GUTIERREZ vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

Facts:
1. On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution.
2. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also
based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
3. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on
Justice at the same time.
4. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in
form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were
sufficient in form.
5. On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme
Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment
proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.

Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."

Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her
disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on September
13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the
two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.

6. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the
Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against
petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should
have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of
the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)
7. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?

Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
 DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the
application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their
choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on
the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in
previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had
been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the
official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered
stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No.
8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots
or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong
on May 13, 2010, Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor.
However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-
Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of
Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that
she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or
added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
FEDERICO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections, the
Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the
conduct of the first national automated election: the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant
to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Maligaya was the Liberal Partys official mayoralty candidate.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the
province of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.

Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as official candidate of
the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna.

Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed after the
deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678.

However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of Edna and Petitioner.

However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been printed, the name of Edna
was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact,
Edna garnered the most votes for that election, beating Private Respodent for the position of mayor.
Eventually the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the replacement
of Edna).

Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner Federico.

The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner and proclaimed Private
Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya). The COMELEC declared that Petitioner's substitution
of Edna was void because if was filed after the period for filing of COCs had lapsed.

Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that Comelec Resolution No.
8678, which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election
code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's replacement candidate of one who withdraws,
dies or is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled Federicos
proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his substitution as mayoralty candidate was
void.

HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is empowered by law to
prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national
automated election. RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections specifically allows
COMELEC to set deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.

Under Sec. 15, the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant
to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.
In Aratea vs. COMELEC (2012), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that an ineligible candidate is not
considered a candidate at all. A void Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot produce any legal effect. All the votes for the ineligible
candidate are stray votes.
Aratea ruling has clarified that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates is not
a second placer. He is technically a first-placer since the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
As explained by the Highest Tribunal, the position vacated by the ineligible candidate for the position of mayor will no longer be
surrendered to the vice mayor but to the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
Thus, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will no longer apply in this scenario.

The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. Sereno, elucidated the import of its latest pronouncements in Maquiling:

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
Topacio vs. Paredes

Facts:

This is an original action instituted in this court wherein the petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Cavite, directing him to certify to this court a transcript of the record of the proceedings it had in that court on a certain election
contest.

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe
Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.

The petition alleges that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in the course of the election contest in that he declared that no one has been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on June 4, 1912, and the petitioner prays that the
judgment thus rendered and all subsequent proceedings based thereon be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge (Court of First Instance) had jurisdiction, under the provisions of section 27 of the Election Law, as amended by
Act No. 2170, to declare that no one was legally elected president of Imus on June 4, 1912.

Held:

As amended by Act No. No. 2170, the same section provides:

SEC. 27. Election contests.The Assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and disqualifications of its members. The time for the
filing of the contests, the notification thereof, and the expenses, costs, and the bonds shall be until repealed. Contests in all elections for the
determination of which provision has not been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction in the judicial
district in which the election was held, upon motion by any candidate voted for at such election. The contest shall be filed with the court within
two weeks after the election and shall be decided by the same as soon as possible after the hearing of the contest. Such court shall have exclusive
and final jurisdiction, except as hereinafter provided, and shall forthwith cause the registry lists and all ballots used at such election to be
brought before it and examined, and to appoint the necessary officers therefor and to fix their compensation, which shall be payable in the first
instance out of the provincial treasury, and to issue its mandamus directed to the board of canvassers to correct its canvass in accordance with
the facts as found. If in any case the court shall be determine that no person was lawfully elected it shall forthwith so certify to the Governor-
General, who shall order a special election to fill the office or offices in question as hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That an appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court, within ten days, from any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests of elections for
provincial governors, for the review, amendment, repeal, or confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon shall be the same as in a
criminal cause.

The method provided in the above-quoted section for the determination of election contests is purely a statutory one. The proceedings are not ordinary
suits. The statute expressly declares that the "proceedings" shall not be "upon pleadings or by action." This statute was especially enacted to give the
Courts of First Instance the power to try contested election cases and it defines the powers of the court and the rules of procedure in the trial thereof.
The statute prescribes a special mode of procedure and the court is compelled to conform to it. It provides a speedy remedy. It prescribes within what
time the motion shall be filed and requires the court to decide the contest as speedily as possible, giving preference over all other cases, if practicable,
and also defines to a great extent how the court shall reach its conclusions. These facts clearly show that the court is made a special tribunal to try
contested election cases. The jurisdiction of such tribunals, although courts of general jurisdiction in all other matters, is strictly confined within the
provisions of the statute creating them for this purpose. The court can take no additional power from its general jurisdiction.

All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (!) those which pertain to the casting and counting of the ballots; and (2) those which
pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be cases incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested. Those parts of section 27 [Act
No. 1582 as amended by Act No. 2170], indicative of the kind of contests which are to be determined under its provisions, read:

Such court (of First Instance) shall have exclusive and final jurisdiction except as hereinafter provided, and shall forthwith cause the registry lists and
all ballots used at such election to be brought before it and examined, and to appoint the necessary officers therefor and to fix their compensation, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In such proceedings the registry list as finally corrected by the board of inspectors shall be conclusive as to who was entitled to vote at such election.

These very words indicate the character of the election disputes which Courts of First Instance are empowered to decide under this provision of law.
Contests which cannot be decided by an examination of the registry lists and of the ballots, and evidence of fraud and irregularity in connection with
the manner of casting and courting the votes, must be included in the phrase "for the determination of which provision has not been otherwise made"
which appears near the beginning of the section. If the nature of the evidence upon which the eligibility (qualifications) of a person to hold office must
be decided is considered, it will be sent that such evidence has nothing to do with the manner of casting and counting the votes. To what purpose would
be the examination of registry lists and ballots by officers appointed and paid for that purpose in determining the eligibility of a successful candidate for
office? The eligibility of a person to be elected to a provincial or municipal office depends upon his qualifications as a voter, his residence, his allegiance
to the United States, his age, the absence of disqualifications inflicted by the courts by way of punishment, etc. That is, these qualifications and
disqualifications do not depend upon the conduct of election inspectors, the illegal trafficking in votes, the method of casting and counting the ballots,
or the election returns. The evidence required to establish such qualifications or disqualifications would not aid in any way in determining the questions
relating to he manner of casting and counting the ballots. E converso, would the examination of ballots aid in arriving at a decision as to his eligibility.
There is nothing section to indicate that the court shall receive or consider evidence as to the personal character or circumstances of candidates.

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.

The SC thinks that the statute limits the power of the county court to contests of elections. That court has no other or further jurisdiction than to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected. The question whether or not a party already elected possesses the necessary qualifications for
the office is one which must be determined in another way and by a different proceeding.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that
no one was elect municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election

TALAGA vs COMELEC

GR. NO. 197015

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office
following the substitutes disqualification.
FACTS:

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national
and local elections. Ramon declared that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served
Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing
that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his
CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the upcoming elections.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second
and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing
jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of
continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid
ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, acknowledging that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City; yet did not withdraw his CoC.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, however, he later on filed for its withdrawal.
On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon,
her husband.

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast
in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby
being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillos 39,615 votes.

Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, alleging that Barbara Ruby
could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara
Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her
substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

Thereafter, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,
positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Rubys substitution had been invalid
and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

ISSUES:

1. WON Barbara Rubys substitution was valid

2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position

HELD:

1.
Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be
considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through
a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a
valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is
not at all a candidate.

Declaration of Ramons disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid
candidate to be properly substituted.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only
that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. The false
representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public
office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no
deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows
from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of
the election laws.

To be sure, the cause of Ramons ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of
a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office."

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from
asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC
was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of
his eligibility to run.

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve
on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all
intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that
he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Labo v Comelec

176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual
Citizenship Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he
has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when
he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as
an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to
the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that
he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He
cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress none of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should
not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had
they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents
himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being
convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the
filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared
Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence,
there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on
Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.
Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3
However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further
bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued
an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved
to declare him in default and to present evidence exparte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken
by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. The First
Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a
Filipino citizen.18The Court ruled that Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered
the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion
for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of arnado
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, There
are three questions posed by the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
SC:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is
proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his
foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he
filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he
had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American,
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which
foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective
SANCHEZ, vs. COMELEC
114 SCRA 454, 1987

Facts: Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections to
determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four (4) winning
senatorial candidates on the ground that votes intended for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil
Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns and other election forms.

On July 16, 1987, the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing petitioner Sanchez petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent
Comelec, by a vote of five to two, reversed its order of dismissal and granted Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots.

Issue: Whether his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election
protest.

Held: The Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-
proclamation controversy.

The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be
raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any
candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the
preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima
facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily
decided.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18,
2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS
 Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the
third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with
the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent
to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694;
22 May 1995]
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates
to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void
on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the
respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
and credible election.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the
element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that
the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of justcompensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a validexercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS.
COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is
an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was
to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on
the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92,
B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec
Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting
and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer
even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these
stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to
petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this
years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to
use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and
supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as
against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space
they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of
public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to
provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM
DILANGALEN, respondents.

FACTS:

Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for
1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration
record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a
plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern
Kabuntalan.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the
transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. Private respondent filed a
disqualification case against petitioner. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the
period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his
application for transfer of voting record. Elections were held without any decision being rendered
by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as
the victor. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13 of Cotabato City.

On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan
as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.

Petitioner argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation
of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his
voters registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year
residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly
created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the
effective date of its creation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not
a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections

HELD: YES.

The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately
declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the
said elections. COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner
was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed
and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a
resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence
does not necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as
of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner merely admitted that
he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the
elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency
requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after
April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.

Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the
residency requirement for the transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay
Indatuan. Given that a voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for
six months immediately preceding the election, petitioners application for transfer on December
13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of
April 27, 2006.

The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not
reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC.
Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.
Rogelio De Jesus vs. People of the Philippines GR No. L-61998 February 22,
1983 (CrimPro 2016)
Posted onJULY 10, 2016

Issue: Wether or not the Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction on election offenses?

Held: The Commission on Elections and the Regional Trial Courts, and not the Sandiganbayan have exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office.

It is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4 of
PD No. 1606 speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office. Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does.

PD 1606 should be understood to refer to offenses other than election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office.
Jardiel vs COMELEC

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Comelec, Second Div., dated 10 December
1980 (P. P. Case # 214), wherein it resolved:

1. to annul the result of the January 30, 1980 elections in the municipality of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija;
and

2. to order the holding of a special election thereof for the positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and
Sangguniang-Bayan Members, on a date to be set by the Commission.

In the local elections of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, held on 30 January 1980, petitioner Jardiel prevailed
over private respondent Aves and was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on the same
date.

The day after the elections, the COMELEC received a telegraphic report from its Special Action Team
recommending the immediate suspension of the canvass of results of elections for Mayor, Vice-Mayor
and Councilors in all voting centers of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija due to rampant election offenses.

After proper observance of due process, the COMELEC resolved to declare the elections or the results
thereof annulled, as above quoted.

Subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was also denied by the Comelec.

Hence, this petition for the Reversal of the Comelec resolution.

Issue:
1. Whether Comelec resolution constitutes a denial of due process on the petitioner.

2. Whether reports of COMSAT is deserving of serious consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled on the two issues in the negative.

On the first issue, the Supreme Court stated that petitioner's contentions were not well taken. The
COMELEC had weighed the conflicting pleadings, certifications and affidavits before it and concluded
that the case was ripe for resolution on the merits. The procedural step taken by COMELEC finds support
in the case of Demetrio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil 45 (1927).

As to the second issue, the Court stated that report of COMSAT No. 9 is deserving of serious
consideration because COMSAT 9 was the COMELEC Special Action Team. Hence, it may be said to have
been an extension of the COMELEC itself. In addition to which the COMELEC gave full faith and credit
considering that COMSAT 9 was its Special Deputy and implementing arm in the critical area or areas
which were expected to become trouble spots in the last elections.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

Arroyo vs. DOJ

G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while
that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?

II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly,
and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code.

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of
law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority
given by the Comelec.

Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Lanot v. COMELEC

GR No. 164858 November 16, 2006

Justice Carpio

FACTS:

Henry Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta, Reynaldo dela Paz, Edilberto Yamat and Ram Alan
Cruz, filed a petition for disqualification against Vicente Eusebio before the COMELEC. Petitioners
alleged that Eusebio engaged in various forms on various occasions premature campaigning.

Regional Director Ladra recommended to the COMELEC the disqualification of Eusebio. The
COMELEC Fist Division adopted the findings and recommendation of the Regional Director and
ordered the disqualification of Eusebio. The resolution is immediately executory unless restrained by
the Commission en banc.

On May 9, 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration. On election day itself, Chairman Abalos
enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the resolution of the COMELEC First Division due to the
motion for reconsideration filed by Eusebio.
On May 11, 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners filed before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of votes. The COMELEC en banc partially denied
the motion. It ordered the suspension, until further orders of the Commission, the proclamation of
Eusebio in the event he receives the winning number of votes.

On May 21, 2004, the Commission en banc lifted and set aside the suspension of proclamation.
Eusebio was proclaimed City Mayor of Pasig. The Commission also annulled the order of the
COMELEC First Division.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Lanot can be proclaimed and allowed to sit as mayor-elect in case of
disqualification of Eusebio.

RULING:

No. The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Votes cast in favor of the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is
qualified.

However, there is an exception which rests on two assumptions: that the one who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified and that the voters nonetheless voted for him despite
knowing that he is disqualified. The petitioners failed to prove the applicability of the exception to this
case. The rule on succession shall apply. The Vice Mayor shall be the Mayor.

LAYUG vs COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify3 (SPA No. 10-016
[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being
its nominee.

He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect.

It is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79415, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act.
 Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual
leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector

xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 88076, the
Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

In their Answer, thereto,

Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a
political party possessing all the qualifications of a party-list.

Composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the
professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group.

Nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.

COMELEC Second Division found Layug to be a phantom petitioner by seeing to it that pleadings,
orders and judicial notices addressed to him are not received by him because the address he gave and
maintains is fictitious. Accordingly, Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the
Resolution dated June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the
reglementary period, said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was entered, in the Book of
Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010.

Proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being
the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to question the declaration of Velarde(SON) AND Teing over
questions of qualifications in which the House of Representatives Tribunal has sole jurisdiction?

Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng

RULING:

I. The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:

(1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and

(2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.

In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees,
Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being
the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives.

Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.

Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List.

It is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.

Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1
We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications
of said party-lists.

Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution2 and Section 1, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Flores VS COMELEC

Facts:

The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest
number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay
pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679. He was voted punong barangay during the elections, a separate position as
that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, protected the result and filed a protect
before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicated Flores, should be declared
stray votes and should not be divided equally to them. In his defense, the petitioner argued that in
accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be entitled to him under the
equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the same full
name and one of them is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is
counted in favor of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent
and subsequently declared him as the punong barangay. Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that
by not following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he is also
an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should be entitled by the rule.

Issue:

Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule?

Held:

No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their
candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former
office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong barangay.
Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his position as punong barangay when he filed for
his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the
resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not within the same class as
that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669
speaks of 7 candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be
regarded as running for the same office.
 Maliksi vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013

Facts: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus,
Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of
the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and
desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion
for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving
notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order
dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is proper.

Held: No. It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then
exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous
regions), provincial and city officials.
 Lynette Garvida vs Florencio
Sales, Jr.
271 SCRA 767 Law on Public Officers Ineligibility SK Chairman Labo Doctrine Applied
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years
old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate
and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida.
When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed
as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK
must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the
maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year
but still less than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years
of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:

1. Filipino citizen;
2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.

The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent to less than 22 years old.
The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in
framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this
a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the second highest number of vote, is
not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winners eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as
successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would
have been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this
would have rendered her votes stray.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who obtained the highest number
of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the SK Chairman refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed
from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what
Section 435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being eligible means
being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
Cagas vs. COMELEC Digest
FACTS: The COMELEC issued a Resolution directing petitioner Marc Douglas to explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court for
the letter he sent to court administrator Jose Midas Marquez. The letter referred to reads:

Cagas, stating that the letter was a personal communication to his friend was not intended to be an official communication to Atty. Marquez,
explained that he did not mean nor intend the letter to be an affront or a sign of disrespect to the Honorable Court. Far from being that, the
letter, in its entirety, actually shows Cagasbelief in the fairness of the court and its members. Cagas may have expressed himself poorly, but
in the second paragraph of the letter, he communicates his continuing faith in the Courts capacity to act on the truth, hence his request for
Atty. Marquez to show the DVDs to the justices para malaman nila ang totoo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cagas may be held guilty of indirect contempt

HELD: YES

POLITICAL LAW: Privacy of Communication cannot be raised as a defense by petitioner

Cagas cannot raise the defense of privacy of communication, especially after his admission that he requested Court Administrator Marquez
to show the DVDs to the members of this Court. Cagas had to admit this since in his letter to Court Administrator Marquez he actually asked
the latter thus: x x xipapanood mopleasesa mgaA. Justicespara malaman nila ang totoo. In any event, messages addressed to the members
of the Court, regardless of media or even of intermediary, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court.

The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Cagas
clearly wanted to exploit his seeming friendly ties with Court Administrator Marquez and havepardsutilize his official connections. Instead of
filing a pleading, Cagas sent a package containing the letter and DVDs to Court Administrator Marquezs office address, with the intent of
having the contents of the DVDs viewed by the members of this Court. Cagas impressed upon Court Administrator Marquez their friendship,
which is underscored by the use ofpardsandpare. Cagas also attempted to sway the members of this Court through the intercession of his
friend who, to his imagined convenience, is an official of the Judiciary.

The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is an abuse of the right to free speech7and degrades the administration
of justice. Hence, the defamatory statements in the letter impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and not just of
theponentealone.

Vera vs Avelino
Facts of the Case:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of
certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate
feedback of the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had
been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated,
as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to
exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issues of the Case:

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their elections.

Held:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore
not under the juridical review of the courts

The case is therefore dismissed

Aratuc vs Comelec

G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Facts:

Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec.A
supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner
therein alleged irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It
will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have
to interview and getstatements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual
voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the
final result of the canvass.

Issue:

Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction?
Ruling:

No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the commission on elections shall have
direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or
office having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the
losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against
COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.

Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the
COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the
COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.

RULING:

It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and
enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such
order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers.