RULE 114

RULE 115
ALMARIO VS CA
FACTS:
Almario is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of
public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the
offended party in both cases. The hearing was reset several times due to the elevation of the
Presiding Judge to a higher court, lack of trial judge immediately appointed to the hearing, and
lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon
motion of Almarios counsel, the respondent court issued an order dismissing the case for failure
to prosecute and considering Almarios right to a speedy trial.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of Almario, respondent court
ordered that there has been no vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified
postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case
tried which would constitute a violation of the right of Almario to speedy trial.
After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October
25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service of
the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did not
interpose objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24,
1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused
were not present. There were only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the
prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid reasons. Furthermore, the
dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the
right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the
motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.
The order dismissing the charge/case against Almario is reconsidered and set aside. Almario then
moved for a reconsideration which was denied and so Almario filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari which the appellate court denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. Almario asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ISSUE:
Whether double jeopardy had set in so that Almarios constitutional right against such jeopardy
had been violated?
RULING: NO.

Clearly, under Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid
plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of
the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a
criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.
Delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial
court. There were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable
lengths of time. It follows that Almario cannot invoke the constitutional right against double
jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. For as Almarios right to speedy trial was
not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused was not met. The trial courts initial order of dismissal was upon motion of
petitioners counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case,
despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach.
 RULE 116
PEOPLE vs PADERNAL

Facts:
Panfilo Padernal was charged by the RTC of Ormoc City with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of Brigido Rodila. The accused entered the plea of guilty but invoked the presence of
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, lack of education and instruction, voluntary
surrender, and spontaneous plea of guilty. Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence to prove the
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender.
When the case was called for continuation on January 27, 1961, upon realizing from the testimony of
the accused that he was invoking complete self-defense, the judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be
entered by the accused and called for trial on merits on January 31, 1961.
During the scheduled trial, both parties submitted the case without presenting any further evidence.
The court decided that the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the time the case
was heard for the purpose of determining presence of incomplete self-defense shall be considered as
evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt of the accused, by virtue of which the case was deemed
submitted for decision. Thereafter, the Judge promulgated a decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal
of the crime of homicide with which he was charged 'on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether the court may enter a plea of not guilty for the accused

Ruling:
In the case, the court a quo caused a plea of not guilty to be entered in place of the plea of guilty of the
accused after presenting evidence to prove the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Section 1(d), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that when the accused pleads guilty but presents
exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for
him.
 RULE 117
LONEY VS PEOPLE GR NO. 152644

Facts:

Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager and Resident Manager for
Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque. Marcopper built concrete plug at the tunnels
discharging tons of tailing into Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC Marinduque for violation of Art. 19 of PD
1067 or the Water code of the Philippines, Section 8 of PD 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree,
Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of the RPC for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information was duplicitous for it
charges more than one offense for a single act, (2) that Loney and Reid were not yet officers when this
incident took place and (3) that the informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or
justification.

MTC: partially granted the quashing of the informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 but
maintained violation of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then issued a consolidated order in so far as the offense
against RPC. With such, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with RTC-Marinduque assailing the
Consolidated Order.

RTC: granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. Consolidated Order was affirmed and ordered
the reinstatement of the informations pertaining to the violation of PD 1967 and PD 984. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion reiterating the defense that
the informations were made out from a single act.

CA: affirmed RTC

Issues: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

Ruling:

No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information charges more than on
offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The
only limit is double jeopardy.

BORLONGAN vs PENA G.R. No. 143591

FACTS: Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses,
damagesand attorneys fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a
Motion to dismiss, including several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were
falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found
probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for the
petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail
as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. Onthe scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not
Guilty for them. The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court
ruled that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail? YES

HELD: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. Moreover, considering the conduct of
the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the
respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention
to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent
to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct
is possible. Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On
the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on
the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of
not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with
the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to
avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.