreign bullets, a bomb
explosion or detonation device, leading Dr. Frei-Shulzer to posit that one can
exclude the possibility of hostile actions from the air or from the ground and that
there was no room for the suggestion of sabotage.
106. In other specialist technical analysis, published shortly after the report of the
UN Commission, an expert from the Forensic Institute of the State of Sweden, Nils
Landin, calls into question the definitiveness of Dr. Frei-Shulzers conclusion.
Landin wrote, in a letter to the Swedish Foreign Ministry dated 25 May 1962, that
Dr. Frei-Shulzer did not (and could not due to the volume and dispersion of
fragments over the crash site) examine every single part of the aircraft wreckage,
leaving open the possibility that there could technically be undetected traces of
foreign bullets, a bomb explosion, detonation device or other evidence of an aerial
attack in the unexamined parts or at the crash site.
107. In assessing the probative value of the information provided by Landin, the
Panel considered as credible the assertion that a definitive conclusion about the

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exclusion of an aerial attack (or indeed, for consideration in a later section of this
report, sabotage) could not be reached because not all of the wreckage material had
been examined. This was informed by the Panels expert understanding that
reaching a definitive conclusion through technical analysis requires testing
absolutely all of the material available. Applying this to the assessment of the
claims made by witnesses to have seen bullet holes in the wreckage, the Panel
assessed as moderate the probative value of the information provided by Landin in
so far as it helps to establish that the examination of the aircraft wreckage by
Dr. Frei-Shulzer could not completely rule out the possibility of hostile actions,
such as an aerial or ground attack, as posited by him.

Possible involvement of mercenary pilots or other agents

Beukels
108. In his investigation report, titled Ndola Disaster, dated February 1993,
Swedish diplomat, Bengt Rosio, outlines a claim that a Belgian mercenary pilot by
the name of Beukels inadvertently shot down SE-BDY on the night of
17-18 September 1961. Rosio was requested by the Swedish Government, in late-
1992, to carry out additional inquiries into the circumstances of Hammarskjlds
death. This was prompted by the publication in United Kingdom newspaper, The
Guardian, on 11 September 1992, of a letter from former senior UN officials,
George Ivan Smith and Dr. Conor Cruise OBrien, in which they claimed to have
proof Hammarskjlds aircraft was inadvertently shot down by the mercenary pilot,
who was trying to divert it elsewhere to prevent Hammarskjld from meeting with
Moise Tshombe. The proof was purported to be taped interviews of Beukels
telling his story to French diplomat, Claude de Kemoularia. The tapes were in the
possession of Smith. As part of his investigation, Rosio met with de Kemoularia in
Paris, during which de Kemoularia stated that he had interviewed Beukels in
Paris, in 1967.
109. By way of background information, de Kemoularia served in the UN
Secretariat as Hammarskjlds personal assistant, from 1957 to 1961, and as the
Permanent Representative of France to the UN, from 1984 to 1987. He was a
businessman living in Paris at the time of the alleged interview with Beukels, on
13 February 1967. He included an account of his meeting with Beukels in his
memoirs, titled Une vie tire-daile: Mmoires (2007). The passage described much
the same account as that included in Rosios report.
110. Both Smiths tape recordings and de Kemoularias memoirs describe a
scenario in which Beukels departed from Kolwezi airfield (approximately 430 km
north-west of Ndola) in a Fouga Magister jet accompanied by another aircraft of the
same type (the identity of the second pilot was not revealed by Beukels). The pair
were purportedly under orders from a Mr. X, considered to be a senior individual
over military command and Lieutenant Colonel Lamouline (Commander-in-Chief
of Katangese forces) to intercept SE-BDY near Ndola and divert it to Kamina
airfield (approximately 620 km north-west of Ndola) in order to have Hammarskjld
meet an influential European company executive. The firing of a warning shot to
demonstrate that they were serious was authorized if the pilots of SE-BDY did not
comply with instructions to divert.
111. Beukels claimed that the position of the aircraft, including its estimated time
of arrival at Ndola, was accurately known, that some of this information was

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provided to him by the Ndola air traffic controller, and that the Fouga was equipped
with sophisticated radio equipment and radar to enable an accurate air-to-air
intercept by night. Beukels claimed that his Fouga was airborne for two hours. To
assist with the interception of SE-BDY, Beukels claimed that the Ndola air traffic
controller directed SE-BDY to conduct an extra round, thereby adding 30 km to
the flight path. When SE-BDY appeared not to be following his instructions to
divert, Beukels purportedly fired the Fougas machine guns from behind SE-BDY,
inadvertently hitting the DC6s tail plane. Beukels stated that the pilot had lost
control and the aircraft began to wobble and wave before crashing and bursting
into flames.
112. Rather than a recording of Beukels himself describing his story, the tapes
referred to by Smith and OBrien in the Guardian newspaper article were instead a
recording of de Kemoularia translating notes of his interview with Beukels from
French into English in a meeting with Smith, on 17 September 1981. Despite
requests from Rosio for him to do so, de Kemoularia did not provide Rosio with a
copy of the French notes, the tapes or a transcript thereof. Instead, a version of the
story, assumed to be prepared by Smith, was delivered to Rosio after the completion
of his assignment. An early version of the story, as prepared by Smith, was also
located by the Panel amongst the Roy Welenksy papers at the Bodleian Library, in
which Smith wrote to de Kemoularia, on 8 December 1981, explaining how he had
prepared the story following his earlier meeting with de Kemoularia. Also in that
letter, Smith set out areas in which matters needed further clarification and the
proposed next steps. It appears there had been an intention to finalize the story for
public release on the twentieth anniversary of the crash of SE-BDY.

Assessment of authenticity
113. Turning to a probative assessment, the Panel sought the assistance of the
Government of France through a request, submitted on 23 April 2015, for the
competent French authorities to search for and share with it any materials they may
have in their possession relating to the interaction between de Kemoularia and
Beukels, and any other material referring to a Belgian pilot going by the name of
Beukels (see appendix 3). The Panel expressed hope that in light of the passage of
time relevant documents could be declassified, in whole or in part, if required, and
shared with the Panel. Similarly, the Panel requested that the competent authorities
of the Government of Belgium search for and share with the Panel any information
they may have in their possession about the activities of a purported Belgian
national by the name of Beukels who may have been operating as a pilot or
otherwise supporting Katangese forces in or around the Congo in 1961 (see
appendix 2).
114. In its response, dated 2 June 2015, the Government of France advised that a
search of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Development have not resulted in the location of information about a conversation
between de Kemoularia and a Belgian pilot named Beukels concerning the death
of Mr. Dag Hammarskjld. The response added that those archives are public and
not classified. The Government further advised that enquiries made by it to de
Kemoularia about his availability for questioning had established that de
Kemoularia is not available due to his age and current health status. While the
Government of Belgium provided materials in response to several other facets of the
Panels information request to it, at the time of writing it was yet to provide

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information about whether it has among its files and records material related to the
possible existence of a pilot by the name of Beukels (see appendix 2).

Probative value
115. The Panel was not able to establish whether Smiths taped recordings of de
Kemoularias dictated notes of his interview with Beukels are still available.
Similarly, the Panel was not able to locate the original notes of de Kemoularias
interview with Beukels. Given de Kemoularias apparently significant interest in
the circumstances of Hammarskjlds death, the Panel found it unexplained that he
did not come forward with this information earlier when it came into his possession.
It is noted that Rosio states in the end notes of his report of 1993 that de Kemoularia
had told the story to senior UN official, Brian Urquhart, in 1968, at which time
Urquhart advised de Kemoularia to inform the police. This was apparently not done.
116. In light of the foregoing, the Panel assessed the probative value of the
information provided by de Kemoularia, Smith and OBrien regarding the
involvement of a Belgian mercenary pilot by the name of Beukels in shooting
down SE-BDY as weak.

Van Risseghem
117. In February 2014, the Government of the United States provided to the
Hammarskjld Commission a declassified cable sent from Leopoldville to
Washington, D.C., dated 18 September 1961, in which the US ambassador in
Leopoldville draws attention to a Belgian pilot he reports possibly shot down
SE-BDY. In the cable, Gullion states, There is possibility [the aircraft carrying Dag
Hammarskjld and the members of the party accompanying him] was shot down by
the single pilot who has harassed UN operations and who has been identified by one
usually reliable source as Vam (rpt VAK) Riesseghel, Belgian, who accepted
training lessons with so called Katanga Air Force. Previously he had been assumed
to be unknown Rhodesian. As long as he is still operational he may paralyze air
rescue operations.
118. The Panel subsequently requested, on 21 and 23 April 2015, respectively, that
the Government of Belgium and the Government of the United States search their
competent authorities for and provide any information they may have in their
possession regarding the activities of Van Risseghem (see appendices 2 and 6,
respectively).
119. Information provided by the Government of Belgium is to the effect that
Hammarskjld sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium, Henri
Spaak, on 16 September, requesting his Governments cooperation in putting to an
end to Van Risseghems criminal acts against the UN and its properties, as well as
attacks against civilians. The Belgian Government, including the Belgian Secret
Service, then conducted an investigation which revealed that Van Risseghem had
returned to Belgium from Kamina, via Zaventhen, on 8 September, where his entry
at the national airport was registered by the immigration authorities. He then left
Lindt, Belgium, on 16 September, indicating that he was returning to Katanga to
resume air services, thence departed Belgium by air for Paris, from where he was to
continue to Katanga. The investigation concluded that Van Risseghem was in
Belgium between 8 and 16 September 1961 and could not have reached the Congo

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from Belgium in time to have the flown a Fouga or any other aircraft over or around
Ndola on the night of 17-18 September 1961.
120. Separately, the Government of the United States made available to the Panel a
telegram, dated 22 September 1961, sent from its embassy in Brussels to
Washington, D.C., which notes that, according to Belgian security and intelligence
officials, Van Risseghem was supposed to have signed a receipt on 17 September
for discharge pay received from the Katanga Mission in Brussels. The Belgian
Government noted however that the signed document was an authority for another
person to collect money on his behalf, from the Sabina Solidarity Fund, and that it
was possible he was either still in Brussels or may have already have been in Paris.
121. That said, Belgian authorities were able to establish that Van Risseghem did
not leave Brussels before 16 September 1961, at the earliest, and they could
therefore demonstrate that it would not have been possible for him to reach Katanga
in sufficient time to have carried out the aerial attack on SE-BDY. On that basis, the
Panel assessed the probative value of the information provided by the Government
of the United States in its cable dated 18 September 1961 regarding the involvement
of a Belgian mercenary pilot by the name of Van Risseghem in an aerial attack on
SE-BDY as weak.

Alleged CIA contractor

122. In a written submission to the Hammarskjld Commission, dated September
2012, researcher and journalist, Lisa Pease, sets out a claim that an alleged CIA
agent, Roland Bud Culligan, was responsible for shooting down SE-BDY. Pease
provided various accompanying documents including, among others, an article by
her in a March-April 1999 issue of the publication Probe, titled Midnight in the
Congo; correspondence from a Christopher Farrell, who appears to be assisting
Culligan in efforts to have him released from a United States gaol in 1976 and at a
later date; a 1994 article by Kenn Thomas in the Steamshovel Press; correspondence
from Culligan to other parties, including to the General Counsel of the CIA and the
Director of the CIA; and a number of Record Identification Forms from the United
States National Archives showing that CIA records relating to Culligan have not yet
been released.
123. In this new information, Culligan lays claim to have been a hit man working
for the CIA for over 25 years, including at the time SE-BDY crashed. In handwritten
correspondence, he described flying from Tripoli in a P38 Lightening aircraft, via
Abidjan and Brazzaville, to Ndola where he intercepted and shot down SE-BDY.
The documents show that the information about Culligan was provided to the
Attorney General of Florida, Robert Shevin, by attorney Christopher Farrell who, in
turn, forwarded them to the United States Senate Select Committee convened to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church
Committee). Culligan claimed to be in possession of a contemporaneous diary of his
activities, although this was not confirmed by or made available to the Panel. Pease
stated that she believes Culligan passed away in 2010.

Assessment of authenticity
124. To assist with its assessment, the Panel requested, on 28 May 2015, that the
competent United States Government authorities search for and share with the Panel
any information they may have in their possession relating to the claim made by

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Culligan. Further, the Panel requested information about whether Culligan was
enlisted in or contracted by the CIA, or other branches of the Government of the
United States, at the time in question, and whether he undertook activities in
connection with the work of the CIA or other Government of the United States
agencies. In addition, the Panel requested any information the United States
Government may have about whether Culligan possessed the knowledge and
expertise required to fly an aircraft on a mission of the nature he described.
125. The United States Government advised, in its letter dated 9 June, that it had
reviewed its records documenting CIA activities at the time in question and found
no reference to Mr. Culligan. The Panel was unable to locate information about
whether the matter involving Culligan was dealt with by the Church Committee and,
if so, how.

Assessment of credibility
126. The Panel noted that Culligans claim lacks detailed information about how he
shot down SE-BDY, including his means of acquiring the aircraft and the methods
used to enable him to intercept SE-BDY over Ndola. In addition, the claim does not
appear to have been first divulged by Culligan until 1976, when he was seeking to
be released from goal. In correspondence to the then Director of the CIA, Admiral
Stanfield Turner, dated 30 October 1978, Culligan claims to have already provided
Admiral Turner with his journal, but threatens to publically release his material,
including a copy of the journal, unless what he describes as his unfair prosecution
by the authorities is addressed. However, in subsequent correspondence from Farrell
to Agent Albergine, United States Secret Service, dated 6 December 1978, Farrell
claims that he has amassed enough evidence even without a copy of the journal, to
convince anyone what has been going on all these years. It is noted that a similar
threat was previously made to the CIA General Counsel, Anthony Lapham, in March
1977, shortly before Culligans release from prison. It was not apparent to the Panel
that the information was ever released in full as proposed and whether it included
the diary to which Culligan referred.
127. In the absence of additional information confirming his qualifications and
account of events, including as claimed to have been detailed in a diary, the Panel
assessed as weak the probative value of the information provided by Pease
regarding the degree to which the information helps to establish the involvement of
purported CIA agent, Roland Bud Culligan, in an aerial attack on SE-BDY.

Employee of Union Minire du Haut Katanga

128. A cable from the then Officer-in-Charge of UNOC, Robert Gardiner, to the UN
Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Ralph Bunche, dated 16 January 1963,
reported that a number of Congolese witnesses and the author of an anonymous
letter submitted to the Swedish Consulate in Leopoldville claimed that Andre
Gilson, a Belgian national and Union Minire du Haut Katanga employee, had,
under orders, shot down SE-BDY in an aerial attack. Gilson had purportedly talked
about his involvement in the attack when he and the witnesses were in the mess
room of Union Minire in Lubumbashi. On 28 August 1963, Gilson was
interrogated by UNOC personnel in Elisabethville, during which he stated that he
was employed as an accountant with Union Miniere in Elisabethville, from 10 July
1961, and was attached to its civilian office for goods and provisions, from

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13 to 27 September 1961. He stated that he was not a pilot and had no role in the
Katanga air forces. The UN investigation concluded that Gilsons testimony was
truthful and verifiable, and that the allegations were unfounded. Further, it found
that his whereabouts on the night of 17-18 September 1961 could be accounted for
and that he lacked the training and information needed to be able to carry out such
an attack.
129. On the basis that those involved in the UN interrogation were able to
independently verify the whereabouts of Gilson on the night in question, the Panel
assessed the probative value of the new information regarding the degree to which it
helps establish that he was involved in an aerial attack on SE-BDY as nil.

Other mercenaries or agents

130. Among the new information provided by former Associated Press journalist,
Errol Friedman, to the Hammarskjld Commission, on 5 September 2012, is a claim
to have met, while staying at the Edinburg Hotel in Ndola in the days following the
crash, two Belgian pilots who told him they had pulled the wool over the eyes of
the [Rhodesian] Commission. They went on to purportedly claim that they had
been in contact with Hammarskjlds white painted DC6 when it was near Ndola
and buzzed it, which forced the pilot of SE-BDY to take evasive action. They
claimed to have buzzed it a second time by flying above and close to its fuselage,
forcing the DC6 down towards the ground. Friedmann noted that the pilots had
drunk a lot of beer and were boisterous.
131. The next day, at the hearing of the Rhodesian Commission, Friedmann
contends that he wrote a short note about his encounter with the two Belgian pilots
to Adrien Porter, a colleague who was to replace him in Ndola following his
departure later that day. The note left on Porters chair found its way into the hands
of the Counsel for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cecil Margo, who
told Friedmann if he did not provide evidence voluntarily, then Margo would take
legal steps to ensure that I did. After consulting his news editor in New York,
Friedmann was instructed to leave Ndola for South Africa without delay. While at
Ndola airport, a local radio station broadcast a request for him to contact the nearest
police station or to phone a certain number. Friedman departed for Johannesburg the
next day without complying with the instructions issued in the broadcast.
132. Giving a partially different version of the encounter, Cecil Margo, in his book,
Final Postponement: reminiscences of a crowded life (1998), states that Friedmann
had approached him and reported that when he was at the Savoy Hotel, one of the
pilots had said what he alleged above.
133. Major Joseph Delin, a pilot of the Katangese air forces, who had testified
before the Rhodesian Commission, on 16 January 1962, was recalled and questioned
about whether he had said that particular phrase or anything similar to Friedmann.
Major Delin responded that he had never used that expression in his whole life and
only recalled speaking to someone for a few minutes, during which he claims he did
not say anything important. He reemphasised that neither he nor any other person
had flown the sole Fouga Magister in the Katangese forces on the night of
17-18 September 1961, which was located at Kolwezi airfield. He stated that he had
known that Hammarskjld was to travel to Ndola, but did not know how or
precisely when.

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Probative value
134. Taking into account all the above, in particular the serious nature of the
allegations; Friedmanns reluctance to testify at the Rhodesian Commissions
hearing for his version to be fully tested, while being fully aware that he was
requested to do so; and Major Delins categorical denial before the Rhodesian
Commission to have said what Friedmann claimed, the Panel assessed the
information provided by Friedmann regarding the degree to which it helps to
establish that the two Belgian pilots under consideration, who of whom appears to
have been Major Delin, was involved in an aerial attack on SE-BDY as nil.

Two unnamed Belgian pilots

135. Similarly, in a written submission to the Hammarskjld Commission, Martin
Hillebard conveyed information about investigations conducted by his partner, Eva
Aminoff, into claims that two unnamed Belgian Air Force pilots were ordered to
shoot down SE-BDY. Aminoff, at the time a writer and journalist, claims to have
been at Ndola on the evening of 17-18 September 1961 together with other media
personnel. She purportedly told Hillebard some years later that she conducted her
own investigations and, in doing so, had spoken with two pilots who told her they
were given an order to shoot down the DC6 and that they arranged a simple
lottery [to determine] who should do the dirty job.
136. The Panel noted that while nationals of a number of states, including Belgium,
participated as mercenaries in support of the provincial Government of Katanga,
some as pilots, it would be difficult to test the authenticity and credibility of the
information in the absence of additional details, including the names and other
identifying particulars of the individuals. In addition, the Panel noted that
Hillebards statement is hearsay, is not contemporaneous and is devoid of
information that can be tested against other evidence. The Panel assessed the
probative value of the new information provided by Hillebard regarding the degree
to which it helps establish that two unnamed Belgian Air Force pilots shot down
SE-BDY as nil.

Expert technical assessment of possible aircraft type and operating airfield

Fouga Magister
137. In its investigation in 1961-62, the UN Commission examined the question of
which aircraft type could have been used to carry out an alleged aerial attack or
threat on SE-BDY. This centred mainly on the Fouga Magister, a French-
manufactured two-seat small jet designed for training and light attack missions. The
UN Commission established that one Katangese Air Force Fouga was operational at
the time of the events and noted that the aircraft had been harassing UN operations
in the Congo in the period prior to the crash, although this harassment had been
almost exclusively directed at ground targets. While the Fouga was typically based
at Kolwezi airbase (approximately 430 km north-west of Ndola), which the UN
Commission assessed was too far from Ndola to enable a round trip, it noted that the
aircraft captain, Major Delin, testified at the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry that
on at least one occasion the Fouga had taken off from an unpaved track. The UN
Commission thus found that nothing would appear to preclude the use [by the
Fouga] of a track within range of Ndola. Delin also testified to the Rhodesian

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Commission of Inquiry that on one occasion near Kamina he had shot at a DC3
aircraft while it was airborne with a burst [of bullets].
138. In new information related to the ability of a Fouga to have been able to carry
out an attack or otherwise threaten SE-BDY, aircraft accident investigator and
former fighter pilot, Hammarberg, expressed serious doubts about the jets capacity
to have launched from and returned to Kolwezi in one sortie due to the limit of its
maximum combat range (calculated as 419 km, flying at 5,000ft). He noted that
while it is theoretically possible to fly between the two locations, this would only
afford approximately five minutes of combat manoeuvring time over Ndola. The
pilot would thus have required very accurate information about the route and arrival
time of SE-BDY, and timed his or her arrival for the intercept accordingly.
139. The Panel noted that recorded information with Salisbury Flight Information
Centre indicates that, at 2002 hours (Zulu), SE-BDY was estimating an arrival time
at Ndola at 2235 hours (Zulu). When it first contacted Ndola tower at 2135 hours
(Zulu), the estimated arrival time for Ndola was then 2220 hours (Zulu). The actual
arrival time overhead the airfield was known to be 2210 hours (Zulu) based on a
report from SE-BDY to the Ndola tower on VHF frequency 119.1 and as noted on
the flight progress strip by Martin, the Ndola tower controller. Testimony by a
number of witnesses to the official inquiries is consistent with this reported arrival
time. On the basis of the 25 minute variation in estimated and actual arrival times,
the Panel finds it difficult, in the absence of elaborate support arrangements that
might have provided more accurate intelligence, including with the use of radar, to
accept that a Fouga could have timed its arrival at Ndola from Kolwezi to enable it
to intercept SE-BDY while still leaving sufficient fuel to return to Kolwezi in one
sortie. However, like the UN Commission, Hammarberg does not completely rule
out the possibility a Fouga could have used another airport closer to Ndola, either as
a temporary operational base or for the purposes of refuelling.
140. In considering other airfields available for use by a Fouga, Rosio noted that
with a full fuel load, the aircraft would require a take-off distance of approximately
1,500 metres. He was informed by Captain von Rosen, a pilot then flying for
Transair with extensive experience of piloting in Africa, that apart from Kolwezi
and Kipushi [200 km north-west of Ndola], there were four other airports from
which a Fouga could have taken off and reached Ndola. Separately, Hammarberg
refers to a report prepared by the Swedish Air Force, dated December 1961, which
states that no appropriate places are likely to be found in [Katanga] south of
Elisabethville from which a jet aircraft could operate, but that the possibility
simpler airfields can be used by jet aircraft is not precluded.
141. In undated correspondence titled, Secret: Report by Neil Ritchie, the First
Secretary at the British High Commission in Salisbury and MI6 officer, Neil
Ritchie, refers to a trip to Kipushi, on 17 September 1961, in which notes that he
inspected the runway and deemed it to be approximately 800 yards long
(approximately 730 metres). He described it as being very rough, overgrown and
with anthills at one end. He asked (Belgian mining company) Union Minire
personnel to put a steamroller over it and start demolishing the anthills. At a
subsequent visit to Kipushi, on 19 September, he observed Union Miniere workers
demolishing the anthills. If Ritchies observations were accurate, the length of the
runway and its poor surface condition would probably have ruled out the possibility

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of a Fouga launching from that location, which was an airfield identified by Rosio
as possibly useable by the Fouga.
142. Aviation expert, Hammarberg, analyses the ability of a Fouga to carry out an
aerial attack at night, drawing from his own experience as a fighter pilot. Regarding
the equipment and other limitations of the Fouga aircraft, Hammarbergs analysis is
based on the generic information contained in Fouga aircraft manuals. Hammarberg
notes, however, that he did not have first-hand information, however, about the
particular equipment of, and support arrangements for, the Fougas used by the
Katanga air force at the time in question. That notwithstanding, he concludes that
the hypothesis that a Fouga aircraft could be used for an aerial attack at night in the
circumstances that prevailed on the 17-18 September 1961 lacks credibility.
143. While the Panel noted that it would have been extremely difficult for a Fouga
Magister to have carried out an aerial attack at night on SE-BDY because of the
Fougas aforementioned operational limitations, the new information from
Hammarberg and Rosio supports the possibility that a Fouga Magister was capable
of perpetrating such an attack or threat and may have used airfields other than
Kolwezi, including unpaved airfields within range of Ndola. This is not to say that
their information supports the proposition that a Fouga was actually used to carry
out the attack on SE-BDY.
144. The Panel assessed the extent to which the new information provided by
Hammarberg and Rosio helps to establish that a Fouga Magister could have been
used to bring down SE-BDY in an aerial attack over Ndola airfield at night as weak.

De Havilland Dove
145. In a report dated 23 January 1962, Transair official, Bo Virving, outlines his
assertion that a De Havilland Dove brought down SE-BDY through an aerial attack
involving firing of rockets from the Dove onto or near the DC6 as it made its
approach to land at Ndola airfield. The assertion was based almost entirely on his
interpretation of the witness observations on the night in question, in particular as
they relate to the presence of a second aircraft in the air and to fire passing from
one aircraft to another. Given that the letter is dated prior to the conclusion of the
UN Commissions inquiry, and that the Commission consulted Virving at various
stages throughout its investigation, including on the matter of Virvings assertion
that a Dove could have been used, the Panel assessed that the information is not new
according to its definition. While not referring to the use of a De Havilland Dove
specifically, the UN Commission noted that Virving put before it a theory that
SE-BDY might have been attacked and shot down by a plane armed with rockets,
that no substantial evidence was submitted in support of this theory and the
Commission is of the opinion that most of the phenomena referred to by Virving are
susceptible of other and more logical explanations.
146. That notwithstanding, the Panel identified new information related to whether
a Dove aircraft could have been capable of carrying out an aerial attack on SE-BDY.
In his memoirs, Mercenary Commander (1986), as told by Brian Pottinger, former-
mercenary pilot Jerry Puren states that De Havilland Dove aircraft were in use by
the Katangese air force as early as 1961 and were capable of bombing ground
targets. Puren goes on to outline the technical aspects of this capability, noting that
the Dove was modified by the Katangese air force to enable bombs to be dropped
from racks through the floor of the aircraft. He also described bombing sorties in

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which he claimed to have been involved; however, his memoir did not include
reference to any sorties flown on the night of 17-18 September 1961.
147. In his analysis of the capability of a De Havilland Dove to carry out an aerial
attack on SE-BDY, Hammarberg acknowledged that Doves were in use by the
Katanga air force at the time, although he is unsure about how many were
operational. The Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry had determined that two Doves
were in United Nations custody at Elisabethville, on the night of 17-18 September,
while three others were in South Africa undergoing maintenance. Other sources
claimed that Doves were based at Kolwezi or Kapushi. In addition, Hammarberg
assessed that because of physical and skill constraints, the theory that a Dove
could have been used to carry out an air-to-air bombing attack using rockets or a
bomb as practically impossible. He cited the difficulty of carrying out a manual
bomb operation (whether in order to hit the aircraft or to have a bomb explode near
to the aircraft) on a moving airborne target at night.
148. The Panel also noted that the maximum cruising speed of a Dove aircraft is
approximately 180 to 200 knots (333 to 370 km/h) making it only possible for a
Dove to have been able to intercept SE-BDY, a DC6B, in a phase of flight in which
the DC6Bs speed is much lower than its normal cruise speed of approximately
270 knots (500 km/h). This would be possible when SE-BDY was preparing to
approach and land at Ndola. Noting that the Rhodesian Board of Investigation had
determined that SE-BDY was found to be in a landing configuration at the time of
impact with the ground; it would therefore have been travelling somewhere between
130 and 160 knots (240 to 296 km/h).
149. While it is noted that Purens memoirs do not describe any sorties involving
air-to-air attacks by a Dove, and Hammarberg is extremely sceptical that such an
attack could have been successfully conducted, this alone may not preclude the
possibility that a Dove was capable of such an attack or for its use in an aerial threat
to SE-BDY such as an attempt to divert the SE-BDY elsewhere. However, without
supporting evidence, it does little to support the proposition that a Dove was
actually used to carry out the attack on SE-BDY. The Panel assessed as weak the
degree to which the new information provided by Puren helps to establish that a De
Havilland Dove could have, in terms of its offensive air capability, carried out an
aerial attack or otherwise threatened SE-BDY.

Dornier DO-27 and DO-28

150. In other new information about types of aircraft that could have been used to
carry out an aerial attack or otherwise threaten SE-BDY, German researcher,
Dr. Torben Gulstorff, provided the Panel with information about the possibility
Dornier DO-27 (a light single-engine four to six seat utility aircraft) or DO-28 (a
twin-engine utility aircraft) were in use by Katangese forces in an offensive
capacity, in September 1961.
151. In a communication originating from New York, United Nations official,
Knappstein, summarizes a meeting with senior United Nations official, Alexander
Macfarquah, held on 7 July 1961, in which Macfarquah refers to information
received from United Nations intelligence sources in the Congo stating, the
provincial government of Katanga in the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) has
arranged to procure German Dornier aircraft with military equipment, including gun
mounts, bomb racks, rocket launchers, etc. The notes goes on to state, It is

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understood on arrival these aircraft will be operated by military personnel in

Katanga. The information alleges that the first of the aircraft was scheduled to be
delivered sometime during July. The author questions the reliability of the source
and expresses doubt as to whether the German Government would be supporting
Katangese forces. The communication is followed by others in which the German
Government makes inquiries into the veracity of the information, including though
discussions with the aircraft manufacturer and by seeking confirmation that DO-27
aircraft have the capability to fire rockets, as demonstrated during Portuguese
military operations in Angola.
152. The Dornier representative in Bonn, Colonel (Rtd.) Wien, told the West
German Ministry of Economics, on 5 October 1961, that during the summer of 1961
a Belgian importer, based in Elisabethville, bought six Dornier DO-28 aircraft, one
of which was delivered to Elisabethville on 21 August 1961. He further advised that
the other five aircraft were yet to be shipped. Colonel Wien added that the DO-28
was not designed to accommodate the installation of machine guns, but he could not
preclude the possibility machine guns could be installed in an improvised way.
153. A Daily Express article, dated 6 November 1961, reported that the then
President of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, had broadcast an urgent appeal to all nations,
calling for a halt to the delivery of arms to Tshombes Katanga. The article goes on
to cite from Indian troops serving with the United Nations in Elisabethville that the
Katanga Air Force had, within the last few days, received five new DO-28 aircraft at
Kolwezi airfield. The account also included the claim that the delivery from Munich
included special equipment to allow the DO-28 to carry bombs or air-to-ground
rockets.
154. The Panel has no reason to doubt the authenticity of the documents provided
by Dr. Gulstorff, which were sourced from various archives in Germany. The
documents suggest based on intelligence information that the Katangese air forces
had in their possession at least one Dornier aircraft on 17 September 1961 and that
the aircraft may have been modified to be able to conduct aerial attacks and
bombings. In his report of 1993, Rosio noted that Dorniers were not equipped with
guns or other weapons, but could be modified to do so, and that while Fougas had
purportedly not flown on night missions, Dorniers had done so, dropping bombs on
United Nations units during such sorties.
155. Regarding their performance capabilities, both the DO-27 and the DO-28 have
short take-off and landing capability, allowing them to use small airfields with short
runways that might otherwise be unsuitable for other aircraft types. The maximum
cruise speed of the DO-27 and the DO-28 is 130 knots (240 km/h) and 145 knots
(270 km/h), respectively, however, which would have made it virtually impossible
for a DO-27 and very difficult for a DO-28 to effectively intercept and manoeuvre
to carry out an aerial attack or threat on a DC6, which typically travels at approach
to landing speeds of between 130-160 knots.
156. While the Panel acknowledged that it would have been extremely difficult
from a capability stand point for a DO-28, and even more so for a DO-27, to have
carried out an aerial attack on SE-BDY because of the Dorniers slower operating
speeds, the new information from Dr. Gulstorff supports the possibility that a
DO-27 or DO-28 was capable of perpetrating such an attack or threat. The
information provided also provides some support for the claim that one or more
Dornier aircraft had already been delivered to Katanga before the events of

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17-18 September. However, without supporting evidence, the information does little
to support the proposition that a DO-17 or DO-28 was actually used to carry out the
attack on SE-BDY. The Panel assessed the probative value of the new information
alleging that a Dornier DO-27 or DO-28 could have carried out an aerial attack or
otherwise threatened SE-BDY as weak.

V. New information about sabotage

157. Among the causes of crash it investigated, the UN Commission investigated
the possibility SE-BDY crashed as a result of sabotage. It found in that regard that
while such a scenario was not impossible, there was no evidence of a bomb
having exploded aboard the aircraft, or in fact of any explosion having occurred
while the aircraft was in flight. Since then, several pieces of new information have
been made to available to the Panel that relates to the possibility SE-BDY crashed
as a result of sabotage.

South African Institute for Maritime Research

158. While conducting its work, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission received from the (South African) National Intelligence Agency, in
July 1998, a file relating to the assassination in 1993 of the leader of the South
African Communist Party, Chris Hani. Included among the files contents were eight
documents purported to be the internal correspondence of the South African
Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR), an organization allegedly engaged in
clandestine mercenary activities in and around the Congo, among other places, in
the early 1960s. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was unable to
investigate the veracity of the documents and the allegations contained therein
before its mandate ran out, in keeping with its commitment to transparency it opted,
in addition to handing them over to the former Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, to
make them available to the public, in August 1998.
159. The documents refer to an operation codenamed Operation Celeste, the
objective of which was purportedly to remove Hammarskjld. The orders to do so
call for his removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice (assumed to
be Patrice Lumumba, the former and first democratically elected Prime Minister of
Congo, who was executed by Katangese Gendarmerie with the complicity of other
persons, on 17 January 1961). The same document purports that [CIA Director]
Allen Dulles agrees and has promised full cooperation from his people and that
[Dulles] tells United States that Dag will be in Leopoldville on or about 12/9/61.
The document also mentions that, The aircraft ferrying him will be a D.C.6. in the
livery of TRANSAIR and urges that, Leo[poldville] airport as well as
Elisabethville is covered by your people.
160. Another of the documents, undated but seemingly sent after that which first
called for Hammarskjld to be removed, reports that [Belgian mining company]
Union Minire has offered to provide logistical or other support. It goes on to say,
We have told them to have 6lbs. of TNT at all possible locations with detonators,
electrical contacts and wiring, batteries, etc., and, Your decision to use contact,
rather than barometric devices is a wise one.

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161. In a hand written instruction bearing the same letterhead as the remainder of
the documents, dated 14 September 1961, Captain reports back to Commodore
that a:
DC6 aircraft bearing Transair livery is parked at Leo[poldville] to be used
for transport of subject. Our technician has order to plant 6lbs tnt in the wheel
bay with contact detonat (sic) to activate as wheels are retracted on taking of.
We are awaiting subjects time of departure before acting.
162. Another of the documents, the date of which is not clearly legible, which
seemingly provides a report back to Commodore and Captain on events, a
Congo Red writes:
1. Device failed on take-off.
2. Dispatched Eagle [illegible] to [illegible].
3. [Illegible] activated [illegible] prior to landing.
4. As advised OBrien and McKeown were not on board.
5. Mission accomplished: satisfactory.

Assessment of authenticity
163. An analysis of the authorship and authenticity of the documents, that is
whether they were written by their purported author, SAIMR or its officers or
agents, and that they are genuinely what they purport to be or to assert therein is
required by the Panel in assigning probative value to them. In that connection, the
Panel first sought to establish the authenticity of the documents. Further, the Panel
noted that the abbreviation of the name of the organisation varied in one document,
which uses SAIMAR as opposed to SAIMR. Efforts by the Hammarskjld
Commission and Dr. Williams to obtain the originals or ascertain through expert
technical analysis the authenticity of the versions in their possession were
unsuccessful. For its part, the Panel submitted a request to the Government of the
Republic of South Africa to search for and share with it any records or other
materials relating to the documents; any references to the existence at the time in
question of the South African Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR); or any
other materials it may have in its possession that either negates or corroborates
information about the purported plan (see appendix 5). At the time of writing, a
response from the Government of the Republic of South Africa was yet to be
received.
164. In addition, the Panel contacted the former Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Chief Investigator to enquire about whether he has any recollections
that could assist with an assessment of the documents authenticity. At the time of
writing, no information had yet been received by the Panel. The Panel was therefore
unable to establish the authority or the authenticity of the documents, of which it
had only poor quality copies.
165. Also in relation to authenticity, another question arises, that being whether
SAIMR existed in 1961. On this issue, the Hammarskjld Commission found that,
Very little can be ascertained about the South African Institute of Maritime
Research, and that, The Commission has been unable to trace any scientific
research published by it.

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166. The absence of the original documents; the existence of SAIMR in 1961 not
having been established; the non-availability of the maker of those documents or
parts thereof, or anyone with personal knowledge or familiarity with their contents;
the unexplained whereabouts and chain of possession of the documents between the
time they were allegedly made in 1961 and their handing over to the South Africa
Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the South African Intelligence Services, in
July 1998, and their eventual public disclosure; and the uncertainty of the
genuineness of photocopies and the discrepancies therein, including in the very title
of SAIMR in one, enhance the significant doubt the Panel has about their
authenticity.
167. Further to its assessment of probative value, the Panel also examined the
documents content, which is to say the feasibility of the alleged plot. Here it noted
that the UN Commission stated in its report, in the absence of a special guard
having been posted at SE-BDY while it was on the ground in Leopoldville, the
possibility of an unauthorized approach to the aircraft for the purpose of sabotage
cannot be ruled out. Moreover, in their statements to the official inquiries, the
Swedish aircraft technicians working on SE-BDY on 17 September advised that the
aircraft was left unattended for one to one and a half hours while they proceeded on
a lunch break and, moreover, one of the mechanics (Nils Arne Ohlsson) recalled
noting when he went to load luggage onto the aircraft in the afternoon the front
cargo hold, which could be accessed from outside the aircraft, was not locked.

Expert technical assessments (ballistics and medical)

168. Using information provided by technical experts, the Panel assessed whether
there is scientific evidence to support the claim that SE-BDY crashed as a result of
the detonation of TNT, as described in the SAIMR documents, or more generally by
types of explosives on board the aircraft. A United Kingdom explosives engineering
expert consulted by the Hammarskjld Commission, Major Daniel Perkins, assessed
that an improvised explosives device of six lbs of TNT main charge would be more
than capable of neutralising the flight controls of SE-BDY if correctly placed.
After assessing the feasibility of detonating such a device using the following
options: a VHF-to-VHF radio transmission, mechanical switch activated by the
undercarriage, projectile command initiation, barometric switch, and time device,
Major Perkins states that in his opinion a VHF-to-VHF transmission affords a
perpetrator the best mechanism by which to do so in an area of his or her own
choosing.
169. Recalling the expert ballistics analysis of Dr. Max Frei-Shulzer and Nils
Landin, which the Panel drew upon in its assessment of the probative value of new
information related to an aerial attack or threat on SE-BDY (see paras. 104 to 107),
the Panel noted that such analysis can also be applied to its assessment of the new
information related to sabotage. According to that analysis, Dr. Frei-Shulzer
concluded from his examination of the wreckage of SE-BDY for traces of a bomb,
infernal machine or foreign bullets that he could exclude the possibility of hostile
actions from the air or from the ground and leave no room for the suggestion of
sabotage (emphasis added). That said, the subsequent analysis of Dr. Frei-
Shulzers work conducted by Landin, which the Panel assessed as having moderate
probative value, challenged the definitiveness of that conclusion. Considered
together, the assessments indicate that while no traces of a bomb, infernal machine

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or foreign bullets were detected in the wreckage of SE-BDY, the possibility traces
of such materials escaped detection cannot be ruled out.
170. In so far as further testing for traces of explosives is concerned, according to
the Diary of Events enclosed in the report of the Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry,
the wreckage of SE-BDY was removed from hanger and buried at Ndola airport,
on 22 and 23 August 1962, where it remains today. In the Panels view, further
testing is not possible since the Dr. Frei-Shulzers examination of the wreckage by
melting down the metal wreckage and parts will have made it impossible to now
carry out chemical tests for traces of explosives materials, which would have been
the preferred procedure. Moreover, the Panel has not been able to find any reference
to examples of aircraft wreckage or material of that nature undergoing such testing
after having been buried for more than 50 years, and particularly not after the
material has been cut into pieces (which is the case for the wreckage of SE-BDY),
melted down and buried in sand or soil.
171. Turning to the available expert medico-legal analysis, the Panel noted the joint
opinion of distinguished pathologists, Drs. Rammer, Busch and James, who stated in
their report to the Hammarskjld Commission of 24 July 2013 that they could
conclude there was no evidence from the autopsy reports that Hammarskjld had
been subjected to an explosion or exposed to smoke (see para. 34).

Probative value
172. In terms of an overall assessment of the probative value of the SAIMR
documents, weighing the considerations spelt out earlier, in particular their
authenticity; the unknown whereabouts of the originals or anyone who has ever seen
them or any reliable secondary substitute; their chain of possession, together with
the possibility of the placement and planting of a 6 lb bomb on board the aircraft;
events which in the then prevailing conditions and circumstances could have taken
place; the time SE-BDY was left unguarded; and parts of the aircraft exposed to the
risk of interference while at Leopoldville airport on 17 September 1961, the Panel
assigned weak probative value to the SAIMR documents and what they purport to
assert.

Involvement of foreign embassy personnel in Leopoldville

173. A former UN administration officer based in Leopoldville in 1960 and 1961,
George Wood, provided information to the Panel to the effect that SE-BDY crashed
as a result of a deliberate assassination perpetrated by personnel from the Romania
Embassy in Leopoldville under the instructions of the KGB. According to Wood, a
former air traffic controller at Ndjili airport in Leopoldville, Peter Brichant,
informed him that the embassy personnel gained access to SE-BDY on the morning
of 17 September, during which time they installed an explosives device in the nose
of the aircraft. The device was apparently meant to detonate on retraction of the
landing gear. However, it purportedly failed to detonate upon take off and instead
ignited when the landing gear was lowered in preparation for landing at Ndola.
Wood cites the fact that the Congolese Government declared the entire staff
contingent at the Romanian Embassy persona non grata and allegedly then deported
from the Congo as supporting information for his allegation. In addition, Wood
attempted to have what he alleged were former-KGB personnel now living in the
United States after having defected corroborate his information. He informed the

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Panel by letter, on 23 April 2015, however, that none of the interlocutors had
responded to his communications.
174. Regarding an assessment of the information, the Panel noted that, in the
absence of supporting information from personnel with first-hand knowledge of the
alleged events, the information constitutes hearsay on the part of Wood from
Brichant. Moreover, Brichant was interviewed by the official inquires yet did not
mention the claim put forth by Wood. The Panel assessed the probative value of the
information provided by Wood in so far as it purports to prove that Romanian
embassy personnel planted a bomb on SE-BDY as weak.

Alleged physical material from the wreckage SE-BDY

175. In 1975, former Swedish staff member with the UN in the Congo, Hilfding
Bjrkdahl, reportedly found a metal plate at the site of the crash of SE-BDY that he
was told originated from the DC6. After having brought the plate back to Sweden, it
came into the possession of his son, Goran Bjrkdahl. During a meeting with
Bjrkdahl, who has conducted extensive research in a private and voluntary
capacity into the crash of SE-BDY, he gave the plate to the Panel to enable an
evaluation of its relevance. The plate is of thin metal construction, approximately
43 cm by 25 cm in size and contains holes Bjrkdahl suspected were made by
bullets or fragments of an explosive device, including four holes located in close
proximity to each other and positioned near the centre of the material.
176. Further to its own expert technical assessment, the Panel requested the
assistance of the FBI with an evaluation of the authenticity of the material and
whether the holes are consistent with damage caused by ballistics or explosives
material. The FBI, in consultation with the NTSB, assessed high resolution
photographs of the item. The agencies offered the opinion that the piece does not
come from an aircraft. The key findings from the NTSB include that while the
material looks like aluminium, it is not load-carrying structure from an aircraft and
unlikely to have been used as an aircraft part. The rows of holes near the left and
right ends are inappropriate for an aircraft due to irregular spacing, alignment and
their small diameter. They appear to belong to industrial rather than aviation use.
The aluminium looks thick and relatively soft with the deformations visible. There
are applications where such materials could be found in cargo compartments or
other non-structural areas of aircraft, but the material looks to be more appropriate
for use in a ground vehicle.
177. The ballistics expert on the Panel assessed that the holes in the metal plate
were not caused by bullets having penetrated the material. He based this, first, on
the fact that the diameters of the holes are not compatible with any known calibre of
arms available in 1961. While some military ammunition is loaded with bullets that
have a hardened penetrator of a smaller diameter embedded in the lead core of the
bullet, it is assessed as extremely unlikely that the penetrators from four bullets
would cause four holes in such close proximity with no visible damage caused by
the rest of the bullet, which would have had to fragmentize at impact. Second, the
expert found that the displacement of the holes and the distance between them does
not appear to be consistent with the normal dispersion pattern created by an
automatic burst of fire. The holes themselves do not show the signature of a bullet
penetration.

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178. A second ballistics expert, a Detective Inspector and Firearms Examiner at the
National Centre of Forensic Services in Denmark, Egon Poulsen, evaluated the
high-resolution images and concurred with the findings of the Panel member. In
particular, he assessed that the holes in the plate (including the four closely located
together), appear to all be placed, which is to say located as if their positions were
measured out. None of the holes appear to be bullet holes, even the four closely
located together. In terms of size and appearance (and in terms of location), the
holes do not look as though they were created by bullets.
179. In light of the NTSB assessment that it is unlikely that the piece of material is
from an aircraft, and the Danish expert assessments that the holes in the plate are
not consistent with bullet holes, the Panel assessed the probative value of the new
information associated with the metal plate, which related to the possible presence
of bullet holes in a piece of aircraft wreckage, as nil.

Incendiary device
180. In other new information about the possibility SE-BDY crashed due to
sabotage, reference is made in a Washington Post report, on 3 June 1978, to an
investigative article that refers to a CIA report purportedly submitted to President
Kennedy in 1962 stating, There is evidence collected by our technical field
operatives that the explosive device aboard the aircraft was of standard KGB
incendiary design. No further information was provided beyond this short passage.
181. To enable an assessment of the probative value of the information, the Panel
requested that the United States Government search its files and records for the
presence of any information about the existence and basis of the alleged CIA report,
or other CIA reports or related information it may have in its possession that would
shed light on the circumstances surrounding the crash of the flight of SE-BDY. The
United States Government replied, on 9 June 2015, that the CIA has found no such
report or any record of such a report. Further, the United States Government advised
that a search of the files and records at the John F. Kennedy Library also has no
information related to the alleged report.
182. Regarding an expert technical assessment of the feasibility of the action
described in the information, explosives expert, Major Perkins, states in his report
to the Hammarskjld Commission that it would be technically possible to cause an
aircraft to crash by activating an incendiary device (as opposed to explosive
materials). He notes that the pyrophoric material in such a device would help to start
a fire on board the aircraft, which would then be fuelled by the aluminium alloy in
the airframe and the aircrafts fuel. That notwithstanding, in the absence of
information about the basis of the information in the Washington Post article or
more detailed information about the claim that could be tested further, the Panel
assessed the new information about an incendiary device planted on the aircraft as
claimed above as having nil probative value.

VI. New information about hijacking

183. As part of its inquiry, the UN Commission noted the sensational story carried
in several newspapers in some countries during January 1962 to the effect that a
seventeenth man boarded the aircraft at Leopoldville for the purposes of hijacking
it. While stating that the story falls clearly into the category of rumour, the UN

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Commission nevertheless carefully investigated whether or not it was true. The

Commission noted in that regard that the Head of United Nations Civilian
Operations in the Congo, Dr. Sture Linner, and others who saw the plane take off
from Leopoldville testified that they knew or were introduced to all persons who
boarded the aircraft prior to its departure. In addition, the UN Commission cited
Dr. Rosss assessment that there was a seventeenth body in the wreckage as
unlikely in the extreme and that the police examined the scene of the crash but
found no trace of any passengers having wandered off into the bush.
184. The Panel identified two pieces of new information related to the hypothesis
that SE-BDY crashed as a result of a hijacking. In the first piece, journalist David
Pallister refers in a United Kingdom Guardian newspaper article, published on
11 September 1992, to a claim in the book, Notre Guerre au Katanga (1963), by
former French army officer and mercenary, Colonel Rene Trinquier, that a hijacker
was smuggled on board SE-BDY (by whom is not stated) before it left Leopoldville.
That hijacker purportedly had instructions to force the pilot to re-route to another
(unspecified) location in order to prevent the ceasefire negotiations to which
Hammarskjld was headed from taking place.
185. With regard to an assessment of the probative value of the information, the
Panel noted that the basis for the Colonel Trinquiers claim is not provided and that
details which can be tested against other information are absent. On that basis, the
Panel assessed the degree to which the information helps to establish that a hijacker
was smuggled on board SE-BDY as nil.
186. In a second piece of new information, the same Guardian article goes on to
describe a discussion between former UN officials, George Smith and Dr. Conner
OBrien, and Prime Minister Welensky, shortly after the crash, in which, in response
to a question from Dr. OBrien about the body count from the crash, Welensky
purportedly gave one of those big smiles of his and just said, Was it 14 or 15?.
By citing that conversation immediately after the claim made by Colonel Trinquier,
the author of the Guardian article appears to infer that Welensky was alluding to the
possibility there was an extra passenger on board SE-BDY that hijacked or
attempted to hijack the aircraft.
187. Regarding an assessment of the remarks purportedly made by Welensky, the
Panel noted that the information is hearsay, there are no further details against
which to test it and its basis is unclear. Moreover, the Panel noted that the number of
passengers on board, according to the UN Commission and (all other official
accounts), was 16, as opposed to 14 or 15 as stated by Welenksy. The Panel
assessed the probative value of the information, in so far as it helps to establish that
there was an extra person on board SE-BDY who hijacked the plane, as nil.

VII. New information about human factors

188. The UN Commission of 1962 considered, among the four categories of
probable causes of the crash of SE-BDY, what it described as the possibility of
human failure. This category included investigations into the possibility the
aircraft crashed as a result of incapacitation of the pilots, use of the wrong
instrument landing chart, misreading of altimeters, distraction of the pilots attention
and misleading or incomplete information provided to the pilot of SE-BDY. While
the Panel did not identify any new information related to these issues in and of

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themselves, it did receive new material about the possible role of crew fatigue in the
crash. A summary and assessment of the probative value of that new material is set
out below. The Panel wishes to emphasise that the possible role of crew fatigue does
not in and of itself explain the cause of the crash or the extent to which, if at all,
fatigue was a contributing factor in the range of possible causes of the crash of
SE-BDY. Nevertheless, flight crew fatigue has the potential to adversely affect the
crews situational awareness as well its ability to react to and manage a range of
abnormal and emergency situations including but not limited to an aerial attack or
external threat, sabotage, hi-jacking or technical failure.

Crew fatigue
189. A common thread in all three of the official inquiries was the reliance on the
belief that the aircraft captain, Per Hallonquist, was fit to fly on the day of the
incident and therefore the inquiries could largely rule out fatigue as a factor in the
crash. At the same time, the inquiries appeared to have largely ignored the possible
fatigue levels of the other flight crew members and their consequential impacts on
the overall performance of the flight crew. The Rhodesian Board of Investigation, in
its discussion of the evidence, noted that SE-BDY pilots Litton and Arheus had
flown to Elisabethville on the night of 16 September, while Hallonquist had
appeared rested and most anxious to make the flight. The Rhodesian Commission
of Inquiry noted that when Litton had boarded the aircraft he indicated that he was
tired, while Hallonquist seemed to be fit and relaxed. The UN Commission noted
that there were three experienced pilots on board, at least one of whom had had
24 hours of rest prior to the flight, that there was sleeping accommodation on board
for the pilots, and it was therefore satisfied that the accident was not due to pilot
fatigue.
190. New information set out in a document prepared by Ulf Strid, dated
18 December 1961, contains an analysis of the flight and duty times of the crew of
SE-BDY. The analysis was informed by Transairs flight log data for the pilots,
Hallonquist, Litton and Arheus, and for the flight engineer, Willhelmssen, and
reconciled with Transairs Flight Operations Manual and relevant collective
agreements. The analysis was an appendix to a larger document signed by Ake
Landin, L. Lindman and Torsten Nylen. The Panel noted that Landin and Lindman
were the accredited representative and the technical advisor, respectively, to the
Rhodesian Board of Investigation. Strid noted in the document that: (a) Hallonquist
had logged no flying hours from 13 to 16 September, while Litton and Arheus had
logged 8.8 hours each on 13 and 14 September, and no flying hours on
15 and 16 September; and (b) in the 24 hours preceding the crash of SE-BDY, both
Litton and Arheus had flown as much as 16.8 of those 24 hours (all logged as night
hours), while Hallonquist had flown 6.3 hours (all night hours).
191. It was Strids view that, in accordance with Transairs Flight Operations
Manual, flight time exceedances had occurred in the 24 hour period leading up to
the crash. Strid stated that, it does not seem possible Litton and Arheus were able
to accumulate a sufficient amount of sleep during the last twenty four hours. Strid
further stated that Hallonquist, on the other hand, appeared to have had opportunity
for sufficient rest in the same period. Flight Engineer Willhelmssen had also flown
as much as 16.8 hours in the preceding 24 hour period, having been on the same
flight as Litton and Arheus to Elisabethville on the night prior to 17-18 September.
Further, Strid identified a number of occasions in the period 1 August to

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17 September when one or more of the three pilots had exceeded flight time
limitations. Strid noted also that his analysis was of flight times only, as opposed to
of crew duty times (which include pre- and post-flight duties as well as airborne
time), which he stated the Sweden Civil Aviation Authority was not obliged to
monitor.
192. It would be expected that analysis of this kind would have been conducted
following the crash in accordance with Swedens obligation as the State of Registry
under the Chicago Convention to provide any relevant information regarding the
aircraft and the flight crew involved to the State of Occurrence (Rhodesia)
(Chicago Convention, appendix 13, para. 4.6).
193. In other new information, a former flight surgeon attached to the Swedish Air
Force, Dr. Ake Hassler, informed the Panel in correspondence, dated 12 May 2015,
that he believed the Ndola crash in September 1961 was an ordinary pilot error
accident. Dr. Hassler was tasked by the Swedish Department of Defence in the
1960s to conduct investigations of all Swedish flight accidents, in which he
included the crash of SE-BDY. He went on to state in his correspondence that he
believed the primary factor contributing to the crash of SE-BDY was that a large
part of the crew was fatigued. He attributed the fatigue to insufficient rest in the
36 hours prior to the flight to Ndola, going so far as to state that the crew were
therefore not fit to fly their mission on the night of 17-18 September 1961. Other
information provided by Hassler included a document prepared by Bengt-Ake
Bengs, dated 29 September 1966, in which, among other things, Bengs has cited and
commented on the same information that was prepared by Strid. Dr. Hassler claimed
that the Swedish authorities did not bring this matter sufficiently to the attention of
the Rhodesian Board of Investigation. He went on to state that he has made a
number of attempts to bring this matter to the attention of the United Nations
through the Swedish authorities, but that his efforts had been blocked by those
authorities.

Probative assessment
194. Even today, with the benefit of a significantly greater body of knowledge than
was available in 1961-1962, the effects of fatigue on flight crew performance
remain a complex issue. The study of human and organisational factors and its
contribution to aircraft accidents accelerated significantly during the late 1970s
following accidents involving large commercial aircraft that resulted in significant
loss of life and which ushered in an era of research focused on crew resource
management and command training. Nevertheless, it was already recognized in
1961 that aircrew must be fit for duty to ensure that they were able to operate their
aircraft safely in a range of conditions; this included through the implementation of
practices to manage fatigue.
195. The ICAO definition of fatigue states that it is a physiological state of
reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss or
extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental and/or physical
activity) that can impair a crew members alertness and ability to safely operate an
aircraft or perform safety related duties. SE-BDY, a DC6B, was, in its time, a
complex and highly demanding aircraft to operate requiring a minimum of three
crew members (two pilots and a flight engineer). In a multi-crew operation, all
members of the crew must work as a team, with clearly defined duties and

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unambiguous communications to ensure that situational awareness is maintained at

all times and that there is capacity to react to and manage non-standard and
emergency situations. If the performance of the flight crew had been adversely
affected by fatigue, it would have increased their risk of making simple errors such
as slips, lapses and mistakes, or experiencing visual illusions or a loss situational
awareness. Equally, it could have adversely affected the crews ability to react to
and manage an abnormal or emergency situation, such as an aerial attack or external
threat, or to deal with the consequences of sabotage or a technical failure.
196. The Panel considered it unsurprising that analysis of the kind conducted by
Strid would have occurred following the crash of SE-BDY, given the obligation
under the Chicago Convention of the State of Registry, in this case Sweden, to
provide any relevant information regarding the aircraft and the flight crew
involved to the State of Occurrence (Rhodesia) (Chicago Convention, appendix 13,
para. 4.6). Accordingly, and with regard to an assessment of the authenticity and
credibility of the new information as part of an assessment of its probative value,
the Panel requested that the Government of Sweden seek to ascertain whether the
report endorsed by Landin, Lindman and Nylen was prepared for internal use only
by the Swedish aviation authorities or whether it had been provided to the UN
Commission or any of the other official inquiries. A representative of the Swedish
Government informally advised that it had not been able to answer this question.
The Panel noted, however, that under questioning during hearings by the UN
Commission, Landin agreed that Litton and Aerheus had not been given sufficient
opportunity to rest during the 24 hours leading up to the crash of SE-BDY and that
it must have [affected the flight itself and the alertness of the two men], but how
much is another question, thereby suggesting that some consideration of the matter
by the Swedish aviation authorities had occurred and may have been informed by
Strids analysis.
197. In other information provided by the Government of Sweden, the Panel was
able to ascertain that the author of the document, Strid, was an employee of the
Swedish Civil Aviation Authority at the time in question and was a qualified pilot
and engineer. Dr. Hassler provided documentation which included a transcript of a
hearing held on 20 April 1967. In that transcript, it was noted that, on 1 February
1963, Dr. Hassler was appointed in a part-time capacity as a special flight surgeon
to the Swedish air force and was attached to flight squadron F21. It was also noted
that, from 1 March 1965, Hassler commenced employment with the Flying
Administration Research Centre at Malmslaet, Sweden.
198. The Panel noted that the crew flight times outlined in Strids report for the
previous 24 hours are consistent with those noted for the same period by the
Rhodesian Civil Aviation Board of Investigation for Hollonquist, Litton and
Wilhelmsson, but for Arheus, for whom the Rhodesian Board of Investigation noted
10 hrs 40 minutes whereas Strid noted 16.8 hours). The Panel was uncertain as to
why there is such a discrepancy, as it had been determined by the Rhodesian Civil
Aviation Board of Investigation that Arheus had also flown to Elizabethville the
night before and should have logged the same hours as Litton.
199. Strid had stated that his report had not included an analysis of duty times,
which the Sweden Civil Aviation Authority was not obliged to monitor. While the
UN Commission appeared to have made some inquiries into the possible impact of
fatigue on the performance of the flight crew informed by the actual flight hours

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logged, based on the information before the Panel, there appears to have been scant
or no analysis of the rest time and other activities of the crew outside of those flight
hours in order to establish the quality and quantity of rest that was taken during the
days and hours leading up to the departure of SE-BDY, and of other personal factors
that might have had any adverse effects on their performance. Such additional
analysis would have provided a fuller picture regarding the crews fitness for duty to
undertake the mission given to them on that night. It is noted that contemporary
practices for the management of flight crew fatigue embrace a more holistic and
risk-based approach that would include both institutional and self-monitoring of
flight crew fitness for duty.

Probative value
200. The Panel assessed the probative value of the information provided by Strid in
so far as it helps to shed additional light on whether fatigue was a contributing
factor to the crash of SE-BDY as moderate. Separately, the information provided by
Hassler, in so far as it relates to analysis and comments on the flight times of the
crew of SE-BDY, constituted a secondary source. In the absence of other supporting
documentation made available to the Panel, such as a contemporaneous record of
his analysis of the crash of SE-BDY in response to his purported assignment, the
Panel assessed the probative value of the information provided by Dr. Hassler in so
far as it helps to shed additional light on whether fatigue was a contributing factor
to the crash of SE-BDY as weak.
201. However, in the absence of other supporting evidence that may have been able
to shed light on this issue, fatigue, to the extent that it may have been a contributing
factor, will be difficult to link to and explain the conditions and circumstances
resulting in the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of
the members of the party accompanying him. SE-BDY was not equipped with a
cockpit voice recorder (CVR). According to ICAO Standards and Recommend
Practices (SARPS) in place at the time, no requirements for the fitment of CVRs
were prescribed. With regard to flight data recorders, which record several
parameters of an aircraft such as airspeed, altitude, and rate of climb or descent, in a
defined period immediately before an aircraft crash, the SARPS recommended that
piston-engine aircraft such as SE-BDY only be equipped with such recorders as
required by the State of Registry (ICAO Appendix 6 Recommended Practice 6.3.2).
It was also not mandatory to have recording facilities on all aerodrome control
service air-ground communications channels such as the tower at Ndola (ICAO
Appendix 11 Recommended Practice 6.1.4.3). Finally, but for Harold Julien, who
did not provide any information about the crew prior to or during the flight in the
period between the crash and his tragic death, there were no surviving witnesses
from onboard the aircraft and it is unlikely that other witness can now be identified
who could provide accurate information about the crews rest periods and other
activities outside of their flying duties prior to the flight on the night of
17-18 September.

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VIII. New information about the activities of officials and

local authorities
202. The UN Commission investigated and analysed the search and rescue action of
the local authorities in the wake of the crash, finding, inter alia, that the fact
SE-BDY had crashed was not definitely established until a ground party reached the
wreckage shortly after 1500B [1500 local time in Ndola]. The Panel understood
this to mean a ground party comprising local authorities or security forces, as
opposed to one or more of the many civilians who testified in the official enquiries
that they visited the site on the morning of 18 September. Since the conclusion of
that inquiry, new information related to the time the aircraft was first located by
security authorities has come to light, which the Panel considered in this section
alongside issues related to other actions taken by officials in connection with the
crash.

Radio communications between SE-BDY and Ndola Tower

203. The Panel noted in its review of the materials a telegram from British High
Commissioner to Salisbury, Lord Alport, dated 18 September 1961, in which Lord
Alport reported that the Plane from Leopoldville assumed to be carry
Hammarskjld passed without landing or making contact (emphasis added). In new
information, in his memoir, To Katanga and On (1976), which the former British
Consul at Elizabethville, Denzil Dunnett, provided to the Hammarskjld
Commission, on 24 January 2013, Dunnett states that sometime on the night of
17-18 September, he overheard a radio call between SE-BDY and the Ndola Control
Tower (the time is not specified) in which SE-BDY reported that it would be
landing at Ndola within a quarter of an hour. The Panel considered the degree to
which the new information helps to establish that officials sought to cover-up that
there were radio communications between SE-BDY and Ndola Control Traffic on
the night of 17 September 1961. It assessed in that regard the probative value of the
new information as moderate.

Incorrect altimeter setting

204. According to information provided by Swedish Army Sergeant, Ingemar
Uddgren, in his memoirs (undated), who was based at Kamina Airbase in Katanga
on the night of 17-18 September 1961, the QNH (altimeter setting) Ndola Control
Tower reported to SE-BDY when it first established communications was such that
it would have caused the aircraft to descend to a dangerously low altitude during the
approach to land. Sergeant Uddgren was in the air traffic control tower at Kamina
around midnight on the night in question and claims to have heard communications
between the aircrafts radio operator, Carl Erik Gabriel Rosn, and his colleague in
the Kamina Control Tower in which SE-BDY asked Kamina to check the QNH they
were given by the Ndola Control Tower. The controller at the Kamina Tower was
sure the QNH setting passed to SE-BDY was incorrect and tried to communicate
this to SE-BDY but could not re-establish communications. He then expressed with
considerable concern to Sergeant Uddgren that the use of that QNH would cause
SE-BDY to descend too low.
205. Kamina airfield, which was under the control of UNOC forces, was nominated
as an alternate airfield for use in an emergency diversion. It was for that reason that
the Swedish-speaking radio operator, Rosn, was on board SE-BDY. His role was to

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establish radio contact with Kamina airfield, where the Air Traffic Controller was
also Swedish, so the two stations could exchange information without other,
non-Swedish speaking operators being able to understand it. The Air Traffic
Controller at Kamina was reportedly knowledgeable about the aircraft approach
procedure information for Ndola Airfield.
206. Regarding its assessment, the Panel questioned why the information was
seemingly not provided to UN officials as soon as the individuals at Kamina
realized that something was wrong or, failing that, the other official enquiries or the
UN Commission. The Panel assessed the probative value of the information in so far
as it helps to establish that the crew of SE-BDY were passed the wrong altimeter
setting by Ndola Control Tower as nil.

Delivery of Fouga Magister jets to Katanga

207. In an interview with the Hammarskjld Commission, on 27 June 2013, former-
CIA officer David Doyle stated that he was a CIA officer operating in Katanga in
the early 1960s. While there and performing a routine airport check, he observed
a United States commercial KC 97 with a United States crew unloading three Fouga
Magisters in Katanga (the precise location was not specified) in the middle of the
night, sometime in July 1961. He advised that a Colonel Delotervang, whose
affiliation is not made clear, had signed for them. He went on to state that the Fouga
aircraft, which were purportedly given by the French to the CIA to help counter UN
operations in Katanga, later had guns installed. Speculating, he did not know
whether Moise Tshombe, France or Belgium had paid for them or whether it was
French or Belgian pilots who flew them. The Hammarskjld Commission assessed
part of Doyles memory as patchy at times during the discussion with him, which
the Panel noted is reflected in his sometimes inconsistent recollection of events in
the statement made available to it.
208. The Panel noted that no basis is provided in the information for the assertion
that the aircraft were supplied by the French, the CIA or any other identified
source for that matter. That said, while taking into account the lack of corroborating
information, which renders the information that of a solitary witness only, the Panel
assessed the degree to which the information helps establish that three Fouga jets
were delivered to Katangese forces prior to the crash of SE-BDY as moderate.

Compromised cipher machine

209. Sixten Svensson, the brother-in-law of the now deceased Boris Hagelin, the
founder of Crypto AG, the Swiss company that produced the CX-52 cipher machine
used by Hammarskjld throughout his visit to the Congo, explained to the
Hammarskjld Commission, on 6 March 2013, that Hagelin had told him that
machine was among those intentionally designed such that their transmissions could
be surreptitiously intercepted by the NSA and other select intelligence agencies
unbeknownst to anyone other than the manufacturer and the intelligence agencies.
Svensson explained to that Commission that the device was designed so that, The
traffic between UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjld and the UN in New York
in September 1961, was therefore fully readable for the NSA, CIA and GCHQ the
moment the document was read at the United Nations. This was purportedly part of
Borisprojekt, a project whereby cryptographic machines were sold with a setting
that, unbeknownst to the users, allowed the NSA and GCHQ, possibly among other

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agencies, to receive the information unencrypted. Hagelin apparently wrote about

this in a memoir scheduled for publication no earlier than 2033, 50 years after his
death.
210. While this interception capability may have existed, searches to date within
the UN records and other archives have not revealed the existence of any cable sent
to or received during the flight. However, communications between the UN in
Katanga and UN headquarters in the days leading up to and following the events on
the night of 17-18 September, if intercepted, could have provided information about
the travel and other arrangements being made for the meetings between
Hammarskjld and Tshombe. As it pertains to the possibility that communications
sent from the CX-52 cryptographic machine used by Hammarskjld during his visit
were intercepted by the NSA and possibly other intelligence agencies as alleged, the
Panel assessed the information as having moderate probative value.

Time the crash site was located by the authorities I

211. Rhodesian authorities reported first locating the wreckage of SE-BDY at
1510 hours (local time) on 18 September 1961. However, in new information that
challenges that account, a total of six of the new witnesses reported visiting the
crash site in the early hours of 18 September (Chimema, Custon Chipoya, Lumiya
Chipoya, Mast-Ingle, Mwebe and Mwansa) and observing the presence of police or
soldiers or both. This sits in contrast with the accounts by Rhodesian Government
officials, provided later that day, that security forces first located the wreckage at
1510 hours (local time) on 18 September.
212. A summary of the observations of five of the eyewitnesses who visited the site
follows. One (Custon Chipoya) stated that he arrived at the crash site around dawn,
at which time there were police and soldiers present. This eyewitness further stated
that Hammarskjlds body had been removed, along with pieces of the aircraft. A
second eyewitness (Mwebe) stated that he arrived at the site between 0600 and
0700 hours in the morning on 18 September, at which time he observed the presence
of police and soldiers. He also claimed that Hammarskjlds body was near an
anthill. A third eyewitness (Mwansa) stated that he arrived at the crash site at
approximately 0700 hours and saw police present. He advised that the site had been
cordoned off and the victims bodies removed. The fourth eyewitness (Chimema)
stated that he arrived at the crash site at 0900 hours and saw police present. He
noted that the wreckage was still burning. The fifth eyewitness (Lumayi Chipya)
recalled that she visited the site shortly after the crash, at which time she observed
police and soldiers present.
213. A sixth new witness (Wren Mast-Ingle) provided, in a statement to
Dr. Williams, a fuller account of his visit to the crash site. He purports to have
visited the site soon after he heard SE-BDY come down while travelling on his
motorcycle nearby (see also para 94). He stated to Dr. Williams that he arrived at
the site at the same time as six to eight men wearing combat-like fatigues in two
jeeps, who reportedly ordered him away from the site. The witness also stated that
the aircraft wreckage was not burnt.
214. Notwithstanding variations in the timing of their arrival at the crash site, some
of these witnesses noted that they were not able to get very close to the wreckage as
police or other security officials prevented them from doing so (Custon Chipoya,

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Mast-Ingle and Mwansa), it was too dangerous to do so because the wreckage was
still burning (Ngongo, Mwebe, Chimema) or that there was heavy smoke.
215. However, some of the observations of three of the six new witnesses about the
time the victims bodies were removed and the manner and time at which the site
was cordoned off were inconsistent with other known facts about the status of the
crash site at the times they claimed to have been there. This suggests that some of
these witnesses may in fact have travelled to the site after 1510 hours, by which
time recovery and investigation activities were well underway. One of the witnesss
(Custon Chipoya) reference to pieces of the aircraft having been removed may be
able to be explained by the fact that so much of the aircraft had been totally
destroyed by the crash sequence and the conflagration such that it appeared as if
parts of the aircraft had been removed.
216. By definition, none of the new eyewitness accounts are contemporaneous.
Further, the general factors affecting the probative value of eyewitness information
outlined by the Panel in paragraphs 62 to 66 above apply to the information
provided by the new eyewitnesses here. The Panel assessed the degree to which the
information provided by the new eyewitnesses helps to establish that the wreckage
was found by the authorities prior to 1510 hours, the time presented in their official
accounts, as moderate in the case of two eyewitnesses (Chimema and Lumayi
Chipoya) and weak in the case of four eyewitnesses (Custon Chipoya, Maste-Ingle,
Mwebe and Ngongo).

Time the crash site was located by the authorities II

217. In an interview with the Hammarskjld Commission, on 12 December 2012,
former British diplomat, Brian Unwin, who was assistant to Lord Alport at the time
of the crash, states that he and Lord Alport were informed by Lord Landsdowne
upon their arrival at Salisbury via a flight from Ndola that there had been a crash
and theyd found it and Hammarskjld was dead. Unwin, who had accompanied
Lord Alport to Ndola on 17 and 18 September, estimated that he and Lord Alport
arrived in Salisbury between 1330 and 1500 hours (local time) (his recollection of
the time varies between his accounts of events, with the later recollections being
closer to the time of the official sighting of the wreckage). Thus, his comments
indicate that he and Lord Alport were informed about the discovery of the crash site
before the official account of the site having been discovered by the authorities at
1510 hours. In his book, The Sudden Assignment (1965), Lord Alport also recalls
first learning upon arrival at Salisbury that the crash site had been located. He
recounts the arrival time as 1400 hours (local time in Salisbury, which is the same
as that of Ndola), although the Panel was not able to identify the source from which
he learnt of the time. A report of the Officer-in-Charge of UNOC to the Secretary-
General, dated 17 September 1961, states that through a direct report received by
the United States embassy in Leopoldville from its Air Attach who was in Ndola,
information was received that the wreck of an airplane had been sighted
approximately seven miles north-east of the airport and that a ground party was
enroute (S/4940/Add.4). The Panel was unable to locate information confirming
this report that the crash site was located by officials at 1400 hours.
218. The time that Lord Alport and Unwin state they were notified that the crash
site had been found and that Hammarskjld was dead is inconsistent with the
official account of when the wreckage was first located by the authorities, that being

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1510 hours local time. This appears to suggest that Lord Landsdowne knew that the
aircraft had crashed and that Hammarskjld was dead prior to the official accounts
of when the wreckage was discovered by Rhodesian (or any other) authorities. In
assessing the probative value of the information the Panel noted that the persons
involved were of a seniority and level of responsibility that they would likely have
been kept up-to-date about the search and rescue efforts. However, the information
is not contemporaneous and, as far as the issue of possible official collusion is
concerned, does nothing more than suggest that the officials covered-up that the
crash site was discovered before 1510 hours (local time). The Panel assessed in that
regard the probative value of the information as moderate.

Time the crash site was located by the authorities III

219. In the book, The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe (1968), by Ian Colvin, a
foreign correspondent in Ndola at the time of the crash, Colvin describes flying over
the crash site at 0900 hours (local time) on 18 September in an aircraft piloted by
himself. He reports having seen a long narrow rift in the trees and police moving
around in the aircraft wreckage and ashes. This was several hours before the time
officials purport to have discovered the wreckage. Colvin does not describe any
efforts to notify somebody. In its assessment, the Panel assessed the probative value
of the information about police observed at the crash site in the morning of
18 September 1961 as weak.

Reporting of a foreign intelligence agency

220. Among the new information made available to the Panel by the Hammarskjld
Commission was a declassified report from the First Secretary at the British High
Commission to Salisbury, and alleged Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) agent, Neil
Ritchie, dated 17 September 1961, in which Ritchie details how he transported
Moise Tshombe and the British Counsel in Elisabethville, Denzil Dunnett, to Ndola,
earlier the same day, whereupon they then awaited the arrival from Leopoldville of
Hammarskjld. While that particular report does not comment on the possible cause
of the crash of SE-BDY, its existence and content serves as new information about
the presence of the British intelligence agency in the area and that agencys
reporting about circumstances related to the activities of Hammarskjld leading up
to the night of 17-18 September. Furthermore, new information presented to the
Panel by Dr. Williams was to the effect that portions of files and records of the
Government of the United Kingdom potentially related to the events in question
have been retained by the Government due to their security classification.
221. In that connection, to assist with its assessments of the probative value of this
and other new information, the Panel requested that the competent authorities of the
Government of the United Kingdom search for and share with it any information
they may have in their possession from Ritchie or other intelligence officials
relating to the tragic deaths, and any other relevant materials. Moreover, the Panel
requested the same authorities to share with the Panel the retained portions of the
records brought to its attention by Dr. Williams (see appendix 7).
222. The Government of the United Kingdom responded, in a letter dated 10 June
2015, that the vast majority of UK material relating to these events has already been
released and is available to the public, and that the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office has coordinated a search across all relevant UK departments, none of which

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have identified any pertinent material. It further noted that after having
commissioned a review of all of the retained material in question to determine
whether this can now be released, that review has determined that the Government
of the United Kingdom is not in a position to release any of it due to security-related
reasons. It further noted that the redactions consist of individual pieces of text
within otherwise open files and that the total amount retained is very small and
consists of only a few words (see appendix 7).

IX. Summary of key findings and conclusions

Summary of key findings
New information on the cause of death or other alleged intervening causes of death
223. The Panel assigned nil probative value to the information made public in 2005
that Hammarskjld had a round hole in his forehead, having suffered a gunshot
injury. No medical evidence was found that he sustained a gunshot wound, pre- or
post-crash. The concurrent forensic opinion is that he died instantaneously (the
Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry) or within a few seconds after impact (the UN
Commission and Knudssen) or that his post-crash survival was only brief
(Drs. Ranner, Busch and James). The external forensic experts consulted by the
Hammarskjld Commission and the Panel respectively support the correctness of
the post-mortem examinations conducted by Drs. Ross, Stevens and Smith in 1961.
224. The new information from an eyewitness to the effect that Hammarksjld was
alive and struggling to survive at the crash site, on 18 September 1961, is of nil
probative value.
225. The new additional allegation that two mercenaries (Swanepoel and Colin
John Cooper) had shot Hammarskjld after the crash lacks any probative value.
226. The confirmed existence of 200 original X-rays of all of the victims of the
tragic air crash and the Analysis of Pathological Findings on Victims of Accident
of UN Aircraft, recorded contemporaneously with the event, in the records of
Dr. Ross deposited in the archives of the University of Dundee, and the photocopies
of the official post-mortem medical examination reports also of all the victims that
were made under the Inquests Act, among the archives of Dr. Smith at the Office of
the Chief Forensic Pathologist of Ontario, enhance the authenticity and propriety of
the original autopsy reports conducted by the Northern Rhodesian authorities.

New eyewitness information about the final stages of flight SE-BDY

227. The Panel assigned moderate probative value to the information provided by
nine of the 12 new eyewitnesses in so far as it helps to establish one or more of the
following:
(a) There was more than one aircraft in the air at the same time as SE-BDY
made its approach to Ndola.
(b) Any additional aircraft in the air at the same time SE-BDY made its
approach to Ndola were jets.
(c) SE-BDY was on fire before it impacted the ground.

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(d) SE-BDY was fired upon or other otherwise actively engaged by other
aircraft present while approaching Ndola.
228. That value was assessed on the basis that, notwithstanding factors affecting the
reliability of eyewitness observations over the passage of time, they represent first-
hand accounts of what they genuinely believed they saw (or heard) and lend weight
to the witness accounts provided to the official inquiries.

New information about an aerial or ground attack or other external threat

229. The Panel assigned moderate probative value to the claims made by Charles
Southall and Paul Abram to have listened to or read a transcript of an intercept of
radio transmissions on the evening of 17-18 September 1961 relating to what they
believe was an attack on SE-BDY that brought about the crash. While it was
considered technically feasible for a radio transmission to have been intercepted by
or relayed to the NSA/CIA listening posts in Cyprus and Greece, where Southall and
Abram were stationed, respectively, aspects of the authenticity of their claims are
yet to be substantiated by the US Government. In addition, the US Government has
informed the Panel in a letter, dated 9 June 2015, that a search of its files and
records has not revealed any documents responsive to the request made by the Panel
on this matter and that this effort included a search of NSA and CIA records (see
appendix 6).
230. The Panel assigned weak probative value to information from one new
eyewitness alleging that the wreckage of SE-BDY was sprayed with bullet holes, on
the basis of inconsistencies with other known information about the circumstances.
However, the Panel accepted that the bullet holes could have, at the time of his
observations, been located in an as yet unburnt portion of the aircraft wreckage.
231. The Panel assigned nil probative value to a second witnesss claim that there
were bullet holes in the wreckage of SE-BDY on the basis that the information was
hearsay.
232. The Panel assigned weak probative value to information relating to the claims
made by French diplomat, Claude de Kemoularia, that he interviewed a Belgian
mercenary pilot by the name of Beukels in Paris, in 1967, who allegedly
confessed to have unintentionally shot down SE-BDY while attempting to divert the
aircraft elsewhere on the night of 17-18 September 1961. That value was assigned
on the basis of the unexplained absence of any information about an attempt by de
Kemoularia to report the allegations to the appropriate authorities; the apparent
absence of the contemporaneous notes taken by de Kemoularia during or soon after
the interview; and the response from the Governments of Belgium and France to the
Panel that they have no information in their files and records about the matter.
233. The Panel assigned nil probative value to information alleging the involvement
of two alleged mercenaries, Van Risseghem and Andre Gilson, on the basis that
investigations conducted by the relevant authorities (the Government of Belgium
and UNOC, respectively) at the time were able to establish their whereabouts,
which demonstrated that it was not physically possible to have been involved in the
aerial attack on SE-BDY.
234. The Panel assigned weak probative value to the claim that a purported CIA
agent, Roland Bud Culligan, shot down SE-BDY on the orders of the CIA. This
value was assigned on the basis of the absence of information confirming Culligans

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qualifications and account of events, including as claimed to have been detailed by

him in a diary, and the response by the US Government to a request for information
by the Panel that there was no reference to Culligan in its records documenting CIA
activities at the time in question (see appendix 6).
235. The Panel assigned nil probative value to the claim that two Belgian pilots,
including a Major Delin, had boasted in a drunken conversation overheard by a
journalist that they had forced down SE-BDY in an aerial attack. This value was
assigned on the basis of the claimants reluctance to testify at the Rhodesian
Commissions hearing for his version to be fully tested, while being fully aware that
he was requested to do so; and Major Delins categorical denial before the
Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry to have made the remarks.
236. The Panel assigned nil probative value to the claim made by the partner of
journalist and writer, Eva Aminoff, that two unnamed Belgian pilots were ordered to
shoot down SE-BDY on the basis that the information was hearsay, not
contemporaneous and devoid of detailed information that can be tested against other
information.
237. The Panel assigned weak probative value to the information that seeks to
support the proposition that a Fouga Magister jet, De Havilland Dove or a Dornier
DO-27 or DO-28 aircraft was used in an aerial attack on SE-BDY. The information
speaks only to the issue of aircraft capability, for which there are a number of
doubts expressed based on operational and other limitations.

New information about sabotage

238. The probative value of the documents made public by the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, on 19 August 1998, and purportedly issued by the
South African Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR) ordering Operation
Celeste, which targeted Hammarskjlds removal, have weak probative value
mainly due the non-establishment of their authenticity; uncertainty of their chain of
possession; and the non-confirmation of whether or not SAMIR existed in
September 1961, much as its contents refer to instructions to plant a 6 lb bomb on
board SE-BDY, the feasibility of which existed when it was left unguarded for an
hour or more at Leopoldville.
239. There is nil probative value in the claim made in 2015 that staff members of a
Foreign Embassy (Romania) in Leopoldville were involved in planting an explosive
device on SE-BDY while it was on the tarmac at Leopoldville airport, on
17 September 1961, merely because its staff members were allegedly also declared
persona non grata on that very day.
240. As potential physical evidence, a piece of metal found at the crash site in 1975
by a former United Nations Staff member has nil probative value, it having been
assessed by the United States National Transportation Safety Board as probably not
from an aircraft and, in regard to the holes in it, by Danish ballistic experts that the
size and appearance of those holes do not show the signature of a bullet penetration.
241. In the absence of the source of the information, authenticity and verifiable
details that can be tested, the claim in a newspaper article, published on 3 July 1978,
to the effect that the explosive device on board SE-BDY was of standard KGB
incendiary design was assigned nil probative value.

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New information about hijacking

242. The new information that a hijacker was smuggled aboard SE-BDY, on
17 September 1961, before it left Leopoldville in order to force it to re-route to an
unspecified location and thus prevent the intended ceasefire negotiations between
Hammarskjld and Tshombe in Ndola has nil probative value.
243. The new information from two former senior UN officials that shortly after the
air crash, the former Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Roy
Welensky, alluded to the possibility of an extra passenger on board SE-BDY has
nil probative value given that the information was hearsay, lacked details, the
identities of all the sixteen passengers on board the airplane were positively
established immediately after the tragic event, and the host of unanswered questions
on the probability of such an enterprise.

New information about human factors

244. The Panel assigned moderate probative value to information in which it was
reported that three of the four members of the flight crew had flown up to
16.8 hours, almost entirely at night, in the 24 hours preceding the crash of SE-BDY
and therefore did not appear to have had sufficient opportunity for adequate rest.
The information was a contemporaneous analysis conducted by qualified staff
working for the relevant Swedish authorities, drawing from records of Transair, the
operating company of SE-BDY.
245. The Panel assessed as weak the probative value of information from another
source that also alleges the crew was fatigued as a result of excessive flight hours,
on the basis the information provided was from a secondary source and that a
contemporaneous record of the claimants analysis of the crash of SE-BDY in
response to his purported assignment was not provided to the Panel.

New information about the activities of officials and local authorities

246. The new information from two eyewitnesses that the aircraft wreckage was
found by Northern Rhodesian authorities prior to 1510 hours, the time presented in
its official account, has moderate probative value.
247. The new information from a witness who visited the site soon after SE-BDY
crashed and, while there, allegedly saw six to eight men wearing combat-like
fatigues, and who may have been from the army or the police, has weak probative
value because, among other considerations, it calls into question the first sighting of
the crash by a member of the air search party who reported having spotted the
wreckage from the air and the official account by Northern Rhodesian authorities
that the police reached the crash site at around 1510 hours.
248. The new information conveyed in 1995 by Lord Alport that upon his arrival in
Salisbury, at 1400 hours on 18 September 1961, Lord Lansdowne informed him that
Hammarskjlds plane had been found and that Hammarskjld was dead, which was
before the official time given by authorities for the discovery of the wreckage, is of
moderate probative value.
249. There is nil probative value in the new information provided by a former Army
Sergeant based at the Kamina Airbase in Katanga and under the control of UNOC
that the Ndola Control Tower communicated an incorrect QNH (altimeter setting) to

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SE-BDY, which could have caused it descend to a dangerously low altitude, as this
contention was neither reported to the United Nations or the troop-contributing
country to which he belonged, in a timely fashion or at all, until he later disclosed it
in his memoirs.
250. The Panel assigned moderate probative value to the new information that
communications sent from the CX-52 cryptographic machine used by Hammarskjld
during his visit to the Congo were intercepted by intelligence agencies based on the
preliminary information provided to the Hammarskjld Commission, on 6 March
2013, by the brother-in-law of the founder of Crypto AG, the Swiss company that
produced the machine.

Conclusions
251. The corpus of the new information and its probative value on the possible
causes of death of Hammarskjld and of some of the members of the party
accompanying him does not discredit the propriety, findings and conclusions of the
original post-mortem examination of the occupants of SE-BDY.
252. The Panel is of the view that, if any further inquiries into this matter are
agreed to by the General Assembly, little will be gained by subjecting the surviving
eyewitnesses that reside in Zambia to additional questioning. Their testimony, in so
far as it is now part of the official UN record, would remain available to be tested
against the body of the current information and any new information that may come
to light in the future.
253. The Hammarskjld Commission recommended that the initial purpose of
reopening the UN Commissions investigation of 1961-1962 was to confirm or
refute, based on the disclosure of communications intercept records, evidence
indicating that the crash of SE-BDY was brought about by some form of attack or
aerial threat. In particular, that Commission considered it important for the Panel to
pursue with the US Government the disclosure of the two documents reported by the
NSA to be responsive to its request but which remained exempt from disclosure
due to their classification. One member of the Panel was afforded full access to the
two responsive files and assessed that the information contained therein would not
help to establish the facts of the cause of the aircraft crash or the cause or causes of
the tragic deaths. The Panel member also assessed that it did not contain any
information relating to the interception of communications about an attack on
SE-BDY. Despite the submission of other specific information requests by the Panel
to certain Member States, those States that have responded have advised that they
were unable to locate any documents responsive to the requests. However, this is a
line of inquiry that the Panel considers has not yet been exhausted.
254. Since the conclusion of the UN Commissions inquiry, there have been several
claims made by mercenaries, or their interlocutors, and other agents that they shot
or otherwise forced down SE-BDY in an aerial attack. Most of the new information
before the Panel on this matter lacks credibility.
255. Based on information the Panel has reviewed during its mandate, it appears
that United Nations information sources may have underestimated the level of
resources that were available to Katanga at the time of the events of
17-18 September, including with regard to the number and types of aircraft that
were in use. Nevertheless, information regarding the Fouga Magister, the

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De Havilland Dove and the Dornier DO-27 and DO-28, speak only to the capability
of those aircraft to perpetrate an aerial attack or threat. The information does not
help to support the proposition that one of those aircraft types was actually involved
in an aerial attack or threat on SE-BDY on the night in question.
256. The claim about a possible sabotage of SE-BDY by the installation or planting
of explosives or other such incendiary devices is weakly supported by the body of
new information.
257. Collectively examined by the Panel, the sum of the new information and its
probative value on hijacking neither supports nor reinforces the hypothesis that
SE-BDY may have been subjected to a hijack while flying from Leopoldville and
Ndola.
258. On the matter of possible official collusion by a State or States or their
officials, the probative value of the new information before the Panel does not
substantiate its existence. At the same time, it also does not exclude or eliminate
such a possibility given the open questions in this regard.
259. While there was some consideration by the UN Commission regarding the
effects of fatigue on flight crew performance, it was nevertheless insufficient by
contemporary investigation standards. However, the possible role of crew fatigue
does not in and of itself, explain the cause of the crash or the extent, if at all, to
which fatigue was a contributing factor to the crash of SE-BDY under one or more
of the hypotheses of the possible causes.
260. Considered in its totality, apart from the discovery of primary and secondary
medical material, the new information is only marginally supported by any physical
evidence.
261. In relation to the parts of the new information about an aerial attack or threat
and its probative value, which was assessed as moderate, the statements by
eyewitnesses that they observed more than one aircraft in the air at the same time as
SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola or of jets or that SE-BDY was on fire before it
impacted the ground or that it was fired upon or other otherwise actively engaged by
other aircraft present; the alleged hearing of radio transmissions or reading of a
radio transcript about the event by two witnesses; and the additional information
that has emerged on the air capability of the provincial Government of Katanga in
1961 and its use of foreign military and paramilitary personnel, may also provide an
appreciable lead in pursuing the truth of the probable cause or causes of the air
crash and tragic deaths.

X. Recommendations
262. The Panel provides the following recommendations:
(a) The Panel notes that the records and archives containing information on
the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of former Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjld and of the members of the party accompanying him,
including primary and secondary material such as the original X-rays and the
post-mortem medical examination reports of the victims, pathological analysis and
charts and other crucial medical information are held in both private and public
archival holdings, and are located in various States (Canada, Sweden and the UK)

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and institutions (Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford, National Archives of

Sweden, Office of the Chief Forensic Pathologist in Ontario, Royal Library of
Sweden, University of Dundee and United Nations Secretariat). The Panel
recommends that the Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States,
institutions and individuals holding such archives, explore the feasibility of the
establishment of a central archival holding or other holistic arrangement that would
enable access by electronic or other appropriate means to those records and archives
by the United Nations and any other authorized parties with a view to ensuring their
continued and enhanced preservation and access.
(b) The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General should continue to
urge Member States to disclose, declassify or allow privileged access to the
Secretary-General to information they may have in their possession related to the
circumstances and conditions resulting in the tragic deaths. In that connection, the
Panel invites the Secretary-General to follow-up on the unfulfilled aspects of the
Panels requests to Member States for specific information related to the event.
(c) Drawing from the Panels key findings and conclusions, as a guide, the
Panel recommends that upon the receipt by the Secretary-General of any additional
new information from Member States or other sources that increases the probative
value of any currently existing information, the Secretary-General, or an
independent body should he deem it preferable to establish one, should carry out a
focused and concerted examination of the degree to which the information
establishes the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of former
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and of the members of the party
accompanying him. The Panel further recommends that the Secretary-General report
that new information and the findings of the examination thereof, including in so far
as it alters the probative value of the information considered in this report or that of
the UN Commission, to the General Assembly.
263. The final revelation of the whole truth about the conditions and circumstances
resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjld and of members of the party
accompanying him would still require the United Nations, as a matter of continuity
and priority, to further critically address remaining information gaps, including in
the existence of classified material and information held by Member States and their
agencies that may shed further light on this fatal event and its probable cause or
causes.

(Signed) Mohamed Chande Othman

Head of Panel
(Signed) Kerryn Macaulay
Member
(Signed) Henrik Larsen
Member

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