Philosophy and Politics in Plato's Crito

J. Peter Euben

Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 2. (May, 1978), pp. 149-172.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0090-5917%28197805%296%3A2%3C149%3APAPIPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Political Theory is currently published by Sage Publications, Inc..

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/sage.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic
journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,
and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take
advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org
Fri Sep 21 08:42:14 2007
CONSIDERING THE CRlTO

I. PHILOSOPHY A N D POLITICS

I N PLATO'S CRlTO

J. PETER EUBEN

University of California, Santa Cruz

URING T H E 1960s, interest in Plato's Apology and Crito

centered on the question of the limits and grounds of political obliga-
tion. Civil disobedients invoked the Socrates of the Apology as a pre-
cursor of and authority for their acts.' His respectful but firm refusal to
give up philosophy at the behest of a n Athenian court seemed exem-
plary: here was a man caught between conflicting commitments, a
citizen who valued personal integrity and truth; a n intellectual valida-
ting his thought and life b y the courage of his death. O n trial for his life,
Socrates rejects in advance any offer of acquittal or probation on condi-
tion that he cease doing philosophy, that is, going among his fellow
citizens to see whether they know what they think they know or truly
understand the bases of their life and actions. T o such a n offer he would
have to say, as he does in the Apology: "Men of Athens, I hold you in
the highest regard and affection, but I will be persuaded by [obey] the
god rather than you. As long as I have breathand strength I will not give
up philosophy o r stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to
everyone of you whom I meet."*
But as critics of civil disobedience were quick to emphasize, another
Platonic dialogue, the Crito, closely linked by time, theme, and refer-
ence t o the Apology, apparently speaks in a different voice and with
different import. In the Apology Socrates is contentious a n d rebellious.
But in the Crito, he is reverent and submissive, referring to himself a s a
child and slave (doulos) of the laws, willing to suffer injustice if unable
to persuade them of their errors of judgment and decision (50de, 5 1 bc).
One might argue that Socrates'acceptance of the unjust decision and his
punishdent is consistent with or even entailed by civildisobedience. But
POLITICAL THEORY. Vol 6 No. 2, May 1978

01978 Sage Publications. Inc.

[ I 501 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

the grounds he offers for that acceptance are disconcerting; to us as to

his fellow citizens,3 in their own terms and in relation to the Apology. If
not a contradiction, there is at least a surface inconsistency between the
two dialogues.
My purpose in this essay is twofold. I want, first, t o probe that incon-
sistency through a n analysis of the Crito and in terms of the relation
of philosophy and Socrates t o politics a n d Crito. I chose this theme
rather than that of obedience o r disobedience t o the law because it
seems t o me more inclusive and therefore more revealing of the depth of
Socrates' dilemma. I chose the Crito because in it the surface inconsis-
tency clearly emerges as a tension that marks much of Plato's thought.
In other words, by transposing the initial inconsistency between the
Apology and Crito on obedience t o the law into one of Socrates' rela-
tion to his old friend Crito and of philosophy to politics, a logical
inconsistency becomes a political, philosophic, and dramatic conflict
of poignant intensity. One consequence of this approach is to make
problematic Socrates' relevance as either a civil disobedient or critic of
civil disobedience. But if we take Socrates as an exemplar, we better be
clear what is exemplary about him.
Second, I want to critically examine two interpretations of the Crito
which, in different ways, attempt t o resolve the inconsistency between it
and the Apologj~.Both readings-the philosophic and the literary-
seem to me incomplete and thus misleading. They achieve consistency
at the expense of Socrates'true dilemma. Since the persuasiveness of my
own reading depends in part on showing the insufficiences of these
other two, I turn to them first.

Recent philosophical readings of the Crito tend to regard the "con-

tingent" circumstances of Socrates' life (such as his attitude toward
death and exile, his age and friendship with Crito), his times(suchas the
political crisis and corruption in Athens following the Peloponnesian
War), and his particular mode of expression (such as the "high flown
oratory" in his conversation with the laws) as distractions from treating
his argument as one intended t o convince "any rational man a t any time
and in any place."4 Thus Socrates' words are formulated in proposi-
tional form in order to show either how his proposition in the Crito is in
fact consistent with his statements in the Apology, o r how it can be
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I511

made so by reformulating the arguments he almost makes, or intended

to make, o r really should have made in the Criro.5
T h e first approach is that of A.D. Woozley who denies that Socrates'
refusal to accept a discharge conditional on his giving up philosophy in
the Apology and his argument in the Criro that a court order must not
be evaded or disobeyed even when unjust, is anything more than a seem-
ing discrepancy. Woozley argues that (1) in default of other evidence,
we must assume that Socrates (as presented by Plato) speaks sincerely
in both dialogues; (2) he cannot be knowingly inconsistent; and (3) it is
implausible t o suppose that there was a n inconsistency of which Soc-
rates, of all people, was unaware.6 Given these assumptions, he goes on
to suggest that there is indeed no inconsistency since "what in the
Apology Socrates is prepared t o d o against the court is not the same as
what in the Criro he is not prepared to d o against thecourt" (307). In the
former dialoque, Socrates is only prepared t o disobey one possible
judgment banning him from continued philosophizing, and his disobe-
dience will be open, not concealed or clandestine.' H e will simply go on
pursuing truth as he always has.
I n the Criro, the disobedience t o a lawful command which he will
not accept because it will injure the law is Crito's suggestion of escape.
All disobedience to lawful commands is of this kind except attempting
to convince the state that the law or command is wrong. "But this per-
mitted exception to the rule of obedience is precisely what he had pro-
posed t o follow in the Apology.. . . T h e one course other than obedience
to the law and its commands which Socrates' argument in the Criro
permits is the one course which he had said in the Apology he would, if
banned from philosophy, take. Once we see that it is not the doctrine of
the Criro that a man must always, and no matter what, obey the laws of
his state, the supposed conflict between that dialogue and the Apology
disappears" (307-308).
As valuable as Woozley's analysis is, his overall argument is incom-
plete for a t least three reasons. First, his assumption that Socrates need
not mention philosophizing a s an exception t o unconditional obedi-
ence t o the state and its laws because philosophy is persuading the
state and this is the exception allowed for in the Criro, is itself not
wholly persuasive. For it is not clear that this is the sole function of
philosophy, nor is how one persuades "the state," of who "the state" is,
or how such philosophic "persuasion" differs from rhetoric.8 (As the
Apology indicates, Socrates has spent his life distinguishing himself
from the sophists-with notably little success.) Second, Woozley
[I521 POLITICAL THEORY / M A Y 1978

assumes that Socrates speaks in a n honest and straightforward manner,

neither dissimulating nor pretending.9 But then what is one to make of
Socratic irony or use of myth? (Several commentators regard the dia-
logue with the laws as a myth.)lO Can one say that a moral teacher and
political educator always speaks straightforwardly? O r is he or she
concerned with the kind of audience and the circumstances of conversa-
tion? If the goal is self-knowledge-that is, a n understanding accom-
panied by inner change-then what is appropriate to say to one person
at one time may not be what should be said to anyone at any time. For
what brings clarity to one person may merely compound another's
confusion; where direct statements may meet resistance and incompre-
hension indirect ones may penetrate and illuminate.11 T o say what one
"knows" directly to one who does not know is likely to lead to misunder-
standing and is, from one point of view, deception. This is especially so
where such knowledge is original a s well as personally and politically
unsettling. It is true that this conception of teaching is open to abuse and
that the insistence that it is Socrates' can be overstated. It may even be
questionable whether such education is political, ifpoliticaleducation is
regarded as taking place among equals rather than in relations analo-
gous to those of parent and child. Nevertheless, these issues are a central
problem in Socrates' life and thought, and in the Crito. Finally, Wooz-
ley rejects Socrates' contention that a man ought always to obey the law
because the consequences of disobedience are, or would be, socially
destructive. He argues that a single act of disobedience would be negli-
gible "unless his example triggered off wider disobedience." But that
is exactly what Socrates anticipates. By treating what Socrates says
literally and largely bypassing the question of audience, Woozley does
not take his own proviso seriously enough to link it with Socrates'
prophecy in the Apology, that "a far more severe punishment than you
have inflicted on me will surely overtake you as soon as I am dead.
You have done this thinking that you will be relieved from having to
give a n account of your lives. But I say that the result will be very differ-
ent. There will be more men who will call you t o account, whom I have
held back, though you did not recognize it. And they will be harsher to
you and I have been" (Church, n.d., 46). What is at stake in Socrates'
trial and his decision in the Crito is the fate of the relations between the
philosopher and his fellow citizens, between philosophy and politics.
Any proclaimed consistency which ignores this dimension of the dia-
logues and the Socratic vocation is t o o easily achieved.
A second philosophic approach to the Crito and the inconsistency
between it and the Apology is that offered by Gregory V l a s t o ~ .Vlastos
'~
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [ I 531

is concerned with the political implications of the fact that s o many

commentators take Socrates' injunction to obey the laws in the Crito as
his last word o n the question of obedience to political authority. S o he
begins by insisting that there is a n inconsistency between the two dia-
logues in order to reformulate and distill a politically sensible, logi-
cally consistent, doctrine of political obligation from them. This re-
quires substantial surgery o n what Vlastos regards as the rhetorical
excesses of the Crito. Only then will it be possible to establish a line of
reasoning implicit in the law's "harangue," which in a different setting
would have been laid out in the familiar Socratic style. As he notes, the
Crito is unique among Socratic dialogues. Instead of Socrates' usual
dialectical approach to a problem-defining terms, facing up t o obscuri-
ties and perplexities, considering counterexamples-one finds "diction
running to hyperbole," "thought flown about by gusts of feeling," and a
unique act of self-abnegation, whereby Socrates yields the floor to a
"majestic surrogate, the personified 'laws and community' of ~ t h e n s "
with their venerated commonplaces (519).13
Given these initial conditions and purposes Vlastos proceeds to ex-
plicate, assess, and reformulate what he regards as the two related
arguments of the Crito-the argument from beneficence and the
argument from agreement.
In general, Vlastos agrees with the contention of the laws (50E,
5 1 A-C) that those who have rendered us substantial, even unique, bene-
fits in the past have put us under a n obligation which entitled them to
special forbearance (520). But how much forbearance? Could Socrates
have meant that there are n o limits within which a beneficiary owes
grateful compliance to his benefactor? Clearly he could not. Suppose
that Socrates was ordered by his lawful government to convey to the
captain of a warship the notorious decision by Athens to destroy the
entire male population of Mytilene. Not only might he not be obli-
gated t o carry out the order, but we might want to argue that he is
obligated not to precisely in terms of the beneficence argument. (In the
Apology Socrates cites his own disobedience to a n unlawful decree of
the Thirty.) For he would be showing his gratitude not by transmitting
the order, but by refusing to be a party to such infamy, thus showing the
world that Athens raised men such as Socrates. "Gratitude," Vlastos
concludes, "could not be a reason for yielding everywhere t o the de-
mands of a beneficient fatherland; in given circumstances it would itself
be a reason for resisting her demands" (522).
Nor is Vlastos prepared t o accept, without qualification, the second
reason Socrates offers for obeying the laws-that he has entered into a
( 1 541 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

tacit nonverbal contract with them. Vlastos accepts the notion that
there are actions that generate tacit nonverbal obligations equivalent to
those resulting from agreements or compacts. Such tacit agreements
can generate obligations of "unquestionable validity even in circum-
stances where it is highly questionable that we had a free choice in
taking the relevant action" (523). What he will not accept is the "false
and quite gratuitous assumption" that Socrates has a n obligation to
the laws because he has the option of remaining o r leaving Athens such
that his remaining constitutes a free choice and a statement of prefer-
ence for his native city. F o r given what Socrates would have t o give up
by leaving-his civic rights (and those of his children), the unique free
speech Athens allowed, the opportunity t o meet and argue with the
leading minds of Greece-it is not clear in what sense we may talk of
"choice." Nor is it clear that "choosing" to remain implies a preference
for the laws of Athens, since one can have many reasons for remaining
where one is that are in part independent of whether one prefers the laws
of one's state.
Vlastos regards these assumptions as gratuitous, for he thinks Socra-
tes has stronger arguments which he does not spell out but of which he
has "an intuitive sense." The first of these regards an action as self-
obligating if "because by means of it the agent draws upon a pool of
benefits which is secured by the cooperation of the beneficiaries and is
distributed justly among them" (527). When Socrates refers t o the great
benefits he has received from having been reared and having lived with-
in the Athenian legal order, he implies that that order is itselfjust. And
this suggests that agreements generate moral obligations only if, and
because, they are in accord with justice; that he is obligated to the laws
of Athens because he made a just agreement with them and they are
just.I4 Thus shorn of its excess and unnecessary assumptions Socrates
appears to argue that Athens is a legal order which produces great bene-
fits for its citizens and that obedience to the laws are the dues every
citizen pays to this collective enterprise. I n exercising his rights as a
citizen (which Socrates did), in a state like Athens "he gives his fellows
to understand that he agrees to carry his individual share of the aggre-
gate burden and undertakes in all fairness to d o his part as he expects
them to d o theirs. Thus disobedience to the law is a default on this
undertaking, not keeping a promise, welshing on a commitment that is
no less 'real for being tacit" (528).
The second stronger argument, though not actually present in the
Crito, is present in other dialogues (such as Book I of the Republic),
where Socrates recognizes collisions beween duties and thus has within
"his line of vision" the modern distinction between what one has a n
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I551

obligation to d o and what,on balance, one is obligated to do. Applying

this substantive distinction t o Socrates' rationale of political obligation
in the Criro and his statement of dutiful disobedience in the Apology,
Vlastos argues (as Woozley did) that, because the circumstances are so
different, there is no inconsistency. The disobedient action contem-
plated in the Crito involves a fraudulent evasion and subversion of
the law, not a n open defiance of it. Socrates could never undertake such
a course of action, for it would trivialize his life and teachings and lend
substance to the charges of his accusers. But neither can he give up
philosophy, which he regards as the greatest benefaction t o the state, a
duty t o the god, and the essence of his moral identity (532-533). S o in
both dialogues Socrates must d o what he does (even if the grounds he
offers must be reformulated). T o flee o r stop doing philosophy would
have meant moral suicide. Thus Socrates is right t o argue that he ought
t o obey the law in his circumstances and also right for saying no to the
abstract question-should every citizen of any state and in any cir'cum-
stances obey the law.
Vlastos is less concerned with a detailed analysis of the Apofogyand
Crito than with (1) arguing against those who invoke Socrates a s a para-
digm of unconditional obedience t o political authority and (2) using the
inconsistency between the two dialogues as an occasion to generate a
theory of political obligation useful t o modern political actors. It is not
that the Apology and Criro are incidental to these purposes, but rather
that they are treated in their terms. Granting the legitimacy of the enter-
prise and the cogency of much of what emerges, there are two kinds of
questions that remain.
The first involves the matter of whether Vlastos' argument is also
Socrates' argument; whether his reformulated consistency does not
obscure the depth of the initial inconsistency thereby making Socra-
tes too comfortably relevant, too much like Kant and Rawls. Certainly
Vlastos does not explain why Socrates says what he says in the manner
or sequence he does. Why, for instance, does Socrates give such promi-
nence t o the laws t o the neglect of other reasons for remaining in Ath-
ens? (Certainly Crito suggests them.) What is the status of the laws with
whom Socrates converses? Does Socrates regard the Athenian legal
order a s just o r is it his invented laws which solicit his agreement and
respect? What effect does Socrates' unique vocation have on his relation
to his fellow citizens? Is he a beneficiary and participant like others, an
equal doing his share t o sustain the common enterprise? Nor is it obvi-
ous that the "high flown" oratory, "gusts of feeling," hyperbole, and act
of self-abnegation can be treated as incidental accompaniments to an
implicit argument. There is a danger that Vlastos' surgery will maim the
patient and make him unrecognizable.
[I561 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

A second set of questions concerns the particular things Vlastos

asserts about the Crito and Socrates. F o r one thing, it is not simply civic
rights and the opportunity t o converse with leading philosophers that
Socrates would give up by choosing exile, but the very opportunity t o
d o political philosophy at all-to have reasoning taken seriously in
practical life. Moreover, it is misleading to speak of reasons for remain-
ing in Athens independent of the laws, given that Greek law was not
merely a series of constraints but a formative educative force, embody-
ing a particular ideal of culture and citizenship. Furthermore, Socrates
seems t o suggest that he owes obedience to the laws not only because
they are just, but because they are his: that patriotism as well as justice
are the proper grounds of obligation. When these grounds fail t o coin-
cide, the philosopher-citizen is forced to reexamine borh his philosophic
vocation and his citizenship.
Given these and previous objections, the efforts of Vlastos and
Woozley t o make Socrates' arguments in the Apology and Critoconsis-
tent exacts too high a price. It is purchased at the expense of what seems
to me the most inclusive issue posed by the dialogues. They explain the
inconsistency by explaining it away.

While the philosophic interpretation of the Crito puts the dramatic

setting aside,'5 the literary interpretation of both the dialogue and the
inconsistency place it at the center. Here the difficulty lies in treating the
Crito as a literary text t o the virtual exclusion of philosophic and
political content. If the philosophic reading of the Crito is t o o abstract
and contextless, the literary approach is too contextual, or rather con-
strues context in too narrowly literary terms.
An example of this approach is a recent essay by Gary Young.16
Stressing the importance of the different dramatic settings of the Crito
and Apology, he regards Socrates as addressing "two different audi-
ences with two presumably different purposes in mind" (3). Thus, there
is n o real inconsistency between the two dialogues; indeed, the issue is
overemphasized. For Socrates does not literally mean the uncondition-
al call for obedience he addresses to Crito. As evidence, Young notes
that Crito is one of the many whose views Socrates regards as irrelevant
to the question at hand-should he o r should he not fleejail and Athens.
As one of the many, he will not be able t o understand Socrates' princi-
ples. "Insofar as such principles are decisive for Socrates' decision not to
flee Athens, Crito will be unable to understand the reasons for that de-
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I571

cision. And if Socrates wishes to persuade Crito that it is not dikaion for
Socrates to flee Athens, he will not be able to rely upon Socratic prirl-
ciples as a means of persuasion: the Socratic principles, at least by them-
selves, will leave Crito unmoved" (6). For though Crito is Socrates' old
friend, he is incapable of applying these principles himself (7). They are
not his own; he does not act on them or even remember them when
facing the prospect of Socrates' death, except where explicitly reminded
of them by Socrates. But because Crito is a dear friend, Socrates is
anxious to ease his sorrow, as best he can, given Crito's inability to
accept Socrates' belief, that it is better to suffer injustice (injury, harm)
than to comtnit it.
Once we recognize that Socrates' aim is not t o justify or explain to
Crito why he refuses to flee, but to "move" Crito to accept his decision
(9), the unique qualities of the dialogue that puzzled Woozley and
annoyed Vlastos became intelligible. The un-Socratic rhetoric, the
absence of dialectic, and the self-abnegation are all designed t o convince
Crito. Indeed, the whole dialogue with the laws, where Socrates assumes
Crito's position and the laws become Socratic, is intended to deal with
Crito's initial considerations in ways that will be regarded as powerful
by Crito. l 7
Young's approach is a useful corrective to any literal reading of the
Criro. He regards the dialogue as a human encounter as well as a n argu-
ment and tries to draw out the implications of the former for the nature
and status of the latter. In so doing, he adds richness and complexity to
what is happening and being said in the dialogue.
But for all its merits, Young claims too much for the dramatic context
and does too little with it. He claims too much when he argues that
Socrates "misrepresents his beliefs" because of the character of Crito.
He does too little with it insofar as he omits aspects of the dramatic con-
text which complicate his initial claim. Let me explore each in turn.
Initially, Young's claim is modest enough and quite similar to those
of Woozley and Vlastos; Socrates "does not believe" that "every citizen
(including myself) should obey every command of the city" (4, 1). But
the reason he gives for this statement is the nature and a character of the
audience, Crito. The problem is that Young does not offer a detailed
analysis of which beliefs Socrates misrepresents and which he does not,
nor what misrepresentation is. Lacking this, his modest claim becomes
a more encompassing one: that the dramatic setting and the character of
Crito so dictate what Socrates can say and how he can say it that he
simply does not believe what he says t o Crito, or has the laws say t o Crito
(or what Plato has Socrates have the laws say t o Crito).lB
This claim in turn rests on at least three assumptions: (1) that though
Crito is Socrates' friend, he is also one of the many whose views and
[ I 58) POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

opinions Socrates dismisses a s irrelevant; (2) that Crito is therefore

separated from Socrates by a n unbridgeable gulf; and (3) that what
Socrates says to Crito does not embody either Socrates' general beliefs
or his specific view about proper obedience to authority. Though there
is evidence in the dialogue to support these assumptions and the claims
based on them, not all the evidence does so.
It is not quite true that Socrates does not care for the many and
regards their views as irrelevant.19 He does not care for them as a multi-
tude (pollon), existing in the swollen polis of Athens. He certainly does
not accept them and their views as the final arbiter of what is right and
truc. But he does care deeply about what his fellow citizens think and
how they live their lives. That is what distinguishes him from the sophists
who, as noncitizens of the polis in which they teach, pretend t o care for
men but really despise them.
Socrates does care for the views of his fellow citizens and for their
view of him. That is the reason why he speaks and acts as he does, going
into the marketplace in the name of philosophy to discuss issues that
arise in the context of daily life and in everyday language. He is anxious
about the fate of Athens, philosophy, and the future relations between
them. It is n o doubt true that Socrates' orchestration of his trial and
punisment to which Crito refers (45e) is a heroic testing of his life and
teaching.20 But, as with Achilles (to whom he refers in both the Crito
and Apology), this test includes a concern for what others will think and
say of him (and of philosophy). Though the multitude is not a final
judge, Socrates is aware that no one is the author and producer of his
own life story.
Thus, because there is a political and moral purpose to Socates'
teaching, because he regards philosophy as political in aim and intended
achievement, his relation to the many and t o the matter of reputation is
ambivalent. T o ignore this fact is to underestimate the tragedy of
Socrates' condemnation and the separation of philosophy and politics
it portends. It is to miss the dilemma that underlies the inconsistency
between the two dialogues and t o leave t o o uncomplicated his relation
with Crito. Socrates is not a n Athenian like any other; but he is a n Ath-
enian. As such, he shares with Crito a common past and citizenship
unshareable with other philosophers.21 Young underemphasizes this
bond and so overemphasizes the gulf that separates Crito from Socra-
tes. He comes perilously close t o treating whatever Crito says as symp-
tomatic of philosophical ineptitude and therefore unworthy of serious
consideration by Socrates. And insofar as he identifies Crito with the
citizen-multitude of Athens, his treatment of Crito is also the denigra-
tion of the claims of citizenship and the polis on philosophers and philo-
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 11591

sophy. This makes it impossible t o recognize the separation of philo-

sophy and politics a s a mutual tragedy the way Socrates does.22
Finally, Young's assumption that Socrates does not believe what he
says because he is talking t o Crito is too narrow a construction of audi-
ence. Leaving aside the complicating fact that Plato is writing for an
audience of readers, there is evidence in the Criro that the dialogue
between Socrates and the laws is a dialogue between Socrates and him-
self; that he too is part of the audience, testing and trying himself before
himself, reexamining his decision and thereby rediscovering a n identity
which is never fully or completely known. Because the dialogue with the
laws is an internal one as well, it cannot simply be true that Socrates does
not mean what he says or that he speaks only for Crito's benefit.
We are left then with the inconsistency more or less intact. Neither the
philosophical nor the literary readings of the Crito has proved com-
pletely satisfactory in stating the substance of the inconsistency or the
stakes in its possible resolution. In what follows, I offer a n alternative
interpretation of the Crito in order t o pose the inconsistency in its most
inclusive terms; a s a tension between philosophy, philosophers, and
Socrates on the one side, and politics, citizens, and Crito on the other. In
so doing, I will try to be appropriately attentive t o both the argument
and dramatic context of the dialogue and thereby account for its unique
tone. Finally, by presenting what I regard a s Socrates' awareness of the
tragic consequences of opposing philosophy and politics, I can return t o
consideration of his exemplary status.

III
There are two dialogues in the Crito, one between Crito and Socrates,
the other between Socrates and the personified laws of Athens. Though
the first is more concrete than the second, both deal with aspects of a
single theme-the relation of philosophy and politics. Each dialogue
asks whether philosophers and nonphilosophers can coexist in friend-
ship and mutual respect; each explores the degree t o which common
citizenship can mute intellectual inequality. T h e conclusions of both
dialogues and the Crito as a whole seem to me inconclusive. Socrates
both moves away from Crito and the polis and reaches out toward them;
he enlarges the gulf that divides them while painfully constructing a
partial bridge in which they might come together. Let me show how and
why this is the case by dealing with each of the Criro's dialogues in turn.
In the beginning of the Crito, Crito is impatient with his friend and
with philosophy. Both are impractical and powerless, as Socrates' im-
[ I 601 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

pending death demonstrates. Neither can be trusted t o operate success-

fully in the real world, t o judge rightly and act decisively. For Crito this
is a time for action, not talk. F o r what is at stake is not an argument but
a life, friendship, families-particular real things and relationships in
the world. Crito knows about such things and cares deeply for them:*3
especially for his friend Socrates.24
Socrates must respond not only t o Crito's arguments but also to his
impatience with argument.25 He must deal with his friend's practicality,
depth of caring, and moral confusion. And he must d o so without for-
cing Crito into false agreements o r bad faith. Finally, he needs t o keep
Crito from disobeying the laws and buying justice wherejustice by law
has, in Crito's opinion, failed.26 If he can successfully meet these chal-
lenges and restore Crito to obedience, his action becomes a testament
to his own good citizenship.
Socrates confronts the challenge through argument and philosophi-
cal rhetoric. His argument casts doubt on the primacy of Crito's consid-
erations and the general assumptions that inform them. His philo-
sophical rhetoric (in the dialogue with the laws), with its appeal to
emotion, religious feeling, love of country, and gratitude for the gift of
life and nurture, redresses the gap of understanding between them,
assuages Crito's potential misology, and answers his prudential maxims
by emphasizing what it is they share a s Athenians and friends.
T o Crito's emphasis on reputation and the opinion of the many
Socrates opposes the one who knows ("if we can find him"; Church, 56)
about questions of justice and injustice, the base and the honorable,
good and evil. It is this man not the multitude who must be followed. T o
Crito's concern for the power of the many to kill a man,2; Socrates offers
a distinction between living and living well, that is, honorably, justly,
and righteously. The multitude can indeed kill someone, but they
cannot d o the greatest good or harm t o him, i.e., make him wise or fool-
ish. T o ignore the many and live justly and righteously requires never
committing injustice no matter what the practical circumstances or
provocation. For Socrates, these considerations, not those of expense,
reputation, family, and friends, are the necessary premises for deciding
whether it is right for him to flee Athens. (Or rather it is only by living
rightly that we will care for these things in the right way.) He is anxious
that Crito agree with them and him; for he does not want to act against
Crito's conviction or without his approval and consent.
But it is not clear whether o r with what depth Crito does agree. As the
argument of the first dialogue proceeds, Socrates tests Crito and the
impact of his own past teachings o n this man of the world. T o Crito's
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I611

initial barrage of criticism (which starts at 45b and culminates at 49d)

Socrates warns: "if your anxiety [eagerness] to save me be right, it is
most valuable; but if not, the greater it is the harder it will be to cope with
[to bear]" (Church, 54-55). The warning is sharpened and broadened
later on when, having reached the conclusion that it is never right to
repay injustice with injustice, Socrates warns Crito to be "careful that
you d o not concede more than you mean. For I know that only a few
men hold, or ever will hold this opinion. And so those who hold it and
those who d o not, have no common ground of argument; they can of
necessity only look with contempt on each other's beliefs" (or "despise
each other's principles and basis of decision").28 Crito's agreement to
this is followed immediately by Socrates' questions whether a man
ought to carry out his just agreements and if in escaping without the
polis' consent he does not injure those whom he least ought to injure by
violating a just agreement. Crito does not understand the quesiton and
to help him, Socrates begins his dialoge with the laws.
Crito's initial assertiveness and sureness has receded. From 47a, he
has become increasingly passive and perplexed, giving short declarative
responses,29 or expressing confusion ("What should we do?" "I do not
understand the question") to Socrates' questioning. What is crucial in
dialogue as a whole and in Crito's perplexity and disorientation is the
relation of philosophical principles and reasoning to the world of prac-
tice and politics. Reasoning and reflection lead to conclusions which
seem at odds with what is sensible. Thus at48d, Crito responds,"I agree
with what you say, Socrates, but I wish you would consider what we
ought to do" (Kalos men moi dokeis legein o Socrates; hora de ti
dromen). Crito finds it difficult to deny what Socrates says, but equally
hard to accept what he says as a guide to action. For him there is an
incongruity and incoherence between the setting and substance of their
past discourse and present imperati~es.3~ The connection between
reasoning and the political-practical world seems to him problematic. It
cannot be for Socrates. If philosophy can be disregarded in this, the
greatest trial of his life, then philosophic discourse is mere child's play,
a phantasm and entertainment to be dismissed when circumstances
change and serious things are at stake.
Crito is confused. On one level he recognizes the force of their old
agreements. Moreover, he loves Socrates and cannot ignore what
Socrates says. But he does not understand him. For on another level, he
does regard philosophy as largely irrelevant to the real world. He must
be reminded over and over again of the principles to which he has
assented many times in the past. Indeed, there is something ritualistic
[ I 621 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

about the roles each man assumes when the conversation becomes
philosophic, as if both are reverting to form; Socrates saying yet again
what he has said so often before, Crito replying in his usual way. Crito
has not made Socrates' principles his own and draws back from them a t
the slightest opportunity.31 This suggests that Crito is a witness for both
Socrates' lack of success as a moral and political educator and the fragile
prospects for his mission after his death. F o r though Socrates silences
Crito now (as he no doubt has in the past and does at the end of the
dialogue), there is something futile about his whole enterprise. For Ulti-
mately he is not convincing; each encounter requires going over the
same ground, winning the battle anew. The testing of Crito then is also a
testing of Socrates. The failure of either implicates the other. Thus what
Crito says and does not say is more than a testament to his ignorance
and incapacity. It reflects back the capacity of the philosophy to find
voice and place in the everyday world.32Indeed, it raisesthe most funda-
mental question of all-is it just to d o philosophy?
If I a m right about the nature of Crito's confusion, then the dialogue
with the laws is not only or even primarily addressed to Crito's specific
lack of understanding, but t o his general perplexity about the relevance
and usefulness of philosophical reasoning. Since this is also Socrates'
concern, the dialogue with the laws cannot simply be an answer t o Crito
or for Crito's exclusive benefit.33 It is also an attempt by Socrates to
define his relation to things of the world; t o his friend Crito and the
considerations he puts forward, to the many, to politics and Athens,
even to philosophy as a worldly activity. In this respect, the dialogue
with laws is an internal dialogue-Socrates invents the personified laws
-from which Crito is necessarily excluded. Prompted by his friend who
is at best a partial participant, Socrates undertakes a final review of his
position. He tries himself before himself, or rather before the idealized
philosophical laws of Athens which warrant his respect and acquiescence.
The dialogue with the laws is simultaneously an exploration of what
Socrates shares and does not share with Crito. As a n internal dialogue,
Socrates turns his back to Crito, moving away from his friend toward
the personified laws of Athens. He becomes progressively aloof and self-
sufficient, widening the gap between the two as death approaches as if
"beyond the reach of Crito's friend~hip,"3~ aware that he alone is his own
true friend. But as a dialogue with even the idealized laws of Athens, a
city that has fathered them both, Socrates attempts to find a bridge over
the chasm of mutual contempt that separates philosophers from non-
philosophers. By singing a paean to Athens, Socrates reminds himself
and Crito that they share a common past, birth, nurture, education, and
citizenship. As the spring of their friendship and the basis of an equality
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I631

between them, this commonality lessens the inequality of nonunder-

standing and the separation of philosophy and practice. And insofar as
Crito is one of the many as well as a friend, this commonality is basic to
the way philosophy must appear and speak to citizens.
Thus the dialogue with the laws has several aspects. Most specifically,
it is impelled by Crito's confusion over whether Socrates'escape without
the consent of the laws would break ajust agreement and injure those he
least ought to injure. But it also addresses Crito's more general con-
fusion about the relevance of philosophic reasoning to political practice.
Socrates' similar concern unfolds into a more abstract consideration of
the relation of philosophy t o citizenship. This leads him to search for the
roots and origins of his vocation in the Athenian polis. H e concludes
that the laws of Athens are father to the practice of philosophy every bit
as much as they are father t o the man, Socrates.35 When the laws call
Socrates their slave and child they suggest that as infants men are virtual
nonpersons and that they become who they are physically, intellec-
tually, emotionally, and morally as a result of the nurtureand education
received from the city in which they are citizens. This is not a matter of
contract but of growing up and into recognizable persons within a spe-
cific culture. Thus, when one chooses a vocation, action, or friend, one
already is somebody. N o one, not even Socrates, is sui generis.36 Though
Socrates gives new content to older Athenian ideals-such as living well,
justice, citizenship, friendship, piety, courage, and the unity of intelli-
gence and action-they are Athenian ideals, implicit in what has been
said and done before. His critical standards (including what it means t o
criticize on the basis of standards) are derived from what he criticizes.
This fact and Socrates' recognition of it has a number of consequences.
First of all, it makes criticism appear paradoxical. For if what one
chooses to criticize, the fact that one chooses to criticize at all, and the
idiom of one's criticism, owes much t o what one is criticizing, i.e., what
has nurtured and educated you, then at least part of what is criticized is
simultaneously affirmed. (The paradox works the other way as well;
since Socrates is Athens' son, to condemn him is also a kind of self-
condemnation.) Whether one conceives of a tradition as speaking in a
single voice, or in many voices any one of which may become the basis
for judgment of another, all political criticism which fails t o recognize
this paradox repeats the ignorance of Aeschylus' Clytemenstra who
proclaims her murder of her husband an end t o violence and a beginning
of order while unknowingly perpetuating the cycle of revenge that was
the curse of the House of Atreus. (Of course she is doing something
which is hers and for which she is responsible, curse or no curse.) In these
terms a claim that a past agreement is unjust can be made intelligible
[ I 641 POLITICAL THEORY / M A Y 1978

only because of a prior "agreement" about what constitutes a n agree-

ment and making a claim.37
Second, it imposes on Socrates a n obligation t o repay his debt to
Athens by giving it the best things he can, as it gave him and all citizens
the best things it could. Such repayment is only possible among those
who share common citizenship and law. And this requires that Socrates
assume responsibility for a world he did not make even when he wishes it
to be other than it is.
Finally, by emphasizing the political source and origin of his philo-
sophic vocation, Socrates becomes part of a tradition of public speech
and po:itical leadership that is distinctively Athenian. It is true that he
is highly critical of that tradition (as the Gorgias makes clear) and that
he refuses t o participate in the deliberations of the Assembly. Yet he
assumes the mantle of exemplary political action even while relocating
the proper arena for such activity. Lacking what only later became
a definition of philosophy a s a distinctive mode of life opposed t o poli-
tics, Socrates was, in part, understood by himself and others as belong-
ing to the tradition of Athenian statesmen-educators from Solon to
Pericles.
These are a few of the considerations that lead Socrates to reject the
proposal to leave Athens and practice philosophy elsewhere. It is only
among his fellow citizens and within the laws they share that philosophy
has any prospect of having a voice in the world. If Werner Jaeger and
H.D.F. Kilto are right in their description of Greek law as (1) a moral
creative force designed to inculcate justice as much as to secure it; (2) a
living influence to be felt, experienced, and manifest in conduct; and (3)
distinctive t o a particular polis, then Socrates has n o choice but t o philo-
sophize within the common life embodied in the laws.38 Outside them
and tradition, the philosopher is unable to derive critical standards
intelligible to his fellow citizens and effective in political and moral edu-
cation. He would be consigned t o futility, flattery, o r silence.39 Thus by
running away from Athens Socrates would be disguising his appearance
not merely with peasant garments but with pretense. T o accept exile
would be to give up citizenship and thus philosophy.
It is then as a citizen of Athens that Socrates examines the lives of
others. And since all citizens share a common life, the examination of
one's own life is also a n examination of the life of the city. Only in this
way and in this context is it possible for philosophy and politics to be
reconciled without compromise; giving philosophy a new subject mat-
ter, the polis, and making the highest norms and laws of political action
the chief problem of philosophy.40
While this is true, it is also one-sided. F o r Socrates is notjust a citizen.
Nor does he owe everything to Athens. The polis and laws gave him all
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [ I 651

the good things they could, but they could not give him everything. (His
daimon owes nothing t o the polis.) Nor are the laws of Athens t o which
he offers such unconditional obedience simply the laws of contemporary
Athens. Rather they are idealizations of an abstract archaic It is to
this idea of law and of Athens that Socrates offers his obedience. And by
making this law holy and the embodiment of wisdom, tradition, and the
will of the gods, he implicitly condemns any legal practices that depart
from it.
Thus in the very process of being a good citizen of Athens, Socrates
shows the corruptness of the city. In so doing, he threatens the polis t o
which he owes so much. For his death wi!l obscure the debt of philo-
sophy t o Athens (which is perhaps why he states that debt so extremely
by calling himself a slave to the laws). In the Apology (38c, 39cd) he
warns his condemners that the polis will be blamed for killing him and
despising wisdom. "And now I wish t o prophesy t o you, 0 ye who have
condemned me; for I am now a t the time when men most d o prophesy,
the time just before death. And I say unto you, ye men who have slain
me, that a punishment will come upon you immediately after my death
far more grievous than the punishment of death which you have meted
out t o me.42 That punishment will be a swarm of young men who, with-
out the restraint of the daimon and Socrates, will be harsherthan he has
ever been. Regarding him rather than the laws of the polis as the father
of their vocation, these future philosophers will revile and hate the polis
because of their love for him. And the polis will respond in kind.43
Socrates does not seek this, even though his conviction and death are the
vehicle for its occurrence. H e warns his fellow citizens and the city
against estranging philosophy as he warns his fellow-philosophers here
and in the Crito against contempt for politics. Yet his warnings are
bound t o go unheeded. Declaring his love of the city and eulogizing its
laws, Socrates is nevertheless a patricide, spawning those who will
despise both. Proclaiming his loyalty t o Athens, his philosophic stan-
dard of justice nevertheless dissipates loyalty by confounding the dis-
tinction between friends and enemies, fellow citizens and strangers.
Anxious t o prevent the separation of thought and action, he drives a
wedge between them. It is n o wonder that the Crito is about the old and
the new, parents and children, beginnings and endings, friendship and
solitude, philosophy and politics, birth and death.
For these and other reasons, Socrates refuses exile. T o the degree that
what he has become derives from his being an Athenian, his fleeing
would be superfluous, since he will carry part of his native city with him
wherever he goes. Given what he owes to Athens, it would be impious to
flee in defiance of the laws. Given the philosopher's need for location
among fellow citizens, it would be self-defeating for him to leave. In the
[I 66) POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

Apology he rejects the punishment of exile on the grounds that he is not

so irrational "as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens,
could not endure my conversation a n d my words, but found them too
irksome and disagreeable, s o that you are now seeking to be rid of them,
others will not be willing t o endure them.. . . A fine life I should lead if I
went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always
being driven out" (37c-d, Fowler translation). F o r Socrates, being
uprooted from Athens is a more certain evil than death.44
The archaic quality of the laws takes the question of exile out of the
narrowly political terms in which it was understood in late fifth and
early fourth century Athens. It points back t o an older ancestral religion
in which exile--expulsion from the tribe-was a terrible punishment.
For by depriving a man of the assistance of his kinsmen, gods, and
ancestors, exile made him a stranger in the world. The outcast, together
with his descendents, was burdened with a curse until the end of time. A
man who died in exile was a soul without a tomb o r dwelling place,
wandering without repose, a malevolent spirit haunting his people
f0rever.~5Part of Socrates' fear of exile is the prospect that he and his
philosophical descendents, will stalk the world as the malevolent spirits
of old.
In one way Socrates is already a political exile and partial stranger
among his own people and in his own city. In the Apology (17d) he
speaks of himself as a foreigner to the law courts and their manner of
speaking. And in the Crito he withdraws from his friend and fellow
citizen into what seems a n impenetrable solitude. But not quite. F o r in
the latter dialogue, the laws, purged of baseness, have become his friend
and interlocutor. They, unlike the Athenians, recognize that he has been
punished unjustly, and thus implicitly share his sense of justice. As we
have seen, these "idealized" laws are abstracted from the decisions of
men and from the city. It is with them that he converses and has made a n
agreement. They are worthy of Socrates' love, service, and obedience.
These laws d o not condemn philosophy or philosophers, but are them-
selves philosophical. Through question and answer, they show Socrates
that to abandon philosophy and flee Athens trivializes his life and work.
(As indicated by the use of the same word homologia and homologein,
legal commitment and dialectical necessity are here ~ n i t e d . ) ~In6the city
ruled by these laws, philosophy and Socrates can be reconciled with
politicsand Athens. Here he can be at peace with himself and his fellow
citizens for there will be no inconsistency between doing philiosophy
and obeying the laws of the polis.
But these laws are invented by Socrates. This leaves the status of his
reconciliation with Crito uncertain, the philosopher's relation, the polis,
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I671

and citizenship ambiguous, and the inconsistency unresolved. The

mutual need is clear; the prospect for satisfaction is not.

I n previous sections, I set out what seemed to me at issue in the incon-

sistency between Socrates' commitment t o philosophy in the Apology
and his equally firm commitment t o the laws of Athens in the Crito. I
argued against those interpreters who quickly resolve the inconsistency
or deny its reality, insisting instead that the inconsistency was persistent
and real, as much existential as logical in character. But I also claimed
that its reality had less to d o with the question ofcivil disobedience than
with the relations beween philosophy and politics. I indicated why I
thought this way of posing the problem more fully captured what Socra-
tes perceived t o be a t stake in the inconsistency and its possible resolu-
tion. But t o subsume the question of obedience o r disobedience to law
under the issue of the philosopher's relation to politics may appear to
narrow unnecessarily Socrates' exemplary relevance for us. As Robert
J. McLaughlin puts it: "One might have thought, along with today's dis-
o b e d i e n t ~that
, Socrates was dealing with a deeper problem [than that of
philosophy and politics] having to d o with the nature and binding force
of law a s such." He finds it inconceivable that Socrates should ground
his attitude toward obedience in his vocation as a philosopher. "Unless
we are willing to allow that the purpose of law is the cultivation of a
society of robots, we have t o make room for the critical examination by
citizens like Socrates of any and every conduct enjoined or forbidden by
law."d7 I would not f o r a moment deny the importance of this concern
particularly in a modern "liberal" nation-state. But Socrates was not
living in such a state; nor was he a philosopher in the sense o r in the way
most contemporary philosophers conceive of philosophy. McLaugh-
lin's views, like many analyses of the Crito and Apology, are in danger of
being ahistorical in the sense of assuming that Socrates' arguments are
intended to "convince any rational man at any time and in any place."
There is some evidence t o support this imputation. Certainly Socrates
presents his principle of justice in universal terms. But even universal
knowledge and the search for it is mediated by a particular tradition,
taking place among a people with location in time. T o ignore this is to
ignore the importance of citizenship for Socrates, of politics for the
Greeks, and thus the nature of Socratic philosophy. It leads to substi-
tuting o u r sense of politics and philosophy for his and theirs. We would
be like someone who, listening to one-half of a phone conversation re-
[I681 POLITICAL THEORY / M A Y 1978

mained unaware it was only a half and not directly addressed to them.
Ignorant of audience and taking the part for the whole, they would be
unable to join the conversation in appropriate ways. Such ahistoricism
is particularly dangerous for the Apology and Crifowhere the political
world implodes into the dramatic setting with particular force. Implicit in
the dialogues and central to the inconsistency is Socrates' perception of
Athens' incapacity to provide moral guidance for the conduct of daily
life. Exhausted by the Peloponnesian W a r and disillusioned with the
Periclean vision of political greatness, his native city is n o longer able to
sustain the disciplined purpose that marked the democratic polis of the
previous century. It is this "failure of nerve" that Socrates and Plato seek
to understand and to transform by rooting political belief and action in
foundations immune to the corrosive scepticism of the sophists, the
extravagance of an Alcibiades, and the terrors of the Corcyrean Revolu-
tion as portrayed by Thucydides.
I d o not mean that Socrates has no relevance for a discussion of civil
disobedience, but that such relevance must be established circumspect-
ly, given Greek conceptions of law, politics, morality, patriotism, and
citizenship. Certainly Socrates led n o political movement as did Gandhi
and Martin Luther King, J r . Nor can one picture Socrates at Walden
Pond. Yet like Gandhi, King, and Thoreau, Socrates' actions a s por-
trayed in the Apology a n d / o r Crifoare deemed exemplary. What sort of
exemplar is he?
By his death, Socrates removes his teaching-that it is better to suffer
than to commit injustice and that one should never injure another no
matter what the circumstances-from the realm of opinion. His most
powerful attempt to persuade the polis was also his last. For by his ex-
emplary death, he sought to differentiate his opinion from all others and
validate its claims to truth. Hannah Arendt has suggested that such
teaching by example is "the only form of'persuasion' that philosophical
truth is capable of without perversion or distortion; by the same token,
philosophical truth can become 'practical' and inspire action without
violating the rules of the political realm only when it manages to become
manifest in the guise of a n e ~ a m p l e . " ~Ifs Arendt is right, then Socrates
sought by his example to appropriately unite intellect, reasoning, and
philosophy with patriotism, practice, and politics.

NOTES
I . See Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice edited by Hugo Bedau (New York,
Pegasus, 1969). 15, 66. 75-80, 182, 196, 217. Socrates is quoted by both sides. See for
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 11691

instance Wyzanski's essay (in Bedau, pp. 194-200); L. H. Van Dusen, Jr., 'civil Dis-
obedience: Destroyer of Democracy," American Bar Associarion Journal, LV, 123, and
Sidney Hook, 71te Paradoxes of Freedom (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962),
pp. 1 18ff.
2. Plato's Eurhyphro, Apology and Criro, translated by F . J. Church (Indianapolis
and New York, Library of Liberal Arts, n.d.), 35-56. I will rely primarily on the Church
translation, but where useful, supplement it with that of Hugh Tredennick ( i n n e Col-
lected Dialogues of Plaro, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairms Bollingen,
Series LXXI V e w York, Pantheon Books, 1961]), Henry North Fowler's (in the Loeb
Classical Library), and my own emandations and interpolations.
3. See Arthur W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibiliiy (London, Oxford Universit)
Press, 1960), 264.
4. Rex Martin, "Socrates and Disobedience to Law," Review of Meraphysics, XXIV
(September 1970), 22 (6.Francis C. Wade, S. J . 'In Defense of Socrates," Review of
Meraphysics [December 19711, 31 1-325). Jeffrie G. Murphy ("Violence and the Socratic
Theory of Legal Fidelity" in Violence and Aggression in rhe History of Ideas, Weiner and
Fisher [eds.] Rutgers University Press, (1974) claims to be indifferent to criticism that he
has imposed a n anachronistic conceptual framework on the Criro which is not applicable
to the historical context in which Socrateslives. Injustification he quotes P. F. Strawson's
Individuals: "No philosopher understands his predecessors until he has rethought their
thought in his own contemporary terms" (my emphasis). But the issue is precisely what is
"theirs" and what is not.
5. There is aother kind of philosophical reading of the Criro which regards what
Socrates says only to "philosophers" (asopposed to someone like Crito) as unproblematic.
See for instance Marvin Fox,'The Trials of Socrates: An Interpretation of the First tetral-
ogy," in Archiv Fur Philosophie, Vol. 6, 226-261.
6. A. D. Woozley, "Socrates on Disobeying the Law," in 7he Philosophy of Socra-
res, edited by Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1971). 299-318.
7. Cf. N. A. Greenberg, "Socrates' Choice in the Crito" (HarvardSrudies in Classical
Philology, Vol. 70, 1965), 61, "To be sure, obedience to the law is not put forward here
(Crito, 50 a-b), as only or simply a sacred principle. It is the survival and well being of
the state that is the primary goal.. . .One need not obey a law which is not conducive to
that goal."
8. Similar criticism are made by Gary Young in his 'Socrates and Obedience,"
Phronesis, pp. 1-29 at p. 26, note 19. Young goes too far when he denies that philosophy
involves persuasion.
9. Woozley recognizes but does not explore or account for the unusual form of the
Criro.
10. For insrance. John Burner (in Plaro's Eurhyphro. Apology of Socrares and Crito,
edited with notes by John Burnet (London, Oxford University Press: 1924, pp. 199-200).
.
"The personification of the Laws. .allows Socrates to invest the declaration of his princi-
ples with a certain emotion. It thus fulfills the same function as the myths of the more
elaborate dialoges."
11. See Hanna Pitkin, Wirrgensrein and Justice (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1972). I would have thought the shift Socrates makes in the Criro
from arguing directly with his friend to indirectly arguing with him through a dialogue
with the laws a perfect example of this. See the discussion by J . Dybokowski (Dialogue:
Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 13,1974, pp. 5 19-535) of the significance of this shift
in making Crito less dependent on-the beliefs of the many.
12. Gregory Vlastos, 'Socrates on Political Obedience," in The Yale Review, Sum-
mer, !974, pp. 517-534.
[I701 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

13. F o r a different interpretation of the tone of the Criro see R. E . Allen, "Law and
Justice in Plato's Circle," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, 1972, pp. 557-567.
14. Hanna Pitkin argues in a similar vein: "Socrates' past consent is not so much
compelling in its own right as it is a way of expressing and reinforcing his present judgment
that there is nothing basically wrong with the system, no justification for resistance,"
"Obligation and Consent 11," American Political Science Review, March 1966, p. 42.
15. Vlastos makes it clear that he recognizes but is not concerned with irony in the
Crito.
16. Young, "Socrates and Obedience."
17. Ibid., p. 12. See Frederick Rosen's "Obligation and Friendship in Plato's Crito," in
Political Theory, Vol. I, Number 3, August 1973, pp. 307-316. Rosen agrees that, 'As a
whole the three speeches (of the nomoi) are persuasive, not merely because of the logic of
:he argument, bilt because they seem particularly designed to appeal to Crito"(p. 3 12). His
subsequent argument in support of this seems t o me right. Notice that Rosen is also
impressed by the logic of the argument in a way Young was not.
18. Greenberg also analyzes the dramatic context but rejects the thesis that "theargu-
ments before the jurors and Crito are so facetious that they could not have been seriously
intended," (1965, p. 47). Young's stronger claim is the converse of Woozley's acceptance
of Socrates' sincerity. On these matters see Robert J. McLaughlin "Socrates on Political
Disobedience: A Reply to Gary Young" Phronesis, Vol. 21, Number 3, 1976, pp. 185-197.
19. I a m purposely expanding the notion of caring what people think to caring for
them, and broadening the question of what the many think of him to what the many think.
At 4 4 , Socrates asks Crito whether they should care so much about what most people
think, "oi gar epieikestatoi on pollon doxas melei." (Melei is from melo which means an
object of thought, care, or anxiety-something to worry about.) But for Socrates what
people think is not something different from what they are and do. T o not care what the
many think is not to care for the many. Of course this does not settle how much or in what
way Socrates might care for the many; but it does keep the question open in a way Young's
notion does not.
20. For instance, by Greenberg (1965), who sees the trial and death of Socrates as an
heroic encounter with his fellow citizens. He shows how Socrates escalates what is at
stake at the trial by accepting the stylistic requirement of the challenge and adding his
own stipulations so that the issuers of the challenge cannot possibly win. The Athenians
are made t o assume responsibility they had not foreseen and become committed beyond
their expectations. They are now the victims. Socrates wins whether he is acquitted or
whether he fails (since what he fails is his own challenge rather than theirs). Greenberg
concludes that Socrates chooses death not in obedience to the law, or because he despises
death, but as a payment of a debt of honor.
21. There is a tendency to overemphasize the originality of the Socratic "doctrine" and
thus widen the gap between him and his fellow citizens in the interest of closing it between
him and other philosophers. An Athenian who had heard Pericles' Funeral Oration (as
presented by Thucydides) would have some respect for the doctrine that living well is more
noble than mere living, though he would not of course be familiar with Socrates' version of
it. See also E. R. Dodds's argument that the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge is
not novel (in The Greeks and the Irrational, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957, ch. I), and
Adkins, 1960, throughout.
22. See Ann Congleton 'Two Kinds of Lawlessness: Plato's Criro," Polirical n e o r y ,
Vol. 2. Number 4, November 1974, P. 445 and throughout.
23. S o he is portrayed in the Euthydemus and Phaedo. Socrates addresses his last
words to Crito.and it is Crito who closes his eyes and mouth (Phaedo, 118a).
 Euben / PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS [I711

24. In the Phaedo (I l5d-e) Socrates refers to Crito's having offered to stand bail for
him during the period between his trial and death. In many of his acts Crito'sfriendship is
two-edged, which has led Richard Herder in Pluto's Kriton (Berlin, 1934) to argue that
Crito is the foe in the friend, much as Socrates is to Athens.
25. In a provocative essay, 'Socrates' Debt to Asclepius," (Classicai Journai, Vol. 66,
1975, pp. 294-297) Richard Minadeo suggests that Socrates is offering thanks to the god
for restoring the ruptured dialogue which if he left unmended would have made misology
Socrates' legacy.
26. Drew A. Hyland, "Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. I,
1968. But, cf. Adkins' contention (230ff. and 260ff.) that when the vital interests of thecity
are not threatened there is nothing in the conventional moral standards to prevent the
agathospoiites from attempting t o thwart the laws of thecity in a particular case on behalf
of the family and friends.
27. Crito understands destruction in physical terms, which is why Socrates chooses an
analogy with a trainer to begin his argument.
28. Church, p. 59, and Fowler, p. 173 (49d).
29. There is a certain symmetry to the dialogue. It begins and ends with Crito's silence.
Socrates silences Crito to save him from bad faith and to emphasize the wordless philia
which unites them despite the gap of understanding (see footnote 40 below).
30. See the illuminating remarks of Greenberg on this point (1965, p. 50).
31. See Crito's response at 51c.
32. Other dialogues, such as the Gorgias and Republic can be read in a similar way. It
matters, of course, what "failure" is and whether, as Hobbes would "say it is a question of
matter or the method."
33. But it is this in part. Dybikowski (1 974, p. 521) rightly argues that the fiction ofthe
personified laws unites Socrates and Crito agains Crito's earlier claims which derived
from his attachment to the multitude. The laws direct their claims to Socrates who enlists
Crito to accept or reject them for him. The laws thereby "compels Crito to stand imagina-
tively in Socrates' place and by viewing his offer in this light to distance himself from many
of the external considerations which weighed heavily with him in making it."
34. Rosen, 1973, p. 309.
35. "Parents love their children as parts of themselves, while children love their
parents as the authors of their being," Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 1161b20.
36. See the discussion of these points in Hanna Pitkin's Wirrgensrein and Justice
(Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1972, pp. 199 and 334).
37. This argument relates t o two changes often leveled at Socrates' views in the Crito
-that he ignores private rights and the need for an "independent assessment" of the laws'
character t o justify his commitment to them (see Dybkowski, 1974, p. 532 and McLaugh-
lin, 1976, p. 188). But if the very idea of private rights as well as the demand for them is a
"product" of the polis, it is not clear what it means t o claim a right against Athens. Nor is it
clear what an "independent" assessment means or where it,would come from.
38. See Werner Jaeger (in Paideia, Vol. I, New York, Oxford University Press, 1945,
p. 100) and H.D.F. Kitto (in The Greeks, Baltimore, Pelican Books, 1957, p. 94).
39. See Socrates remarks in The Republic, 495c. As we have seen, the theme ofsilence
runs throughout the Crito, At the conclusion of the dialogues Socrates, turning to his
"dear friend Crito," yet immune to anything Crito might say, invokes the dervishes of
Cybele. In their frenzied passion they can hear only the music of the flutes, as he can hear
no words other than those spoken by the laws. Only silence is possible and Crito is left with
no choice but to conclude "ouk echo legeinW--Ihave nothing to say. Burnet explains that
the Corbantic enthusiasm to which Socrates refers (oi corybantiontes) has to d o with the
homeopathic treatment of nervous and hysterical patients by wild pipe and drum music.
(1 721 POLITICAL THEORY / MAY 1978

"The patients were thus excited t o the pitch of exhaustion, which was followed by a sleep
from which they awoke purged and cured" (1924, p. 21 1). It would take a more detailed
treatment of the Phaedo to work out the implications of this reference. R. Guardini in his
n e Death of Socrates (Cleveland and New York, Meridian, 1962; pp. 89-90) interprets
this reference differently.
40. See Max Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and 7hought. Cordrecht, Holland, D.
Reidel Publishing, 1966, p. 57, and Werner Jaeger, Arisrotle, New York, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1962, Appendix 11.
41. Foustel De Coulange, 7he Ancient City (New York, Doubleday, 1956), thinks
Socrates' conception of law here is ancient, even archaic, while Burnet regards the phrase
td koinon [as poleos (the laws, the commonwealth) as the beginning of "the idea that the
State as such was a juristic personality or corporation" (1924,200). Both seem right to me,
fa: uhat Socrates appears t o be doing is making the zncient laws transcendant.
42. With emandations from Fowler, p. 135-137; I think Socrates refers here t o both his
own students and the sophists. Eric Havelock, in an essay "Why Was Socrates Tried?"
(Phoenix Supplement I; Studies in Honor of Gilbert Norwood, 1952, pp. 95-108). gives a
useful historical context for my argument. He concludes that Socrates' share in the moral
revolution amounted t o a kind of leadership, since Socrates was a native Athenian whose
attacks came from within. But he also notes that it was precisely being"within" that pre-
vented Socrates from being detached from tradition as were the sophists
43. Socrates confronts a dilemma: on the one hand he is his teaching; what he says is
validated by what he does and how he lives his life. But on the other hand, he stands in the
way of what he is trying t o say and do. People d o not want t o hear what he says but hear
him; they do not see him as a philosopher but as a healer and magician. Moreover, they
find in him what they see in themselves; that is their way of connecting him, of making him
human.
44. "To cut men off from their living center, from the networks with which they natur-
ally belong; or t o force them tosit over the rivers ofsome remote Babylon and t o prostitute
their creative faculties for the benefit of strangers, is t o degrade, dehumanize, and destroy
them" (Isaiah Berlin, "Herder and the Enlightenment," in Wasserman (ed.) Aspectsof the
Eighreenth Century).
45. See De Coulanges, 1956, p. 17. This is a constant theme of Greek drama.
46. See F. Bornkamm's ' OpoXoh -zur-Geschichte eines Politschen Begriffs" in
Hermes 1936, pp. 377-393.
47. McLaughlin, 1976, pp. 185-186.1945; he does not seem t o recognize how much he
gives away in saying 'citizens like Socrates."
48. Between Past and Future, New York, Viking Press, 1968, pp. 247-248; she con-
cludes by saying; "This is the only chance for an ethical principle to be verified a s well as
validated." It is not the only way as long as it is done once. For the example gives status to
moral argument such that death need not be repeated as the ultimate verification and
validation of eaoh subsequent moral position.

J. Peter Euben is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Cali/ornia,

Sonia Cruz. where his primary teaching and research interests center on classical
political theory, philosophy of social science, and technology andpolitics. His two
most recent efforts willappearsoon: one, "Creatures o f a Day; Thought and Action
in Thycydides,"is included in an anthology. Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives;
the other, "Equality in the Greek Po1is"ispart of O n Liberalism: Dissenting Essays
in Contemporary Political Theory.