1

2
 3

MEDIA
violence and terrorism
 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization - 2003

Editors: S.T. Kwame Boafo, John Maguire and Sylvie Coudray

4

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this book and for the opinions
expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of
any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of
its authorities or concerning the delimination of its frontiers and boundaries.

Layout and cover design: Irmgarda Kasinskaite

Published in 2003 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP (France)

Printed by Vaishali Graphics India, H-969, Palam Extention, New Delhi (India)
Contents
Foreword Kofi Annan, Mary Robinson and Kochiro Matsuura vii
Preface Abdul Waheed Khan ix
Introduction S.T. Kwame Boafo and Sylvie Coudray xi

Part I Conference on Media and Terrorism 15

Chapter 1 Journalism and the War on Terrorism 17

Chris Warren 5
Chapter 2 Media in Danger 39
Mogens Schmidt
Chapter 3 Terrorist Attacks of 11 September:
Consequences for Freedom of Expression 43
Toby Mendel
Chapter 4 11 September: Consequences for Press Freedom 51
Jean-Paul Marthoz
Chapter 5 Brother with no Arms 59
Philippe Latour
Chapter 6 General Overview 65
I. General Remarks on Terrorism and Media 65
Oliver Clarke
II. Fairness is the Best Defence 67
Ronald Koven

Part II Media and Terrorism: Case Studies 69

Chapter 7 Africa and Arab States 71

Case Study I 11 September: Consequences for Freedom of Information

in South Africa
Raymond Louw 71
Case Study II Terrorism and Media in Zimbabwe 73
Geoffrey Nyarota
Case Study III Aftermath of 11 September: An Arab Perspective 74
Nedal Mansour
Chapter 8 Asia and the Pacific 77

Case Study I Terrorism and Journalists in Afghanistan 77

Faheem Dashty
Case Study II Is the Safety of Journalists in Timor Leste Guaranteed? 78
Hugo Fernandes
Case Study III The Safety of Journalists in the Pacific 80
Justin Kili
Case Study IV Media and Terrorism in the Philippines 81
Melinda Quintos de Jesus
Case Study V Media in Danger : South East Asia at a Glance 84
Chavarong Limpattaamapanee
 Chapter 9 Europe 87

Case Study I To Die for Being a Journalist in the Basque Region 87

Carmen Gurruchaga Basurto
Case Study II War, Terrorism and Journalists: The Chechen Experience 89
Anna Politkovskaya

Part III Media and Terrorism: Status of Research 91

6
Chapter 10 Media, Violence and Terrorism in Africa 93
Andy O. Alali
Chapter 11 Media, Violence and Terrorism in the Arab World 101
Basyouni I. Hamada
Chapter 12 Media, Violence and Terrorism in Europe 107
Annabelle Sreberny and Prasum Sonwalker
Chapter 13 Media, Violence and Terrorism in Latin America 115
Jorge Bonilla Vlez and Camilo Tamayo Gmez

Chapter 14 Media, Violence and Terrorism in North America 119

David L. Paletz and Jill Rickershauser

Apendices
1. Resolution on Terrorism and Media Adopted by Participants
in the Conference on Terrorism and Media, Manila, the Philippines 127
2. Official Ceremony and Awarding of the UNESCO/Guillermo
World Press Freedom Prize, 3 May 2002, Manila, The Philippines: 128
I. Remarks by Mrs Ana Maria Busquets de Cano,
President of the Guillermo Cano Foundation 128
II. Remarks by Mr Kochiro Matsuura,
Director-General of UNESCO 129
III. Speech by Her Excellency Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines 131
 Foreword

World Press Freedom Day,

3 May 2002

Joint Message

This year, World Press Freedom Day is devoted to the question of terrorism and media freedom. Above all,
it is dedicated to those courageous journalists who put themselves at serious risk, and sometimes pay the highest
penalty, by exercising their profession.

In each of the past two years, more than 50 journalists have been killed while covering violent conflicts. 7
VII
Increasingly, such deaths are not the result of wars accidents but the outcome of a deliberate targeting of journalists
by those seeking to prevent media exposure of their criminal, corrupt or terrorist activities. The cruel fate of Daniel
Pearl, to cite just one tragic case, illustrates how dangerous the profession of journalism can be.

The threat of terrorism to the freedom and independence of the media can be both direct and indirect.
Terrorism all too often includes violent attacks on reporters and publishers, including assassinations, abductions,
torture and bombings of media offices. We abhor such violence. Journalists have human rights like everyone else,
rights which have not been forfeited because of their choice of profession.

The indirect threat of terrorism has two main aspects. First, it seeks to intimidate, to instill fear and suspicion
and to silence any voices with which it disagrees a climate inimical to the exercise of rights and freedoms. Second,
terrorism may provoke governmental responses that lead to laws, regulations and forms of surveillance that under-
mine the very rights and freedoms that an anti-terrorism campaign is supposed to defend. Indeed, in the name of
anti-terrorism, principles and values that were decades, even centuries, in the making may be put at risk.

Basic freedoms, human rights and democratic practices are the best guarantors of freedom. This protection
must extend to press freedom and free speech as positive goods in themselves and as means through which the fight
against terrorism may be waged. The greatest service that the media can perform in the fight against terrorism is to
act freely, independently and responsibly. This means that they must neither be cowed by threats nor become a mere
mouthpiece of patriotic sentiment or inflammatory opinion. Rather, the media must search for and publicize the
truth; present information and views impartially; consider their words and images carefully; and uphold high stand-
ards of professional conduct. A responsible press, moreover, is a self-regulated press. The temptation to impose
drastic state regulation upon the media must be resisted.

On World Press Freedom Day, we reaffirm that press freedom is an indispensable dimension of that wider
freedom of expression that is each persons birthright and one of the foundations for human progress.

Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Kochiro Matsuura Mary Robinson

Director-General of UNESCO UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
8
 Preface

When adopting the Constitution in November 1945, UNESCOs founders set the agenda for the Organizations
action in the field of communication for decades to come by mandating it to promote the free flow of ideas by
word and image. UNESCOs Constitution stresses the need for information and communication within and
between nations. It links the free flow of ideas to the broader objective of preventing wars and constructing the
defences of peace by advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples so that ignorance of each
others ways and lives ... suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world will no longer be a direct cause
of conflict.

The terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001 caused the international community to 9
IX
focus on the issue of terrorism with renewed intensity. Within the span of a few weeks, the Security Council
unanimously passed resolutions 1368 (2001) on 12 September 2001; 1373 (2001) on 28 September 2001; and 1377
(2001) on 12 November 2001. The General Assembly adopted resolutions 56/1 on 12 September 2001 and 56/88
on 12 December 2001 and a Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism was established at the
request of the Secretary-General in October 2001.

Within this context, UNESCO, as the lead agency of the UN system in communication development, has endeav-
oured to contribute to the international anti-terrorism efforts by reviewing the complex issue of media and terror-
ism. As nations engage in conventional and new types of warfare to battle terrorism and resolve conflicts, accurate
information and analysis are needed. For antagonists and protagonists alike, media are important because they
generate information, symbols, impressions and ideas that are critical in the battle for the minds and hearts of
nations and people. Since 11 September 2001, the international press freedom landscape has become very complex.
Journalism itself has become a battleground as governments on all sides seek to influence media coverage to suit
their own political and strategic interests. At the same time, journalists and media workers have taken tragic risks to
report and to disseminate news and information about terrorism and the various efforts to deal with it.

In his address to the international conference on media and terrorism organised by UNESCO in Manila, Philip-
pines, on 2-3 May 2002, the Director-General of UNESCO noted: one of the most worrying results of terrorism
is that it may cause some countries to impose forms of control and regulation which constrain democracy, freedom
of expression, and free, independent, and pluralistic media. We must remember that security is not an end in itself
but the means to an end, namely the peaceful enjoyment of our rights and liberties. Care must therefore be taken to
ensure that, in pursuing greater security, governmental authorities do not impose unjustified restrictions on freedom
of expression and press freedom. The struggle against terrorism should never undermine the protection and
promotion of human rights. As the UN Secretary-General stated when he addressed the Security Council on 18
January 2002: While we certainly need vigilance to prevent acts of terrorism, and firmness in condemning and
punishing them, it will be self-defeating if we sacrifice other key priorities such as human rights- in the process.

This publication attempts to reveal some of the profound changes in the way that fundamental liberties such as
freedom of expression and press freedom have been affected by terrorism and the efforts by the international
community to deal with terrorists threats.

Abdul Waheed Khan

Assistant Director-General
for Communication and Information
UNESCO, Paris
10
 Introduction

The tragic event of 11 September 2001 set in motion an intensified global discussion on terrorism and global
security. Some of the measures adopted to enhance global security have had profound repercussions on civil
liberties, especially freedom of expression. As UNESCO is the UN lead agency for freedom of expression, Mr
Kochiro Matsuura, the Director-General, decided to commemorate World Press Freedom Day on 3 May 2003 with
an international conference focusing on the theme of media and terrorism.

The principal purpose of the Conference, which was organized in collaboration with the National Commission for
11
XI
UNESCO in Manila, the Philippines, on 2-3 May 2002, was to provide a platform to exchange ideas and experien-
ces on various issues related to media and terrorism, including how media spotlight terrorism as a political, ideologi-
cal, religious and military weapon against civilians and how terrorism affects media and the safety of media pro-
fessionals.

The 150 media professionals and representatives of non-governmental organizations from different regions of the
world who participated in the Manila Conference resolved that any strategy to address the threat of terrorism must,
first and foremost, promote greater respect for freedom of expression and of the media, rather than impose
restrictions on these fundamental rights. They stressed that the media have the right to report on terrorism in the
interest of the publics right to know and to promote open and informed debate on the issue and called on govern-
ments, institutions, public bodies and media organisations to do all in their power to ensure the safety of journalists
at all times and under all circumstances. The brutal killing of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002 was a grim reminder
of the dangers facing media professionals in the wake of 11 September 2001. The deaths of Marc Brunereau,
Johanne Sutton, Pierre Billaud, Volker Handloik, Azizullah Haidari, Harry Burton, Julio Fuentes, Maria Grazia
Cutuli and Ulf Strmberg, all of them killed in Afghanistan, add to the sad litany of those journalists who have lost
their lives while carrying out their mission.

This publication contains edited texts of papers and case studies presented at the Manila Conference as well as
regional reports on status of research studies dealing with media, violence and terrorism. The publication is organ-
ized in three parts. Part I presents the views of leading members of media professional bodies and organisations
concerned with freedom of the press on the issue of media and terrorism as well as the aftermath of the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, especially regarding freedom of expression and press free-
dom.

In Chapter 1, Chris Warren reviews the consequences of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks for press freedom
and civil rights in 36 countries and discusses the extent to which the right of journalists as well as basic human rights
such as freedom of expression have been altered in the aftermath of the attacks. He concludes that, although in
most countries the right of free and independent media has been preserved, vital changes have nevertheless oc-
curred. In Chapter 2, Mogens Schmidt underlines the importance of a strong and critical media as a cornerstone for
every democratic society. He focuses on the Basque region in Spain and Colombia, where the media and the life of
journalists are in great danger due to threats, including terrorist acts, aiming to counter press freedom. He describes
the capacity-building programmes which the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), together with the World
Editors Forum, have introduced to assist media professionals.
 In Chapter 3, Toby Mendel discusses the introduction of new anti-terrorist laws by diverse governments around the
world, following the 11 September terrorist attacks in the U.S. He argues that some of the laws have adverse effect
on basic human rights as they often curtail the free flow of information and hence restrict the right of the public
to access official government information. Jean-Paul Marthoz focuses in Chapter 4 on restrictions on the work of
journalists and the media in general in the post-11 September world with special attention on the U.S.-led war in
Afghanistan and outlines several factors that hinder journalists from reporting objectively. Chapter 5 by Philippe
Latour deals with the dangers that war correspondents face when reporting crisis situations. He explores the best
ways to improve their circumstances and minimise fatalities, noting that increased awareness and prior experience
are critical factors. In Chapter 6, Oliver Clarke briefly discusses the importance of securing free and critical media to
guarantee democracy and security, especially in the aftermath of 11 September, 2001. In the same Chapter, Ronald
12
XII Koven argues that, in the face of terrorism whether from non-state actors or from governments fairness is the
best defence of press freedom.

Part II contains 10 case studies of media and terrorism from Africa, the Arab States, Asia, the Pacific, and Europe
which were presented at the Manila conference. The case studies represent a diversity of situations and the effects
of terrorism on the working conditions of professional journalists and editors.

Three case studies from Africa and the Arab States are presented in Chapter 7. Raymond Louw discusses the effects
of 11 September 2001 on freedom of information in South Africa, including the adoption of several anti-terrorism
bills which impinge on press freedom. Geoffrey Nyarota provides an insight on the suppression of the Zimba-
bwean media by the government and Nedal Mansour notes that, after the 11 September attacks, the media in the
Arab States have focused on factors in that region that trigger terrorism.

Chapter 8 presents five case studies from Asia and the Pacific. Faheem Dashty discusses the effects of terrorism on
the work of journalists in Afghanistan and Hugo Fernandes describes the threats to the safety of journalists in
Timor Leste both during the conflict in the region and in the post-conflict era. Justin Kili follows with a report on
the safety of journalists in the Pacific with a particular focus on Papua New Guinea. Melinda Quintos de Jesus
presents the situation in the Philippines, noting that a full understanding of the relationship between the media and
terrorism in the country requires background training in the development of terrorism and its use by marginalized
and aggrieved communities. Finally, Chavarong Limpattaamapanee describes various threats to press freedom in
five South East Asian countries and remarks that threats are not only physical in nature, but also come in the form
of advertising pressure and closure of newspapers by the government.

Two case studies from Europe are presented in Chapter 9. Carmen Gurruchaga Basurto reviews the dramatic
development of the Basque terrorist group, ETA, and the threats facing journalists who cover its activities. Anna
Politkovskaya describes the difficult situation for journalists reporting from Chechnya in the face of severe restric-
tions imposed by the government and threats from the military.

Part III, consisting of five chapters, deals with the status of research studies on media, violence and terrorism ca-
rried out in Africa, the Arab States, Europe, Latin America and North America. The main purpose of the desktype
research reports was to identify and assess the focus and content of research work and scholarly publications carried
out on media, violence and political terrorism during the four-year period of January 1998 to December 2001. Each
regional report presents an overview and critical assessment of the research studies and scholarly publications
examined, the main trends identified and makes suggestions for further investigation in the subject area.
In Chapter 10, Andy O. Alali analyses the patterns of violence and terrorism in Africa and media framing of such
acts. He notes that, despite the high incidence of different kinds of violence and terrorism in Africa, there is a dearth
in scholarly literature on the subject. Basyouni Ibrahim Hamada reports on the situation in the Arab region in
Chapter 11 and observes that, although the Arab region has been portrayed in the Western media as an environ-
ment which produces violence and terrorism Arab communication scholars have not carried out much research
work on the communication implications of violence and terrorism. Annabelle Sreberny and Prasun Sonwalker
also stress in Chapter 12 that the relationship between media and terrorism has not received much attention from
communication researchers in Europe and that, except in relation to the Balkans and the Kosovo crisis, the specific
consideration of the role of the media in political conflict and violence has not generated much sustained research
attention in the region.
13
XIII
In Chapter 13 Jorge Bonilla Velz and Camilo Tamayo Gmez report on the situation in Latin America and remark
that terrorism does not seem to be a particular subject for research in the region and that studies do not focus on
analysing terrorism or the role of media with respect to terrorism and its agents. In the final report in Chapter 14,
David Paletz and Jill Rickershauser compare and analyse a number of studies carried out in North America on the
relationship between media, political violence and terrorism. They point out the relative paucity of research on the
topic during the period of study and suggest that future research on media, political violence and terrorism should
be empirical, cummulative, generate original data, build on existing theories and use concepts from political commu-
nication.

This publication is designed to contribute to on-going discussions and reflections on terrorism, media, freedom of
expression, global security and human rights. Hopefully, such discussions and reflections will stimulate further
actions in the subject-area among the community of media professionals, freedom of expression advocates, re-
searchers and policy-makers.

S.T. Kwame Boafo and Sylvie Coudray

Communication and Information Sector
UNESCO, Paris, France

* http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm
14
 PART I 15

Conference on Media and T

Conference errorism
Terrorism
16
 Introduction
Journalism
In the year since the 11 September attacks on the United States, the world has
and become a more uncertain and fearful place. The IFJ surveyed the media landscape
in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks and our first report, published
on 23 October 2001, revealed a fast-developing crisis for journalism and civil liber-
the War ties.

on Almost a year on, these fears have been confirmed. The declaration of a war on
terrorism by the United States and its international coalition has created a danger-
Terrorism ous situation in which journalists have become victims as well as key actors in re-
porting events. This is war of a very different kind. There is no set piece military
confrontation; there is no clearly defined enemy, no hard-and-fast objective, and no
CHAPTER 1 17
obvious point of conclusion. Inevitably, it has created a pervasive atmosphere of
paranoia in which press freedom and pluralism have suffered.

It has also led to casualties among media staff. The brutal killing of Daniel Pearl in
Pakistan at the start of 2002 chillingly filmed by his media-wise murderers has
come to symbolise the appalling consequences of 11 September for journalism and
for freedom of expression. Pearls murder, together with the deaths of Marc
Brunereau, Johanne Sutton, Pierre Billaud, Volker Handloik, Azizullah Haidari, Harry
Burton, Julio Fuentes, Maria Grazia Cutuli and Ulf Strmberg in Afghanistan, is a
grim indicator of the dangers facing journalists.

In a world hungry for news, people need to understand the context and complexi-
ties of this new confrontation. They rely on journalists to provide them with reli-
able and timely information. During the war in Afghanistan around 3,500 foreign
correspondents were roaming the region covering the story.

But war is rarely good news for journalism. While journalists and media staff take
terrible risks to get their story, governments on all sides seek to influence media
coverage to suit their own political and strategic interests. The post-11 September
media crisis is seen everywhere. From Australia to Zimbabwe, via Colombia, Rus-
sia, the United States and Uganda, politicians have rushed to raise the standard of
anti-terrorism against their political opponents, and have tried to stifle free jour-
nalism along the way.

But media need to resist the pressure of politicians who are willing to sacrifice civil
liberties and press freedom to win their propaganda battles. The priority must al-
ways be the right to publish words and images however unpalatable that help
people better understand the roots of conflict.

This report covers developments in some 40 countries up to the beginning of

September 2002. We draw extensively upon information from IFJ member unions,
press freedom groups and human rights bodies at regional and international level. It
is not an exhaustive document and is, inevitably, abbreviated but it reveals pro-
Chris Warren
found changes in political attitudes and their impact on journalism. It should
set alarm bells ringing in newsrooms around the world.
President
of the International
Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
 Australia
Media coverage of 11 September has been comprehen-
sive and all pervading and, generally, professional. Jour-
nalists in the mainstream media at both the tabloid and
broadsheet ends of the market have been responsible in
handling issues of tolerance.
However, among some non-journalists such as radio
commentators there has been a serious increase in, at
best, lack of care in handling issues of race and, at worst,
open racism against people from Muslim backgrounds.
This is partly because the attacks occurred against a pre-
18
existing background of racial tension within Australia
generated by the debate over asylum seekers, particu-
CHAPTER 1
larly asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq. By world
standards, only a small number of asylum seekers at-
tempt to enter Australia, some 4,500 a year, arriving by
boat, usually through Indonesia. But the conservative
government of John Howard has sought to make its
refusal to allow asylum seekers to enter Australian terri-
torial waters or to land on Australian territory a major
political issue and, in doing so, has fed uncertainty and
fear within the population at large. Polls indicate that
more than 70 per cent of people agree with the govern-
ments stance.
At the same time, the government has sought to deliber-
ately link asylum seekers with terrorism, claiming that 11
September has justified their approach because there
could be sleeper terrorists attempting to enter Aus-
tralia by posing as asylum seekers. This caused tension
between much of the media and the Australian commu-
nity, with supporters of the government and the gov-
ernment itself criticising media for being out of touch
with the majority views of Australia. 1
Since the generation of the asylum seekers crisis and
the 11 September attacks, the government called a gen-
eral election, and successfully campaigned on the basis
of providing leadership against asylum seekers and ter-
rorist attacks. Relying on the war on terrorism, the Fed-
eral Government has introduced two legislative pack-
ages.
The first package sought to amend the Commonwealth
Crimes Act so as to restate the official secrets legislation
and to extend it so as to make it an offence for a person
to receive leaked information. In other words, a journal-
ist who was leaked information could be charged and
face jail of up to two years. In January and February
2002, the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, me-
dia employers and press freedom supporters ran a ma-
jor campaign against this legislation and, after the non-
government parties in the Australian senate agreed to
block the legislation, the government announced it was
withdrawing the bill. A second security bill has also been
introduced. This would enable the government to pro-
scribe organisations which threaten the security of Aus-
tralia or of other countries. It also increased the power
of security organisations to detain suspects, suppress
information and intercept emails and other information.
This bill has been criticised by a Senate committee and
after attacks from its own back bench, the government
has agreed to redraft the bill to meet civil liberty con-
cerns.
In a related development, an ABC journalist was arrested
outside a refugee detention centre in South Australia on
26 January and charged with trespass on Commonwealth
land. After extensive protests, the government agreed to
drop the charges.
These experiences illustrate two things: First, that the
government is prepared to use the war on terrorism to
expand its scope of investigation and to restrict press
freedom and other civil rights. Second, that concerted
campaigns in support of civil liberties still attract bipar-
tisan political support and can be successful.
In Australia, coverage of the war has become inextrica-
bly linked with the debate over asylum seekers, many of
whom are Afghan or Iraqi refugees. Generally, profes-
sional journalists have handled these issues with com-
passion and sensitivity.
However, among other areas of the media, there has
been a rising intolerance which, it has to be said, attracts
some public support. This often puts the mainstream
media in conflict with majority views. For a perspective
on this, see the article by Mike Steketee in the most re-
cent issue of The Walkley magazine2.
Canada
As in all western countries, Canadian coverage of the 11
September events was extensive and largely professional,
but freedom of expression groups responded angrily
when the federal government announced the prepara-
tion of a package of anti-terrorism legislation for intro-
duction in Parliament. Canadian journalists called on the
government to reject curbs on free expression or pro-
posals for increased surveillance that would trample ba-
sic citizens rights and obstruct the work of reporters.
We believe an effective counter-terrorism campaign
demands not only the preservation of fundamental lib-
erties but also the vigorous assertion of their impor-
tance, said Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
(CJFE) president Arnold Amber. Amber is also director
of The Newspaper Guild Canada and a member of the
IFJ Executive Committee.3
The introduction of Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act,
aroused an unprecedented debate about its impact on
civil liberties and freedom of expression. Under public
pressure the government made a number of positive
amendments to the original bill which the Senate passed
on 18 December 2001. However, according to CJFE, it
still contains language that could lead to serious assaults
on freedom of expression.
The group says the bill provides for greater limits on
access to information and raises the prospect of pros-
ecution for anyone who publishes information the gov-
ernment is taking measures to safeguard, even if un-
classified. It also increases the surveillance powers of
the state and encroaches on the private communications
of individuals. Another concern is that those who peace-
fully exercise their right to free expression in the service
of a cause or in defence of the rights of the accused
could be prosecuted under the act because of provi-
sions concerning the facilitation of terrorism.
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to most Canadians, two other
proposed bills aimed at curbing political dissent at inter-
national meetings are proceeding quickly through Par-
liament.
Bill C-35, currently before the Senate, introduces amend-
ments to the Foreign Missions and International Or-
ganisations Act. Civil liberty groups say Bill C-35 widens
the definition of internationally protected persons,
those foreign dignitaries who are granted diplomatic
immunity when they visit Canada. The new definition
now includes representatives of a foreign state that is a
member of or participates in an international organisa-
tion. Cross-referenced with Bill C-36, which defines
interference with protected persons or the threat of
interference as acts of terrorism, the legislation gives the
government wide-ranging powers to clamp down on
those who wish to exercise their legitimate right to pro-
test at international gatherings, groups say. Indeed, some
critics believe passage of the bill is timed to quell pro-
tests before the convening of an upcoming summit of
G-8 leaders in Alberta.
Bill C-35 also gives the police wide discretion in con-
trolling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the
extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances. However, the Canadian Civil Liberties As-
sociation (CCLA) says the bill does not provide any clear
definition of what reasonable in the circumstances
might mean. CCLA counsel Alan Borovoy argues that
police should not be given powers to determine citizens
rights to free expression. The usual role of the police
in a democracy is to enforce the judgments made by
others, not to make such judgments themselves. The
Canadian Association of University Teachers has voiced
concerns over Bill C-42, saying it contains provisions
directed at suppressing political dissent, particularly pro-
test activity. It says universities and colleges, as centres
of dissenting opinion (from students in particular), and
often located close to international gatherings, are likely
targets.
Colombia
According to human rights groups, Colombias wors-
ening internal armed conflict affects virtually every part
of the country and has taken the lives of more than
60,000 people since 1985 - currently around 20 people
19
every day. Journalists are among the victims, with more
than 80 killed in the past 10 years.
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
Thousands of civilians live in fear of being kidnapped,
killed or disappeared; thousands are forced to flee their
homes, their lands, their livelihood, as warring factions
refuse to guarantee their safety and their right not to be
drawn into the conflict. Around 80 per cent of victims
are civilians, killed outside combat. Killings, threats and
intimidation of members of human rights organizations,
trade unionists and other vulnerable sectors of civil so-
ciety form part of a campaign by sectors of the Colom-
bian security forces and their paramilitary allies to weaken
the work of human rights defenders.
The civilian population, caught in the crossfire between
military and their paramilitary allies on one side and armed
opposition groups on the other, is not receiving the hu-
man rights and humanitarian protection it urgently needs.
Each month, thousands of people are being displaced
as they flee from areas of armed conflict and huge num-
bers are victims of human rights violations committed
by the Colombian security forces and their paramilitary
allies, as well as by armed opposition groups. Impunity
persists, as the vast majority of perpetrators of human
rights violations continue to evade accountability in Co-
lombia. Following the events of 11 September the United
States administration strengthened its contribution to
the anti-terrorist effort of the authorities and there
are fears that the internal conflict will, as a result, deepen.
The deterioration of the human rights situation contin-
ues to intensify and spread throughout the country and
has reached an even greater level of urgency since the
breakdown of the peace process between the Colom-
bian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, in February 2002.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has condemned
the persistence of impunity in Colombia with regard to
violations and abuses of human rights and international
 humanitarian law; has expressed its concerns regarding
alleged links between the Colombias armed and secu-
rity forces and paramilitary groups; and has also deplored
attacks against human rights defenders. The Colombian
government should undertake full and prompt imple-
mentation of UN recommendations as a step towards
tackling impunity and addressing the human rights cri-
sis. Alvaro Uribe, who has been elected the new Presi-
dent of Colombia, is under pressure to make human
rights concerns the centerpiece of his agenda.
Cyprus
20
While media coverage has been generally extensive and
well informed, there has been no problem of intoler-
CHAPTER 1
ance in reporting. Although the Attorney General an-
nounced the preparation of a new anti-terrorism bill that
may create some dangers for free speech and civil liber-
ties, the only relevant law introduced was one ratifying
the International Convention of the United Nations on
the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. The au-
thorities say they will not impose anything that endan-
gers press freedom, but the Union of Cyprus Journal-
ists has said it will follow the situation closely.
Denmark
As in many countries, 11 September turned the media
world upside down. Papers which for centuries had been
steadfastly domestic in their front-page news coverage
opened themselves to extensive coverage of international
news for several weeks. The reporting in general was
balanced.
Attempts to blame all Muslims for what happened have
been few and Muslim representatives in Denmark have
been asked their views frequently in the media. There
have been, however, in the first days after 11 September
episodes where people from different ethnic back-
grounds were attacked or had their shops damaged.
In the media the question of how to define a terrorist
has been much discussed. This has also focused on local
connections. For example, the current vice-chairman of
the large Danish liberal party in the early 1980s volun-
teered to take part in the struggle in Afghanistan follow-
ing the intervention by the Soviet Union, supporting
Taliban. Photographs of him and three Taliban-support-
ers, all four in typical Afghani-clothes and with guns,
have been printed over and over again as a constant ref-
erence point for this debate.
Although the government says it will do what is needed
to stop terrorism, no national legislative initiatives that
could be seen to influence the working conditions of
the press have been introduced, but controversy did ac-
company the national process for ratifying the Euro-
pean Union regulations covering the establishment of a
European-wide arrest warrant.
European Union
In the weeks and months after 11 September, European
Union states quickly formed a joint approach on coun-
ter-terrorism actions with the United States. Many of
these undermine traditional standards of civil liberties.
Cooperation was demonstrated most dramatically one
day after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon when NATO activated its never-before-in-
voked Article 5, which declares an attack on one to be
an attack on all. European combat forces, aircraft and
ships were committed to support the U.S. strike on Af-
ghanistan. Within three months, the European Union
had a common legal definition of terrorism, a list of
suspects closely in line with Washingtons and more than
100 million dollars in assets frozen. They also adopted a
common arrest warrant to prevent suspected terrorists
from evading arrest by crossing the EUs largely un-
checked internal borders.
Joint meetings in December 2001 and June 2002 be-
tween European and U.S. officials sought to co-ordinate
policy and a list of terrorists groups was agreed. U.S.
targets left off Europes terrorist list in December, in-
cluding the PKK Kurdish rebels in Turkey, the Shining
Path group in Peru and the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, were included on an expanded list in June.
The June update also added five Palestinian groups, in-
cluding the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and De-
velopment, a U.S.-based charity that has been accused
of channeling money to Hamas, which has carried out
dozens of deadly attacks in Israel. However, the EU dif-
ferentiates between the political and military wings of
Hamas. And the Iran-backed Hezbollah, which targets
Israel from Lebanon, is considered a terrorist organisa-
tion by Washington but not by the EU.
The European Council, representing 15 nations, put
forward controversial proposals on 9 October 2002 for
a package of measures to improve the European Un-
ions response to terrorism. The proposals included
more cross-border co-operation between police forces
and the establishment of a European-wide arrest war-
rant. Civil liberty groups have been particularly concerned
over the adoption of the EU-wide definition of terror-
ism which they say threatens to include people taking
part in recent violent protest demonstrations over
globalisation. The changes broaden the scope of what
constitutes a terrorist offence by including actions that
seriously affect (rather than seriously alter) the po-
litical, economic or social structures of a country or an
international organisation. This brings international
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation, or
the World Bank, into the picture.4
The actions by the European Union are a deliberate
attempt to broaden the concept of terrorism to cover
protests such as those in Gothenburg and Genoa, says
Tony Bunyan, the Editor of Statewatch, a civil liberties
watchdog. Draconian measures to control political dis-
sent only serve to undermine the very freedoms and
democracies legislators say they are protecting
On 30 May 2002, the IFJ among others protested when
the European Parliament agreed to amend the 1997
European Directive on the Protection of Telecommu-
nications Data and Information to allow Member States
to pass laws that will give the authorities regular access
to peoples telephone and Internet communications. This
will, said the IFJ, open the door to the snooping society
in which peoples private communications will become
subject to official monitoring.5
Giving the police, customs, immigration and intelligence
services access to peoples electronic communications
goes far beyond existing rules whereby data can only be
retained for a short period for billing purposes (i.e.: to
help the customer confirm usage details) and then it must
be erased. This amendment to policy would have been
unthinkable before September 11. Politicians are using
public uncertainty and security concerns to undermine
peoples rights and liberties, said the IFJ.
While Brussels bureaucrats argue that it will be up to
each government to decide how to respond to the
amended law, the IFJ has been informed that EU gov-
ernments are planning to adopt a Framework Decision
that will bind all Member States to introduce the reten-
tion of data. This situation was confirmed in August
2002 when details of a binding framework decision were
revealed that will mean personal data traffic will be kept
throughout the EU for up to two years.
The IFJ says that putting telephone calls, e-mails, faxes
and Internet usage under official surveillance will under-
mine data protection as will the capacity of journalists
to monitor the apparatus of state and to store informa-
tion. The citizens right to private space and for the
press to investigate and scrutinise the authorities with-
out intimidation are freedoms that distinguish democra-
cies from authoritarian regimes, says the IFJ, They must
not be given up lightly. However, the waiving of Eu-
ropes strict data protection laws has also been done to
allow complete sharing of information between Europol
and U.S. investigative agencies as part of the process in
which European leaders have worked together, and in
coordination with the United States, to craft a military,
judicial and financial crackdown on terrorism. A U.S.-
EU working group is now looking for guidelines to al-
low protected personal data to be exchanged among
American and European law enforcement agencies on a
general basis, rather than under emergency exemption.
France
The tone of the French media coverage says the SNJ-
CGT, can be summed up by the 12 September 2001 21
editorial of Le Monde: We are all Americans Now. While
one cannot talk of intolerance, much of the coverage
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
was lacking in analysis of American policy. Unfortunately,
many journalists committed errors of ignorance by con-
fusing the terms, Arab, Muslim and Islamic and they
strengthened the view of many in France that Mus-
lim equals terrorist. The SNJ-CGT published a press
release criticising this approach. It was not reported. The
union reports that many media organisations have taken
advantage of the uncertain times to announce cutbacks
(job losses, salary cuts) in the days immediately after the
terror attacks.
The government announced new anti-terrorist legisla-
tion, including surveillance and tracking of Internet
messages. Many journalists fear that, under the pretext
of the urgency of the situation and the tracking of terro-
rist networks, the government is preparing to adopt,
without much debate or dialogue, measures which could
have serious implications for press freedom and civil lib-
erties.6
Unions and press freedom groups condemned these
moves and are demanding that there is full public debate
and examination of proposed legislative measures that
have been announced concerning Internet controls,
encryption and the retention of data. But there are fears
that, under the cover of the emergency of post-Sep-
tember 11, measures already included in the Informa-
tion Society Bill (projet de loi sur la socit de linformation,
LSI) will be added to the Daily Security Bill (projet de
loi sur la scurit quotidienne).
Examined at the beginning of Summer 2002 by the
National Assembly, and currently being reviewed in the
Senate, this text will, therefore, be amended to include
the anti-terrorist measures presented by the Prime Min-
ister in his 3 October speech to the Assembly. These
measures may also be included in a distinct post Sep-
tember 11 bill, but will in any event be adopted in a
form responding to the immediate urgency, according
to Jospins remarks. The measures aimed at regulating
 the use of encryption technologies limit Internet users
ability to send their messages securely on the network.
Despite the many promises to completely liberalise
encryption technologies, the ownership and use of ap-
propriate software will continue to be limited by the regu-
lations included in the LSI Bill (Articles 41, 42 and fol-
lowing). In the context of legal proceedings, the text
calls for recourse to the defence services in order to break
encryption keys.
The measures that concern the retention of Internet
users data, that is to say, the traces of the use of differ-
ent public networks (mobile, land, etc.), are aimed at in-
22
troducing the principle of preventive retention of data
into French law. A decree is likely to determine what
CHAPTER 1
types of data are targeted by this measure, which is sched-
uled to be applied for a 12-month period. In the context
of the LSI, these measures would probably not have
been adopted until Spring 2002, after being reviewed by
the CNIL.
The LSI was, in fact, expected to serve as a legal frame-
work for all Internet-based activities in France. Po-
tentially repressive measures included in the first draft
of the bill, such as the criminal responsibility of
Internet service providers, or the CSAs control of
Internet content, were dropped from the final ver-
sion. However, the bill announced the creation of an
Internet co-regulatory body, the Forum of Internet
Rights (Forum des droits de lInternet), which is to in- reach out to journalists from all cultures and traditions
clude private and public sector representatives, as well
as regular Internet users. This new regulatory bodys
rights are poorly defined.
On 28 May 2001, RSF, which campaigns for com-
plete freedom regarding Internet controls and con-
tent, denounced the creation of such a surveillance
body. In early April, the government submitted a
nearly final draft version of the bill to four consulta-
tive groups representing citizens interests. However,
these institutions were expected to submit comments
prior to presentation before the Council of Ministers
and the vote in the National Assembly. The last minute
inclusion of the LSI Bills controversial measures in
the legislative plan on fighting terrorism renders the
four independent authorities exercise of their con-
sultative role more difficult.
Finland
Although it is difficult to be precise, coverage was exten-
sive and detailed. The very first media assumptions were
that the attack was linked directly to the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians. These were supported by pic-
tures showing triumphant Palestinians on television.
However, accusations against Palestinians ceased after
the news about Osama bin Ladens role became clearer.
Nevertheless, certain media still identify the root cause
as the long-lasting conflict between Israel and the Pales-
tinians, as well as the support given to Israel by the U.S.
The media follow-up has been to the point and profes-
sional with extensive media coverage of Islam and how
widely it is spread around the world. There have been
illuminating discussions on television and radio with Is-
lamic people living in Finland, people representing other
religions, as well as researchers and specialists in politics.
The Finnish audience has been provided with a fairly
comprehensive information package on Islam within a
short period of time.
At the same time, coverage has been tempered with nu-
merous newspaper articles and at least one television
documentary about the distressing situation of the civil
population of Afghanistan and the military situation
there. There are no reports of limitations on the work
of journalists. 7
This is the moment to strengthen the work of the Inter-
national Media Working Group Against Racism and
Xenophobia (IMRAX) which was launched some years
ago by the IFJ. The only way in which journalists can
effectively influence matters is by raising awareness and
reducing suspicion and racist attitudes. The Union of
Journalists in Finland has suggested that the IFJ should
to promote professional solidarity and organise a global
conference or regional events on these issues.
Germany
The coverage in Germany of 11 September was uni-
form and, like most countries, provided continual rep-
etition of the incidents with pictures from CNN used
by German private channels. According to some news-
papers, the incidents brought journalism and the public
closer because the very surprise and shock of the terror
attacks did not require additional sensational report-
ing. It was one of those few events that speaks for itself.
Pictures and information about the attacks have been
distributed and exchanged between media without the
usual fierce competition and dealing between news out-
lets.
The public service broadcaster, ARD, had the largest
audience followed by private RTL network and then
ZDF, the second public broadcaster, although there was
little between them all in terms of content. As in many
other countries, advertisements were taboo in the first
hours. In the immediate aftermath, the power of im-
ages was felt in the sudden gulf of understanding that
appeared between Western perspectives and those of
the Arab world as media showed people celebrating the
attacks: as one commentator put it, years of efforts
toward mutual comprehension have been destroyed in
one day.
So far there have been no official anti-terrorist measures
that affect media. Laws are very general safety laws:
fingerprints for foreigners, analysis of bank-accounts,
restriction on freedom of association for religious be-
liefs, more possibilities for German justice to investigate
in foreign countries.
The President of the German Federation of Journalists
(DJV), speaking in 20018, said that there was not enough
background information and analysis in the media (about
fundamentalism and terrorism before the attacks). He also
criticised the use of pictures from Palestine of celebra-
tion; this was emotional and very local and did not re-
flect the entire Arab world in general. He said the fact
that some channels had exactly the same programme
shows how the private sector is concentrated.
Great Britain
As in many other countries, the coverage of the 11 Sep-
tember events was saturation. In terms of intolerance
covering ethnic/religious differences, the U.K. press has
not performed badly. There have been riots in some
British cities in recent times between white racist youth
and particularly Asian Muslim youth, and there is a real
fear of ethnic conflict that has forced government and
press to pull back from racist coverage.
The National Unions of Journalist (NUJ) reports that
U.K. media follow the government slavishly in such times.
Television, especially the BBC, is even more loyal than
the papers. The BBC goes straight into Ministry of
Information mode, says the NUJ, imagining at some
level of its collective consciousness that it is holding the
nation together in the face of a Nazi invasion.9
The government has been assiduous in cultivating eth-
nic and religious minorities, especially Muslims. The
Prime Minister has held meetings with Muslim leaders
and the message we are at war with terrorism not
Islam - has been widely covered. There have not, says
the NUJ, been anything like the level of assaults and
harassment of Asians in the U.K. that there has been in
the U.S. - but perhaps it is just not being reported. But
there is another kind of intolerance that of dissent.
The media hardly cover the anti-war movement (which
might be small but is at least of interest) and are full of
unpleasant articles attacking anyone who questions the
U.S., often in violently abusive terms.
The NUJ reports a general clampdown on civil liberties,
though not specifically targeted at freedom of expres-
sion. Measures introduced by the government include
speeding up extradition, tightening restrictions on grant-
ing asylum, removing the right to jury trial in some cases
(though this was being done anyway), steps against
money-laundering the clandestine movement of money
by people suspected of terrorism and acceptance
of the Euro-warrant. A new crime of incitement to re-
ligious hatred is to be introduced.
It is an offence already for a journalist (like anyone else)
to fail to tell police of any activity by organisations
deemed to be terrorist. There is a list of such organisa-
23
tions, although some are not terrorist groups (for in-
stance, liberation organisations of Kurds, Tamils, etc).
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
Though nobody questions steps to prevent terrorism,
there is concern about the application of anti-terrorist
laws, which do affect journalists. This anxiety is vividly
illustrated by the protest and criticism of civil liberty
groups that greeted the U.K. governments Anti-Terror-
ism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which passed into
law in December 2001. It went through Parliament very
quickly, as such measures, introduced in a panic induced
by government propaganda, usually do.
For the first time in peacetime, the government has taken
power to imprison people without trial. The power ap-
plies to foreign citizens seeking asylum or otherwise try-
ing to stay in the U.K., against whom there is a suspicion
of terrorist activities or sympathy. It suspends the tra-
ditional right of habeas corpus.
To be able to enact this law the government had to de-
clare a state of national emergency in order to dero-
gate from Article 5 of the European Human Rights
Convention. The convention had only been incorpo-
rated into British law a year earlier in the 1999 Human
Rights Act. For some people this process demonstrated
the hollowness of the U.K.s hysterical reaction to the
imagined threat of terrorism. There has been no critical
media coverage at all of the declaration of the state of
emergency, even though it was patently absurd and there
was and is no national emergency. There has been no
terrorist activity in the U.K. since 11 September, despite
a number of well-publicised official announcements that
attacks were imminent.
But the Act is not entirely novel, being merely an exten-
sion of a process that U.K. governments (there is no
difference between the main parties) have been follow-
ing for a long time. The Terrorism Act 2000, enacted
before the New York atrocity, contained repressive meas-
ures that could specifically be used against journalists. It
established a list of terrorist organisations and an of-
fence of failing to notify police of any of their activities.
So any journalist in contact with one of these organisa-
 tions who does not tell police everything he or she knows
could be imprisoned. There are about 25 of these or-
ganisations. Some have been defunct for years but oth-
ers are quite well known liberation groups in the U.K.,
with whom journalists work regularly. We must point
out that these powers have not yet been used against
any journalists. Perhaps the main intention is deter-
rent.
As everywhere, the media tend to follow the general
political direction of government, and both were already
very pro-American. After 11 September this tendency
overrode everything else. Reporting of the war aims of
24
the coalition was uncritical and for a month or two dis-
CHAPTER 1
senting voices were bitterly attacked. The problem has
been the lack of questioning of the consensus, and not
so much regarding reactions to events in the U.S. as re-
garding Britains own military role. The BBC in particu-
lar has given completely uncritical coverage.
However, it must be stated that there has been some
excellent coverage, and not just in the obvious paper, the
Guardian, the leading liberal paper. In particular the Daily
Mirror, the second highest circulating national paper,
which had been totally Blairite, converted itself to a
critical position in March 2002 and has run some critical
coverage, which has been widely welcomed among jour-
nalists. The Nation Unions of Journalists adopted a se-
ries six of resolutions in a special debate on the War
against Terror at its Annual Delegate Meeting (ADM)
in March 2002.
Greece
The Journalists Union of Athens Daily Newspapers,
the largest journalists group in Greece, reports that some
media have tried to cash in on the heightened atmos-
phere of uncertainty and deep public concern. When
the military campaign started and reports of fear and
panic came from the United States, some newspapers
and television channels attempted to increase their audi-
ence share and advertising profits at the expense of pro-
fessional standards, according to a statement from the
Unions executive board.10
An extreme example of this was the action of the televi-
sion channel Tempo, which has been investigated by the
board for allegedly fabricating a report said to have come
directly from Afghanistan and which the channel claimed
as a world exclusive. The board also condemned the
bias of the reporting.
Although there have been concerns over self-censor-
ship and the counter-terrorism campaign that may lead
to measures limiting individual freedom, no precise pro-
posals have yet been made. The union has issued a strong
appeal to journalists to ensure that their reporting is pro-
fessional and has encouraged the IFJ to lead an interna-
tional campaign for tolerance and quality in journalism.
Hong Kong, China
The Hong Kong Journalists Association reports that the
government published a bill targeting terrorist organisa-
tions and financing on 12 April 2002. The Hong Kong
government says it is adopting a minimalist approach to
the issue, and has refrained from increasing surveillance
and detention powers. On preliminary reading, the bill
does not appear to be as draconian as feared by many
observers.
Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities in Beijing have used
the war on terrorism to seek international backing for
their campaign against Muslim groups seeking independ-
ence in the North west of the country. The record of
the mainland government in continuing to apply pres-
sure on press freedom advocates, Internet users and its
denial of meaningful freedom of expression remain, ir-
respective of 11 September, of great concern to jour-
nalists and human rights groups in the region.
Hungary
Hungary, a new NATO member, supported President
Bushs call for steps to be taken in order to avoid terror-
ist attacks like those against WTC and the Pentagon. No
special regulations were enforced concerning the activi-
ties of the Press, but Parliament adopted a complex
motion, which amended statutory provisions to make
money laundering difficult.
From 1 January 2002. anonymous accounts were banned,
cash flow was limited, banks were compelled to report
to the Hungarian authorities all transfers of monies over
and above HUF 2 million (8,000 Euros approx.), and
account holders are being asked seemingly inappropri-
ate questions if they have accounts with unclear origins.
Those questions are so personal (level of education,
possession of real estate etc.) that they tend to cross the
borders of civil liberties but, on the whole, policies and
regulations regarding civil liberties as such or freedom
of the press remained unchanged.
Within Hungary there has been an extensive debate on
the events and their roots. The catastrophe was very
widely reported, including a continuous commentary in
the public radio. Bitter arguments developed over who
was responsible. Istvn Csurka, a former playwright ten-
der of Hungarys extreme right-wing party MIP (the
party lost all its parliamentary positions in the first round
of the elections on 7 April), said that what happened
was sad but when it comes to responsibility, America
comes in not only as a victim but, indirectly, motivated
the attacks itself. Lively polemics followed, with valuable
contributions in the daily Npszabadsg, the widest circu-
lation Hungarian daily, and two weeklies, let s Irodalom
(Life and Literature), and 168 ra. At the same time
Hungarians took to the web to air their views, opening a
new chapter for quality e-journalism.
India
Since India has a long history of facing terrorist threats
and acts, as they are perceived, in Kashmir and other
parts of the country, there is a general climate of under-
standing over the need for counter terrorism in the coun-
try, but journalists have joined a wide-ranging coalition
of groups that have protested strongly over recent
changes to law that threaten civil liberties.
The National Union of Journalists (India) and the In-
dian Journalists Union report that, by and large, media
coverage of attacks on New York and Washington was
professional and unbiased although a section of the
media did try to focus attention on Islamic fundamen-
talism presumably with a view to equate the terrorist
attacks on the U.S. with terrorism in India. However, to
many the global campaign has begun to appear as a
selective and brutal military campaign to secure the glo-
bal strategic interests of the West, particularly the U.S.
and Britain. Media can play a major role in trying to en-
sure that the focus of the campaign remains on terror-
ism and diplomatic ways to resolve the problems respon-
sible for the growth of terrorism.
In response to heightened national security concerns,
and as relations with Pakistan deteriorate and violence
in Kashmir and elsewhere escalates, the Indian govern-
ment introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(POTO), a modified version of the now-lapsed Terror-
ists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)
of 1985, which facilitated the torture and arbitrary de-
tention of minority groups and political opponents.
POTO was signed into law by the president on 24 Oc-
tober 2001 to remain in effect for six weeks. It was in-
troduced as a bill during Indias winter session of parlia-
ment and was passed on 27 March 2002.
Under TADA, tens of thousands of politically moti-
vated detentions, torture, and other human rights viola-
tions were committed against Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits, trade
union activists, and political opponents in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. In the face of mounting opposition to
the act, Indias government acknowledged these abuses
and consequently let TADA lapse in 1995. Civil rights
groups, journalists, opposition parties, minority rights
groups, and Indias National Human Rights Commis-
sion unequivocally condemned POTO. Now enacted,
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) sets forth a
broad definition of terrorism that includes acts of vio-
lence or disruption of essential services carried out with
intent to threaten the unity and integrity of India or to
strike terror in any part of the people.
Since it was first introduced, the government has added
some additional safeguards to protect due process rights,
but POTAs critics stress that the safeguards do not go
far enough and that existing laws are sufficient to deal
with the threat of terrorism. Shortly after POTA was
approved by parliament, Richard Boucher, speaking for
the United States, declared that the bill was within con- 25
stitutional bounds and India had strengthened its legal
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
system to combat terrorism in a manner consistent with
democratic principles.
However, critics say that sentencing a journalist to im-
prisonment because he is suspected of not transmitting
information about a terrorist to the authorities is con-
trary to Indias commitment to press freedom. Indian
journalists warn that the law may lead to more self-cen-
sorship in the coverage of separatist movements. Some
sensitive issues may, therefore, completely disappear
from the media.
In some Indian states, such as Kashmir, Assam or
Manipur, the new law will likely make journalists inves-
tigative work impossible. Reporters will be caught in the
crossfire between separatists, designated as terrorists
by the authorities, and the security forces. The Indian
Journalists Union says the community of journalists will
remain vigilant and will campaign vigorously to protect
journalists interests and are confident of getting wide
support from the democratic forces in the county against
measures directed against reporters.
Ireland
The national mood of sympathy and support for the
victims of the 11 September attacks reflects the strong
ties between the United States and the Republic of Ire-
land. One incident that underlined this relationship and
led to a media controversy was the decision of the Irish
Government to declare a National Day of Mourning.
The Irish Times, one of the countrys leading newspapers,
decided not to publish on the National Day of Mourn-
ing, describing non-publication as being in keeping with
the national mourning. However, this caused outrage
within the papers editorial committee and was opposed
by the National Union of Journalists office branch. Jour-
nalists complained that the decision was taken only for
commercial and operational reasons few newspaper
shops were open. Journalists (including senior editorial
 personnel) felt it would have been better to give the pa-
per out free. There has been saturation coverage, much
of it repetitive, with a strong reliance on Sky News and
CNN, especially in the early stages. Outstanding cover-
age was provided by Conor O Clery, The Irish Times, who
provided on-site commentary from the Twin Towers in
New York. Many sections of media gave coverage to
the reaction of the Muslim community, and to explain-
ing Islamic culture.
It must be said that The Irish Times and the State broad-
casting service, RTE, along with independent commer-
cial station Today FM have provided a platform for some
26
critical voices, notably Robert Fisk, (The Irish Independ-
ent/RTE). Independent News and Media Groups Sun-
CHAPTER 1
day Independent stands out as the only newspaper which
has been intolerant not of ethnic or religious minori-
ties but of media commentators who have challenged
or questioned the American response or, indeed, Irish
government policy. Outside commentators included
former U.S. Diplomat George Dempsey who claimed
that the Irish medias anti-American stance meant that
Irish media should share blame for the events of 11
September. He was especially critical of Fintan OToole,
who was targeted by the Sunday Independent as a hate fig-
ure alongside Fisk.
An issue of concern is the decision of Independent News
and Media, the largest media group in the country, not
to send journalists abroad, relying instead on U.K. and
U.S. media outlets. The anti-union station, TV3 also de-
cided not to send reporters abroad. No specific national
measures have been considered which would limit me-
dia freedom arising from this attack.
The issue of terrorism and media was brought home to
all journalists in Ireland with the assassination of inves-
tigative journalist Martin OHagan on 28 September by
Protestant terrorists. His killing was the first targeted
death of a journalist in 30 years of conflict in the region.
Media outlets need to be specific in informing readers/
viewers of limitations placed on coverage. Journalists
need to be warned against reliance on Government agen-
cies and vested interests.
Israel
Israel responded immediately to the attacks of 11 Sep-
tember by declaring its full support for the War on Ter-
ror launched by the United States and by linking the
attacks to the conflict in Palestine. Speaking before the
United States Congress on 20 September, former Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the international ter-
rorist network is based in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, on Taliban
Afghanistan, Yasser Arafats Palestinian authority, and
several other Arab regimes such as the Sudan. The Is-
raeli response to Palestinian attacks during 2002 has been
to continually make the link with the war on terror
with its actions against the Palestinian Intifada. There have
been accusations that the Palestinians have been
harboring terrorist groups such as Osama bin Laden in
Afghanistan, Hizbullah and others in Syrian controlled
Lebanon, and sundry other terror organizations based
in such capitals as Damascus, Baghdad, and Khartoum.
Israel alleges that these states and terror organizations
together constitute a terror network whose constituent
parts support each other operationally as well as politi-
cally.
Although Palestinians sought to distance themselves
from militants by limiting press freedom in one case
television stations were warned by the Palestinian Au-
thority in the days after 11 September not to broadcast
film of Palestinians apparently celebrating the attacks
on the U.S. persistent comment from the Israeli lead-
ership has been to link Yasser Arafat with Osama bin
Laden and the Palestinian cause with Al-Qaeda. Former
Prime Minister Ehud Barak told CNN on 12 Septem-
ber 2001 that the terror attacks on the U.S. were the
result of continuous incitement by Chairman Arafat
and his media.11 The response of Israeli media, once
known for their critical edge, has been to marginalize
opposition to the official line, broadcasting almost solely
those views conforming to the governments position.12
Japan
In Japan, the 11 September events led to co-ordinated
and extensive coverage by all networks and, as a result,
public opinion was supportive of American military ac-
tion in retaliation. There was little public debate about
the consequences of military retaliation. Opposing views
were difficult to express. For instance, a Japanese Diet
member who belonged to an Opposition party stated
controversially on her website that she thought Ameri-
cas mistaken foreign policies were to blame for the as-
sault, which would explain why some countries would
welcome the news. She had to apologise. Gathering in-
formation about U.S. military bases was strictly restricted
and it was almost two weeks after the initial attack be-
fore Japanese television and press began covering objec-
tions to Americas military actions.13
Because the Constitution of Japan, framed after World
War Two, prohibits sending the army abroad, tempo-
rary legislation is necessary to cooperate with Americas
military action. However, in the atmosphere of uncon-
ditional support for the U.S., opinions of those oppos-
ing the Self-Defense Force abroad were criticised or ridi-
culed by right leaning press. Journalists had to be very
courageous to write reports that questioned Americas
retaliation by armed forces. There was no backlash against
Islamic civilians. Some editors and journalists say it was
not easy to express their opinions, particularly those who
do not agree with sending the Japanese Self-Defense
Force abroad and Americas retaliatory measures.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumis cabinet submitted
to the Diet a set of three bills to govern Japans response
to a foreign military attack on 17 April 2002. One of
them, covering self-defence, will apply to the case that
Japan is attacked or likely to be attacked by foreign coun-
tries.
Under the bill, the Self-Defense Forces can build mili-
tary bases and they can use arms. The government has
authorization to request citizens to cooperate with the
government, and to restrain their rights. As for the me-
dia, NHK, the public broadcasting, is assigned to coop-
erate with the government. The bill offers basic policies
only. Specific items, such as restrictions on rights of citi-
zens, NHKs role, and countermeasures to terrorism,
will be laid before the Diet in two years.
The bill was presented in answer to the trend of public
opinion that needed emergency legislation on protect-
ing the country. Japanese have become conscious of the
importance of crisis management after the attack on the
United States and aggravation of relations between Ja-
pan and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.
The Constitution stipulates that Japan renounces war
and the use of force, so, in case of being attacked by
foreign countries, Japan will need a law to handle the
situation. Countermeasures had been discussed, but no
bill had been presented because many people had ob-
jected to them. Though presented, the bill will not pass
the Diet easily, because deep antipathy still exists among
the citizens. They claim that laws that allow the use of
the force are undesirable because they will threaten Asian
countries, and the governments request for coopera-
tion will lay an embargo upon free speech of the press.
In another development, bills have been put before the
Diet on the Protection of human rights and Protec-
tion of privacy. They could limit the ability of the press
to investigate and publish material about corrupt politi-
cians and bureaucrats. The three journalists unions af-
filiated to the IFJ have declared their opposition to these
bills. In addition, another draft bill is being prepared that
protects young people from bad influences of the
media. Public sympathy for media opposition to these
laws is limited.
Jordan
Although in recent years Jordan has been considered to
be one of the Arab countries with the most press free-
dom, there is evidence that the Jordanian government is
taking advantage of the instability and anti-terrorism
campaign to adopt restrictive measures against the press.
In October 2001 Jordan amended by decree its penal
code and press law in order, said Prime Minister Ali Abul
Ragheb, to cover all the needs that we are confronting
now. The amendments allowed the government to close
down any publications deemed to have published false
or libelous information that can undermine national unity
or the countrys reputation, and prescribed prison terms
for publicizing in the media or on the Internet pictures
that undermine the kings dignity or information tar-
nishing the reputation of the royal family. 27
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
The new amendments apparently provided the basis for
the 13 January arrest of Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of Al-
Majd weekly, for articles criticizing Abul Raghebs gov-
ernment and predicting, accurately as it turned out, that
the King intended to replace his cabinet. Rimawi was
released on bail on 16 January. If convicted Rimawi could
face jail terms of up to three years as well as sizeable
fines. According to information collected by press free-
dom groups14, restrictive measures were adopted against
the press, as part of the anti-terrorist campaign, on 9
October 2001. Our penal code does not cover all the
current needs and amendments will be introduced in
order to deal with these issues, meaning how to deal
with terrorist acts and punish them, said Prime Minis-
ter Ali Abou Ragheb.
The measures provide for the temporary or perma-
nent closure of newspapers in case they publish news
that is defamatory, false, harmful to national unity or
the states reputation, or incitement to strike, hold illegal
public meetings or disturb public order. At the same
time, sentences for insulting the royal couple and the
crown prince are being reinforced. These offences are
now punishable by sentences ranging from one to three
years in jail. Previously, the penalty was limited to a fine.
The 1999 amendments to the penal code put an end to
the penalty of closing newspapers in Jordan.
Mexico
The Mexican press depends increasingly on informa-
tion supplied by North American media, especially when
speaking of international events, so the coverage of the
events of 11 September was dominated by reports from
Mexican correspondents in the U.S. and the news re-
ceived from the international, and mainly North Ameri-
can, networks. The information was uniform, impartial
and straightforward with little analysis.
It is useful to note that the main national television net-
works did not broadcast either the images of the im-
 pacts of the planes against the towers or Bin Ladens
famous videotaped press statement. However, some in-
tolerance vis--vis Muslim people was evident and the
authorities took action to protect their interests. At least
18 Mexican citizens died during the attacks and the Mexi-
can government has not reacted with any new laws to
counter terrorism. However, in the coming months,
President Fox will send to the Congress a proposal on
the right to information, which does not exist for the
moment in Mexico. It is not yet clear whether this new
law will contain elements that may curtail the freedom
of journalists.
28 The Netherlands
CHAPTER 1
Dutch media maintained a central focus on the attack
for days with news about the attack, extra bulletins and
specials on radio and television. The work of print me-
dia, radio, and television was complementary. Moreover,
both Internet sites of the NVJ have since the attack been
visited daily in abnormally high numbers.15 Villamedia
had on 11 September, within two hours, a separate page
and links with information for journalists on the attack.
There have been a high number of attacks on Muslims,
reports the Dutch Journalists Association, which has pro-
voked a great deal of open debate. The NVJ itself has
organised with the assistance of some of the ministries
some very well attended debates through its working
group on Migrants and the Media. The core discussion
concerns the attitude of the media on the 11 September
attacks and the relationship with migrant communities.
Journalists have stressed the need to maintain profes-
sionalism and have warned that journalism dedicated to
only good intentions can result in bad practice. NVJ rep-
resentatives, editors-in chief and editors maintain the
line that all news needs to be reported even when diffi-
cult for minority groups or ethnic groups. Each news-
paper or broadcaster adopts a degree of extra careful-
ness or sensitivity according to their perspective, but
everyone maintains the view that news is the priority
and sensitivity concerning conflicting emotions in soci-
ety comes second.
The NVJ notes that the presence of the working group
on Migrants and the Media (established in 1984 follow-
ing the example of the NUJ, U.K. & Ireland) now fulfils
a special role. The working group, with an annual turno-
ver in projects of 120,000 Euros, is also recognised by
the authorities as an independent organisation dealing
with the problems associated with the media and the
changing multi-cultural society. In cooperation with the
Ministry of Defence, the NVJ organised an extra infor-
mation/training day for journalists going to Afghani-
stan and neighbouring countries. The NVJ, together with
the Dutch public broadcaster NOS, has a good risk in-
surance for journalists going on dangerous missions. In
addition, the NVJ is very concerned about the control
of information at official level that makes journalists
work difficult. The importance of access to informa-
tion in times of uncertainty is critically important. The
actions of the European Union to restrict free access to
information, highlighted by the intervention of the
Council of Ministers last year the infamous Solana
summertime coup when rules on access to official
information were virtually changed overnight on secu-
rity grounds and were later endorsed by the Parliament,
indicate just how important this matter is at times of
heightened international tension.
Nigeria
The events of 11 September and the subsequent mili-
tary action have heightened on-going tensions between
Muslim and Christian communities and precipitated an
urgent response on the part of journalists and media
people.
The country is already grappling with a wave of ethnic
and religious bloodshed in which well over 2,000 people
have died following the introduction of strict Islamic
sharia law in parts of predominantly Muslim northern
Nigeria, despite opposition from non-Muslims. This cri-
sis appears to have only compounded the historic ethnic
and regional rivalries, which are blamed for the devastat-
ing civil war in the late 1960s in which more than a mil-
lion people died. Major confrontations have centred on
Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria where, ac-
cording to community leaders, more than 200 died after
a weekend of violence on 13 and 14 October during
Muslim protests against U.S. air strikes on Afghanistan.
In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September events,
a major meeting was held between journalists, editors
and media experts on Media and Terrorism Lessons of the
American Attack, organised by the International Press
Center (IPC), Lagos, on 25 September 2001. The meet-
ing, supported by the International Federation of Jour-
nalists, analysed media coverage of the recent terrorist
attack in the United States in Nigeria and worldwide.
The meeting considered the media had been fair, bal-
anced and objective in their post-attack reports.
However, there is widespread concern over reports
tainted with religious and race bias thus violating the
principles of ethics and professionalism. There was a
strong feeling that the Nigerian media had devoted too
much attention to the American incident to the detri-
ment of conflicts at home, for example the Jos, Plateau
State, killings, a major national incident that was equally
deserving of attention. At the end of the exhaustive pres-
entations and discussions, it was agreed that:
 < The media in their further reports must be sensitive
to the diversity social, religious, political, cultural,
language of different peoples in different parts
of the world; and
< The media should condemn terrorism but must re-
frain from portraying or labelling any particular re-
ligion as terrorist. They should also highlight identi-
fied likely causes of terrorism with a view to re-
moving them.
The meeting also agreed that in reporting the attack or
any other major crisis, journalists should abide by their
ethics and code of conduct through:
< Eschewing propaganda;
< Not embellishing facts;
< Presenting different sides to the issues to enable the
reader or audience to arrive at a balanced conclu-
sion;
< Avoid being manipulated by politicians and policy-
makers.
These principles can only be meaningful if journalists
continuously remind themselves of the fundamentals
of the profession.
Norway
Media coverage of the 11 September attacks was exten-
sive and, although no specific problems of intolerant
journalism are reported, a debate has taken place among
authors, politicians, journalists and intellectuals on the
use of symbols and words like Christian world, Mus-
lim world, Islamic and other terms in media cover-
age and political debates. Some politicians now say that
there should be more flexibility and tolerance over when
and where the police may tap phones and tape conver-
sations. There is also a debate in Norway taking place in
the context of an old system of a network between gov-
ernment authorities and military leadership and centrally
placed editors and journalists in Norwegian media. This
network of contacts, which has existed since the Cold
War, is now being openly questioned. The Norwegian
Union has asked the press ethics complaints committee
to give a statement on whether or not such a network is
acceptable as part of the conditions for an independent
and free press. There have been complaints by military
authorities on lack of competence and quality in the
media coverage of issues related to defence, the army
and strategic policy. In this way they want to continue
the sort of network described above.
Pakistan
Pakistan is one of those countries that has been most
affected by the fall-out of 11 September. It became a
crucial ally of the United States and its war on the Taliban
in Afghanistan and meanwhile has maintained a form
of military rule that has challenged its commitment to
democratic legitimacy.
The United States regards the Musharraf regime as a
vital player in its campaign against terrorism and is re-
luctant to challenge the governments democratic fail-
ings because the Musharraf has proved effective in cap-
turing Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters who fled to Pakistan
from Afghanistan.
29
This position has given Musharraf the confidence to
announce, in August 2002, changes to the constitution
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
allowing him to dissolve the elected parliament and ap-
point military leaders and Supreme Court justices and to
neutralise the impact of elections proposed for Octo-
ber 2002. He extended his stay in office by another five
years.
Musharraf, a military general, seized power in 1999
through a bloodless coup. The United States initially re-
garded him as a pariah, but this was turned around after
11 September. The countrys media are largely caught
up in the fierce rivalry with India over the disputed Kash-
mir region with media on both sides being accused of
providing propaganda to suit their own political claims.
Journalists do not have access to high profile court hear-
ings (the case of those accused over the killing of Wall
Street journalist Daniel Pearl is one example).
Few believe that the latest amendments to the constitu-
tion will assist the development of a more open and
pluralist media system within the country. Indeed,
Musharraf s constitutional changes hand more power
to the military and they have further united the generals
opponents who say Musharraf s position will be stronger
after the October 10 general elections and still give him
wide-ranging powers under a supposedly more demo-
cratic set-up.
Musharraf s leeway to carry out changes in the Consti-
tution, however, has been upheld by the Supreme Court,
which had also given him three years to rule after the
coup and required him to call elections in 2002.
Musharraf s reforms allow him to dismiss an elected
parliament and government, and to appoint and sack
heads of important constitutional offices, powers previ-
ously exercised only by the prime minister. In effect, critics
say, the amendments will grant the military, which has
run Pakistans affairs for more than half of its life as an
independent nation, a permanent role over the function-
ing of a popularly elected government.
Although Musharraf says the package has been agreed
 after consultation, since public consultations were opened
in June, Musharraf has dismissed protests by an assem-
bly of political parties, lawyers groups, rights-based or-
ganizations and the intellectuals including journalists, all
of whom declared the changes an attack on the free will
of the people as exercised by their elected representa-
tives.
Palestine
The difficulties facing journalists in the Middle East in-
tensified in the period after 11 September. In the weeks
and months that followed the crisis developed into a
30
profound confrontation as bitter and as tragic as any in
the period since the six-day war in 1967.
CHAPTER 1
On 8 October, in Gaza, police prevented journalists from
covering an anti-American demonstration.16 This was the
latest in a number of press freedom violations in the
Territories under Palestinian authority since the begin-
ning of the international crisis caused by the terrorist
attacks on the United States.
While there is a fear that the Palestinian Authority is
taking advantage of the international medias focus on
the American response to increasingly repress the right
to information, these issues have been dwarfed by the
confrontation in the first months of 2002 in which hun-
dreds of Israelis and Palestinians have been killed. Local
and international media have been prevented from cov-
ering the reactions of the Palestinian people to 11 Sep-
tember. That same day, a cameraman with the French
television channel TF1 was arrested for three hours and
at least four journalists were beaten. During this dem-
onstration, which was declared illegal by the police, two
Palestinians were killed. The Palestinian Authority de-
cided to ban, in the territories under its control, inter-
views of Palestinians on the subject of the attack
launched by the United States in Afghanistan. Since 9
October, access to Gaza is forbidden to foreigners, in-
cluding foreign journalists. The Palestinian Authority
justified this measure by explaining that it was not able
to secure the safety of foreigners against possible at-
tacks.
On 14 September, the Palestinian police detained five
journalists. They were covering a demonstration in the
Nusseirat refugee camp in memory of the perpetrator
of the 9 September suicide-bomb attack in Nahariya,
Israel. A photographer and an editor from Reuters, an
Associated Press TV cameraman, the correspondent for
the Abu Dhabi satellite television channel and an Agence
France-Presse photographer were released one and a half
hours after the police had seized their tapes and films.
On 18 September, in Bethlehem, Palestinian police an-
nounced the implementation of new regulations con-
cerning Palestinian television and radio stations. They
were instructed not to broadcast news items concerning
calls for a general strike, nationalist activities, demon-
strations or security news without permission from the
police or national security services.17
During 2002 the confrontation deepened with new Is-
raeli actions to counter suicide bombings. Actions were
taken to derecognise the professional status of Palestin-
ian journalists and widespread allegations were made that
Palestinian media were promoting terrorism. The IFJ
carried a detailed mission to the region in June 2002 which
called for a new Israeli/Palestinian initiative to issue press
cards to journalists.18
Poland
Media coverage was generally fair, quick and accurate.
There were a few incidents of anti-Muslim behaviour
and physical attacks were widely reported and con-
demned. The general tone of media coverage focused
on the war on terrorism not against the Muslim or
Arab world. The President visited a mosque in Gdansk
to apologise to the Muslim community.
The voices of journalists were heard effectively during
the weeks after 11 September. Ryszard Kapusciuski, the
distinguished reporter and author, launched a debate on
the implications for globalisation, North-south relations
and appealed for solutions to third world underdevelop-
ment and the need to confront widespread problems of
social exclusion, fear and poor health care. On another
level, Oriana Fallacis controversial essay on Christian
and Muslim values published in Gazeta Wyborcza caused
a stir. Some described her remarks about Islam as racist
and hysterical while others said she was right to point
out the problem of discrimination against Christians in
the Muslim world. The Media Ethics Council of jour-
nalists, established with the support of the Polish Jour-
nalists Association, criticised her views as well as some
racist and xenophobic opinion from a minority of Polish
media.
Apart from some anti-war protests, there have been no
other significant events nor any attempts to draft new
counter terrorism laws that might compromise civil lib-
erties or press freedom.
Qatar
A factor for change in Arab media has been the estab-
lishment of Qatars al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, which
has been putting across the views of Osama Bin Laden
and his al-Qaeda network. As the only broadcaster per-
mitted by the Taliban to operate in Kabul, al-Jazeera has
captured worldwide fame with exclusive pictures of
bombing raids and air defences, as well as more con-
troversially its transmission of taped messages from
the leaders of al-Qaeda.
Born five years ago out of the ruins of a failed co-ven-
ture between the BBC and Saudi investors, al-Jazeera in-
herited many BBC-trained journalists left jobless when
repeated Saudi attempts to inhibit reporting of regional
issues forced the BBC to withdraw. The Emir of Qatar
has invested $150 million in re-starting the project. The
station has earned a steady flow of protests from fellow
heads of state who are unused to seeing Arab stations
interviewing Israeli cabinet ministers, and treating openly
issues not normally exposed to the viewing masses. It
has also become Bin Ladens favourite way of getting
his point of view across to the Arab and Muslim people,
over the heads of the sheikhs and presidents whose rule
he detests.
Al-Jazeera has been used by Western leaders, notably by
British Prime Minister Tony Blair to put their point of
view. The channel, which carried a pre-recorded video
of Bin Laden giving a response to the opening of the
military action against Afghanistan, has also come un-
der pressure from outside the region particularly in the
United States.
Press freedom groups report that Qatars emir, Sheikh
Hamid bin Khalifa al-Thaniof, said he was asked by the
U.S. State Department, during a recent visit to Washing-
ton, to use his governments influence to soften the re-
porting stance of al-Jazeera which, said the State Depart-
ment, has provided air time for experts hostile to the
U.S. Denying the criticism, al-Jazeera stated it gave both
the U.S. and Afghanistan positions equal airtime. We
give equal coverage to both sides and that is our role. We
present both sides, said Mohammed Jassem al-Ali, di-
rector general of the television station.
The channels unique access to Bin Laden has, accord-
ing to media commentators, exposed a paradoxical as-
pect of the cultural divide, converted by 11 September
into a chasm.19 It is now Western broadcasters who are
under pressure from their governments to restrict ac-
cess to their airwaves for people deemed enemies of the
state. The Bush administration and the Blair government
have pressed their national networks to exercise cau-
tion over use of al-Jazeera material, claiming pictures
may contain coded messages. The networks Kabul
office was destroyed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in
October.
Russia
The Russian mass media as a whole have covered widely
and objectively the events in New York and Washing-
ton, reports the Russian Union of Journalists, as well as
the Russian and international reaction to them. The ba-
sic theme has been the hostile methods of terrorism
and an understanding for the need of an international
response.
However, since the 11 September attacks, international
concern for human rights abuses in Chechnya appeared
to wane, although Russian forces in Chechnya have con-
tinued to engage in extra judicial executions, arrests, and
extortion of civilians. Since 11 September alone, at least
one person per week has disappeared after being taken
into custody by Russian forces. Western governments
did little to challenge perceptions that it had softened its 31
criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya to gain Rus-
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
sian support for the war on terrorism. When he visited
Russia last November, NATO secretary-general Lord
Robertson told his Russian host, who had just sided with
the United States in the fight against terrorism, we cer-
tainly see the plague of terrorism in Chechnya with dif-
ferent eyes now.
The Russian Union warns that a campaign against ter-
rorism can be used as an excuse for inappropriate re-
strictions on civil liberties and human rights particu-
larly in the Northern Caucasus where such infringements
are taking place on a daily basis. However, media are
covering these issues far less often than before. Although
there is no direct increase in violations to press freedom
or civil rights beyond Chechnya, statements made by a
growing number of officials in the government as well
as in the parliament show that attempts are underway to
take advantage of the situation in order to toughen con-
trols over the media.20
Saudi Arabia
A Reuters report from Riyadh on 10 October 2002 points
out that, while tradition still rules in Saudi Arabia, birth-
place of Islam, in the month since 11 September its news-
papers have shown just how far press freedom has ad-
vanced since the last big crisis 11 years ago. When Iraq
invaded Kuwait in August 1990, it took several days be-
fore some of the kingdoms dailies mentioned the event.
By contrast, U.S. attacks on Afghanistan a sensitive
subject made instant front-page news.
Newspaper editors say the governments handling of
the media began to alter in the mid-1990s, and they now
have an unprecedented degree of freedom. We are en-
joying a sort of freedom that we didnt have before,
Mohammed al-Tunisi, editor of the Arabic business daily
al-Eqtisadiah, told Reuters. Nobody tells us anymore
dont publish this. They feel we are responsible for re-
flecting the interests of our country. Saudi newspapers
are printing stories about previously taboo issues like
 child abuse, mistreatment of domestic servants, and ris-
ing unemployment.
Things have really opened up here nowadays you
cant hide anything, Arab News editor-in-chief Khaled
Al-Maeena told Reuters. As a journalist I feel much more
comfortable. There has been extensive coverage of
the 11 September attacks and of military strikes against
Afghanistan. At the same time, journalists had become
more responsible and the authorities would tolerate criti-
cism provided it was accurate. There is an acceptance
of criticism by government bodies on lots of issues
they might get angry but they take it seriously, al-Tunisi
32 said.
CHAPTER 1
The main drivers of change in Saudi Arabia and else-
where in the region have been satellite television and
the Internet. In Saudi Arabia itself, editors believe Crown
Prince Abdullah has been instrumental in easing pres-
sure on the media since he took over the bulk of re-
sponsibility from an ailing King Fahd several years ago.
Interior Minister Prince Naif, another key figure, heads
an information council and holds regular off-the-record
briefings with media editors. The doors are opening, but
ministers and the countrys ruling elite still guide cau-
tious moves towards full press freedom.
South Africa
The South Africa Union of Journalists (SAUJ) has criti-
cised the growing harassment of journalists covering
the conflict in Afghanistan and says scores of media
workers from around the world had been arrested, physi-
cally attacked and sometimes barred from performing
their professional duties in covering the war.21 SAUJ gen-
eral secretary, Motsomi Mokhine, said the union was
horrified by the implications of the U.S. State Depart-
ments demand that the media exercise caution in using
material from the al-Jazeera TV station, which has been
airing the views of Osama Bin Laden: We believe this
demand is an attack on freedom of expression and might
lead to similar demands being made on journalists by
other sides in the conflict for or against their own inter-
ests.
Spain
One country where journalists and media staff were tar-
gets of terrorism prior to 11 September was Spain where
the activities of the terrorist separatist group ETA in
the Basque region had been roundly condemned by the
IFJ Congress, meeting in Seoul on 11 to 15 June, 2001.
In the months prior to the Congress, three media work-
ers had been assassinated, several injured persons and
many more had been threatened. The IFJ called on the
political authorities in the Basque region, Spain and the
European Union to take urgent measures to grant the
free exercise of journalism in the Basque region.
The events of 11 September led to fresh national initia-
tives to counter the threat of terrorism, but indiscrimi-
nate attacks on civil society continued during 2002 lead-
ing in August 2002 to new legislation from the govern-
ment seeking to ban the political party, Batasuna, that is
close to the terrorist organisation ETA. Although
Batasuna denies any links with ETA, the government al-
leges that the party is a key part of the armed groups
shadowy network of commandos, fund-raising activi-
ties and recruitment operations. Authorities also accuse
Batasuna of fomenting street violence by radical Basque
youth groups through its strong anti-Spanish stances and
its refusal to condemn ETAs attacks. The opposition
Socialists also backed the bill. However, legislators from
parties in the Basque, Catalonian, Galician and other small
regions either abstained or voted against the motion.
These non-violent parties, some of which are in favour
of Basque self-determination, fear they may also be
banned. A judge has ordered that Batasunas activities be
suspended for three years. The party is barred from call-
ing public demonstrations or political rallies or receiving
a share of electoral funds. But elected representatives of
the party will be allowed to serve out their terms in the
75-member Basque regional parliament. The party won
10 percent of the vote in the last Basque regional elec-
tion in May 2001. The authorities claim ETA has killed
836 people since its first attack in 1968 and injured 2,367
over the course of 3,391 attacks, and also sponsored
3,761 acts of so-called low-level street violence since
1991. One group that has been particularly targeted has
been media.
Sweden
The Swedish Union of Journalists reports some exam-
ples of intolerance in reporting, but says this has been
offset by many more examples of serious attempts to
analyse the situation and present a balanced view of
events. Swedish media in general seem to be very aware
of the dangers and as a whole, the coverage can be said
to be professional and objective. Part of the debate tak-
ing place also concerns the role of Swedish media and
its quality given the importance of the events after 11
September. There has been no open political discussion
about measures that might compromise press freedom,
although civil liberties have been put under pressure. The
government has made it clear that Sweden is on Ameri-
cas side in the war on terrorism. So far, the media have
been left alone.
Reporting has been balanced, with sometimes very bi-
ased reporting counter-attacked by more debate about
quality in journalism and the role of media and journal-
ists than is usually seen in Swedish media. (In this new
debate and questioning of sources etc. has developed
fresh discussion about quality of reporting about, for
instance, the situation in the Middle East.)
However, when it comes to civil liberties and the judicial
system, it is a different story. Three Swedish citizens are
on the U.S. list of terrorists and in practice out-lawed
since several months (all their financial assets have been
frozen, including a housing allowance paid to one of
the families). They are accused of helping al-Qaeda fi-
nancially (by sending money to their relatives in Soma-
lia) but no evidence has been presented. For a long pe-
riod of time the government was very quiet about this
situation, but apparently the case has been discussed for
some time with American authorities and the three men
involved seem to get some help in proving their inno-
cence. Meanwhile, they survive on money that is illegally
collected among people and the Swedish authorities have
chosen to turn a blind eye to this. The compliance to-
wards the U.S. has been very much criticized and de-
bated by the media. Another Swedish citizen with immi-
grant background is among those prisoners of war be-
ing held at Guantanamo. Again, the government has been
very passive.
Switzerland
The Swiss affiliate of the IFJ, Comedia, reports that as
far as Switzerland is concerned, while no new laws have
been introduced surrounding the war on terrorism
the quality of journalism has been affected. Coverage
of the war was - for the most of it - very close to the
American point of view (with the exception of the Pal-
estinian conflict, where more balanced and critical jour-
nalism has been evident). There has been precious little
real investigation of the war on terrorism and events
around it.
This may be due to the difficult working conditions for
journalists covering the war directly from Afghanistan,
but the union says that there is also a widespread lack of
wanting to tell the true story. A real problem for jour-
nalists working here in Switzerland - and a theme we as
a union treated and discussed several times over the last
few months concerns the working conditions of our
members. Due to the exceptional circumstances (war
on terrorism, Swissair grounding, attack on the parlia-
ment of Zug, etc.), journalists have worked exceptional
times beyond agreed limits and there is little chance to
recoup this extra time worked.
Uganda
President Yoweri Museveni set the tone for Ugandas
anti-terrorist actions after 11 September in October 2001
when he highlighted the differences between fighting
for freedom and terrorism and promised to firmly deal
with those elements that plan to destabilise Uganda.
The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2001, which imposes
a mandatory death sentence for terrorists and any per-
son who aids, abets, finances or supports terrorism was
tabled before Parliament at the same time.22 The law is
intended to suppress acts of terrorism by imposing tough
sentences for terrorists, their sponsors and supporters.
It gives the High Court extra-territorial jurisdiction to
try any offence relating to terrorism committed within
or outside Uganda. It also seeks to give extra-ordinary
powers to officers engaged in anti-terrorism investiga-
tions to carry out surveillance against suspects. These 33
powers include accessing suspects bank accounts and
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
intercepting their phone calls, faxes, e-mail and other
communication.
When the Ugandan Parliament finally adopted the bill in
April 2002, it additionally threatened the death penalty
to any journalist publishing materials deemed to sup-
port terrorism. The bill has raised major concerns with
the Ugandan Journalists Union and other press freedom
groups in the region.
Ukraine
The Parliament in Kiev has adopted a law On the Fight
Against Terrorism which contains provisions that go
beyond what is necessary to combat terrorism and
amount to a severe restriction on freedom of expres-
sion. The law gives State authorities power in the area
of the conduct of a counter-terrorism operation to use
for official purposes means of communication belong-
ing to citizens, state agencies and organisations regard-
less of their form of ownership. It also permits the
head of the counter-terrorism operation to regulate the
activities of media representatives in the area of con-
duct of the counter-terrorism operation. Both provi-
sions confer an open-ended power on State authorities
to assume control over media, the only qualifying provi-
sion being that the power can only be used during a
counter-terrorism operation.
Second, the powers granted to authorities under these
provisions are extremely broad and hence potentially
subject to abuse. International law does recognise that
certain obligations may be imposed on public service
broadcasters to, for example, broadcast public warnings
in times of national emergency. However, the powers
conferred by this Law go far beyond this and are, in-
deed, unprecedented in their scope, allowing the State in
effect to assume full control over the media.
The broad nature of these powers is exacerbated by the
loose definition in Article 3 of terrorist activity, which
 would include political demonstrations where some acts
of violence occur. The powers conferred under Article
13, therefore, constitute a serious restriction on the right
to freedom of expression, which cannot be justified, even
in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The IFJ
says they should be removed. In addition, Article 15 of
the law restricts circulation of information if it dis-
closes special methods or tactics used in conducting the
counter-terrorism operation, or that serves as propa-
ganda for or justification of terrorism, or that con-
tains information about staff involved in anti-terrorist
actions. This law inhibits legitimate, and indeed crucial,
public debate and is open to abuse on political grounds,
34 potentially being used by the authorities to silence politi-
cal opponents.23
CHAPTER 1
United States of America
The U.S. news media, battered for 25 years by declining
credibility, appear to have regained respect among read-
ers and viewers at least temporarily after the 11 Sep-
tember terrorist attacks. But within days journalists came
under pressure, says the Newspaper Guild-CWA, the
IFJ affiliate representing journalists and newspaper in-
dustry staff. Some found themselves expected to become
patriots first, and journalists second.24 At the same
time the Congress has moved rapidly to adopt repres-
sive new immigration and wiretapping laws and other
anti-terrorist measures raising serious concerns about
civil liberties.
Linda Foley, President of the Newspaper Guild-CWA,
reports that journalists and media staff both at the
top and bottom of the media have on the whole
acted responsibly. The unprecedented atrocities of 11
September and the events in the following days, in which
journalists themselves were the targeted victims of at-
tacks, has tested the professionalism of media to the
full, she said. The response of media has been meas-
ured with widespread support for the tough measures
enacted by the government, though the civil liberty im-
plications of changes in law raise some understandable
questions.
Despite some early backlash against Arab-Americans
and Islam, much of it an emotional and fearful reflec-
tion of anxiety in the wake of 11 September, there has
been a high level of professionalism and racist attitudes
have been largely sidelined, says Linda Foley.
In the first week after the attacks, an unprecedented 89
per cent of the public gave the media a positive rating,
according to the Pew Research Center for the People &
the Press, a Washington-based independent polling firm.
This is a welcome change for many newspapers in par-
ticular, where a shift toward scandal, sensationalism and
celebrity-oriented news, combined with reductions in
staff and news space, had exacerbated reader dissatis-
faction.
However, when military action began on 7 October 2001
and media sought more access and information than
the Pentagon and the White House were willing to pro-
vide, problems emerged. On 10 October the Bush ad-
ministration called on all news networks to exercise
judgement in broadcasting statements by Bin Laden
and his associates, warning that they may include coded
incitements to violence.
The Newspaper Guild-CWA established a web site to
publicise attacks on the media.25 It has also issued nu-
merous advice and guidance on dealing with the threat
of anthrax following the targeting of media organisa-
tions and the death of a Florida-based journalist. A wide-
spread debate on the role of media has emerged with
numerous cases of individual journalists and news staff
victimised for expressing views that do not agree with
the conventional wisdom of the political and military
administration. Journalists have found themselves striv-
ing to maintain professionalism in an atmosphere where
popular opinion suggests that in the aftermath of the
attacks on New York and Washington people are all too
willing to give up their essential liberty. A poll was con-
ducted by ABC News and the Washington Post on 13 Sep-
tember in which 92 per cent of respondents said they
would support new laws that would make it easier for
the FBI and other authorities to investigate people they
suspect of involvement in terrorism. Support dropped
only slightly, to 71 per cent, when people were asked
whether they were prepared to give up some of Ameri-
cans personal liberties and privacy.
In this atmosphere of widespread public anxiety, Arab-
Americans have been harassed and attacked. Music has
been censored. In Texas, the FBI shut down Arabic Web
sites prompting, according to Reuters, charges of con-
ducting an anti-Muslim witch hunt. In Baltimore, the
Sun reported that anchors and even a weather forecaster
at one TV station were required to read messages con-
veying full support for the Bush administrations efforts
against terrorism. When staffers objected, the message
was changed to indicate that it came from station ma-
nagement.
The Bush Administration has several times tried to curb
or control the flow of news. This anti-democratic ten-
dency met resistance, which demonstrated the countrys
solid democratic traditions. But there are anxieties that
the process has encouraged a drift towards increasing
self-censorship among journalists. Media critics of Presi-
dent Bush like Tom Gutting, city editor for the Texas
City Sun, and Dan Guthrie, a columnist for the Grants
Pass Daily Courier in Oregon were fired. In September
2001, the U.S. Department of State asked the Voice of
America, a U.S. government-funded radio network, to
refrain from running an interview with Mullah
Mohammad Omar, leader of Afghanistans ruling Taliban
saying that airing the interview would be providing a
means for terrorists to communicate their messages and
that it was not newsworthy. After staffers protested,
the State Department relented and the interview was
broadcast on 25 September.
In October 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleeza
Rice contacted the five networks to caution them against
running interviews of Osama bin Laden out of fear that
his televised addresses may contain hidden messages for
his followers, inspire his followers and frighten Ameri-
cans. In another case, syndicated radio host Peter Werbes
talk-radio show was dropped by radio station KOMY-
AM in Santa Cruz, California, in early October 2001 af-
ter questioning U.S. military actions in Afghanistan. On
5 October, 2001, President Bush, citing national secu-
rity needs, instructed senior members of his govern-
ment to stop sending certain confidential material to
members of Congress for fear it would be leaked to the
media. A few days earlier, the Washington Post had run a
story saying members of Congress had been told a new
terrorist attack on the United States was very likely. The
president soon withdrew in the face of strong protests
by members of Congress.
On 19 February, the New York Times reported that the
Defence Departments Office of Strategic Influence
(OSI) had proposed planting disinformation in the for-
eign media. At that time, the government feared for-
eigners would see the war against terrorism as a war
against Islam. The outcry set off by these revelations
led the White House to order the OSI closed down be-
cause, according to defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
the Pentagon does not lie to the American people.
From the first day of the U.S. militarys Operation Endur-
ing Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001, the Penta-
gon tried to exercise control over the media. The filming
of the war was inhibited by an exclusive government
contract with the firm Space Imaging, preventing the
company from selling, distributing, sharing or provid-
ing pictures taken by the Ikonos civilian satellite to the
media, which were thus deprived of pictures of the re-
sults of the U.S. bombings taken by this satellite. Ikonos
is the most efficient of the civilian satellites. While the
Pentagon says the agreement is meant to supplement
the governments own satellite images, observers point
out that the agreement means that the news media will
no longer have access to such images and, as a result, are
unable to report on basic aspects of military actions in
Afghanistan. Journalists will not be able to independ-
ently verify Pentagon claims.26 In addition, a dozen me-
dia organisations covering the military operations were
prevented several times from doing their work by U.S.
Special Forces troops.
The foreign media were not spared either. On 12 No-
vember, U.S. troops bombed and seriously damaged the
Kabul offices of TV station Al-Jazeera. In February this
year, the Pentagon refused to open an enquiry into the
bombing, saying the building was suspected of harbour-
ing Al-Qaeda militants and was, therefore, a military tar-
get. This matter was the subject of strong protests by
the IFJ and other press freedom groups. Journalists from
35
CNN, CBS, The Army Times and others were given per-
mission in January to photograph and film in Kabul the
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
departure of about 20 prisoners being flown to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. After the prison-
ers were flown out, the journalists were told they could
not use their pictures. A Pentagon spokesman said they
violated international agreements because they were de-
grading for the prisoners. Several media ignored the
order.
Media were also targets and victims in the rush to legis-
late against terrorism, a process that has raised the most
serious concerns among those campaigning for civil lib-
erties. The limitations on press freedom imposed by the
government include undermining the confidentiality of
Internet messages. Shortly after the attacks on the World
Trade Center in New York, FBI agents went to the of-
fices of Internet service providers AOL, Earthlink and
Hotmail to install their Carnivore programme on the
servers, to monitor the e-mail of all their customers, in
the hope of finding traces of the attackers on the
Internet. This Internet monitoring was formalised on
24 October when the House of Representatives passed
the Patriot Act, allowing the FBI to install Carnivore on
any Internet service provider, to monitor all e-mail mes-
sages and keep track of the web-surfing of people sus-
pected of having contacts with a foreign power. To do
this, the only permission needed is from a special legal
entity whose activities are secret. The measures also in-
cluded easing the rules surrounding phone tapping. As
well as the invasion of individual privacy, this blank
cheque given to the FBI threatens the confidentiality of
journalists sources.
Encryption technology, which allows Internet users to
code their messages to keep them private, is under at-
tack from the FBIs Magic Lantern programme, a virus
that can be sent to targets by e-mail without their knowl-
edge and which records their keystrokes and thus the
key to the encryption codes. After the press reported
this, the FBI denied it had such a device, but admitted it
was working on one. The American Civil Liberties Un-
ion (ACLU) announced bitter disappointment with
 the passage of anti-terrorism legislation, which mirrored
closely highly controversial original legislative proposals
the Bush Administration submitted to the House of
Representatives and the Senate. This bill has simply
missed the mark of maximizing security and, at the same
time, minimizing any adverse effects on Americas
freedoms, said Laura W. Murphy, Director of the ACLU
Washington National Office. Most Americans do not
recognize that Congress has just passed a bill that would
give the government expanded power to invade our pri-
vacy, imprison people without due process and punish
dissent.
36
Congress has recent experience in how not to react to a
terrorist attack. A year after the Oklahoma City bomb-
CHAPTER 1
ing of 1995, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, a piece of legislation that
severely curtailed the writ of habeas corpus, making it
far more difficult for convicted criminals even those
awaiting the death penalty to present new evidence
that they had been wrongly convicted. It further allowed
the use of secret evidence in deportation cases against
immigrants. In recent years, a number of proposals to
curtail fundamental freedoms in the name of security
have lurked in back offices in Washington and elsewhere,
waiting for the right time to be sprung upon an unsus-
pecting public.
The new law adopted by Congress follows closely the
text submitted by Attorney General John Ashcroft as
the so-called Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, or ATA. The
bill was the subject of wide-ranging opposition from a
broad coalition of interest groups ranging from the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) to conservative groups such
as Phyllis Schlaflys Eagle Forum and the Gun Owners
of America.
The new Senate legislation goes far beyond any powers
conceivably necessary to fight terrorism in the United
States, said Laura W. Murphy, The long-term impact
on basic freedoms in this legislation cannot be justified.
For immigrants, added Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate
Director of the ACLUs Washington Office, this bill is
a dramatic setback. It is unconscionable to detain immi-
grants who prove in a court of law that they are not
terrorists and who win their deportation cases.
Other threats lurk. Certain elements in Washington have
been trying for years to ban the use of encryption tech-
nology unless the government could be guaranteed a
way to crack the code. There is no evidence the New
York and Washington terrorists used encryption, but
freedom fighters in other parts of the world have used it
to safeguard their communications from tyrants such as
Slobodan Milosevic. When encryption is outlawed, only
outlaws will use encryption.
Many fear that in the desperate search for security, the
right to private speech, to engage in public discussion,
and to do so anonymously will be drastically diminished
and the Bill of Rights substantially weakened.
The ALCU says many of the provisions enhance the
power of the FBI to spy on Americans for intelligence
as opposed to criminal purposes. Other information
sharing provisions direct highly personal information
about Americans into the hands of the CIA and the
Department of Defense, without meaningful restrictions
on how it is used or re-distributed.27 The historical record
makes clear that unchecked trust in the government to
spy on its citizens responsibly is misplaced. The ACLU
points to the introduction of the FBIs infamous and
secret Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO),
created out of fear of growing social dissidence by Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover, which harassed and spied on a
vast number of peaceful social protest groups. The vast
majority of the organisations and individuals targeted
for surveillance were actually avowedly non-violent. One
of the most prominent public figures investigated was
the Rev. Martin Luther King.
In light of the 11 September attacks, says Laura W.
Murphy, the lessons of historical examples of inappro-
priate and unconstitutional domestic surveillance are all
the more relevant. The current administration would
do well to remember its predecessors breaches of the
public trust, she says. If Congress really wishes to earn
Americas trust, it should ensure that its anti-terrorism
legislation contain all the essential checks and balances
to prevent the political or ideological surveillance of law-
abiding citizens.
The threat posed to civil liberties aside, fears over press
freedom and the constitutional protection of the First
Amendment do not so much concern official censor-
ship that is, bans enacted by the government as
self-censorship, a phenomenon that is far more danger-
ous in an age of media conglomerates than it would
have been in an earlier time.
Zimbabwe
The campaign of the regime of Robert Mugabe against
independent media and professional journalists reached
a rare peak of hysteria and paranoia on 23 November
2001, when a government spokesman announced that
six journalists working for foreign-based media, includ-
ing both Zimbabweans and non-citizens, who wrote sto-
ries on attacks on whites and political violence in Zim-
babwe would be treated as terrorists.
It is now an open secret that these reporters are not
only distorting the facts but are assisting terrorists who
stand accused in our courts of law of abduction, torture
and murder, by covering up and misrepresenting the
brutal deeds of terrorists, said the presidential spokes-
man, adding that, As for the correspondents, we would
like them to know that we agree with U.S. President Bush
that anyone who in any way finances, harbors or de-
fends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We, too, will not
make any difference between terrorists and their friends
and supporters.
Internal critics of the Mugabe regime have increasingly
been subjected to intimidation, harassment, and arrest.
In his remarks, the presidential spokesman also criticized
Zimbabwes independent media for intimidating state-
controlled media, stating that, this kind of media ter-
rorism will not be tolerated.
Ironically, the government has remained subdued as
unknown attackers have firebombed, threatened and at-
tacked the offices of the Daily News, one of the newspa-
pers most critical of the regime. 28
Conclusions and Recommendations
IFJ Executive Committee, meeting in Washington in June 2002,
considered this report and agreed the following statement and reit-
erated a plan of action agreed at its previous meeting in Stockholm
in October 2001:
If there is a war on terrorism to be won, it will not be on
the back of strategies that promote fear, ignorance and
intolerance. But the actions of governments in North
America and Europe would suggest otherwise. Since 11
September 2001 the democracies of Europe and North
America have been dangerously ambivalent about their 37
commitment to citizens rights and press freedom. Their
Journalism and the War on Terrorism
actions have reinforced cynicism in autocratic regimes
about Western commitment to fundamental rights and,
even worse, they have inspired a fresh round of media
oppression in countries that routinely victimise and in-
timidate journalists.
On this issue, journalists groups and publishers are of
one voice. The World Association of Newspapers Con-
gress in Belgium at the end of May 2002 called on the
international community to reverse the current trend and
said that the United States policies in the wake of 11
September had contributed to the increasing threats to
press freedom.29 Dwelling on the attitude and actions
of the American government, when the world is full of
real villains, might seem unfair, were it not for the im-
mense power and influence that the U.S. wields on the
global stage and the effects its policies and example have
on so many other countries, said the WAN President.
The hardening of American attitudes is certainly the most
symptomatic of the restrictions affecting freedom of
expression after 11 September; and steps taken by the
United States, simply because of that countrys power,
inevitably have consequences for the rest of the world.
The 11 September events in the U.S. have been a pro-
found test of the professionalism of journalists world-
wide and, apart from the inevitable banalities and some
bizarre exceptions, coverage appears to have been re-
strained, intelligent and informed.
However, there have been numerous attempts to ma-
nipulate the media message by governments creating
undue pressure on journalists that is potentially damag-
ing to the quality of coverage of the conflict. Journalists
must be free to work without being pressed into service
in defence of governmental definitions of patriotism
or national interest. At the same time there has been
an unprecedented debate about policing, security and
civil liberties. In almost every country, governments and
politicians have been developing anti-terrorist strategies,
which include the possibility of damaging new laws that
 may threaten existing standards of personal freedom and
press freedom. Journalists should be among the first
to question politicians who make quick-fix promises
in the name of security, particularly when our ability
to collect and store information, to protect sources
of information, to carry out legitimate inquiry, and
to be independent of the policing and security serv-
ices, are at risk. The IFJ will engage fully in this de-
bate.
The evidence of this report alone shows that, among
others, in Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, France, Russia and within the European Union,
38
there is a worrying rush to legislate on new rules on
phone-tapping, police surveillance, encryption technol-
CHAPTER 1
References
1
For further information, see Media, Entertainment and Arts Alli-
ance, see http://www.alliance.org.au/
2
http://www.alliance.org.au/
3
Full details from http://www.cjfe.org/
4
Full details of the proposed new laws are available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/index.html
5
IFJ Press Release, 27 May 2002.
6
Details available from Reporters Sans Frontieres at http://www.rsf.fr/
7
Further information from the Finnish Union of Journalists at
http://www.journalistiliitto.fi/inenglish
8
WEISCHENBERG, S. contact through Deutscher Journalisten
Verband at http://www.djv.de/home.htmlsee
9
Further information from Tim Gopsill at
http://www.gn.apc.org/media/nuj.html
10
Press release October 12, Athens. See http://www.esiea.gr/
11
Israel National News, 12 September 2001.

ogy, detention of migrants, control of the Internet and

12
NEVE G., Ben-Gurion University writing for
Inthesetimes.com
freedom of movement. Many believe these new laws 13
Further information from IFJ Tokyo Office.
are being drafted and processed too quickly for effective E-mail: ifj-okuda@nifty.com
scrutiny by the public at large or by legislators. The im- 14
See International Freedom of Expression eXchange (IFEX) at
pact on journalists and their work could be far-reaching. http://www.ifex.org
15
http://www.villamedia.nl/ and http://www.Internetjournalist.nl
16
See International Freedom of Expression eXchange (IFEX) at
http://www.ifex.org
Plan of Action 17
For full reports on incidents that affected journalists in this period
see www.ifj.org
< The IFJ will launch an international campaign to
18
See IFJ Report Deadlines and Danger, www.ifj.org
19
See comment in Opendemocracy.net by David Elstein and James
publicise useful material and guidelines for journal-
Curran, 15 October 2001.
ists and media covering the current crisis in order to 20
Details can be obtained from the Moscow-based Glasnost De-
promote better understanding of the issues involved fence Foundation at http://www.gdf.ru/
and the need for professionalism. 21
The SAUJ General Secretary can be contacted at
e-mail: mokhine@sauj.co.za
22
New Vision, 4 October 2001.
< The IFJ will continue to provide useful data on safety 23
Information from Article 19, the Centre for Free Expression.
of journalists and health and safety matters and will 24
More information available from http://www.newsguild.org/
promote risk awareness among media unions. 25
www.newsguild.org/2edged.php
26
New York Times, 19 October 2002
< The IFJ will promote the importance of tolerance
27
The full text of the legislation is available at http://www.aclu.org/
28
For more information see www.ifj.org
and quality in journalism to counter prejudice and 29
PARKINSON, R 2002. World Association of Newspapers, Presi-
cultural misunderstanding through a range of initia- dent, 3 June.
tives including the launch of five regional prizes for
tolerance in journalism and by reinvigorating the In-
ternational Media Working Group Against Racism
and Xenophobia (IMRAX).

< The IFJ will promote international solidarity between

journalists from all cultures and traditions in the
current conflict, particularly by reaching out to col-
leagues from the Arab world and supporting their
efforts to promote professionalism in journalism
against the threat of fundamentalism and govern-
mental interference.

< With this in mind, the IFJ will sponsor international

and regional seminars and conferences on war, ter-
rorism and the role of media with the support of
appropriate international agencies and press free-
dom agencies.

Media
in
Danger
CHAPTER 2
Mogens Schmidt*
World Association of
Newspapers and Director,
World Editors Forum
* Mr M. Schmidt is now Director,
Division for Freedom of Expression,
Democracy and Peace, UNESCO, Paris.
In a windy corner of a large, democratic European country, editors and journalists
are being physically assaulted, several journalists have been killed and many others
have escaped murder attempts. In a highly developed South American country with
a long tradition for democracy and a flourishing cultural life, an atmosphere of
intimidation and fear is making it impossible for editors and journalists to live a
normal life, privately and professionally. I am talking about the Basque region in
Spain and I am talking about Colombia.
When journalists have to begin their day on their hands and knees looking for bombs
under their cars telling their children that they are looking for the cat so as not to
scare them, when steel doors and refined arms and bomb detectors have to be
installed in newspaper offices and printing plants, and when journalists cannot fetch
their children after school or eat in the same restaurant two nights in a row, the media
are in danger. When journalists or their families are threatened because of what they 39
write, and when other editors and journalists are forced to pay so-called protection
money to stay out of the terrorists sights, the media are in danger. When journalists
have to carry bullet proof vests and run in zigzag in order to escape attacks from
left-wing and right-wing guerrillas, from extreme nationalist groups, and from crimi-
nals, the media are in danger.
The World Association of Newspapers (WAN) and the World Editors Forum, the
editorial branch of WAN, have decided to establish a series of press freedom activi-
ties in those countries where media are indeed in danger. This initiative has been
taken in order to create increased attention to the problem and to work out a new
three-step-strategy, which we at WAN believe will create the most efficient output.
The three-step strategy comprises an initial phase with field and document research,
and missions; a second phase to create attention, including the organising of one or
more high profile conferences in the targeted region or country; and a third phase
with a capacity building programme that caters for both the eminent press freedom
issues and for assisting the media in obtaining true financial independence through
developing their business performance and editorial quality.
Fighting for Press Freedom
There are many press freedom organisations working nationally and internationally.
All of them are important and are contributing to every small progress that is actu-
ally made in the field. All of them, at the same time, are also working under difficult
conditions, often under-financed, and sometimes these organisations are threatened
and persecuted just like critical, independent media. All of them need the collabora-
tion of similar organisations in other countries, they need the attention and support
from donor organisations in the field and they need national and international expo-
sure of their work and the problems they are facing. It is one of the aims of Media
in Danger activities to assist in meeting this objective.
It is a perversion of civil conditions for the media, when printing plants and news-
rooms have to be fortified and staff and visitors have to undergo security checks
again and again. It is poisoning the professional standards of journalism when fear
for your own life or that of your relatives is influencing your reporting and editorial
decisions. Publishers, editors, press photographers and journalists, all media profes-
sionals, work under dangerous conditions in countries where press freedom is not
an established reality. It does not matter whether the threat comes from local or
national authorities, from criminals or from guerrillas and terrorists. What matters is
to assist these media professionals in the best practical way. This is the other objec-
tive of Media in Danger activities. The fight for press freedom needs exposure, and
the media professionals fighting for the right to write and tell the full truth about
current issues need the active backing from colleagues from all over the world and
 from such organisations that have been created to sup-
port the quest for freedom of expression. This is an-
other objective of Media in Danger activities.
Business Development and
Press Freedom
It is generally accepted that the existence of a free and
independent press is fundamental, indeed a precondi-
tion, to the establishment of durable democracy and an
effective market economy. Good government, a mature
system of political alternance and responsible civil soci-
ety rarely if ever develop in the absence of a strong,
40
critical and free press. Freedom of the press demands
not only that journalists be able to exercise their profes-
CHAPTER 2
sion without restriction. It also requires the existence of
well-managed, economically viable newspaper enter-
prises, operating within effective infrastructures.
All over the developing world, and in countless coun-
tries making the transition to democracy and a market
economy, newspapers with excellent journalists have
failed to accomplish their mission because they have failed
as businesses. In many cases, they have not had a sec-
ond chance. A brief window of opportunity for democ-
racy has closed behind them. When the socialist regimes
of the Soviet bloc collapsed at the end of the 1980s, the
need to help the rapid creation of an independent press
in these countries, if recognized at all, was barely a foot-
note in the master-plans drawn up to reconstruct the
economies of the region. A decade later, one could see
that in Russia alone the vast majority of newspapers
outside Moscow remain in the hands of provincial and
local government administrators, with the consequences
one can imagine on their editorial independence, objec-
tivity and willingness or ability to expose corruption and
bad management and, only recently, there are the first
signs of a new development for the press.
If mere survival were ambition enough, one might even
consider the Russian press fortunate in finding politi-
cians avid to retain press control and influence through
subsidies. Most newspapers in Ukraine, Georgia, Ar-
menia, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria or the former Soviet
Republics of Central Asia, live either a hand-to-mouth
existence or face imminent danger of bankruptcy, both
of which effectively prevent their development as seri-
ous counterweights to the abuse of political power.
In the new development programmes for Afghanistan,
the plans for aid and reconstruction of society do in-
deed comprise support for media infrastructure and train-
ing programmes to make media professionals better jour-
nalists and better entrepreneurs. That is an encouraging
sign. Another one is that the new annual report from
the World Bank Institute dedicates a full chapter to the
importance of supporting the business development of
the media to secure a truly independent press.
A capacity-building programme will always be an in-
tegrated part of Media in Danger activities. This pro-
gramme will always comprise practical initiatives to help
protect media professionals, initiatives to enhance mo-
nitoring of press freedom violations, initiatives to assist
exiled journalists, initiatives to organise public campaigns
for press freedom and to support jailed journalists, ini-
tiatives to fight impunity by providing legal assistance.
It will also comprise training intended to improve the
professional editorial and writing skills of reporters and
training to develop local professional standards. Further-
more, it will also comprise such issues as increasing ad-
vertising revenues for newspapers, the establishment of
intelligent Customer Relation Management systems, as-
sistance in creating Internet-based news-services, and
newspaper management training for both the editorial
and the commercial workforce.
Media in Danger Events
Bilbao, the Basque Region of Spain
WAN started its Media in Danger activities in 2001. On
the encouragement of the Spanish newspaper publish-
ers association AEDE, a number of WAN staff and
representatives from the WAN Press Freedom Advi-
sory Committee went in March 2001 on a fact finding
mission to Spain, especially to the Basque region in the
North. A report was written, on the basis of more than
20 interviews with all the media in the region, politicians
representing all parties and other key persons.
After writing the report, WAN organized in collabora-
tion with the Spanish publishers and the media in Bil-
bao in the Basque region a large conference in Septem-
ber 2001. More than 250 media professionals took part
in this conference. Speakers included journalists and
editors who had been attacked by ETA, a panel of all
the Spanish newspaper publishers who at this Confer-
ence for the first time were on a public stage together,
and national and international reporters who talked about
how to work under similar dangerous conditions in coun-
tries such as Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel and
Northern Ireland. The manifest outcome of the Con-
ference was a strong resolution, which is included in this
chapter, condemning terrorism against the media. How-
ever, the outcome was certainly also the strengthened
collaboration among Spanish and Basque media which
had not been working strongly together in the fight for
press freedom before and the increased national and in-
ternational attention to the horrendous terror in a small,
windy corner of Europe.
Bogota, Colombia
The second Media in Danger Conference took place in
Bogot, Colombia, in March 2002. The conference
brought back to Colombia six media professionals who
had had to flee their country and live in exile. Their tes-
timonies were a strong argument for the reason to con-
tinue to fight against the violations of press freedom in
Colombia, whether these violations came from paramili-
tary groups, guerrillas or drug gangsters. Speakers also
included leading Colombian and South American intel-
lectuals and, again, it was a clear objective of the event
to bring together all of the newspaper publishers to se-
cure a strong collaboration within the press to stand up
against terror. Also in Bogot, the 300 participants car-
ried a strong resolution.
During the second days Capacity Building Workshop,
the participating representatives from the media and from
Colombian press freedom organisations agreed upon a
concrete assistance programme for enhancing press free-
dom work and collaboration among these organisations
and on providing the Colombian press with stronger
tools for their business development to improve their
independence.
The programme included eight different activities. The
first aimed at enforcing press freedom monitoring
through enhanced cooperation among the main Colom-
bian press freedom organisations. Through better-coor-
dinated activities, it will be ensured that press freedom
monitoring and assistance to threatened journalists and
their families will be improved and better coordinated.
The second is a training and work programme for exiled
Colombian journalists, which will be created with the
support of international donor organisations. Third, a
UNESCO guide for journalists working in conflict ar-
eas will be adapted to Colombian conditions and dis-
tributed through the Fundacion Antonio Narinho. The
IFJ will open a Solidarity Centre in Bogot to assist
Colombian journalists with practical and legal assistance.
Fifth, the Interamerican Press Association (IAPA) has
committed to make a larger number of training scholar-
ships available for Colombian media professionals, no-
tably for those working in the most dangerous regions
and those already in exile.
Furthermore, the International Media Support (IMS) will
fund a WAN training and consulting programme on Cus-
tomer Relations Management for the national press in
Colombia and also a WAN training and consultancy pro-
gramme on advertising sales and other commercial is-
sues for Colombian regional press. Finally, sponsorship
is at present sought for a comprehensive training pro-
gramme in newspaper management, comprising tech-
nological, commercial and editorial issues.
Future Media in Danger Events
There is unfortunately no doubt that there are still many
countries and regions where the media are in danger.
One of the preconditions for the WAN Media in Dan-
ger Programme is the active involvement of a local, sig-
nificant press institution that will assure the active in-
volvement of all the media publishers in the country or
region. This precondition excludes some countries, where
other means for support must be found. There are, how-
ever, still ample possibilities for three-step strategy Me-
dia in Danger events in the countries of Central Asia, in
Bangladesh, in Nepal, in Namibia, in Venezuela, in
41
Moldova, in Ukraine and in Pakistan.
Media in Danger
Press Release and Resolution from
the Bilbao Media in Danger Event
Bilbao, Spain, 14 September 2001
More than 200 publishers, journalists and free press ad-
vocates from 25 countries, meeting in Bilbao, Spain, on
Friday, condemned without reservation the outra-
geous and cowardly attacks on the media by Basque
terrorists. In a resolution, they stated that the murders
of press executives and the bombing of media enter-
prises in Spain were the work of terrorists pursuing the
same fanatical logic as the terrorists who wrought mass
destruction in the United States on Tuesday.
The catastrophe in the United States is evidently per-
petrated on quite another scale than the regular acts of
terrorist murder and destruction in Spain, said the clos-
ing resolution of the Conference on Terrorism Against
the Media. The roots of this violence and the motives
of the killers are, however, essentially the same and fol-
low a similar fanatical logic: to pursue political ends not
by debate and the free flow of information and ideas,
but by terrorising and eliminating the people, institu-
tions, and guarantors of democratic society, it cautioned.
In a message to the conference, the President of the
European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, said: The Par-
liament, and myself, consider the fight against terrorism
in Spain a priority of the European Union because ter-
rorism denies the fundamental rights and the democratic
principles on which our Union is founded. She said
that attacking freedom of the press was a priority for
the terrorists because of its fundamental role in devel-
oping democracy.
The conference had been planned before the fatal U.S.
attacks to focus on terrorism against the media, particu-
larly in Spains Basque region, where the terrorist organi-
sation ETA has made media and their staff a priority
target for violent attacks. The resolution concluded: In
these tragic days of new and unprecedented terror against
humanity, it is more urgent than ever to stand resolute
 against, and to condemn, every single violation of the
fundamental, democratic principles which govern the
civilised world.
In addition to focusing on the escalation of attacks against
the media in the Basque region, the conference also ex-
amined violence against the media in Algeria, Colombia,
Indonesia, Israel and Northern Ireland. The resolution
expressed total solidarity with journalists and media in
the Basque country in their dangerous and courageous
work and called on all political parties to denounce all
forms of violence against the media.
42 The conference was organised by the World Associa-
tion of Newspapers, the World Editors Forum, the Span-
CHAPTER 2
UNESCO and the International Media Support Fund
have organised the conference Media in Danger taking
place in Bogot on 22-23 March 2002, gathering more
than 200 media professionals from 15 countries.
The Conference condemns without reservation the out-
rageous and cowardly attacks on the free press and calls
on the authorities, police and security forces to do eve-
rything possible to apprehend the perpetrators. The
Conference underlines the importance of national and
international attention to the plight of the Colombian
press in the face of murders and kidnappings. The Con-
ference urges initiatives to advance efforts to protect
media professionals, including the reinforcement of the
Colombian press freedom organisations.

ish Newspaper Publishers Association (AEDE), sup-

ported by the Federation of Spanish Press Associations
(FAPE). It was hosted by Grupo Correo. It follows a
WAN and World Editors Forum mission to the Basque
Country that found an alarming increase in threats, in-
timidation, and attacks on media staff made by the radi-
cal Basque nationalist terror organisation, ETA and its
supporters. The attacks have made it impossible for jour-
nalists there to live normal lives, both privately and pro-
fessionally.
Press Release and Resolution from
the Bogota Media in Danger Event
Bogota, 11 March 2002
More than 200 publishers, journalists and free press ad-
vocates from 15 countries, meeting in Bogot, Colom-
bia on Friday, 22 March 2002 condemn without reserva-
tion the outrageous and cowardly attacks on the media
by Colombian criminals and terrorists.
On behalf of the world newspaper community, we the
participants also express our total solidarity with jour-
nalists and media in Colombia in their dangerous and
courageous work and their refusal to be held hostage to
threats and violence. The participants of the Confer-
ence strongly encourage all democratic political parties
in Colombia to denounce without reserve all forms of
violence and intimidation of the press and to refrain
from any speech or writing that incites hatred or vio-
lence against media.
In a period of unprecedented terror against humanity, it
is more urgent than ever to stand resolute against, and
to condemn, every single violation of the fundamental,
democratic principles, which govern the civilised world.
That has been the aim of this conference.

Freedom of expression and the right to be informed are

basic conditions for any society to be defined as demo-
cratic. Any threat to these fundamental rights seriously
damages society and endangers democracy. Media pro-
fessionals working to maintain these principles have the
right to carry out their duties safely and freely without
the risk of being threatened, harassed or attacked.

In Colombia, paramilitary and criminal organisations have

made media and their staff a target for violent attacks.
Thus freedom of expression and of the press is seri-
ously limited by murder, terrorism, kidnapping, pressure,
intimidation, destruction of printing and broadcast fa-
cilities, and violence of any kind and impunity for per-
petrators.

In order to confront this challenge, the World Associa-

tion of Newspapers, the World Editors Forum, the Co-
lombian Newspaper Publishers Association, Andiarios,
together with the Inter-American Press Organisation,
 Introduction
Terrorist
Attacks of In the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September, a number of governments around
the world took steps to enact new legislation to enable them to take more effective
11 September: measures to combat terrorism worldwide. To a greater or lesser extent, these legisla-
tive efforts give the authorities legitimate new powers to address the very real prob-
lem of terrorism, a problem which, in the past, appears to have attracted less official
Consequences attention, at least in some countries, than one would have expected. At the same
time, however, governments have taken advantage of the climate of fear, in certain
for cases verging on hysteria, to give themselves some powers which trench on human
rights. The most obvious, and blatant, examples of this are in relation to the deten-
Freedom of tion, removal and/or trial of suspected terrorists without respect for due process
43
guarantees that have been established over centuries. However, in some cases, legis-
lative measures have also eroded guarantees of freedom of expression and of infor-
Expression mation.
CHAPTER 3 More subtle, but no less important, is the impact of 11 September in terms of self-
censorship, both encouraged by the authorities and in response to public attitudes.
This self-censorship has made it difficult openly and critically to discuss issues such
as the root causes of terrorism and how best to address this problem, including an
assessment of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan, the terri-
ble events now taking place in Israel and Palestine, and the threat of further military
measures to fight terrorism. It has also made it much more difficult for human
rights advocates to promote what are now unpopular causes, such as the human
rights of those accused of terrorism. This undermines holistic, long-term attempts
to address the problem of terrorism.

A related problem is the enormous international attention currently being devoted

by the international community to the fight against terrorism. While this is not a bad
thing in itself, it has two side effects which are most unfortunate for human rights
advocates. First, given capacity limits for international action, the overwhelming
focus on terrorism diverts attention from human rights issues. Second, some of the
main powers playing an active role in the fight against terrorism, particularly the
United States, have been prepared to overlook human rights abuses to gain allies or
strategic advantage. This makes it significantly more difficult for human rights advo-
cates to effect change.

Freedom of Expression and Combating Terrorism

International bodies and courts have made it very clear that freedom of expression
and information is one of the most important human rights. In its very first session
in 1946 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I) which
states: Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touch-stone
of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.
Toby Mendel
As this resolution notes, freedom of expression is both fundamentally important in
its own right and also key to the fulfilment of all other rights. It is only in societies
Head
where the free flow of information and ideas is permitted that democracy can flour-
Law Programme,
ish. In addition, freedom of expression is essential if violations of human rights are
ARTICLE 19
to be exposed and challenged. The importance of freedom of expression has re-
peatedly been stressed by both international and national courts.

Efforts to promote greater respect for freedom of expression are crucial to any
long-term strategy to address the problem of terrorism. It is only in the context of
respect for freedom of expression that the root causes of terrorism can be ad-
 dressed. The three special international mechanisms on
freedom of expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Rep-
resentative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, adopted a
Joint Declaration on 20 November, 2001 stating, among
other things that [We are] of the view that the events
of 11 September, 2001 and their aftermath highlight the
importance of open public debate based on the free
exchange of ideas, and should serve as a catalyst for States
all over the world to bolster guarantees of freedom of
expression.
44 Respect for freedom of expression is essential both in
those countries which are potential targets of terrorism
CHAPTER 3
and in those countries which harbour or generate ter-
rorists. Although there can be no question that the meth-
ods employed by terrorists on 11 September were to-
tally illegitimate, it is equally clear that they were moti-
vated by concerns which strike a chord with many peo-
ple, particularly those living in the poorer regions of the
world. These concerns may be described as pull fac-
tors for terrorism. It is short-sighted, indeed futile, to
attempt to address the problem of terrorism without
understanding pull factors and taking steps to address
them. This can only be done through frank, open de-
bate, in a context of respect for freedom of expression
and the free flow of information and ideas.
At the same time, terrorism thrives in repressive envi-
ronments, where peaceful, democratic means of express-
ing dissent, and of having ones views heard, are not
available. It also thrives on rumours, distortion and bias;
in other words in places where reliable, accurate infor-
mation is not freely available. There is, therefore, a clear
association between breeding grounds for terrorism and
lack of respect for human rights, and in particular the
right to freedom of expression, what we might call
push factors. A comprehensive strategy to address
terrorism must, therefore, seek to eliminate push fac-
tors, including by enhancing protection for human rights.
Finally, there is a need for more, and better, contact be-
tween communities and societies around the world. Over
the longer term, contact, including open communica-
tion, is the only way to address problems such as racism,
which has unfortunately flourished since 11 September,
and partisanship, including both anti-Arab sentiment and
demonising the West and the United States.
Official Measures Restricting Freedom
of Expression
Under international law, freedom of expression may be
restricted, but only where the measures taken meet a
strict three-part test. First, the interference must be pro-
vided for by law. The European Court of Human Rights
has stated that this requirement will be fulfilled only where
the law is accessible and formulated with sufficient pre-
cision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. Sec-
ond, the interference must pursue one of the legitimate
aims listed in the treaty in question. These aims include
public order and national security. Third, the restriction
must be necessary and proportionate to secure the le-
gitimate aim. Addressing terrorism is clearly a legitimate
aim, but where measures have an excessive impact on
freedom of expression, or could be drafted more nar-
rowly and still achieve the aim, they cannot be justified.
In various countries around the world, such as Belarus,
Canada, India, Nepal, the United Kingdom and the
United States, new legislation has been introduced in
the wake of the attacks of 11 September to address the
threat of worldwide terrorism. These laws focus prima-
rily on powers to detain and try suspected terrorists. Of
some notoriety, for example, is the Executive Order is-
sued by President Bush of the United States which pro-
vides for the trial of non-citizen international terror-
ists by military commissions, originally envisaged as
being held in secret. This provides authority for trials of
al-Qaeda suspects at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
The new rules also have implications for freedom of
expression. An example of a measure restricting free-
dom of expression is a provision under the USA PA-
TRIOT Act (United and Strengthening America by Pro-
viding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism) allowing the U.S. Secretary of State
to declare persons seeking entry into the U.S. to be in-
admissible because they are deemed to have undertaken
advocacy that undermines U.S. anti-terrorist efforts. The
broad terms of this power mean that it can be used
against practically anyone criticising the U.S. administra-
tions approach to combating terror. This may deter le-
gitimate criticism of U.S. policy and/or practice abroad,
for example where journalists are concerned about jeop-
ardising their ability to enter the U.S. It could lead to the
exclusion from the U.S., for example, of a British jour-
nalist who opposed Bushs proposed military solution
for Iraq.
The breadth of this power and the fact that it is wielded
by a political actor, the Secretary of State, make it hard
to justify as a restriction on freedom of expression. It
may be contrasted with the general constitutional stand-
ard in the U.S., whereby speech may be limited only where
it constitutes incitement to lawless action (mere advo-
cacy of such action is permitted) and where the threat
of lawlessness is imminent. States obviously have the
right to prevent terrorists from entering their borders,
but this is quite different from excluding everyone
deemed to undermine U.S. anti-terrorist efforts.
The PATRIOT Act also grants the FBI broad powers
to investigate terrorism, including by looking into read-
ing habits and the like of suspects. The Act also prohib-
its libraries and bookstores from disclosing the fact that
they have been subjected to an investigation. This effec-
tively shields from public view large areas of FBI opera-
tions. The prohibition should at least be restricted to
cases where the disclosure would be likely to cause harm
to the investigation.
In other countries, even more draconian steps have been
taken. An anti-terrorism law passed in December 2001
in Belarus imposes a number of wide-ranging restric-
tions on the media including by granting the authorities
the power to take over media outlets in the area of con-
duct of an anti-terrorism operation. There is no justifi-
cation for such an extreme measure, particularly given
that the area in question is undefined and may well in-
clude the whole country. The law also imposes broad
content restrictions, for example, on material that serves
to justify terrorism or about staff involved in anti-ter-
rorist activities. There is no requirement in either case
that the material in question pose a risk of harm.
In India, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(POTO), passed on 1 April, 2002 makes it a criminal
offence for journalists to refuse to hand over informa-
tion which the authorities consider to be of material
assistance in preventing a terrorist attack. This trenches
on the right of journalists to protect confidential sources
and clouds the line between investigative journalists and
the police. The European Court of Human Rights has
held that mandatory source disclosure may be legitimate
only where justified by an overriding requirement in
the public interest. The POTO clearly fails to meet this
standard.
Even more draconian is a new anti-terrorist bill currently
before the Nepalese parliament which would make it a
criminal offence to distribute information about any
individual or groups implicated in terrorist or subversive
activities. If applied, this would make it practically im-
possible for the media to report on the on-going con-
flict inside Nepal and would seriously undermine the
publics right to know.
In many instances, law enforcement authorities have been
granted new, broader powers to undertake electronic
surveillance and monitoring, for example, of telephone
or Internet communications. These are powers which
historically have been subjected to serious abuse by the
authorities, and which were subjected to formal limits
only after concerted public action, including exposure
of official abuse. Although communications are most
directly protected as an aspect of the right to privacy, the
threat of excessive official surveillance may also lead to
self-censorship. In the past, courts have often struck
down these powers as offensive to human rights and,
although terrorism has to be addressed, there is little to
suggest that broader surveillance powers are needed for
this task than to combat other kinds of crime.
Authorities in some countries also attempted to rein in
independent reporting relating to Afghanistan, particu-
larly during the first part of the military campaign, be-
fore the Taliban were overthrown. This started with U.S.
officials using their influence to try and prevent the Voice
of America, an independent but State-funded broad-
caster which remains susceptible to official pressure, from
aring an interview with the Taliban leader, Mullah Mo- 45
hammed Omar. The station eventually decided to broad-
Terrorist Attacks of 11 September: Consequences for Freedom of Expression
cast just a few excerpts from the interview as part of a
larger programme.
On 10 October, national security advisor Condoleezza
Rice held a conference call with major U.S. network
broadcasters, urging them not to broadcast pre-recorded
statements by Osama bin Laden. This was justified by
White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer as follows:
At best, Osama bin Ladens messages are propaganda calling on
people to kill Americans. At worst, he could be issuing orders to
his followers to initiate such attacks.
The networks insisted that they were treating the call
simply as friendly advice, and rejected the idea that it
amounted to censorship. The idea that Osama bin Laden
would use American broadcasts to disseminate orders
verges on the ridiculous, given the many other more re-
liable means at his disposal to achieve this end. Osama
bin Laden and his multi-billion dollar network surely have
more effective ways of spreading their message than
through the U.S. networks. If they wanted to use a broad-
caster, which hardly seems the most reliable means of
issuing commands given other options such as the
Internet, Al-Jazeera would be a more likely choice.
Despite this, the networks agreed to review tapes before
airing them, suggesting the conference call did have an
impact on reporting. Britain followed suit a few days
later with Prime Minister Tony Blairs director of com-
munications, Alistair Campbell, summoning broadcast-
ers in the U.K. for a meeting on the same issue. Again,
the broadcasters, including the BBC, insisted they had
not been censored. A joint statement issued afterwards
stated that the broadcasters believed sensible dialogue
with the Government is important during the current
conflict. But we will retain the right to exercise our own
independent, impartial editorial judgement. However,
broadcasting practise in relation to the airing of direct
statements by al-Qaeda did change recognisably after the
meeting.
 Even more insidious were attempts by U.S. officials to
censor the independent Qatar-based Al-Jazeera satellite
channel. Al-Jazeera is one of the few independent broad-
casting voices in the Middle East and had, even before
11 September, established a good reputation for its open
political reporting. Even before the U.S. attacks in Af-
ghanistan began, on 2 October 2001, the U.S. Embassy
in Qatar issued a formal diplomatic complaint regarding
Al-Jazeeras coverage of the Afghan issue. This was fol-
lowed a day later by a meeting in Washington between
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Qatari ruler
Sheikh Hamad Khalifa al-Thani, at which the Sheikh
was requested to rein in Al-Jazeeras coverage. It would
46 appear U.S. officials were irked by Al-Jazeeras frequent
airing of its exclusive December 1998 interview with
CHAPTER 3
Osama bin Laden, and its anti-American and anti-Israeli
position. The latter is a particularly sensitive issue, given
U.S. attempts to secure peace in the region as part of its
coalition-building efforts.
These blatant attempts by U.S. officials to censor Al-
Jazeera were widely criticised, including by several media
freedom groups, such as the U.S.-based Committee to
Protect Journalists and Reporters sans Frontires, based
in France. A New York Times editorial on 11 October,
2001 also decried the censorship and instead called on
U.S. officials to address what they perceived as Al-Jazeeras
bias by providing the station with more information from
a U.S. perspective. Al-Jazeera had in the past complained
that it was unable to secure interviews with U.S. officials.
Secrecy
The past few years have witnessed a significant growth
in openness in countries around the world, and in offi-
cial recognition that the public has a right to know what
government is doing on their behalf. This is reflected in
the fact that, over the past five years, numerous coun-
tries from every region in the world have adopted free-
dom of information laws giving individuals a right to
access information held by public bodies.
The attacks of 11 September have had an unfortunate
impact on this very positive trend. Openness is often
the first casualty of war, as governments justify secrecy
on the basis of military necessity and the public accepts
this excuse too readily, not being willing, or able, to ef-
fectively question it. There is something particularly in-
sidious about this form of secrecy, since it is extremely
difficult to assess independently the need for secrecy in
a conflict situation.
Almost immediately after the 11 September attacks, U.S.
officials were calling for better protection for confiden-
tial documents, even though leaks of such documents
had nothing whatsoever to do with the attacks. Reports
indicate that in practice it is now more difficult to access
information. A recent article in the Christian Science Moni-
tor, for example, decried the rise in secrecy at the White
House, including in response to requests under the Free-
dom of Information Act. It goes beyond the issue of
terrorism, however, and in February 2002 a federal judge
ordered the Energy Department to release thousands
of pages of information from Vice President Dick
Cheneys energy task force, criticising the administration
for moving at a glacial pace.
In November 2001, shortly after the beginning of the
hostilities in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom put off
implementation of its Freedom of Information Act,
adopted in November 2000, until at least January 2005.
It had previously been scheduled to come into force in
the summer of 2002. Around the same time, the Cana-
dian authorities amended their Access to Information
Act by allowing the Minister of Justice to issue certifi-
cates exempting certain records from disclosure. This
was done despite the fact that studies have indicated that
the Act already provided adequate protection to national
security interests.
There is little doubt that secrecy has also increased in
countries which have not amended their freedom of
information laws, although the precise impact is some-
times hard to assess. A number of countries in Eastern
and Central Europe, including Bulgaria and Romania,
are in the process of adopting secrecy laws as a condi-
tion for NATO membership. Although these laws are
not a result of the events of 11 September, there are
concerns that advantage has been taken of the prevail-
ing climate of secrecy in drafting these laws. This is ex-
acerbated by the fact that campaigning for greater open-
ness is undermined by moves towards greater secrecy in
countries like the U.S. and Canada, traditionally strong
proponents of openness.
The three special rapporteurs on freedom of expres-
sion expressed concern about these developments in their
Joint Declaration of 20 November 2001, as follows:
Certain governments have, in the aftermath of the events of Sep-
tember 11, adopted measures or taken steps to limit freedom of
expression and curtail the free flow of information; this reaction
plays into the hands of the terrorists.
In most cases, responding to terrorism cannot justify
eroding established guarantees of openness. Freedom
of information laws normally provide for a comprehen-
sive, often excessive, regime of exceptions which already
takes into account every legitimate reason to refuse to
disclose information, including national security. Al-
though terrorism is a unique threat to national security,
it does not require special systemic forms of secrecy. In
particular, there is no reason to abandon the rule that all
exceptions to the right to information must be justified
on the basis of a threat of tangible harm to a legitimate
interest and that even where a risk of harm is proved,
the information should still be disclosed where this is in
the overall public interest.
Legal measures find their parallel in the sometimes bla-
tant manipulation of military information during the war
by both sides. An interesting example of this was infor-
mation about the failed U.S. raid of 19 October, 2001
on Afghan territory, which was successfully repulsed by
Taliban forces. For their part, the Taliban reported sig-
nificant numbers of U.S. fatalities, whereas in fact no
Americans were killed. The U.S. authorities, on the other
hand, claimed the next day that the raid had been a suc-
cess. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, stated in a press briefing that it had been
conducted without significant interference from Taliban
forces and the authorities even released footage dem-
onstrating this, later revealed to be showcased rather than
the actual event. The U.S. authorities only acknowledged
much later that the raid had led to a number of casual-
ties but continued to obscure the extent and effective-
ness of Taliban resistance.
The media had no independent means by which to verify
or assess either sides claims. Western media duly reported
the U.S. claims of success while media in some coun-
tries, for example, Pakistan, presented the Taliban claims
of fatalities as accurate. This led to the public either be-
ing misled, confused or kept totally in the dark. By the
time the truth did finally emerge, there was enough gen-
eral confusion that only careful readers would have been
set straight. In any case, by that time the importance and
relevance of the information had significantly declined.
As this example clearly shows, official control over in-
formation places the media in a very difficult position.
They have to report on these events, which are of para-
mount public importance, and yet they have very little
capacity to independently assess military claims.
A related problem is the need for the media to exercise
professional responsibility in light of military claims of
a need for secrecy. This is reflected in the BBC Editorial
Policy Guidelines on reporting on the war which, to their
credit, they made public. The Guidelines recognised both
the need to inform the public and the risk that dissemi-
nating information might increase the hazards facing the
armed forces. As a result, the BBC signalled a willing-
ness to withhold information for a while at the request
of the military authorities, as long as satisfactory rea-
sons are given. However, in most cases it will be almost
impossible for the BBC to assess whether or not rea-
sons given are satisfactory. As a result, it has to take claims
of a need for secrecy at face value, giving the military
authorities significant powers over the flow of informa-
tion.
Problems of Self-Censorship
and Media Bias
The impact of official restrictions on freedom of ex-
pression is at least paralleled by the effect media self-
censorship and bias has had on the flow of information
to the public in the aftermath of 11 September. Self-
censorship in this context derives from a number of
factors, including official pressure and underlying public
fear and emotion. Officials and the public at large are
47
focused on responding, not analysing, and this can cre-
ate a climate whereby the public simply do not want to
Terrorist Attacks of 11 September: Consequences for Freedom of Expression
hear anything which does not appear to fully support
the measures being taken. This seriously undermines
public oversight of official action.
In some cases, officials have taken active steps to pro-
mote self-censorship. An example of this was the suc-
cessful attempt by U.S. President Bush and his officials
to promote a climate in which anyone who was not with
the U.S. was seen as supporting the terrorists. This bi-
partisan attitude of us and them is palpably false in
fact and has the effect of eroding the middle ground,
making it very difficult to criticise the U.S. administra-
tions response to the attacks. Even the name of the
anti-terrorist legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act, was
cleverly designed to stifle dissent.
U.S. officials have also used the us and them tactic
directly to attempt to quell human rights voices. On 7
December 2001, appearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft stated:
[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: your tactics only aid terrorists, for they
erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give am-
munition to Americas enemies, and pause to Americas friends.
They encourage people of goodwill to remain silent in the face of
evil.
There is something ironic in this message, inasmuch as
one of the key problems with the terrorists is that they
do not respect liberty and the rule of law and yet Ashcroft
is criticising those who defend liberty. There is further
irony in Ashcrofts concern about silencing people of
goodwill, since that is exactly what he himself is trying
to do.
Public attitudes also have an impact on open discussion
and the free flow of information about the Afghan situ-
ation. No doubt partly because of overwhelming public
support for the administrations response to the events
of 11 September, the U.S. media largely abandoned their
 role as watchdog of government, accepting adminis-
tration claims, failing to challenge assumptions and not
questioning policies. This is reflected, for example, in
CNN coverage of the war in Afghanistan, which used
the banner Strike Against Terror, thereby effectively
precluding any criticism, or even serious analysis, of the
military action.
An illustrative example of public pressure on the media
relates to a regular BBC show called Question Time,
hosted by David Dimbleby, aired two days after the ter-
rorist attacks. The show brings together a hand-picked
audience and a number of special guests and, on that
48 day featured, among others, the former U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the United Kingdom, Philip Lader. Strong anti-
CHAPTER 3
American sentiments were voiced by the audience and
Mr. Lader was reportedly reduced to tears. Over 2,000
viewers called in to complain about the programme. The
BBC originally defended the programme but then re-
versed its position and the Director General, Greg Dyke,
took the unprecedented step of issuing a personal apol-
ogy, which included the following statement:
[D]espite the best efforts of David Dimbleby and the panel, there
were times in the programme when the tone was not appropriate,
given the terrible events of this week.
The apology was unfortunate. The Bush administration
portrayed the attacks from the very beginning as a war
against America, thereby paving the way for a military
response. Opposition to this, including that voiced on
BBCs Question Time, was effectively being stifled out
of respect for the dead. However, open and frank de-
bate about the attacks was essential, including in the pe-
riod immediately after they occurred, since this was a
key formative period for peoples views, including about
how to respond to the attacks.
Although the above example took place just two days
after the attacks, the enormity of the tragedy was used
to attempt to stifle criticism long afterwards. A televised
debate in the U.K. in January 2002 concerned the rights
of prisoners accused of supporting al-Qaeda and being
held at Guantanamo Bay. An American lawyer, finding
himself getting the worst of the debate, accused his chal-
lenger, a human rights activist, of demeaning the memory
of the victims. Obviously the plight of the victims can-
not justify human rights abuse by U.S. authorities, but it
plays on peoples emotions, causing them to lose sight
of the real issue.
Self-censorship and bias also played a role in reporting
in countries where there was significant public opposi-
tion to the war. For example, in Pakistan even leading
dailies regularly reported on Taliban claims of success
without much verification, although most ultimately
proved to be false. The example of reporting on the
U.S. raid of 19 October has already been noted. An-
other example concerns Taliban claims in early Novem-
ber to have shot down a B-52 bomber. This attracted
newspaper attention in Pakistan for several days, even
though the evidence behind the claim was very dubi-
ous. In the event, the claim proved to be false. This gave
people in the country a very distorted view of what was
actually happening.
These instances of self-censorship derive primarily from
underlying public fears and biases, rather than media
manipulation. Conflict brings out the worst in people,
and a tendency to interpret events emotionally, rather
than based on a sober assessment of the situation. This
almost naturally leads to a situation of self-censorship,
whereby it becomes difficult to voice unpopular views
and in which the media avoid certain types of contro-
versy for fear of a public backlash.
Unfortunately, the very topics which become taboo are
often matters which society most needs to discuss openly.
It is, for example, of the greatest importance that the
U.S. and Britain have an open, informed public debate
before any decision regarding military action against Iraq
is taken. In practice, however, the opposite seems to be
the case with the leadership taking decisions and trying
to prevent debate.
Promoting Human Rights
A serious implication of the attacks of 11 September
for human rights advocates is the general decline in pri-
ority of human rights concerns, including those relating
to freedom of expression. Human rights advocates
around the world are finding it more difficult to pro-
mote their causes for a number of reasons. A key prob-
lem is that the attention of the international community
is focused on combating terrorism, to the detriment of
promoting human rights. Resources and attention are
limited, and the overwhelming attention given to terror-
ism naturally undermines efforts in other areas.
A related problem is that key international players, in-
cluding the U.S. and the U.K., have shown that they are
willing to overlook human rights abuses as a trade-off
for support in the fight against terrorism. A good exam-
ple of this is Pakistan, where the international commu-
nity had expressed serious concern about both the de-
velopment of nuclear military capacity and the military
takeover. These concerns were, however, summarily
brushed aside in exchange for Pakistans support for the
war in Afghanistan.
Finally, as noted above in relation to freedom of infor-
mation, it is far more difficult for countries which have
promoted human rights to continue to do so when they
themselves have been repudiating long-established rights.
This clearly affects human rights advocates, since it is
difficult to convince governments to improve their hu-
man rights records when those governments are aware
that rights are being limited in established democracies.
As the three special rapporteurs on freedom of expres-
sion noted in their 20 November 2001 Joint Declara-
tion, We are particularly concerned that recent moves
by some governments to introduce legislation limiting
freedom of expression set a bad precedent.
Conclusion
Freedom of expression, and of the media, has suffered
in a number of ways since the attacks of 11 September.
Official actors have taken steps which both directly limit
freedom of expression and information and which in-
directly have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
Equally important is the serious climate of media self-
censorship and bias in many countries, which leads to a
denial of the publics right to know.
Restricting human rights in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack somehow represents a victory for the terrorists 49
who seek to undermine our way of life, including de-
Terrorist Attacks of 11 September: Consequences for Freedom of Expression
mocracy and human rights. Furthermore, restricting free-
dom of expression is likely to undermine, rather than
enhance, long-term strategies to address the problem
of terrorism. Frank, open debate is essential to counter
both push and pull factors associated with terrorism.
50
 For journalists, the murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan at the start of 2002 was
11 September: certainly the most brutal instance of the consequences of 11 September for free-
dom of expression. That murder, together with the earlier killing of no fewer than
Consequences eight journalists in Afghanistan, gives some indication of the dangers that lie in wait
for journalism and threaten freedom of expression; threats posed directly by the
bands of killers, but arising also, and more perniciously, from certain governments
for Press notions of press freedom. Daniel Pearl was not, as President Musharaf of Pakistan
was to declare a few weeks later, being over-intrusive. He was doing his job, and
Freedom doing it very well. Like Marc Brunereau, Johanne Sutton, Pierre Billaud, Volker
Handloik, Azizullah Haidari, Harry Burton, Julio Fuentes, Maria Grazia Cutuli and
Ulf Stromberg, he was where he ought to have been, on the spot, to witness and to
explain. His murder trial, which began in Karachi on 5 April 2002, affords another
example of the restrictions imposed on journalists. The Pakistani authorities re-
CHAPTER 4 fused on security grounds to let the press attend the proceedings. 51

These murders remind us that States, or at least their official representatives, are not
the only authors of attacks on press freedom, or even necessarily the worst culprits.
Among those who prey on freedom, we increasingly find unofficial agencies, fun-
damentalist groups, paramilitary gangs, freewheeling secret services and organized
crime. In this twilight war against terrorism, State repression occurs alongside indi-
vidual crime and on occasion the two mingle inextricably. In this, 11 September was
not a sharp divide. In the course of the last 10 years, the majority of murdered
journalists have been killed by private groups: the Basque separatists of ETA,
armed Islamic groups in Algeria, guerrilleros of the far Left and paramilitaries of
the far Right in Colombia, and rebel raiders in Sierra Leone.

Shock Waves

War has never been good for freedom of expression. Before even truth, the first
casualty of war is, in fact, this freedom: the freedom to investigate and report, the
freedom to publish criticisms and revelations. Yet war can also bring more freedom.
The press enjoys greater freedom in Kabul today than under the Taliban, and is freer
now in Belgrade than before the fall of Milosevic. The shock waves of world events
do not all move the same way, nor do they have the same effects in all places. Hos-
tilities can gag the media, or remove a gag. In Saudi Arabia, the shock of 11 Septem-
ber might even explain the faint stirrings noticed these last few months in a press
that has always toed the regimes line until now. The effects of 11 September on the
world system, notes Critique Internationale, cannot be reduced to a logical and
unambiguous summary; in fact they are opening up as many opportunities as they
are imposing constraints. 1

Even though the atrocity of 11 September shook the news-gathering world to the
core and made drastic changes to the circumstances surrounding the exercise of
journalism, it still does not really constitute a complete break in terms of freedom
of expression. Attacks on press independence in Zimbabwe, restrictions imposed
on press coverage of the violence in the Middle East, curtailment of press freedom
Jean-Paul Marthoz in Morocco or Uzbekistan: none of these began only on 12 September, and some
of the laws and regulations enacted after the terrorists flew into the twin towers had
Director of Human Rights already been in the pipeline long before, such as the French Prevention of Terror-
Watch, Europe Office ism Act [the Everyday Security Act], the bill for which was first brought before
the National Assembly on 14 March 2001.

Nor should we deceive ourselves, in our assessment of the consequences of 11

September, over our apparent unanimity. True, we all protest against the murder of
journalists, or their imprisonment, or the outrageous amounts they are fined. But
this does not mean we share the same definitions of what it should or should not be
 permissible to say. The balance of contending rights such
as freedom of expression, non-discriminatory treatment
and the security of the nation or the citizen is not only a
thorny issue between the State and journalists. It is also
a matter on which journalists themselves are divided,
and this debate began well before 11 September.
The present war is also, consequently, a test of the uni-
versality, the globalization of journalism, of the me-
dias capacity not only to handle global information, but
also to think about the principles and values underlying
their mission to inform. The controversy over the en-
counter between civilizations, exacerbated by different
52 interpretations of the terrorist outrage, raises crucial
questions about freedom of expression, its responsibili-
CHAPTER 4
ties, its prospects and its limitations. What is blasphemy
in one place is freedom in another; what is racism here is
free speech there. Censorship may also be exercised in
the cause of morality and respect for others.
On the Defensive
These introductory remarks and caveats do not, how-
ever, drain our central theme of its content. Since 11
September, press freedom has not been quite the same.
What we need to know is whether the curtailments of
these liberties are going to be temporary or herald the
end of a historic cycle which began with the upsurge of
freedom as the Berlin Wall crumbled, and was confirmed
on African soil in the Windhoek Declaration. As the
Canadian writer and thinker Michael Ignatieff observed
in a New York Times article,2 the atrocity has put the hu-
man rights movement on the defensive, a victim of the
priority now accorded to national security.
The hardening of American attitudes is certainly the most
symptomatic of the restrictions affecting freedom of
expression after 11 September. Steps taken by the United
States, simply because of that countrys power, inevita-
bly have consequences for the rest of the world. Policies
adopted by the Pentagon for theatres of military opera-
tions directly influence the special correspondents of all
countries. And the measures taken for surveillance of
the alleged activities by terrorist groups on the Internet,
that global medium par excellence, affect all Internet users
directly.
The United States, which in the name of the First
Amendment to the Constitution had made the defence
of free expression one of the cornerstones of its diplo-
macy and a foundation of its policy of assisting the media
in former Communist countries, has done a brisk about-
turn. This change of mood and policy is illustrated in its
attitude to the Qatar TV station Al-Jezeerah. That sta-
tion, praised until then as a model of free expression in
the Arab world, suddenly became one that had to be
muzzled as soon as, against the backdrop of the war
against terrorism, it did not confine itself to relaying the
American line, but gave air time to Bin Laden.
The understanding extended by the United States to
authoritarian governments known for suppression of
free speech is another negative consequence of the fight
against terrorism, recalling the unholy alliances and se-
lective expressions of indignation of Cold War days. The
welcome Washington gave this March to President Is-
lam Karimov of Uzbekistan clearly demonstrated this
new indulgence towards allied dictators.3
This is a challenge for all the democratic countries which
have in recent years spoken in favour of press freedom
and supported independent journalists who were being
harassed by authoritarian regimes. There is a danger that
the fight against terrorism may relegate press freedom
to the background, when actually it is one of our best
bulwarks against violence and hatred. The international
community, observed Ann Cooper, Executive Direc-
tor of the Committee to Protect Journalists, must con-
tinue to make it costly for those countries that do im-
prison journalists. But there are signs that the political
cost has declined somewhat since the war on terror was
declared; the crackdowns that left 11 in prison in Eritrea
and 17 in Nepal, for example, were carried out swiftly
and with little international outcry. 4
Access to Information
In the United States itself, this change of attitude has led
to a questioning of traditional principles concerning in-
formation, and in particular of the right to know.5
Thus a number of individual American states, the De-
partments of Transport and Energy, and federal agen-
cies including the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the national archives administration, have
(sometimes temporarily) withdrawn information from
their sites which they judged too sensitive, such as the
location of power stations or measures for the preven-
tion of industrial accidents in chemical factories. Moreo-
ver, in October, the United States Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, sent a circular to federal agencies requiring them
to exercise extreme caution in their handling of requests
made under the Freedom of Information Act.6
Nevertheless, it has been on the battlefields of Afghani-
stan that press restrictions have most got in the way of
journalists work. The rules for war reporting laid down
by the Pentagon have never been so strict, exclaimed
the respected Columbia University Journalism Review.7 On
28 September, on the eve of its Afghanistan campaign,
the Pentagon set out the guidelines for coverage of mili-
tary operations before the bureau chiefs of the Wash-
ington press corps. As during the Gulf War, the United
States Department of Defense announced that it would
be taking it upon itself to organize pools of journalists
authorized to accompany the operations, and that the
journalists copy would be purged of any information
regarded as sensitive. The Pentagon spokesperson also
gave a warning that the kind of operation envisaged for
Afghanistan, the use of special forces, would necessarily
complicate news gathering, not least by making it harder
for war correspondents to accompany United States
forces.
To boilerplate its arrangements, the Pentagon also
bought the exclusive rights to images from the Ikonos
satellite turned on Afghanistan. One of the purposes
was to prevent the major media companies from spy-
ing on its military operations. The information made
public at Donald Rumsfelds briefings at the Pentagon,
or Ari Fleischers at the White House, was likewise de-
signed with a view to keeping everything under control.
Contradictions, obfuscating formulations and correc-
tions made only under duress have given the feeling that
the information was strongly filtered when not down-
right distorted, was Le Mondes comment.8 As a result,
the initial phases of the war in Afghanistan were con-
ducted with next to no published pictures, except from
the territories controlled by the Northern Alliance. Kept
away by the United States army, the press was also gen-
erally shut out from the zones under Taliban control.
Only a few journalists were authorized to cross the
Talibans lines (heavily escorted) to observe the collat-
eral damage (civilian losses) attributed to the American
bombing.
The Internet
Presented as a favourite instrument of terrorism, the
Internet found itself a particular target of the anti-ter-
rorist campaigners. The United States security services
were authorized to use Carnivore (a surveillance system
installed on the main computers of United States-based
ISPs) without requiring a warrant.9 The Libration re-
ported: The FBI will from now on be able to connect
this snooping-machine to an ISPs network and vacuum
up all of an Internet users e-mails and every trace of
Web surfing.10 In a report published in October 2001,
Reporters Sans Frontires said the FBI had demanded,
and got, from those in charge of Hotmail, every detail
of any account whose e-mail address included the word
Allah. All the major ISPs, RSF went on, would ap- launched by the United States, have been marked, in a
pear to have followed Hotmails example and be fully
collaborating with the United States security services.11
RSF also noted (January 2002) that the FBI had got hold
of an application known as Magic Lantern that could be
remotely operated to communicate to the authorities the
whole contents of a target computer.
Some United States corporations have taken measures
on their own initiative which, in the name of security,
effectively limit freedom of expression and the free flow
of information. For instance, Anonymizer.com will not
now take subscribers from countries suspected of har-
bouring terrorists.12 The Electronic Frontier Foundation
has been keeping a list of sites closed by ISPs on United
States Government instructions (such as iraradio.com),
and of sites that have been closed in part, or cleansed,
by their owners, either because they contained informa-
tion regarded as sensitive (an example is the website of
the Project on Government Secrecy, run by the Federa-
tion of American Scientists), or because they published
articles too hostile to the United States President at a 53
time of appeals to national unity (for example, the Barbra
11 September: Consequences on Press Freedom
Streisand site and that of Planned Parenthood).13
There is also a real danger that technologies for
encryption of electronic transmission of information
may be outlawed. Such a ban might appear sensible as
part of the fight against terrorism, but the danger is that
it may be applied to the communications of perfectly
legitimate organizations (such as the press, or human
rights groups) which need confidentiality if they are to
carry out their mission.
What 11 September in fact did was to accelerate devel-
opments already begun by the repercussions in the United
States of the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians.
As early as 5 September, before the atrocity, 500 Internet
sites, many of them related to the Arab or Muslim worlds,
had become impossible to access after government in-
tervention in a Texan company, InfoComp.14 Many gov-
ernments, moreover, had been taking steps to curb the
Net before the atrocity. In China, more than 60 regula-
tions were issued from 1995 onwards to control Internet
content. In many Middle East countries, governments
insisted that servers must be capable of tracing surfers
and establishing the identity of sites consulted. Under
pressure from some governments, certain servers refuse
access to websites which compromise state security or
national morale. This includes sites of organizations
for the defence of human rights. In June 1999, at a par-
ticularly acute moment of the Kashmir crisis, India
banned access to the website of the Pakistani daily Dawn.
Windfall Effect
The period following 11 September, and the campaign
number of countries, by urgent reinforcement of anti-
terrorist laws, regulations and measures of implementa-
tion. The report published in March 2002 by the Coali-
tion Information Centre lists with satisfaction the meas-
ures taken by coalition member countries, but it is hard
to see which of these initiatives truly and legitimately
 contribute to the safety of citizens, and which are undue
limitations on free expression.
The nature of the regimes which have joined the coali-
tion (formally or informally), gives an initial clue. Some
authoritarian governments have indeed made good use
of the example set by the United States and reinforced
their instruments of repression, not least for justifying
and intensifying their harassment of ethnic, political or
religious minorities that can be depicted as terrorists. This
is what the French review Critique Internationale has called
the windfall effect.15 In particular, such opportunist
reactions have affected the Uighur minority in the
54
Xinjiang region of China and Muslim dissidents in
Uzbekistan. In India, the government pushed through
CHAPTER 4
an anti-terrorist bill at the end of March 2002 (the Pre-
vention of Terrorism Ordinance, POTO) which had
been described the previous October by the former
Editor of The Times of India as an encroachment on the
freedom of the press in an unprecedented manner.16
In Zimbabwe, the Information Minister, seeking to jus-
tify repression against independent journalists, referred
directly to the measures taken in the West. If the most
celebrated democracies in the world wont allow their
national interests to be tampered with, we will not allow
it, too, exclaimed Jonathan Moyo. RSF was concerned
to note (20 March 2002) that the parliament of Uganda
had adopted a new anti-terrorist law punishing with up
to 10 years imprisonment the publication of informa-
tion liable to promote terrorism. As for the regimes
which had already been waging a tough fight against Is-
lamic extremist groups, involving curtailment of free
expression, these hastened to claim their vindication, with
praise on occasion from leaders of democratic coun-
tries, as when the former Italian Foreign Minister, Renato
Ruggiero, declared: Tunisias example in the fight against
extremism and terrorism could be followed to advan-
tage within the framework of the international struggle
to deal with this scourge.17
Democracies on Edge
Certain democracies have not been slow to follow suit.
Many countries traditionally attached to the protection
of freedom of expression have also adopted measures
that threaten it or gnaw at its edges. In the United States,
hundreds of foreigners have been arrested and held in-
cognito without due process, and special military courts
have been proposed under terms which nullify freedom
of information by denying or restricting the right of the
press to know the charges against those arrested or to
attend the proceedings.
In the European Union, organizations for the defence
of freedom of expression have also become concerned
at the measures envisaged, warning particularly against
the definition of terrorism proposed by the European
Commission on 19 September, as throwing the doors
open to a dangerously vague interpretation that could
prejudice legitimate forms of freedom of opinion.18
They have also had strong reservations about the draft
treaty on computer crime which is currently before the
Council of Europe.19 In France, the Parliaments enact-
ment (October 2001) of the Everyday Security Bill was
vigorously denounced by libertarian Internet-users. The
Act embodies the principle that ISPs must retain users
connection data (their digital traces) for periods of up to
a year, and restricts the use of encryption, which is re-
garded as the only effective means of ensuring the con-
fidentiality of Internet communications.20
The Australian Government had already raised the hack-
les of associations for the defence of refugees rights by
using the terrorist menace to justify incarcerating Af-
ghan refugees. Journalists, too, have felt targeted by gov-
ernment measures. The alarm was sounded by Fred
Hilmer, Chairman of the major press group Fairfax, in a
speech at Sydney University, accusing the Howard Gov-
ernment of being a growing threat to freedom of the
press with its changes to legislation and its refusal to
allow access to the refugee detention camps.21 This sen-
ior media figure took particular issue with the amend-
ment to the criminal law on espionage and similar of-
fences, which prescribes criminal penalties for divulg-
ing, or receiving, official information. If it makes it a
crime to reveal or receive any information without au-
thorization, Fred Hilmer observed, then this law, by
restricting coverage of the doings of government, di-
rectly hinders and prevents the public discussion of cur-
rent issues, and strikes right at the heart of the work of
a free press in a democracy. In Canada, the introduc-
tion of a Prevention of Terrorism Bill (C-36) in the fed-
eral Parliament has aroused vigorous resentment among
journalists. Though its most dangerous provisions have
been abandoned, Canadian Journalists for Free Expres-
sion pointed out (26 February, 2002) that it still con-
tained clauses that were death to certain freedoms, re-
stricting access to information, aggravating the expo-
sure to criminal charges of journalists who published
(even non-confidential) information which the Govern-
ment regarded as damaging, and threatening to
criminalize some forms of peaceful expression.22
Some governments, however, have not thought it nec-
essary to legislate or amend their legislation on the press,
either because they decided they should keep a sense
of proportion or because they already had a sufficient
legislative arsenal to deal with the terrorist threat. The
Belgian group of the Interparliamentary Union declared
(6 February 2002) that no draft or Bill with any possible
impact on the media (including the Internet) had been
laid before, debated in or adopted by the Belgian Parlia-
ment following 11 September, 2001. Similar reports came
in from Cyprus, Albania, Ireland, Latvia, Malawi, Nor-
way, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Spain, Japan, United
Arab Emirates, Korea, Solomon Islands, Ecuador, Cape
Verde, Guinea, and Hungary.
Bombardment
A bomb can be as effective in censorship as a decree or
a blue pencil. The war in Afghanistan has renewed seri-
ous issues concerning combatants right to target the
media. Although the bombardment of Serbian Radio
and Television during the Kosovo war had been strenu-
ously condemned by most organizations for the defence
of free expression, the story was the same in Afghani-
stan, with the destruction of the Kabul office of Al-
Jezeera accused of being used by the terrorist Al-Qaeda
network. Fernando Castello,23 former Director of the
agency EFE and international President of RSF (Re-
porters Sans Frontires), wrote The United States has
made Afghan journalists into military targets, with their
selective bombing of radio and television facilities (in-
cluding the premises of the Qatar television station Al-
Jezeera and of press buildings in Kabul and other towns,
just as NATO previously did in Kosovo. The Israeli
army followed this example in December and January,
when it bombarded the premises of Voice of Palestine
and destroyed the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation
building. Ann Cooper of the CPJ has issued a timely
reminder that international humanitarian law prohibits
deliberate attacks on civilian facilities unless they are used
for military purposes.
There is a more general, and very disturbing, tendency
for the armed forces of countries which claim to be
concerned with defending press freedom to target jour-
nalists without hesitation, as demonstrated by incidents
in Afghanistan24 and, above all, in the Palestinian territo-
ries occupied by the Israeli army.
Propaganda
Propaganda is another form of censorship. Muddying
information streams, putting obstacles in the way of the
long march towards the truth, has been in the thick of
every conflict, and the war against terrorism could be no
exception. The United States set up a highly official ap-
paratus for overall communication between Washing-
ton, London and Islamabad so as to exercise the great-
est possible control in a particularly multifaceted
transnational media environment. The New York Times
revealed, however (19 February 2002), that after 11 Sep-
tember, the Pentagon had, much more secretly and with
the advice of a private PR agency, created a Bureau of
Strategic Influence for the purpose of planting (true or
false) information favourable to United States interests
in the international press. Although this Bureau was abol-
ished after indignant protests (from the media and from
American Government officials), the affair shows that
the work of journalists in time of war crosses some dan-
gerous minefields. Such propaganda pollutes journalism,
and therefore constitutes a real restriction on freedom
of expression by making it hard to get at the truth. It is
all the more pernicious in that it allows rumours to start
and to spread. The memory of how past wars have been
manipulated (Kosovo or the Gulf), fosters this atmos-
phere of doubt in which the daftest theories can thrive,
such as the one denying that there had ever been an
attack on the Pentagon, or the one accusing CNN of 55
recycling video footage from the Gulf War.
11 September: Consequences on Press Freedom
Patriotism
In periods of crisis and great insecurity, governments
find in patriotism a weighty argument for demanding
prudence, or even a conniving silence, on the part of the
media. This is a natural and widespread phenomenon.
A study made at the end of 2001 on the way the French
press had handled terrorist atrocities in France (the RER
outrage, the assassination of Claude Erignac, Prfet of
Corsica) concluded: it seems the media find it impossi-
ble to say anything about terrorism that is truly inde-
pendent of the dominant patterns of interpretation laid
down by the political authorities.25 This reaction is par-
ticularly strong in the first days following any outrage.
At such times, the press takes on a role going beyond its
mission to inform, providing psychological therapy for
public opinion in its state of shock.
But the appeal to patriotism may be utterly perverted, as
in the case of Zimbabwe, where the authorities used the
fight against terrorism as a pretext for muzzling the in-
dependent press. In the United States, the Government,
approved by a majority of public opinion, required jour-
nalists to choose their side and not undermine the
effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. Pointing to
the example of Zimbabwe, where a pro-government
journalist had proclaimed negativity is not news, Joseph
Lelyveld, former CEO of The New York Times, mused:
I find this a particularly opportune example, at a time
when the idea that negative news is no news is gaining
ground in the United States. Our Government has or-
dered us not to print or publish Bin Ladens crazy ha-
rangues for fear his medieval vision justifying the massa-
cre of innocent civilians may stir up new supporters. It
has promulgated a system of military tribunals which,
according to the Vice-President, would have the power
to try and even to execute some of these people [for-
eigners under arrest Ed.] without any provision for
recourse to the constitutionally established courts, still
less any access for journalists.26
 Self-censorship
In most societies, whether democratic or authoritarian,
self-censorship is still the rulers most effective weapon.
The fear of displeasing majority opinion, of rubbing
the public up the wrong way, has influenced many in the
media where coverage of the fight against terrorism and
the war in Afghanistan is concerned. The profit motive
that dominates their world further intensifies the temp-
tation to conform.
This self-censorship has taken two forms: the privati-
56 zation of censorship, where the management of an
organ has set limits to the freedom of its journalists, and
CHAPTER 4
the internalizing of censorship where journalists them-
selves consciously or unconsciously restrict their own
free will, and stick as closely as possible to the official
line or the feelings of public opinion. Some instances:
the Washington Posts media critic, Howard Kurtz, revealed
on 30 October that Walter Isaacson, President of CNN,
had circulated an internal memo suggesting the editorial
staff should balance their coverage of American
bombing in Afghanistan by recalling the atrocity of 11
September and its civilian victims. Two journalists were
fired, one from the Texas City Sun and the other from
the Daily Courier, for criticizing President Bush. Such di-
rect measures have, however, been exceptional. Another
writer has even suffered for an excess of martial zeal.
Ann Coulter had her column withdrawn from National
Review Online after she had written that the United States
ought to invade [the terrorists] countries, kill their bosses
and convert them to Christianity.
The fact that the second Intifada is going on at the same
time, and the connections that have inevitably been es-
tablished between the troubles in the Middle East and
the terrorist attacks, have considerably added to the pres-
sure on journalists, both in democracies where editors
have been lobbied by pro-Israelis and pro-Palestinians,
and in the authoritarian countries of that region, where
governments have taken every opportunity to exercise
tighter control of their media, here requiring activism,
and there applying the muzzle.
Nuances
The extent of government restrictions and the amount
of media self-censorship are not things that should be
exaggerated or caricatured. Media professionals cour-
age and sense of vocation have not in every instance
caved in before patriotic intimidation or police intru-
siveness. In the country directly targeted by the atrocity,
the serious press very quickly re-established the neces-
sary distance for critical appraisal of the steps taken by
the United States Government, in particular those, such
as the military courts or the incarceration of foreigners
without due process, which involved restrictions on press
access to courts and hearings. Journalists associations,
likewise, have been very quick to protest against the rules
imposed by the Pentagon for the battlefields of Afghani-
stan. On 13 October 2001 a score of professional or-
ganizations, including the well-respected Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists, published a joint communiqu
maintaining that increasing restrictions by the United
States Government that limit news gathering pose
dangers to American democracy and prevent citizens
from obtaining the information they need.
The previous day, The New York Times had published an
editorial clearly setting out the rights and duties of the
press and criticizing the White Houses request to the
television networks to censor Bin Ladens messages. All
Americans understand that, in wartime, certain infor-
mation must be protected The security of American
troops and the confidentiality of the means of espio-
nage must not be compromised by the sudden publica-
tion of sensitive and classified information much
other information, however, which the government
would prefer to suppress in order to avoid debate, be-
longs in the public domain. This principle is at the heart
of the American system of government. And it is in the
interest of the Administration to respect it; for a de-
mocracy, if it is to build and sustain a consensus in war-
time, needs an informed citizenry.
A Test for Journalism
This war against terrorism is a test for journalism; a
test of its claim to guarantee free, accurate and plural
information-gathering which allows citizens to choose
and helps those who govern to avoid mistakes; and a
test, also, of its capacity to demonstrate that human rights
in general and freedom of the press in particular are the
most effective weapons in the fight against terrorism
and for the protection of our societies.
We should always mistrust appearances; whatever the
revisionist historians of wartime journalism may assert
to the contrary, freedom of the press and freedom of
expression are an advantage, not a handicap, in emer-
gencies. Lies and self-censorship, as the history of the
Vietnam and Algerian wars have eloquently proved, are
most often poor counsellors, and contribute to the na-
tional disasters they claim to prevent. Indeed, as with a
ships captain, a democracys press freedom ought not
to be judged when the sea is calm, but right in the mid-
dle of the storm, when the familiar guides to navigation
disappear and panic is setting in.
The responsibility of American journalists, particularly,
is at stake. We know, says the Committee to Protect
Journalists,27 that we are going through periods of ex-
traordinary peril, and that there are responsible people
who can find heavyweight arguments for the measures
that have been taken. But let us go back to the funda-
mental subject of the journalists duty. It is our duty to
try to find out what is really going on, and to take our
publication and information decisions in complete in-
dependence, asserting that to publish and inform is our
raison dtre in a free society. It is our duty to provide the
means of revealing what has been improperly held back
in the name of national security.
References
1 plan: legislative measures in justice and home affairs policy, Statewatch, London.
11
RSF, Entre tentation patriotique et autocensure : les mdias amricains
dans la tourment de laprs-11 septembre [Temptations of patriotism and
self-censorship: the American media in turmoil after 11 September], Octo-
ber 2001, Paris.
12
International Herald Tribune, summary by the European Journalism
Centre, 3 April 2002.
13
See www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/
antiterrorism_chill.html.
14
WHITAKER, B.Muslim websites targeted by Justice, The
Guardian, No. 568, September 20-26, 2001.
15
BAYART, J.F.; HIBOU, B.; KHIARI, S., 2002. Effets daubaine, Les
rgimes autoritaires librs des conditionnalits [Its an ill wind :
authoritarian regimes freed from constraints], Critique Internationale,
Presses des Sciences Po, CERI, Paris, January, pp. 7-11.
16
Tehelka.com, Anti-terrorism ordinance: muzzling the media, New Delhi, 29
October 2001.
17
Quoted in Critique Internationale, op. cit., p.7.
18
Human Rights Watch, European Union: Security Proposals Threaten Human 57
Rights, 6 November 2001. See also Brian Hayes, EU anti-terrorism action

11 September: Consequences on Press Freedom

BAYART, J.F. ; HIBOU, B. and KHIARI, S. 2002. Aprs le 11 septembre,
Effets daubaine [After 11 September, Windfall Effects], Critique
19
See Index on Censorship, Bug them all and let Echelon sort them out,
Internationale, January, p.11. 8 November 2001.
2
Is the Human Rignts Era Ending ?, The New York Times, 5 February
20
NOULHAT, L. 2002. La Toile alternative en ordre de bataille [The
2002. alternative Web in battle order], Libration, 29 January.
3
DIEHL, J. 2002. U.S. again supports unsavoury dictators, The Washing-
21
CRABB, A. 2002. Media chief takes aim at Howard, The Age, 28
ton Post, published in the International Herald Tribune, 20 March. February.
4
See Attacks on the Press in 2001, Introduction, p.xii.
22
CJFE, Not a Balancing Act, Security and Free Expression, a submission to
the draft NGO Human Rights Consultations, 26 February 2002.
5
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Homefront Confiden- 23
CASTELLO, F. 2001. Depredadores de la libertad de prensa
tial, How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Publics Right to [Robbers of Press Freedom], El Pais, 23 November.
Know, Washington, March 2002. 24
Un envoy special du Washington Post en Afghanistan mis en joue par
6
See www.ombwatch.org des soldats amricains [A Washington Post special correspondent in
7
HICKEY, N. Access Denied, Columbia Journalism Review, January 2002. Afghanistan targeted by American soldiers], RSF, 12 February 2002.
8
JARREAU, P. Relations entre le Pentagone et la presse se dgradent
25
GARCIN-MARROU, I. 2001. Ter rorisme, Mdias et Dmocratie
[Relations worsen between the Pentagon and the press], Le Monde, 10 No- [Terrorism, Media and Democracy], Presses Universitaires de Lyon,
vember 2001, p. 6. Collection Passerelles, p. 135.
9
GRVISSE, B. 2001, Guerres et Faits [Wars and Facts], Mdiatiques,
26
CPJ, International Press Freedom Awards 2001, Joseph Lelyvelds
Acceptance Remarks, 6 December 2001.
Autumn, p. 6. 27
CPJ, as above.
10
LATRIVE, F. 2001. La Toile en libert trs surveille [The Web: free-
dom under very close surveillance], Libration, 2 November.
58
 Ten Years of Living Dangerously
Brothers
Within a month in 2001, eight prominent reporters were killed in Afghanistan. With
With each conflict, the price paid by press correspondents is getting heavier. After respect
has been paid to the victims for their courage, people are asking increasingly urgent
No questions. Have the countries, the international organisations, the media and the
editors themselves put in place all the possible means to limit the risks incurred by
war correspondents? Can reporters be efficiently prepared, and by whom, to face
Arms the dangers?

In the past 10 years, 243 journalists have been killed in conflict zones. Forty-six
journalists died on the battlefield in the Balkan wars alone, 14 in Sierra Leone, 12 in
Chechnya, and 10 in Afghanistan. Last year, 10 journalists died in Colombia. 70 per
CHAPTER 5 59
cent of these reporters were deliberately assaulted or gunned down after they had
been identified as media personnel. The rest of them fell victims of shelling, mine
explosions or other acts of war.

To us, at RSF, this continuing and expanding bloodshed is simply unbearable. Being
a war reporter involves a great deal of risk, including the one of not coming home.
We are all aware of this and so are the journalists who accept such an assignment.
But there may be ways to create better working conditions and a greater risk aware-
ness to lessen the suffering of war correspondents and their families.

Let us have a look at some of the dangers reporters face in conflict zones and the
new threats to media personnel that have recently emerged. We will then try to
identify how journalists themselves and editors might act to prevent, or at least sig-
nificantly reduce, the risks of becoming part of the collateral damage figures.

Wrong Place, Wrong Time

On the battlefield or in any trouble zone, let us remember that we have neither
friends nor enemies, not even the right to be respected, ordinarily the right of a
referee. For most of the actors in a conflict, reporters, be they local journalists or
foreign correspondents, simply should not be there, let alone witness whatever vio-
lent actions they might be willing to perpetrate. This has been expressed relentlessly
by military officers, rarely on primetime TV, but often during private conversations
on the field.

Most of us will agree it is not our duty to take sides or be judgemental. At least
general ethics says so. On the other hand, a lack of financial resources and means of
communication or transport, often lead journalists to use the logistics of the
belligerents, NGOs, international organisations or other actors on the ground. This
increases the risk of being caught in the crossfire or not being able to leave a place
when danger is approaching.

Let me give you a very good example. On 18 March 2002, my colleague Olivier
Philippe Latour
Weber, a Special Envoy for Le Point and one of the best French specialists of Af-
ghanistan, decided to hit the road instead of flying from Kabul to Islamabad, be-
South East Asia cause the UN-chartered flight was outrageously expensive, US $ 1,200 for a roundtrip.
Representative for Reporters Despite the fact that he had received recent threats over a book he had just published
Sans Frontires (RSF) about Afghanistan, he hired a Toyota taxi and left for Torkham, the border-town
with Pakistan, with three Afghan men also on board. When travelling through the
Kabul gorges, where four journalists were killed back in November 2001, his car was
attacked several times by Afghan gunmen. Thanks to his driver, who chose to speed
up and escape the attackers banging on his car with their AK47s, Olivier is still alive
today. More than 10 journalists were attacked on this road during that period, many
 of them for the same reason. They could not afford to
pay for the flight.
Before going further, I wish to emphasize that I am not
only talking about western journalists. Of course, much
publicity is concentrated around the misadventures of
western correspondents in areas of conflict. We all have
in mind the plight of three French TV journalists who
were kept hostages for weeks on Jolo Island by the Abu
Sayaf guerrilla group. But who knows about the two
Philippine journalists who were kidnapped along with
them? Three out of four journalists killed in conflict
zones are locals and more and more journalists from the
60 developing world are sent to conflict zones. For instance,
Philippine and Thai journalists were sent to Afghani-
CHAPTER 5
stan last year and some were attacked. So, when looking
at solutions to improve the safety of reporters working
in trouble areas, we must bear in mind these facts.
In a war situation, overconfidence, a lack of experience,
and misplaced trust in assistants or intermediaries are
often the reasons that lead a journalist to be in the wrong
place at the wrong time. The attractive idea of being the
first to know and scoop the pool sometimes induces
reckless behaviour. I remember myself going up to the
frontline between government forces and the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia in 1994, driving alone on a motor-
bike in poor condition, on a muddy path between two
fields which could well have been minefields, hearing,
with an undisguised pleasure, shelling ahead in the moun-
tains. My only thought was for the good story I could
send to Le Point in Paris on my first assignment for such
a prestigious magazine. Only months later did I realise
how foolish I had been. In that case, I must acknowl-
edge that the editor in Paris had never asked me to risk
my life. Nonetheless, it is our duty, it seems, to be as
close as possible to the action and the limit between the
necessity to see for ourselves and the will to stay alive is
always difficult to assess. This dilemma is a fact of eve-
ryday life for most journalists living dangerously and we
should salute their courage. Competition and strict dead-
lines imposed by desk editors only add to the pressure.
But battlefields or guerrilla zones are no longer the only
places where journalists might directly or indirectly suf-
fer the consequences of an armed conflict.
Terrorists, by this I mean people who wish to inspire
terror, can strike anywhere. They can kidnap journalists,
like Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, bomb media buildings like
a radio station in Mindanao, southern Philippines, in 2000.
Terrorists can also directly target journalists who do not
please them. In such a context, both the army and the
terrorist group they are fighting can both be a threat to
journalists. In May last year, Philippine radio announcer
Candelario Cayona was gunned down by unidentified
gunmen after he had received a death threat from a
spokesman of the Abu Sayyaf guerrilla group. But some
reports also suggest the army, unhappy about Cayonas
reports, might have played a role in the killing. In Nepal,
after a State of Emergency was declared on 26 Novem-
ber last year, security forces arrested more than 100 jour-
nalists to gather information about their contacts with
Maoist rebels. At least 27 reporters and media contribu-
tors are still being detained. Worse still, at least three
journalists have been tortured by security forces while in
custody.
Impunity for those who attack journalists, whether they
are terrorists, militias or military personnel, is a factor
which increases the threat to journalists at work. In Is-
rael and Palestine, an Italian photographer was killed and
nearly 40 journalists injured since September 2000. For
some of them, it was not a mistake. They were shot by
Israeli soldiers although they were far from any Palestin-
ian protesters. Investigations led by the Israeli govern-
ment on these incidents were biased and superficial and
very few soldiers were actually sanctioned for their acts.
This leads to a climate of impunity where a soldier knows
that he has nothing to fear if he chooses to shoot the
messenger.
Unfortunately, preventing terror attacks is almost im-
possible and, within the media, nothing but an increased
awareness from those at risk can diminish the casualty
figures. Journalists and editors could accept to stoop to
toning down and self-censoring themselves, but this
unacceptable solution would mean that the enemies of
press freedom would have won the battle.
Reporters: a Little Company for
a Greater Safety
Do you know the Afghan Explorer? It is the media
equivalent of a drone plane, a robot recently invented by
the MITs Media Lab. This remote-controlled device on
wheels could go and shoot videos of a battle at close
range and even conduct interviews. It might be a solu-
tion for journalists eager to cover danger areas without
risking their lives. But I am afraid the Afghan Explorer,
like satellite transmission devices a decade ago, will not
be available to the average journalist for a number of
years. In the meantime, how can reporters improve their
own safety?
In war zones or danger areas, journalists must first learn
to share information with their colleagues and editors.
By consulting each other, they can assess and reduce the
risks of an unstable situation. Many young journalists,
often without a firm assignment, choose to cover wars
or guerrilla zones to make a name for themselves and be
noticed by editors. More experienced journalists have a
duty to assist their younger colleagues and help them
out when they find themselves in a difficult situation.
Experience, it is often said, is the best shield against risks.
Building pools, as I have experienced myself, does not
necessarily lead to carbon-copy reports. Each newspa-
per, radio or TV uses its own different formats, has a
different audience and above all, each reporter has a dif-
ferent perception of the situation and a different mind.
Those who choose to go it alone should think twice
about the dangers lying ahead and the advantages of
having a little company.
Talking about company, it is also essential for reporters
to take special care when hiring local fixing agents,
guides or interpreters, since journalists, especially if it is
their first stay in the area, rely totally on their assistants
for the knowledge of the country, its culture and cus-
toms, and the hazards of the conflict at hand. Working
with a local journalist or stringer is also a valuable op-
tion.
As for those journalists who enjoy wearing camouflage
clothes or other military outfits or find them fashion-
able, I would like to repeat the words of Ronald Koven
of the World Press Freedom Committee, who recently
participated in an RSF discussion about the safety of
journalists. Mr. Koven said: Journalists must under no
circumstances wear camouflage uniforms, in whole or
in part, or wear a suit that could be construed as a uni-
form. This is first to avoid being a target. It is also be-
cause, in case of capture, they could be considered as
combatants or spies, and would not benefit from the
protection of the Geneva conventions.
As far as security gear is concerned, reporters should be
reminded that helmets could be painted in non-military
colours and bullet-proof jackets also exist in different
colours.
Finally, journalists should not bow to any demand from
their editors, who, far from the realities on the ground,
might sometimes have unrealistic expectations. War re-
porters should made their voices heard and claim the
right to say no and the right to withdraw if they can not
stand the pressure or the fear anymore.
This leads us to the issue of the editors responsibilities.
Editors: To Protect and Let Live
A widely accepted if not always respected principle is
the free will of media workers. Editors should respect
the decision of a journalist who refuses an assignment
to cover a war situation or expresses the will to with-
draw. They should favour a frank dialogue with report-
ers on the ground and refrain from exerting any kind of
pressure on them to take additional risks. In short, we
believe that the human factor should prevail over hot
news.
As I mentioned earlier, experience provides the best
possible protection against the hazards of reporting in a
hostile environment. How do you tell the direction and
the distance of shelling or explosions, the kind of am-
munition used and how could you know it is coming
closer to you if you have never experienced such a situ-
ation before? How far can you go when asking an armed
patrol access to a prohibited area?
61
A sense of danger can only be acquired after a number
Brothers With No Arms
of assignments and editors should be aware of this when
sending a reporter to a conflict zone for the first time.
They should make sure that he or she will be accompa-
nied by a more experienced colleague, from their own
staff or from another media organisation. A security
debriefing should be systematic when the reporters re-
turn. Access to psychological counselling should also be
available to those who feel the need for support after
returning from dangerous areas or having witnessed
shocking events.
Experience can partly be acquired through training ses-
sions provided by the media themselves or national and
international bodies. At the BBC and Reuters, for in-
stance, reporters and local correspondents must undergo
compulsory risk-awareness training. In France, such
workshops were created in collaboration with the French
army during the war in Bosnia. The aim was essentially
to sensitise the reporters to the specific aspects of a thea-
tre of military operations: the various weapons used,
how to identify anti-personal mines and explosives, how
to protect oneself and which mistakes to avoid. Editors
should inform staff and freelancers of any special train-
ing available to them and make every possible effort to
finance their participation. We encourage governments
and international organisations to consider setting up
formal and permanent facilities and provide human re-
sources for such training sessions.
Editors also have a responsibility to provide and ensure
the maintenance of the security gear I have already men-
tioned, helmets and bullet-proof jackets among others.
Reliable communication equipment, including locator
beacons, although expensive, add a very important level
of security to the lives of journalists in danger zones.
First-aid kits and survival equipment including, for in-
stance, a filter to purify water, would complete the pack-
age every reporter should carry on the ground.
Finally, editors and media owners must ensure that staff
dispatched to conflict areas have an appropriate insur-
 ance policy. This avoids adding expensive medical care
or repatriation costs to the grief and pain of the fami-
lies. It may seem obvious to you but unfortunately it is
not always the case even for the largest media compa-
nies. Our colleague Maria Grazia Cutuli, a reporter for
the Corriere della Serra who was killed in Afghanistan
last year, was not insured. Some may argue that such
insurance policies are much too expensive. Our insur-
ance experts suggest that a collective contract covering
the whole editorial staff offers the best formula, amount-
ing to less than half a per cent of journalists salaries.
The thorniest issue regards freelance reporters. They
often work for a number of different media organisa-
62 tions for a flat rate income which does not include any
additional social benefits. Some have suggested the es-
CHAPTER 5
Organisations which helped to draft the Charter include
the French Foreign and Defence ministries, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, the Council of Eu-
rope, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, UNESCO, the World Press Freedom Commit-
tee and the IPS Bellini-Gutenberg insurance group.
Although no war zone is absolutely safe, the Charter
makes a number of useful proposals in the form of
eight principles. These are a commitment by the media,
public authorities and journalists to systematically seek
ways to assess and reduce the risks involved, not forcing
journalists to cover wars against their will, using only
experienced journalists, providing adequate preparation,
equipment and insurance, offering post-mission psycho-

tablishment of a professional fund which would be dedi- logical counselling if requested, and giving journalists
cated to providing assistance to those journalists with a international legal protection.
particular status. As you will probably agree, this could
only be worked out on a country-by-country basis. That
is why we are asking national media organisations to
engage in discussions in order to establish new protec-
tive mechanisms for independent journalists.

A Charter for the better

All the principles I have just mentioned have been gath-

ered following a number of discussions initiated by RSF
between war correspondents, editors, media owners,
government officials and representatives of international
organisations. We have put them together into a Charter
for the Safety of Journalists Working in War Zones or Dangerous
Areas. This Charter is aimed at averting, or at least re-
ducing, the risks that war reporters run in the course of
their work.
 Charter
for the Safety of Journalists Working
in War Zones or Dangerous Areas
The safety of journalists working on dangerous assignments is not always guaranteed, even if international law
provides adequate protection on paper, because warring parties these days are showing less and less respect for that
law. News-gatherers cannot get assurances from belligerents that they will be fully protected. Because of the risks
they run to keep the public informed, media workers, journalists and their assistants (whether permanent staff or
freelance) working in war zones or dangerous areas are entitled to basic protection, compensation and guarantees
from their employers, though protection must never be taken to mean supervision by local military and governmen-
tal authorities. Media management also have their own responsibility to make every effort to prevent and reduce the
risks involved. The following eight principles shall apply:
63
Principle 1 - Commitment Principle 5 - Equipment

Brothers With No Arms

The media, public authorities and journalists themselves
shall systematically seek ways to assess and reduce the
risks in war zones or dangerous areas by consulting each
other and exchanging all useful information. Risks to be
taken by staff or freelance journalists, their assistants,
local employees and support personnel require adequate
preparation, information, insurance and equipment.
Principle 2 - Free will
Covering wars involves an acceptance by media workers
of the risks attached and also a personal commitment
which means they go on a strictly voluntary basis. Be-
cause of the risks, they should have the right to refuse
such assignments without explanation and without there
being any finding of unprofessionnal conduct. In the
field, the assignment can be terminated at the request of
the reporter or the editors after each side has consulted
the other and taken into account their mutual responsi-
bilities. Editors should be aware of exerting any kind of
pressure on special correspondents to take additional
risks.
Principle 3 - Experience
War reporting requires special skills and experience, so
editors should choose staff or freelances who are ma-
ture and used to crisis situations. Journalists covering a
war for the first time should not be sent there alone, but
be accompanied by a more experienced reporter. Team-
work in the field should be encouraged. Editors should
systematically debrief staff when they return so as to
learn from their experiences.
Editors should provide special correspondents working
in dangerous areas with reliable safety equipment (bul-
let-proof jackets, helmets and, if possible, armoured
vehicles), communication equipment (locator beacons)
and survival and first-aid kits.
Principle 6 - Insurance
Journalists and their assistants working in war zones or
dangerous areas should have insurance to cover illness,
repatriation, disability and loss of life. Media manage-
ment should take all necessary steps to provide this be-
fore sending or employing personnal on dangerous as-
signments. They should strictly comply with all applica-
ble professional conventions and agreements.
Principle 7 - Psychological counselling
Media management should ensure that journalists and
their assistants who so desire have access to psychologi-
cal counselling after returning from dangerous areas or
reporting on shocking events.
Principle 8 - Legal protection
Journalists on dangerous assignments are considered ci-
vilians under Article 79 of Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions, provided they do not do anything
or behave in any way that might compromise this status,
such as directly helping a war, bearing arms or spying.
Any deliberate attack on a journalist that causes death or
serious physical injury is a major breach of this Protocol
and deemed a war crime.

Principle 4 - Preparation
Regular training in how to cope in war zones or danger-
ous areas will help reduce the risk to journalists. Editors
should inform staff and freelances of any special train-
ing offered by nationally or internationally qualified bod-
ies and give them access to it. All journalists called upon
to work in a hostile environment should have first-aid
training. Every accredited journalism school should fa-
miliarise its students with these issues.
64
 Definition of Terrorism
I. General
Remarks There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism or indeed of terrorist. One
definition of terrorism comes from the U.S. Department of Defense: the calcu-
on lated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political,
Terrorism religious or ideological. Other definitions of terrorism require that the violence be
directed at innocent parties; the terrorist not be a nation state; and the act of terror-
and ism should be very public or symbolic so as to use media coverage to maximize fear.

Media International organizations seek to ensure that their definitions of terrorism ex-
clude authorised governmental action taken against its citizens whether or not such
actions cause terror amongst the same group. Terrorists have generally concluded
CHAPTER 6: 65
that elections are an ineffectual technique for changing government policy and so
General Overview
apply pressure through violence to achieve political change. If terrorists achieve
their ends then their description may become elevated to that of freedom fighter.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The Russian Revolution, the French Revolu-
tion, the Chinese Revolution were all started by groups of citizens deciding to change
government policy through the pressure of violence. The Boston Tea Party of 1773
could be described as a terrorist act, the slave rebellions of the 1800s in the Carib-
bean might then qualify as terrorism. But today these events would be looked at in
quite another light.

The Red Army Faction (the Baader-Meinhof gang) killed 31 persons, carried out 25
bombings and generally terrorised Western Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The
objectives of this gang was to target American imperialism. The Red Brigades of
Italy were inspired by communist ideals and fought to encourage a workers revolu-
tion. The 30-year prolonged struggle in Northern Ireland has produced another
classic example of how religious differences fanned by border realignments, affect-
ing a relatively small number of people and in a minute geographical area, can con-
tinue to create a caldron of violent incidents over an extended period. This situation
is replicated by the current violence of the Israel-Palestine conflicts that have pro-
duced HAMAS, the PLO, as well as the often-excessive response of the Israelis.
From the days of the Crusades, it has been difficult to build rational solutions in
long-standing conflicts between adversaries who both believe they are beneficiaries
of their Gods endorsement.

Terrorists Need the Media

Oliver F. Clarke
Managing Director,
The Gleaner, Kingston, Jamaica,
Chairperson, Jury for the 2002
UNESCO/Guillermo Cano
World Press Freedom Prize
Terrorist acts are designed to create fear amongst the many. A terrorist act, which is
unreported, may be supremely violent but will cause no widespread fear and so be
regarded as a failure by the terrorist group. So the terrorist must create an incident
that will demand media coverage. Attacking Olympic athletes in 1972; blowing up
TWA Flight 800; kidnapping the American NATO Commando; blowing up the
World Trade Center; killing journalists in Colombia, Mexico, or Spain (ETA); blow-
ing up American diplomatic missions; the activities of Abu Sayyaf; dispensing bio-
logically lethal gases on subway transport systems are all actions which compel world-
wide media coverage.
So the terrorist needs the media. The media have to report incidents of public
interest and importance especially when the terrorist act is unique, unexpected, and
politically effective. The bombing of the World Trade Center was such an event.
America had never been attacked by a foreign force on its domestic territory since
the British during the American Independence. For Americans the concept of do-
mestic security was destroyed by the bombing of the World Trade Center.
 The act of terrorism then creates a path of its own. The
attacked seeks to demonize and isolate the attacker in
the public mind. This allows the constituents of the
terroree to rally behind its leaders and support measures
that in normal times would be regarded as severe and
unacceptably restrictive of civil rights.
One terrorist act may produce many months of media
coverage. The terrorist act is covered. Then the often
extended hostage negotiations. The public response to
these actions takes a long time to play out. The continu-
ous action of terrorists can lead to severe reductions of
civil liberties, liberties that have been built up over many
66 years. The media are obliged to cover the ensuing de-
bate of the conflict between security priorities, personal
CHAPTER 6: General Overview
freedoms and privacy concerns. Frequently the media
get pressured not to report on such issues. The U.S.
media, for example, were asked not to run tapes of
Osama Bin Laden sitting in front of an Afghan cave.
Al-Jazeera in Qatar was pressured not to run its exclusive
interviews with the terrorists.
Domestic terrorism is now thought to be fought best by
intelligence and surveillance. The German response to
the Baader-Meinhof gang was to increase wire-tapping,
ban membership of predetermined terrorist groups,
encourage plea-bargaining to facilitate terrorist inform-
ants, mobilise special anti-terrorist police squads and
authorize anonymous court evidence. In Colombia, it
has been necessary to allow the anonymity of judges.
Arising from the recent terrorist actions on domestic
United States soil, the U.S. fight against terrorism has
been extended beyond trying to eliminate the terrorists
themselves to seeking to punish those states that allow
terrorists residence. The Axis of Evil appears to in-
clude the seven states named by America as sponsoring
terrorism, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan
and Syria. This Axis is a new development in the fight
against terrorism and is one that has caused concern
within the U.S. coalition.
Terrorists need the media to spread the fear that the
terrorist wishes to create. But at the same time terrorists
generally stand for intolerance and do not support open-
ness. Terrorists fear new ideas, new religions and they
see the modern world as a threat, not an opportunity. It
is the role of the media to create a more open world.
The terrorist who manipulates the media in the short
run will come to be fearful of the media as they seek to
better inform the public about the narrowness of ter-
rorist ambition.
 The upsurge of rebel organizations that practice terrorism, meaning, in my view, the
II. Fairness violent intimidation of civilian populations, was probably inevitable after the Cold
War. The major powers who were the main actors of the Cold War had a great
is the interest in keeping conflicts within manageable limits that would not escalate into
all-out international warfare. So they clientalized those involved in local conflicts,
Best and they worked hard to circumscribe the actions of those client states or groups so
that their violence would serve superpower interests, confining regional wars or
uprisings to reasonable proportions.
Defense
The end of the superpower confrontation seemed at first to mean that there were
no longer the same reasons for the great powers to work so hard to contain regional
conflicts. Clearly, this analysis was behind the Bush Administrations initial reluc-
tance to involve itself in regional disputes. 11 September, 2001 changed all that.
CHAPTER 6: 67
General Overview But the unleashing of local actors in conflicts below the threshold of world war
creates new challenges for press coverage and new dangers for the journalists in-
volved. We have spoken here largely as if dangers come almost exclusively from
non-state actors that are commonly considered to be terrorists. This neglects the
ugly fact that the greatest danger to journalists in recent years has come from gov-
ernments and that that is likely to continue to be the case.

Governments are quick to accuse journalists of irresponsibility. But there is no

reasonable comparison between any conceivable journalistic irresponsibility and
the scale and effect of governmental irresponsibility. I refer not only to Nazi Ger-
many or Stalinist Russia. Think of Serbia, of post-Communist Russia in Chechnya,
of Iraq gassing Kurdish villages, of Syria wiping out virtually the whole population
of one of its own cities, of Pol Pots massacre in Cambodia, of the famines pro-
voked by the Ethiopian government, of the northern governments war against the
southern Sudan, and so forth.

Those examples were all forms of terrorism. And they share a common character-
istic. Contrary to the assertions we have heard so often here that terrorism needs
publicity and seeks a kind of involuntary objective complicity from the press, each
of those examples was being publicly denied by its perpetrators. They tried very
hard to hide their terrorist acts, and the press had to dig very hard to uncover them.
So, the largest-scale, generally most murderous forms of terrorism thrive on se-
crecy, not on publicity. The distinction, of course, is between state sponsors of
terrorism and non-state actors. But even guerrillas who carry out what the late 19th
Century Anarchists called propaganda by the deed, generally meaning assassina-
tions, are often in fact secretly manipulated by state actors who seek to hide their
hand which the press must try to uncover.

In the future, as in the past, the dangerous job of journalists will also include reveal-
ing things that states try to hide. The presence of free, independent journalists is
often a guarantee against state-sponsored terrorism. That is one reason why states
jail so many journalists in countries like Turkey, China and Ethiopia. Those journal-
Ronald Koven ists were defying the classic philosophical notion that if a tree fell in the forest and
nobody heard it, it must have made no detectable noise. Journalists go into the
European Representative,
forest to see fallen trees, and they deduce that there was indeed noise. One form of
World Press Freedom Committee
noise we have trouble hearing is the demands of disaffected groups whose voices
are stifled by undemocratic governments. At least some of todays terrorist groups
come from frustration over making their voices heard democratically.

And the too-often successful efforts of governments to stifle such voices may ex-
plain the very genuine astonishment of the American public after 11 September.
The question Why do they hate us? was a very sincere one based on simply not
 knowing that there were radically disaffected groups out
there whose demands had been muffled by governments
and to which a responsible press had not paid enough
attention. What is going on in the southern Philippines
is hard for outsiders to understand. It is a special case.
But every violent situation in every country is a special
case that needs a lot of explaining. Discouraging the press
from talking about it poses a real danger, to the press
itself, to the national society, and to the international
community. We should not make laws of responsible
behavior on the basis of special cases. Let us remember
the legal dictum, hard cases make bad law.
68 Just confining the press to factual reporting, as we have
heard suggested here as a solution, does not work either.
CHAPTER 6: General Overview
The trouble for the press generally comes when one of
the parties to a conflict, and it is usually a government,
forces or cajoles us to lean too far in its own direction.
The other party or parties then perceive the press as an
adversary, ripe for targeting. The best defense for the
press is for us to stick to our principles of fair coverage,
and not to let anyone assign to us any other roles, mis-
sions, or obligations, no matter how high-sounding they
may be in the name of peace, harmony, conflict resolu-
tion, development or the like. We journalists must resist
all attempts, both by our friends and adversaries, to en-
list us to their causes, either openly or covertly. Our best
defense (in addition to common-sense safety procedures)
is to try tell it like it is.

In the United States, the Hutchins Commission on the

press back in 1947 concluded that a major trouble with
the U.S. press of the day was that it did not tell the
truth about the facts. In other words, it did not give
enough analysis and context to its reporting. The quality
press all over the world has improved a great deal since
then. Any governmentally-inspired effort to put the clock
back endangers everyones understanding and, therefore,
their security. Ultimately, the best security for the press
is general public recognition that we try to be as fair as
possible in our reporting. If publics and governments,
and, indeed, rebel groups, feel that, then we can gener-
ally do our job. The actors, the parties to conflicts, might
not always like our reporting, but if they are forced to
respect it, our safety will be enhanced.
 PART II 69

Media and Terrorism: Case S

Terrorism: tudies
Studies
70
 CASE STUDY I
Case Studies
11 September: Consequences for Freedom of Information
in Africa in South Africa
Raymond Louw,
Editor and Publisher of Southern Africa Report
and
Mr Jean-Paul Marthoz has already described how there has been a tightening up of
Arab the channels of official communication in the United States, for example, how there
are restrictions on the media covering the war in Afghanistan and so on, and the
misguided attempt by the Americans to introduce a mechanism for falsifying the
States news, providing disinformation, as a means of combating terrorism. We in South
Africa are experiencing variations of such official conduct, in some cases not so
CHAPTER 7: blatant, but with echoes, nevertheless, of the American scene. The high degree of 71
openness that characterised South African society after its accession to democratic
governance has been slowly eroding as the new rulers have realised how difficult it
is to govern, especially after the kind of autocratic government we had endured
before, and how embarrassing disclosures in the media of incompetence and mal-
administration can be.

But this increasing reticence has been accelerated since 11 September and with it, no
doubt inspired by the misguided American suggestion about managing and falsify-
ing information, has been a much more blatant disregard for the facts, a facile ap-
proach to truth by simply denying what had been said even when it was recorded on
TV or tape, or in certain instances lying. We all know that politicians are frequently
economical with the truth but in South Africa some politicians have reduced it to
budget zero proportions.

However, let me briefly sketch one aspect of the scene in South Africa against
which one discusses the topic. That is crime and security. South Africa has a high
crime rate which is accentuated by its viciousness and the ease with which robbers
and others murder sometimes for no gain at all. And this is interlaced with low level
terror campaigns with bombs and sometimes drive-by shootings. For some years
the police appeared to be losing the battle but now appear to be stabilising the
situation. But this is the climate in which administrative repression breeds rapidly.
This is reflected by proposals for legislation by the politicians, arbitrary actions fre-
quently with strong-arm methods by the security authorities and the police.

When people are living behind electric fences, setting electronic burglar alarms at
night and have dogs in their gardens and armed response security companies
patrolling their suburbs, it is very difficult to impress on them the values of freedom
of expression and freedom of the media. And it is even less so with a government
still grappling to shed its bush war liberation struggle authoritarianism and heavily
influenced by the concerns of the security forces.

So, in this environment repressive legislation such as a Terrorism Bill and an Inter-
ception and Monitoring Law have a ready genesis. It may seem strange that just
eight years after our present rulers were expressing outrage at the draconian laws
used by the previous apartheid government to control their insurgency, they should
now be intent on introducing similar restrictive laws, all in the name, of course, of
defending democracy.

The Terrorism Bill contains such dreadful mechanisms as detention without trial
which, of course, can be used to seriously inhibit peoples freedom of expression.
There are other provisions which are restrictive but let me leave it there because the
law is with our Law Commissioners, who review controversial legislation before it is
 submitted to parliament and who have decreed that por-
tions of this legislation contravenes the Constitution. I
understand it is now in a redrafting process and we should
wait to see what occurs. However, there is also the Inter-
ception and Monitoring Bill which appears to have been
influenced by similar instruments being forged in coun-
tries such as Britain, for example. The aims of the Bill
are pretty explicit:
1. To regulate the interception and monitoring of
certain communications (mostly on the Internet, but
nowdays that can apply to almost anybody who writes).
72 2. To provide for the monitoring of communications
in the case of a serious offence or if security or other
CHAPTER 7: Africa and Arab States
compelling national interests are threatened.
3. To provide for the interception of postal articles
and communications.
4. To prohibit the provision of certain telecommuni-
cation services which cannot be monitored.
5. To regulate authorised telecommunications moni-
toring.
There is also a provision for call-related information
to be provided by the service provider to the authorities.
That includes the name of the user, the destination and
duration of the communication. And the service pro-
vider has to spend the money required to buy the equip-
ment to provide this information. Phone bugging is
normally authorised by a judge but in certain circum-
stances a police officer of police assistant commissioner
rank or a major in the military can do this.
Well, these laws were making laborious progress through
the usual processing channels when 11 September oc-
curred. That hardened public opinion against terrorism
and gave the ministries involved a huge boost and the
process was speeded up. It is indeed fortunate that we
have an instrument to keep the government in line, the
Constitution and the Constitutional Court, but the other
Bill appears not to have been caught in this safety net
despite vigilance also being exercised by vociferous civil
society organisations such as the Freedom of Expres-
sion Institute, and others.
It appears that invasions of privacy do not evoke as pow-
erful a deterrent as imprisonment without trial. Maybe
the medias insistence on privacy, particularly of political
and other civil society leaders, not being sacrosanct may
have something to do with this. There is certainly little
opposition to the Bill among the general public. 11 Sep-
tember and the arrival of similar legislation overseas
appear to be having an effect and the legislation is likely
to go through. However, to give a practical example of
how security paranoia has pervaded government, or
should I say, the Presidency, let me tell you about the
attempts to set up a Presidential Press Corps, ostensibly
modelled on the American example.
In America, journalists apply to join the White House
Press corps, some 1,600 have, and they fill in a question-
naire which is not too probing and then receive their
accreditation. Sometimes, it is suspected that the secu-
rity services investigate the reporter but they do not ques-
tion him further. In South Africa, however, it is differ-
ent. After the questionnaire, National Intelligence agents
have questioned journalists about their sex lives, if mar-
ried whether they have indulged in extra marital sex, and
whether they have had homosexual relationships. Then
whether they have been treated by a psychiatrist, whether
they have been jailed. They must also provide copies of
their bank statements and be prepared to undergo a lie
detectors test, a polygraph test.
There has been uproar over this but despite being told
that the American system, which I believe is similar to
that in other Western countries, does not involve any of
these procedures, the questioning will continue but with-
out the sex questions and the polygraph test.
The government has been quite unabashed over being
caught lying in saying that it based its procedures on the
U.S. system. It also lied over the sex questions, a minister
saying that they were never part of the procedure and
ascribing it to over-zealousness by an agent and then a
senior departmental official describing the questions as
an essential part of the procedure, which illustrates what
I said earlier.
But finally, despite 11 September, there was one victory.
For some years the prosecuting authorities have been
using every legal means, and some illegal, to try to get
journalists who were present at the spectacular murder
of a gang leader in 1996 in Cape Town to supply their
video tapes or pictures or to give evidence in the case
against the alleged murderers, all members of Pagad (Peo-
ple Against Gangsterism and Drugs, a vicious vigilante
group which was suspected of turning into gangsters
themselves). They had subpoenaed a photographer to
tell what he saw and he refused on grounds that his
Constitutional media freedom rights were being breached
and because he had been threatened with death on more
than one occasion. But at the last minute the police with-
drew the summons. Fifty policemen who witnessed the
killing refused to give evidence. We regarded that as a
victory for the media.
But let me leave you with another controversy that is
developing, the national interest versus the public in-
terest. The government wants journalists to pursue the
national interest and forgets that many opposition pa-
pers during the apartheid era did exactly the opposite. If
they had pursued the national interest they would have
propagated apartheid; instead they pursued the public
interest by opposing the dreadful policy.
CASE STUDY II
Terrorism and Media in Zimbabwe
Geoffrey Nyarota,
Editor-in-Chief of The Daily News,
Zimbabwe
As the government of the United States and its allies
intensified their crackdown on terrorism in the after-
math of the 11 September attacks, the government of
Zimbabwe waged a war of its own on terrorism. The
targets of this onslaught by the authorities in Harare
were, however, terrorists of a totally different nature.
The terrorists referred to in rather incongruous terms
by the regime of Mr Robert Mugabe were the journal-
ists working for the countrys small, but increasingly vi-
brant and popular, privately owned, independent press.
Also listed by government among the ranks of Zimba-
bwes special breed of terrorists were members, espe-
cially the leadership, of the major opposition political
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
The partys leader, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, lost an elec-
tion in March 2002 to President Mugabe in a poll that
was embroiled in controversy and allegedly fraught with
irregularities. Mr Mugabe has openly been accused of
winning through fraudulent means.
More than 100 supporters of the MDC were killed by
militants and agents of the ruling Zanu PF party and
government. Scores were arrested. The MDC was ac-
cused in the run-up to the presidential election 2002 and
its members were locked up by the government of Mr
Mugabe on murder and terrorism charges following the
death of activists of the ruling Zanu PF party. Also to
bear the brunt of the governments so-called onslaught
on terrorism were members of the small white com-
mercial farming community who, since 2000, have been
the victims of a vicious land expropriation and redistri-
bution programme which has left more than 12 people
dead, with many more displaced or arrested on various
spurious charges. While no journalist has paid the su-
preme sacrifice yet, death threats have been issued and
journalists on each of Zimbabwes three weekly and one
daily privately owned newspapers have been arrested.
Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, one of Mugabes
top aides, accused the countrys small population of 4000
white commercial farmes of colluding with journalists
to commit what he described as economic terrorism.
Moyo made this accusation when an elderly farmer and
20 of his workers were arrested and hauled before the
courts on accusations that during clashes with support-
ers of the ruling party who raided his farm, John Bibby,
the farmer, caused the death of two of the invaders.
Taking up the cudgel on behalf of government, The
Chronicle, a pro-government daily newspaper, stated in
an editorial comment that the ongoing foreign-spon-
sored political thuggery that has raised its ugly head
should not be allowed to go unchecked. We would like
to urge the government to use the state security machin-
ery to deal with these acts of terrorism before they get
out of hand.
As if in direct response, President Mugabe soon after
his re-election in March signed the controversial and 73
draconian Access to Information and Protection of Pri-
Case Studies in Africa and Arab States
vacy Bill, which seeks to silence Zimbabwean journalists
through licensing, through the prosecution and handing
down of stiff penalties on those whose writings are
deemed to be disruptive, the barring of foreign journal-
ists from working in the country and the prevention of
foreigners from having a stake in any Zimbabwe media
organisation.
The government will use the law to bring to book MDC
terrorists and their media supporters without fear or fa-
vour, enthused Moyo in The Sunday Mail, another gov-
ernment-owned newspaper. No terrorist or terrorist
sponsor will find comfort in Zimbabwe. The use of the
media, whether local or international, will not suffice as
a cover for terrorism.
Despite the ministers assertions that the government
will apply the new law without fear or favour, evidence
abounds to the contrary. Since it became law in March
2002, Zimbabwes Access to Information and Protec-
tion of Privacy Bill has been selectively used to haunt
journalists working for the countrys independent press.
They were obviously the prime target of the new legisla-
tion, anyway.
I now hold the dubious distinction of being the first
Zimbabwean journalist ever to taste the wrath of gov-
ernment under the provisions of this repressive and
obnoxious legislation, which is aimed at gagging the qual-
ity of information reaching the public of Zimbabwe. I
was arrested on 15 April, 2002 and charged with violat-
ing the Access to Information Act. My arrest followed
the publication in The Daily News which stated that there
was a discrepancy between the figures of election re-
sults broadcast live by Zimbabwes Registrar General and
the actual figures.
The basis of the story was a tape containing the live
recording. Also arrested were Iden Wtherell, the Editor
of the privately-owned weekly, The Zimbabwe Independent
and his chief reporter, Dumisani Muleya. The two were
 detained following publication in their paper of a story
linking the First Lady of Zimbabwe, Mrs. Grace Mugabe,
to a labour dispute between a white-owned company
and an employee alleged to be her brother.
For journalists arrested by the government of Zimba-
bwe what is usually more painful than the arrest itself is
the wholesale condemnation, normally unwarranted, by
the state-owned media. The Daily News story was de-
scribed as a preposterous and deliberate falsehood con-
sistent with many previous claims made by theBritish
sponsored paperbehind the disinformation campaign
on behalf of the MDC. The Daily News is not British
74 sponsored.
CHAPTER 7: Africa and Arab States
The international media watchdog Reporters Sans
Frontires (RSF) was not spared the wrath or the sharp
tongue of the government of Zimbabwe on this occa-
sion. Information Minister Moyo launched a scathing
and vitriolic attack on RSF, which he accused of pro-
moting lawlessness in Zimbabwe. RSF had written to
Moyo expressing concern over the arrest of the three
journalists. Moyo described the appeal as nothing but a
shameless partisan voice for imperial Europe deserving
of the greatest contempt.
If the strict definition of terrorism is applied, it is obvi-
ous that the journalists of Zimbabwe are not, in any
way, engaged in terrorist activity as alleged by the gov-
ernment. It would be nearer the truth to suggest that it
is the independent journalists of Zimbabwe, along with
the commercial farming community and the leadership
of the major opposition party, who have become the
victims of state-sponsored acts of terrorism during Zim-
babwes descent into the state of lawlessness and anar-
chy which has prevailed in the country since the run-up
to the parliamentary elections, held in June 2000.
During that period The Daily News experienced a bomb
attack on its offices in April 2000; a bomb attack on its
printing press in January 2001 which completely ruined
the newspapers printing press; the arrest and other har-
assment on numerous occasions of its journalists and
newspaper vendors; two death-threats against me; the
seizure and destruction of thousands of copies of the
newspaper; and the banning of the paper in certain ar-
eas, especially the rural areas, which are the stronghold
of the ruling party.
Through their tireless effort to provide information to
the public, the media of Zimbabwe could, in a way, be
guilty of promoting acts of terrorism in the country,
especially pertaining to the illegal invasion of white-
owned commercial farming land by the so-called war
veterans. Critics, some of them within the media, argue
that if the media had not provided wide publicity to the
farm invaders, who became instant celebrities, especially
in ruling party circles and among certain landless peas-
ants in the rural areas, land invasions might not have
become as prevalent as is the case now, with rather dev-
astating consequences for food security and the general
economy of Zimbabwe.
As the war vets, some of them too young to have
made any meaningful contribution to Zimbabwes war
of liberation from colonialism, marched onto the com-
mercial farms to evict the farmers, invaded private sec-
tor companies, some of which immediately closed and
stormed into the chambers of Supreme Court judges
seeking to evict them, hordes of local and foreign jour-
nalists were in attendance. The perpetrators of these
outrages then watched themselves being paraded as he-
roes on state-sponsored television. They saw their pic-
tures, AKs held aloft, gracing the front pages of the
newspapers. This fawning adoration and adulation by
the state media of young men who, with impunity tanta-
mount to state protection, went about committing acts
of lawlessness and wreaking general havoc, must have
served as an incentive to further acts of terrorism. But
then this concern must be addressed in the context of
the need by Zimbabwes media, especially the private
press, to inform the public on all matters of interest and
relevance to them.
CASE STUDY III
Aftermath of 11 September:
An Arab Perspective
Nedal Mansour
Editor-in-Chief, Al-Hadath,
President of the Center for Defending the Freedom of
Journalists, Amman, Jordan
I would like to start by saying that I would have pre-
ferred that this event could have been held in an Arab
country so that you would be able to closely view how
the public there interprets the word terrorism after its
repeated use everywhere after 11 September, 2001. I hope
you will excuse me for speaking to you in Arabic. It is
the language that best expresses how deeply frustrated
we are in the Arab world that our language and the color
of our skins have become enough to draw suspicion
and accusations of terrorism. I hope that the Arabic
language will be considered as an official language in
such Conferences as this in order to achieve The Dia-
logue of Civilizations.
I am standing here as an Arab. The scarf around my
neck is the one which people defending themselves and
their land usually wear and it is not the same one that so-
called terrorists wear. To speak frankly, let us stop beat-
ing around the bush and stop ignoring the American
whip above our backs driving us, and the entire world,
to its own destination and according to its sole vision.
We should begin by asking the following questions. What
is terrorism? and Who is a terrorist? Again, before at-
tempting to answer those questions, let me remind you
that, as an Arab, I am against bloodshed. I believe in life,
not death and destruction. So, what is terrorism? Is re-
sisting occupation terrorism? Is throwing a stone at
armed tank terrorism? Is asking and demanding safety,
independence and liberty terrorism? Is rejecting injus-
tice and tyranny terrorism? And, most importantly, is
state terrorism also not terrorism?
What we, in the Arab world, feel is going wrong relates
to the obscure blurring of concepts as well as double
standards when dealing with us. Do you think that there
will be a day when Arab people will be willing to con-
demn martyrdom attacks? If you think that this will hap-
pen before the end of the Israeli occupation and the
withdrawal from Palestinian lands and the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state, then it is unreal to
think so. Also, if you think that Arab media will refer to
those martyrdom attacks as terrorist attacks, then that is
unreal too. It is important to know that it is impossible
to call on Arab people and Arab media to take no sides
in this conflict. It has become even more impossible
after Sharons massacre in Jenin refugee camp on the
West Bank.
We should carefully look at the scene and not become
selective. You should keep an eye on the Israeli media
and even some so-called prestigious American media or-
ganizations when they cover the conflict. They consider
the assassination of Palestinian leaders as being preven-
tive operations. They consider that throwing a stone at a
tank is violence by both parties. And they justify massive
killings of Palestinians as attempts to destroy terrorists.
Once again, the real problem is of a conceptual nature,
and as long as we do not agree, then debate and argu-
ment will go on and on and will be in turn transmitted to
the media which remain the voice of the nature of con-
flict within society. In the same context, Arab govern-
ments as well as the media have condemned what hap-
pened on 11 September, while many think-tanks and
political figures have publicly condemned the killing of
innocent civilians in the United States in those attacks.
But the public in the Arab world has always experienced
bitterness and frustration over U.S. policies and posi-
tions, and in a way there was some hope that those events
would possibly make the U.S. rethink its policies and use
its powers to deeply search for the roots and causes of
terrorism.
Moreover, months after the 11 September attacks, the
media in the Arab world focused on many issues that
produces or have produced terrorism including the fol-
lowing: occupation. Absence of economic development,
and the spread of poverty, unemployment and hunger.
Absence of standards of rights and justice.
But what happened was that no attention was paid to
those reminders, when the U.S. administration and its
allies announced the war on terrorism. That consequently
led to the killing of a large number of innocent people
which was justified as the search for terrorists. During
this campaign against terrorism, many countries in the
world seized it as an opportunity to restrict the media
and the press. This set us back years after it became clear
that the campaign against terrorism was also a war on 75
freedom of the press and expression, as well as on indi-
Case Studies in Africa and Arab States
vidual liberties.
For instance, in my country Jordan, the government saw
an opportunity in the campaign against terrorism to en-
act a new Penal Code legislation that severely punishes
the press. According to Article 150 of that Penal Code,
terrorism and the media were linked. Using that law, the
government is now capable of ordering accused jour-
nalists to appear before State Security Courts. For the
first time those courts have the legal right to close down
newspapers temporarily or even permanently.
We should be aware that the billions of dollars that have
been spent on the war against terrorism could have been
spent on sustainable development and eradicating the
roots of violence and hatred. This is a task that Cruise
missiles are not able to do. Whats more, we should also
take care that the media and the press are not the first to
pay the price for this war with their liberty and freedom.
As for covering terrorism, the Afghani experience is
worth studying. While the U.S. administration was capa-
ble of rallying its own media, and, indeed the Western
media in general, to its side throughout this campaign,
developments in the field of communications meant that
the U.S. was incapable of holding on to the advantage.
This is where the Al-Jazeera satellite channel made its
presence felt and even beat CNN. It was also interesting
to see those accused of terrorism, Al-Qaeda, inventing
new media tools that enabled them to communicate their
views through the use of recorded video tapes of Bin
Laden which were sent to Al-Jazeera.
It is also true that press coverage of hot spots in the
world puts those who work for media organizations in a
dangerous position. This has been the case regarding
the atrocities and brutality Israeli troops and Israeli au-
thorities carried out against journalists and cameramen
when preventing them access to the Jenin refugee camp
in the first days after the event so that they could not
cover the Israeli war crimes that took place there. The
 been spent on the war against terrorism could have been
spent on sustainable development and eradicating the
roots of violence and hatred. This is a task that Cruise
missiles are not able to do. Whats more, we should also
take care that the media and the press are not the first to
pay the price for this war with their liberty and freedom.
As for covering terrorism, the Afghani experience is
worth studying. While the U.S. administration was capa-
ble of rallying its own media, and, indeed the Western
media in general, to its side throughout this campaign,
developments in the field of communications meant that
the U.S. was incapable of holding on to the advantage.
76 This is where the Al-Jazeera satellite channel made its
presence felt and even beat CNN. It was also interesting
CHAPTER 7: Africa and Arab States
to see those accused of terrorism, Al-Qaeda, inventing
new media tools that enabled them to communicate their
views through the use of recorded video tapes of Bin
Laden which were sent to Al-Jazeera.
The media, in the overall process, should not only ex-
amine the surface of the terrorism issue, but they should
also look more deeply into the issue. The media should
be looking into what this is really all about and whether
it belongs to a religion or even a language. The media
should also think twice before firing accusations, and it
might also take some time to answer why young men
and women prefer to die rather than to live. It is prob-
ably a message that the world should know about. Could
it be that death and life have the same meaning when all
windows of hope are closed?
There is a line for Ibrahim Nassarallah, a Jordanian poet
portraying feelings of a commando that has chosen to
die. The line says:
I do not like Death But it is the stairs that I am going
to take up to LIFE.
 CASE STUDIES I
Case Studies I. Terrorism and Journalists in Afghanistan
Faheem Dashty,
in Asia Chief Editor, Kabul Weekly,
Kabul, Afghanistan
and Terrorism and journalism have nothing in common, but journalists and the princi-
ples they stand for are often terrorisms targets. Terrorism has always threatened
the Pacific defenders of freedom and opponents of tyranny in Afghanistan. In September
2001, Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghan National Re-
sistance, first against the communists and then the architects of global terror, was
killed by two Arab terrorists posing as journalists.
CHAPTER 8: I spent nine days with these men in a house in Khawaja Bahawodin in north-east 77
Asia and the Pacific Afghanistan. Yet right up to the moment that the suicide bombers detonated their
hidden explosives, killing Commander Massoud and injuring me, neither I nor any-
one else imagined that they were anybody else other than who they said they were.
None of us had any idea that they were using the freedoms of the journalist to
strike as terrorists.

But we must not forget that journalists have a decisive part to play in the future of
Afghanistan. This is the reason I have continued to work in journalism. I can
continue to work towards Massouds objectives of national unity, democracy and
human rights for all, especially for women, to defy the terrorists threats and defend
the integrity of the nation. I have done this despite my experiences and the psycho-
logical shock of witnessing the murder of my leader. And even though my injuries
from that day made it difficult for me to work, this is why I began the process of re-
launching the long banned Kabul Weekly newspaper last year with the cooperation
of friends from Paris.

The Kabul Weekly was first published between 1993 and 1996 during some terrible
years of war in and around the city, yet it was widely distributed across the country
and often abroad. It was eventually banned by the government in 1996 after it
published controversial articles about the Afghan embassy in New Delhi. The paper
finally returned to the streets in early January 2002, produced by some of the staff
of the old weekly together with new journalists with new visions. Last Thursday we
published the 13th issue of the new paper, printing 4,000 copies, carrying reports in
Afghanistans two national languages and two international ones.

The Kabul Weekly was the first independent newspaper to emerge after the fall of
the Taliban. Since then we have been joined by many more. According to the records
of the Ministry of Information and Culture, there are now 87 independent publica-
tions in the country. Without doubt, if we want to move forward as a peoples
government, we need freedom of the press. But in Afghanistan today the inde-
pendent press faces the following problems: a lack of professionally experienced
journalists, which is why there are no great publications in Afghanistan as yet; a lack
of equipment; and a lack of funds and of guarantees of economic independence.

In normal situations an independent publication can pay its way through sales of
advertising and copies of its editions. But 23 years of war has taken away much of
its readership. Fewer people can read these days, and of those who can, few can
afford to buy a newspaper. Papers have to be sold cheaply and produced on low
revenues. One useful source of income for a paper in the developed world is its Jobs
Vacant pages. Yet though there are job vacancies in Afghanistan, there are not enough
of them and most of them pay too little to justify the cost of an advertisement. Still,
independent, professional, properly equipped and economically independent media
 are strongly needed in Afghanistan. Terrorisms roots
run deeper in Afghanistan than anywhere else. It has
not been long since its grip on our country has been
loosened. But with all I have said in mind, the possibility
always remains that it may yet return.
We need to open the windows in the peoples mind. Ter-
rorism came to Afghanistan disguised as religion, just as
I saw it once come in the disguise of journalism. Too
many of our people still cannot tell the difference be-
tween the message of religion and the message of ter-
rorism. We need to separate those messages and remove
the disguises.
78
All media organisations in Afghanistan, but especially
CHAPTER 8: Asia and Pacific
the independent press, need support. This is why we
seek the assistance of the international community. We
do not ask for a long-term financial commitment. We
believe that the independent press can become self-sus-
taining in three years. In the meantime we will remain a
front line defence against terrorism and all it seeks to
achieve and destroy.
CASE STUDIES II
Is the Safety of Journalists in Timor
Leste Guaranteed?
Hugo Fernandes,
Deputy President of Timor Lorosae Journalists Associa-
tion (TLJA), Editor-in-Chief of Talitakum Weekly,
Dili, East Timor
The history of the Timor Leste independence move-
ment over 24 years began with the death of five Austral-
ian journalists and a new Zealand journalist on 16 Octo-
ber, 1975. Roger East, an Australian journalist, was killed
on invasion day, 7 December, 1975. Kamal Bamadah,
an activist from new Zealand was killed on 12 Novem-
ber, 1991. And a number of journalists were wounded
as a result of Indonesian military violence.
When the referendum was held on 30 August, 1999, three
journalists experienced the same fate. Bedinho Guetrre,
a Radio Matebian journalist, was shot by Indonesian
police when he was covering the pro-independence cam-
paign on 25 August, 1999. Sanders Thoenes, a Dutch
journalist, was murdered by the Indonesian military on
21 September, 1999. And Agus Maulyawan, an Indone-
sian journalist who worked for the Japanese press, was
killed on 25 September, 1999 in Lospalos by the SAKA
militia. This does not include the journalists who received
threats and ill-treatment from the Indonesian military
apparatus.
The above information is the history of journalists in-
volvement and the beginning of threats to their safety in
Timor Leste. Despite victory in the referendum and two
years of UN presence in Timor Leste, the safety of jour-
nalists is still under threat. Journalists have been threat-
ened and subjected to acts of violence. The Timor
Larosae Journalists Association (TLJA) has recorded a
number of attacks, beatings, forced removals, and the
destruction of journalists offices and equipment over
the past two years.
For 24 years threats to the safety of journalists came
from the military and the Indonesian government. How-
ever, in independent Timor Leste, the threats and vio-
lence that journalists are currently experiencing come
from civilians, rather than the military or the police. Sev-
eral cases recorded by the TLJA between January 2001
and April 2002 indicate who is threatening the safety of
journalists and carrying out violent acts.
These include physical attacks and the forced removal
of reporters and cameraman from TV Timor Lorosae
when they were covering student orientation. A case is
still at the judicial stage involving the forced removal of
journalists from the National Council room resulting in
the destruction of cameras and video cameras. Threats
came from the head of the mass organization CPD-
RDTL that it would burn down the Lian Maubere Weekly
news magazine because it reported that the CPD-RDTL
was working in collaboration with the Indonesian mili-
tary. Xanana Gusmaos guard used the government of-
fice car for their own personal use. The CPD-RDTL
group attacked and broke the doors and windows of
the Radio Timor Kmanek station. A Japanese journal-
ists camera was destroyed by Serio Vieirra de Mello, a
bodyguard of the Special Representative of Secretary
General (SRSG) of the UN. Takhesi won this case in a
Dili court against the SRSG. The same journalist, Takhesi,
was put in jail for 11 days as a result of false accusations
from several of Xanana Gusmaos staff about attempts
to murder him.
Other threats have come from Armando da Silva, the
president of the Liberal Party who is now in the Legisla-
tive Assembly. Armando da Silva threatened that the
masses from FITUN, a clandestine youth organization
during the time of Indonesian occupation, would attack
the Talitakum weekly newsmagazine because this maga-
zine was reporting about the involvement of Armanda
da Silva in a number of Indonesian military operations
which resulted in the death of many FALINTIL mem-
bers in 1991.
Talitakum investigations prove that FITUN itself had
officially fired Armando da Silva from the board of this
organisation because he was working in collaborationwith
KOPASSUS, the Indonesian Special Forces. The latest
acts of violence experienced by journalists occurred at
the time of the Timor Leste presidential candidates de-
bate at the National University of Timor Leste on 12
April, 2002. A student who did not have a place in the
debating room beat a Radio Untaet journalist and ru-
ined his tape recorder.
The Reasons Behind the Threats and
Attacks on Journalists
The cases of violence and threats against journalists
mentioned above can be categorized by the origin of
the threats, namely movement leaders and their follow-
ers; bureaucrats within the new government; party lead-
ers; the leaders and members of mass organizations; and
students.
In the case of movement leader, Xanana Gusmao, the
attacks carried out by his bodyguards and followers ap-
pear to be driven by the need to protect the reputation
of a leader who was revered for 24 years. The acts car-
ried out by people close to Xanana Gusmao are gener-
ally committed without his knowledge. Excessive pro-
tection of his reputation has caused Xananas bodyguard
and followers to act irrationally. As a result, Xanana
Gusmaos reputation could falter in the eyes of local
journalists.
Threats and acts of violence from the leaders of various
mass organizations or political parties attempt to cover
up the mistakes they made throughout the 24 years of
struggle. The known followers of these leaders are the
masses who fail to understand ideologically, and these
are the people who are ready to react when political dis-
course cannot be reconciled. Journalists who reveal the
facts surrounding these leaders often receive support
from the masses who want justice. Revelations in the
media of facts about a number of new bureaucrats is
demanded by the masses who are dissatisfied with cer-
tain people because of their political affiliation with the
Indonesian era.
A number of the threats and acts of violence experi-
enced by journalists are basically due to efforts to ensure
the success of bad policies, as developed by government
bureaucrats, party leaders, mass organization leaders and
movement leaders. It is easy for these leaders to mobi-
lize the masses to support them. These leaders are very
clever at manipulating the mentality of the masses in a
post-conflict area like Timor Leste. One aspect of the
mentality of the masses, which is easily manipulated by
politicians or leaders, is revenge. This is linked to the
post-referendum mass destruction of the social and eco-
nomic landscape carried out by the militias and the In-
donesia military. However, up until now there has not
been a single journalist in Timor Leste who has died as a
result of the violence, but journalists have been threat-
ened. This does not guarantee that journalists in Timor
Leste will not become victims of violence in the near
future.
The critical post-conflict mentality of the masses is find-
ing a new identity and there has indeed been a massive
change. On the other hand, the majority of the masses
still continue to revere past leaders of the masses. The
low level of education in Timor Leste has caused a low
level of understanding about the meaning of a free press.
After looking at these cases, how can the safety of Timor
Leste journalists be guaranteed? In the Timor Leste
Constitution, there are two articles, Article 40 and Arti-
cle 41, which guarantee freedom of expression, free- 79
dom of information and press freedom. Unfortunately
Case Studies in Asia and the Pacific
these two articles are flawed. In Article 40, regarding
freedom of expression and freedom to information, the
first point clearly states that Every person has the right
to freedom of expression and the freedom to seek and
spread information. The second point goes on to state
that The exercise of these rights cant be restricted by
forms of censorship. However, point three, states that,
The exercise of these rights and freedoms are regu-
lated by law based on respect for the constitution and
individual values. Point three of this article is the big-
gest threat to those who use the right to express, pro-
vide and find information. This third point opens up
the opportunity for the government to create a press
law which will protect government policy and interests.
Article 41 specifically addresses press freedom and so-
cial communication in six points. Points 1 to 5 are ad-
equate. Point 6, however, limits the operations of radio
and television stations. It states that radio and television
stations can only operate with a license and this is based
on the law. Once again this point does not clearly state
what kind of license is needed. Do they need a license to
start up or a license to get a frequency? In addition it
does not mention which institution they can get the li-
cense from. The biggest threat comes from the phrase
based on the law.
So, what about the real conditions of the mass media
and journalists in Timor Leste? All media organizations
are still dependent on donor assistance. There is yet to
be a mass media organization, either print or broadcast,
which is financially independent. These conditions mean
that the safety of journalists which should be addressed
by publishing companies, can not be addressed. Growth
in the private sector in Timor Leste has not attracted
entrepreneurs with large sums of capital to invest their
money in the media industry. We can assess the charac-
teristics of the future government in the light of the
above two Articles of the Constitution. In the past two
years, various policies from the transitional government
have been criticized by the mass media. Still, Timor Leste
 bureaucrats say that the situation is still tolerable because
the UN and they believe that recent policies which have
been adopted are not their responsibility. As a result, if
the mass media criticize public policy, the government
responds that they will examine the situation after 20
May.
Besides the weakness in the Constitutions ability to guar-
antee the safety of journalists, another matter which could
become a threat to the safety of journalists is the bu-
reaucratic mentality of the Indonesia New Order, which
is still strong within the minds of Timor Leste bureau-
crats. Bureaucrats in Timor Leste are very protective of
80 their policies. This means that they do not want any poli-
cies to be criticised.
CHAPTER 8: Asia and Pacific
What can be done under these conditions and how can
the safety of journalists be guaranteed while they are
working? Over the past two years and possibly the next
five years the only tool which can be used for protection
is Press ID. This is the only guarantee which has been
given to journalists from publishing companies. The jour-
nalists have to avoid reporting the minority issues which
could lead them to become a majority community en-
emy (such as reporting on the returnees from Indone-
sia, reporting reconciliation issues, or even criticizing the
government policy about Muslims). They also have to
avoid writing sensational stories which are hard to un-
derstand by common people.
By looking at these conditions what can Timor Larosae
Journalists Association do? It is hoped that journalists
will adhere to the code of ethics which has been mutu-
ally agreed upon. For specific events such as the elec-
tion, the TLJA is working together with IEC to produce
a code of conduct for covering the campaign and the
election day. The TLJA can provide advocacy for jour-
nalists who are experiencing problems with other par-
ties. It can continue to campaign for freedom of press
in the framework of raising peoples awareness. It can
often implement self-censorship even though this is
sometimes in conflict with the instinct of journalists. It
can establish cordial relations with both the ruling and
opposition leaders. And the TLJA can provide more
training for journalists in terms of covering and pre-
senting the stories to the public.
CASE STUDY III
The Safety of Journalists in the Pacific
Justin Kili
Pina Radio Group, Pacific Islands
Let me begin my short presentation by just saying that
the word terrorism is not one that is readily included in
the vocabulary of ordinary Pacific Islanders as they tell
their stories round their camp-fires at night or at their
meeting houses. Pacific Island States, in the hope of
encouraging tourism after 11 September, 2001, believed
and wanted to promote the South Pacific as the Safe
Pacific. But that does not necessarily mean that journal-
ists in the Pacific are safe and free from the impacts of
terrorism and related risks to their lives.
There are strands of terrorism in the region. Pacific
Islanders call them coups detat and mutinies. Such is
the case in Fiji. They are called ethnic uprisings in the
case of Solomon Islands and Bougainville in Papua New
Guinea, or student protests, as in the University of PNG-
led bloody street protests of June 2001 in Port Moresby.
The third strand of Pacific terrorism is corruption in
the corridors of power, in the public service system and
in the high offices of business. All of these are danger-
ous for the working journalist.
South Pacific journalists have had their share of harass-
ment and threats from the perpetrators of these illegal
acts. My regional colleague from the Samoa Observer, Pub-
lisher Savea Sano Malifa, persevered and persisted in
printing the truth even though the very survival of his
newspaper and Sanos own professional career as a news-
man was strongly threatened by outside political preasure.
The Publisher of the Solomon Star and owner of PAOA
FM in Honiara, John Lamani, also suffered political har-
assment. His two media companies were threatened with
imminent closure unless he apologized and paid a hefty
sum of money as compensation to the leader who was
alledgedly defamed. This was because the Solomon Star
printed what it believed to be the truth. Both of these
publishers have between them a number of Media Free-
dom Awards from many news organizations in the world
including our own Pacific Islands News Association
(PIMA).
There are many stories about the safety, or rather the
lack of safety, of Pacific journalists. Journalists risked
their lives reporting live from military zones without pro-
tective gear during the coups and mutiny in the Fiji Is-
lands. Honiara journalists dodged bullets as they tried to
report on the ethnic clashes that brought a government
down.
I would like to concentrate on the Papua New Guinea
experience, the Bougainville Crisis, for example. This was
a landowner protest that successfully shut down the sec-
ond largest open-cut copper mine in the world,
Bougainville Copper. The perpetrators of this ethnic
uprising called themselves the Bougainville Revolution-
ary Army (BRA), who, at the height of the 10-year up-
rising, did not recognise or respect journalists of the
local media accusing them of being pro-Government
spies and working with the government forces. How-
ever, they had no problem with overseas media person-
nel who entered Bougainville from the Solomon Islands,
and interviewed them for overseas publications. Also at
this time, a turn of events further endangered the lives
of local journalists as some of them actually walked into
the jungles and up into the mountains conducting exclu-
sive interviews with rebel leaders and recording on film
rebels in their element, the jungle.
In this situation, you will understand, our journalists were
like meat in a sandwich with the BRA on one side and
government forces on the other. Danger was always
present for the journalists reporting from the jungles of
Bougainville. But as time wore on, the media found the
means to develop a unique relationship with the rebels,
on one hand, and government forces, on the other, while
reporting the viewpoints of both sides. Needless to say,
there were casualties and deaths on both sides. But we
did not lose a journalist.
There is also the meaningless but nevertheless danger-
ous assault and harassment of reporters and the destruc-
tion of their tools during protest marches or political
rallies. This is becoming synonymous with rent-a-crowd
style marches or gatherings which cause general destruc-
tion to property under the guise of the claim that those
taking part represent the silent majority. The danger to
reporters covering the one week stand-off between the
government and university students in June last year was
staring them in the face everyday. There were deaths and
casualties as a result of this protest.
Another incident of terrorism in the corridors of power
happened during a prime ministerial press conference
when a politician singled out a TV cameraman and
shouted there he is, get him, while advancing towards
our newsman. This was recorded and broadcast on na-
tional television. The incident was apparently based on
a TV report the previous day which criticized the rather
dubious financial dealings of the government of the day
and its leader did not agree with it. The politician who
openly threatened the TV newsman eventually was ap-
pointed Police Minister.
We in PNG fear that incidents of assault, harassment
and destruction of property could increase for our jour-
nalists, especially after the Media Council of Papua New
Guinea declared an all-out War Against Corruption as
the country braces itself for national elections in June.
We sought and got the support of all concerned citi-
zens, church groups, NGOs, chambers of commerce,
and various councils to carry forward the campaign which
effectively took the focus away from the media and their
workers thereby minimizing the risk of danger of what
we in PNG call payback. Journalists who are covering
the campaign trails for candidates or individual political
parties run the personal risk of being attacked or abused
by supporters of a rival candidate or party, merely for
being the one that reports the views of the other side.
The PNG Media Council is very mindful of the number
of high-powered weapons now in the hands of certain
candidates or their supporters. These were allegedly
brought into the country or stolen from armories of the
army or the police specifically for the campaign trail.
The danger in the face of duty for our journalists will be
very real in some parts of the country during the com-
ing national elections.
Another unique danger that PNG journalists risk is based
on culture and tradition. They can not write to expose
81
the wrongs and sins of a wantok, a prominent citizen
and member of their tribe. Tribal or traditional law de-
Case Studies in Asia and the Pacific
crees that they must respect their elders and must never
ever raise their voices against them for fear of repercus-
sions which could affect immediate family or relatives.
So how are we addressing this problem? The Media
Council of PNG is working closely with the Pacific Is-
lands News Association to find answers. For example,
PINA and the Media Council of PNG are running a
regional workshop in Madang on Training the Trainers
in Crisis Reporting, a program we began last year as a
result of identifying the many dangers Pacific Islands
journalists face these days. These include the experiences
of the three Fiji coups, the Solomons Ethnic Conflict
and coup, the Bougainville Secessionist war, the PNG-
Solomons border conflict, and the continuing conflict
of the West Papuan people. With the support of
UNESCO, we are also developing a handbook on peace
reporting. This gives examples of how the media in these
Pacific countries have promoted reconciliation and peace
in these conflicts and have moved another step closer to
make it a Safe Pacific for our journalists to carry out
their work.
CASE STUDY IV
Media and Terrorism in the Philippines
Melinda Quintos de Jesus
Executive Director of the Center for Media Freedom
and Responsibility (CMFR), the Philippines
The constitutional protection of freedom of expression
and press freedom adds to the complexity of the Philip-
pine experience of media and terrorism. The context of
issues also includes the activities of insurgent rebel groups
as well as the use by government, military, and police of
terror tactics against the population. However, the brev-
ity of this paper limits its focus on the analysis of media
coverage of terrorism in the Philippines.
General Background
The Philippine press has enjoyed a long tradition of au-
 tonomy from government control. Its newspapers are
noted for a freewheeling, in-your-face treatment of
news, an unrelenting criticism of government and poli-
tics, and a flamboyant editorial style. The trend toward
entertainment news highlights the commercialism of
press enterprise whether in TV, radio or print, all three
of which are dominated by the private sector. At present,
the Philippine constitution provides that no law shall
be passed that will abridge the freedom of expression
and with it the freedom of the press. Libel laws do
provide recourse for those unfairly aggrieved by the press
but the courts have construed the law liberally to favor
the press.
82
The broad arena for press activities assures that the in-
CHAPTER 8: Asia and Pacific
stitution has enduring power and influence. The press
generally enjoys public support. But the press mirrors
all the problems of society. Poverty, the culture of cor-
ruption, patronage politics and the decline of the educa-
tional system have all affected the conduct and character
of journalism. Media practice does not always assist
democratic growth. Content analysis of news coverage
reveals flaws of Philippine journalism: sensationalism,
the surrender to political and corporate patrons, and the
lack of reporting and editorial skills.
Terrorism Reviewed
Global mapping of terrorism has drawn the Philippines,
along with three other countries in Southeast Asia, as
part of a terrorist front operating in four regional capi-
tals: Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. The
network has been linked to Al-Qaeda. In 1993, investiga-
tions in Manila led to the capture of Ramzi Yousef who
is now in jail in the U.S. for his involvement in the first
bombing of the World Trade Center. In November 2001,
the arrest of two Palestinians and one Jordanian gave
more credence to the Philippines usefulness for Al-
Qaedas plans. Time Magazine reported that the three are
part of an Al-Qaeda cell which includes members of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Even more recently in
March 2002, an Indonesian terrorist suspect was arrested
in Manila who, police reported, had admitted his role in
the bombing of the citys Light Rail Transit (LRT) in
December 2000 in which 22 people were killed and hun-
dreds were wounded.
But this terrorist front is not as visible as the terrorist
scourge of the Abu Sayaf (AS), a small band of Muslim
militants who have taken to kidnapping and hostage-
taking for ransom in Southern Mindanao. The groups
connection to Al-Qaeda remains sketchy and their ideol-
ogy is vague, but their activities have constituted a greater
terror in the public mind. In the last two years, the Abu
Sayaf group, operating from bases in southern islands
of Jolo and Basilan, have raided three exclusive beach
resorts, the Sipadan in Malaysia in 2000 and Dos Palmas
and Pearl Farm in the Philippines in 2001, taking Filipi-
nos and foreigners as hostages. Past raids of the Abu
Sayaf had taken foreign and Filipino priests and nuns,
teachers and students in Basilan. One raid seized 42 peo-
ple from a ferry crossing the strait between Basilan and
Zamboanga.
A joint campaign called Balikatan 2002 was billed by
the Macapagal-Arroyo government as a response to the
threat of domestic terrorism. It joined the AFP (Armed
Forces of the Philippines) and U.S. Special Forces in
training exercises. These efforts were focused only on
capacity-building against the Abu Sayaf whose activities
have been limited to the Philippine South.
Unfettered Coverage
In most cases, few restrictions have prevented journal-
ists from covering the Abu Sayaf or any other group,
for that matter. Government did call for a news black-
out on the AS raids in 2001 but different organizations
decided their own coverage policy accordingly; with some
following government instructions and others ignoring
them. In fact, the coverage of these incidents yielded a
smaller number of reports compared to coverage in 2000.
But the public did not complain that they did not know
what was going on.
Of all the armed groups confronting government, the
press has given the most coverage to the Abu Sayaf.
During then President Joseph Estradas military offen-
sive against the dissident Moro Independent Liberation
Front (MILF) in 2000, the press gave extensive cover-
age to AS raid of the Sipadan resort in Malaysia and
their hostage-taking of 19 foreigners. The military be-
gan attacking MILF camps on 28 April and claimed vic-
tory on 16 May. In the period surveyed for analysis
(March June 2000), five major Manila dailies showed
670 reports on the AS hostages/kidnapping and 434
reports on the military/MILF, out of a total number
1633 articles on Mindanao.
Closer analysis showed media stretching the hostage story
beyond the storys actual development, playing up pic-
tures and other related aspects of the victims and rela-
tives. The MILF has been a more significant political
reality, having sustained its rebellion for longer than the
existence of Abu Sayaf. But the press did not deepen
war reporting by examining the related issues of con-
flict. Defense correspondents basically reported military
statements about the war and did not explore the story
from behind enemy lines. On the Abu Sayaf front,
journalist excursions explored the groups territory and
a number of journalists themselves were taken hostage
by their news sources. Interestingly, the arrests of for-
eign nationals suspected of having Al-Qaeda links and
maintaining its Southeast Asian front have received only
scant space in local media.
The greater news attention given to the Abu Sayaf fol-
lows traditional news values. The story had more drama
and more excitement than the largely invisible interna-
tional terrorist cells. The press exploited the victims
plight, playing up the beheading of victims or the possi-
bilities of more beheadings. In the 2000 raids, the media
gave the gangs colorful leader Commander Robot
prime space and time as he played up to the media, issu-
ing statements on radio and managing to hold media
attention even when the story lagged. The competition
for scoops was so sharp that TV correspondents com-
plained of not being allowed to return to Manila for as
long as the competing networks team remained in Jolo.
News Blackout
The coverage of the raids the following year were more
muted. In 2001, Abu Sayaf raids of Pearl Farm in Davao
on 23 May and of Dos Palmas in Palawan on 27 May
received 326 articles in all.
The publics negative feedback on the sensationalistic
treatment and media over-exposure may have been one
reason. The government also appealed to the press to
exercise restraint in the coverage and to treat tactical
military information with sensitivity, pointing out that
media exposure serves AS purposes; that certain infor-
mation could compromise search and rescue operations,
and that media could be used for disinformation. But
the president unfortunately used news blackout dur-
ing the press conference and the term provoked pro-
tests from some media sectors. Radio Mindanao Net-
works Zamboanga station continued to broadcast in-
terviews with AS spokesperson Abu Sabaya and to air
appeals from hostages for the military to back off.
Many media sources agreed that coverage was motivated
primarily by the desire to scoop the competition.
In reality, the news blackout was taken as no more
than a cautionary appeal for responsible reporting, a re-
minder that groups like the AS actually use media as part
of the array of weapons in fighting their war. After the
experience of 2000, some journalists also felt that it was
just too dangerous to get too close to the AS. The pro-
tection of journalists is a societal question. Where gov-
ernment cannot assure protection for ordinary citizens,
it is unrealistic to ask for special treatment of journalists.
There have been efforts in the past to legislate attacks
against journalist as a heinous crime and a way of de-
terring journalist killings, but the press community felt it
improper to be set aside as a special community among
their fellow citizens.
Sources
In covering terrorist incidents, the press relies on gov-
ernment sources, the military or police, local officials
and Malacanang. In the same CMFR study on Mindanao
coverage, the military dominated all other sources, in-
cluding the coverage of the military offensive against
the MILF. But the coverage gave the Abu Sayaf group
ample space with which to reveal their real nature to the
public. Nationwide, the AS has lost any public sympathy
they may have had. But people fear the AS and this has
been cited as a reason for the decline of tourism in
Mindanao. However, community support (or fear) in the
83
groups island base is still cited as a reason they can hide
so well.
Case Studies in Asia and the Pacific
Level of Awareness
Extensive as the reporting on AS has been, coverage
does not indicate a high level of journalistic awareness
of terrorism as a movement or as a tactic of war. Re-
ports did not use the term terrorist or terrorism in
describing AS and its activities. When the word appears,
it is in a quote from a military source or in an opinion
piece. The word is not used in reports on dissident groups
employing tactics such as bombing and kidnappings, or
when military uses terrorism against civilians. In cover-
ing terrorist incidents, the press reports as they do any
other crime story.
After the 11 September attacks on the World Trade
Center, the press covered the course of the war in Af-
ghanistan but it has shown little interest in international
developments after the fall of the Taliban. The re-align-
ment of global interests to fight terrorism has not be-
come a major thematic concern in the news or in com-
mentary. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was not
timid. Her critics say she was too eager to give all-out
support for the U.S. campaign to fight terrorism. But
the press has not examined the global change that oth-
ers claim is re-casting geopolitical realities.
Recommendation
The issues raised by the relationship of media to terror-
ism cannot be fully understood without some kind of
background training in the development of terrorism,
its use by marginalized and aggrieved communities, and
its application everywhere. The media must recognize
the method as a different way of making war or fighting
for a cause, which can be used by criminals, by mischief
makers, by dissidents as well as freedom fighters. With-
out such a framework of analysis, the press can not serve
its purpose, which is to shine the light of truth on what
can easily be used to confuse and to mislead.
 Journalist education can then lead to the formulation of
meaningful guidelines or guiding principles. These should
be set and adopted either at the newsroom level or in-
dustry-wide. It is important, however, that such guid-
ance emerges from within an informed news commu-
nity and arises from a broad understanding of the im-
pact of news on the course of events.
CASE STUDY V
Media in Danger:
South East Asia at a Glance
Chavarong Limpattaamapanee,
84 Acting Chairperson, South East Asian Press Alliance
South East Asia is one of the most dynamic regions in
CHAPTER 8: Asia and Pacific
the world, in terms of social, economic and political
development. The fall of Suharto in Indonesia, the
ouster of Estrada in the Philippines and political reform
in Thailand are all events which have had an impact on
demands for free expression in Malaysia and the devel-
opment of the press in Cambodia. There is also the
emerging press in the new state of East Timor. How-
ever, the media in the South East Asian region are not
completely secure, especially in more open societies such
as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, due to the
fact that media organizations are still the target of accu-
sations whenever there is political, economic and social
turmoil. The threats to media freedom in South East
Asia are not only physical in nature. They also take the
form of advertising pressure, closure of newspapers,
control through ownership and the corruption of jour-
nalists. The threats come not just from governments
but from big business, and, in Indonesia, there is the
threat of mob violence.
Threats to the Media in the Region
Indonesia
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the media in Indonesia
became free overnight. Since then, over 200 new news-
papers and magazines have opened. A new press law
was introduced in 1999. It states that the media in Indo-
nesia are completely free from legal constraints. But
Indonesia is facing a new threat from social pressure
groups. Mobs composed of Islamic militants have at-
tacked the offices of newspapers and TV stations be-
cause they were angry about their reporting. Journalists
face threats not only from the government but also from
unruly mobs.
The Philippines
The Philippines has one of the freest presses in Asia,
but it also has one of the highest casualty counts. Some
35 Philippine journalists have been killed since the res-
toration of democracy in 1986. Many Philippine jour-
nalists, especially in the provinces, face threats and har-
assment in the course of their work. Former President
Joseph Estrada tried to muzzle the press by forcing the
closure of a critical newspaper and initiating an advertis-
ing boycott of an influential daily that ran critical re-
ports about his presidency. He also used
envelopmental journalism, distributing money to en-
sure that he got good coverage.
Malaysia
The media in Malaysia are under the tight control of the
ruling party in different ways, including strong press regu-
lations and ownership control. On 3 May, 2000, an ex-
traordinary movement developed when some 1,000
Malaysian journalists, regardless of race and religion,
signed a petition to the Home Minister demanding a
change in the press law. This coincided with the advent
of alternative media in Malaysia with Malaysiakini.com
as their pioneer. Since then, various group of journalists
in the mainstream and in the alternative media have been
trying to work their way towards a freer media environ-
ment. However, there is still no sign from the govern-
ment that the journalists demands will be met. Because
most of the media in Malaysia are owned by companies
linked to the ruling coalition, the Malaysian government
has exercised media control through ownership. Earlier
this year, key journalists and editors of the Sun newspa-
per were fired, after the newspaper ran a story that dis-
pleased Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad.
Cambodia
The media in Cambodia are considered freer than their
neighbors in Laos and Vietnam. But Cambodias press
law still has a loophole allowing the government to issue
a restricted subdecree to control the press. Political in-
terference is still rampant and it is one of the problems
that makes the Cambodian press vulnerable to threats.
Thailand
Thai media are considered completely free, according to
a rating by Freedom House in 2002. But since Prime
Minister Thaksin Sinnawattra took power in early 2001
with a landslide election victory, the media have been
under pressure. After only a few months in power, the
new government started to put tight controls on the
broadcast media which are still in government hands.
Several radio and television programs that aired differ-
ent views to the governments had been withdrawn. The
new government is also accused of using advertising
power to put pressure on the print media, which are all
privately owned, to be friendly to the government. The
situation became worse when the Anti-Money Launder-
ing Agency launched an investigation into the bank trans-
actions of media people, especially those from newspa-
pers that heavily criticized the government. This was
condemned by academics, civil society and media asso-
ciations because it was clearly against the human rights
principles enshrined in the constitution. So far, the
Thaksin government has not listened to the demand of
the media profession to issue a policy guaranteeing that
no radio or television programs would be banned with-
out proper reason and without going through a certain
process of investigation.
Concluding Remarks
If we consider all the incidents referred to above as threats
to the media, we can simply say that the media in South
East Asian countries are in danger. In addition, after 11
September, some of the countries in the region have
come up with new measures and legislation to muzzle
the media and limit civil liberty. All of this is done in the
name of the campaign against terrorism.
Therefore, whenever the media are under threat, press
freedom is also under threat. When that happens, the
citizens ears, eyes and mouth will be shut, and that is the
85
end of democracy.
Case Studies in Asia and the Pacific
86
 CASE STUDY I
Case To Die for Being a Journalist in the Basque Region
Carmen Gurruchaga Basurto,
Studies Journalist, El Mundo,
Spain
in In the Basque region at present, simply being a journalist can cost you your life,
particularly if you defend freedom of expression. To explain how this situation has
Europe come about, I shall briefly review the history of ETA in terms of its relationship
with the media. In this region of Spain, this terrorist organization has existed for 40
years and, in the last 15 to 20 years, it has gradually become a totalitarian movement.
Anyone who does not think exactly like the leaders of this armed group immediately
becomes its enemy and therefore a target for attack.
CHAPTER 9: 87
Europe Journalists have not always been the targets of ETA attacks during the 40 or so years
of its existence. This was because, among other reasons, much of the Basque and
Spanish media regarded that armed organization for many years as a revolutionary
group that had fought against Francos dictatorship. In that context, the bad guys
were General Francisco Franco and his dictatorship and the good guys were ETA
and its campaign against Spains dictatorial system of government.

The problem arose when Franco died in 1975 and Spain became a parliamentary
democracy with a constitutional monarch. ETA did not accept this and carried on
killing, kidnapping and blackmailing, but with a new excuse. It acknowledged that
Franco had gone and that all prisoners belonging to its organization had been am-
nestied, but it considered that it made no difference to the Basque people (ETA
claims the word Basque for itself) what type of government there was in Spain
since no government, either democratic or fascist, would acknowledge that the Basque
people had historic rights on account of which they should be a nation independent
from Spain. In other words, the terrorist organization said that it was struggling,
now in a democratic context, to win independence for the Basque country. Some of
its long-standing activists did not support the new strategy and left. Others took the
opposite view and, on the strength of this new justification, a new ETA, much more
radical than before, emerged in 1977. However, practically no one was aware of this
situation at the time and several years elapsed before it came to be regarded as a
terrorist organization by some of the sectors of society that had supported it during
the dictatorship: the left, part of society, the Church, France and the media.

However, just in case any journalist intended to treat it as a terrorist organization, in

June 1978 an ETA unit murdered Bilbao journalist Jos Mara Portell and, two years
later, tried to kill the editor of the most important newspaper in Navarra, Jos Javier
Uranga, who was shot 10 times, but survived. In both cases, the terrorist group
issued a press release in which it justified the attacks so as to legitimize its action to
society, something which it would attempt to do throughout its existence. Legiti-
macy is vital to a terrorist organization that pursues political goals and bases its
existence on the support of society. At that time, whenever an attack occurred, a
large part of the population believed that the victim had done something to deserve
being a target of the terrorist organization. Those two selective strikes meant that
many journalists became subconsciously afraid of being murdered by ETA. That is
the reason why during the many years in which ETA did not target the media,
journalists lived in a state of respect bordering on fear of the terrorists.

Furthermore, during those early years of democracy, Spanish society, Basque soci-
ety and journalists as members of those societies could not quite believe that Spain
was just another Western democracy. They were therefore unable to call a spade a
spade and used euphemisms to write or speak about anything relating to the terror-
 ist organization. Thus, instead of using the word mur-
der they spoke of death. Nor did they call ETA mem-
bers terrorists, but referred to them as militants.
The organization itself was described as an armed or-
ganization rather than a terrorist organization. Black-
mail to obtain money from businessmen was called a
revolutionary tax, and so on. Under those circum-
stances, ETA felt that the media were serving its propa-
ganda purposes. If anyone strayed from the path and
openly criticized terrorists activities, a leader of its po-
litical wing (Herri Batasuna) would call the journalist in
question and make him see that, in his opinion, he had
gone too far on this or that news item. Or they would
88 use Egin, the publication owned by the political arm but
sold as a commercial newspaper, to criticize the journal-
CHAPTER 9: Europe
do not apply self-censorship and who dare to break these
established rules. They conduct investigative journalism
and publish what they have found out about the clan-
destine terrorist organization or about the other organi-
zations that make up the network. At first, the terrorists
used intimidation against them as described above, but
when they found that it was unsuccessful, they decided
upon a complete change of direction. ETA had already
radicalized its strategy in 1995 when it initiated what it
euphemistically described as the socialization of suf-
fering, which consisted in extending violent action to
wider and wider sectors of society. Thus, political repre-
sentatives of non-nationalist parties, university profes-
sors, judges and so on became ETA targets. The terror-
ists believe that the greater the number of people who

ist who had dared to speak out frankly. A campaign would
be launched immediately against the journalist in ques-
tion, who would be accused of being in the pay of the
Spanish Ministry of the Interior, of being a centralist
(a supporter of the Spanish state and an enemy of the
Basque country) and, furthermore, of lacking objectiv-
ity, which is the worst thing that could be said about a
journalist. It was all lies, but that did not matter because
the desired goal was achieved. Its supporters, Egin read-
ers, believed what was said about the reporter. Those
journalists who did not dare to disagree were described
as objective and good professionals as compared with
the one criticized who, in many cases, kept quiet because
he or she felt isolated. For one reason or another self-
censorship had been imposed.
The 1980s passed in this way and some journalists be-
gan to lose their fear of ETA because in none of the
documents that the security forces seized from the ter-
rorists were journalists listed among the organizations
targets. But there was a reason for that. The media were
being used to let people know about their activities, which
is the aim of terrorism. According to the most generally
accepted definitions, terrorism is the use of violence to
spread fear and to disseminate terror beyond the actual
victim to the sections of the community to which the
victim belongs or even to the whole of society. There-
fore, for a long time, ETA used the media to spread its
message of terror, although most of the information
was couched in terms that were hostile to the terrorists.
According to Schmid and de Graaf, what matters to
terrorists is not whether the information is positive or
negative, but just the amount of information. To them,
a lot of information is good, and a little is bad. The
other message, the political one, which is the one that
they want to reach their own audience in exactly the way
in which it is published, is disseminated by their own
media, minor publications, the Internet, and other means.
Despite this division, which suits ETA and its entire
politico-social network, there are some journalists who
feel targeted by the terrorist group, the greater the pres-
sure exerted on the government, which would ultimately
have to agree to negotiate with the organization on the
latters terms. In accordance with such a strategy, it was
vital to keep a tight rein on the media. It was against this
background that evidence emerged in the mid-1990s of
the existence of a document on the expediency of at-
tacking the media and journalists. In 1996, when the
content of that document became known, ETAs sup-
port network asserted that it was merely a contribution
to the strategic debate. Whether journalists really believed
it or merely wished to believe it, the fact is that, from
that time on, terrorist acts of aggression and coercion
against the media and its representatives rose sharply.
ETA has a youth group that practises street violence,
which is known in Basque as kale borroka. That group
was the first one to begin to take action against journal-
ists and newspaper buildings by throwing Molotov cock-
tails, breaking windows, and other similar action.
I had the dubious honour of being the first woman jour-
nalist to undergo an attack for which they subsequently
claimed responsibility, justifying themselves by saying that
she wrote for a Spanish newspaper. That happened
on 22 December, 1997 and since then I have been pro-
tected by two bodyguards. The year before that, young
apprentice terrorists had thrown Molotov cocktails at
my San Sebastian office and had punctured the tyres of
my car; the 21 members of the Herri Batasuna leader-
ship had gathered in front of my home and that same
party had organized several marches against me from
the centre of San Sebastian to the newspaper building. I
am relating this to give an idea of the pressure that can
be put on journalists who try to practise their profession
freely in the Basque region and who are considered to
be non-nationalists by that group. Jos Luis Lpez de la
Calle, a colleague on my newspaper, suffered similar ex-
periences before he was killed in May 2000 in front of
his home. Jos Luis had waged a lifelong battle against
totalitarianism. He had been imprisoned under Franco
and 40 years later ETA killed him. At present, in Spain,
more than 100 media professionals carry on their work
accompanied by bodyguards to protect them, while oth-
ers look under their cars each day to check for bombs,
they change their routes and their timetable, and rarely
say where they are going.
It is clear that ETA now needs more than ever to legiti-
mize its activities to that part of Basque society that still
supports it today. That accounts for somewhat less than
10 per cent of Basque society. Some 150,000 people vote
for the political arm of the organization. The Basque
terrorist organization, therefore, legitimizes its action
against the media by claiming that they are part of the
media arm of the State, directly linked to the centres
of Spains economic and political power. It compares
journalists with army spokespersons when it says, no
one would say that that kind of work is the expression
of the right to information or that they must remain on
the sidelines of the conflict. In pursuit of this policy, it
uses its own media, its newspaper, its radio stations,
Internet pages, its magazines, book publishers, in which
the organizations targets have been described as en-
emies of the Basque people and of the nationalist cause,
and collaborators of the Spanish Ministry of the Inte-
rior. ETA, therefore, usurps the term Basque as if
the people who have been targets of its attacks are less
Basque than its supporters because they do not share its
ideas and, above all, because they are against the means
it uses (murder, blackmail and coercion) to achieve its
political ends. In any event, the audience for whom this
crude message is intended believes it, and that is all that
matters to ETA. For, paradoxical though it may be, the
other message, that of terror, continues to be dissemi-
nated by the media that are the targets of its actions
because, independently of the terrorist campaign, or
precisely because of it, journalists and the media con-
tinue to feel obliged to defend freedom of expression
and to provide information to satisfy the peoples right,
and their own right, to be informed.
I should like to stress that, despite the difficult condi-
tions under which journalists write about politics and, in
that context, about Basque nationalism and violence, we
feel obliged to carry on our profession and we have a
formal commitment to defend, in whatever circum-
stances, freedom in the Basque region and, more spe-
cifically, freedom of expression. I suppose that you all
know that in the Basque region there is a considerable
lack of freedom at present. Many of those who make
up civil society, business people, university staff and
judges, for example, live under police protection, as do
members of the non-nationalist parties (the Popular Party
and the Socialist Party) that form the opposition to the
regional Basque government. In the last few years, about
20 elected officials belonging to these two parties have
been assassinated and the two parties, which are main-
stream parties in Spain, will find it difficult to fill their
electoral lists in the Basque region for the municipal elec-
tions in 2003. There are town councils in the Basque
region in which practically half of the members have
resigned out of fear of being assassinated. The situation
is really very difficult, and, as we have just seen, not only
for journalists. ETA is trying to undermine the very foun-
dations of the rule of law by attacking the legislative,
executive and the judicial powers and what is known as
the fourth estate, namely the media. ETA is acting just
like the Nazis when it murders journalists, but also when
it burns bookshops, as it did recently in San Sebastian
because some books that were not to its liking were dis-
played in the shop windows or because the shop owners 89
had taken part in a demonstration against terrorism and
Case Studies in Europe
in support of democracy and peace.
CASE STUDY II
War, Terrorism and Journalists:
the Chechen Experience
Anna Politkovskaya,
Journalist, Novaya Gazeta,
Russian Federation
At the time of writing, the second Chechen war had
already been under way for two and a half years, May 2002
will be its 31st month. It is officially known as an anti-
terrorist operation, just like the American war in Af-
ghanistan. What is it like to work as a journalist in
Chechnya? In a situation in which all illusions have long
since been lost, it has become clear that what we have is
in no way a fight against terrorism. Instead, on the
one hand, we have complete military anarchy. This has
the blessings of the highest authorities in Russia. It takes
the form of such absolutely unacceptable methods as
endless marauding in towns and villages, the murder of
civilians, punishment without trial, a slave trade and even
a trade in corpses on the part of federal troops. On the
other hand, we have a growing number of people seek-
ing to avenge the death or disappearance of relatives, in
other words the de facto recruitment of resistance fight-
ers, and hence the reproduction of terrorism.
From the very beginning of the second Chechen war,
the administration of President Putin issued instructions
regulating the work of all the news media. Initially, these
instructions were contrary to the Russian legislation.
However, the Presidents administration did not make
any concessions. To begin with, each journalist had to
have accreditation from the office of President Putins
top aide, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who was made respon-
sible for the so-called ideological component of the
antiterrorist operation.
Then, after obtaining accreditation, each journalist had
to report to the main federal military base in Chechnya,
 known as Khankala, on the outskirts of Grozny, and be
registered once again with the Armys press service and
stay put at the military base. In other words, they had to
place themselves at the complete disposal of the Armys
press service. Journalists thus found themselves in a trap.
The conditions of work were dictated by military per-
sonnel. It was forbidden, on penalty of losing ones ac-
creditation, to meet civilians, to visit towns and villages
independently, or even simply to leave the military base
unaccompanied by military personnel, who were also
unwilling to leave it and, as they put it, risk their lives in
order to enable journalists to do their work. Consequently,
the only information that journalists working in Chechnya
90 could get was from military press releases. They con-
tained more ideology than information, and too much
CHAPTER 9: Europe
blatantly false information. It was forbidden to check it
against other sources.
Most Russian publications and journalists, not wishing
to take risks (the Presidents administration was constantly
trying to frighten recalcitrant media), accepted such work-
ing conditions. Both newspaper columns and the
airwaves carried a flood of bare-faced lies about the war
in Chechnya. The Armys failures, and the incapacity and
unwillingness of the secret services, to ferret out and
take custody of the real terrorists were presented as mili-
tary victories and successful operations. Civilians killed
were said to be resistance fighters. Local inhabitants liv-
ing under regular fire and bombardment were exclusively
described as accomplices of the resistance fighters,
thereby fully justifying the harsh reprisals against them.
Accommodating, obedient journalists who worked ex-
clusively with military personnel received ample rewards
for their services from the Ministry of Defence and the
President of the country. Less docile journalists who
attempted to follow proper journalistic practices, the most
important of which is to collect the fullest possible in-
formation about an event, were treated to constant pub-
lic denigration and insults.
Now, two and a half years later, it seems that the Gov-
ernments brainwashing campaign to ensure the right
image for the war in Chechnya has been completely suc-
cessful. The proportion of Russian citizens who are
convinced that Chechnya is the scene of a real war with
terrorism, who do not know and do not wish to know
the truth of the matter, and who therefore support the
anti-terrorist operation, remains high at 30-45 per cent
of the population. And thanks to the Government- and
Army-controlled media, the Chechens have been branded
a nation of bandits bearing collective responsibility for
the acts of a handful of Chechen individuals.
Those journalists and media that have not submitted to
the rules imposed by the Presidents administration and
the General Staff, and have travelled independently
around Chechen towns and villages, in order to gather
full information on the events taking place in Chechnya,
have had a very difficult time.
One such publication is Novaya Gazeta. Throughout the
entire war, we have pursued a line of active support for
the group that has suffered most from the war, the civil-
ian population. For this position, our newspaper has been
under constant attack from the Presidents administra-
tion. Indeed, it has become a tradition for the military to
make regular, public threats against the lives of those
who continue to investigate and write about war crimes
in Chechnya and protest in the newspapers against the
way the war is being conducted and the Armys arbitrary
methods. These threats became particularly harsh in the
autumn of 2001, following the events of 11 September
in New York, when President Putin received a kind of
papal indulgence from Western leaders for his opera-
tions in Chechnya.
It has now become all but impossible for an independ-
ent journalist, even with all the necessary authorization,
to get past a military checkpoint in Chechnya. There are
soldiers taunts, threats to shoot, imitations of shooting,
and constant arrests and detentions, with the result that
the journalists work has become that of a spy in enemy
territory. What is really needed is to be able to gather
information inconspicuously and disappear in time, with-
out attracting attention. Chechnya today is the scene of
a topsy-turvy war, in which terrorism has become con-
fused with anti-terrorism, and non-state terrorism is in
fact being fought with state terrorism. Journalists who
seek to be objective are deemed to be enemies of Rus-
sia, who should be destroyed. We are in the middle of
an acute crisis of civilization.
 PART III 91

Media and Terrorism: Status of Research

Terrorism
92
 Introduction
Media,
In the last few years, acts of violence and terrorist incidents have occurred with such
Violence regularity to attract extensive media attention and coverage. Like most continents,
Africa has not been immune or spared from the explosive nature of violence and
terrorist acts that become a daily staple in the news media. The acts of violence and
and terrorism include kidnapping of foreign nationals, ethno-political conflicts, and state
sponsored violence. Often, most of these incidents serve as lead-in and front-page
Terrorism stories for television evening news and newspapers. For better or worse, the con-
texts and framing of news stories about violence and terrorism do impact on global
in Africa and regional perceptions of Africa, as either an ally of those at the forefront of the
war on terrorism or as enemy nations that provide refuge and comfort for terrorists
and their operatives. This is what is now known as the Bush doctrine no distinc-
CHAPTER 10
tion exists between terrorists and those who harbor them. 93

The perception of a nation as an ally or collaborator appears to influence foreign

policy imperatives, as most enemy or rogue nations are severely punished while
those who support the U.S.-led effort to combat terrorism are rewarded. Therefore,
for most African countries, it matters how the media cover terrorist incidents within
their territories and it is important how their role in the war on terrorism is packaged
or framed for world consumption. The conflation of media coverage of violence
and terrorism, the resulting perception and the unequal dependency relationship
that exists between Western and African countries can earn them a status that ena-
bles world isolation or even military action. Consequently, the so-called war on ter-
rorism has compelled the leadership in most African countries to present them-
selves as supportive of the U.S.-led effort to rid the world of terrorism.

In this research, we are concerned with how violent acts and terrorist incidents in
Africa are reported in the media. This is also an attempt to document scholarly
analysis of such coverage. In the process, we hope to review the focus of each study
and the research questions addressed as well as their conceptual or theoretical frame-
works. All of these studies are examined within the context of the extent, if any,
they contribute to knowledge and understanding about violence and terrorism in
Africa. To set the stage for this research, however, it is important to examine the
definitional problems associated with the discourse of terrorism so as to assist read-
ers to understand the concept as used in this discussion.

Understanding Terrorism as a Concept

Andy O. Alali
Department of Communications
California State University,
Bakersfield, U.S.A.
While definitional consensus has eluded most students of terrorism, there has not
been any reluctance on their part to understand terrorism. One such effort is that of
Laqueur (1987) who, in his book The Age of Terrorism, grapples with the intricacies
of the term terrorism and the label terrorist as he traces their origin and mean-
ing over the years to contemporary usage. In his view, terrorism has undergone
changes in character over the last century and these changes compound the
definitional problems one faces in dealing with it.
Understanding terrorism has meant trying to define it. One of the most serious
attempts at scholarly definition and classification of types of terrorism has been
that of Paul Wilkinson (1974). First, Wilkinson makes a distinction between four
types of terrorism (criminal, psychic, war, and political) before defining political
terrorism as the systematic use or threat of violence to secure political ends (p.
17). He further distinguishes political terrorism into three broad types: revolution-
ary, sub-revolutionary, and repressive. According to Wilkinson, the first type,
revolutionary terrorism, is a systematic use of violence with the ultimate goal being to
obtain a radical change in the political order. The second type, sub-revolutionary terror-
 ism, is the use of terroristic violence to effect a change in
public policy without altering the political order. The third
type, repressive terrorism, involves the use of violence to
suppress or restrain certain individuals or groups from
forms of behavior considered undesirable by the state.
Whereas the first two types are used by individuals and
non-state actors against target states, the latter is used by
states to maintain a status quo that may be advantageous
to those belonging to a particular class, ethnic or racial
group, or religious faith. States that practice this form of
terrorism usually explain their repressive actions as be-
ing in the interest of national security even though the
real purpose of their actions may have been to maintain
94 regime security. Iraq is a good example of a nation in
which this form of terrorism is practiced; to some ex-
CHAPTER 10
tent, pre-Mandela South Africa fits this category.
In his contribution to our understanding of terrorism,
Andrew Pierre (l984) focuses on terrorism of the inter-
national variety. Although conceding the difficulty of
endowing international terrorism with a universally ac-
ceptable definition, he sees it as acts of violence out-
side national boundaries, or with clear international re-
percussions (p. 85). He goes on to list factors that mo-
tivate international terrorists. According to Pierre:
1. The terrorist is dedicated to a political goal which
he sees as one of transcendent merit;
2. The terrorist seeks attention and publicity for his
cause;
3. The terrorist aims to erode support for the estab-
lished political leadership or to undermine the author-
ity of the State by destroying normality, creating uncer-
tainty, polarizing a country, fostering economic discord
and generally weakening the fabric of society;
4. The terrorists actions can be a measure of deep
frustration where there is no legitimate way to redress
grievances;
5. The terrorist may seek to liberate his colleagues in
foreign jails; and
6. Finally, the terrorist may desire money so as to buy
arms and finance his organization (pp. 86-87).
Research Method
The focus of the report presented here was a desk re-
search to identify the kinds of research studies and schol-
arly publications about media, violence and terrorism in
Africa during the period of January 1998 to December
2001. To collect information for the report, I relied heavily
on electronic library search engines to identify scholarly
literature about media, violence and terrorism in Africa
between 1998 and 2001. I also looked for case studies,
qualitative and quantitative analyses that provide perspec-
tives on media coverage of violence and terrorism in
Africa. A comprehensive content analysis of available
materials was conducted. What emerged was alarming:
even though Africa had experienced over 160 terrorist
attacks, with 5,331 wounded and over 485 deaths during
the period under study (U.S. Department of State, 2001;
2000; 1999; 1998), there was a dearth in scholarly litera-
ture on media coverage of violence and terrorism in
Africa. The lack of published research in this subject
area is alarming because one would expect that the high
incidence of violence and terrorism in the African con-
tinent would warrant serious scholarly endeavor to de-
termine how reports in the media are framed. Conse-
quently, the conclusions here are based on the authors
analysis rather than published research.
Global Analysis and Critical Assessment
The analysis here covers the extent of terrorist threat, if
any, in Africa; patterns of violence and terrorism in Af-
rica; and media framing of the context of violence and
terrorism in Africa.
Terrorist Threat in Africa
There is no doubt that terrorism is a new challenge world-
wide. Terrorist assaults claim human lives and have rocked
the military and economic foundation of countries, as
seen in the 11 September, 2001 terrorist incidents in the
United States. The anti-terrorist agenda of the United
States has placed African countries in the spotlight, par-
ticularly Sudan and Somalia because of the alleged
connection between Osama bin Laden and these na-
tions. Given this background, we ask the question: Is
there a terrorist threat in Africa? We discuss this ques-
tion in the next few paragraphs.
Two recent incidents have given people reason to be-
lieve that there is a terrorist threat in Africa. First is the
11 September terrorism, when the two World Trade
Center buildings were reduced to rubble and parts of
the Pentagon destroyed. Second is the 1998 bombings
of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. These two incidents enabled focus on
Africa as public celebrations that displayed strong anti-
Western (particularly, anti-American) sentiments in Ni-
geria, the Sudan and Somalia were broadcast to the en-
tire world. Coupled with these incidents is the fact that
Osama bin Laden is no stranger to Africa. It is no secret
that he took shelter in Sudan between 1991 and 1996.
He has been charged with his operatives with the 1998
bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Sa-
laam.
It is also a belief, at least one that is widely held in West-
ern countries, that there is a threat of terrorism in Africa
because one-third of its 700 million citizens are Mus-
lims, some of whom are said to be associated with bin
Ladens al-Qaeda. It has been reported that al-Qaeda op-
eratives sought refuge in Somalia and they have done so
in concert with al-Itihaad al-Islami, a Somali organization
dedicated to creating a radical Islamist state in Somalia.
Even though the organization operates its own schools
and provides services normally associated with govern-
ment, it has also been accused of conducting terrorist
operations in neighboring Ethiopia. In fact, Al-Ittihaad
al-Islami earned a mention in President George Bushs
23 September, 2001 Executive Order blocking property
of and prohibiting transactions with terrorists.
It is important to note that reports about the history
and talks about radical Islamist terrorism can be traced
back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the seizure of
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November of that year
(Boroumand and Boroumand, 2002). Since then,
Boroumand and Boroumand (2002) observe that its
presence is global, and its influence is felt not only in the
lands of the cast Islamic crescent that extends from
Morocco and Nigeria in the west to Malaysia and
Mindanao in the east but also in many corners of Eu-
rope, India, the former Soviet world, the Americas and
even parts of western China (p. 6).
Clearly, Africa is an important piece in the global war on
terrorism. The terrorist threat is complex and a serious
challenge in the Horn of Africa because of bin Ladens
connection to Sudan and Somalia. Sudan was his home
from 1991 until early 1996, and his al-Qaeda organiza-
tion enjoys a level of popularity and support within the
northern Sudanese society. The connection to Somalia
is that it is home of mujaheddin veterans, operating under
the mantle of al-Itihaad. In his report on Somalis and
Sudans race to the force in Africa, Morrison (2002) con-
cludes that Sudan and Somalia will remain credible po-
tential havens for al-Qaeda (p. 194), thereby posing a
serious threat to the war against terrorism.
Africas connection to terrorism is also substantiated by
the presence of al-Qaeda cells in some of the countries.
For example, al-Qaeda cells exist in Cape Town and Dur-
ban, South Africa, the Sudan, and Somalia. In Cape Town,
the cells are alleged to have established affiliation with
two movements People Against Gangsterism and Drug
(Pagad) and Qibla. Pagad was accused of launching a
bombing campaign and terrorist assaults upon U.S. in-
terests and others in Cape Town in 1998. The two move-
ments, Pagad and Qibla, are on the official U.S. list of
terrorist organizations.
Lastly, the fact that terror groups such as the al-Qaeda
and Hizballah, are linked to illicit diamond trafficking in
West Africa indicates the serious threat of terrorism in
Africa. In November 2001, the Washington Post reported
that with the funds generated from this trade and resale
of diamonds purchased from rebel movements, they are
able to fund some of their operations as well as preying
on the poor to execute some of their attacks. The argu-
ment here, therefore, is that there is a terrorist threat in
Africa. If that is the case, what then are the patterns of
violence and terrorism in Africa? The question is ad-
dressed in the next section.
Patterns of Violence and Terrorism in
95
Africa
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Africa
Between 1998 and 2001, Africa experienced a wave of
violence and terrorist incidents, resulting in the deaths
of hundreds of people and countless number of
wounded. Most violence in Africa has ethnic and/or
religious dimensions while terrorism is often political in
nature. Yet, even though terrorism is a form of political
violence, no group describes itself as terrorists; they of-
ten describe themselves as freedom fighters. A typical
example is the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of the mid-
1970s, an organization led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi;
Pagad and Qibla in South Africa, and al-Itihaad in Somalia.
Terrorism, as we know it, is not restricted to small groups.
States are also predators and perpetrators of violence. A
good example is the violent acts perpetrated on blacks
by the apartheid-era government of South Africa. Such
acts are replicated in African countries where dictator-
ship is the norm, as in the case of Nigeria under the
leadership of late General Sani Abacha. In most cases,
state-linked violence is a means of regulating human re-
lations within a countrys borders. It is also a mechanism
used to control insurgency from opposition outside of
the states territory. Concretely, the patterns of violence
and terrorism in Africa can be placed within the follow-
ing three categories:
Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals
Most reports on violence and terrorism in Africa em-
phasize the casualties suffered by foreign nationals. For
example, between 1998 and 2001 alone, the U.S. De-
partment of State data indicate that a number of West-
ern nationals, particularly French, Austrian, Italian, Por-
tuguese, United States, German, Belgian, Norwegian, and
Swiss were either abducted or kidnapped in Africa. It is
not uncommon for foreign nationals to be kidnapped
or abducted in Africa because of the continued Euro-
pean exploration of the continent without due regard to
the economic and ecological situation of the people. Fol-
lowing are recent incidents in Africa:
 1. Four French nationals were kidnapped in Febru-
ary 1998 by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)
in Manda National Park in Moyen-Chari Prefecture,
Chad;
2. Austrian nationals were kidnapped in February
1998 by the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF);
3. Six French and two Italian nationals in the Tibesti
region of Chad were kidnapped by the National Front
for the Renewal of Chad (FNTR);
96
4. Two Portuguese citizens were abducted in Cabinda
by the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda En-
CHAPTER 10
claveCabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC); and
5. The widely reported abduction of nine Red Cres-
cent workers at an airstrip north of Mogadishu, So-
malia. The hostages included a U.S. citizen, a Ger-
man, a Belgian, a French, a Norwegian, two Swiss,
and one Somali.
Civil Wars or Internal Strife
A significant part of violence seen in Africa pertain to
civil wars and the internal strife that continue to besiege
the continent. It is evident that the mass media have
replayed the various wars in Africa, particularly in An-
gola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Si-
erra Leone. Also, such reports include some of the rebel
activities and military struggles, as seen in Senegal and
Guinea-Bissau.
Ethno-Political Conflicts
Africas image in the media have also been framed within
ethno-political perspective, which is indicative of how
actions by dominant groups prompt minority groups
toward secession and invigorate movements aimed at
autonomy. The struggles of the Sudan Peoples Libera-
tion Army (SPLA), the case of Biafra in Nigeria, the
Casamance in Senegal, and the Hutu and Tutsis in
Burundi and Rwanda, are typical examples of ethno-
political conflicts replayed in Western media.
Media Framing of the Context of
Violence and Terrorism in Africa
Analysis of news about Africa indicates that the mass
media often depend on government officials for most
of their reports and highlights about violence and ter-
rorism in Africa. There is tendency for media depend-
ency on official versions, often from countries remote
from where the incident occurred. Such dependency is
what Mark Fishman (1980, p. 143) describes as the prin-
ciple of bureaucratic affinity where the media often
depend and gravitate toward official sources as a means
of quenching their thirst for news. Yet, because of the
media failure to adequately report or cover Africa, inci-
dents of violence and terrorism in the region are
underreported, unless the incidents result in an Ameri-
can or European casualty or effects Westerner or West-
ern interests.
Even though Africa is still underreported in the media,
the images associated with Africa are often framed within
the context of an embattled continent that is besieged
by violence. The few reports about Africa is intended to
remind audiences that the continent has had more than
its share of a variety of violence that ranges from con-
flicts with historical roots to actions of badly behaved
dictators.
The representation of instability of African states as a
product of badly behaved dictators is often equated with
pre-modern tribalism and that the only solution is the
institution of democratic elections and nation-state build-
ing based on the Western model and experience. Unfor-
tunately, these reports are not embedded in national or
ethnic/tribal histories, which may offer explanations for
the public violence that permeates the region, nor do
they include peoples interpretation of the cause of vio-
lence and the conditions and circumstances that precipi-
tated such acts.
Richard A. Giggs (1995) argues that the construction of
this image of violence in Africa is intended to absolve
the West from the structural damages imposed by colo-
nialism. He suggests a list of these structural damages
that include: (i) irrational boundaries that contribute to
endemic instability; (ii) export-oriented infrastructure that
marginalizes Africa within the world economic system;
(iii) Western cultural hegemony that has weakened Afri-
can tradition; and (iv) bureaucratic systems of govern-
ance that concentrated political power and favored cer-
tain ethnic groups over others.
This perspective dovetails with what Africans have long
argued that the Western media emphasize more on
the negative than confronting the factors that precipi-
tated the current condition in the region.
Suggestions for Further Studies
The dearth of research attention to how violence and
terrorism in Africa are replayed in the news media is
particularly surprising because of the incessant appetite
to portray the worst of Africa to the world. Equally in-
teresting is the fact that Africanist communication schol-
ars have done little analysis or serious research on media
coverage of violence and terrorism in the continent.
Clearly, research on this subject-area and the quality of
findings that result from such endeavor would offer
scholars and other interested parties governmental and
non-governmental significant grounds for reflecting
on how Africa is covered, the competing influences that
shape such coverage, to predict future coverage of the
region and the perceptions of Africas role in violence
and terrorism.
There is no question that the lack of research effort about
media, violence and terrorism in Africa has created a
vacuum in contemporary scholarly literature. As research-
ers, we have an obligation to the academic community
to offer prescriptive measures and recommend ways this
dearth in literature can be remedied. The first step is to
prescribe themes that would guide future research in the
subject-area. Therefore, it is my recommendation that
researchers interested in media, violence and terrorism
in Africa focus their work on four general themes: fac-
tors contributing to violence and terrorism in Africa;
perpetrators and victims of violence and terrorism; media
representations of violence and terrorism in Africa; and
perceptions created by media coverage. A brief explana-
tion of each theme is presented here.
Factors Contributing to Violence and
Terrorism in Africa
The first theme for further investigation requires re-
searchers to ascertain the root causes and factors that
contribute to violence and terrorism in Africa. Here, re-
search should focus on a number of issues, including
the structure and nature of conflicts and the factors per-
petuating conflicts, examination of these issues would
make available to other researchers answers to the why,
who, and what questions that are often missing in most African versus Western victims of violence and terror-
discourse of this nature. For example, we need to know
the extent, if any, to which ethnic class divisions and
religion impact on conflicts, violence and terrorism in
Africa.
There is no question that, though ethnicity or religion is
not the sole cause of conflicts, Africas problems are
often attributed to its myriad of ethnic identities and
religion, particularly in the context of Islam one of
the predominant religions in the continent. In his analy-
sis of the Ugandan conflict, Mark Leopold (1999) ob-
served that news about the so-called war in the north
is as misleading as some international reporting, often
doing more than elaborating ethnic ideologies than the
real issues. One can argue that the focus on ethnicity
appears to be a deliberate act aimed at exonerating the
West from their culpability for the violence and conflict
that take place in Africa. We need to seriously examine
these issues by asking ourselves the following questions:
Is it possible that ethnic and religious labels influence
bias and news interpretations of violence in Africa? Is it
possible that some conflicts start with no ethnic or reli-
gious dimensions and develop ethnic and religious over-
tones? Why does this occur? Is it possible that state and
non-state leaders manipulate these concepts to stir con-
flicts and violence?
Additionally, we must consider the economic conditions
and human rights abuses that may influence violence
and terrorism in Africa. Often times, the economic con-
ditions people are subjected to in Africa result from gov-
ernmental or institutional abrogation of their responsi-
bilities and agreements. Is it possible that these factors
trigger violence and terrorism? It is equally important to 97
examine how Western interests may impact on violence
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Africa
and terrorism in Africa. Within these lines of research is
the need to determine whether the factors that nurture
these conditions in one country may, or may not, serve
as threat to violence and terrorism in other African coun-
tries.
Perpetrators and Victims of
Violence and Terrorism
The second suggested theme for further research deals
with a need to identify the who alluded to earlier in the
discussion. For example, we need to answer questions
such as: Who are the perpetrators of violence and ter-
rorism? Who are the key political actors in the violence
and terrorism that take place in Africa? What about the
extra-regional actors the outsiders who influence and
seek to ameliorate or exploit conditions in the conflict
area? Who are the victims? Are African victims treated
as important as those from Western countries? Are these
acts of violence aimed at only Western interests or are
African interests equally targeted? What is the ratio of
ism? Here, we believe research that answers these ques-
tions would add immensely to our understanding of the
context and victims of violence and terrorism in Africa.
Media Representations of
Violence and Terrorism in Africa
The third set of issues suggested for further research
concerns media representations of the violence and ter-
rorism that emanate from Africa. The media, particu-
larly those outside of the African continent, have been
accused of presenting their interpretations of violence
and terrorism from a Western viewpoint. Often times,
violence and terrorism are indexed within the concept
of winners and losers, or seen as acts perpetrated on
Western interests by people who ought to be apprecia-
tive of Western humanitarian efforts in their respective
countries. In the process, acts of violence and terrorism
are framed within perspectives that give meaning and
credence to the Western view, without adequately ad-
 dressing or providing realistic interpretations of the ac-
tions and motivations of perpetrators of violence and
terrorism. This is not to suggest that we provide refuge
to those who commit violent and illegal acts, rather, we
need to provide a well-rounded picture of what hap-
pened, why it happened, and how to go about address-
ing the issues or factors that precipitated these acts of
violence and terrorism.
Most scholars, especially those who study media repre-
sentation of Africa, would agree that there are obvious
contradictions between domestic and foreign media re-
porting of Africa, particularly as it relates to violence
98 and terrorism. We believe these contradictions exist be-
cause the context of news and the framing of opinions
CHAPTER 10
are defined within different ethical standards when it
comes to Africa. Here, the journalistic ends justify the
means and the importance of accuracy and fairness is
somehow forgotten. Therefore, any research in this sub-
ject-area must focus on a set of issues that provide the
public and policy makers a picture of the context of
media framing and the potential impact it would have
on society. Research about media representation of vio-
lence and terrorism in Africa should consider some of
the following questions: Who are the sources (govern-
mental and non-governmental) of the perspective that
is advanced in the media? We need to determine what
sources say about violence and terrorism and how the
media interpret them. What language do journalists use
to describe violence and terrorism in Africa? What are
the general themes and issues covered, or not covered,
by the media? Do the media cover the reactions of Afri-
cans to violence and terrorist attacks? Are local journal-
ists employed to feed international news agencies or are
journalists remote from what or where they report? How
does such arrangement affect the news content? Clearly,
the goal here is to determine whether coverage about
Africa is responsible or misleading.
Assessment of media coverage would not be complete
without analysis of the symbolic referents used in repre-
senting Africa to the world. For example, researchers
should try to identify the connotations and symbolic
referents of the language used in discourse about vio-
lence and terrorism in Africa. Are the same terms ap-
plied in context of violence and terrorism in Africa and
elsewhere?
Lastly, researchers would contribute immensely to the
research literature if studies were to examine the per-
spectives advanced. For example, it makes a difference
in news content if the perspectives advanced are either
those of the journalist, government, victim, or of those
who perpetrate violence and acts of terrorism. It would
be useful to determine the perspectives of international
versus domestic and regional media, especially how each
index violence and terrorism. We must identify the types
of discourse that constraint or promote violence and
terrorism and how market forces impact on press cov-
erage of these issues. It is our belief that a research agenda
that focuses on these issues would provide a picture of
the role of the media independent and state-control-
led and how they replay for the world the violence and
terrorism that takes place in Africa.
Perceptions Created by
Media Coverage
The last important theme is research that documents
the perceptions created by media reconstruction of vio-
lence and terrorism in Africa. The question, How is
Africa perceived by the world community? must be
answered. Are Africans countries seen as nations that
provide safe haven to terrorist? Are their leaders seen as
individuals who condemn or support violence and ter-
rorism? What is Africas contribution to international
terrorism? What is the level of African governments
commitment on cooperation in the fight against terror-
ism?
Concluding Remarks
The globalization of violence and terrorism appears to
be a challenge to nation-state building in Africa. And,
while the U.S.-led anti-terrorism effort has placed Africa
in the spotlight, U.S. preoccupation with al-Qaeda dis-
places attention to many other concerns in Africa
(Morrison, 2002, p. 196).
There is no doubt that the bombings of U.S. Embassies
in the region and the 11 September incidents have
strengthened cooperation between some African gov-
ernments and the U.S. Most noteworthy is the coopera-
tion between U.S. and Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa
and Nigeria. All of these countries have pledged to work
with the United States to:
1. remove the terrorist threat extant in Africa and
ensure against the use of African countries as a ter-
rorist base;
2. prevent developments in regions of rogue nations
from threatening regional peace and stability; and
3. overcome the long-term governance challenges that
terrorists exploit to make African countries their base.
The media have responsibility to explain violence and
frame conflicts within the contexts that precipitate such
acts: that violence and conflicts are invariably tangled up
with power plays in the African political landscape.
References
BOROUMAND, L. 2002. Terror, Islam, and democracy. Journal of De-
mocracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 5-20.
FISHMAN, M. 1980. Manufacturing the news. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press.
GIGGS, R.A. 1995. The boundaries of a new Africa. Boundary and Secu-
rity Bulletin, Vol. 2, No.4.
LAQUEUR, W. 1987. The Age of Terrorism. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
LEOPOLD, M. 1999. The war in the north: Ethnicity in Ugandan press
explanations of conflict, 1996-97. In T. Allen & J. Senton, Eds. In The
Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence. London:
Zed Books, pp. 219-243.
MORRISON, J.S. 2002. Somalis and Sudans race to the force in Africa.
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 191-205.
PIERRE, A.J. 1984. The politics of international terrorism. In C. Kegley
& E. Wittkopt, Eds. The Global Agenda. New York: Random House.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 2001. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
___. 2000. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of State.
___. 1999. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of State.
___. 1998. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of State.
WILKINSON, P. 1974. Political Terrorism. London: Macmillan.
99
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Africa
100
 Introduction
Media,
Violence At the beginning of the 21st Century terrorism has come to be regarded by govern-
ment officials as the most important issue facing the world. It has also earned the
and attention of media, public opinion and social scientists especially after September
11, 2001. In response to this terrorist event, the international community has wit-
Terrorism in nessed a huge number of conferences, seminars, websites and publications on glo-
bal terrorism. While these activities have dealt with terrorism in all of its complexi-
the Arab ties, there is yet to be an agreement on what terrorism is. The definition of terrorism
has an impact on whether or not the perpetrators of an act of violence are labeled
World criminals terrorists or freedom fighters (Eke and Alali, 1991, p. 3). More
importantly is the complex relationship between media, violence and terrorism.
CHAPTER 11 Communication scholars have yet to reach a theoretical framework for better un- 101
derstanding of the dynamic and intricate media-terrorism relationship and media
policy options towards terrorism coverage.

In this respect, the Arab world has obviously occupied a special place in the interna-
tional debate on terrorism. Many of the more dramatic and violent incidents of
recent decades have been perpetrated either in the Middle East or elsewhere by
groups involved in the domestic and inter-state conflicts in that region. Some Pales-
tinian groups and others in the Arab world are defined by their opponents as terror-
ist bodies and, therefore, any act of legitimate resistance to liberate their occupied
land from Israel must be terrorism by definition. Others, however, especially those
who sympathise with their just cause, would regard them as freedom fighters (Shiva,
2001). Prior to September 11, the Western media successfully created and perpetu-
ated the impression that terrorism is rooted in Muslims and Arab Muslim people.
Accordingly, national, regional and international counterterrorism cooperation re-
mained a key element in the local as well as in foreign policy for many Arab states
throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the third millennium.

It is worth, at the beginning of this report, to empathize three facts:

1. The terrorist attacks against Western countries are receiving a lot of attention
in media and international public opinion as well as in the UN and international
bodies. However, the terrorist attacks on civilian targets belonging to other, less
powerful nations, especially in the Arab Palestinian occupied lands, have not re-
ceived the same amount of international interest (Shukri, 1991);

2. Terrorism and violence are the most sensitive issues in the Arab world. They
are related to the instability of the Arab social, political and economic environ-
ment, the Israeli occupation of Arab lands in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon as well
as the interference of the U.S. in local affairs of the region; and,

3. A significant gap exists between the importance of terrorism in the Arab

Basyouni Ibrahim world and the rarity of scholarly work on this subject in general and in the field of
Hamada communication in particular.

Department of This report reveals that in the Arab world few studies have tried to describe media
Mass Communication coverage of violence and terrorism and none attempted to investigate terrorism.
United Arab Emirates University The importance of the present report stems from the fact that in the majority of
terrorist and violent acts, the most important element in communication about
terrorist acts is not the acts themselves but the meaning assigned to the acts by the
media, authorities, and the populace. What is said about the acts and how the acts
are interpreted play a greater role in determining the impact and significance than
does the terrorism itself (Robert, 1993, p. 19).
 Research Methods
The purpose of this report is to present global synthesis
and critical assessment of studies and publications on
media, violence and terrorism in the Arab world during
the four- year period of January 1998 to December 2001.
Relevant research studies as well as scholarly publica-
tions carried out on media, violence and terrorism in the
Arab world from January 1998 to December 2001 were
collected and reviewed. Although this report is dedicated
to reviewing Arab published studies during this period,
we reviewed other scholarly works published either be-
fore 1998 or in 2002 because of their relevance. Also,
102 most relevant Arab communication publications on the
subject appeared in 2002. Three types of data were used
CHAPTER 11
in this report. First, relevant literature on terrorism, writ-
ten in English, was collected and analyzed. The second
kind of data covers the literature on violence and the
third consists of a few research papers and publications
which deal with media and terrorism and violence. The
sources of this scholarly work include refereed journals,
books, conference papers, library databases, and online
documents. This report is based on the assumption that,
whereas the Arab world has been shown as an environ-
ment which produces violence and terrorism, Arab com-
munication scholars have yet to participate in any type
of research that seriously examines the communication
implications of violence and terrorism. This situation
has resulted in an obvious failure to deal with some criti-
cal questions concerning the distortion of the Arab im-
age in the West and the coordination of counter-terror-
ism efforts.
Arab Political Research on
Violence and Terrorism
For better understanding of media-terrorism literature
in the Arab world, it is essential to critically examine the
Arab official political position on terrorism as well as
some of the political research on terrorism. Ibrahim
(1999) sees the concept of political violence as compris-
ing different types of behaviors and practices that imply
the real use or threat to use power to cause any injury or
harm to individuals or to damage public and private
possessions in order to attain political, economic, social
or cultural goals. These actions can be individual, or col-
lective, declared or undercover, organized or random. It
might be either an official violence practised by govern-
ments against their citizens, manifested in actions such
as: detention, imprisonment or termination or a popular
violence practised by the citizens against the ruling re-
gime such as events of riots, rebellion, assassination,
coups detat and revolutions. Despite the plausibility of
this concept and its applicability to different forms of
political violence and terrorism acts, it does not cover
the forms of organized international political violence
induced and encouraged by the state against one another
and their inhabitants. As a result, the concept tends to
be confined to domestic political violence. Accordingly,
it does not give an explanation for the roots of the inter-
nal Arab violence which to a large extent are symptoms
of external factors such as the Israeli political violence
against the Palestinians and the intended absence of the
global justice in managing the Middle East question. It is
this question that perpetuates the hostility between Arab
and Muslim world and the West.
Most significant for the present discussion is the official
Islamic position toward terrorism and violence as re-
flected in the Islamic Summit Conference held in Casa-
blanca December 1994. The conference announced a
code of conduct, including the following: (i) to declare
that Islam is innocent of all forms of terrorism that
involves the assassination of innocent people as it is pro-
hibited by God, (ii) to strongly condemn the perpetra-
tors of those serious crimes which are committed under
the plea of implementing Islam or any other justifica-
tion; (iii) to confirm that the struggle of peoples under
colonial or foreign control or occupation for realization
of their right to self-determination does not constitute
an act of terrorism. Islam condemns any person who is
fanatical or extremist and insists on moderation, and
tolerance towards one another and other non-Muslims.
In the Quran, the only permissible war is one of self
defense. Muslims may not begin hostilities (Taher, 1997,
p. 67).
Media, Violence and Terrorism:
Is There a Relationship?
As incidents of terrorism have risen, so has the interest
of communication scholars all over the world - except
in the Arab world - who have attempted to understand
medias relations to terrorism. This is partially attribut-
able to the fact that many have come to view terrorism
as a form of communication. Thus, it is necessary to
examine the communicative impact of terrorism. This
is primarily done by investigating the manner in which
the media report terrorist acts. Both terrorists and re-
searchers have vested interests in determining which la-
bels are positively perceived, and when each is used
(Simmons, 1991). The interest of communication schol-
ars in examining the communication implications of ter-
rorism is based on the notion that terrorism can best be
understood as a violent communication strategy. The
nature of the terrorist act, its atrocity, its location and
the identity of its victim serve as generators for the power
of the message. Violence, to become terroristic, requires
witnesses (Robert, 1993).
Whereas there seems to be no argument about the im-
pact of media coverage of news on its audiences, the
same is not true concerning its impact on terrorists.
On this matter, there are at least two major schools of
thought. Proponents of the first school contend that
media coverage of terrorist events has a contagion ef-
fect. Reporting terrorism is likely to increase terrorist
activities; without communication there can be no ter-
rorism (Eke and Alali, 1991). The effects of media, ac-
cording to the first school, can be classified as aware-
ness, contagion, and interference. Interference may in-
volve direct physical involvement in an event, such as a
reporter mediating between terrorists and police, or in-
direct pressure on officials to end the violence or threat.
The second type is the contagion effect which implies
that terrorism spreads, sometimes by other means but
most often through the media. The third type is aware-
ness. The diffusion concept of media would seem to
support the idea that media coverage increases public
awareness of terrorism. There are also those who ac-
cept general diffusion theory as having relevance to the
spread of terrorism. In this case, one has to hypothesize
that the media may play a role in the awareness aspect of
the adoption process of terrorism, but only a minor part
in the evaluative, acceptance, and adoption portions of
the diffusion of terrorist techniques (Simmons, 1991).
The second major school of thought argues that there
is no clear evidence that publicity (by the media) is re-
sponsible for significantly affecting the occurrence of
terrorism. When carefully analysing the terrorism litera-
ture, one finds that it contains no credible evidence that
media are an important factor in inducing and diffusing
terrorist acts. As one reviews the literature, it becomes
clear that not a single study, based on accepted social
science research methods, has established a cause-effect
relationship between media coverage and the spread of
terrorism. Yet public officials, scholars, editors, report-
ers, and columnists continually link the two elements
and present their relationship as proven (Simmons, 1991).
A few writers from diverse quarters oppose placing blame
on the media. They instead support the view that the
media are victims of terrorism. They argue that erasing
terrorism is a juridical and ethical question, not a ques-
tion of the media (Barnhurst, 1991). Still, there is an-
other school of thought claiming that media coverage
may actually reduce the possibility of future violent ac-
tion on the part of those who engage in terroristic vio-
lence by removing the need for individuals and groups
to resort to violence in order to gain coverage (Simmons,
1991).
Global Analysis and Critical Assessment
As stated earlier, a significant gap exists between two
phenomena: (i) the proliferation and intensity of terror-
ism and violence acts in recent decades with an interna-
tional emphasis on the Arab world as the source of this
phenomenon and damage, and (ii) the rarity of the
number of research studies devoted to understanding
the complexity of the incidents of terrorism from the
Arab point of view. This gap represents the first feature
of Arab media and terrorism literature. The second is
that it has recently received some limited academic at-
tention initiated by some communication researchers in
the Arab region. The focus of Arab literature is on the
question of how media cover the violent and terrorist
acts, and the how Western media portray Arab image.
The Aqsa Intifada has received some attention from both
Arab and American researchers. In her research on
103
Egyptian Newspaper Coverage of Palestinian Intifada,
El Tarabishi (2002) analyzed three Egyptian leading news-
Media, Violence and Terrorism in the Arab World
papers from the period of September 2000 to May 2001.
The content analysis focuses on the variables of news
stories, investigative reports, editorial articles, interviews,
cartoons, and columns among other writings forms, in
addition to sources used in stories and event actors, types
of issues. El Tarabishi concludes that the three newspa-
pers, Al Ahram, AL Wafad and Al Osbooa, place great
emphasis on the developments of the Israeli terrorist
and aggressive military attacks against the Palestinian ci-
vilians in the occupied territories. Daniel (1997) found
that several interrelated frames were used to present the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the news media, in-
cluding the cold war frame, the terrorist frame, the Jew
as historical victim, and the dichotomous good/evil
framework. As symbols of Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the steady stream of negative images affects American
public opinion and subsequently U. S. foreign policy
(Daniel, 1997).
Arab Image Research:
Misleading Terrorist Image
The stereotypical image that Western media present
about Arabs has had dangerous effects on justifying ag-
gressive acts against Arabs, including military aggression,
and on mobilizing international public opinion to ac-
cept any allegations - whether they are true or false -
against Arabs. It also affects the diffusion of the Ameri-
can media perspective toward Arabs among other Eu-
ropean media without attempts to maintain a neutral,
critical and independent position (Baek, 2002). Pollock
and Artz (1997) found that public support for the Ameri-
can offensive in the Persian Gulf was promoted by me-
dia employment of culturally acceptable anti-Arab im-
ages. This claim is based on a survey of headlines, pho-
tographs, captions, and cartoon regarding the Gulf con-
flict and more specifically on editorial cartoons published
in the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun-Times, Los Angeles Times,
the New York Times, and Newsweek from August to De-
cember 1990. A rhetorical analysis of the dominant im-
ages in these media supports the above claim. First, the
 media reduced a complex, geopolitical situation to the
motives of Saddam Hussein. Second, to demonize
Hussein, the media simply retrieved standard anti -Arab
stereotypes from popular culture and the medias sym-
bolic image conditioned the American public for the
military aggression that was to follow. Kamalipour (1997)
draws the same conclusion in his research on media im-
ages of Arabs, Muslims, and the Middle East in the U.S.
He found that violence and terrorist acts such as the
TWA explosion, the Oklahoma City bombing, the U.S.
embassy bombings, and the 1996 Olympic bombing
provide many lessons of the relationship between me-
dia, terrorism and violence acts. These lessons include
104 media dependency on the government and vice versa;
propaganda techniques aimed at manipulating public
CHAPTER 11
opinion, reinforcing and globalizing stereotypical images
of the Arabs and manufacturing or altering public per-
ception; and media portrayals of peoples, places, and
events become perceptions, and perceptions become
realities. These stereotypes or mindsets then become the
bases for human interactions.
In his study of Arab image in the minds of Western
image-makers, Hamada (2001) found a dominance of
negative Arab image among Western image - makers
(media professionals). For example, 85.7 per cent said
that Arabs are fundamentalists, 78 per cent perceives
Arabs as anti-West, and 69 per cent claimed that Arabs
are aggressive. As for the values Western image - makers
think Arabs are promoting, the findings show that 97
per cent of Western image makers see that fundamen-
talism is the main value Arabs are promoting, 54 per
cent, said that violence is the basic value of Arabs, while
40 per cent notes terrorism as the value that Arabs pro-
mote. Most important is the negative consequences of
the Arab image. Western image - makers were asked:
what do you personally think are the negative conse-
quences of a distorted Arab image? The majority (87
per cent) said that a distorted Arab image justifies any
armed aggression against Arabs, and 81 per cent said it
may mobilize international public opinion to act against
Arabs. Slightly more than three-quarters of the surveyed
Western journalists reported the threat to Arab security
and the isolation of Arabs as negative consequences
of the biased image.
Salah El-Deins research (2002) seeks to examine the in-
tricacies underlying the relation between Egyptian me-
dia and the cognitions and attitudes of public opinion.
His research reveals a positive correlation between in-
tensive exposure to the news media and (i) the knowl-
edge of the audience about terrorism in general and 11
September, 2001 in particular; (ii) the attitudes toward
terrorism in general and 11 September, 2001 in particu-
lar; (iii) and the favorable evaluation of the performance
of the Egyptian authorities with regard to terrorism.
Abd El-Ghaffar (2002) found that Egyptian universi-
ties students relied heavily on CNN as the main inter-
national source of information about 11 September
while Al Jazeera TV was the main regional source for
these events, followed by Egyptian television and Egyp-
tian national press as major information sources in Egypt.
Iseed (2001) notes that Western media consciously at-
tempt to damage and distort Islamic values and civiliza-
tion in a very systematic way and its negative impact will
remain until Arab media develop a strategic plan capa-
ble of addressing Arab issues according to the Islamic
culture heritage. Gallall (2002) argues, in his research on
Arab and Islamic issues in Arab media, that, if we seek
to understand how Western media portray Arab and Is-
lamic issues, it is important to study how Arab media
cover Arab Islamic issues. He believes that a strong rela-
tionship exists between Arab medias coverage of Arab
and Islamic issues and that of the Western media. The
author who uses the news framing theory as a theoreti-
cal framework concludes that the Arab-Israeli conflict
represents the most salient issue in all Arab media (print
and electronic). He also notes that, although Arab news-
papers and TV channels differ in their news values, the
general attitude of Arab media toward the Arab-Israel
conflict and the main issues discussed are similar.
Siddiqi (2002) addresses four questions: (i) how exten-
sively did the selected newspapers cover the issue of
terrorism, (ii) how did each newspaper treat the events
of 11 September, 2001; (iii) to what extent the newspa-
pers agree or disagree with the cause of terrorism, and
about combating it; and (iv) what primary national and
or international sources did the newspapers rely on? The
newspapers that were selected are The New York Times,
The Times of London, The China Daily, Saudi Gazette, The
Strait Times of Singapore, Friday Report of Pakistan, and
Dawat, an Indian newspaper. The time frame for the
study was the three-month period of September - De-
cember 2001. Siddiqi revealed two important findings:
(i) while The Times, The Strait Times, Saudi Gazette and China
Daily disagree somewhat with the positions taken by The
New York Times on the question of causes of terrorism
and counter-terrorism efforts, Dawat and Friday Report
disagreed considerably with the position taken by The
New York Times, and (ii) there are significant differences
in the way terrorism is defined and understood in vari-
ous cultures. Terrorism in the U.S. referred to any action
by a group or individual that threatens the hegemony of
the U.S., whereas in other cultures, especially in the Mid-
dle East and Asia, the emphasis seems to be on a broader
definition of terrorism.
Amer and El Metwally (2002) focus on how the opposi-
tion press in Egypt presents the position of both the
U.S. and Egypt toward the events of 11 September, 2001.
Two hypotheses were tested: (i) press coverage of crisis
contribute to formulate an urgent and distorted images
about what the crisis is, its causes and consequences,
and (ii) the image of Arabs as presented in the Egyptian
opposition press is positive and capable to manage the
crisis and its aftermath while the image of U.S. is de-
picted negatively. They found that the media ignore the
historical, and social context of the terroristic acts and
concentrate on the events per se. In other words, the
press isolates the incidents from the environment that
produces them, the causes and the potential impact. The
research offers strong support to the first hypothesis
but does not lend the same support to the second hy-
pothesis.
Policy Options on Media Coverage
of Terrorism
With the general belief that media coverage of terror-
ism has a contagion effect, it comes as no surprise that
the media are seen as having an important role to play in
any effort to combat terrorism. The debate around the
relation between media and terrorism arouses many ques-
tions including: What form should the medias role take?
And at whose behest should the necessary policing of
the media come? (Eke and Alali, 1991). Terrorist acts
throughout the world have resulted in bans and limita-
tions on news reporting in many countries. These have
ranged from temporary suspension of liberties to strict
censorship of the press. Much of the controversy over
press coverage of terrorism revolves around who should
control the news and on the basis of what objectives.
However, we cannot regard suppression of such report-
ing as being justified. To suppress the news for whatever
reason, good or bad, violates the fundamental principle
that govern a free press in a free society (Gerbner, 1988).
It has been certain that the role of media in forming
public opinion towards any type of conflict - wars, ter-
rorist and violent acts, crises, etc. is problematic. In Oc-
tober 2001, it was reported that the U.S. Secretary of the
State, Colin Powel, met with the Emir of Qatar and asked
him to restrain Al Jazeera Satellite Television, citing spe-
cifically the channels rebroadcast of the 1998 bin Laden
interview and charging that it invited anti-American
guests, who point to U. S. foreign policy as being behind
the 11 September attack (Al Mirazi, 2002). Israel has
denied access to journalists and media people to report
its massacres of Palestinians. This measure has occurred
many times during the second Intifada. Moreover, the
Palestinian television building has been destroyed by the
Israeli airstrike with a justification that it tends to en-
courage and support potential terrorists. In the Arab
world, temporary terrorist acts give Arab governments
an opportunity to justify the continuity of press restric-
tions with the purpose of protecting the national secu-
rity interests as well as combating terrorism. However, it
seems that analyses of how the media should and should
not respond to terrorism will continue as long as such
activities take place, and we may never come up with
satisfactory answers. Anderson (1993) believes that the
press must fulfill its duty to expose and present infor-
mation objectively, thereby serving the public good. Cen-
sorship by government officials would be a grievous
mistake, and so-called general guidelines are too often
vague or unsuited to particular events to be useful in
these kinds of situations.
What are the major policy options for a democratic so-
ciety with regard to the medias response to terrorism?
First, there is a policy of laissez faire. This assumes that 105
no specific steps should be taken with regard to media
Media, Violence and Terrorism in the Arab World
coverage of terrorism. A second policy option is some
form of media censorship or statuary regulation. The
third option and the approach most favored by profes-
sional media organizations is voluntary self-restraint to
try to avoid the dangers of manipulations and exploita-
tion by terrorist groups (Wilkinson, 1997). For several
reasons, it is certainly difficult to disallow media from
uncovering the truth regarding the violation of any in-
ternational law under the guise of misleading allegations.
The forms of the global injustice as well as the terrorist
acts of the colonial occupier must form the base and
substance of any free press in a free and democratic
society. Media people have to report these issues to the
fullest extent possible to make the people aware of dan-
gerous effects of these forms of terrorism. On the other
hand, dealing with terrorist acts perpetrated by individu-
als or groups is a matter of a journalists sense of social
responsibility and self-judgment.
Suggestions for Further Studies
While the literature on media and terrorism provides
some general findings on how media portray violence
and terrorism and how the Western media in particular
contribute to mobilizing international public opinion
against Arabs and Muslims, it does not offer a compre-
hensive approach to understanding media-terrorism re-
lationship. The problems of violence and terrorism are
of a cultural and ideological sensitivity as there are many
perspectives that define and interpret these phenomena
and different media as well as different persons will have
different positions and attitudes. Bearing this in mind, I
suggest that future Arab research on violence and ter-
rorism should deal with such issues as: (i) how and why
terrorists use the media; (ii) how Arab media character-
ize acts and perpetrators of political violence and ter-
rorism; (iii) what is the impact of media coverage of
violence and terrorism on public opinion; (iv) how the
opponents and supporters of terrorists use Internet to
manipulate the audiences (v) what is the impact of me-
dia coverage of terrorism on crisis management and
 decision making, (vi) what is the credibility of local and
international sources of news media for the Arab peo-
ple in times of terrorism; and (vii) how American, Is-
raeli and Arab media portray the violence of Arab-Is-
raeli conflict.
Conclusions
This report has reviewed and evaluated the current Arab
literature on media, violence and terrorism and presented
global synthesis and critical assessment of research and
scholarly studies. The report has shown the rarity of
serious scholarly work in the area of media and terror-
106
ism in the Arab region. It has also highlighted the need
for serious academic research projects through which
CHAPTER 11
Arab communication scholars are required to contrib-
ute to the understanding of the most critical issues fac-
ing the international system.
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 Introduction
Media,
Violence This report presents an overview and critical assessment of research in the Euro-
pean region on media, violence and terrorism. We take the European dimension to
and not only include work on political violence occurring in Europe but also work by
European scholars on the subject. We have not included the voluminous amount of
Terrorism research on the subject of media and domestic violence, or violence in popular
culture, although such material was included in earlier bibliographic reviews for
in UNESCO (especially Gerbner, 1988); these issues refer to different forms of poli-
tics than used here.
Europe
While the theoretical debates about the relationship between the media and terror-
ism were fiercely waged through the late 1970s and 1980s (Alexander, 1976; Schmid,
CHAPTER 12 107
1981) and reviewed in more recent work (Alali and Eke, 1991; Paletz and Schmid,
1992; Weimann and Winn, 1994), the issue has not occupied center stage in Euro-
pean studies of the media. Also, there is a substantial body of work on the causes of
political conflict and the nature of political violence, yet the specific consideration
of the role of the media in such conflicts has not generated much sustained re-
search attention in Europe, except in relation to the Balkans and the Kosovo crisis.

Research Methods

The timeframe was material published or presented during the four-year period of
January 1998-December 2001. UNESCO argued that this period has been chosen
mainly for pragmatic reasons and also to coincide with an observable increase in
political violence and terrorism in different parts of the world. However, this is not
a very accurate perspective for Europe. The Europe Overview of Patterns of Global
Terrorism, published by the U.S. State Department for the years 1998-2001 (see
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/europe.html) suggests that for
1998 the number of terrorist incidents actually declined in Europe. The reasons for
this are in large part because of increased vigilance by security forces and the
recognition by some terrorist groups that longstanding political and ethnic contro-
versies should be addressed in negotiations. The report identifies the main inci-
dents of terrorism: terrorism in Spain was attributable almost entirely to the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group. In Turkey, most incidents were related to the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In Greece, a variety of anarchist and terrorist
groups continued to operate with virtual impunity. The deadliest terrorist act oc-
curred in Omagh, Northern Ireland, when a splinter Irish Republican Army (IRA)
group exploded a 500-pound car bomb that killed 29 persons, including children.

Similarly, Europe experienced fewer terrorist incidents and casualties in 1999, and
Western Europe had the largest decline in the number of international terrorist
incidents of any region in 2000. Several European states moved to strengthen and
codify anti-terrorism legislation, and many signed the International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, which was opened for signature on 10
Annabelle Sreberny and
January 2000. In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States,
Prasun Sonwalker
European nations responded by offering immediate assistance to manage the crisis
and build the international coalition against terrorism, with Al-Qaida-related arrests
Centre for
carried out in Belgium, Bosnia, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. (www.state.gov/
Mass Communication Research
s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10240.htm)
University of Leicester
England
Thus two points are clear. First, incidents of terrorism actually declined in Europe
during the UNESCO study period, and this was reflected in the discursive and
random nature of academic output. Second, academic output in this period was
dominated by the media dynamics of the Kosovan crisis. This reflects both the
centrality of the Balkans as the major political crisis during the period, but also
 reflects the usual length of the academic research and
publishing cycle, which almost guarantees that no rapid
response to events can get published. While September
11 has clearly been a trigger for renewed interest in re-
search on this topic, most of that has not yet filtered
into the public domain. Our sense is that a considerable
amount of relevant work will appear within the next
year or two, but this cannot be included here.
Email and the Internet mean that the conduct of such
bibliographic research has certain advantages over ear-
lier work. On-line bibliographic searches are faster, re-
search activities are more transparent, individuals and
108 organizations are easier to locate than before. We posted
requests on numerous academic listservs in different
CHAPTER 12
disciplines (Political Science, International Relations,
Communications, Media Studies). We made direct con-
tact with individuals known to work in this area, and
with thinktanks, research institutes and university depart-
ments.
We used a variety of electronic databases including
BIDS/IBSS, INGENTA and others. There is undoubt-
edly a bias toward English-language materials, a bias that
is perhaps inherent in the very structure of the Net and
its tools. While substantial material has been accessed in
full, some has been retrieved electronically, and we are
dependent upon author-written abstracts, which often
lack detail about method and approach, for a sense of
the content of the research. Our searches generated
about 100 items, mainly in English.
We also found a few references in French, German, Ser-
bian, Greek, Norwegian and Spanish. Yet without ac-
cess to the complete texts, nor any available English trans-
lations or summaries, this material could not be included
here. The language barriers, lack of research coordina-
tion and lack of key research sites across Europe in this
area of media research are quite marked.
Synthesis and Critical Assessment
General Findings
The research we were able to identify was mainly written
in English and conducted in a limited number of coun-
tries. We found almost no work conducted in Italy, and
little in Scandinavia or Eastern Europe. Research is not
necessarily triggered by instances of local violence, nor
does it necessarily focus on the local. It can develop as
much out of theoretical interests or interests in com-
parative media dynamics. In general, there is a lack of
sustained, large-scale projects, perhaps because of a lack
of sources of funding. There is also little evidence of
longitudinal studies of media coverage of political vio-
lence, although this is one area where tracking of pat-
terns of political and media response seems vitally im-
portant. None of the big organizations, including the
European Union and UNESCO, appear to have funded
work in this area.
Most of the research work was conducted on the press
in and across various countries. Yet different researchers
select different newspapers for analysis, again leading to
a randomness of subject matter and lack of building
upon and refinement of research questions. There was
very little work conducted on television, despite a gen-
eral acknowledgement of its major role in opinion-for-
mation and audience preference for its mode of infor-
mation delivery. There was almost no work conducted
on radio, which often comes into its own during times
of crises and can be accessed in wireless mode when
electricity fails. Since some crises do surprise us, it is of-
ten very difficult to put a research project together quickly
enough; academic research is not noted for its rapid re-
sponse modalities. Also, very few countries have any-
thing like a television news archive, such as the Vanderbilt
News Archive in the U.S., from which to retrieve broad-
cast news content.
The preferred research approach was the use of rhetori-
cal and discourse analysis and most research was con-
tent-driven. Not much work focused on the interface
between politics and the media, and even less focused
on the military-media interface, although both areas are
central for exploration of issues of agenda-setting, de-
termination of the origins of discursive frames and is-
sues of propaganda and surveillance. Research that in-
volved interviews with journalists, politicians, govern-
ment and military spokespeople was rarely used and there
was little attempt at triangulation.
Despite the widespread use of comparative method,
there was a lack of comparison between European and
U.S. media coverage to fully explore the potential CNN
effect. Whether there is an emerging global hegemony
constructed by the U.S. articulated in its media channels
and picked up by European media or whether a more
modulated European political consensus has developed
against American foreign policy seem valuable questions
for media analysis in this area. Not unsurprisingly, as
already mentioned, the bulk of European research work
during this time-period focuses on media and political
violence in the Balkans and Kosovo. The rest includes
such divergent foci and orientations, including terror-
ism, that it is hard to consider it as a sustained body of
academic research.
The Media and Political Violence in the
Balkans
The main, although not universal, finding across this body
of work are that the European media unabashedly toed
the NATO-government line and enlisted in the propa-
ganda war. On the other hand, detailed comparative stud-
ies suggest that different European media systems re-
ported Kosovo differently, both reflecting the European
Unions fragmented public sphere but also the manner
in which detailed rhetorical and discourse analysis pro-
duces difference. Analysis of the interface between mass
media and new technologies suggests that in the Kosovo
conflict the Web ensured that the media coverage was
seen as propaganda, in contrast to the good war per-
ception during the Gulf crisis.
Government-media Relations
Perhaps the most significant specific area of work fo-
cused on government-media relations in different loca-
tions. Hammond and Herman (2000) analysed the par-
tisan and propagandistic role of Western media in re-
producing official spin. Hryatin and Trampuz (2000)
discuss the manner in which the Serbian media national-
ized, mobilized and emotionalized the public sphere with
the use of patriotic journalism, in the context of the
Serb authorities spreading Serbian nationalism and the
implementation of new media legislation in the 1990s
when abuse of the media began. Some analysts focused
on the general way in which new information technolo-
gies had changed the shape of warfare. Livingstone et.
al. (2000) analyse the changes for both military and for-
eign-policy establishments created by the new environ-
ment of global real-time media.
The CNN Effect: Media Coverage and
Humanitarian Intervention
A popular, if not very securely grounded, argument arose
after the Kosovo crisis that media coverage of suffering
could prompt so-called humanitarian intervention by
Western governments. Robinson (2000a, 2000b) looked
for evidence of media-driven intervention by examin-
ing U.S. policy responses to humanitarian crises in So-
malia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and suggests that there is
some substance to the claims that media coverage can
trigger the deployment of airpower intervention during
humanitarian crisis but not ground troops. In another
article, Robinson (2000c) puts forward a policy-media
interaction model as a useful tool for testing the claim
that media coverage causes intervention during humani-
tarian crises; the suggestion is that media influence oc-
curs when policy is uncertain and media coverage is criti-
cally framed and empathises with suffering.
Thussu (2000) examines the nature of CNNs presenta-
tion of NATOs bombing of Yugoslavia as humani-
tarian intervention, one of the few studies to take the
role of television seriously. Hammond (2000a) exam-
ines British media coverage and identifies a close rela-
tionship between the media and the military, a journal-
ism of attachment, which helps to justify western mili-
tary intervention as humanitarian. Keeble (2000) sug-
gests government and media both function to hide the
horror of humanitarian warfare. Considerable critique
focuses on the role of U.S. media as a voice of NATO.
Allen and Seaton (1999) make very strong argument that
myths and falsehoods were deliberately perpetrated by
the U.S. in conjunction with the media so that action in
the name of humanitarianism actually obfuscated the
U.S. goal of global hegemony. Phillips (1999) argues that
the mainstream U.S. media knowingly passed on biased
and false information from the U.S. military and NATO 109
to the U.S. public, with the U.S. government creating the
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Europe
International Public Information group to orchestrate
the news environment.
Comparative Research
Comparative method is popular in media analyses of
the coverage of political crises, yet researchers chose a
variety of other crises with which to compare Kosovo.
Robinson (2000c) examined Somalia, Bosnia and
Kosovo. Contributors to Allen and Seatons book (1999)
examined media representations of war in Greece, Iraq,
former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and
Kenya. Kuusisto (1999) compared the Western political
rhetoric used against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War
with that of the conflict in Bosnia. Keeble (2000) also
compared the Iraqi conflict of 1991 to the Kosovo cri-
sis of 1999, examining the growth of a secret state in
Britain and the role of the media, explored through the
institutional and personal links between journalists and
security services.
A second form of comparison is the examination of
representation of a particular moment across a number
of different media systems. Kuusito (1999) compared
the political rhetoric of U.S., British and French political
leaders, while Grundmann, Smith and Wright (2000)
examined the discourses pertaining to the Balkan war in
the establishment press of France, Britain and Germany.
In Hammond and Herman (2000), various contributors
analyse how the war was reported in the U.S., Britain,
Germany, Greece, Russian and France. Nohrstedt et. al.
(2000) examine the discourses of the press in Greece,
Norway, Sweden and Britain and how specific national/
local contexts function in a context of globalization and
super-power dominance. Such comparisons suggest a
pragmatic logic of the availability of research colleagues
as much as an analytically driven argument for the choice
of comparators. Savarese (2000) examines 10 European
newspapers, looking at infosuasion, narrative struc-
ture and media logic. Nacos et. al.s publication (2000) is
one of the few volumes to make sustained comparison
 of public opinion in relation to both American and Eu-
ropean foreign-policy establishments.
At third form of comparison is to explore the differ-
ences across a range of media channels within one coun-
try. Eilders and Luter (2000) examined Kosovo war dis-
course in the editorials of the five leading German news-
papers and suggest a high degree of consent in the press
toward Germanys first military action since World War
Two. Vincent (2000) looks at nine different U.S. news
media and coverage of Milosevic and the Serbs and found
considerable agreement.
110
Examining Television Coverage
CHAPTER 12
There was not much research work conducted on tel-
evision, despite it being the most popular medium for
the delivery of international news and the one perhaps
most driven by the visually exciting agenda of violent
events. Most countries still lack television news archives
so it takes a very enthusiastic researcher to tape televi-
sion material in real-time for possible future research
analysis. Thussu (2000) looks at television news through
the coverage of CNN, arguing that it reproduced the
U.S. agenda to a global audience, molding public opin-
ion in support of war. However recently and falling
outside the strict time-frame of this study - McLaughlin
(2002) examined a sample of British and American tel-
evision newscasts in relation to NATO campaigns in
Serbia and Kosovo and concludes that the presentation
of NATO material was often treated with appropriate
professional scepticism. This is notable as one of the
few critiques of the media that suggests they did not
simply toe the NATO line.
Rhetorical and Discourse Analysis
Analyses of the rhetoric and discourses used in media
coverage were the most popular research methods used.
Penalva and Mateo (2000) conducted a semiotic analysis
of the coverage of NATO intervention in Kosovo by
the Spanish newspaper El Pais which revealed the ten-
dency of the media to display events within a narrative
structure in which the actors are predetermined. Scott
(1999) examines the arguments about NATO interven-
tion in Kosovo by cosmopolitans and their critics as pre-
sented by the broadsheet press in Germany, with some
comparisons to the differences in debate in Britain.
Goodwin and Hills (2001) examine the responses by
NATO to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade, as reported in Hong Kongs English-language
press; the focus is mainly on the perceptions that China
and Western nations have about each other and the con-
tradiction between Chinas on-going economic interde-
pendence with the West and its desire for political inde-
pendence.
The Media Screen and Horror
One line of analysis running through this material is the
power of visual imagery of violence. Terrorism or hos-
tage taking can provide dramatic visuals that attract huge
media audiences. Doubt (2000) looks at Bosnia as a glo-
bal media screen for a horrifying moral tale. Hryatin
and Trampuz (2000) look at the film Wag the Dog,
and discuss medias role in not only reporting about but
also constructing war. Scanlon (2001) examined two in-
cidents that attracted strong media attention: Waco, Texas
and the Air France highjacking and showed how escalat-
ing media coverage raised questions about effective re-
sponses and about political leadership. Haynes (1999)
examined a recent German docudrama on the Red Army
Faction and suggested that newspapers and film act as a
forum for debating the difficult issues which political
violence raises.
History and Memory
Media play the role of keepers of public memory, but
whose memories and which historical narrative is often
a site of contestation. Huyssen (2000) looks at discourses
of memory and focuses on Holocaust narratives that
were energized by genocidal politics in Rwanda, Bosnia
and Kosovo, examining media as transmitters of memory
and their possible influence on perception and tempo-
rality. Hammonds book review essay (2000b) examines
journalisms instantaneous production of history, and
its lack of perspective in the context of reporting on
war and conflict.
NATOs campaign in Kosovo triggered debate about
the virtualization of conflict with new technologies
rendering what was a distanced and de-realised experi-
ence. Carruthers (2001) questions the extent to which
conflict has been transformed in an age of virtual tech-
nology and virtuous motivations. Whine (2001) con-
trasts Islamism and totalitarianism, and argues that both
mobilise the masses to combat external threat and both
rely on mass communication and suppression of dis-
sent to develop their own monopolistic ideologies.
Trauma Talk
Some work in this area grows out of psychological con-
cern for mental health effects. Slone (2000) conducted
an experiment about media coverage of national threat
situations and anxiety. An experimental group was shown
television news clips of terrorism while the control group
was shown newsclips unrelated to national security, and
results supported the anxiety-inducing effect of the ex-
perimental condition, suggesting that further explora-
tion of media coverage of political violence and psy-
chological processes was needed. Hobart (2000) studied
how ordinary people in Bali articulate the role of mass
media in maintaining the existing political order, where
before the riots that brought down the Soeharto regime,
they suggest that a new political and social order could
only emerge after apocalyptic violence. More recent work
by Skirrow et. al. (2002) investigated the influence of
media events on hallucinatory content of intensive care
unit patients and discovered that during the war in
Kosovo, patients, especially older adults, were more likely
to have hallucinatory experiences involving themes of
war or the military.
Media and Terrorism
A small literature during the period of the research fo-
cused specifically on terrorism, although our sense is
that a considerable amount of research and writing that
has been triggered by 11 September is currently underway,
as reflected in conference presentations through 2001-
2, and will soon appear in published form.
Kaminaris (2000) examines the interface of government,
media and terrorists in Greece, noting the minimal spread
of terrorism there but the considerable criticism heaped
upon the Greek government regarding its relationship
to terrorists. Both Silke (2001) and Merari (1999) essen-
tially argue that terrorist events have had a very high
media profile, the latter arguing that essentially terror-
ism has not changed for many years and that, true to its
inherent characteristics as a mode of struggle, terrorism
cannot substantially change for better or for worse (writ-
ten before 11 September). Gordon (2001) argues that
the scholarly communication system with respect to ter-
rorism research is both open, with information coming
in from government, and media, but closed, with infor-
mation flowing to the popular press. A more closed in-
formation system might help its maturation into an au-
tonomous academic research discipline.
The ethical implications of the political framing in tel-
evision (Iyengar, 1991) and more specifically the media
coverage of violence has generated a considerable theo-
retical literature (Tester, 1994; Boltanski, 1999; Moeller,
1999; Cohen, 2001). This has raised profound questions
about both the news production processes and audi-
ence responses, and this issue runs as an implicit theme
through much of the work cited here.
Political Violence and the Web
Surprising little work appeared during this period on the
function and use of the web at times of political crisis.
Again, it seems that post- 11 September work will, of
necessity, pay more attention to the role of the web as a
global news source. Hall (2000) examines Kosovo as the
first web war and the manner in which the information
war fought out on the Net between NATO and Serbia
mediated the real war in new ways, addressing readers
both in Serbia and around the world. Purcell and Kodras
(2001) examine Slovenias efforts at crafting an image of
itself via the Internet, trying to disassociate itself from
the Balkan moniker and persuade the European Union
and NATO of its readiness for accession. Bieber (2000)
suggested that while the Internet alleviated information
shortages in Yugoslavia, it helped the independent me-
dia as well as reaching a small user population. Tiryakian
(2001) offers a structural-functionalist analysis of the
dynamics of ethnic conflict and the responsibility of
democratic states to intervene to mitigate such conflict.
The modernity of virtual warfare also heightens the 111
responsibility of the media, particularly television.
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Europe
With a more general focus, Watts (2001) argues that the
Internet has supported both the political and commer-
cial growth of skinhead and right-wings culture, provid-
ing a means of support and growth. Crilley (2001) looks
at the use of the Internet by terrorists and extremists in
a new kind of information warfare, and argues that gov-
ernments have to strike a balance between freedom of
speech and national security.
Herd (2000) focuses on the information warfare aspects
of the second Russo-Chechen campaign in 1999, in-
cluding Chechen exploitation of the Internet and inter-
nal Russian press criticism of the war, providing a leit-
motif of Russias systemic transformation. Watts (2001)
shows that bias crime has risen in Germany since unifi-
cation while one-third of violent incidents come from
unaffiliated, informal groups of young men and not from
identifiable ideological groups as earlier. He suggests that
contemporary xenophobia is linked to aggressive ele-
ments of youth culture but also to international ideo-
logical networks supported by the Internet.
Suggestions for Further Research
It appears that the debates about the relationship be-
tween the media and terrorism that had been so fiercely
waged through the late 1970s and 1980s had pretty much
fallen out of the academic research agenda until the tragic
events of 11 September, 2001 put terrorism firmly back
onto the public political agenda. Our scanning of the
academic literature generated little work that focused on
definitions of terrorism, on the relationship between
symbolic violence and the media, or on media coverage
of terrorist acts. We anticipate a flurry of new work fo-
cusing on and reinterpreting these issues to be currently
in print, but falling outside the remit of this study.
It appears that academic work is not immediately reac-
tive to external events as the underlying presumption
behind this study might imply. Research is slow to fund,
 organize and undertake and the publishing cycle further
slows material appearing in the public domain, and thus
any potential impacts on policy-making or public opin-
ion formation. Instead, academic work tries to refine
theoretical contsructs, test hypotheses, undertake com-
parative work. Indeed, much of the work uncovered here
is from doctoral research by individuals, suggesting the
difficulties for groups of academics to organize such
intensive work without adequate time and funding. The
cumulative difficulties of undertaking research work in
such a critical and contemporary area implies the need
for major institutional prioritizing and funding for such
work, a role that UNESCO and the Council of Europe
112 might take up.
CHAPTER 12
There are few longitudinal studies that seek to test
whether coverage of a particular conflict actually changes
over time within a media system, depending on the shifts
of governing group or changes in the ownership and
focus of the media. While there is a plethora of com-
parative studies, each compares different things: differ-
ent countries, different media, different time frames. And
there is a lack of analysis of the benefits and drawbacks
of comparative analysis: if we are not comparing like
with like (and how do we define that?) then of what use
is comparative analysis?
The possible impact of media coverage needs better in-
vestigation. There is anecdotal evidence of political and
diplomatic elites rushing to watch CNN in order to un-
derstand world events; more research is needed on the
elite-media interface and the effects of mainstream cov-
erage on policy-making. That is, as well as trying to un-
derstand how political elites try to influence and struc-
ture media coverage (the Pentagon controlling access to
press accreditation during the Gulf War; or the role of
NATO briefings) it is also vital to understand how these
elites are themselves influenced by media output. Ac-
cess to sources is difficult, but perhaps more analysis
could be made of secondary sources, such as memoirs,
autobiographies, etc, as well as government documents;
declassification is a slow process, and this implies a his-
torical approach to this area of work.
New areas of research would include analysis of the
coverage of the role of peacekeeping forces, both within
Europe and beyond, such as European forces deployed
in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. This would include
the blurring of the boundaries between military and
political activity as well as the relations between such
troops and the local peoples amongst whom they are
placed. We discovered no such research.
It seems an important time to open up the field of re-
search, and to acknowledge different kinds of violence
with different causal patterns and different effects. Mini-
mally, it is possible to recognize domestic violence in the
private sphere, violence that stems from deprivation,
drugs and social exclusion, and more overtly political
forms of violence by proto-nations and schismatic
groups. While these forms of violence cannot be simply
collapsed together, they cannot be kept strictly separate
either. Hill (2001) is one of the few analysts to attempt
such a rereading of the debates. He examines the key
stages in the physical and moral amplification of the
risks of media violence, looking at the role of media,
politicians and anti-violence campaign groups. These
groups try to control the information flows about stig-
matized examples of popular culture and media audi-
ences, trying to create a safer moral and cultural envi-
ronment.
We need a better definition of what constitutes political
violence, since all of these forms have political ramifica-
tions in one form or another. Ball-Rokeach (2001) has
written of the need to analyse political forces operative
in the study of media effects and of mediated violence
in particular, including the establishment of commis-
sions and the writing of commission reports. This might
be the start of a rethinking and a recombination of the
fragmented field of media and violence within a revi-
sion of the understanding of politics.
A more sophisticated examination of the inter-locking
of different forms of violence would lead to a stronger
focus on the gendered nature of conflict and coverage
of conflict. This would not only include the gendered
nature of political conflict and the differential impacts
of political violence on men, women and children; it
would also examine the gendered nature of media cov-
erage, exploring whether women journalists and editors
focus on different stories or different angles of stories,
and bring a different optic to their telling. Additionally,
political violence in theatres of war often has pro-
found consequences for relations in the domestic thea-
tre of family life, issues that have barely begun to be
recognised, let alone researched.
Despite the growing awareness of the gendered nature
of political conflict and its coverage, very little work even
remarked upon this issue. Some recent work like that by
Del Zotto (2002) argues that womens experiences of
war were highly misrepresented in mainstream media.
Using a content analysis model for media of 21 nations,
she suggests a news blackout of womens war experi-
ences and distortions of these experiences, all of which
hide crucial issues that would otherwise improve the
public understanding of warfare. Also, in Playdons (2002)
interview with Eve-Ann Prentice, there is some discus-
sion of the inflection that being a woman has given her
professional work as a journalist.
Concluding Remarks
A major limitation to this study is the linguistic blinkering
within academic databases. While many of the databases
searched include non-English language materials, our
sense is that this is a miniscule amount of the totality of
references. We are acutely aware of the English-language
bias of this study, and the difficulties of trying to rem-
edy that in the short-term. Indeed, there is probably a
strong English-language bias within academic research
as a whole. If this area of research is of policy and po-
litical significance, as we suggest it is, then a centre, per-
haps located within a university, could be established as
an archive or clearing-house for the collection, annota-
tion and on-going monitoring of this area of research.
Additionally, serious work needs to be supported by se-
rious funding and time. These are possible future func-
tions for UNESCO and the Council of Europe to take
up. Indeed, given that this very research is being under-
taken by researchers outside Europe, who may well be
making similar recommendations about their own cor-
ners of the world, an archive that collected the global
literature on this topic would be welcome.
Given the range of European languages in which re-
search is conducted, there is need to gather the mate-
rial/data at one central site. For this purpose, an interac-
tive website could be created, where researchers from
different European countries feed in data that could be
available to others working in the same field. Such an
initiative may be undertaken by an apex organisation such
as UNESCO or the Council of Europe, whose transla-
tion strengths could also be tapped for the purposes of
wider dissemination and utility to policy and research. A
conference of researchers working in this area could help
synthesise research across Europe, as well as highlight
the disjunctures between various theatres of conflict.
As we write this in October 2002, in the wake of new
terrorist violence against tourists in Bali, a new research
question imposes itself around the relationship between
the experience of risk and the role of media in increas-
ing public fear. There is tension between the publics
right to know and the need to be forewarned about pos-
sible acts of violence, and the possible escalation of anxi-
ety that generalised pronouncements about anticipated
future acts of terror generate. The focus of analysis here
is not about media coverage of acts of terror themselves
but about the media-politics interface when public safety
depends upon unreliable knowledge about future possi-
ble events. It is undoubtedly the case that the events of
11 September, 2001 have reawakened the research agenda
about media and political violence, not least in the dif-
ferent approaches between the U.S. and Europe about
these issues. This overview report is a small contribu-
tion toward that renewed debate.
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 Introduction
Media,
The purpose of this report is to provide a summary and a critical analysis of the
Violence academic studies and publications on media, violence and terrorism in Latin America
between 1998 and 2001. There were two methodological considerations for select-
ing and reviewing the texts presented in this report. First, different reference sources
and in the region were consulted and information was sought from research centers
specialized in communication. The Red Iberoamericana de Revistas de Comunicacin (Ibero-
Terrorism in American Network of Communication Journals) was consulted as were the annals
of national and regional symposia organized by FELAFACS, the Federacin
Latinoamericana de Facultades y Escuelas de Comunicacin, (Latin American Federation of
Latin America Communication Faculties and Schools); ALAIC, the Asociacin Latinoamericana de
Investigadores de la Comunicacin (Latin American Association of Communication Re-
CHAPTER 13 115
searchers); and by the different national communication associations.

Secondly, the selection of works was done based on academic criteria. The search
was limited to studies and publications that contained: a conceptual, even if brief,
approach to the topic; an expository methodology; a bibliography; and other char-
acteristics of academic works. The sample included partial and complete reports on
research projects, and theoretical essays supported by empirical knowledge, all taken
from annals of national and international congresses; books; academic journals;
and communication research centers web pages, among other reference sources.
We hope this report is useful for those people and institutions involved in media
production, education and research, and in the design of policies concerning media
and violence in Latin America.

Global Analysis and Critical Assessment

Information Coverage:
Armed Conflict and Political Violence

The set of works which we analysed focused on media coverage of armed conflicts
and other forms of political violence, including but not limited to terrorism. These
studies are grouped under three basic headings: media narratives that manufacture
news about war and peace; the situation of journalists in politically violent contexts;
and the public interactions between journalists, politicians, and armed groups. A
total of 28 studies and publications are in the group. Half of them are academic
studies which, although based on empirical data, do not intend to produce empirical
knowledge. The other half includes research reports that combine content analysis
with semiotic methods that characterize cultural and discourse analyses.

News about Peace and War

Jorge Bonilla Vlez and
Camilo Tamayo Gmez
School of
Communication and Language
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
Bogota, Columbia
Colombia is one of the countries where works on this topic abound. It is worth
noting that in none of the works analyzed is the concept of terrorism used to
denote internal confrontation in this country. On the contrary, all papers aim at
studying the armed confrontation on the basis of political motivations, and social
and cultural causes. Therefore, the discussion is not focused on whether there should
be information about the war, or on whether media are used for propaganda to
magnify the actions and discourse of illegal armed groups. In that sense, works such
as those of Rey (1998), Barn (2001) and Garca and Romeros (2001) contribute
interesting elements for analysing the nature of journalistic representations of the
armed conflict. Based on their works, it can be seen that the fascination with events
of war in media agenda is due to the fact that these events are associated with news
values that favor drama, tragedy, novelty, spectacularity, antagonism and heroism.
 Such narratives constantly deflect events of peace
because these are not related to the dramatic, the unu-
sual, or the shocking.
It is emphasized that this kind of media visibility is pro-
portional to the degradation of the armed conflict
(Lpez, 2000). Parallel to the conflicts escalation and
degradation, information agenda drive value-news to
extremes where information is combined with drama,
uncertainty, and entertainment (Abello, 2001), and real-
ity is mixed with fiction (Correa, 2001). This is done
through news stories that not only (re)present war con-
frontation in a simplistic way that lacks historical per-
116 spective and political context (Barn and Valencia, 2001),
but also trivialize horror, reinforce intolerance (UNDP,
CHAPTER 13
1999), box society into the passive victims role, and turn
journalism into a place for hegemonic representation of
the official points of view (Garca and Pereira, 2000). evolution, and logic of conflicts, war, and violence.
For some of the authors, the challenge of information
coverage is to make visible the faces and voices of the
majority of the population that struggle daily to solve
conflicts peacefully and creatively without resorting to
violence (Flores and Crawford, 2001). Accordingly, one
of the aspects to be worked on with journalists is the
political and professional background behind their vi-
sion of reality; this would give room to other criteria for
information where peace - peace culture - can be seen as
a matter of public concern. This can be done by foster-
ing political discussion, strengthening the public use of
common sense, and reconstructing news stories that
enhance reconciliation (Rey, 2000).
Those who examine other conflicts, either internal such
as those in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Peru
or border conflicts such as the one between Peru and
Ecuador, acknowledge that societies at war or which have
worrisome levels of political violence will always be con-
fronted with information restrictions. Several reasons
account for this: official censorship (Cortes, 1999); per-
secution of free and independent media (Herrera, 1998);
lack of autonomy with respect to political power (Smeets,
1999); medias submission to anti-subversive policies that
prevent greater coverage and democratic criticism
(Acevedo, 2001); and the war fever that takes over
media and reinforces old myths by stereotyping the en-
emy and simplifying the real causes for struggle (Reyes,
1999).
Informing in the midst of conflict:
the role of journalists
Another common concern of the works analysed points
in two directions: the necessary guarantees to work as a
journalist, and the indispensable professional training to
work in situations of generalized violence. Albarrn
(1999) points out that journalists are at high risk when
they work in such situations, since they are usually sub-
ject to pressure from the State, illegal armed groups, and
even by media owners who try to prevent them from
informing about issues they prefer to leave in the dark,
away from public scrutiny.
With respect to this situation, some of the studies sug-
gest that threats to journalists are the result of their own
polarized, ignorant, and naive information coverage.
Some other studies defend the thesis that weak profes-
sional training brings about unnecessary risks that affect
not only individuals but also the profession as a whole;
journalists become victims of the cross fire between
violence actors (Guerrero, 2001). Therefore, it is pointed
out, journalists have the fundamental responsibility to
be better prepared to understand the causes, interests,
What would be the task? Three basic aspects of infor-
mation culture should be strengthened: (i) journalists
training to cover peace, human rights, and democratic
coexistence insofar as these are long-term social proc-
esses (Beltrn, 1988); (ii) journalists specialization in the
coverage of war, so that they can distinguish propaganda
from information, and question official and irregular
information sources intelligently (Abello, 2001; Guerrero,
2001); and (iii) medias assumption of their social re-
sponsibility. The goal should be for journalism to be-
come a democratic forum for the expression and public
debate of the points of view of those sectors that seek
access to, deliberation about, or the defense of public
expression (Acevedo, 2001).
Public Sphere, Information, Violence,
and Power
A third issue of concern that can be identified in some
of the works is based on the acknowledgment that me-
dia are central arenas for competition and symbolic
power display, where political and social antagonists strug-
gle for access to the public sphere. In some of the texts
found in this group, it is argued that, in political vio-
lence, war and conflicts, actors bring along their forces
against the enemy, and their symbolic and ideological
interpretation frameworks to act in society, since these
processes not only involve death and destruction but
also construction.
By questioning one of the most popular hypotheses
about the role of media in political violence, Peralta (1998)
proposes to go beyond the idea that media are reso-
nance boxes for violent actors. The author argues that
media, more than being inductors of political violence,
are immersed into a complex system of interactions and
symbolic representations that also involve academic dis-
course, the State, and violence agents. After comparing
the role of national and international press regarding
the terrorist violence perpetrated by Sendero Luminoso
in Peru (1980-1994), Peralta (2000) points out that the
press swung from media spectacularization of vio-
lence, to keeping with official discourse, to an alliance
with academic discourse.
Bonilla (2001) and Medina & Garca (2001) have a simi-
lar argument. They point out that the public sphere, which
includes media, is a permanently tense space in constant
dispute. There, journalists and media establish coopera-
tion, consensus, censorship, inequality, rupture, opposi-
tion and/or autonomy relationships with other com-
munication agents - groups and institutions. These, in
turn, struggle to become visible or invisible, as the case
may be, in the public sphere(s), as well as to control and
manage communication as a strategic resource of vital
importance for political and military management, and
for the symbolic structuring of conflicts.
Through the analysis of the communication model of
the EZLN (Spanish acronym for Zapatist National Lib-
eration Army), particularly of the discussion of sub-com-
mander Marcos, Karam (2001) suggests that the pub-
lic sphere should be understood as a space of perma-
nent tension given its social significance. According to
this analysis, the political charisma of Marcos is based
on his ability to mix Mexican popular and indigenous
symbolic drama with network technology. The strength
of his message is not in the inductive and objective con-
tents of Western thought, but rather in the narrative
expression capable of keeping hope alive.
Sierra (1998) also refers to this tension in his analysis of
the Mexican war conflict. The author argues against the
generalized idea that the conflict in Chiapas is a com-
munication war without censorship, and the result of a
postmodern form of confrontation based on the gen-
eralized use of the Internet and on medias central posi-
tion. According to the author, although the EZLN has
been able to position itself in the international public
sphere through a discourse based on dignity and restruc-
tured symbols, the myth that Chiapas is a conflict which
uses that which is symbolic and technological prevents
analysis of disinformation, propaganda, and censorship.
These are the methods that the Mexican government
and power sectors have learned in modern counterin-
surgency manuals and are using today.
Along the same line, although less ideologically, Rey
(1998) compares the quality of the public sphere and
media narratives both in international wars and in local
conflicts. Based on analysis of the public sphere gener-
ated by local war conflicts, the author argues that there
are greater public visibility factors where information
and narrative, drama and technique, ordinary and expert
knowledge are combined. In contrast, television wars
of today are limiting public visibility through virtual and
technological management of the confrontation that
prevent horror, destruction and death from being shown.
It is worth mentioning three studies that refer to the 11
September, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States:
Chaves (2001), Levario (2001) and Pacheco (2001). The
three analyze coverage of the events in the Mexican media
by focusing on three main aspects of the information:
there was no obsession for horror images, although sen-
sationalism was evident; mythical and religious explana-
tions of the events were common; and an anti-Ameri- 117
can sentiment was displayed, which did not promote
Media, Violence and Terrorism in Latin America
rational analysis of the situation.
Concluding Remarks
Terrorism does not seem to be a particular topic for
research within this academic interest in violence in me-
dia. Studies were not interested in analyzing terrorism,
or the role of media with respect to terrorism and its
agents. Instead, they concentrated on analyzing infor-
mation coverage and medias staging of violence, around
three main topics: armed conflicts, political violence, and
criminal violence. In countries with current or previ-
ous armed conflicts and generalized political violence,
the media were analyzed in the light of their complex
relationships within the public sphere, and the role of
journalists who risk their autonomy, independence, and
personal safety. Special attention was paid to the quality
of public visibility of violence, war and peace, and the
news values behind the presentation of horror, death,
and tragedy, but also of life, hope and post-conflict times.
In countries where there are no armed conflicts, vio-
lence is no longer shown as revolutionary violence
but rather as molecular violence associated with lack
of safety, scandal and crime. In these cases, more than
analyzing violent contents, researchers were interested
in analyzing the consequences of media productions in
the construction of a social order based on reinforcing
fear of others and on demands for safety.
In both cases, emphasis should be given to comparative
studies on media and violence in different Latin Ameri-
can countries. This would allow for a comparison be-
tween topic setting agendas and public debate concern-
ing armed conflicts, violence, terrorism, crime and pun-
ishment, and the way they are valued and used politically
and socially in various cultural scenarios, demographic
contexts, social orders, and communication media in
Latin America. In terms of the theoretical scope and
limitations of each study, observations can be made
in two respects. First, it should be said that half of
 the papers are interested in approaching the relation
between media and violence from different theoreti-
cal perspectives. However, their objective is not the
production of empirical knowledge, even if supported
by empirical data, but rather the construction of ex-
planation frameworks for future studies. The Latin
American research community is encouraged to gen-
erate knowledge that provides empirical evidence by
carrying out solid and systematic studies, and not only
theoretical studies that may be considered pure specu-
lation. This suggestion is borne out of the fact that
some texts involved political discussion and moral
debate about media and violence based on pre-estab-
118 lished positions, instead of empirical evidence on the
topic.
CHAPTER 13
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pp. 27-56.
 Introduction and Research Methods
Media,
Violence This chapter presents a report on research published in North America on media,
political violence and terrorism during the four year period from 1998 to 2002. We
and began with a comprehensive search, using the key words terrorism, media, po-
litical violence, newspaper, television, and news to identify all items that
Terrorism in could possibly be relevant. For books and doctoral or M.A. dissertations, we applied
our key words to WorldCat, a library catalogue of the holdings of hundreds of
North libraries including the Library of Congress. It generated over 300 items, including
such works with bibliographies as Alexander (2002), Kushner (2002), and Taylor
America and Horgan (2000). We eliminated the numerous books aimed at a general audience
and those obviously devoid of original research. We also excluded the many books
that looked as if they might contain relevant research but on closer inspection turned
CHAPTER 14 119
out not to do so; as well as those that, even when they had at least a modicum of
research, only briefly mentioned any form of media. After examining the rest for
scholarship and substance, we identified fewer than a dozen books with appropriate
material. Some of these were edited collections (e.g. Kushner, 2002), from which we
extracted only those parts published between 1998 and 2002.

For articles, we used several databases, including JSTOR and Expanded Academic
Index, and surveyed political science, economics, and sociology journals. This search
produced several hundred articles, the overwhelming majority of which we dis-
carded because they did not discuss the media or did so only briefly. We also looked
through every issue published during the research period of the two leading jour-
nals: Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, finding a few
additional articles. Our focus is on research, so reports to government agencies
and collections of statements and documents devoid of research, such as the vol-
umes compiled by Alexander and Swetnam (1999), were not eligible. We scrutinized
think tank studies on terrorism and violence (e.g. from the Rand Corporation) but
found few related to the media.

Our search and elimination left us with approximately 100 items for detailed consid-
eration. Reviewing them, we found that many only alluded to the media briefly or in
passing. Typical are Kushners survey of contemporary terrorism which limits its
discussion of the media to a few pages on cyberspace (Kushner, 1998, pp. 74-78),
and David Wilcoxs chapter (in Alexander, 2002) on combatting terrorism in the
U.S. which has only roughly one page on the media. Even a book on terrorism and
the U.S. Constitution referred only by implication to the effects of and limitations
imposed by anti-terrorism laws on the media (Cole and Dempsey, 2002).

Global Analysis and Critical Assessment

In this report, we discuss the relevant research that remains under three main cat-
egories with appropriate sub-categories. The categories are contents, effects, and
David L. Paletz information and communication technologies. To the extent that each study deals
and Jill Rickershauser with each subject, we cover its focus, research questions, theories and concepts,
methods, findings, conclusions, and contributions to knowledge.
Department of Political Science
Duke University
Contents
USA
Cotter (1999) studies the impact of white power rock and roll on the spread of the
neo-Nazi subculture. He seeks the reasons for the subcultures durability, diffusion
and appeal, and for skinhead violence. Main research methods are content analysis
of record albums (lyrics and music) and acquiring sales figures as a measure of
popularity. He finds that the skinhead subculture has spread to more than 30 coun-
tries and that there are more than 100 white power bands. The musics themes
 include being a skinhead, hatred for outgroups, anti-
semitism, conspiracy theories, incitements to violence,
and war between the races. Cotter concludes that the
music could result in more politically effective skinhead
organizations and more large-scale violence.
Yamamotos subject (1999) is threatening letters sent to
the news media. He compares coverage and treatment
in Japanese newspapers of the message from a teenage
murderer with American newspapers responses to the
Unabombers demand for publication of his manifesto.
He uses Robert Mertons theory on patterns of cultural
goals and institutional norms, as well as orienting the
120 research around the concepts of media ethics and re-
sponsibility. The research method is analysis of the news-
CHAPTER 14
papers decisions and reasons based on the public record.
He concludes that in the United States these were based
on newsworthiness and concern for public safety, al-
though the latter was emphasized. He recommends that
the media reconsider their way of reporting the mes-
sages of those using illegitimate means to get the me-
dias attention (1998, p. 128).
Anderson (1998) focuses on Iranian sponsored terror-
ism in the media. He researches correlations between
anti-U.S. terrorism and communications by Iranian offi-
cials. His theory and concepts stem from Alex Schmid
and Janny de Graaf s discussion of the various possible
causes of terrorism, for example, anthropological or stra-
tegic choice. Both have been used to explain Iranian ter-
rorism. Anderson tests a different model, adopted from
Bruce Hofffman of RAND, in which contending fac-
tions in Iran use their views of terrorism to play out
domestic political quarrels in the media. The idea is that
state sponsorship of political communication, in the
form of threats or demands directed at an ultimate au-
dience, begins even before any terrorist action occurs.
The research method samples Iranian state communi-
cations using categorical coding techniques to determine
whether there are significant associations between cat-
egories of statements and terrorist events. The main find-
ing is that for every 1.0 per cent increase in the measure
of factional strife, there was a 1.22 per cent increase in
anti-U.S. terrorist activity 10 months later. Anderson
concludes that Iranian terrorism is not anthropological
but comes from the deliberate calculations of certain
individuals or groups associated with the Islamic Repub-
lic. This research is more scientific than most: it is based
on theoretical models and tests different theories.
In her 1998 book, Annamarie Oliverio focuses on how
acts of terrorism by terrorists are portrayed. She wants
to know whether the depictions differ and, if so, how
and why? She, therefore, compares Italian and Ameri-
can state and media presentations of the 1985 seizure
of the Italian luxury liner Achille Lauro and the death of
one of its American passengers, the hijacking also in
1985 of TWA flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome
and resulting in the death of an American and, briefly,
the Oklahoma City bombing, the activities of the
Unabomber, and other incidents. Her conceptual ap-
proach is that terrorism is definitional: what makes ter-
rorism is the power to define it. The research method is
textual interpretation of prominent magazines, newspa-
pers, government reports, and academic writings in the
two countries. Oliverio finds that whether actions were
defined as terrorism in Italy and the U.S. depended on
each states geopolitical interests. She concludes that the
concept of terrorism is used by the authorities in the
U.S. for statist purposes: to stage-manage crises and so-
cial unrest. This book contributes to knowledge by re-
minding us of the importance of whether events are
defined and constructed as terrorism and the benefits
that can accrue to the authorities especially when their
definitions are widely accepted and circulated by the
media.
The subjects of Hirschbergs (1998) doctoral disserta-
tion are the Oklahoma City Bombing and its perpetra-
tor Timothy McVeigh. Her research asks how the
hegemonic media, presidential rhetoric, victim-survivor
groups, and militia and conspiracy theorists frame them.
The theories and concepts are taken from Baudrillard
and Foucault. Impressionistic content analysis is the re-
search method. The main findings are that hegemonic
national media converged to define the event as a na-
tional symbol: this shows how crucial the proliferation
and hyperproduction of specific images are to the effec-
tive reproduction of ideology (p. 4). The research con-
tributes to knowledge by showing that the events could
be depicted in various ways but that one predominated
in the media.
Relatedly, based on a descriptive content analysis of CNN
coverage, Justin Boyd (1998) shows that from the time
of the bombing through the next two days the media,
with television foremost, framed the story with Middle-
Eastern terrorists as the likely suspects. He attributes
this to the magnitude of the story and intense competi-
tion, immediate reporting without waiting for confirma-
tion and corroboration, pack journalism, the felt need
by television news personnel for short and simple sto-
ries, and the incorporation of entertainment values in
the news which results in mini-dramas.
Effects
Killebrew (1998) conceives of terrorist attacks as criti-
cal events that can influence the agendas of the elite
news media and government policy makers. He asks
whether media or government sets the agenda? How
critical events enter the agenda? And whether they are
subject to conditions not typical in agenda-setting? The
critical events are the 1992 mortar attack on the British
Prime Ministers residence at 10 Downing Street by the
IRA and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.
Research consists of content analyses of coverage of
the events in two elite newspapers in the U.S. and two in
the U.K. and of the policy speeches by relevant govern-
ment officials. Even though these critical events received
widespread media coverage and comments by
policymakers, no agenda-building effects were found
from the World Trade Center bombing in the U.S. and
only weak agenda-setting effects in Britain from media
coverage of the motor attack.
In both cases, coverage emphasized their political more
than their criminal nature. Killebrew recommends the
development of a better model of agenda setting and
that future studies should include effects on public opin-
ion.
The focus of James David Ballards (2000) doctoral dis-
sertation is the bombing of the Federal Building in Okla-
homa City in 1995. His research uses it as a case study to
test three political sociology theories: corporate liberal,
state autonomy, and state-centered. His method is con-
tent analysis of preexisting policy debates, media cover-
age of the bombing, and the debate leading to passage
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996. Ballard finds limited support for the first two
theories. He concludes that the state-centered theory
offered the most explanatory value for the events prior
to and after the bombing in Oklahoma City (p. iii). By
testing the relations of political sociology policy making
theories on an act of political terrorism and policy for-
mation processes and policies, this research makes a
major contribution to knowledge. Future research should
go beyond publically available testimony to include the
speeches of the politicians who control the hearings and
use a longer media focus. Most important is to apply
this type of study to the destruction of the World Trade
Buildings on 11 September, 2001.
Hall (2001) focuses on the sources of U.S. policy re-
garding terrorism and biological and chemical weapons,
researching the medias role in spreading panic. He looks
particularly at novels and finds that they ridiculously
overstate the danger. He calls them the threat indus-
try (p. 45). The essay contributes to knowledge and
understanding by cautioning against making public policy
for unlikely dangers. The author concludes and recom-
mends: instead of spending countless millions on anti-
biotics and vaccines that might never be used, Id like to
see the government spend that money on development
of better vaccines for common diseases and reforms of
the economics that cripple drug development and dis-
tribution for the developing world (p. 45).
Information and Communication
Technologies
Ronfeldts introduction (1999) to a special issue of Stud-
ies in Conflict & Terrorism and the analytical background
article written with John Arquilla in the same issue
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999) encapsulate and explain
their research on the relationship between the informa-
tion revolution and conflict. They focus on what they
call the netwar waged by transnational terrorists, ethno-
nationalists, criminals, and even radical social activists.
These groups use the Internet and other communica-
tions services for internal command and control, coor-
121
dination, recruiting, projecting identity, and communi-
cating to target audiences. The authors find that netwar
Media, Violence and Terrorism in North America
is likely to revolve around propaganda campaigns, psy-
chological warfare, and strategic public diplomacy... (p.
203). They conclude that counternetwar may require
very effective inter-agency approaches, which by their
nature involve networked structures (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt, 1999, p. 200).
In the same vein and the same issue of the journal, Whine
(1999a) looks at the use of ICTs by Islamists and the Far
Right. He quotes leaders and people involved in these
movements and gives examples of their activities, such
as information posted on web sites. He finds that the
use of ICTs is cheap, allows covert and anonymous com-
munications, is a force multiplier enhancing power, and
enables extremists to reach their target audiences when
other outlets and media are denied them, and to reach
new audience, particularly the young and educated (p.
237). Whine concludes that the movements he studied
used ICTs for communication and were poised (in 1999)
to extend that use to command and control.
In a separate article, Whine (1999b) looks at Islamic ter-
rorist operating on the Internet. He poses three research
questions: what do terrorist groups do on the Internet?
Where are they? How can researchers use the Internet
to learn more about terrorist groups? He uses the con-
cept of netwar devised by Arquilla and Ronfeldt. His
research consists of collecting data from web sites and
reading through intelligence reports and reports of in-
telligence reports. He finds that the groups use the
Internet for internal communication, often requiring
passwords given only to members or close sympathiz-
ers; and for external propaganda from sites calling or
presenting themselves as news agencies. He concludes
that the Internet is beneficial for Islamist groups but it
also makes it easy for researchers to gather information.
He recommends rigorous monitoring of the sites and
those with which they interconnect.
Valeri and Knights (2000) focus on what they call of-
fensive information warfare, activities with political and
 strategic objectives aimed at the integrity, availability and
confidentiality of data inside information systems con-
nected to the Internet. Their article has no conceptual
and theoretical background or research method and re-
lies on assertion. They claim that, because critical na-
tional infrastructure is well protected and hard to break
into, terrorists are more likely to target e-commerce sites,
producing mistrust and negative repercussions for the
Internet. They recommend cooperation between busi-
ness and government to ensure that e-commerce uses
the kind of software and hardware that will protect
against terrorist intrusions.
122 Damphousse and Smith (1998) ask how the Internet
has changed terrorists communication forms. Their
CHAPTER 14
work is mainly empirical, without much theoretical or
conceptual background. During 1995 and 1996 they
searched Yahoo for supposed terrorist groups. Natu-
rally, organizations do not identify themselves as terror-
ist, so to find them the authors used such key words as
Aryan and followed links from one page to another. They
found that the Internet allows these groups inexpensive
and broad access to supporters and potential new mem-
bers, to engage in attacks on objects of anger (through
virtual graffiti) and, most commonly, to request funds
from the general public. Most important, the groups used
the Internet to perform acts of terrorism such as defac-
ing home pages, access government communication
processes, and threaten to or actually impair them.
Damphousse and Smith conclude that political revolu-
tionaries are making creative use of the Internet through
their apparently leaderless web sites. This methodical
study of web pages is an improvement over more im-
pressionistic, less systematic research, although the au-
thors do not make explicit recommendations for future
work.
Post et. al. (2000) are interested in information terror-
ism. Their research questions and issues involve them in
defining the term, establishing criteria for designating an
event as terrorism, and determining who will use infor-
mation terrorism as a tactic. So they investigate defini-
tions, typologies of groups, and the psychology of group
behavior. Their conceptual and theoretical approach
develops Arquilla and Ronfeldts definition of netwar
and pre-1998 work on information terrorism by other
scholars. Their research draws from newspapers, other
publications, and psychological theories, and displays a
convincing understanding of how the Internet actually
works. After providing several examples of information
terrorism, Post et. al. conclude that there is a growing
threat of information terrorism. This is deterred mainly
by the high cost of development but inhibiting factors
are likely to decrease over time.
In a summary of his previous research, Stevens (1998)
also warns of the damage terrorists can inflict through
the Internet on American institutions, particularly the
government, military, business, and the electronic me-
dia. According to Stevens, cyber-biotech terrorism is also
likely. To counter these dangers, he recommends pre-
vention and that the media not give immediate and
unlimited attention to terrorism and terrorists (p. 207).
In contrast, Smith (2001) documents that the mass me-
dia have often gullibly given prominence (undue atten-
tion) and credibility to the grandiose claims of so-called
electronic terrorists that they are about to use their com-
puters to wreak some sort of havoc such as downloading
U.S. nuclear secrets.
Suggestions for Further Studies
In a detailed study of the academic literature on terror-
ism and the media, Paletz and Boiney (1992) found much
of it focussed on one question: does media coverage aid
and encourage or obstruct and deter terrorism in gen-
eral and terrorist causes in particular. Publications fell
into such categories as terrorists strategies and tactics,
how and why terrorists use the media; indictments of
the media as pro-terrorist or, far less common, anti-ter-
rorist; and prescriptions such as voluntary cooperation
between media and government or formal controls over
media coverage of terrorism.
In searching out and studying the academic literature for
the present report, we found no such research. Perhaps,
this approach has been so written about and repeated in
the past, there is nothing new for researchers to add,
leaving it only to the popularizers and polemicists. Cer-
tainly, we do not recommend it as a desirable direction
for future research. We do believe that future research
on media, political violence and terrorism should be
empirical, generate original data and become, in a word,
scientific. We briefly suggest five ways to help achieve
this objective.
First, researchers should use and thereby test the validity
of the elements of some of the (admittedly few) theo-
ries that exist on the media, political violence, and ter-
rorism. An example of such a theory is Gadi Wolfsfelds
model of political conflict (1997). Second, research would
benefit from being cumulative, trying to replicate and
develop previous findings, including from several of the
studies analysed in our report. Third, some of the stud-
ies we have discussed display the benefits of comparing
coverage of the same event in various media outlets and
countries. Comparative coverage can show, for example,
whether governments infuse their definitions of terror-
ism in the media; it reveals similarities and differences in
definitions of terrorism and of depictions of terrorist
organizations and their activities. Fourth, as some of the
studies we have described also show, research is more
fruitful when connected to political communication con-
cepts. For analyzing media contents, framing is such a
concept. Another one is indexing: the idea that journal-
ists coverage of an event or issue usually represents (in-
dexes) the range of views expressed in government de-
bate about it. Political communication concepts useful
in research on the effects of media coverage of political
violence and terrorism, that are used in the studies we
have described, are agenda setting and policy. But there
are many more possibilities. Effects on the public, for
example, can utilize such concepts as political
socialization, priming, the information gap, third-per-
son effects, public opinion, and political participation.
Fifth, we recommend research using information from
governments and terrorists. Certainly, governments agen-
cies in the United States, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), keep many of their anti-terrorism methods and
activities confidential, classify documents as secret, and
only release information in their own interests. Yet, gov-
ernments do announce their strategies and tactics for
combatting terrorism. Moreover, in democracies such
as the United States, with a free and sometimes aggres-
sive press, governments find it hard to keep information
secret for long. This is especially so after a terrorist ac-
tion: witness, following the 11 September attacks, the
investigations, media coverage, and revelations of the
inadequacies of U.S. intelligence agencies.
Certainly, terrorist organizations infrequently give can-
did interviews to western journalists. But they do make
public statements and issue video and audio tapes ex-
pressing their ideology, justifying their tactics, and claim-
ing credit for their actions. As with Osama bin Laden
and al-Qaeda, they also grant occasional access to sym-
pathetic media outlets such as Al Jazeera. Robin Gerrits
(1992) has shown that considerable information can be
gained from terrorists memoirs.
Conclusions
Some of the studies we have described raise thoughtful
research questions, use significant concepts, apply ap-
propriate methods, come up with convincing (although
sometimes predictable) findings, articulate conclusions,
and contribute to knowledge.
For the period 1998-2002, however, there is a relative
dearth of research. Moreover, as we pointed out in our
suggestions for future studies, current research does not
build on existing theories, is infrequently cumulative, and
fails to use concepts from political communication.
A few articles in Terrorism and Political Violence bemoan
the inadequate quality of research. For Andrew Silke
(2001), terrorism researchers tolerate conceptual confu-
sion, fail to produce meaningful explanatory results and
predictions. Only about 20 percent of articles provide
substantially new knowledge which was previously una-
vailable to the field (p. 8). He finds that most terrorism
research is based mainly on data from books, journals,
the media (or media-derived databases), or other pub-
lished documents (p. 5). But this material may be inac-
curate and biased.
For Avishag Gordon (2001 also 1999) terrorism studies
have not evolved into an academic discipline. Instead of
data and documents flowing from academia to the gov-
ernment and media, the reverse occurs. His explanations
123
are the problematic nature of defining terrorism...the
spread and lack of coordination of terrorism
Media, Violence and Terrorism in North America
literature...too few new researchers in the field and the
lack of a long-term commitment by researchers to this
subject area (p. 116). Gordon claims that the field is
gradually acquiring the characteristics of an established
discipline. We are less sanguine. On the one hand, we are
dismayed that so little of the research on media, terror-
ism and violence is by established scholars. On the other
hand, we are encouraged by the prevalence in the re-
search we have discussed in our report of studies by
young scholars, particularly in the form of doctoral or
masters dissertations. If they continue their work, a re-
search community of scholars is possible.
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YAMAMOTO, Y. 1998. When the Media Receive a Threatening Letter From a
Perpetrator. Master of Journalism Thesis. University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
 PART IV 125

Appendices
126
 Appendix 1:
Resolution on
Terrorism and Media
adopted by the participants in the Conference on Terrorism and Media,
Manila, the Philippines 1-2 May 2002
Participants in the UNESCO-sponsored conference on
Terrorism and Media, meeting in Manila, the Philippines
on 1-2 May 2002:
< Recalling the fundamental role of the media in
meeting the publics right to know, including about
issues relating to terrorism;
< Condemning killing of, attacks on, threats against
and harassment of journalists reporting on terror-
ism and conflicts;
< Concerned about the restrictions imposed on the
right to freedom of expression and to freedom of
information by a growing number of States in the
aftermath of the attacks of 11 September;
< Convinced that open public debate and the free
flow of information are essential to any long-term
solutions to the problems of terrorism;
< Welcoming the Charter for the Safety of Journal-
ists Working in War Zones or Dangerous Areas,
adopted by concerned organisations in Paris on 8
March 2002, and the Safety Charter, adopted in
Montreal in 1992;
< Noting the Joint Message for World Press Free-
dom Day, 3 May 2002, by Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General of the UN, Mary Robinson, UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, and Kochiro
Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, which
recognised the importance of press freedom and
freedom of expression in the fight against terror-
ism;
Resolve as follows:
Any strategy to address the threat of terrorism must
promote greater respect for freedom of expression and
of the media, rather than imposing restrictions on these
fundamental rights.
Right to Report on Terrorism
The media have both a right and a duty to report fully
on terrorism in the interest of the publics right to know
and to promote open, informed debate about terror-
ism;
All parties to conflicts should respect the right of jour-
nalists to investigate and report freely on conflict and to
have maximum access to conflict areas;
The threat of terrorism should not be used as an excuse
to impose restrictions on the right to freedom of ex-
pression and of the media, or on freedom of informa-
tion, and specifically on the following rights:
< to editorial independence;
< to protect confidential sources of information; 127
< to access information held by public bodies;
< to freedom of movement; and
Appendices
< to privacy of communications;
Media outlets, journalists and publishers and broadcast-
ers associations, academic institutions and other civil
society organisations should take measures to enhance
the capacity of the media to report professionally on
terrorism and to promote tolerance, including through
training and providing opportunities for discussion of
ethical issues relating to reporting on terrorism.
Safety of Journalists
States at peace, as well as all parties to conflicts, should
take effective measures to ensure that they, military forces,
combatants, as well as secret and intelligence services
and other officials engaged in combating terrorism, un-
derstand and respect the rights of journalists as civilians
under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols, as well as their right to freedom of expres-
sion;
States should devote sufficient resources and attention
to preventing attacks on journalists, to investigating such
attacks when they occur and to bringing those responsi-
ble to justice without delay;
States at peace, as well as all parties to conflicts, should
never allow their agents or combatants to pose as jour-
nalists, or attempt to use journalists as agents;
Media outlets, journalists and publishers and broadcast-
ers associations and other civil society organisations
should take measures to promote the safety of journal-
ists reporting on conflict and terrorism, including through
training, the development of safety guidelines and the
provision of appropriate equipment; and
The news media industry and the international commu-
nity should consider establishing a fund to assist under-
resourced media organisations and freelance journalists
to have access to safety training and equipment.
 Appendix 2:
Official Ceremony and Awarding
of the UNESCO/Guillermo
World Press Freedom Prize, 3 May 2002,
Manila, the Philippines:
Remarks by
Mrs. Ana Maria Busquets de Cano,
President of the Guillermo Cano Foundation
We are gathered, once again, to submit the Unesco
128 Guillermo Cano Prize to Freedom of de Press, to one
person chosen by the international jury among many
Appendices
candidates who deserved the honor. In this occasion it
is Manila who kindly welcomes us in order to discuss
different affairs that concerns us. Being terrorism the
issue of the day, I would like to evoke some words, writ-
ten by Guillermo Cano in l980 but that still prevail to-
day:
Each new terrorist act taking place, here or in any
place of the world , immediately receives the qualifi-
cation that the victim of such an act wants to give to
it. If it occurs in a country with a left wing tendency,
immediately, the author or the authors, as well as those
who inspire it, are called right wing fascist. On the
contrary, if it occurs in countries ruled by right wing
governments, the terrorism is a provocative of the
left wing fascists. If the terrorist act affects a centrist
government, the responsibility falls into both left and
right fascist.Left , right and center wingers all act the
same way.
We all get caught in a snow ball when we try to face
and stop terrorism and however make it grow bigger
and bigger until we find ourselves in front of a huge
monster that, due to its appearing forms, is unassail-
able and indestructible by the traditional and known
means.
There is terrorism bloody perpetrated, as any terror-
ism act, in the name of de religion, no matter which
it may be. Archbishops, bishops, priests and devo-
tees are assassinated . There is communist, fascist,
left, right, and center winger, anarchist, democratic,
antidemocratic, with or without freedom terrorism.
It is the symbol of our era!
And every response to it engenders a new cruelty and
a new chain of cruelties in which the link of good
human feelings, of fraternity and equality, of loving
each other, is irremediably lost.
Due to the fact that terrorism is an effect, it has to have
many causes. And as a long as they are not removed,
there is going to be, here and everywhere, terrorism that
vindicates its execrable crimes. It is compulsory them,
to have the strength of true intelligence and start today
( for it was not done yesterday and it would be too late
to do it tomorrow) to remove the causes. Wherever the
bad weeds lay.
The removal asked by Guillermo Cano has become a
pledged for the violent to stop attacking journalists of
all regions an countries. Year after year we repeat the
complains and we denounce the abuses done on jour-
nalists. This need for constant repetition of our com-
plaints makes me think that we are not being heard, that
maybe some governments have not interest in listening
to us, that maybe our claims are not loud enough or
maybe that we complain and afterwards we abandon our
causes. In those occasions in which we have insisted we
have insisted we have achieved the freedom of those
who received the prize in former years.
Besides rejoicing for the prize that we submit today for
such a complete journalist, as is Mr Nyarota, I want to
play tribute to those Colombian journalist assassinated
during this year or who could survive to the attacks of
different violent groups. To those how died for publish-
ing frauds or information concerning some politician.
To those that died for publishing the damages perpe-
trated by the guerrilla groups. To those killed for de-
nouncing the right wing groups, and finally those who
dared to denounce ones and others for drug dealing.
Year after year we also remember the fight of Guillermo
Cano. In spite of that, the country where the editor of
El Espectador was assassinated, is still the victim of the
most cruel violence perpetrated by the same people, those
responsible for the killing in the tragic times of
narcoterrorism and those who have had no objections
in profiting with the dirty money gained in the business,
arguing that they are doing it for the sake of the people.
This is why , between ones and others, it is harder every-
day to be a journalist in Colombia. In the last year, ac-
cording to the Antonio Nario Foundation, in Cartagena
de Indias , the sad annual average of killings has raised
from seven to 11, which is the number of journalist as-
sassinated in the last moths in different regions of our
country.
So many Colombians killed, make me pledge for the
removal of what causes terrorism for your solidarity
and for a maximum support to those who dare to de-
nounce or criticize the acts of violent people. When a
community gets together, and in our case it is that of
people who work in the media, it is easier to face the
attacks because we are so many that the terrorists would
not know who to silence.
I think we are lacking solidarity and action through all
the media at the same time. If we could count on it, it
would enable us to have better defense. We are also lack-
ing that you, journalist from all over de world, be al-
ways alert to defend freedom of expression and to de-
nounce, with higher determination, those countries that
without being directly responsible for violence, collabo-
rate with others to be so.
Colombia, it is true, produces cocaine that is grown in
our beautiful mountains, which, by the way, are being
devastate for that purpose. However others are in charge
of completing the job of the peasants in Los Andes.
Journalist of those countries that do not produce co-
caine but make weapons and with no remorse sell it to
the violent people who kill their fellow mates in other
parts of the world, should say so.
Journalist of those countries that do not produce co-
caine, but profit by keeping the money of the violent
people who kill their fellow mates in other parts of the
world, should denounce it.
Journalist of those countries that do not produce co-
caine, but produce the chemicals with which the drug
that damages the minds of the youth is produced, should
denounce it.
Journalist of those countries that do not produced co-
caine but buy and consume it without making any ef-
forts to find the people who is profiting with the busi-
ness, should denounce it.
We, the Cano family, lost Guillermo who was denounc-
ing the males of the drug dealing and terrorism, stress-
ing on the risks that these brought to freedom of ex-
pression. We have also lost the journal.
However the Guillermo Cano Foundation will continue
to make every effort in order to keep those ideals and
the belief that a country only is free when is free to
express itself, alive. For that we also need your coopera-
tion.
Remarks by
Mr Kochiro Matsuura,
Director-General of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Madam President of the Republic of the Philippines,
Mr Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines,
Mr President of the UNESCO Advisory Group
for Press Freedom,
Mr President of the World Press Freedom Prize Jury,
Mrs Anna-Maria Busquets de Cano, President of the
Cano Foundation,
129
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Appendices
Let me first convey to all of you my warm greetings. I
am delighted to be here to celebrate World Press Free-
dom Day 2002. It is an important day on the worlds
calendar and I am most grateful to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines for agreeing to host this
years event and for all the hospitality and support it has
given to UNESCO.
I would like to begin by paying special tribute to Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Under
her capable stewardship, democracy in the Philippines is
not only in safe hands, it is thriving. To lead and govern
a democracy as complex and diverse as the Philippines
is a great challenge but it is one she is taking in her stride.
One sign of the democratic health of the Philippines is
the freedom and vigour of its media. With over 40 daily
newspapers, over 500 AM and FM radio stations, and
over 130 TV stations, democracy in the Philippines is
not short of either news or opinions.
While this is my first official visit to the Philippines in
my capacity as Director-General of UNESCO, I am no
stranger to your country. In my earlier diplomatic career,
I made over 10 visits to the Philippines. I am very happy
to be here once more and to experience again the wel-
coming hospitality of the Filipino people.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
World Press Freedom Day is the day on which we com-
memorate the right of freedom of expression, which is
enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This is one of the most basic of human
rights and a cornerstone of democracy. Indeed, in to-
days society, freedom of expression means nothing if it
does not also imply freedom of the press and, in turn,
pluralistic and independent media. Todays World Press
Freedom Day serves to highlight these basic human rights
and to draw public attention to the fact that press free-
dom is still far from being a reality in many countries
around the world. In UNESCOs Constitution, there is
 a clear commitment to the free exchange of ideas and
knowledge, which is a fundamental human right that
should be enjoyed by all peoples, regardless of cultural,
religious, ethnic or other backgrounds. The UNESCO
Constitution guarantees the free flow of ideas by word
and image as the very basis of international coopera-
tion in the fields of education, science and culture. These
freedoms are prerequisites for the active participation
of citizens in social development, civil society, demo-
cratic political processes and collective efforts to achieve
peace.
The values and principles expressed in the UNESCO
130 Constitution remain highly relevant to the worlds cur-
rent problems and the difficult challenges ahead of us.
Appendices
Our goal of contributing to peace and security by pro-
moting collaboration among the nations through edu-
cation, science and culture is truly enduring. However,
we recognize that this goal must be continuously
refocused in order to address the changing realities of
our world. This is evident in our response to the terrible
events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath.
UNESCOs mission to promote intercultural dialogue
and mutual understanding has become more important
than ever in the emerging international context.
Let us be under no misapprehension: our fundamental
freedoms and rights are being threatened by transnational
terrorism. The international community, including rep-
resentatives of civil society such as the international and
regional NGOs present here at todays celebration, should
join forces in opposition to terrorism. By acting in uni-
son, the international community can show its collective
strength in the face of terrorisms threats. In the exer-
cise of their profession, journalists may sometimes find
themselves in situations of great danger and insecurity;
their personal safety and their other basic human rights
may be at serious risk. The rights and freedoms of jour-
nalists must be fully protected and respected. This is
important, first and foremost, for their own sake but it
is also important for all our sakes. When a journalist is
kidnapped or threatened or attacked, our own rights and
freedoms are in jeopardy too.
One of the most worrying results of terrorism is that it
may cause some countries to impose forms of control
and regulation which constrain democracy, freedom of
expression, and free, independent, and pluralistic media.
We must remember that security is not an end in itself
but the means to an end, namely, the peaceful enjoy-
ment of our rights and liberties. Care must therefore be
taken to ensure that, in pursuing greater security, gov-
ernmental authorities do not impose unjustified restric-
tions on freedom of expression and press freedom.
UNESCO is seeking to improve the current situation
by bringing all its partners together in a process of
intercultural dialogue aimed at promoting better mutual
understanding. This is the only way to build confidence,
trust and tolerance amongst different cultures and civili-
zations. The media, in fact, can play a vital role in this
process but they cannot do so if their own freedom and
independence are heavily constrained.
During the conference that was held over the last two
days, many important issues have been discussed regard-
ing Terrorism and Media. These issues deserve to be
aired so they become matters of open debate. While we
must not discount the fact that there are real dangers
and real anxieties, these concerns should not impose a
hard silence upon us. But the discussion of the issues
should be as mature as possible. With regard to terror-
ism, the media should not encourage an irresponsible
excitement of the publics fears. At the same time, how-
ever, this responsible approach should be achieved
through self-restraint based on professional standards
rather than through harsh government control or cen-
sorship.
Terrorism, as we well know, is no friend of a free press.
Whether its impact is direct or indirect, terrorism always
seeks to succeed through intimidation. The best defence
against our fears is the active exercise of our basic rights
and freedoms. This is the central message of World Press
Freedom Day
The award of the World Press Freedom Prize has be-
come an integral part of each annual celebration of World
Press Freedom Day. It is one of the ways in which
UNESCO expresses its strong and abiding commitment
to freedom of speech and its solidarity with those who
suffer from repression and persecution in the exercise
of their profession as journalists.
The annual award of the World Press Freedom Prize,
moreover, helps to broaden public awareness of the val-
ues of freedom of expression and press freedom. It
draws wider attention to the problems faced by many
media professionals around the world, who find that
searching for truth and risking ones life go hand-in-hand.
The UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom
Prize is awarded in honour of the Columbian journalist
and editor Guillermo Cano, whose murder has become
a symbol of cruelty against journalists. Just a few mo-
ments ago, we listened with great interest to the words
of his widow, Mrs Ana Maria Busquets Cano. Each year,
we re-affirm our commitment to his ideals of a free press
and freedom of expression. The World Press Freedom
Prize honours journalists who, like Guillermo Cano, have
distinguished themselves by standing up for their beliefs
and the ideals of a free press.
Before making this years award, I wish us all to remem-
ber the situation of Mr U Win Tin, the winner of last
years World Press Freedom Prize. I would like to appeal
to the authorities of Myanmar to allow the release of
Mr U Win Tin, who has been in jail since 1989 and re-
cently celebrated his 72nd birthday in detention. Com-
mon humanity and justice demand nothing less than his
immediate release.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
On the recommendation of the jury, composed of no-
table media professionals from all around the world, I
have the honour to award this years prize to Mr Geoffrey
Nyarota from Zimbabwe. His courage and persistence
in denouncing the corruption and criminal activities of
government officials in his country, despite two bomb
attacks against his newspaper, are an example to jour-
nalists throughout the world. He has been arrested and
detained, he has repeatedly received death threats and
four libel suits are pending against him.
However, he has never ceased to denounce bad practice,
crime and corruption. The Daily News, the newspaper
founded by Mr. Nyarota on 31st March 1999, has not
missed a single issue since it began to be published and
is now Zimbabwes biggest-selling newspaper.
On behalf of UNESCO as well as in my own name, I
would like to congratulate the prize winner for this great
distinction. His courage and persistence are an example
to us all. The World Press Freedom Prize 2002 consists
of a cheque for US$ 25,000, of which US$ 12, 500 is
given by the Cano Foundation.
Please accept my sincere congratulations.
Speech by
Her Excellency
Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos
President of the Republic of the Philippines
Thank you very much Dr. Garcia.
First, I would like to greet and congratulate once again
former President Fidel V. Ramos, who is here not only
because he is former president of the Philippines but
because he belongs to the family of awardees of
UNESCO. We remember him and congratulate him once
again for receiving the 1997 UNESCO Peace Award.
131
Congratulations, Mr. President.
Appendices
Director-General Matsuura; Madame de Cano; Mr.
Nyarota, our Awardee for this year; excellencies of the
diplomatic corps; Mrs. Soliven and Mrs. Elizalde; the
journalists and delegates of UNESCO World Press Free-
dom Day International Conference on Terrorism and
the Media. The commissioners and officers of the
UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines;
distinguished guests; ladies and gentlemen:
Thank you for this opportunity to be with your distin-
guished group.
I welcome the fact that we are here together celebrating
World Press Freedom Day in the Philippines. The Phil-
ippines is honored to have been chosen by UNESCO
to host this years celebration. And as both Mr. Matsuura
and Mr. Nyarota said, our country has earned the repu-
tation of being one of the not-so-many havens of press
freedom in the world today. With all humility, I never-
theless claim on behalf of our country that this is a well-
deserved reputation for press freedom.
Today we celebrate good journalism, which means we
celebrate the responsible exercise of press freedom. We
celebrate principled disagreement, enlightened debate,
productive controversy. We celebrate the light that shines
through events and mirrors them in the firmament of
truth.
In the Philippines today there is avowedly a growing in-
terest in the media about playing up the good news. This
seems to go against the tradition of reporting the seedy
part of the day. In the Philippines, we are known not
only for our free press but for having a licentious press.
But in the Philippines, speaking for the government, we
would rather have a licentious press than a bridled press,
that is our policy. Nonetheless, I am glad to know that
there are reformists within the press, and I hope that
this celebration of World Press Freedom Day will in-
spire the reformists to demonstrate that press freedom
can also mean the freedom to report good news. As a
 public servant, and therefore the subject of press re-
ports, I really appreciate the good news. Good news about
personal heroism, such as the heroes that we in fact honor
today, values, human worth and community triumphs.
Sometimes we tend to gloss over these things, even if
they are the real stuff of nationhood.
I see no reason, for instance, why press freedom should
not mean that a good provincial story makes page one,
or a good metro report lands on premium space. I be-
lieve that press freedom means that the press is free
enough to give credit to a small-town mayor who helped
the military and the police recover a terrorist hostage or
132 a hometown entrepreneur who develops a 15,000-peso
core shelter for calamity victims. Press freedom should
Appendices
mean also giving credit to the people because the people
deserve a break.
But by all means, press freedom should mean letting the
media take down the spotty woodwork. God knows there
are many underperforming public servants and there are
many lousy programs, but press freedom should mean
letting the battle focus on issues, on policy, on princi-
ples.
Our societies need relief from personal attacks so that
the the issues will surface in a clear light. Press freedom
means getting to the heart of a controversial policy. Press
freedom means doing it with fervor and a genuine pen-
chant for chronology and detail. Indeed, done this way
as our awardees have demonstrated, press freedom is
one of the cornerstones of policy.
In the world press, Mindanao has become a media focus
of the global war against terrorism, especially now with
the participation of American forces in training exer-
cises. I believe this attention is as it should be because
we must defeat terrorism not only with force but with
enlightment.
But there is a deeper reason why the press must be deeply
involved in the fight against terror. It is accepted that
terrorism is aimed at an audience beyond its immediate
victims. Terrorism operates in the broad arena of public
awareness and discourse, moulding a psychological land-
scape of its own. Terrorism breeds fear and doubt in
the efficiency of institutions, suspicion, hatred of au-
thority, and, most of all, irrational bases of conflict.
We took this into account early in the day in the Philip-
pine battle against terrorism. In September last year, I
laid down a 14-point counter-terrorism program, and
this is what I said about the press.
The mass media assumes a paramount role in the
overall strategy to defeat terrorism. I seek the medias
support in the implementation of our policies and
programs, in enlightening the public of the rationale
behind our actions, in promoting consensus and con-
structive criticism, in depriving terrorists of the ben-
efits of glorified coverage and publicity, and, most of
all, in maintaining calm, sobriety, prudence and soli-
darity in our society. We must bring the media into
the loop of collective action and information.
Let me cite a few areas where common action between
the government and the press in indicated.
First, informing the public of the full dimensions of the
terrorist threat, especially concerning the relationship
between physical and psychological action, and the
transnational nature of terrorism. The public must ap-
preciate the common interest involved in such alliances
as Balikatan and our trilateral agreement with Indonesia
and Malaysia to check the movement of terrorists along
our common sea borders.
Second, mustering the cooperation of the public with
the executive, legislative and judicial authorities in meet-
ing terrorist threats through operational programs, crimi-
nal justice programs and legislative measures. For in-
stance, we now have an anti-terrorism bill pending in
congress that I consider urgent.
Third, strengthening local institutions and civil society
to bolster the vigilance of ordinary citizens in the streets
and in the countryside, which makes the big difference
in the war against terror.
Fourth, enlightening the public about the constitutional
issues involved, because the war against terrorism re-
quires strong measures such as the power of the com-
mander-in-chief to call upon the armed forces to quell
violence. The nature and breadth of these measures must
be clear in the public mind, so that the we can allay the
perception that constitutional guarantees such as the bill
of rights are being eroded or set aside in favor of mar-
tial imperatives.
Fifth, supporting broader interfaith dialogue to promote
Christian and Muslim solidarity. Terrorists wish to insti-
gate a religious war. We must instead take every oppor-
tunity to forge religious understanding, ecumenism and
solidarity.
Sixth, improving support for, and confidence in, the law
enforcement agencies. We need strict vigilance against
movements of suspected persons, firearms, explosives,
raw materials, toxic materials and biological materials.
We have already put a money-laundering law in place to
check questionnaires and dirty money transfers.
Seventh, coordinating public preparation and action in
the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack however re-
mote this may be.
Eighth, enhancing public vigilance in securing critical
infrastructures including power plants, power transmis-
sion and distribution facilities, oil and gas depots, key
public works structures, vital communications installa-
tions, public buildings as well as private buildings, and
facilities in the nerve centers of commerce and industry.
Ninth, pushing forward the anti-poverty campaign, with
focus upon the perceived roots of fanaticism and irra-
tional violence.
I consistently mention poverty side by side with terror-
ism because there is a need to put terrorism in a wider
perspective. Poverty is a form of lingering terrorism,
one that slowly kills on a daily basis, one that condemns
its victims to a lifetime of pain and misery.
This is not to say that poverty is the cause of terrorism.
Osama Bin Laden is not a poor man. It is evil, not pov-
erty, that causes terrorism. But poverty and the sense of
powerlessness it brings provide the fertile ground on
which terrorism can more easily spread its evil ideology,
so if we must defeat terrorism, we must defeat poverty
with equal resolve and fervor.
The Philippines did not need to join the war on terror-
ism. It was in that war already, in the southwestern part
of our islands. The Philippines could not have done oth-
erwise than renew its commitment to fight terrorism in
a wider field in the wake of September 11.
This is a fight between tolerance and bigotry, between
reason and fanaticism, between law and anarchy, between
justice and murder pretending to be just.
The fact that the Abu Sayyaf bandits, who once freely
roamed the entire southwestern Philippines, have ended
up with their last stand in Basilan, the province with the
lowest human development index in our country, reminds
us of how closely national security and economic pros-
perity are intertwined.
In this context, I welcome the call made by President
George Bush for a new compact for development de-
fined by greater accountability for rich and poor nations
alike. This call echoes an initiative I proposed to form a
global coalition against poverty, just as we have formed
a coalition against terrorism.
The developed nations must recognize their duty to open
markets, the transfer of resources and the reform of
international institutions. These will all help to win the
war against poverty.
I hope that we can soon remove the scourge of terror-
ism. But, more than that, I hope that we can soon have
tangible results in our war against poverty. And that the
media will find our continuing struggle worth covering.
Thank you for inviting me to celebrate Press Freedom
Day with you. I would like to welcome all the journalists
who took part in the International Conference on Ter-
rorism and Media. I understand that you had a success-
ful conference and that the agreements are very good.
You have agreed that journalists have the right to report
on terrorism and that journalists have the right to be
protected against terrorism. I hope indeed, that those
who participated, whether they are in the media, in gov- 133
ernment, or in civil society, will work together and also
Appendices
work in their own fields to carry out and ensure that
these resolutions are implemented.
I would also like to congratulate the recipient of this
years UNESCO Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom,
Mr. Geoffrey Nyarota, Editor-in-Chief of Zimbabwe
Daily News. He told us of his story and as he was telling
us about how in his journalism he has been the subject
of so much terrorism against him, his institution and his
colleagues. I suppose our journalists here must thank
their lucky stars that we are a country with a very free
press.
I would also like to pay homage to the man after whom
the award is named, Guillermo Cano, a martyr of ter-
rorism perpetrated by the syndicates who try to spread
the evil of drugs all over the world. That is political ter-
rorism and there is also criminal terrorism. It doesnt
matter who causes the terrorism, it is the act that consti-
tutes the terrorism. Well remember him. When the
awards are given, we must always remember him and
thank him for giving up his life for the cause of journal-
ism.
We also remember Daniel Pearl because we all saw his
martyrdom on TV. Not that we saw how he was mar-
tyred but we all know how he disappeared and we all
know how he surfaced again because everything was
covered by the free press. And we pay homage to him as
we pay homage to Guillermo Cano.
On this note, I would like to thank all the journalists
who are here today and all the diplomats. To thank all
the representatives of the different countries who be-
lieve in press freedom, who believe in the war against
terrorism. I thank you for a fervent and lasting partner-
ship against terrorism and poverty and in favor of world
press freedom.
Congratulations and thank you.
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