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In the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, many United States policy
makers were concerned with Brazil's MECB because of the possibility of
diverting space-launch technology to a ballistic missile program.
Although by mid-1997 Brazil had not produced a ballistic missile, its
military had given high priority to the development of several missile
systems, including the Piranha missile (MAA-1). Brazil's space-launch
program, coupled with its artillery rocket technology, suggests that the
country has the potential to develop advanced missiles, including ballistic
missiles.
From 1987 to 1994, the United States sought to stifle the development of
Brazil's ballistic missile program through the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), formed on April 16, 1987. Given Brazil's advanced
nuclear program, the United States was especially concerned that a
potential Brazilian ballistic missile could eventually serve as a vehicle for
a nuclear warhead. The United States restrictions on space technology
to Brazil stalled Brazil's VLS (Satellite Launch Vehicle) program and
ballistic missile research and development, strained United States
security relations with Brazil, and prompted Brazil to explore closer ties
with China, Russia, and various countries in Europe and the Middle East
(especially Iraq).
On February 11, 1994, Brazil announced that it would comply with MTCR
guidelines. Such compliance would include export controls on Brazilian
space and missile goods and technology. Brazil's accession to the
MTCR coincided with various attempts by the United States to cooperate
in space activities and seemed to signal a new era in space relations.
Brazil's application for MTCR membership was accepted in October
1995. Thus, by the end of 1995 Brazil's space capabilities were
improving, although they were modest by the standards of countries
such as the United States and Russia.
The basic Orion launch vehicle concept with a height of above 41.60
meters has a maximum width of 9.8 meters across its three barrel
configuration similar to the Titan-3 with a bulbous payload shroud with a
last stage contained within the shroud. There are two optional, single
stage kerosene, liquid oxygen strap-ons boosters powered by one NK-33
engine each and a core of three stages. The core booster second stage
is powered by one NK-33 engine while its third stage is powered by the
kerosene, liquid oxygen RD-0124E engine which is in turn topped by the
fourth last stage. There are several configurations for this launch vehicle
that allow it to be flown without its last stage or with out its strap on
boosters. The booster has been deigned to be capable of carrying 6
metric tonnes to GTO and and less mass on GSO missions. Orion will be
capable of placing 14 tonnes into low earth Orbit. The cost of the one of
the three NK-33s based on previously released information by Aerojet is
about $1 million a piece.
Like the Tysklon-4 which probably will finally come to fruition this Orion
project and others have been open invitations for other nations and
companies to invest the funds required to make this Brazilian space
facility program a reality. With the present glut in launch services and the
lack of immediately available satellites to launch as well as the lack of
cheap highly reliable launch services available elsewhere this
development growth will by necessity be slow for the Alcantara launch
infrastructures development.
Although the United States and Brazil have signed in April 2000 an
accord for the launching of American satellites on American launch
vehicles from Alcantara there has been no further development to make
this come to fruition beyond visits by the various American contractor
organizations to consider the possibilities. With the advent of the Sea
Launch, Zenit-3 program equatorial launches essentially eclipsed the
Alcantara importance for the present commercial market.