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This is the only complete English translation of Kant's major work in applied
moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles o f rights and of
virtues. It should not be confused with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals (1785), an earlier work which is sometimes treated as if it were the
definitive statement of Kant's moral philosophy but which, in fact, merely lays
the foundation for the longer work. It is in the longer work that Kant tries to
give content to his formal principle, the categorical imperative.
The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) comprises two parts: T h e Doctrine of Right,
which deals with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the Doctrine
of Virtue, which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Parts have been
translated before, but this new edition is the only complete translation of the
whole work. A substantial introduction considers the relation between the two
parts, and there is extensive annotation on the unfamiliar and sometimes
difficult vocabulary.
Given Kant's status as one of the most important moral philosophers of all
time, the publication of this new translation will be of critical importance to
all students of ethics and of legal and political philosophy.
T E X T S IN G E R M A N PHILOSOPHY
The Metaphysics
of Morals
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Translator's Introduction 1
Notes to Translator's Introduction 29
Preface 35
Introduction to the Metaphysics o f Morals 40
Introduction to the Doctrine o f Right 55
Division of the Doctrine of Right 62
I Private Right 68
v
vi Contents
Conclusion 160
A p p e n d i x . Explanatory Remarks on The Metaphysical
First Principles of the Doctrine of Right 163
Preface 181
Introduction to the Doctrine o f Virtue 185
The Edition
ix
x Note on the Text
ture. A l t h o u g h Kant speaks, for example, o f "the law (pacta sunt ser-
vanda)," which ethics o r the Doctrine of Virtue accepts as given by the
Doctrine of Right, that "contracts are to be kept" is not a law in the sense
o f what a legislator could enact, but rather a principle u n d e r l y i n g and
providing the basis f o r what a lawyer would call "contract law." It is the
"metaphysical first principle" of contract law, itself derived f r o m the
three basic principles of the Doctrine of Right: the universal principle o f
Right, practical reason's postulate with regard to rights, a n d the postu-
late o f public Right. A l t h o u g h Kant may r e f e r to these indifferently as
"laws" or "principles," I have substituted "principle" f o r some occur-
rences o f "law" [Gesetz]. I have, however, sometimes i g n o r e d this
distinction in the case o f "the law [or laws] o f f r e e d o m , " which is
prominent in both the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue.
A problem o f translation c o m m o n to both parts o f The Metaphysics of
Morals, and indeed to most o f Kant's writings, is the translation o f
Vermgen. In view o f Kant's distinction between a passive capacity
(.Fhigkeit, Rezeptivitt) for being a f f e c t e d or acted u p o n and an active
capacity (Vermgen, Spontaneitt), I should have p r e f e r r e d to translate
Vermgen as "power." B u t " p o w e r " in the sense o f " f o r c e " (Macht,
Gewalt) plays a crucial role in the Doctrine of Right, and Kraft occurs
both there and in the Doctrine of Virtue. I have, accordingly, translated
Vermgen as "capacity," except w h e n it is used in the sense o f "means,
resources, wealth." O n the whole, The Metaphysics of Morals is con-
cerned primarily with active capacities or powers rather than with
susceptibilities to being affected. T h e context indicates w h e n the latter
are u n d e r discussion.
Finally, the translation of a very ordinary term, der Mensch, has
become somewhat problematic. In a few passages, f o r example, those
having to d o with marriage, it is obviously used in the sense o f "a
male." For the most part, it would be philosophically correct through-
out Kant's moral philosophy to translate der Mensch as "a h u m a n
being." T o d o so, however, seems to me anachronistic, suggesting that
Kant was m o r e advanced in this respect than his English-speaking
contemporaries and that he was, in fact, writing in the twentieth cen-
tury. T h e translation o f der Mensch as " m a n " should occasion n o mis-
understanding, and I have so translated it.
Translator's Introduction
W h e n they fail the test, the will gives a law prescribing the adoption o f
an end. In this way, Kant argues that the happiness o f others (393)
and one's own natural perfection (3912) are ends that it is one's duty
to adopt. A s f o r the first, his cryptic a r g u m e n t turns o n two points:
that every h u m a n being, as a being with needs and hence with inclina-
tions, makes his own happiness his e n d and that, in so d o i n g , he makes
himself an e n d f o r others. Strictly speaking, someone cannot m a k e
himself an e n d f o r others; only they can make his happiness their end.
B u t he wants others to have a m a x i m o f benevolence toward him that,
in case he needs their help to attain some e n d essential to his happi-
ness, will lead to beneficence, and he cannot know w h o the others
might be. Insofar as he makes his own happiness his e n d he cannot
r e n o u n c e the means to it, since he would then be merely wishing
rather than a d o p t i n g a maxim (according to 213). H e n c e he wants
others to be b o u n d to benevolence toward him independently of their
natural feelings. But since obligation is constraint in accordance with
a law binding u p o n everyone, he can consistently will his m a x i m o f
m a k i n g his own happiness his e n d his maxim o f benevolence toward
himself only by including his happiness in the happiness o f h u m a n
beings generally. Hence, Kant concludes, I am permitted to d o what
I unavoidably and gladly do, namely make my own happiness my end,
only by d o i n g what I may be reluctant to do, namely a d o p t i n g as my
e n d the happiness o f h u m a n beings in general.
So too, the a r g u m e n t that my o w n natural perfection is an end
which is also a duty begins with a m a x i m that I would adopt on the
basis o f my inclinations. It is m o r e comfortable not to exert oneself to
develop one's natural capacities; it is at least arguable that we w o u l d all
be better o f f in terms o f happiness if we were to be content with what
nature gave us (445). C a n I t h e r e f o r e will as a universal law that
h u m a n beings in general (and myself in particular) not make it their
e n d to develop their natural capacities? I cannot d o so. For what
distinguishes h u m a n agents f r o m other animals is their capacity f o r
f r e e choice, f o r a d o p t i n g maxims, and to adopt a m a x i m is to deter-
mine oneself to action to e f f e c t an end. T h u s the adoption o f a m a x i m
to exclude f r o m one's ends that o f having the capacity to e f f e c t and
hence to set ends would be incompatible with one's " humanity" or
capacity f o r rational agency. A s f o r one's moral perfection, Kant does
not a r g u e that this is an end that is also a duty but only states what is
involved in the moral perfection o f a h u m a n being. Since a virtuous
disposition is acquired by practicing the virtues, he reserves for " T h e
Elements of Ethics" his discussion o f what obstacles or tendencies to
vice must be combated and what virtues o p p o s e d to t h e m must be
cultivated.
i o Translator's Introduction
1 See Kant's letter to Herder of May 9, 1767 (X, 71). References to Kant's
writings other than The Metaphysics of Morals include the volume as well as
the page number of the Academy edition; if no volume is indicated, the
reference is to volume V I . O n the history of Kant's long delayed project of
a "metaphysics of morals," see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, i960),
PP-5-!3-
2 Or, simply, "what everyone knows about morality." As Beck points out,
"common sense" should not be taken as a technical term. Kant: Selections
(New York & London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 248 n.
3 Or "consistency." Traditionally, reason's function is to make inferences and
its principle is that of noncontradiction. One of Kant's ways of moving from
concepts of the understanding to Ideas of reason in his technical sense of
"reason" is the traditionally recognized division of syllogisms. His concep-
tion of reason as the source of Ideas of the unconditioned is clearly relevant
to his discussion of freedom.
4 It should be noted that Kant's use of "objective end" and "incentive" in The
Metaphysics of Morals differs from the Groundwork. In the Groundwork (IV,
42631), Kant seems to characterize a "subjective end" as an end 1) to be
produced by one's actions, and 2) resting on an incentive (Triebfeder) or sub-
jective ground of desire (427). A n "objective end," by contrast, is an inde-
pendently existing end (428, 437), correlated with a motive (Bewegungs-
grund) or objective ground of volition (427), which serves as the supreme
limiting condition of all subjective ends (431). In The Metaphysics of Morals, an
'incentive" may be either "subjective" or "objective," and an "end," which is
something to be produced by one's action, may be "objective."
5 It is also essential to Kant's account of moral evil, which makes a "doctrine
of morals" for human beings a "doctrine of virtue," not merely an autonomy
but also an autocracy of practical reason (383). T h u s , H . J . Paton, in his
classical commentary on the Groundwork, asks "Is only the good will free?"
and, in reply to the question, refers to The Metaphysics of Morals' distinction
between Willkr and Wille. See The Categorical Imperative (London: Hutchin-
son's University Library, 1947), p. 213.
i o Translator's Introduction
14 In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant discusses the affects and
the passions in considerable detail (VII, 25177).
15 Far from denying the role that feeling plays in virtue, Kant insists upon it.
It is through "moral feeling," produced by consciousness of the law, that
reason gains ascendancy over the inclinations (399403 and 408).
16 Such a concept would, however, be open to Hume's objection that such
"freedom," involving no causal law, would be equivalent to a random
occurrence, for which an agent could not be held responsible. See A Treatise
of Human Nature, III, iii; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
VIII.
17 This, he adds, is also the case with "the universal ethical command: 'Act in
conformity with duty from duty.' " (391). (So far, however, the only duties
that have been derived are those to which rights of others correspond.)
Compare the diagram of duties of virtue in XI.
18 In his Introduction to the Doctrine of Right Kant referred to "the Right of
humanity in one's own person" and proposed to treat perfect duties to
oneself as "internal duties of Right" (officia iuris interna) (2367, 240). This
is quite at variance with what follows from his division of a metaphysics of
morals on the basis of the two kinds of lawgiving, which produces duties of
Right (officia iuris) and duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), as well as
with his assertion that perfect duties to oneself are duties of virtue (419).
ig What is prescribed is not an "action" (Handlung) but instead an "act" (Akt),
sometimes called Actus (as, e.g., the Critique of Pure Reason calls appercep-
tion Actus in B is8n and 423n). It seems strange that in discussing the basis
for thinking of an end that is also a duty Kant uses Akt for a categorical
imperative (385); however, in Religion (VI, 213) he used Actus in referring
to the basis for the adoption of maxims, which is itself a maxim.
20 In the Civil Law a number of factors, including the theory of a strict divi-
sion of the powers within a state, combined to obviate a "court of equity."
Instead, the law of the land was to be so precise that, once the facts of a case
had been determined, a judge need only find the applicable provision.
Metaphysical First Principles
of the Doctrine of Right
Preface
35
36 Metaphysics of Morals
*Porro de actuali constructione hie non quaeritur, cum ne possint quidem sensibiles figurae ad
rigorem definitionem effingi; sed requiritur cognitio eorum, quibus absolvitur formatio, quae
intellectualis quaedam constructio est. C . A . H a u s e n , Elem. Mathes, Pars I , p . 8 6 A ( i 7 3 4 ) .
[Moreover, what is in question here is not an actual construction, since sensible
figures cannot be devised in accordance with the strictness of a definition; what is
required is, rather, knowledge of what goes to make up the figure, and this is, as it
were, a construction made by the intellect.]6
38 Metaphysics of Morals
made by using some of its terms, which in the Critique of Pure Reason
itself cannot well be replaced by m o r e customary words, outside the
Critique in public e x c h a n g e o f thoughts. T h i s certainly deserves to be
c o n d e m n e d , although in c o n d e m n i n g it Nicolai 7 reserves j u d g m e n t as
to whether such terms can be entirely dispensed with in their o w n
p r o p e r field, as t h o u g h they were used e v e r y w h e r e merely to hide
poverty of thought. Meanwhile it is m o r e amusing to laugh at an
unpopular pedant than at an uncritical ignoramus (for, in fact, a meta-
physician w h o clings obstinately to his own system, heedless o f any
critique, can be classed as an uncritical ignoramus, even t h o u g h he
willfully ignores what he does not want to let spread since it does not
b e l o n g to his older school of thought). But if it is true, as Shaftesbury
[20g] asserts, 8 that a doctrine's ability to withstand ridicule is not a bad touch-
stone o f its truth (especially in the case of a practical doctrine), then
the critical philosophy's turn must finally come to laugh last and so
laugh best w h e n it sees the systems of those w h o have talked big f o r
such a long time collapse like houses of cards one a f t e r another and
their adherents scatter, a fate they cannot avoid.
T o w a r d the e n d of the book I have worked less thoroughly over
certain sections than might be expected in comparison with the earlier
ones, partly because it seems to m e that they can be easily i n f e r r e d
f r o m the earlier ones and partly, too, because the later sections (deal-
ing with public Right) are currently subject to so m u c h discussion, and
still so important, that they can well justify postponing a decisive
j u d g m e n t f o r some time.
I h o p e to have the Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue
ready shortly. 9
The Doctrine of Right 39
Part I
Private Right with Regard to External Objects
(the Sum of Laws That Do Not Need to be Promulgated)
Chapter I
How to Have Something External As One's Own
Chapter II
How to Acquire Something External
Part II
Public Right
(The Sum of Laws that Need to be Promulgated)
Section I
T h e Right of a State
Section II
T h e Right of Nations
Section III
Cosmopolitan Right
[an] Introduction
to the Metaphysics of Morals
i.
O n the Relation of the Capacities of the
Human Mind to Moral Laws
40
The Doctrine of Right 41
sweet, and so forth) they have because of the nature o f the subject, are
still r e f e r r e d to an object as elements in our k n o w l e d g e of it, pleasure
or displeasure (in what is red or sweet) expresses nothing at all in the
object but simply a relation to the subject. For this very reason plea-
sure and displeasure cannot be explained m o r e clearly in themselves;
instead, one can only specify what results they have in certain circum-
stances, so as to make them recognizable in practice.
T h a t pleasure which is necessarily connected with desire (for an
object whose representation affects feeling in this way) can be called
practical pleasure, w h e t h e r it is the cause or the e f f e c t o f the desire. O n
the other hand, that pleasure which is not necessarily connected with
desire f o r an object, and so is not at bottom a pleasure in the existence
o f the object o f a representation but is attached only to the representa-
tion by itself, can be called merely contemplative pleasure or inactive
delight. We call feeling o f the latter kind of pleasure taste. Practical phi-
losophy, accordingly, speaks o f contemplative pleasure only in passing,
not as if the concept belonged within it. A s f o r practical pleasure, that
determination of the capacity f o r desire which is caused and t h e r e f o r e
necessarily preceded by such pleasure is called desire in the narrow
sense; 1 0 habitual desire in this narrow sense is called inclination; and a
connection o f pleasure with the capacity f o r desire that the u n d e r -
standing j u d g e s to hold as a general rule (though only f o r the subject)
is called an interest. So if a pleasure necessarily precedes a desire, the
practical pleasure must be called an interest of inclination. B u t if a
pleasure can only follow u p o n an antecedent determination o f the
capacity f o r desire it is an intellectual pleasure, and the interest in the
object must be called an interest o f reason; f o r if the interest were
based on the senses and not on p u r e rational principles alone, sensa-
tion would then have to have pleasure connected with it and in this [213]
way be able to determine the capacity for desire. A l t h o u g h w h e r e a
merely p u r e interest o f reason must be assumed no interest o f inclina-
tion can be substituted f o r it, yet in order to c o n f o r m to ordinary
speech we can speak o f an inclination f o r what can be an object only
o f an intellectual pleasure as a habitual desire f r o m a p u r e interest o f
reason; but an inclination o f this sort would not be the cause but
rather the e f f e c t o f this p u r e interest of reason, and we could call it a
sense-free inclination (propensio intellectualis).
Concupiscence (lusting after something) must also be distinguished
f r o m desire itself, as a stimulus to determining desire. Concupiscence
is always a sensible modification o f the mind but one that has not yet
become an act o f the capacity for desire.
T h e capacity f o r desiring in accordance with concepts, insofar as the
g r o u n d determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object,
42 Metaphysics of Morals
II.
On the Idea of and the Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals
III.
O n the Division of a Metaphysics of Morals*
*A deduction of the division of a system, i.e. a proof that it is both complete and
continuous - that is, that a transition from the concept divided to the members of the
division takes place without a leap (divisio per saltum) in the entire series of subdivi-
sions - is one of the most difficult conditions which the architect of a system has to
fulfill. Even what the highest divided concept would be, the divisions of which are right
46 Metaphysics of Morals
It can be seen f r o m this that all duties, just because they are duties,
b e l o n g to ethics; but it does not follow that the lawgiving f o r them is
always contained in ethics: For many o f them it is outside ethics. T h u s ,
ethics c o m m a n d s that I still fulfill a contract I have entered into, even
t h o u g h the other party could not coerce me to d o so; but it takes the
law (pacta sunt servanda) and the duty corresponding to it f r o m the
doctrine o f Right, as already given there. Accordingly the giving o f [220]
the law that promises agreed to must be kept lies not in ethics but in
Ius. All that ethics teaches is that if the incentive which juridical lawgiv-
ing connects with that duty, namely external constraint, were absent,
the Idea o f duty by itself would be sufficient as an incentive. For if this
were not the case, and if the lawgiving itself were not juridical so that
the duty arising f r o m it was not really a duty of Right (as distinguished
f r o m a duty o f virtue), then faithful p e r f o r m a n c e (in keeping with
promises m a d e in a contract) would be put in the same class with
actions of benevolence and the obligation to them, and this must not
happen. It is no duty o f virtue to k e e p one's promises but a duty o f
Right, to the p e r f o r m a n c e o f which one can be coerced. B u t it is still
a virtuous action (a p r o o f of virtue) to d o it even w h e r e n o coercion
may be applied. T h e doctrine o f Right and the doctrine o f virtue are
therefore distinguished not so m u c h by their d i f f e r e n t duties as by
the d i f f e r e n c e in their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the
other with the law.
Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be external) is that which
cannot be external; juridical lawgiving is that which can also be exter-
nal. So it is an external duty to k e e p a promise made in a contract; but
the c o m m a n d to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard f o r
any other incentive, belongs to internal lawgiving alone. So the obliga-
tion is assigned to ethics not because the duty is of a particular kind (a
particular kind of action to which one is bound) f o r there are exter-
nal duties in ethics as well as in Right but rather because the lawgiv-
ing in this case is an internal one and can have no external lawgiver.
For the same reason duties of benevolence, even t h o u g h they are
external duties (obligations to external actions), are still assigned to
ethics because their lawgiving can be only internal. Ethics has its spe-
cial duties as well (e.g., duties to oneself), but it also has duties in
c o m m o n with Right; what it does not have in c o m m o n with Right is
only the kind o f obligation. For what is distinctive of ethical lawgiving
is that one is to p e r f o r m actions just because they are duties and to
make the principle of duty itself, w h e r e v e r the duty comes f r o m , the
sufficient incentive f o r choice. So while there are many directly ethical [221]
duties, internal lawgiving makes the rest o f them, one and all, indi-
rectly ethical.
48 Metaphysics of Morals
IV.
Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals
(Philosophia practica universalis)
nal lawgiving are indeed external but natural laws, whereas those that
d o not bind without actual external lawgiving (and so without it would
not be laws) are called positive laws. O n e can t h e r e f o r e conceive o f
external lawgiving that would contain only positive laws; but then a
natural law would still have to precede it, which would establish the
authority o f the lawgiver (i.e., his authorization to bind others by his
mere choice).
A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A [225]
rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective g r o u n d s
is called his maxim; hence d i f f e r e n t agents can have very d i f f e r e n t
maxims with r e g a r d to the same law.
T h e categorical imperative, which as such only a f f i r m s what obliga-
tion is, is: A c t u p o n a m a x i m that can also hold as a universal law. You
must t h e r e f o r e first consider your actions in terms o f their subjective
principles; but y o u can know w h e t h e r this principle also holds objec-
tively only in this way: T h a t w h e n y o u r reason subjects it to the test of
; conceiving yourself as also giving universal law t h r o u g h it, it qualifies
Introduction
to the Doctrine of Right
A.
What the Doctrine of Right Is
B.
What Is Right?
Like the much-cited query "what is truth?" put to the logician, the
question "what is Right?" might well embarrass the jurist if he does not
want to lapse into a tautology or, instead o f giving a universal solution,
r e f e r to what the laws in some country at some time prescribe. H e can
indeed state what is laid d o w n as right 2 1 (quid sit iuris), that is, what the
laws in a certain place and at a certain time say or have said. But
whether what these laws prescribed is also right, and what the univer-
sal criterion is by which one could recognize right as well as w r o n g [230]
(iustum et iniustum)22 this would remain h i d d e n f r o m him unless he
leaves those empirical principles behind f o r a while and seeks the
sources o f such j u d g m e n t s in reason alone, so as to establish the basis
f o r any possible giving of positive laws (although positive laws can
serve as excellent guides to this). Like the w o o d e n head in Phaedrus'
fable, a merely empirical doctrine o f Right is a head that may be
beautiful but unfortunately it has no brain.
55
loo Metaphysics of Morals
sc.
The Universal Principle [Prinzip] of Right
those conditions in conformity with the Idea o f it and that it may also
be actively [ttlich] limited by others; and it says this as a postulate that
is incapable o f f u r t h e r proof. 2 5 W h e n one's aim is not to teach virtue
but only to set f o r t h what is right, one may not and should not repre-
sent that law o f Right as itself the incentive to action.
D.
Right Is Connected with an Authorization to Use Coercion
SE.
[232]
A Strict Right Can Also Be Represented as the Possibility
of a Fully Reciprocal Use of Coercion That Is Consistent
with Everyone's Freedom in Accordance
with Universal Laws
/.
Equity ( Aequitas)
[235] own rights are concerned, and he can dispose o f the case f o r his o w n
person, may a n d should he listen to equity, as, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n the
crown itself bears the damages that others have incurred in its service
and f o r which they petition it to i n d e m n i f y them, even t h o u g h it could
reject their claim by strict Right on the pretext that they u n d e r t o o k
this service at their own risk.
T h e motto (dictum) o f equity is, "the strictest Right is the greatest
w r o n g " (summum ius summa iniuria). B u t this evil cannot be r e m e d i e d
by way o f what is laid d o w n as right, even t h o u g h it concerns a claim
to a right; for this claim belongs only to the court of conscience (forum
poli) whereas every question of what is laid d o w n as right must be
b r o u g h t b e f o r e civil Right (forum soli).
II.
The Right of Necessity ( I u s Necessitatis)
A.
General Division of Duties of Right
62
The Doctrine of Right g 63
B.
General Division of Rights
someone merely says what he thinks, another always remains free to take it as he
pleases. But a rumor, having some basis, that this is a man whose talk cannot be
believed comes so close to the reproach of calling him a liar that the borderline
separating what belongs to Ius from what must be assigned to ethics can only be
drawn in just this way.
The Doctrine of Right 65
DIVISION [240]
in Accordance with the Objective Relation of Law to Duty
Perfect Duty
Imperfect Duty
[241]
T h e subjects between w h o m a relation of right to duty can be thought
of (whether admissibly or not) can stand related to each other in
d i f f e r e n t ways, and so a division can also be m a d e f r o m this point o f
view.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
DIVISION
in Accordance with the Relation of the Subject Imposing
Obligation to the Subject Put Under Obligation.
1. 2.
T h e relation in terms of T h e relation in terms of
rights of men toward beings rights of men toward beings
that have neither rights that have rights as well
nor duties. as duties.
Vacat" Adest
For these are beings lacking For this is a relation
reason, which can neither of men to men.
bind us nor by which we can
be bound.
3- 4-
T h e relation in terms of The relation in terms of
rights of men toward beings rights of men toward a
that have only duties but being that has only rights
no rights. " but no duties (God).
Vacat Vacat
For these would be men At least in philosophy,
without personality (serfs, since such a being is not
slaves). an object of possible
experience.
CHAPTER I
81.
2.
Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights 3 "
68
The Doctrine of Right g 83
3.
4-
Exposition of the Concept of External Objects
That Are Mine or Yours
T h e r e can be only three external objects of my choice: 1) a (corporeal)
thing external to me; 2) another's choice to p e r f o r m a specific d e e d
loo Metaphysics of Morals
5.
Definition of the Concept of External Objects
That Are Mine or Yours
T h e nominal definition [Namenerklrung] of what is externally mine
that which suffices only to distinguish the object f r o m all others and
arises f r o m a complete and determinate exposition of the concept
would be: T h a t outside me is externally mine which it would be a
w r o n g (an infringement upon my freedom that can coexist with the [249]
f r e e d o m of everyone in accordance with a universal law) to prevent
me f r o m using as I please. B u t the real definition [Sacherklrung] of this
concept that which also suffices for the deduction of it (for knowledge
of the possibility of the object) goes like this: Something external is
mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even
though I am not in possession of it (not holding the object). I must be in
some sort of possession of an external object if it is to be called mine,
for otherwise someone who affected this object against my will would
not also affect me and so would not wrong me. So, in consequence of
4, intelligible possession (possessio noumenon) must be assumed to be
possible if something external is to be mine or yours. Empirical posses-
sion (holding) is then only possession in appearance (possessio phaenom-
enon), although the object itself that I possess is not here treated, as it
was in the Transcendental Analytic, as an appearance but as a thing in
itself; f o r there reason was concerned with theoretical knowledge of
the nature of things and how far it could extend, but here it is con-
cerned with the practical determination of choice in accordance with
laws offreedom, whether the object can be known through the senses or
through the pure understanding alone, and Right is a pure practical
rational concept of choice under laws of freedom.
For the same reason it is not appropriate to speak of possessing a
right to this or that object but rather of possessing it merely rightfully;
for a right is already an intellectual possession of an object and it
would make no sense to speak of possessing a possession.
6.
Deduction of the Concept of Merely Rightful Possession
of an External Object (possessio noumenon)
7-
Application to Objects of Experience of the Principle
That It Is Possible for Something External To Be
Mine or Yours
T h e concept of merely rightful possession is not an empirical concept
[253] (dependent u p o n conditions o f space and time) and yet it has practical
reality, that is, it must be applicable to objects o f experience, knowl-
e d g e o f which is d e p e n d e n t u p o n those conditions. T h e way to pro-
ceed with the concept of a right with respect to such objects, so that
they can be external objects that are mine or yours, is the following.
Since the concept o f a right is simply a rational concept, it cannot be
applied directly to objects of experience and to the concept o f empirical
possession, but must first be applied to the understanding's p u r e con-
cept of possession in general. So the concept to which the concept o f a
right is directly applied is not that o f holding (detentio), which is an
empirical way o f thinking of possession, but rather the concept o f
The Doctrine of Right g 75
10.
General Principle of External Acquisition
Section I
On Property Right
11.
What Is a Right to a Thing?
T h e usual exposition of a right to a thing (ius reale, ius in re), that "it is
a right against every possessor of it," is a correct nominal definition. B u t
what is it that enables me to recover an external object f r o m anyone
w h o is h o l d i n g it and to constrain him (per vindicationem) to put m e in
possession of it again? C o u l d this external rightful relation o f my
choice be a direct relation to a corporeal thing? S o m e o n e w h o thinks
that his right is a direct relation to things rather than to persons w o u l d
have to think (though only obscurely) that since there corresponds to
a right on one side a duty on the other, an external thing always
remains under obligation to the first possessor even t h o u g h it has left his
hands; that, because it is already u n d e r obligation to him, it rejects
anyone else w h o pretends to be the possessor o f it. So he would think
of my right as if it were a guardian spirit a c c o m p a n y i n g the thing,
always pointing m e out to w h o e v e r else wanted to take possession o f it
and protecting it against any incursions by them. It is t h e r e f o r e absurd
to think of an obligation of a person to things or the reverse, even
t h o u g h it may be permissible, if need be, to make this rightful relation
perceptible by picturing it and expressing it in this way.
So the real definition would have to go like this: A right to a thing is
[261] a right to the private use of a thing o f which I a m in (original or
instituted) possession in c o m m o n with all others. For this possession in
c o m m o n is the only condition u n d e r which it is possible f o r me to
exclude every other possessor f r o m the private use o f a thing (ius
contra quemlibet huius rei possessorem) since, unless such a possession in
c o m m o n is assumed, it is inconceivable how I, w h o am not in posses-
sion o f the thing, could still be w r o n g e d by others w h o are in pos-
session o f it and are using it. By my unilateral choice I cannot bind
another to refrain f r o m using a thing, an obligation he would not
otherwise have; hence I can do this only t h r o u g h the united choice o f
all w h o possess it in c o m m o n . Otherwise I would have to think o f a
right to a thing as if the thing had an obligation to me, f r o m which my
right against every other possessor o f it is then derived; and this is an
absurd way of representing it.
By the term Property Right (ius reale) should be understood not
only a right to a thing (ius in re) but also the sum o f all the principles
having to do with things being mine or yours. But it is clear that a m a n
The Doctrine of Right g 83
w h o was all alone on the earth could really neither have nor acquire
any external thing as his own, since there is no relation whatever o f
obligation between him, as a person, and any other external object, as
a thing. H e n c e , speaking strictly and literally, there is also no (direct)
right to a thing. W h a t is called a right to a thing is only that right
someone has against a person w h o is in possession o f it in c o m m o n
with all others (in the civil condition).
12.
First Acquisition of a Thing Can Be
Only Acquisition of Land
13.
Any Piece of Land Can Be Acquired Originally, and
the Possibility of Such Acquisition Is Based on the Original
Community of Land in General
14.
[263]
In Original Acquisition, the Act Required to Establish
a Right Is Taking Control (occupatio)
T h e only condition under which taking possession (apprehensio), begin-
ning to hold (possessionis physicae) a corporeal thing in space, conforms
with the law of everyone's outer f r e e d o m (hence a priori) is that of
priority in time, that is, only insofar as it is the first taking possession
(prior apprehensio), which is an act of choice. But the will that a thing
(and so too a specific, separate place on the earth) is to be mine, that
is, appropriation of it (appropriatio), in original acquisition can be only
unilateral (voluntas unilateralis s. propria). Acquisition of an external
object of choice by a unilateral will is taking control of it. So original
acquisition of an external object, and hence too of a specific and
separate piece of land, can take place only through taking control of
it (occupatio).
No insight can be had into the possibility of acquiring in this way,
nor can it be demonstrated by reasons [durch Grnde dartun ]; its possi-
bility is instead an immediate consequence of the postulate of practical
reason. But the aforesaid will can justify an external acquisition only
insofar as it is included in a will that is united a priori (i.e., only through
the union of the choice of all who can come into practical relations
with one another) and that commands absolutely. For a unilateral will
(and a bilateral but still particular will is also unilateral) cannot put
everyone under an obligation that is in itself contingent; this requires
a will that is omnilateral, that is united not contingently but a priori and
therefore necessarily, and because of this is the only will that is lawgiv-
ing. For only in accordance with this principle of the will is it possible
for the free choice of each to accord with the f r e e d o m of all, and
therefore possible f o r there to be any right, and so too possible f o r any
external object to be mine or yours.
The Doctrine of Right g 85
15. [264]
Something Can Be Acquired Conclusively Only in a Civil
Constitution; in a State of Nature It Can Also Be Acquired,
but Only Provisionally
example, as far as a cannon shot can reach no one may fish, haul
u p amber f r o m the ocean floor, and so forth, along the coast o f
a territory that already belongs to a certain state. M o r e o v e r , in
o r d e r to acquire land is it necessary to develop it (build on it,
cultivate it, drain it, and so on)? No. For since these f o r m s (of
specification) are only accidents, they make no object of direct
possession and can belong to what the subject possesses only
insofar as the substance is already recognized as his. W h e n first
acquisition is in question, developing land is n o t h i n g m o r e than
an external sign o f taking possession, f o r which many other signs
that cost less e f f o r t can be substituted. F u r t h e r m o r e , may one
party interfere with another in its act of taking possession, so that
neither enjoys the right o f priority and the land remains always
free, b e l o n g i n g to no one? Not entirely; since one party can pre-
vent another f r o m taking possession only by being on adjacent
land, w h e r e it itself can be prevented f r o m being, absolute hin-
drance would be a contradiction. B u t with respect to a certain piece
of land (lying between the two), leaving it unused, as neutral
territory to separate the two parties, would still be consistent with
the right of taking control. In that case, however, this land really
belongs to both in c o m m o n and is not something belonging to no
one (res nullius), just because it is used by both to k e e p them apart.
A g a i n , can anyone have a thing as his own on land no part o f
which belongs to someone? Yes, as in Mongolia w h e r e , since all
the land belongs to the people, the use of it belongs to each indi-
vidual, so that anyone can leave his pack lying on it or recover
possession o f his horse if it runs away, since it is his. However, it
[266] is only by means of a contract that anyone can have a movable
thing as his on land that belongs to another. Finally, can two
neighboring peoples (or families) resist each other in a d o p t i n g a
certain use o f land, for example, can a hunting people resist a
pasturing people or a f a r m i n g people, or the latter resist a peo-
ple that wants to plant orchards, and so forth? Certainly, since as
long as they keep within their boundaries the way they want to
live on their land is u p to their own discretion (res meraefacultatis).
Lastly, it can still be asked whether, w h e n neither nature nor
chance but just our own will brings us into the n e i g h b o r h o o d of
a people that holds out no prospect of a civil union with it, we
should not be authorized to f o u n d colonies, by force if need be,
in o r d e r to establish a civil union with them and b r i n g these men
(savages) into a rightful condition (as with the A m e r i c a n Indians,
the Hottentots, and the inhabitants of New Holland); or (which is
not m u c h better), to f o u n d colonies by f r a u d u l e n t purchase o f
The Doctrine of Right g 87
16. [267]
Exposition of the Concept of Original
Acquisition of Land
All men are originally in common possession of the land o f the entire
earth (communio fundi originaria) and each has by nature the will to use
it (lex insti), which, because the choice of one is unavoidably o p p o s e d
by nature to that o f another, would do away with any use o f it if this
will did not also contain the principle f o r choice by which a particular
possession f o r each on the c o m m o n land could be d e t e r m i n e d (lex
iuridica). But the law that is to determine for each what land is mine or
yours will be in accordance with the axiom of outer f r e e d o m only if it
proceeds f r o m a will that is united originally and a priori (that presup-
poses no rightful act for its union). Hence it proceeds only f r o m a will
in the civil condition (lex iustitiae distributivae), which alone determines
what is right, what is rightful, and what is laid down as right. But in the
f o r m e r condition, that is, b e f o r e the establishment of the civil condi-
tion but with a view to it, that is, provisionally, it is a duty to proceed in
accordance with the principle o f external acquisition. Accordingly,
there is also a rightful capacity o f the will to bind everyone to recognize
the act of taking possession and of appropriation as valid, even t h o u g h
loo Metaphysics of Morals
[268] 17.
Deduction of the Concept of Original Acquisition
that is, possession by mere right, even t h o u g h the object (the thing I
possess) is a sensible object.
[271] Section II
On Contract Right
18.
same person o r against others); but there is only a single sum (system)
o f principles, contract Right, in accordance with which I can be in this
sort o f possession.
A right against a person can never be acquired originally and on
one's own initiative (for then it would not c o n f o r m to the principle o f
the consistency o f my choice with the f r e e d o m o f everyone, and would
t h e r e f o r e be wrong). So too, I cannot acquire a right against another
t h r o u g h a d e e d o f his that is contrary to right (facto iniusto alterius)-, f o r
even if he has w r o n g e d me and I have a right to d e m a n d compensa-
tion f r o m him, by this I will still only preserve what is mine undimin-
ished but will not acquire m o r e than what I previously had.
Acquisition t h r o u g h another's d e e d to which I determine him in
accordance with principles o f Right is, accordingly, always derived
f r o m what is his; and this derivation, as an act that establishes a right,
cannot take place t h r o u g h a negative act o f the other, namely his
abandoning o r renouncing what is his (per derelictionem aut renuncia-
tionem)\ f o r by such an act this would only cease to belong to one or the
other, but nothing would be acquired. T h i s derivation can take place
only by transferring (translatio), which is possible only t h r o u g h a com-
m o n will by means of which the object is always u n d e r the control o f
one or the other, since as one gives u p his share in this c o m m o n
u n d e r t a k i n g [Gemeinschaft] the object becomes the other's t h r o u g h his
acceptance o f it (and so by a positive act o f choice). T r a n s f e r o f the
property o f one to another is alienation. A n act o f the united choice o f
two persons by which anything at all that belongs to one passes to the
other is a contract.
19. [272]
For every contract there are two preparatory and two constitutive right-
ful acts of choice. T h e first two (of negotiating) are offering (oblatio) and
assent (approbatio) to it; the two others (of concluding) are promise (pro-
missum) and acceptance (acceptatio). For an o f f e r i n g cannot be called a
promise apart f r o m a preliminary j u d g m e n t that what is o f f e r e d (obla-
turn) would be acceptable to the promisee. T h i s is indicated by the first
two declarations, but by them alone nothing is as yet acquired.
B u t what belongs to the promisor does not pass to the promisee (as
acceptant) by the separate will of either but only by the united will o f
both, and consequently only insofar as both wills are declared simulta-
neously. B u t this cannot take place by empirical acts of declaration,
which must necessarily/o//ow> each other in time and are never simulta-
neous. For if I have promised and the other now wants to accept, I can
still d u r i n g the interval (however short it may be) regret having
promised, since I am still free b e f o r e he accepts; and because o f this
loo Metaphysics of Morals
the one w h o accepts it, f o r his part, can consider himself as not b o u n d
to his counterdeclaration after the promise. T h e external formalities
(solemnia) in concluding a contract (shaking hands, or breaking a
straw, stipula, held by both persons), and all the confirmations back
and forth o f the declarations they have made, manifest the perplexity
o f the contracting parties as to how and in what way they are g o i n g to
represent their declarations as existing simultaneously, at the same
moment, although they can only be successive. T h e y still d o not suc-
ceed in this, since their acts can only follow each other in time, so that
w h e n one act is the other is either not yet or is no longer.
Only a transcendental deduction o f the concept o f acquisition by
contract can r e m o v e all these difficulties. It is true that in an external
relation of rights my taking possession o f another's choice (and his
taking possession o f mine in turn), as the basis for d e t e r m i n i n g it to a
deed, is first t h o u g h t of empirically, by means o f a declaration and
counterdeclaration o f the choice o f each in time; this is the sensible
condition o f taking possession, in which both acts required f o r estab-
lishing the right can only follow one u p o n another. Since, however,
[273] that relation (as a rightful relation) is purely intellectual, that posses-
sion is represented t h r o u g h the will, which is a rational capacity f o r
giving laws, as intelligible possession (possessio noumenon) in abstraction
f r o m those empirical conditions, as what is mine or yours. H e r e both
acts, promise and acceptance, are represented not as following one
u p o n another but (as if it were pactum re initum) as p r o c e e d i n g f r o m a
single common will (this is expressed by the w o r d simultaneously); and
the object (promissum) is represented, by omitting empirical condi-
tions, as acquired in accordance with a principle o f p u r e practical
reason.
20.
21.
Section III
On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights
to Things 44
22.
T h i s Right is that o f possession of an external object as a thing and use
o f it as a person. W h a t is mine or yours in terms o f this Right is what is
mine or yours domestically, and the relation o f persons in the domestic
condition is that o f a community o f f r e e beings w h o f o r m a society o f
m e m b e r s o f a whole called a household (of persons standing in commu-
nity with one another) by their a f f e c t i n g one another in accordance
with the principle o f outer f r e e d o m (causality). Acquisition o f this
status, and within it, therefore takes place neither by a d e e d on one's
own initiative (facto) nor by a contract (pacto) alone but by principle
(1lege); for, since this kind o f right is neither a right to a thing nor
merely a right against a person but also possession of a person, it must
be a right lying b e y o n d any rights to things and any rights against per-
sons. T h a t is to say, it must be the Right o f humanity in o u r own
person, f r o m which there follows a natural permissive principle, by
the favor o f which this sort o f acquisition is possible f o r us.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
[277] 23.
25.
For the natural use that one sex makes of the other's sexual organs is
enjoyment, for which one gives itself u p to the other. In this act a h u m a n
The Doctrine of Right g7
being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the Right o f
humanity in his own person. T h e r e is only one condition u n d e r which
this is possible: that while one person is acquired by the other as if it
were a thing, the one w h o is acquired acquires the other in turn; f o r in
this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality. B u t acquiring
a m e m b e r o f a h u m a n being is at the same time acquiring the whole
person, since a person is an absolute unity. Hence it is not only admis-
sible f o r the sexes to surrender to and accept each other for e n j o y m e n t
u n d e r the condition o f marriage, but it is possible f o r them to d o so
only u n d e r this condition. T h a t this right against a person is also akin to
a right to a thing rests on the fact that if one o f the partners in a mar-
riage has left or given itself into someone else's possession, the other
partner is justified, always and without question, in bringing its part-
ner back u n d e r its control, just as it is justified in retrieving a thing.
26.
27.
A marriage contract is consummated only by conjugal sexual intercourse
(copula carnalis). A contract made between two persons o f opposite
sex, either with a tacit understanding to refrain f r o m sexual inter-
course or with awareness that one or both are incapable o f it, is a
simulated contract, which institutes no marriage and can also be dis-
solved by either of them w h o pleases. B u t if incapacity appears only
afterwards, that right cannot be forfeited t h r o u g h this accident f o r
which no one is at fault.
[280] Aquisition o f a wife or o f a husband therefore takes place neither
facto (by intercourse) without a contract preceding it nor pacto (by a
mere marriage contract without intercourse following it) but only lege,
that is, as the rightful consequence of the obligation not to e n g a g e in
sexual union except t h r o u g h possession o f each other's person, which is
realized only t h r o u g h the use of their sexual attributes by each other.
Title II:
Parental Right
28.
Just as there arose f r o m one's duty to oneself, that is, to the humanity
in one's own person, a right (ius personale) o f both sexes to acquire each
other as persons in the manner of things by marriage, so there follows
f r o m procreation in this community a duty to preserve and care f o r its
offspring; that is, children, as persons, have by their procreation an
original innate (not acquired) right to the care o f their parents until
they are able to look after themselves, and they have this right directly
on the basis of principle (lege), that is, without any special act being
required to establish this right.
For the o f f s p r i n g is a person, and it is impossible to f o r m a concept
o f the production of a being e n d o w e d with f r e e d o m t h r o u g h a physi-
The Doctrine of Right g 99
29-
F r o m this duty there must necessarily also arise the right o f parents to
manage and develop the child, as long as he has not yet mastered the
use of his members or of his understanding: the right not only to f e e d
and care f o r him but to educate him, to develop him both pragmati-
cally, so that in the f u t u r e he can look after himself and make his way
in life, and morally, since otherwise the fault for having neglected him
would fall on the parents. T h e y have the right to do all this until the
time o f his emancipation (emancipatio), w h e n they r e n o u n c e their
parental right to direct him as well as any claim to be compensated f o r
their support and pains u p till now. A f t e r they have completed his
education, the only obligation (to his parents) with which they can
charge him is a m e r e duty o f virtue, namely the duty o f gratitude.
[282] From a child's personality it also follows that the right o f parents is
not just a right to a thing, since a child can never be considered as the
property o f his parents, so that their right is not alienable (ius person-
alissimum). But this right is also not just a right against a person, since
a child still belongs to his parents as what is theirs (is still in their
possession like a thing and can be b r o u g h t back even against his will into
his parents' possession f r o m another's possession). It is, instead, a
right to a person akin to a right to a thing.
F r o m this it is evident that, in the doctrine o f Right, there must
necessarily be a d d e d to the headings rights to things and rights against
persons the h e a d i n g rights to persons akin to rights to things; the division
m a d e u p till now has not been complete. For w h e n we speak o f the
rights of parents to children as part o f their household, we are refer-
ring not merely to the children's duty to return w h e n they have r u n
away but to the parents' being justified in taking control o f them and
i m p o u n d i n g them as things (like domestic animals that have g o n e
astray).
Title III:
Right of a Head of the Household
3-
T h e children of a household, w h o together with their parents f o r m e d
a family, reach their majority (maiorennes) without any contract to with-
draw f r o m their f o r m e r d e p e n d e n c e , merely by attaining the ability to
support themselves (which happens partly as a natural c o m i n g o f age
in the general course of nature, partly in keeping with their particular
natural qualities). In other words, they become their own masters (sui
iuris) and acquire this right without any special act to establish it and
so merely by principle (lege). Just as they are not in debt to their
parents f o r their education, so the parents are released in the same
way f r o m their obligation to their children, and both children and
parents acquire or reacquire their natural f r e e d o m . T h e domestic
society that was necessary on principle is now dissolved.
[283] Both parties can now maintain what is actually the same household
but with a d i f f e r e n t f o r m of obligation, namely, as the connection of
the head of the household with servants (male or female servants
o f the house). W h a t they maintain is the same domestic society but it
is now a society under the head of the household (societas herelis), f o r m e d
by a contract t h r o u g h which the head o f the household establishes a
domestic society with the children w h o have now attained their major-
ity or, if the family has no children, with other f r e e persons (members
The Doctrine of Right g 101
Dogmatic Division
of All Rights That Can Be Acquired by Contract
31.
I.
What Is Money?
What Is a Book?
Episodic Section.
On Ideal Acquisition of an External
Object of Choice
32.
I.
Acquisition by Prolonged Possession51
33-
I acquire another's property merely by long possession of it (usucapio),
not because I may legitimately presume that he consents to my acquir-
[292] ing it (per consensum praesumtum), nor because I can assume that, since
he does not contradict me, he has given it up (rem derelictam), but
because, even if there should be someone w h o was the true o w n e r and
as such laid claim to it (a claimant) I may still exclude him merely by
virtue of my long possession, ignore his existence u p to now, and carry
on as if he existed u p to the time o f my possession only as a thought-
entity, even if I should later learn of his reality as well as that of his
claim. A l t h o u g h this way o f acquiring is called acquisition by superan-
nuation of claims (per praescriptionem), this is not altogether correct,
since exclusion of claims is to be r e g a r d e d only as a result o f acquisi-
tion: Acquisition must have come first. It has now to be p r o v e d that it
is possible to acquire something in this way.
The Doctrine of Right g 109
II.
Inheritance
(Acquisitio haereditatis)
34-
Inheritance is transfer (translatio) of the belongings and goods o f some-
one who is dying to a survivor by agreement of the wills of both.
Acquisition by the heir (haeredis instituti) and leaving by the testator (tes-
tatoris), that is, this change of belongings, takes place in one moment,
namely the moment at which the testator ceases to exist (articulo
mortis). It is therefore not, strictly speaking, a transfer (translatio) in
the empirical sense, since this assumes two acts following each other,
namely the acts by which one person first leaves his possessions and
the other then comes into them. Instead it is an ideal acquisition. Now
inheritance in the state of nature cannot be conceived of without a
last will (dispositio ultimae voluntatis). Whether this is a contract of inheri-
tance (pactum successorium) or a unilateral disposition to the heir (testamen-
tum) amounts to the question, whether and how it is possible f o r
belongings to pass f r o m one to the other precisely at the moment at
[294] which the subject ceases to exist. T h e question of how it is possible to
acquire by inheritance must accordingly be investigated apart f r o m
the many ways in which it can be carried out (which are f o u n d only in
a commonwealth).
"It is possible to acquire something through disposition to the heir."
For the testator, Caius, promises and in his last will declares to Titius,
who knows nothing of this promise, that upon his death his belongings
are to pass to Titius. As long as he lives, Caius therefore remains sole
owner of his belongings. Now it is true that by a unilateral will alone
nothing can pass to the other person; for this there is required, besides
the promise, acceptance (acceptatio) by the other party and a simulta-
neous will (voluntas simultanea), which is still lacking here; for as long
as Caius is alive, Titius cannot explicitly accept, so as to acquire by his
acceptance, since Caius has promised only on the occasion of his death
(otherwise the property would for a moment be c o m m o n property,
and this is not the testator's will). Titius, however, still tacitly acquires
a proprietary right to the legacy as a right to a thing: Namely, he has
the exclusive right to accept it (ius in re iacente), so that the legacy at the
moment of death is called haereditas iacens. Now, since every man
would necessarily accept such a right (since he can always gain but
never lose by it), and so accepts tacitly, and since Titius, after Caius'
death, is in this situation, he can acquire the bequest by acceptance of
the promise, and the bequest has not become altogether ownerless (res
nullius) in the meantime but only vacant (res vacua). For Titius alone
The Doctrine of Right g 111
has the right to make the choice as to whether or not he wants to make
the belongings left to him his own.
HI. [295]
Leaving Behind a Good Reputation after One's Death
(Bona fama defuncti)
35-
It would be absurd to think that someone who has died can still possess
something after his death (and so when he no longer exists), if what he
left behind were a thing. But a good reputation is an innate external
belonging, though an ideal one only, that clings to the subject as a
person, a being o f such a nature that I can and must abstract f r o m
whether he ceases to be entirely at his death or whether he survives as
a person; for in the context of his rights in relation to others, I actually
regard every person simply in terms o f his humanity, hence as homo
noumenon. So any attempt to stain someone's reputation by falsehood
after his death is suspect, because it is at least ungenerous to spread
reproaches against one who is absent and cannot defend himself,
unless one is quite certain of them. Nevertheless, a well-founded accu-
sation against him is still in order (so that the principle de mortuis nihil
nisi benea is incorrect).
For a man to acquire by an irreproachable life and the death that
ends it a (negatively) good name, which continues to be his when he no
longer exists as homo phaenomenon; for those who survive him (relatives
or strangers) to be also authorized by right to d e f e n d him (for
unproved charges are dangerous to them as well, since they could get
similar treatment when they die); for a man to be able to acquire such
a right, is, I say, a phenomenon as strange as it is undeniable, a phe-
nomenon of reason giving law a priori that extends its commands and
prohibitions even beyond the limits of life. If anyone spreads it abroad
that someone who has died committed a crime which in his lifetime
would have made him dishonorable or only contemptible, whoever
3 6.
!'3
loo Metaphysics of Morals
A.
On a Contract to Make a Gift
37-
In accordance with private Right, this contract {donatio), by which I
alienate without remuneration (gratis) what is mine, a thing o f mine (or
my right), involves a relation of myself, the d o n o r (donans), to another,
[298] the recipient (donatorius), by which what is mine passes to the recipient
by his acceptance o f it (donum). But it is not to be p r e s u m e d that I
intend by this contract to be coerced to k e e p my promise and so also
to give u p my freedom gratuitously and, as it were, to throw myself
away {nemo suum iactare praesumitur). Yet this is what w o u l d h a p p e n in
accordance with Right in the civil condition, w h e r e the one w h o is to
receive my gift can coerce me to carry out my promise. So, if the matter
were to come b e f o r e a court, that is, in accordance with public Right,
it would either have to be p r e s u m e d that the d o n o r consented to this
coercion, which is absurd, or else the court in its j u d g m e n t (verdict)
simply takes no account of w h e t h e r the d o n o r did or did not want to
reserve his f r e e d o m to go back on his promise, but takes account only
o f what is certain, namely, the promise and the promisee's acceptance
o f it. So even if, as can well be supposed, the promisor t h o u g h t that
he could not be b o u n d to k e e p his promise should he regret having
m a d e it b e f o r e it is time to fulfill it, the court assumes that he would
have had to m a k e this reservation expressly, and that if he did not he
could be coerced to fulfill his promise. T h e court adopts this principle
because otherwise its verdict on rights would be made infinitely m o r e
difficult or even impossible.
B.
On a Contract to Lend a Thing
3-
In this contract (commodatum) by which I permit someone to use with-
out compensation something of mine, if the parties to the contract
agree that this very same thing is to be b r o u g h t u n d e r my control again,
the borrower (commodatarius) cannot presume that the thing's o w n e r
(commodans) also assumes every risk (casus) of possible loss o f the thing,
or o f what makes it useful, that might arise f r o m its having been put
into the borrower's possession. For it is not a matter of course that the
owner, in addition to granting the b o r r o w e r the use of his thing (such
The Doctrine of Right g 115
C.
On Recovery (Repossession) of Something Lost
(vindicatio)
39-
It is clear f r o m the foregoing that something of mine that continues to
exist remains mine even though I am not continuously holding it; that
it does not of itself cease to be mine apart from some act by which I
give u p my right to it (derelictionis vel alienationis); and that I have a
right to this thing (ius reale) and therefore a right against whoever holds
it, not merely a right against a specific person (ius personale). But the
question now is whether this right must also be regarded by everyone
else as ownership that continues of itself, if I have only not renounced it,
when the thing is in another's possession.
Suppose that someone has lost a thing (res amissa) and that someone
else takes it in good faith (bona fide), as a supposed find. O r suppose that
[301] I get a thing by its being formally alienated by someone possessing it
w h o represents himself as its owner although he is not. Since I cannot
acquire a thing f r o m someone who is not its owner (a non domino), the
question arises whether I am excluded by the real owner f r o m any
right to this thing and left with only a personal right against the
illegitimate possessor. This is obviously the case if acquisition is j u d g e d
merely in accordance with the intrinsic grounds that justify it (in the
state of nature), not in accordance with what is appropriate for a
court.
It must be possible for whatever can be alienated to be acquired by
someone or other. T h e legitimacy of acquisition, however, rests
entirely on the f o r m in accordance with which what is possessed by
another is transferred to me and accepted by me, that is, on the
formalities of the act of exchange (commutatio) between the possessor
of the thing and the one acquiring it, by which a right is established;
The Doctrine of Right g 117
I may not ask how the possessor obtained possession o f it, since this
would already be an o f f e n s e (quilibet praesumitur bonus, donee etc.).
Suppose, now, that it later turns out that the possessor was not the
o w n e r but that someone else was. I cannot then say that the o w n e r
could straightway take the thing f r o m me (as he could f r o m anyone
else w h o might be holding it). For I have stolen nothing f r o m him, but
have, f o r example, b o u g h t a horse o f f e r e d f o r sale in the public mar-
ket in conformity with the law (titulo emti venditi). T h e title of acquisi-
tion on my part is indisputable since I (as buyer) am not b o u n d o r even
authorized to search the other's (the seller's) title o f possession this
investigation would go on to infinity in an ascending series. I f the
purchase is formally correct, I become not just th e putative but the true
o w n e r o f the horse.
B u t against this, the following a r g u m e n t arises with regard to rights.
A n y acquisition f r o m one w h o is not the o w n e r o f a thing (a non dom-
ino) is null and void. I can derive n o m o r e f r o m another than what he
legitimately has. Even though, in b u y i n g a stolen horse f o r sale in the
market, I proceed quite correctly as far as the f o r m o f acquisition
(modus acquierendi) is concerned, ray title of acquisition is still defective,
since the horse did not b e l o n g to the one w h o actually sold it. I may
well be its possessor in good faith (possessor bonafidei), but I am still only
its putative o w n e r (dominus putativus) and the true o w n e r has a right to [302]
recover it (rem suam vindicandi).
If one asks what is to be laid d o w n as right in itself (in the state of
nature) in the acquisition o f external things in accordance with princi-
ples of justice in men's exchanges with one another (iustitia commuta-
tiva), then one must answer as follows. If someone intends to acquire
an external thing in this way it is in fact necessary f o r him to investi-
gate w h e t h e r the thing he wants to acquire does not already b e l o n g to
someone else; that is to say, even if he has strictly observed the f o r m a l
conditions f o r deriving the thing f r o m what belongs to another (has
b o u g h t the horse in the market in the p r o p e r way), as long as he
remains ignorant as to w h e t h e r someone else (other than the seller) is
the true o w n e r o f it, the most he could have acquired is only a right
against a person with regard to the thing (ius ad rem), so that if someone
comes forth w h o can d o c u m e n t his previous ownership of it, nothing
is left to the alleged new o w n e r but to have legitimately enjoyed the
use o f it u p to this m o m e n t as its possessor in g o o d faith. Since it is
largely impossible to discover w h o was absolutely first (the original
owner) in the series o f putative owners deriving their right f r o m each
other, no trade in external things, n o matter how well it may agree
with the f o r m a l conditions o f this kind of justice (iustitia commutativa),
can guarantee a secure acquisition.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
Here again reason giving laws with regard to rights comes forth with
a principle of distributive justice, of adopting as its guiding rule f o r the
legitimacy of possession, not the way it would be j u d g e d in itself by the
private will of each (in the state of nature), but the way it would be
j u d g e d before a court in a condition brought about by the united will
of all (in a civil condition). In a civil condition, conformity with the
formal conditions of acquisition, which of themselves establish only a
right against a person, is postulated as an adequate substitute for the
material grounds (which establish derivation from what belonged to a
previous alleged owner); and what is in itself a. right against a person,
when brought before a court, holds as a right to a thing. A horse, f o r ex-
[33] ample, that someone puts up for sale in a public market regulated by
police ordinances becomes my property if all the rules of buying and
selling are strictly observed (but in such a way that the true owner re-
tains the right to put forward a claim against the seller on the g r o u n d
of his earlier, unforfeited possession of it); and what would otherwise
be my right against a person is converted into a right to a thing, in
accordance with which I can take (recover) it as mine wherever I find
it, without having to get involved in how the seller obtained it.
So it is only for the sake of a court's verdict (in favorem iustitiae
distributivae) that a right to a thing is taken and treated not as it is in
itself (as a right against a person) but as it can be most readily and surely
judged (as a right to a thing), and yet in accordance with a pure a priori
principle. O n this principle various statutory laws (ordinances) are
subsequently based, the primary purpose of which is to set u p condi-
tions under which alone a way of acquiring is to have rightful force,
conditions such that a judge can assign to each what is his most readily
and with least hesitation. For example, in the saying "Purchase breaks a
lease," what is a right to a thing (the lease) in accordance with the
nature of the contract, that is, in itself, holds as a mere right against a
person; and conversely, as in the case discussed above, what is in itself
only a right against a person holds as a right to a thing. In such cases
the question is what principles a court in the civil condition should rely
on in order to proceed most surely in its verdicts about the rights
belonging to each.
D.
On Acquiring Guarantees by Oath5*
(Cautio iuratoria)
40.
No other reason could be given that could bind men as a matter o f
Right [rechtlich] to believe and acknowledge that there are gods than
The Doctrine of Right g 133
and distributive justice (iustitia distributiva). In these the law says, first,
merely what conduct is intrinsically right [recht] in terms o f its f o r m (lex
iusti) \ second, what [objects] are capable o f being covered externally by
law, in terms o f their matter, that is, what way of being in possession
is rightful [rechtlich] (lex iuridica)-, third, what is the decision o f a court in
a particular case in accordance with the given law u n d e r which it falls,
that is what is laid down as right [Rechtens] (lex iustitiae). Because o f this
a court is itself called the justice o f a country, and w h e t h e r such a thing
exists or does not exist is the most important question that can be
asked about any arrangements having to d o with rights.
A condition that is not rightful, that is, a condition in which there is
n o distributive justice, is called a state o f nature (status naturalis). W h a t
is o p p o s e d to a state o f nature is not (as Achenwall thinks) a condition
that is social and that could be called an artificial condition (status
artificialis), but rather the civil condition (status civilis), that o f a society
subject to distributive justice. For in the state o f nature, too, there can
be societies compatible with rights (e.g., conjugal, paternal, domestic
societies in general, as well as many others); but no law, "You o u g h t to
enter this condition," holds a priori f o r these societies, whereas it can
be said o f a rightful condition that all m e n w h o could (even involuntar-
ily) come into relations o f rights with one another ought to enter this
condition.
T h e first and second o f these conditions can be called the condition
o f private Right, whereas the third and last can be called the condi-
tion o f public Right. T h e latter contains no f u r t h e r or other duties o f
men a m o n g themselves than can be conceived in the f o r m e r state; the
matter o f private Right is the same in both. T h e laws o f the condition
o f public Right, accordingly, have to do only with the rightful f o r m of
men's association (constitution), in view o f which these laws must nec-
essarily be conceived as public.
T h e civil union (unio civilis) cannot itself be called a society, f o r be-
tween the commander (imperans)53 and the subject (subditus) there is no [307]
partnership. T h e y are not fellow-members: O n e is subordinated to, not
coordinated with the other; and those w h o are coordinate with one
another must f o r this very reason consider themselves equals since
they are subject to c o m m o n laws. T h e civil union is not so m u c h a
society but rather makes one.
42-
F r o m private Right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate
of public Right: W h e n you cannot avoid living side by side with all
others, 5 4 y o u o u g h t to leave the state o f nature and proceed with them
loo Metaphysics of Morals
SECTION I
43-
T h e s u m o f t h e laws that n e e d to b e p r o m u l g a t e d g e n e r a l l y in o r d e r
to b r i n g a b o u t a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n is public Right. Public R i g h t is
t h e r e f o r e a system o f laws f o r a p e o p l e , that is, a m u l t i t u d e o f m e n , o r
f o r a m u l t i t u d e o f p e o p l e s , that, b e c a u s e they a f f e c t o n e a n o t h e r , n e e d
a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n u n d e r a will u n i t i n g t h e m , a constitution (constitu-
tio), so that they m a y e n j o y w h a t is laid d o w n as right. T h i s c o n d i t i o n
o f the individuals within a p e o p l e in relation to o n e a n o t h e r is called
a civil c o n d i t i o n (status civilis), a n d the w h o l e o f individuals in a right-
f u l condition, in relation to its o w n m e m b e r s is called a state (civitas).
B e c a u s e o f its f o r m , by w h i c h all a r e united t h r o u g h their c o m m o n
interest in b e i n g in a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n , a state is called a commonwealth
(respublica latius sic dicta). In relation to o t h e r peoples, h o w e v e r , a state
is called simply a power (potentia) (hence the w o r d potentate). B e c a u s e
the u n i o n o f t h e m e m b e r s is ( p r e s u m e d to be) o n e they i n h e r i t e d , a
state is also called a nation (gens). H e n c e , u n d e r the g e n e r a l c o n c e p t o f
public R i g h t w e are led to think not only o f the R i g h t o f a state b u t also
o f a Right of nations (ius gentium).55 Since the earth's s u r f a c e is not
u n l i m i t e d b u t closed, the concepts o f the R i g h t o f a state a n d o f a R i g h t
o f nations lead inevitably to the I d e a o f a Right for all nations (ius
gentium) o r cosmopolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum). So if the principle o f
o u t e r f r e e d o m limited by law is l a c k i n g in any o n e o f these t h r e e
possible f o r m s o f r i g h t f u l condition, the f r a m e w o r k o f all t h e o t h e r s is
u n a v o i d a b l y u n d e r m i n e d a n d must finally collapse.
44- [312]
It is not e x p e r i e n c e f r o m w h i c h w e learn o f m e n ' s m a x i m o f violence
a n d o f their m a l e v o l e n t t e n d e n c y to attack o n e a n o t h e r b e f o r e exter-
nal legislation 5 e n d o w e d with p o w e r a p p e a r s . It is t h e r e f o r e not s o m e
fact that m a k e s c o e r c i o n t h r o u g h public law necessary. O n the con-
123
loo Metaphysics of Morals
45-
A state (civitas) is a union o f a multitude of m e n u n d e r laws o f Right.
Insofar as these are a priori necessary as laws, that is, insofar as they
The Doctrine of Right g 125
46.
47-
All those three authorities in a state are dignities [Wrden], and since
they arise necessarily f r o m the Idea o f a state as such, as essential f o r
the establishment (constitution) of it, they are civic dignities. T h e y
comprise the relation o f a superior over all (which, f r o m the viewpoint
of laws of f r e e d o m , can be none other than the united people itself) to
the multitude o f that people severally as subjects, that is, the relation o f
a commander (imperans) to those who obey (subditus). T h e act by which a
people f o r m s itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speak-
ing, the original contract is only the Idea o f this act, in terms o f which
alone we can think of the legitimacy o f a state. In accordance with the
original contract, everyone (omnes et singuli) within a.people gives u p his
external f r e e d o m in o r d e r to take it u p again immediately as a mem-
ber o f a commonwealth, that is, o f a people considered as a state
(universi). A n d o n e cannot say: A state, man in a state has sacrificed a [316]
part o f his innate outer f r e e d o m f o r the sake o f an end, but rather, he
has relinquished entirely his wild, lawless f r e e d o m in o r d e r to find his
f r e e d o m as such undiminished, in a d e p e n d e n c e u p o n laws, that is, in
a rightful condition, since this d e p e n d e n c e arises f r o m his own lawgiv-
ing will.
48.
Accordingly, the three authorities in a state are, first, coordinate with
one another (potestates coordinatae) as so many moral persons, that is,
each complements the others to complete the constitution o f a state
(icomplementum ad sufficientiam). But, second, they are also subordinate
(subordinatae) to o n e another, so that one of them, in assisting another,
cannot also u s u r p its function; instead, each has its own principle, that
is, it indeed c o m m a n d s in its capacity as a particular person, but still
u n d e r the condition of the will o f a superior. Third, t h r o u g h the union
of both each subject is apportioned his rights. 5 9
It can be said o f these authorities, r e g a r d e d in their dignity, that the
will o f the legislator (legislatoris) with regard to what is externally mine
or yours is irreproachable (irreprehensible)\ that the executive power o f
the supreme ruler (summi rectoris) is irresistible; and that the verdict of the
highest judge (supremi iudicis) is irreversible (cannot be appealed).
49-
T h e ruler of a state {rex, princeps) is that (moral or natural) person to
w h o m the executive authority (potestas executoria) belongs. H e is the
loo Metaphysics of Morals
General Remark
O n the Effects with Regard to Rights That Follow
from the Nature of the Civil Union
A.
this order: For a people already subject to civil law these rationaliza-
tions are altogether pointless and, moreover, threaten a state with
d a n g e r . If a subject, having p o n d e r e d over the ultimate origin of the
authority now ruling, wanted to resist this authority, he w o u l d be
[319] punished, got rid of, or expelled (as an outlaw, exlex) in accordance
with the laws of this authority, that is, with every right. A law that is so
holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime even to call it in d o u b t in a
practical way, and so to suspend its e f f e c t f o r a m o m e n t , is t h o u g h t as
if it must have arisen not f r o m men but f r o m some highest, flawless
lawgiver; and that is what the saying "All authority is f r o m G o d "
means. This saying is not an assertion about the historical basis o f the
civil constitution; it instead sets f o r t h an Idea as a practical principle o f
reason: the principle that the presently existing legislative authority
o u g h t to be obeyed, whatever its origin.
Now f r o m this principle follows the proposition: T h e h e a d of a state
has only rights against his subjects and no duties (that he can be
coerced to fulfill). Moreover, even if the organ o f the head o f a state,
the ruler, proceeds contrary to law, f o r example, if he goes against the
law o f equality in assigning the b u r d e n s of the state in matters o f
taxation, recruiting and so forth, subjects may indeed o p p o s e this
injustice by complaints (gravamina) but not by resistance.
Indeed, even the constitution cannot contain any article that would
make it possible f o r there to be some authority in a state to resist the
s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r [obersten Befehlshaber] in case he should violate
the law of the constitution, and so to limit him. 6 0 For someone w h o is
to limit the authority in a state must have even more p o w e r [Macht]
than he w h o m he limits, or at least as m u c h p o w e r as he has; and, as
a legitimate c o m m a n d e r [Gebieter] w h o directs the subjects to resist, h e
must also be able to protect them and to r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t having
rightful force in any case that comes up; consequently he has to be
able to c o m m a n d resistance publicly. In that case, however, the su-
p r e m e c o m m a n d e r [obersten Befehlshaber] in a state is not the s u p r e m e
c o m m a n d e r ; instead, it is the one w h o can resist him, and this is
self-contradictory. In that case the sovereign behaves t h r o u g h its min-
ister as also the ruler and so as a despot; and the illusion that allows us
to think of the people, t h r o u g h its deputies, as the limiting authority
(though it has, properly speaking, only legislative authority) cannot
conceal the despotism, so that it does not come to light f r o m the mea-
sures the minister takes. T h e people, in being represented by its dep-
uties (in parliament), has, in these guardians o f its f r e e d o m and rights,
men w h o have a lively interest in positions f o r themselves and their
families, in the army, the navy and the civil service, that d e p e n d on
The Doctrine of Right g 131
B.
C a n the h e a d o f state be r e g a r d e d as the supreme proprietor 6 1 (of the
land) o r must he be r e g a r d e d only as the one w h o has s u p r e m e com-
loo Metaphysics of Morals
mand over the people by law? Since the land is the ultimate condition
that alone makes it possible to have external things as one's own, a n d
the first right that can be acquired is to possession and use o f such
things, all such rights must be derived f r o m the sovereign as lord of the
land, or better, as the supreme proprietor o f it (dominus territorii). T h e
people, the multitude of subjects, also belong to him (they are his
people). B u t they b e l o n g to him not as if he owned them (by a right to
things); they instead belong to him as their s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r
[iOberbefehlshaber] (by a right against persons). T h i s s u p r e m e propri-
etorship is, however, only an Idea o f the civil union that serves to
represent in accordance with concepts of Right the necessary union of
the private property of everyone within the people u n d e r a general
public possessor, so that determination o f the particular property o f
[324] each is in accordance with the necessary formal principle o f division
(division o f land), instead o f with principles o f aggregation (which
proceeds empirically f r o m the parts to the whole). In accordance with
concepts of Right, the supreme proprietor cannot have any land at all
as his private property (for otherwise he would make himself a private
person). All land belongs only to the people (and indeed to the people
taken distributively, not collectively), except in the case o f a nomadic
people u n d e r a head o f state [nomadisch-beherrschtes ], with w h o m there
is n o private ownership of land. T h e supreme c o m m a n d e r [Oberbe-
fehlshaber] can t h e r e f o r e have no domains, that is, no estates f o r his
private use (for maintaining his court). For if he did, it would then be
u p to his own discretion how far they should be e x t e n d e d , so that the
state would r u n the risk o f seeing all ownership of land in the hands
of the g o v e r n m e n t and all subjects as serfs (gelbae adscripti), possessors
only o f what is the property of another, and t h e r e f o r e d e p r i v e d o f all
f r e e d o m (servi). O n e can say of the lord of the land that he possesses
nothing (of his own) except himself; f o r if he had something o f his own
alongside others in the state, a dispute could arise between them and
there would be n o j u d g e to settle it. B u t one can also say that he possesses
everything, since he has the right o f c o m m a n d over the people, to
w h o m all external things belong (divisim) (the right to assign to each
what is his).
those privileges with which they are favored ownership in land to pass
on to their successors; they can acquire only use o f it u p to the present.
T h e estates o f a knightly o r d e r can be revoked without scruple
(though u n d e r the condition mentioned above) if public opinion has
ceased to favor military honors as a means f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g the state
against i n d i f f e r e n c e in d e f e n d i n g it. T h e holdings of the c h u r c h can
be similarly revoked if public opinion has ceased to want masses for
souls, prayers, and a multitude o f clerics appointed f o r this as the
means f o r saving the people f r o m eternal fire. T h o s e a f f e c t e d by such
r e f o r m s cannot complain of their property being taken f r o m them, [325]
since the reason f o r their possession hitherto lay only in the people's
opinion and also had to hold as long as that lasted. But as soon as this
opinion lapses, and even lapses only in the j u d g m e n t o f those w h o by
their merit have the strongest claim to guide j u d g m e n t , the supposed
property has to cease, as if by an appeal o f the people to the state (a
rege male informato ad regem melius informandum).
O n this originally acquired ownership of land rests, again, the right
o f the supreme c o m m a n d e r [Oberbefehlshaber], as s u p r e m e proprietor
(lord o f the land), to tax private owners o f land, that is, to require
payment of taxes on land, excise taxes, and import duties, or to
require the p e r f o r m a n c e of services (such as providing troops for
military service). T h i s must, however, be d o n e in such a way that the
people taxes itself, since the only way o f p r o c e e d i n g in accordance
with principles o f Right in this matter is for taxes to be levied by those
deputized by the people, even in case o f forced loans (deviating f r o m
previously existing law), which it is permissible to exact by the right o f
majesty in case the state is in d a n g e r of dissolution.
O n this supreme proprietorship also rests the right to administer
the state's economy, finances, and police. Police provide f o r public
security, convenience, and decency; f o r the government's business of
guiding the people by laws is made easier w h e n the feeling f o r decency
(sensus decori), as negative taste, is not d e a d e n e d by what o f f e n d s the
moral sense, such as begging, u p r o a r on the streets, stenches, and
public prostitution (venus volgivaga).
A third right also belongs to the state for its preservation, that of
inspection (ius inspectionis), so that no association (of political or reli-
gious fanatics) that could a f f e c t the public well-being o f society [pub-
licum) remains concealed. Instead, no association can r e f u s e to dis-
close its constitution w h e n the police d e m a n d it. But the police are not
authorized to search anyone's private residence except in a case of
necessity, and in every particular case they must be warranted to d o so
by a higher authority.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
C.
D.
subjects) cannot decide with regard to itself and its fellows, the sover-
eign can also not decide with r e g a r d to it." Now a hereditary nobility is
a rank that precedes merit and also provides n o basis to h o p e for
merit, and is thus a thought-entity without any reality. For if an ances-
tor had merit he could still not bequeath it to his descendants: T h e y
must acquire it f o r themselves, since nature does not arrange things in
such a way that talent and will, which make meritorious service to the
state possible, are also hereditary. Since we cannot admit that any man
would throw away his f r e e d o m , it is impossible for the general will o f
the people to assent to such a groundless prerogative, and t h e r e f o r e
f o r the sovereign to validate it. T h e anomaly of subjects w h o want to
be more than citizens of the state, namely b o r n officials (a born profes-
sor, perhaps) may have crept into the machinery of g o v e r n m e n t f r o m
older times (feudalism, which was organized almost entirely f o r war).
T h e only way the state can then gradually correct this mistake it has
made, o f c o n f e r r i n g hereditary privileges contrary to right, is by let-
ting them lapse and not filling vacancies in these positions. So it has a
provisional right to let these titled positions of dignity continue until
even in public opinion the division into sovereign, nobility, and com-
moners has been replaced by the only natural division into sovereign
and people.
Certainly no m a n in a state can be without any dignity, since he at
least has the dignity of a citizen. T h e exception is someone w h o has t33]
lost it by his own crime, because o f which, t h o u g h he is kept alive, he is
made a mere tool o f another's choice (either of the state or o f another
citizen). W h o e v e r is another's tool (which he can become only by
j u d g m e n t and Right) is a bondsman62 (servus in sensu stricto) and is the
property (dominium) of another, w h o is accordingly not merely his mas-
ter (herus) but also his owner (dominus) and can therefore alienate him
as a thing, use him as he pleases (only not f o r s h a m e f u l purposes) and
dispose of his powers, t h o u g h not of his life and members. No one can
bind himself to this kind of d e p e n d e n c e , by which he ceases to be a
person, by a contract, since it is only as a person that he can make
a contract. Now it might seem that a man could put himself u n d e r
obligation to another person, by a contract to let and hire (locatio con-
ductio), to p e r f o r m services (in return for wages, board, or protection)
that are permissible in terms of their quality but indeterminate in terms
of their quantity, and that he thereby becomes just a subject (subiectus),
not a b o n d s m a n (servus). But this is only a deceptive appearance. For
if the master is authorized to use the powers of his subject as he
pleases, he can also exhaust them until his subject dies o r is driven to
despair (as with the Negroes on the Sugar Islands); his subject will
m fact have given himself away, as property, to his master, which is
loo Metaphysics of Morals
E.
[331] On the Right to Punish and to Grant Clemency
51.
52-
It is futile to i n q u i r e into the historical warrant [Geschichtsurkunde] o f t h e
m e c h a n i s m o f g o v e r n m e n t , that is, o n e c a n n o t r e a c h back to the time
at w h i c h civil society b e g a n (for savages d r a w u p n o r e c o r d o f their
*I shall not mention the adulterations of these forms that arise from invasion by
powerful unauthorized people (oligarchy and ochlocracy), or the so-called mixed
constitutions, since this would take us too far afield.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
SECTION II
53-
A s natives o f a c o u n t r y , those w h o constitute a nation c a n b e l o o k e d
u p o n a n a l o g o u s l y to d e s c e n d a n t s o f the same ancestors (congeniti) e v e n
t h o u g h they are not. Yet in an intellectual sense a n d f r o m the p e r s p e c -
tive o f rights, since they are b o r n o f the s a m e m o t h e r (the republic)
they constitute as it w e r e o n e family (gens, natio), w h o s e m e m b e r s
(citizens o f the state) are o f equally h i g h birth a n d d o not m i x with
those w h o m a y live n e a r t h e m in a state o f n a t u r e , w h o m they r e g a r d
as i n f e r i o r ; the latter (savages), h o w e v e r , f o r their o w n p a r t c o n s i d e r
themselves s u p e r i o r because o f the lawless f r e e d o m they h a v e c h o s e n ,
e v e n t h o u g h they d o not constitute states but only tribes. T h e R i g h t o f
states in relation to o n e a n o t h e r (which in G e r m a n is called, not quite
correctly, the Right of Nations, b u t s h o u l d instead be called the R i g h t o f
States, ins publicum civitatum) is w h a t we h a v e to c o n s i d e r u n d e r the
title the R i g h t o f Nations. H e r e a state, as a m o r a l p e r s o n , is consid-
e r e d as living in relation to a n o t h e r state in the c o n d i t i o n o f natural
f r e e d o m a n d t h e r e f o r e in a c o n d i t i o n o f constant war. T h e rights o f
states consist, t h e r e f o r e , partly o f their right to go to w a r , partly o f their
r i g h t in w a r , a n d partly o f their r i g h t to constrain e a c h o t h e r to leave
this c o n d i t i o n o f w a r a n d so f o r m a constitution that will establish
lasting p e a c e , that is, its r i g h t after war. I n this p r o b l e m the only
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the state o f n a t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l m e n a n d o f
families (in relation to o n e a n o t h e r ) a n d that o f nations is that in the
R i g h t o f N a t i o n s w e h a v e to take into consideration not only the
[344] relation o f o n e state t o w a r d a n o t h e r as a w h o l e , b u t also t h e relation o f
individual p e r s o n s o f o n e state t o w a r d the individuals o f a n o t h e r , as
well as t o w a r d a n o t h e r state as a w h o l e . B u t this d i f f e r e n c e f r o m the
rights o f individuals in a state o f n a t u r e m a k e s it necessary to c o n s i d e r
only such f e a t u r e s as can b e readily i n f e r r e d f r o m the c o n c e p t o f a
state o f n a t u r e .
150
The Doctrine of Right g 151
54-
T h e elements of the Right o f Nations are these: 1) States, considered
in external relation to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature
in a n o n r i g h t f u l condition. 2) T h i s n o n r i g h t f u l condition is a condition
of war (of the right o f the stronger), even if it is not a condition of
actual war and actual attacks being constantly m a d e (hostilities). Al-
t h o u g h n o state is w r o n g e d by another in this condition (insofar as
neither wants anything better), this condition is in itself still w r o n g in
the highest d e g r e e , and states neighboring u p o n one another are
u n d e r obligation to leave it. 3) A league o f nations in accordance with
the Idea o f an original social contract is necessary, not in o r d e r to
m e d d l e in one another's internal dissensions but to protect against
attacks f r o m without. 4) T h i s alliance must, however, involve no sover-
eign authority (as in a civil constitution), but only an association (feder-
ation); it must be an alliance that can be r e n o u n c e d at any time and so
must be r e n e w e d f r o m time to time. T h i s is a right in subsidium o f an-
other and original right, to avoid getting involved in a state o f actual
war a m o n g the other members (foedus Amphictyonum).7
55-
A s regards the original right that f r e e states in a state o f nature have
to go to w a r with one another (in order, perhaps, to establish a condi-
tion m o r e closely a p p r o a c h i n g a rightful condition), the first question
that arises is: W h a t right has a state against its own subjects to use t h e m
for war against other states, to e x p e n d their goods and even their lives
in it, or to put them at risk, in such a way that whether they shall go to
war does not d e p e n d on their own j u d g m e n t but they may be sent into
it by the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d o f the sovereign?
It might seem that this right can be easily proved, namely f r o m the
right to d o what one wants with what belongs to one (one's property). [345]
A n y o n e has an incontestable property in anything the substance o f
which he has himself made. W h a t follows, then, is the deduction, as a
mere jurist would draw it up.
T h e r e are various natural products in a country that must still be
considered artifacts (artefacta) of the state as far as the abundance o f
natural products of a certain kind is concerned, since the country
would not have yielded them in such abundance had there not been
a state and an orderly, p o w e r f u l government, but the inhabitants
had been in a state of nature. W h e t h e r f r o m lack of f o o d or f r o m
the presence o f predatory animals in the country w h e r e I live, hens
loo Metaphysics of Morals
(the most useful kind of fowl), sheep, swine, cattle, and so forth w o u l d
either not exist at all or at best would be scarce unless there were a
g o v e r n m e n t in this country, which secures the inhabitants in what
they acquire and possess. T h i s holds true o f the h u m a n population as
well, which can only be small, as it is in the A m e r i c a n wilderness, even
if we attribute to these people the greatest industry (which they d o not
have). T h e inhabitants would be very scarce since they could not take
their attendants and spread out on a land that is always in d a n g e r o f
being laid waste by m e n or by wild and predatory beasts. T h e r e would
therefore not be adequate sustenance f o r such a great a b u n d a n c e of
m e n as now live in a country. Now j u s t as we say that since vegetables
(e.g., potatoes) and domestic animals are, as regards their abundance,
a product o f man, which he can use, wear out or destroy (kill), it seems
we can also say that since most o f his subjects are his own product, the
supreme authority in a state, the sovereign, has the right to lead t h e m
into war as he would take them on a hunt, and into battles as on a
pleasure trip.
A l t h o u g h such an a r g u m e n t f o r this right (which may well be
present obscurely in the monarch's mind) holds with r e g a r d to ani-
mals, which can be a man's property, it simply cannot be applied to m e n ,
especially as citizens o f a state. For they must always be r e g a r d e d as
colegislating m e m b e r s of a state (not merely as means, but also as ends
[346] in themselves), and must t h e r e f o r e give their f r e e assent, t h r o u g h
their representatives, not only to w a g i n g war in general but also to
each particular declaration of war. Only u n d e r this limiting condition
can a state direct them to serve in a way full o f d a n g e r to them.
We shall t h e r e f o r e have to derive this right f r o m the duty of the sov-
ereign to the people (not the reverse); and f o r this to be the case the
people will have to be r e g a r d e d as having given its vote to g o to war.
In this capacity it is, although passive (letting itself be disposed o f ) ,
also active and represents the sovereign itself.
56.
57- [347]
T h e greatest d i f f i c u l t y in the R i g h t o f Nations has to d o precisely with
R i g h t d u r i n g a w a r ; it is d i f f i c u l t e v e n to f o r m a c o n c e p t o f this o r to
think o f law in this lawless state w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i n g o n e s e l f (inter
arma silent leges).a R i g h t d u r i n g a w a r w o u l d , then, h a v e to b e the
w a g i n g o f w a r in a c c o r d a n c e with principles that always leave o p e n the
possibility o f l e a v i n g the state o f n a t u r e a m o n g states (in e x t e r n a l
relation to o n e a n o t h e r ) a n d e n t e r i n g a r i g h t f u l condition.
N o w a r o f i n d e p e n d e n t states against e a c h o t h e r can b e a punitive
war (bellum punitivum). F o r p u n i s h m e n t occurs only in t h e relation o f
a s u p e r i o r (imperantis) to those subject to h i m (subditum), a n d states d o
not stand in that relation to each o t h e r . N o r , again, can any w a r be
either a war of extermination (bellum internecinum) o r o f subjugation (bel-
lum subiugatorium), w h i c h w o u l d b e the m o r a l annihilation o f a state
(the p e o p l e o f w h i c h w o u l d either b e c o m e m e r g e d in o n e mass with
that o f the c o n q u e r o r o r r e d u c e d to servitude). T h e r e a s o n t h e r e
cannot b e a w a r o f s u b j u g a t i o n is not that this e x t r e m e m e a s u r e a state
m i g h t use to achieve a c o n d i t i o n o f p e a c e w o u l d in itself contradict the
right o f a state; it is r a t h e r that the I d e a o f the R i g h t o f N a t i o n s
involves only t h e c o n c e p t o f an a n t a g o n i s m in a c c o r d a n c e with princi-
ples o f o u t e r f r e e d o m by w h i c h e a c h can p r e s e r v e w h a t b e l o n g s to it,
but not a way o f acquiring, by w h i c h o n e state's increase o f p o w e r
c o u l d t h r e a t e n others.
""In time of war the laws are silent." Cicero, Pro Milone, 4, 10.
loo Metaphysics of Morals
58.
T h e right o f a state after a war, that is, at the time o f the peace treaty
and with a view to its consequences, consists in this: T h e victor lays
d o w n the conditions on which it will come to an a g r e e m e n t with the
vanquished and hold negotiations f o r concluding peace. T h e victor
does not d o this f r o m any right he pretends to have because o f the
w r o n g his o p p o n e n t is supposed to have d o n e him; instead, he lets this
question d r o p and relies on his own force. T h e victor can therefore
not propose compensation f o r the costs o f the war, since he would
then have to admit that his o p p o n e n t had f o u g h t an unjust war. While
he may well think of this a r g u m e n t he still cannot use it, since he
would then be saying that he had been waging a punitive war and so,
f o r his own part, committing an o f f e n s e against the vanquished.
Rights a f t e r a war also include a right to an e x c h a n g e o f prisoners
(without ransom), without regard f o r their being equal in n u m b e r .
A d e f e a t e d state or its subjects d o not lose their civil f r e e d o m
t h r o u g h the conquest of their country, so that the state would be
d e g r a d e d to a colony and its subjects to b o n d a g e ; f o r if they did the
war would have been a punitive war, which is self-contradictory. A
colony or province is a people that indeed has its o w n constitution,
its own legislation, and its own land, on which those w h o b e l o n g to
another state are only foreigners even t h o u g h this other state has
The Doctrine of Right g 155
59-
T h e right to peace is 1) the right to be at peace w h e n there is a war in
the vicinity, or the right to neutrality; 2) the right to be assured o f the
continuance o f a peace that has been concluded, that is, the right to a
guarantee; 3) the right to an alliance (confederation) o f several states
for their c o m m o n defense against any external or internal attacks, but
not a league f o r attacking others and a d d i n g to their own territory.
60.
SECTION III
Cosmopolitan Right
72
6a.
T h i s rational I d e a o f a peaceful, e v e n if not f r i e n d l y , t h o r o u g h g o i n g
c o m m u n i t y o f all nations o n the e a r t h that can c o m e into relations
a f f e c t i n g o n e a n o t h e r is not a p h i l a n t h r o p i c (ethical) p r i n c i p l e b u t a
principle having to do with rights. N a t u r e has enclosed t h e m all t o g e t h e r
within d e t e r m i n a t e limits (by the spherical s h a p e o f t h e place they live
in, a globus terraqueus). A n d since possession o f the land, o n w h i c h an
inhabitant o f t h e e a r t h can live, can b e t h o u g h t only as possession o f
a p a r t o f a d e t e r m i n a t e w h o l e , a n d so as possession o f that to w h i c h
each o f t h e m originally has a right, it follows that all nations stand
originally in a c o m m u n i t y o f land, t h o u g h not o f rightful c o m m u n i t y o f
possession (communio) a n d so o f use o f it, or o f p r o p e r t y in it; instead
they stand in a c o m m u n i t y o f possible physical interaction (commer-
cium), that is, in a t h o r o u g h g o i n g relation o f each to all the o t h e r s o f
offering to engage in commerce with any o t h e r , 7 3 a n d e a c h has a r i g h t to
m a k e this a t t e m p t without the o t h e r b e i n g a u t h o r i z e d to b e h a v e
t o w a r d it as a n e n e m y b e c a u s e it has m a d e this attempt. T h i s right,
since it has to d o with the possible u n i o n o f all nations with a view to
certain universal laws f o r their possible c o m m e r c e , c a n b e called cosmo-
politan Right (ius cosmopoliticum).
A l t h o u g h the seas m i g h t s e e m to r e m o v e nations f r o m any c o m m u -
nity with o n e a n o t h e r , they are t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s o f n a t u r e most
f a v o r i n g their c o m m e r c e by m e a n s o f navigation; a n d t h e m o r e coast-
lines these nations h a v e in the vicinity o f o n e a n o t h e r (as in the M e d -
[353] iterranean), t h e m o r e lively their c o m m e r c e can be. H o w e v e r , visiting
these coasts, a n d still m o r e settling there to c o n n e c t t h e m with the
m o t h e r c o u n t r y , p r o v i d e the occasion f o r evils a n d acts o f violence in
o n e place o n o u r globe to b e felt all o v e r it. Yet this possible abuse
c a n n o t a n n u l t h e r i g h t o f citizens o f the w o r l d to try to establish com-
m u n i t y with all a n d , to this e n d , to visit all r e g i o n s o f t h e earth. T h i s is
158
The Doctrine of Right g 159
Conclusion
160
The Doctrine of Right g 161
APPENDIX
Explanatory Remarks on
The Metaphysical First Principles
of the Doctrine of Right
163
164 The Metaphysics of Morals
2.
Justification of the Concept of a Right to a Person Akin
to a Right to a Thing
3-
Examples
*I do not say here "to have a person as mine" (using the adjective), but "to have a
person as what is mine, TO'meum," (using the substantive). For I can say "this is my
father," and that signifies only my physical relation (of connection) to him in a
general way, e.g., I have a father; but I cannot say "I have him as what is mine."
However, if I say "my wife" this signifies a special, namely a rightful, relation of the
possessor to an object as a thing (even though the object is also a person). Possession
(physical possession), however, is the condition of being able to manage (manipulatio)
something as a thing, even if this must, in another respect, be treated at the same
time as a person.
180 The Metaphysics of Morals
4-
On Confusing a Right to a Thing
With a Right Against a Person
I have also b e e n censured f o r heterodoxy in natural private Right f o r
the proposition that sale breaks a lease. (The Doctrine of Right, 31, p. 129
[Ak. p. 290]).
It does seem at first glance to conflict with all rights arising f r o m a
contract that someone could give notice to someone leasing his house
b e f o r e the period o f residence a g r e e d u p o n is u p and, so it seems,
break his promise to the lessee, provided he grants him the time f o r
vacating it that is customary by the civil laws where they live. B u t if it
can be p r o v e d that the lessee knew or must have known, w h e n he
contracted to lease it, that the promise made to him by the lessor, the
owner, naturally (without its n e e d i n g to be stated expressly in the con-
tract) and t h e r e f o r e tacitly included the condition, as long as the owner
does not sell the house during this time (or does not have to turn it over to
his creditors if he should become bankrupt), then the lessor has not
broken his promise, which was already a conditional o n e in terms of
reason, and the lessee's right was not encroached u p o n if he was given
notice b e f o r e the lease expired.
For the right a lessee has by a contract to lease is a right against a [362]
person, to something a certain person has to p e r f o r m f o r another (ius
182 The Metaphysics of Morals
5-
Further Discussion of the Concept of the Right to Punish
*In every punishment there is something that (rightly) offends the accused's feeling
of honor, since it involves coercion that is unilateral only, so that his dignity as a
The Doctrine of Right g 169
6.
O n a Right from Prolonged Possession
"One who commits a sin is punished through it and in the same way."
170 The Metaphysics of Morals
7-
On Inheritance
8.
[367] On the Right of a State with Regard to Perpetual
Foundations for Its Subjects
A.
[368]
T h e clergy that does not propagate itself carnally (the Catholic clergy)
possesses, with the favor o f the state, estates and the subjects attached
to them. T h e s e b e l o n g to a spiritual state (called a church), to which
the laity, f o r the salvation of their souls, have given themselves by their
bequests as its property. 7 A n d so the clergy, as a special Estate, has
possessions that can be bequeathed by law f r o m one generation to the
next and that are adequately d o c u m e n t e d by papal bulls. B u t may one
assume that this relation to the laity can be directly taken f r o m the
clergy by the absolute p o w e r of the secular state? Would this not
a m o u n t to d e p r i v i n g someone by force o f what is his, as the unbeliev-
ers o f the French republic are attempting to do?
T h e question here is whether the church can b e l o n g to the state or
the state b e l o n g to the church; f o r two s u p r e m e authorities cannot
without contradiction be subordinate one to the other. It is evident
that only the first constitution (politico-hierarchica) could subsist by itself,
since every civil constitution is o f this world because it is an earthly
authority (of men) that, along with its results, can be c o n f i r m e d in ex-
perience. Even if we concede to believers, whose kingdom is in heaven
and the other world, a constitution relating to that world (hierarchico-
politica), they must submit to the sufferings of this era u n d e r the
higher authority o f m e n o f this world. H e n c e only the first constitu-
tion is to be f o u n d .
Religion (in appearance), as belief in the d o g m a s of a c h u r c h and in
the p o w e r o f priests, w h o are the aristocrats of such a constitution
t h o u g h it can also be monarchical (papal), can neither be imposed
u p o n a people nor taken away f r o m them by any civil authority; nor
can a citizen be e x c l u d e d f r o m the service o f the state and the advan-
tages this brings him because his religion is d i f f e r e n t f r o m that o f the
court (as Great Britain has d o n e with the Irish nation).
In o r d e r to partake o f the grace a c h u r c h promises to show believers
even after their death, certain devout and believing souls establish
foundations in perpetuity, by which certain estates o f theirs are to
become the property o f a c h u r c h after their death; and the state may
pledge itself to fealty to a c h u r c h r e g a r d i n g this or that foundation, [39l
or indeed all o f them, 7 9 so that these people may have the pray-
ers, indulgences, and penances by which the servants o f the c h u r c h
174 The Metaphysics of Morals
appointed f o r this (clergy) promise that they will fare well in the other
world. B u t such a foundation, supposedly instituted in perpetuity, is
not at all established in perpetuity; the state can cast o f f this b u r d e n a
c h u r c h has laid u p o n it w h e n it wants to. For a c h u r c h itself is an
institution built merely u p o n belief, so that w h e n the illusion arising
f r o m this opinion disappears t h r o u g h popular enlightenment, the
f e a r f u l authority o f the clergy based o n it also falls away and the state,
with full right, takes control of the property the c h u r c h has arrogated
to itself, namely the land bestowed o n it t h r o u g h bequests. However,
the f e u d a l tenants o f the institution that hitherto existed have the
right to d e m a n d compensation as l o n g as they live.
Even perpetual foundations for the poor, and educational institu-
tions, cannot be f o u n d e d in perpetuity and be a perpetual e n c u m -
brance on the land because they have a certain character specified by
the f o u n d e r in accordance with his ideas; instead the state must be
f r e e to adapt t h e m to the needs o f the time. No one n e e d be surprised
that it becomes m o r e and m o r e difficult f o r this idea to be carried out
in all its details (e.g., that poor students must supplement by singing
f o r alms an inadequate educational f u n d beneficently established); f o r
if the one w h o sets u p the f o u n d a t i o n is somewhat ambitious as well as
good-natured, he does not want someone else to alter it in accordance
with his concepts; he wants to be immortalized in it. T h a t , however,
does not change the nature of the matter itself and the right, indeed
the duty, o f a state to alter any f o u n d a t i o n if it is o p p o s e d to the
preservation of the state and its progress to the better. Such a f o u n d a -
tion, therefore, can never be r e g a r d e d as established in perpetuity.
C.
D.
Conclusion
Finally, the reviewer has made the following remark about the ideas I
presented u n d e r the h e a d i n g o f Public Right, with regard to which, as
he says, space does not permit him to express himself:
"So far as we know, no philosopher has yet admitted that most [371]
paradoxical o f all paradoxical propositions: the proposition that
the m e r e Idea o f sovereignty should constrain me to obey as my
lord w h o e v e r has set himself u p as my lord, without my asking
w h o has given him the right to c o m m a n d me. Is there to be no
d i f f e r e n c e between saying that one o u g h t to recognize sover-
eignty and supreme authority and saying that one o u g h t to hold
a priori as his lord this or that person, whose existence is not even
given a priori?"
Now, granting the paradox here, I at least h o p e that, once the matter
is considered m o r e closely, I cannot be convicted of heterodoxy. I hope,
rather, that my astute and careful reviewer, w h o criticizes with moder-
ation (and who, despite the o f f e n s e he takes, "regards these metaphys-
176 The Metaphysics of Morals
Preface
181
182 The Metaphysics of Morals
Introduction
to the Doctrine of Virtue
I.
Discussion of the Concept of a Doctrine of Virtue
185
200 The Metaphysics of Morals
[380] free (moral) being, w h e n the concept o f duty concerns the internal
determination o f his will (the incentive) the constraint that the concept
o f duty contains can be only self-constraint (though the representation
o f the law alone); f o r only so can that necessitation (even if it is external)
be united with the f r e e d o m o f his capacity f o r choice. H e n c e in this
case the concept of duty will be an ethical one.
Impulses o f nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within man's mind
to his fulfillment o f duty and (sometimes powerful) forces o p p o s i n g it,
which he must j u d g e that he is capable of resisting and c o n q u e r i n g by
reason not at some time in the f u t u r e but at once (the m o m e n t he
thinks o f duty): H e must j u d g e that he can d o what the law tells him
unconditionally that he ought to do.
Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but
unjust o p p o n e n t is fortitude (fortitudo) and, with respect to what op-
poses the moral disposition within us, virtue {virtus, fortitudo moralis).
So the part o f the general doctrine o f duties that brings inner, rather
than outer, f r e e d o m u n d e r laws is a doctrine of virtue.
T h e doctrine o f Right dealt only with the formal condition o f outer
f r e e d o m (the consistency of outer f r e e d o m with itself if its maxim
were made universal law), that is, with Right. But ethics goes beyond
this and provides a matter (an object o f f r e e choice), an end o f pure
reason that it presents as an end which is also objectively^ necessary,
that is, an e n d which, as far as m e n are concerned, it is a duty to have.
For since men's sensible inclinations tempt them to ends (the matter of
[381] choice) that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason can in turn
check their influence only by a moral end set u p against the ends of
inclination, an e n d that must t h e r e f o r e be given a priori, indepen-
dently o f inclinations.
A n end is an object o f the choice (of a rational being), t h r o u g h the
representation o f which choice is determined to an action to b r i n g this
object about. Now I can indeed be constrained by others to p e r f o r m
actions that are directed as means to an end, but I can never be con-
strained by others to have an end; only I myself can make something my
end. But if I a m u n d e r obligation to make my end something that lies
in concepts o f practical reason, and so to have, besides the formal
determining g r o u n d of choice (such as Right contains), a material one
as well, an end that could be set against the end arising f r o m sensible
impulses, this would be the concept o f an end that is in itself a duty. But
the doctrine o f this end would not belong to the doctrine o f Right but
rather to ethics, since self-constraint in accordance with (moral) laws
belongs to the concept o f ethics alone.
For this reason ethics can also be d e f i n e d as the system o f the ends
o f p u r e practical reason. Ends and [coercive] duties distinguish the
two divisions o f the doctrine o f morals in general. T h a t ethics contains
duties that one cannot be constrained by others (through natural
means [physisch])63 to fulfill follows merely f r o m its being a doctrine o f
ends, since coercion to ends (to have them) is self-contradictory.
T h a t ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum virtutis) follows,
however, f r o m the above exposition o f virtue w h e n it is connected
with the kind o f obligation whose distinctive feature was just pointed
out. T h a t is to say, determination to an end is the only determination
of choice the very concept o f which excludes the possibility o f con-
straint through natural means by the choice o f another. A n o t h e r can
indeed coerce m e to do something that is not my end (but only a means
to another's end), but not to make this my end; and yet I can have no e n d
without m a k i n g it an e n d f o r myself. T o have an end that I have not
myself m a d e an e n d is self-contradictory, an act o f f r e e d o m that is yet
not free. B u t it is no contradiction to set an e n d f o r myself that is also
a duty, since I constrain myself to it and this is altogether consistent
with f r e e d o m . * B u t how is such an e n d possible? T h a t is the question [382]
now. For that the concept o f a thing is possible (not self-contradictory)
is not yet sufficient f o r assuming the possibility o f the thing itself (the
objective reality o f the concept).
II.
Discussion of the Concept of an End That Is Also a Duty
* T h e less a m a n c a n b e c o n s t r a i n e d by n a t u r a l m e a n s a n d t h e m o r e h e c a n be c o n -
strained m o r a l l y ( t h r o u g h t h e m e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f duty), so m u c h t h e m o r e f r e e
h e is. S u p p o s e , f o r e x a m p l e , a m a n so firm o f p u r p o s e a n d s t r o n g o f soul that h e
c a n n o t b e d i s s u a d e d f r o m a p l e a s u r e h e i n t e n d s to h a v e , no m a t t e r h o w o t h e r s m a y
r e a s o n with h i m a b o u t t h e h a r m h e will d o h i m s e l f by it. I f s u c h a m a n gives u p his
p l a n i m m e d i a t e l y , t h o u g h reluctantly, at the t h o u g h t that by c a r r y i n g it o u t h e
w o u l d o m i t o n e o f his duties as an o f f i c i a l o r n e g l e c t a sick f a t h e r , h e p r o v e s his
f r e e d o m in t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e by b e i n g u n a b l e to resist t h e call o f d u t y .
188 The Metaphysics of Morals
tinually a p p r o x i m a t e ) , w h i c h is c o m m o n l y p e r s o n i f i e d poetically by
the sage.
B u t v i r t u e is not to b e d e f i n e d [zu erklren] a n d v a l u e d m e r e l y as
an aptitude a n d (as the prize-essay o f C o c h i u s , the c o u r t - c h a p l a i n , 8 4
puts it) a l o n g - s t a n d i n g habit o f morally g o o d actions a c q u i r e d by
practice. F o r unless this a p t i t u d e results f r o m c o n s i d e r e d , firm, a n d
continually p u r i f i e d principles, t h e n , like any o t h e r m e c h a n i s m o f [384]
technically practical reason, it is n e i t h e r a r m e d f o r all situations n o r
a d e q u a t e l y s e c u r e d against the c h a n g e s that n e w t e m p t a t i o n s c o u l d
bring about.
Remark
III.
O n the Basis for Thinking of an End That Is Also a Duty
out himself m a k i n g the object o f his choice into an end, to have any e n d
o f action whatsoever is an act of freedom on the part o f the acting
subject, not an e f f e c t of nature. But because this act that determines an
e n d is a practical principle that prescribes the end itself (and so pre-
scribes unconditionally), not the means (hence not conditionally), it
is a categorical imperative o f p u r e practical reason, and t h e r e f o r e an
imperative which connects a concept of duty with that o f an e n d in
general.
Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corre-
sponding to it. For since there are f r e e actions there must also be ends
to which, as their objects, these actions are directed. B u t a m o n g these
ends there must be some that are also (i.e., by their concept) duties.
For were there n o such ends, then all ends would hold f o r practical
reason only as means to other ends; and since there can be n o action
without an end, a categorical imperative would be impossible. T h i s
would d o away with any doctrine o f morals.
So it is not a question here o f ends m a n does adopt in k e e p i n g with the
sensible impulses o f his nature, but o f objects o f f r e e choice u n d e r its
laws, which m a n ought to make his ends. T h e study o f the f o r m e r type
of ends can be called the technical (subjective) doctrine o f ends; it is
really the pragmatic doctrine of ends, containing the rules o f pru-
dence in the choice o f one's ends. T h e study o f the latter type o f ends,
however, must be called the moral (objective) doctrine o f ends. B u t
this distinction is s u p e r f l u o u s here, since the doctrine of morals is
already clearly distinguished in its concept f r o m the doctrine o f nature
(in this case, anthropology) by the fact that anthropology is based on
empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine o f ends, which treats
of duties, is based on principles given a priori in p u r e practical reason.
IV.
What Are the Ends That Are Also Duties?
V.
Clarification of These Two Concepts
A.
One's Own Perfection
B.
The Happiness of Others
VI.
Ethics Does Not Give Laws for Actions (Ius Does That),
but Only for Maxims of Actions
[390] VII.
Ethical Duties Are of Wide Obligation, Whereas
Duties of Right Are of Narrow Obligation
VIII.
Exposition of Duties of Virtue as Wide Duties
1.
One's Own Perfection as an End That Is Also a Duty
2.
The Happiness of Others as an End That Is Also a Duty
IX.
What Is a Duty of Virtue?
x- [39 6 ]
The Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Right Was Analytic;
That of the Doctrine of Virtue Is Synthetic
[398] XI.
1. 2.
3- 4-
T h e law, which is also T h e end, which is also
the incentive the incentive
[399] XII.
Concepts of What Is Presupposed on the Part of Feeling
[Aesthetische Vorbegriffe] by the Mind's Receptivity
to Concepts of Duty as Such
a.
Moral Feeling
Conscience
c.
Love of Man
d.
Respect
XIII.
General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
in Handling a Pure Doctrine of Virtue
*The formulas commonly used in the language of classical ethics: [1] medio tutissimus
ibis; [2] omne nimium vertitur in vitium; [3] est modus in rebus, e t c . ; [4] medium tenuere
beati; [5] insani sapiens nomen habeat, etc., contain a superficial wisdom that really has
no determinate principles. For who will specify for me this mean between the two
extremes? What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that
avarice carries thrift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle
(maxim), that of putting the end of economizing not in enjoyment of one's means but
merely in possession of them, while denying oneself any enjoyment from them. In
the same way, the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in an excessive enjoyment of
one's means but in the bad maxim which makes the use of one's means the sole end,
without regard for preserving them.
[1] "you will travel most safely in the middle of the road" (Ovid, Metamorphoses
II, 137); [2] "too much of anything becomes vice"; [3] "there is a certain measure
in our affairs and finally fixed limits, beyond which or short of which there is no
place for right" (Horace, Satires I, 1, 105-6) [quotation supplemented in view of
Kant's note to Ak. 433]; [4] "happy are those who keep to the mean"; [5] "it is a
foolish wisdom, equivalent to wickedness, that seeks to be virtuous beyond the
proper measure" (Horace, Epistles I, 6, 15) [quotation supplemented in view of Ak.
409 and 433n].
" "Prodigality is excess in consuming one's means."
4
"Avarice is deficiency," etc.
220 The Metaphysics of Morals
On Virtue in General
"The first edition has Meinungen, "views," which seems to be a simple mistake for
Lastern, "vices."
The Doctrine of Right g 207
men, not to the law) can be said here and there to be meritorious and
to deserve to be rewarded, yet in itself, since it is its own end it must
also be regarded as its own reward.
Considered in its complete perfection, virtue is therefore rep-
resented not as if man possesses virtue but rather as if virtue possesses
man; f o r in the f o r m e r case it would look as if man still had a choice
(for which he would need yet another virtue in order to choose vir-
tue in preference to any other goods o f f e r e d him). T o think of several
virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing other than to think of
the various moral objects to which the will is led by the one principle
o f virtue, and so too with regard to the contrary vices. T h e expres-
sion that personifies both is an aesthetic device that still points to
a moral sense. So an aesthetic of morals, while not indeed part o f
the metaphysics of morals, is still a subjective presentation of it in
which the feelings that accompany the constraining power of the
moral law (e.g., disgust, horror, etc., which make moral aversion sen-
sible) make its efficacy felt, in order to get the better of merely sensible
incitements.
XIV.
On the Principle that Distinguishes the Doctrine of Virtue
from the Doctrine of Right
Remark
On the Doctrine of Virtue in Accordance with
the Principle of Inner Freedom
A n aptitude (habitus) is a facility in acting and a subjective perfec-
tion of choice. But not every such facility is a free aptitude (habitus
libertatis); for if it is a habit (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity in
action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition, it
is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore not a moral
222 The Metaphysics of Morals
XV.
Virtue Requires, in the First Place,
Governing Oneself
XVI.
Virtue Necessarily Presupposes Apathy
(Regarded as Strength)
T h e word "apathy" has fallen into disrepute, as if it meant lack of
feeling and so subjective indifference with respect to objects of choice;
it is taken for weakness. This misunderstanding can be prevented
by giving the name "moral apathy" to that absence of affects which
is to be distinguished from indifference, because in cases of moral
apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence
on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful
than all such feelings together. Only the apparent strength of some-
one feverish lets a lively sympathy even for what is good rise into an [409]
affect, or rather degenerate into it. A n affect of this kind is called
enthusiasm, and the moderation that is usually recommended even for
the practice of virtue is to be interpreted as referring to it (insani
sapiens nomen habeat aequus iniqui ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat
ipsam. Horat.)\ for otherwise it is absurd to suppose that one could
be too wise, too virtuous. A n affect always belongs to sensibility, no
matter by what kind of object it is aroused. T h e true strength of virtue
is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law
of virtue into practice. T h a t is the state of health in the moral life,
whereas an affect, even one aroused by the thought of what is good, is
a momentary, sparkling phenomenon that leaves one exhausted. But
that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be
morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as
with man-traps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish,
drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree with me. Fantastic
virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie ] which, were it admit-
ted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue
into tyranny.
Remark
Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning.
It is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an
ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is
a duty. T h a t it always starts f r o m the beginning has a subjective
basis in human nature, which is affected by inclinations because
of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with
its maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is
unavoidably sinking. For moral maxims, unlike technical ones,
224 The Metaphysics of Morals
[410] XVII.
Concepts Preliminary to the Division
of the Doctrine of Virtue
" T h e text reads (der Gesetzmssigkeit von der Zweckmssigkeit); it would seem how-
ever that "conformity with ends" is "the matter" and "conformity with law" the
"form."
The Doctrine of Right g 211
Remark [411]
XVIII.
Introduction
214
The Doctrine of Right g 215
CHAPTER I
5-
T h e first, t h o u g h not the principal, d u t y o f m a n to h i m s e l f as a n ani-
m a l b e i n g is to preserve himself in his animal n a t u r e .
T h e c o n t r a r y o f this is willful physical death o r killing o n e s e l f
(autochiria), w h i c h can b e t h o u g h t as either total, suicide (suicidium), or
m e r e l y partial, mutilating oneself. Mutilating o n e s e l f can in t u r n be
either material, depriving o n e s e l f o f certain integral, o r g a n i c parts, that
is, m a i m i n g o n e s e l f , or formal, depriving o n e s e l f ( p e r m a n e n t l y o r tem-
porarily) o f one's capacity f o r the natural (and so indirectly f o r the
moral) use o f one's p o w e r s .
Since this c h a p t e r deals only with negative duties a n d so with duties
o f omission, t h e articles a b o u t duties m u s t b e d i r e c t e d against t h e vices
o p p o s e d to duties to oneself.
[422] Article I.
O n Killing Oneself
6.
218
The Doctrine of Right g 219
Casuistical Questions
Article II.
On Defiling Oneself by Lust
7-
Just as love o f life is destined by nature to preserve the person, so
sexual love is destined by it to preserve the species; in other words,
each o f these is a natural end, by which is understood that connection
of a cause with an e f f e c t in which, although no u n d e r s t a n d i n g is
ascribed to the cause, it is still t h o u g h t by analogy with an intelligent
cause, and so as if it p r o d u c e d m e n on purpose. W h a t is now in
question is w h e t h e r a person's use of his sexual capacity is subject to a
limiting law of duty with regard to the person himself or w h e t h e r he
is authorized to direct the use o f his sexual attributes to m e r e animal
pleasure, without having in view the preservation o f the species, and
would not thereby be acting contrary to a duty to himself. In the
doctrine o f Right it was shown that m a n cannot make use of another
person to get this pleasure apart f r o m a special limitation by a contract
establishing the right, by which two persons put each other u n d e r
obligation. B u t the question here is w h e t h e r man is subject to a duty to
himself with r e g a r d to this enjoyment, violation of which is a defiling
(not merely a debasing) of the humanity in his own person. T h e
impetus to this pleasure is called carnal lust (or also simply lust). T h e
vice e n g e n d e r e d t h r o u g h it is called lewdness; the virtue with r e g a r d
to this sensuous impulse is called chastity, which is to be represented
[425] here as a duty o f m a n to himself. Lust is called unnatural if a m a n is
aroused to it not by a real object but by his imagining it, so that he
The Doctrine of Right g 221
" Species facti is the totality of those features of a deed that belong essentially to its
imputability. See A. G. B a u m g a r t e n , Initiaphilosophiae practicaeprimae, Ak. X I X , 62.
222 The Metaphysics of Morals
""His virtue was enkindled by unmixed wine." Kant is quoting, from memory,
Horace, Odes III, 21,11.
b
In the second edition, the sentence "The use of opium . . . only as medicines"
follows the sentence "But who can determine . . . for measuring?"
224 Metaphysics of Morals
I. [429]
O n Lying
9-
T h e greatest violation o f man's d u t y to h i m s e l f r e g a r d e d m e r e l y as a
m o r a l b e i n g (the h u m a n i t y in his o w n person) is the c o n t r a r y o f truth-
fulness, lying (aliud lingua promptum, aliud pectore inclusum gerere)." I n
the d o c t r i n e o f R i g h t an intentional u n t r u t h is called a lie only if it
violates a n o t h e r ' s right; but in ethics, w h e r e n o a u t h o r i z a t i o n is
d e r i v e d f r o m harmlessness, it is clear o f itself that n o intentional
u n t r u t h in t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f one's t h o u g h t s can r e f u s e this h a r s h
n a m e . F o r the d i s h o n o r (being an object o f m o r a l c o n t e m p t ) that
a c c o m p a n i e s a lie also a c c o m p a n i e s a liar like his s h a d o w . A lie can b e
an e x t e r n a l lie (mendacium externum) o r also a n internal lie. B y a n
e x t e r n a l lie a m a n m a k e s h i m s e l f an object o f c o n t e m p t in t h e eyes o f
others; by a n internal lie h e d o e s w h a t is still w o r s e : H e m a k e s h i m s e l f
c o n t e m p t i b l e in his o w n eyes a n d violates t h e dignity o f h u m a n i t y in
his o w n p e r s o n . A n d so, since the h a r m that c a n c o m e to o t h e r m e n
f r o m l y i n g is n o t w h a t distinguishes this vice (for if it w e r e , the vice
w o u l d consist o n l y in violating one's d u t y to others), this h a r m is not
t a k e n into a c c o u n t h e r e . N e i t h e r is the h a r m that a liar b r i n g s o n
himself; f o r t h e n a lie, as a m e r e e r r o r in p r u d e n c e , w o u l d conflict
with the p r a g m a t i c m a x i m , not the m o r a l m a x i m , a n d it c o u l d not b e
c o n s i d e r e d a violation o f d u t y at all. B y a lie a m a n t h r o w s away a n d ,
as it w e r e , annihilates his dignity as a m a n . A m a n w h o d o e s not
h i m s e l f believe w h a t h e tells a n o t h e r (even if the o t h e r is a m e r e l y ideal
""To have one thing shut up in the heart and another ready on the tongue." Sallust,
The War with Catiline X , 5.
225
226 The Metaphysics of Morals
Remark
Casuistical Questions
II. [432]
On Avarice
10.
*The proposition, one ought not to do too much or too little of anything, says in
effect nothing, since it is a tautology. What does it mean "to do too much"? Answer:
to do more than is good. What does it mean "to do too little"? Answer: to do less
than is good. What does it mean to say "I ought (to do or to refrain from some-
" In place of the passage "nor, again, do I mean . . . that I am referring to here" the
second edition has "I mean, rather, miserly avarice, which is called stinginess or
niggardliness when it is shameful; and I am concerned with this kind of avarice, not
as consisting in mere neglect of one's duties of love to others, but as a restricting of
one's own use of the means for living well so narrowly as to leave one's true needs
unsatisfied, and so as contrary to one's duty to oneself." In fact, only two kinds of
avarice, prodigality and miserliness, are in question.
' The second edition omits "and maintain."
The Doctrine of Virtue 243
Casuistical Questions
thing)"? Answer: that it is not good (that it is contrary to duty) to do more or less
than is good. If that is the wisdom in search of which we should go back to the
ancients (Aristotle), as to those who were nearer the fountainhead virtus consistit
in medio, medium tenuere beati, est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, quos citraque
nequit consistere rectum then we have made a bad choice in turning to its oracle.
Between truthfulness and lying (which are contradictorie oppositis) there is no mean;
but there is indeed a mean between candor and reticence (which are contrarie
oppositis), since one who declares his thoughts can say only what is true without
telling the whole truth. Now it is quite natural to ask the teacher of virtue to point out
this mean to me. But this he cannot do; for both duties of virtue have a latitude in
their application (latitudinem), and judgment can decide what is to be done only in
accordance with rules of prudence (pragmatic rules), not in accordance with rules
of morality (moral rules). In other words, what is to be done cannot be decided after
the manner of narrow duty (officium strictum), but after the manner of wide duty
(officium latum). Hence, one who complies with the basic principles of virtue can, it
is true, commit a fault (peccatum) in putting these principles into practice, by doing
more or less than prudence prescribes. But insofar as he adheres strictly to these
basic principles he cannot practice a vice (vitium), and Horace's verse, insani sapiens
nomen habeat aequus iniqui, ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam, is u t t e r l y f a l s e , if
taken literally. In fact, sapiens here means only a. judicious man (prudens), who does
not think fantastically of virtue in its perfection. This is an ideal which requires one
to approximate to this end but not to attain it completely, since the latter require-
ment surpasses man's powers and introduces a lack of sense (fantasy) into the
principle of virtue. For really to be too virtuous - that is, to be too attached to one's
duty - would be almost equivalent to making a circle too round or a straight line too
straight. [For a translation of these Latin quotations see the page of this translation
corresponding to Ak. 404n.]
230 The Metaphysics of Morals
III.
On Servility
11.
12.
Casuistical Questions
Is not man's f e e l i n g f o r his sublime vocation, that is, his elation of spirit
(elatio animi) o r e s t e e m f o r himself, so closely akin to self-conceit (arro-
gantia), the v e r y o p p o s i t e o f true humility (humilitas moralis), that it
w o u l d b e advisable to cultivate humility e v e n in c o m p a r i n g o u r s e l v e s
with o t h e r m e n , a n d not only with the law? O r w o u l d n o t this k i n d o f
self-abnegation instead s t r e n g t h e n others' verdict o n us to t h e p o i n t
o f despising o u r p e r s o n , so that it w o u l d b e c o n t r a r y to o u r d u t y (of
respect) to ourselves? B o w i n g a n d s c r a p i n g b e f o r e a m a n seems in any
case to be u n w o r t h y o f a m a n .
P r e f e r e n t i a l tributes o f respect in w o r d s a n d m a n n e r s e v e n to those
w h o h a v e n o civil authority r e v e r e n c e s , obeisances (compliments),
a n d courtly p h r a s e s m a r k i n g with the u t m o s t precision e v e r y distinc-
tion in r a n k , s o m e t h i n g a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m courtesy (which is
necessary e v e n f o r those w h o respect e a c h o t h e r equally) t h e Du, Er,
Ihr, a n d Sie, o r Ew. Wohledeln, Hochedeln, Hochedelgeborenen, Wohlgebore-
nen (ohe, iam satis est!)" as f o r m s o f a d d r e s s , a p e d a n t r y in w h i c h the
G e r m a n s s e e m to o u t d o any o t h e r p e o p l e in the w o r l d ( e x c e p t possibly
t h e I n d i a n castes): D o e s not all this p r o v e that t h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d
p r o p e n s i t y to servility in m e n ? (Hae nugae in seria ducunt. )b B u t o n e
w h o m a k e s h i m s e l f a w o r m c a n n o t c o m p l a i n a f t e r w a r d s if p e o p l e step
o n him.
Section I
On Man's Duty to Himself as His Own
Innate Judge
13.
233
234 The Metaphysics of Morals
* A man who accuses and judges himself in conscience must think of a dual person-
ality in himself, a doubled self which, on the one hand, has to stand trembling at the
bar of a court that is yet entrusted to him, but which, on the other hand, itself
administers the office of judge that it holds by innate authority. This requires
clarification, if reason is not to fall into self-contradiction. I, the prosecutor and yet
the accused as well, am the same man (numero idem). But man as the subject of the
moral lawgiving which proceeds from the concept of freedom and in which he is
subject to a law that he gives himself (homo noumenon) is to be regarded as another
(specie diversus) from man as a sensible being endowed with reason, though only in
a practical respect for there is no theory about the causal relation of the intelli-
gible to the sensible - and this specific difference is that of the faculties (higher and
lower) of man that characterize him. The first is the prosecutor, against whom the
accused is granted a legal adviser (defence counsel). When the proceedings are
concluded the internal judge, as a person having power, pronounces the sentence of
happiness or misery, as the moral results of the deed. Our reason cannot pursue
further his power (as ruler of the world) in this function; we can only revere his
unconditional tubeo or veto ["I command" or "I forbid"].
The Doctrine of Right g 235
[441] Section II
On the First Command of All Duties
to Oneself
814-
15-
Episodic Section
On an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts
of Reflection, Taking What Is Man's Duty
to Himself for a Duty to Other Beings
16.
A s far as reason alone can j u d g e , man has dudes only to men (himself
and other men), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by
that subject's will. H e n c e the constraining (binding) subject must, first,
be a person; and this person must, second, be given as an object o f
experience, since man is to strive f o r the end o f this person's will and
this can h a p p e n only in a relation to each other o f two beings that exist
(for a mere thought-entity cannot be the cause o f any result in terms of
ends). B u t f r o m all o u r experience we know o f no being other than
man that would be capable o f obligation (active or passive). Man can
therefore have no duty to any beings other than men; and if he thinks
he has such duties, it is because o f an amphiboly in his concepts of
reflection, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to
himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with
regard to other beings for a duty to those beings.
T h i s supposed duty can be r e f e r r e d to objects other than persons or to
objects that are indeed persons, but quite imperceptible ones (who can-
not be presented to the outer senses). T h e first (nonhuman) objects can
be mere inorganic matter (minerals), or matter organized f o r repro-
duction though still without sensation (plants), or the part of nature
endowed with sensation and choice (animals). T h e second (superhu-
man) objects can be thought as spiritual beings (angels, God). It must
now be asked whether there is a relation o f duty between man and
beings o f these two kinds, and what relation there is between them.
17- [443]
A propensity to wanton destruction o f what is beautiful in inanimate
nature (spiritus destructionis) is opposed to man's duty to himself; f o r it
weakens or uproots that feeling in man which, though not of itself
moral, is still a disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality
or at least prepares the way for it: the disposition, namely, to love
something (e.g., beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty
of plants) even apart f r o m any intention to use it.
238 The Metaphysics of Morals
18.
SECTION I
19-
239
240 The Metaphysics of Morals
20.
81.
88.
241
242 The Metaphysics of Morals
tively) there is only one virtue (as moral strength o f one's maxims); but
in fact (subjectively) there is a multitude o f virtues, made u p o f several
d i f f e r e n t qualities, a n d it would probably be impossible not to find in
it some lack o f virtue, if one wanted to look f o r it (though, because o f
those virtues, such other qualities are not usually called vices). B u t a
sum o f virtues such that o u r self-knowledge can never adequately tell
us whether it is complete or deficient can be the basis only o f an
i m p e r f e c t duty to be perfect.
CHAPTER I
Section I
On The Duty of Love to Other Men
Division
23.
24.
243
244 The Metaphysics of Morals
25-
In this context, however, love is not to be understood as feeling (sthet-
isch), that is, as pleasure in the perfection of other m e n ; love is not to
be understood as delight in them (since others cannot put one u n d e r
obligation to have feelings). It must rather be t h o u g h t as the m a x i m o f
benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence.
T h e same holds true of the respect to be shown to others. It is not
to be understood as the m e r e feeling that comes f r o m c o m p a r i n g o u r
o w n worth with another's (such as a child feels merely f r o m habit to-
ward his parents, a pupil toward his teacher, o r any subordinate
toward his superior). It is rather to be understood as the maxim o f lim-
iting our self-esteem by the dignity o f humanity in another person,
and so as respect in the practical sense (observantia aliis praestanda).
Moreover, a duty o f f r e e respect toward others is, strictly speaking,
only a negative one (of not exalting oneself above others) and is thus
analogous to the duty o f Right not to encroach u p o n what belongs to
[450] anyone. H e n c e , although it is a m e r e duty of virtue, it is r e g a r d e d as
narrow in comparison with a duty o f love, and it is the latter that is
considered a wide duty.
T h e duty o f love f o r one's n e i g h b o r can, accordingly, also be ex-
pressed as the duty to make others' ends my own (provided only that
these are not immoral). T h e duty of respect f o r my n e i g h b o r is con-
tained in the m a x i m not to d e g r a d e any other m a n to a m e r e means to
my ends (not to d e m a n d that another throw himself away in o r d e r
to slave f o r my end).
By carrying out the duty of love to someone I put another u n d e r
obligation; I m a k e myself deserving f r o m him. But in observing a duty
o f respect I put only myself u n d e r obligation; I k e e p myself within
my own bounds so as not to detract anything f r o m the worth that the
other, as a man, is authorized to put u p o n himself.
27.
28.
Now the benevolence present in love for all men is indeed the greatest
in its extent, but the smallest in its degree; and when I say that I take an
A.
29-
Providing for oneself to the extent necessary just to find satisfaction in
living (taking care o f one's body, but not to the point of e f f e m i n a c y )
belongs a m o n g duties to oneself. T h e contrary of this is d e p r i v i n g
oneself (slavishly) o f what is essential to the c h e e r f u l e n j o y m e n t o f life,
by avarice, or depriving oneself (fanatically) of e n j o y m e n t o f the plea-
sures o f life by e x a g g e r a t e d discipline o f one's natural inclinations.
Both of these are o p p o s e d to man's duty to himself.
But beyond benevolence in o u r wishes f o r other men (which costs
us nothing) how can it be required as a duty that this should also
be practical, that is, that everyone w h o has the means to d o so should
be beneficent to those in need? Benevolence is satisfaction in the hap-
piness (well-being) o f others; but beneficence is the m a x i m o f mak-
The Doctrine of Right g 247
ing others' happiness one's end, and the duty to it consists in the
subject's being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a
universal law.
It is not obvious that any such law is to be f o u n d in reason. O n the
contrary, the maxim "Every man for himself, G o d (fortune) for us all"
seems to be the most natural one.
3- [453]
T o be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one's means [Ver-
mgen] the happiness o f others in need, without hoping f o r something
in return, is every man's duty.
For every man w h o finds himself in need wishes to be helped by
other men. B u t if he lets his maxim o f being unwilling to assist others
in turn when they are in need become public, that is, makes this a
universal permissive law, then everyone would likewise deny him
assistance w h e n he himself is in need, or at least would be authorized
to deny it. Hence the maxim o f self-interest would conflict with itself
if it were made a universal law, that is, it is contrary to duty. Conse-
quently the maxim of common interest, o f beneficence toward those
in need, is a universal duty of men, just because they are to be consid-
ered fellow men, that is, rational beings with needs, united by nature
in one dwelling place so that they can help one another.
31.
A rich man (one w h o has abundant means [Mitteln] for the happiness
of others, i.e., means in excess o f his own needs), should hardly even
regard beneficence as a meritorious duty on his part, even though he
also puts others u n d e r obligation by it. T h e satisfaction he derives
f r o m his beneficence, which costs him no sacrifice, is a way of reveling
in moral feelings. He must also carefully avoid any appearance of
intending to bind the other by it; for if he showed that he wanted to
put the other u n d e r an obligation (which always humbles the other in
his own eyes), it would not be a true benefit that he rendered him.
Instead, he must show that he is himself put u n d e r obligation by the
other's acceptance or honored by it, hence that the duty is merely
something that he owes, unless (as is better) he can practice his benef-
icence in complete secrecy. This virtue is greater w h e n the benefac-
tor's means are limited and he is strong e n o u g h quietly to take on
himself the hardship he spares the other; then he is really to be con-
sidered morally rich.
248 The Metaphysics of Morals
B.
On the Duty of Gratitude
32-
Gratitude is a duty. It is not a merely prudential m a x i m o f e n c o u r a g i n g
the other to show m e f u r t h e r beneficence by a c k n o w l e d g i n g my obli-
The Doctrine of Right g 249
gation to him f o r a favor he has done (gratiarum actio est ad plus dandum
invitatio), for I would then be using my acknowledgment merely as a
means to my f u r t h e r purposes. Gratitude is, rather, direct constraint
in accordance with a moral law, that is, a duty.
B u t gratitude must also be considered, in particular, a sacred duty,
that is, a duty the violation of which (as a scandalous example) can
destroy the moral incentive to beneficence in its very principle. For a
moral object is sacred if the obligation with regard to it cannot be
discharged completely by any act in keeping with it (so that one w h o
is u n d e r obligation always remains u n d e r obligation). A n y other duty
is an ordinary duty. B u t one cannot, by any repayment o f a kindness
received, rid oneself of the obligation for it, since the recipient can
never win away f r o m the benefactor his priority o f merit, namely hav-
ing been the first in benevolence. B u t even mere heartfelt benevo-
lence, apart f r o m any such act (of beneficence), is already a basis o f
obligation to gratitude. A grateful disposition o f this kind is called
appreciativeness.
33-
As far as the extent o f this gratitude is concerned, it reaches not only to
one's contemporaries but also to one's predecessors, even to those one
cannot identify with certainty. It is for this reason, too, that it is
thought i m p r o p e r not to d e f e n d the ancients, w h o can be r e g a r d e d as
our teachers, f r o m all attacks, accusations, and disdain, insofar as this
is possible. B u t it is a foolish mistake to attribute preeminence in
talents and good will to the ancients in preference to the moderns just
because o f their antiquity, as if the world were steadily declining in
accordance with laws o f nature f r o m its original perfection, and to [456]
despise everything new in comparison with antiquity.
But the intensity of gratitude, that is, the degree of obligation to this
virtue, is to be assessed by how useful the favor was to the one put
u n d e r obligation and how unselfishly it was bestowed on him. T h e
least degree is to render equal services to the benefactor, if he can
receive them (if he is still living) or, if he cannot, to render them to
others; it involves not regarding a kindness received as a b u r d e n one
would gladly be rid o f (since the one so favored stands a step lower
than his benefactor, and this wounds his pride), but taking even the
occasion for gratitude as a moral kindness, that is, as an opportunity
given one to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man, to combine
the cordiality of a benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence
(attentiveness to the smallest d e g r e e o f this disposition in one's
thought o f duty), and so to cultivate one's love of man.
250 The Metaphysics of Morals
C.
34-
Sympathetic joy a n d sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings o f
pleasure or pain (which are t h e r e f o r e to be called "aesthetic" [sthet-
isch]) at another's state o f j o y or sorrow (shared feeling, sympathetic
feeling.) N a t u r e has already implanted in m a n susceptibility to these
feelings. B u t to use this as a means to p r o m o t i n g active and rational
benevolence is still a particular, t h o u g h only a conditional, duty. It is
called the duty o f humanity (humanitas) because m a n is r e g a r d e d h e r e
not merely as a rational being but also as an animal e n d o w e d with
reason. Now humanity can be located either in the capacity and the will
to share in others' feelings (humanitas practica) or merely in the susceptibil-
ity, given by nature itself, to feel j o y and sadness in c o m m o n with
others (humanitas aesthetica). T h e first is free, and is t h e r e f o r e called
sympathetic (communio sentiendi liberalis)\ it is based on practical reason.
[457] T h e second is unfree (communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis)\ it can be
called communicable (since it is like the susceptibility to w a r m t h or
contagious diseases), and also compassion, 9 7 since it spreads naturally
a m o n g m e n living near one another. T h e r e is obligation only to the
first.
It was a sublime way of thinking that the Stoic ascribed to his wise
m a n when he had him say, "I wish f o r a friend, not that h e might help
me in poverty, sickness, imprisonment, etc., but rather that I might
stand by him and rescue a man." B u t the same wise man, w h e n he
could not rescue his friend, said to himself, " W h a t is it to me?" In
other words, he rejected compassion.
In fact, w h e n another suffers and, although I cannot help him, I let
myself be infected by his pain (through my imagination), then two of
us s u f f e r , t h o u g h the evil really (in nature) affects only one. B u t there
cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evil in the world and so to do
g o o d from compassion. T h i s would also be an insulting kind o f benefi-
cence, since it expresses the kind o f benevolence one has toward
someone unworthy, called pity; and this has no place in men's relations
with one another, since they are not to m a k e a display o f their worthi-
ness to be h a p p y .
35-
B u t while it is not in itself a duty to share the s u f f e r i n g s (as well the
joys) o f others, it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to
The Doctrine of Right g 251
Casuistical Questions
L45oJ
W o u l d it not b e better f o r the well-being o f the w o r l d g e n e r a l l y if
h u m a n morality w e r e limited to duties o f R i g h t , f u l f i l l e d with the
u t m o s t conscientiousness, a n d b e n e v o l e n c e w e r e c o n s i d e r e d m o r a l l y
i n d i f f e r e n t ? It is not so easy to see w h a t e f f e c t this w o u l d h a v e o n
m a n ' s h a p p i n e s s . B u t at least a g r e a t m o r a l a d o r n m e n t , love o f m a n ,
w o u l d t h e n b e missing f r o m the w o r l d . L o v e o f m a n is, a c c o r d i n g l y ,
r e q u i r e d by itself, in o r d e r to p r e s e n t the w o r l d as a b e a u t i f u l m o r a l
w h o l e in its f u l l p e r f e c t i o n , e v e n if n o a c c o u n t is t a k e n o f a d v a n t a g e s
(of happiness).
G r a t i t u d e is not, strictly s p e a k i n g , love t o w a r d a b e n e f a c t o r o n the
p a r t o f s o m e o n e h e has p u t u n d e r obligation, b u t r a t h e r respect f o r
h i m . F o r universal l o v e o f one's n e i g h b o r can a n d m u s t b e based o n
equality o f duties, w h e r e a s in g r a t i t u d e the o n e p u t u n d e r obligation
stands a step l o w e r t h a n his b e n e f a c t o r . Is it not this, n a m e l y p r i d e ,
that causes so m u c h ingratitude? s e e i n g s o m e o n e a b o v e o n e s e l f a n d
f e e l i n g r e s e n t m e n t at not b e i n g able to m a k e o n e s e l f fully his e q u a l (as
f a r as relations o f d u t y are c o n c e r n e d ) ?
36.
forth into action (to diminish their well-being) it is called envy proper;
otherwise it is merely jealousy (invidentia). Yet envy is only an indirectly
malevolent disposition, namely a reluctance to see o u r own well-being
overshadowed by another's because the standard we use to see how
[459] weH f f we are is not the intrinsic worth of o u r own well-being but how
it compares with that o f others. A c c o r d i n g l y one speaks, too, of envi-
able h a r m o n y and happiness in a marriage or family and so forth, just
as if e n v y i n g someone were permitted in many cases. Movements o f
envy are t h e r e f o r e present in h u m a n nature, and only w h e n they
break out do they constitute the abominable vice of a sullen passion
that tortures oneself and aims, at least in terms o f one's wishes, at
destroying others' g o o d fortune. T h i s vice is t h e r e f o r e contrary to a
man's duty to himself as well as to others.
Remark
[462] Section II
On Duties of Virtue toward Other Men
Arising from the Respect Due Them
37-
Moderation in one's d e m a n d s generally, that is, willing restriction of
one man's self-love in view of the self-love o f others, is called modesty.
Lack of such moderation (lack of modesty) as regards one's worthiness to
be loved by others is called egotism (philautia). B u t lack o f modesty in
one's claims to be respected by others is self-conceit (arrogantia). T h e
respect that I have f o r others or that another can require f r o m m e
(observantia aliis praestanda) is therefore recognition o f a dignity (digni-
tas) in other m e n , that is, of a worth that has no price, no equivalent
f o r which the object evaluated (aestimii) could be e x c h a n g e d . J u d g i n g
something to be worthless is contempt.
The Doctrine of Right g 255
38.
Every man has a legitimate claim to respect f r o m his fellow men and
is in turn b o u n d to respect every other.
Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a
means by any m a n (either by others or even by himself) but must
always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his
dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all
other beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used, and so
over all things. B u t just as he cannot give himself away f o r any price
(this would conflict with his duty o f self-esteem), so neither can he act
contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem o f others, as men, that is,
he is u n d e r obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity
o f humanity in every other man. Hence there rests on him a duty
regarding the respect that must be shown to every other man.
[463]
T o be contemptuous o f others (contemnere), that is, to deny them the
respect owed to men in general, is in every case contrary to duty; f o r
they are men. A t times one cannot, it is true, help inwardly looking
down o n some in comparison with others (despicatui habere); but the
outward manifestation of this is, nevertheless, an offense. W h a t is
dangerous is no object o f contempt, and so neither is a vicious man; and
if my superiority to his attacks justifies my saying that I despise him,
this means only that I am in no d a n g e r f r o m him, even t h o u g h I have
prepared no defense against him, because he shows himself in all his
depravity. Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man
as a man; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in
his quality as a man, even though by his deeds he makes himself
unworthy o f it. So there can be disgraceful punishments that dishonor
humanity itself (such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs,
cutting o f f his nose and ears). Not only are such punishments more
painful than loss o f possessions and life to one w h o loves honor (who
claims the respect o f others, as everyone must); they also make a
spectator blush with shame at belonging to a species that can be
treated that way.
Remark
O n this is based a duty to respect a man even in the logical use o f
his reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them
absurdities, poor j u d g m e n t and so forth, but rather to suppose
56 The Metaphysics of Morals
that his j u d g m e n t must yet contain some truth and to seek this
out, uncovering, at the same time, the deceptive illusion (the
subjective g r o u n d that determined his j u d g m e n t that, by an
oversight, h e took f o r objective), and so, by explaining to him the
possibility of his having erred, to preserve his respect f o r his own
understanding. For if, by using such expressions, one denies any
understanding to a man w h o opposes one in a certain j u d g m e n t ,
how does one want to bring him to understand that he has erred?
T h e same thing applies to the censure o f vice, which must never
break out into complete contempt and denial o f any m o r a l worth
[464] to a vicious man; for on this supposition he could never be im-
v proved, and this is not consistent with the Idea o f a man, w h o as
such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition
to the good.
4-
Respect f o r the law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral
feeling, is identical with consciousness o f one's duty. T h i s is w h y show-
ing respect f o r man as a moral being (holding his duty in highest
esteem) is also a duty that others have toward him and a right to which
he cannot r e n o u n c e his claim. T h i s claim is called love of honor, and its
manifestation in external conduct, respectability (honestas externa). A n
o f f e n s e against respectability is called scandal, an e x a m p l e of disre-
garding respectability that might lead others to follow it. T o give scan-
dal is quite contrary to duty. B u t to take scandal at what is merely
unconventional (paradoxon) but otherwise in itself g o o d is a delusion
(since o n e holds what is unusual to be impermissible as well), an e r r o r
d a n g e r o u s and destructive to virtue. For a man cannot carry his giving
an e x a m p l e of the respect d u e others so far as to d e g e n e r a t e into blind
imitation (in which custom, mos, is raised to the dignity o f a law), since
such a tyranny of popular mores would be contrary to a man's duty to
himself.
41-
For this reason, too, duties to one's fellow men arising f r o m the [465]
respect due them are expressed only negatively, that is, this duty of
virtue will be expressed only indirectly (through the prohibition o f its
opposite).
A.
Arrogance
42.
B.
Defamation
43-
B y d e f a m a t i o n (obtrectatio) or b a c k b i t i n g I d o not m e a n slander (contu-
melia), a. false d e f a m a t i o n to be t a k e n b e f o r e a c o u r t ; I m e a n only t h e
i m m e d i a t e inclination, with n o particular a i m in view, to b r i n g into
the o p e n s o m e t h i n g prejudicial to respect f o r others. T h i s is c o n t r a r y
to the respect o w e d to h u m a n i t y as such; f o r e v e r y scandal g i v e n
w e a k e n s that respect, o n w h i c h the i m p u l s e to the m o r a l l y g o o d rests,
a n d as f a r as possible m a k e s p e o p l e skeptical a b o u t it.
T h e intentional spreading (propalatio) o f s o m e t h i n g that detracts
f r o m a n o t h e r ' s h o n o r e v e n if it is not a m a t t e r o f public j u s t i c e , a n d
e v e n if w h a t is said is true - diminishes respect f o r h u m a n i t y as such,
so as finally to cast a s h a d o w o f worthlessness o v e r o u r race itself,
m a k i n g m i s a n t h r o p y (shying away f r o m m e n ) o r c o n t e m p t t h e p r e v a -
lent cast o f m i n d , o r to dull one's m o r a l f e e l i n g by r e p e a t e d l y e x p o s i n g
o n e to the sight o f such things a n d a c c u s t o m i n g o n e to it. It is, there-
f o r e , a d u t y o f virtue not to take malicious p l e a s u r e in e x p o s i n g the
faults o f o t h e r s so that o n e will be t h o u g h t as g o o d as, o r at least not
w o r s e than, o t h e r m e n , b u t r a t h e r to t h r o w the veil o f love o f m a n o v e r
their faults, not m e r e l y by s o f t e n i n g o u r j u d g m e n t s b u t also by k e e p -
i n g these j u d g m e n t s to ourselves; f o r e x a m p l e s o f respect that w e give
o t h e r s c a n a r o u s e their striving to d e s e r v e it. F o r this r e a s o n , a m a n i a
f o r s p y i n g o n t h e morals o f others (allotrio-episcopia) is by itself already
an o f f e n s i v e inquisitiveness o n the p a r t o f a n t h r o p o l o g y , w h i c h every-
o n e can resist with r i g h t as a violation o f the respect d u e h i m .
f46?] Ridicule
44-
Wanton faultfinding a n d mockery, the p r o p e n s i t y to e x p o s e o t h e r s to
l a u g h t e r , to m a k e their faults the i m m e d i a t e object o f one's amuse-
m e n t , is a k i n d o f malice. It is a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m banter, f r o m
the familiarity a m o n g f r i e n d s in w h i c h o n e m a k e s f u n o f their pecu-
liarities that only s e e m to b e faults b u t are really m a r k s o f their pluck
in sometimes d e p a r t i n g f r o m the rule o f f a s h i o n (for this is not deri-
sion). B u t h o l d i n g u p to ridicule a person's real faults, o r s u p p o s e d
faults as if they w e r e real, in o r d e r to d e p r i v e h i m o f the respect he
deserves, a n d t h e p r o p e n s i t y to d o this, a m a n i a f o r caustic m o c k e r y
The Doctrine of Right g 259
Remark
" verehren
b Hochachtung
' Achtung
Verehren. Kant may well have in mind the duty not to give scandal. However, the
second edition changes this sentence to read "To obey the law also with regard to
other men, but not to . . . "
CHAPTER II
v 45-
T h e s e (duties o f virtue) d o not really call f o r a special c h a p t e r in the
system of p u r e ethics; since they d o not involve principles o f obliga-
tion f o r m e n as such toward one another, they cannot properly consti-
tute a part o f the metaphysical first principles o f a doctrine o f virtue.
T h e y are only rules modified in accordance with d i f f e r e n c e s of the
subjects to w h o m the principle o f virtue (in terms o f what is formal)
is applied in cases that come u p in experience (the material). Hence,
like anything divided on an empirical basis, they d o not admit of
a classification that could be guaranteed to be complete. Neverthe-
less, just as a passage f r o m the metaphysics of nature to physics is
n e e d e d a transition having its own special rules something similar
is rightly required f r o m the metaphysics of morals: a transition that,
by applying the p u r e principles o f duty to cases of experience, would
schematize these principles, as it were, and present them as ready f o r
morally practical use. How should one behave, f o r e x a m p l e , toward
m e n w h o are in a state of moral purity or depravity? toward the
cultivated or the crude? toward m e n of learning or the ignorant, and
[469] toward the learned insofar as they use their science as m e m b e r s o f
polite society or outside society, as specialists in their field (scholars)?
toward those whose learning is pragmatic or those in w h o m it pro-
ceeds more f r o m spirit and taste? How should people be treated in
accordance with their differences in rank, age, sex, health, prosper-
ity or poverty, and so forth? T h e s e questions d o not yield so many
d i f f e r e n t ways o f imposing ethical obligation (for there is only one
way, that o f virtue as such), but only so many d i f f e r e n t ways o f apply-
ing it (corollaries). Hence they cannot be presented as sections o f eth-
ics and m e m b e r s o f the division o f a system (which must proceed a
priori f r o m a rational concept), but can only be a p p e n d e d to the
system. Yet even this application belongs to the complete presentation
of the system.
260
CONCLUSION OF T H E ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
261
262 The Metaphysics of Morals
47-
Moral friendship (as distinguished f r o m f r i e n d s h i p based o n f e e l i n g
[.sthetischen ]) is the c o m p l e t e c o n f i d e n c e o f two p e r s o n s in r e v e a l i n g
their secret j u d g m e n t s a n d f e e l i n g s to each o t h e r , as f a r as s u c h disclo-
sures are consistent with m u t u a l respect.
M a n is a b e i n g m e a n t f o r society ( t h o u g h h e is also an unsociable
one), a n d in cultivating the social state h e feels strongly the n e e d to
reveal h i m s e l f to o t h e r s (even with n o ulterior p u r p o s e ) . B u t o n the
o t h e r h a n d , h e m m e d in a n d c a u t i o n e d by f e a r o f t h e misuse o t h e r s
m a y m a k e o f his disclosing his t h o u g h t s , h e f i n d s h i m s e l f c o n s t r a i n e d
to lock up in h i m s e l f a g o o d p a r t o f his j u d g m e n t s (especially those
a b o u t o t h e r people). H e w o u l d like to discuss with s o m e o n e w h a t h e [472]
thinks a b o u t his associates, t h e g o v e r n m e n t , religion a n d so f o r t h , but
h e c a n n o t risk it: partly b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , w h i l e p r u d e n t l y
k e e p i n g back his o w n j u d g m e n t s , m i g h t use this to h a r m h i m , a n d
partly because, as r e g a r d s disclosing his faults, the o t h e r p e r s o n m a y
conceal his o w n , so that h e w o u l d lose s o m e t h i n g o f t h e other's respect
by p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f quite c a n d i d l y to him.
I f h e f i n d s s o m e o n e intelligent s o m e o n e w h o , m o r e o v e r , shares
his g e n e r a l o u t l o o k o n things with w h o m h e n e e d not b e a n x i o u s
a b o u t this d a n g e r b u t can revea! h i m s e l f with c o m p l e t e c o n f i d e n c e , h e
c a n t h e n air his views. H e is not c o m p l e t e l y alone with his t h o u g h t s ,
as in a prison, b u t enjoys a f r e e d o m h e c a n n o t h a v e with the masses,
a m o n g w h o m h e m u s t shut h i m s e l f u p in himself. E v e r y m a n has his
secrets a n d d a r e not c o n f i d e blindly in others, partly b e c a u s e o f a base
cast o f m i n d in most m e n to use t h e m to one's d i s a d v a n t a g e a n d partly
b e c a u s e m a n y p e o p l e are indiscreet o r incapable o f j u d g i n g a n d dis-
t i n g u i s h i n g w h a t m a y o r m a y not b e r e p e a t e d . T h e necessary c o m -
bination o f qualities is s e l d o m f o u n d in o n e p e r s o n (rara avis in ter-
ris, nigroque simillima cygno)," especially since the closest f r i e n d s h i p
r e q u i r e s that a j u d i c i o u s a n d trusted f r i e n d b e also b o u n d not to s h a r e
t h e secrets e n t r u s t e d t o h i m with a n y o n e else, n o m a t t e r h o w reliable
h e thinks h i m , w i t h o u t explicit permission to d o so.
T h i s (merely m o r a l f r i e n d s h i p ) is not j u s t an ideal b u t (like black
swans) actually exists h e r e a n d t h e r e in its p e r f e c t i o n . B u t that (prag-
matic) f r i e n d s h i p , w h i c h b u r d e n s itself with the e n d s o f o t h e r m e n ,
a l t h o u g h o u t o f love, can h a v e n e i t h e r the purity n o r t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s
requisite f o r a precisely d e t e r m i n a n t m a x i m ; it is an ideal o f one's
wishes, w h i c h k n o w s n o b o u n d s in its rational c o n c e p t b u t w h i c h m u s t
always b e v e r y limited in e x p e r i e n c e .
""a bird that is rare on earth, quite like a black swan." Juvenal, Satires II, 6, 165.
264 The Metaphysics of Morals
48.
265
[477] D O C T R I N E OF T H E METHODS OF E T H I C S
SECTION I
Teaching Ethics3
49-
T h e very c o n c e p t o f virtue already implies that v i r t u e m u s t b e a c q u i r e d
(that it is not innate); o n e n e e d not a p p e a l to a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l k n o w l -
e d g e based o n e x p e r i e n c e to see this. F o r man's m o r a l capacity w o u l d
not b e virtue w e r e it not p r o d u c e d by t h e strength o f his r e s o l u t i o n in
c o n f l i c t with p o w e r f u l o p p o s i n g inclinations. V i r t u e is the p r o d u c t o f
p u r e practical r e a s o n i n s o f a r as it gains a s c e n d a n c y o v e r s u c h inclina-
tions with consciousness o f its s u p r e m a c y (based o n f r e e d o m ) .
T h a t virtue can a n d must b e taught a l r e a d y follows f r o m its not
b e i n g innate; a d o c t r i n e o f virtue is t h e r e f o r e something that can be
taught [eine Doktrin]. B u t since o n e d o e s not a c q u i r e t h e p o w e r to p u t
the rules o f v i r t u e into practice m e r e l y by b e i n g t a u g h t h o w o n e o u g h t
to b e h a v e in o r d e r to c o n f o r m with the c o n c e p t o f virtue, t h e Stoics [in
d e n y i n g that v i r t u e can b e taught] m e a n t only that v i r t u e c a n n o t b e
taught m e r e l y by c o n c e p t s o f d u t y o r by e x h o r t a t i o n s (by paraenesis),
b u t m u s t instead b e exercised a n d cultivated by e f f o r t s to c o m b a t the
i n n e r e n e m y w i t h i n m a n (asceticism); f o r o n e c a n n o t straightway d o
all that o n e wants to d o , w i t h o u t h a v i n g first tried o u t a n d e x e r c i s e d
one's p o w e r s . B u t t h e decision to d o this m u s t b e m a d e all at o n c e a n d
c o m p l e t e l y , since a disposition (animus) to s u r r e n d e r at times to vice,
in o r d e r to b r e a k away f r o m it g r a d u a l l y , w o u l d itself b e i m p u r e a n d
e v e n vicious, a n d so c o u l d b r i n g a b o u t n o virtue (which is b a s e d o n a
single principle).
[478] 50.
A s f o r the m e t h o d o f t e a c h i n g ( f o r e v e r y scientific d o c t r i n e m u s t b e
treated methodically; otherwise it w o u l d b e set f o r t h chaotically), this too
"Die ethische Didaktik. In the "second division of ethics," Ak. 413, this was called
"Catechizing," although in Ak. 411 two methods, cathechizing and dialogue, were
distinguished.
266
The Doctrine of Right g 267
For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument for
teaching the doctrine o f virtue is a moral catechism. T h i s must precede
a religious catechism; it cannot be interwoven, merely as an interpola-
tion, in the teachings o f religion but must rather be presented sep-
arately, as a self-subsistent whole; for it is only by p u r e moral prin-
ciples that a transition f r o m the doctrine o f virtue to religion can be
made, since otherwise the professions o f religion would be impure.
For their own part, even the worthiest and most eminent theologians
have hesitated to draw u p a catechism for teaching statutory religion [479]
(which they would personally answer for), though one would have
thought this the least that could be expected f r o m the vast treasury o f
their learning.
But a p u r e moral catechism, as the basic teaching o f duties of virtue,
involves no such scruple or difficulty since (as far as its content is
concerned) it can be developed f r o m ordinary h u m a n reason, and (as
far
as its f o r m is concerned) it needs only to be adapted to rules of
teaching suited f o r the earliest instruction. T h e formal principle of
268 The Metaphysics of Morals
52-
T h e experimental (technical) m e a n s f o r cultivating v i r t u e is good e x a m -
ple o n t h e part o f t h e t e a c h e r (his e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t ) a n d cautionary
e x a m p l e in o t h e r s , since, f o r a still u n d e v e l o p e d h u m a n b e i n g , imita-
tion is the first d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f his will to accept m a x i m s that h e
a f t e r w a r d m a k e s f o r himself. T o f o r m a habit is to establish a lasting
inclination a p a r t f r o m any m a x i m , t h r o u g h f r e q u e n t l y r e p e a t e d grat-
ifications o f that inclination; it is a m e c h a n i s m o f sense r a t h e r t h a n a
principle o f t h o u g h t (and o n e that is easier to acquire t h a n to get rid of
a f t e r w a r d ) . A s f o r the p o w e r o f e x a m p l e s * ( g o o d o r b a d ) that c a n b e
[480] h e l d u p to the p r o p e n s i t y f o r imitation o r w a r n i n g , w h a t o t h e r s give us
c a n establish n o m a x i m o f virtue. F o r a m a x i m o f v i r t u e consists pre-
cisely in the subjective a u t o n o m y o f e a c h man's practical r e a s o n a n d so
implies that the law itself, not the c o n d u c t o f o t h e r m e n , m u s t serve as
o u r incentive. A c c o r d i n g l y , a t e a c h e r will not tell his n a u g h t y p u p i l :
T a k e an e x a m p l e f r o m that g o o d (orderly, diligent) b o y ! F o r this
w o u l d only cause h i m to hate that b o y , w h o puts h i m in a n u n f a v o r a b l e
light. A g o o d e x a m p l e ( e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t ) s h o u l d not serve as a
m o d e l b u t only as a p r o o f that it is really possible to act in c o n f o r m i t y
with duty. So it is not c o m p a r i s o n with any o t h e r m a n w h a t s o e v e r
(with m a n as h e is), but with the Idea (of h u m a n i t y ) , with m a n as h e
o u g h t to be, a n d so c o m p a r i s o n with the law, that m u s t serve as the
constant s t a n d a r d o f a teacher's instruction.
Remark
Fragment of a Moral Catechism
In this catechism, which must be carried out through all the articles
o f virtue and vice, the greatest care must be taken to base the com-
mand o f duty not on the advantages or disadvantages that follow f r o m
observing it, whether for the m a n it is to put u n d e r obligation or even
f o r others, but quite purely on the moral principle. O n l y casual men-
tion should be made o f advantages and disadvantages, as o f a supple-
ment which could really be dispensed with but which is serviceable,
merely as an instrument, for the taste o f those w h o are weak by
nature. It is the shamefulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent [483]
himself), that must be emphasized above all. For unless the dignity o f
virtue is exalted above everything else in actions, the concept o f duty
itself vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts, since man's
consciousness o f his own nobility then disappears and he is f o r sale
and can be b o u g h t for a price that the seductive inclinations o f f e r him.
Now when this is wisely and carefully developed out o f a man's own
reason, with regard for the differences in age, sex, and rank which he
gradually encounters, then there is still something that must come at
the end, which moves the soul inwardly and puts a man in a position
in which he can look u p o n himself only with the greatest w o n d e r at the
original predisposition dwelling within him, the impression o f which is
never erased. W h e n , namely, at the end o f his instruction his duties
are once more, by way o f summary, recounted in their o r d e r (recapit-
ulated); and when, in the case of each o f them, his attention is drawn
to the fact that none o f the pains, hardships, and sufferings o f life
not even the threat o f death which may befall him because he faith-
fully attends to his duty can rob him o f consciousness o f being their
master and superior to them all, then the question is very close to him:
W h a t is it in you that can be trusted to enter into combat with all the
forces o f nature within you and around you and to conquer them if
they come into conflict with your moral principles? A l t h o u g h the
solution to this question lies completely beyond the capacity o f specu-
lative reason, the question arises of itself; and if he takes it to heart, the
very incomprehensibility in this self-knowledge must p r o d u c e an exal-
tation in his soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred,
the m o r e it is assailed.
In this catechistic moral instruction it would be most helpful to the
pupil's moral development to raise some casuistical questions in the
analysis o f every duty and to let the assembled children test their
understanding by having each say how he would solve the tricky
problem put to him. T h e advantage o f this is not only that it is a culti-
272 Metaphysics of Morals
Ethical Ascetics
53-
T h e rules f o r practicing virtue (exercitiorum virtutis) a i m at a f r a m e o f
m i n d that is b o t h valiant a n d cheerful in f u l f i l l i n g its duties (animus
strenuus et hilaris). F o r virtue not only has to m u s t e r all its f o r c e s to
o v e r c o m e the obstacles it m u s t c o n t e n d with; it also involves sacrificing
m a n y o f the j o y s o f life, the loss o f w h i c h can s o m e t i m e s m a k e one's
m i n d g l o o m y a n d sullen. B u t w h a t is not d o n e w i t h p l e a s u r e b u t
m e r e l y as c o m p u l s o r y service has n o i n n e r w o r t h f o r o n e w h o attends
to his d u t y in this way a n d such service is not loved by h i m ; instead, h e
shirks as m u c h as possible occasions f o r practicing virtue.
With r e g a r d to the principle o f a v i g o r o u s , spirited, a n d valiant
practice o f virtue, the cultivation o f virtue, that is, m o r a l ascetics, takes
as its m o t t o the Stoic saying: A c c u s t o m y o u r s e l f to put up with the
m i s f o r t u n e s o f life that m a y h a p p e n a n d to do without its s u p e r f l u o u s
pleasures (assuesce incommodis et descuesce commoditatibus vitae). T h i s is a
k i n d o f regimen [Ditetik] f o r k e e p i n g a m a n healthy. B u t health is only [485]
a n e g a t i v e k i n d o f well-being: It c a n n o t itself be felt. S o m e t h i n g m u s t
b e a d d e d to it, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h , t h o u g h it is only m o r a l , a f f o r d s an
a g r e e a b l e e n j o y m e n t to life. T h i s is the e v e r - c h e e r f u l heart, a c c o r d i n g
to the idea o f t h e virtuous Epicurus. F o r w h o s h o u l d h a v e m o r e reason
f o r b e i n g o f a c h e e r f u l spirit, a n d not e v e n f i n d i n g it a d u t y to p u t
h i m s e l f in a c h e e r f u l f r a m e o f m i n d a n d m a k e it habitual, t h a n o n e
w h o is a w a r e o f n o intentional transgression in h i m s e l f a n d is s e c u r e d
against f a l l i n g into any? (hie murus aheneus esto etc., Horat.)a O n the
o t h e r h a n d , m o n k i s h ascetics, w h i c h f r o m superstitions f e a r or h y p o -
critical l o a t h i n g o f o n e s e l f g o e s to w o r k with self-torture a n d m o r t i f i -
cation o f the f l e s h , is not directed to virtue b u t r a t h e r to fantastically
p u r g i n g o n e s e l f o f sin by i m p o s i n g p u n i s h m e n t s o n oneself. Instead
o f morally repenting sins (with a view to i m p r o v i n g ) , it wants to do pen-
ance by p u n i s h m e n t s c h o s e n a n d inflicted by oneself. B u t such punish-
273
274 The Metaphysics of Morals
CONCLUSION
275
276 The Metaphysics of Morals
Concluding Remark
I. D O C T R I N E O F T H E E L E M E N T S O F E T H I C S .
P A R T I.
O n M a n ' s Duties to Himself.
B O O K I.
O n M a n ' s Perfect Duties to H i m s e l f .
C h a p t e r I.
O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f as a n Animal Being.
C h a p t e r II.
O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f M e r e l y as a Moral Being.
S e c t i o n I.
O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f as His O w n I n n a t e Judge.
O n t h e First C o m mSection
a n d o f AII.
l l Duties to O n e s e l f .
E p i s o d i c Section.
O n an A m p h i b o l y in M o r a l Concepts of Reflection
with R e g a r d to D u t i e s to O n e s e l f .
Book
[493]
O n M a n ' s Imperfect D u t i e s to H i m s e l f
with R e g a r d to His E n d .
Section I.
O n the D u t y to O n e s e l f to D e v e l o p a n d I n c r e a s e
One's Natural Perfection.
S e c t i o n II.
O n t h e D u t y to O n e s e l f to I n c r e a s e
One's Moral Perfection.
P A R T II.
O n Ethical Duties to Others.
C h a p t e r I.
O n Duties to O t h e r s Merely as Men.
S e c t i o n I.
O n t h e Duty of Love to O t h e r M e n .
S e c t i o n II.
O n the Duty of Respect f o r O t h e r s .
C h a p t e r II.
O n D u t y to O t h e r s in A c c o r d a n c e with Differences
In Their Condition.
Conclusion of the Doctrine o f Elements.
O n t h e Most I n t i m a t e U n i o n o f L o v e with R e s p e c t
in F r i e n d s h i p .
II. D O C T R I N E O F T H E M E T H O D S O F E T H I C S
S e c t i o n I.
T e a c h i n g Ethics.
Section II.
Ethical Ascetics.
C o n c l u s i o n o f t h e Entire Ethics.
Translator's Notes to the Text
1 On the term "Right" (Recht) see Translator's Note on the Text, page x. As for
"doctrine," Kant concludes his Preface to the Critique ofJudgment by noting
that this critique concludes the critical part of his enterprise and that he will
now proceed to the doctrinal (doktrinell) part, i.e., to the application of the
principles established in the First two critiques in a metaphysics of nature
and a metaphysics of morals (Ak. V, 170).
2 Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Naturwissenshaft (1785), Ak. V.
3 Christian Garve (17421798) was professor of philosophy at Leipzig. Part I
of Kant's essay "On the Common Saying: That May Be True in Theory But
It Does Not Apply in Practice" (1793), Ak. VIII, which deals with the rela-
tion of theory to practice in moral philosophy in general, is a reply to some
objections raised by Garve in his Versuche ber verschiedene Gegenstnde aus der
Moral und Literatur. Kant's reference to Garve in the present context is topi-
cal, since in his Vermischte Aufstze (1796) Garve complains about the mischief
that "various authors of the Kantian school" (though not Kant himself) have
been making in popular philosophy.
4 Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794), whose discovery of the role of oxy-
gen in combustion and influence in establishing the nomenclature of chem-
istry earned him the title of principal architect of the new science of chem-
istry.
5 On John Brown's system, see my introduction to the translation of Kant's
Rektoratsrede, "On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body," in Lewis W. Beck,
ed., Kant's Latin Writings (New York and Berne: Peter Lang, 1986).
6 Christian Hausen (1693-1745) was professor of mathematics at Leipzig.
According to Natorp (Ak.V, 505-7), the reviewer from Tbingen was prob-
ably the same Johann Friedrich Flatt to whom Kant refers in the Preface to
the Critique of Practical Reason. Flatt's recurrent theme, that Kant's cardinal
distinctions had already been made in substance by other writers, seems to
have been one that annoyed Kant.
7 See Walter Strauss, Friedrich Nicolai und die kritische Philosophie: ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Aufklrung (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1927). In 1796 Nicolai, in
his Beschreibung einer Reise durch Deutschland und die Schweiz im Jahre 1781,
ridiculed the use to which Schiller and his followers had put Kantian termi-
nology. Despite Kant's warning that this criticism should not be extended to
critical philosophy itself, Nicolai did just that with his Leben und Meinungen
281
282 Notes to Pages 38-46
Sempronius Gundiberts (1798), which called forth Kant's Ueber die Buchmach-
erei: Zwei Briefe an Herrn Friedrich Nicolai (Ak. VIII, 4318).
8 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury ( 1 6 5 1 - 1 7 1 3 ) . T h e ref-
erence is to his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Treatise
II, "Sensus communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour" (170g),
Section I: "Truth . . . may bear all Lights: and one of those principal
Lights . . . is Ridicule itself. . . . So much, at least, is allow'd by All, who at
any time appeal to this Criterion."
9 That the Doctrine of Right was written and published before the Doctrine of
Virtue accounts for the title page [203] and Table of Contents [210] in the
Akademie edition.
10 T h e distinction I have marked between the "capacity for desire" and "de-
sire in the narrow sense" is that between Begehrungsvermgen and Begierde.
11 In this initial occurrence of the terms Willkr and Wille I have, when it
seemed advisable, translated Willkr fully, as "the capacity for choice." I
have done so again at the beginning of The Doctrine of Virtue. Hereafter,
Willkr is translated simply as "choice" except when it is necessary to distin-
guish Willkr occurring with the indefinite article from Wahl, "a choice" or
"his choice" (i.e., a choice he makes); the corresponding verb is whlen.
Something is lost by this translation of Willkr in passages where Kant is
discussing the relation of Willkr and Wille. What militates against consis-
tently translating Willkr as "the capacity for choice" is not so much the
wordiness this would involve; it is rather that Kant seems at times to use
Willkr to signify the exercise of this capacity or external actions resulting
from it. To indicate this would, however, involve distorting the German
text. It should also be noted that, having drawn the distinction between
Willkr and Wille, Kant does not always observe it. Nevertheless, careful
attention would seem to be required here in view of Kant's assertion (Ak.
2i8n) that der Akt der freien Willkr berhaupt is the highest concept in the
system of the metaphysics of morals.
12 mit den Lehren der Sittlichkeit. In Ak. 219 Kant distinguishes between the
legality of an action and its Moralitt (Sittlichkeit); drawing the same distinc-
tion in Ak. 225 he uses Sittlichkeit (moralitas). In the present context, how-
ever, it would seem that he continues to discuss what he has been calling
Sittenlehre, i.e., the "doctrine of morals" or of duties generally. In Ak. 239
he refers to the metaphysics of morals in both its parts as Sittenlehre (Moral ).
13 Kunst. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak.IV, 415) Kant calls
such precepts those of "skill" (Geschicklichkeit).
14 von den pathologischen Bestimmungsgrnden der Willkr. In order to avoid the
suggestion of "diseased," pathologisch is translated throughout as "sensibly
dependent."
15 rechtlich. T h e term is introduced here as, apparently, synonymous with
"juridical" (juridisch). Once the concept of a right is derived, in the Intro-
duction to the Doctrine of Right, rechtlich seems often to be used in the
general sense of "having to do with a right or rights." I have so used it in
the remainder of the Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals. T h e term
becomes prominent in Private Right. See notes 28 and 32 below.
283 Notes to Pages 38-46
there is no occasion for mistaking "state" for Staat, I have used "state" and
"condition" interchangeably.
25 "A postulate is a practical imperative given a priori, the possibility of which
cannot be explained [keiner Erklrung . . . fhiger ] (so that no proof of it can
be given)." "Perpetual Peace in Philosophy," Ak. VIII, 418m Taken out of
context, this seems appropriate to the present text; however, it is rather
unusual for Kant to use "postulate" for a moral imperative (in this case, the
imperative to promote the summum bonum) as distinguished from the
propositions about freedom, God and immortality established for practical
purposes by means of an imperative. T h e way in which the word "postu-
late" is introduced here, " und dieses sagt sie als ein Postulat," might be a ref-
erence to Ak. 225, where it was said that moral laws, like mathematical
postulates, are indemonstrable and yet apodictically certain.
26 die Sentenz, perhaps "the sentence." Kant seems to draw no clear or consis-
tent distinction between a "sentence" and a "verdict" or "decision" of a
court. For further discussion of "the right of necessity," see "Theory and
Practice," Ak. VIII, 300n.
27 rechtliche Ehrbarkeit. It is difficult to bring out the connection between
Ehrbarkeit here and such words as Ehrliebe (honestas interna, iustum sui aestim-
ium), Ak. 236, and Ehrlichkeit, Ak. 429. What they have in common, how-
ever, is the practical affirmation of one's dignity as a person. T h e source of
this terminology may well be the Stoic "honestum." As for "the Right
of humanity in our own person" mentioned in the concluding sentence of
this paragraph and also in the table on Ak. 240, one would expect Kant to
discuss it within the Doctrine of Virtue. However, he makes no reference
to it there. It is mentioned occasionally in the Vorarbeiten, e.g., Ak. XXIII,
276 and 390.
28 rechtliche Akt. In Ak. XXIII, 262, Kant defines a rightful action (eine recht-
liche Handlung, actus iuridicus) as "someone's action from which a right of
his arises." (Strictly speaking, an Akt, translated as "act," is not the same as
an "action," Handlung.) In the text of Private Right I have often translated
rechtliche Akt as "an act establishing a right," although this needs to be modi-
fied when Kant is discussing empirical actions that are necessary but not
sufficient conditions for acquiring rights; and a rightful act can also be one
by which someone gives up a right (Ak. 300). Now that the concept of a
right has been derived, I shall often translate rechtlich by such phrases as "in
terms of rights," "with regard to rights," "about rights," "affecting rights,"
"bearing upon rights." See the use of rechtlich in 306.
ag In the context of man's natural talents and capacities, this is translated as
"to develop." However, in the context of analytic and synthetic proposi-
tions, see the Jsche Logik (IX, 111, Anmerkung 1), where it is said that in an
implicitly identical proposition (as distinguished from a tautology), a pred-
icate which lies unentwickelt (implicite) in the concept of the subject is made
clear by means of Entwickelung (explicatio). In D (Ak. 231) Kant said that
(the concept o f ) an authorization to use coercion, i.e., "a right," is con-
nected with (the concept of) "Right" by the principle of contradiction.
Compare Ak. 396, where the "supreme principle of the doctrine of Right"
285 Notes to Pages 38-46
44 As in Sections I and II, the heading here suggests "the sum of principles"
having to do with such possession. However, this third member of the
division of rights is an innovation on Kant's part, and there is no English
term for it corresponding to "property" and "contract." At the beginning
and at the end of Section III, accordingly, I have sometimes used "rights"
in contexts that would call for "Right."
45 Besitzstand. See Ak. 306.
46 Gottfried Achenwall's Ius Naturae was one of the texts Kant used for the
course on Natural Right that he gave at least twelve times during his
teaching career. Achenwall's text, with Kant's comments on it, is included
in Ak. XIX, 3.
47 Fleiss. In view of what Kant regards as his direct quotation from Adam
Smith (Ak. 289), one would expect him to use Arbeit, "labor," rather than
Fleiss, "industriousness" or "diligence." However, in "translating" Smith's
sentence into German Kant uses Fleiss. Throughout this passage I use
"industry" in the sense of "industriousness."
48 Adam Smith says merely: "It is in this manner that money has become in
all civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce, by the interven-
tion of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one
another." The Wealth of Nations, Bk. I, Ch. IV, (Middlesex and New York:
Penguin Books, 1970), p. 131. He does, however, develop in Chapter V the
notion that labor determines the value of all goods.
49 Or "publishing books without having been empowered by the author." To
translate Bchernachdruck as "literary piracy" would seem inconsistent with
the "appearance of being rightful" that Kant says it has. T h e language used
here is similar to that of his essay "Von der Unrechtmssigkeit des Bchernach-
drucks," which was published in the Berliner Monatsschrift of May 1785 (Ak.
VIII, 7787). T h e word translated here, and in the context of contracts, as
"on his own initiative" is eigenmchtig, which was earlier (in, e.g., Ak. 250)
translated as "unsanctioned."
50 von rechtswegen verboten. The term von rechtswegen was used earlier (Ak.
250), apparently in the sense of "by legal proceedings."
51 T h e distinction between "long possession" (Ersitzung, usucapio) and "super-
annuation of claims" (Verjhrung, praescriptio) discussed here has a long
history. In Roman Law, acquiring ownership (dominium) of a thing by
usucapio was originally available only under the ius civile, for Roman citi-
zens, and praescriptio had to be devised as an analogous procedure for pro-
vincials or foreigners. It did not confer ownership but enabled the posses-
sor to bar a claimant's right of action against him if he could show that he
had been possessor in good faith for the prescribed period of time. But
before the time of Justinian, prescription had come to extinguish the
claimant's title instead of merely barring his action; and when Justinian
abolished the distinction between Italian and provincial land (which had
belonged to the Roman people or to the Emperor), prescription by 30
years' possession gave ownership to a possessor in good faith, even if the
thing had originally been stolen. See R. W. Leage, Roman Private Law (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 1 5 9 - 7 1 .
288 Notes to Pages 11825
52 Kant seems to be thinking here of "the decisory oath," which would decide
a fact at issue in a case. This was one of the devices of civil procedure
designed to protect the judge from threats by the wealthy and the power-
ful. " T h e decisory oath worked in the following way: Party A could put
Party B on his oath as to a fact at issue that was within Party B's knowledge.
If Party B refused to swear, the fact was taken as conclusively proved
against him. If Party B swore, the fact was taken as conclusively proved in
his favor." John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1969), p. 126.
53 Befehlshaber. Kant has not yet discussed the relation of the legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial authorities in a state. When he does so in Ak. 316, the
(Oberbefehlshaber is associated with the executive authority. Here, however,
as in 47, Kant is apparently using the word simply in the sense of "a
superior in general."
54 Grammatically, the relation of "with all others" to the rest of the sentence
is ambiguous: T h e phrase could modify "proceed." My reasons for the
above translation are 1) Kant's thesis of "original possession in common" of
the earth's habitable surface by the whole human race and 2) the fact that
the heading of 41 indicates that 42 is part of the transition from Private
Right to the whole of Public Right. As Kant has said (Ak. 266), until "the
original contract" extends to the whole human race, acquisition will always
remain provisional.
55 T h e English terms "municipal law" and "international law" might be used
here, if it were kept in mind that Kant's concern is only with a priori
principles. However, given the meaning of Recht specified in Ak. 229, it
seems preferable to continue using this term throughout das ffentliche
Recht or "public Right."
56 Although Kant continues to use Gesetzgebung and Gesetzgeber, which were
translated in private Right as "lawgiving" and "lawgiver," he is now dis-
cussing a condition in which there are positive laws. Hence "legislation"
and "legislator" seem appropriate.
57 Or, more familiarly, "powers" (Gewalten). In paragraphs 43 and 44 Kant
used Macht (potentia), which was translated as "power." He now begins to
use Gewalt (potestas). But once he distinguishes the three "powers" or "au-
thorities" within a state, it is only the executive authority that has "power"
in one sense, i.e., it is the authority that exercises coercion.
58 In this initial distinction of the three authorities within a state Kant speci-
fies that "sovereignty" (die Herrschergewalt, Souvernitt) belongs to the leg-
islative authority. Subsequently he introduces, without explanation, such a
variety of terms that it is not always clear which of the three authorities is
under discussion. In his "General Remark" (Ak. 31837) I take it that A
and B have to do primarily with the legislative authority and C, D, and E
with the executive. I have used "sovereign" only when Kant specifies Sou-
vern or, as here, Herrschergewalt. Otherwise I have used the more general
"head of state," except for passages which might indicate that one (physi-
cal) person has both legislative and executive authority. In Ak. 316 Kant
speaks of "the executive authority of the Oberbefehlshaber," and notes that
Notes to Pages 95108 289
his Befehle are not "laws." Perhaps Kant's very casual vocabulary with
regard to the authorities within a state stems from his recognition of the
existence and legitimacy of forms of state that fall far short of the Idea of
a state ('s 512). In an autocracy, for example, one person has both all
"authority" and all "power."
59 Natorp suggests that a fairly extensive portion of the text may be missing
here, in which "first," "second," and "third" occurred twice and the first
occurrence of "third" got replaced by the second. In any case, the "third"
point here seems to concern the relation of the judicial authority to the
legislative and the executive authorities, not another relation parallel to
coordination and subordination.
60 Although Kant goes on to call a "moderate" (gemssigte) constitution ein
Unding (an "absurdity" in the sense, apparently, of a logical impossibility),
it would seem from Ak. 322 that the absurdity consists in supposing that a
parliament representing the people can actively resist the highest executive
authority. I take it that his references to a "moderate" and to a "limited"
(eingeschrnkte) constitution are both directed at the British constitution.
, As he points out in "Theory and Practice" (Ak. VIII, 303), the British
constitution says nothing about what the people may do if the monarch
violates the contract of 1688. Since the constitution could not, without
; self-contradiction, contain a public provision that the people may over-
throw the existing government, the people must tacitly reserve the right to
rebel. But a tacit right cannot be part of a constitution since "all the laws of
a constitution must be conceived as arising out of a public will." To extricate
themselves from such difficulties, the leaders or "guardians" of the British
people had to invent the notion that James II had voluntarily abdicated.
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Kant was no ardent admirer of the
British constitution, which he regarded as lulling the people with an illu-
sion of freedom.
61 Or "supreme owner" (Obereigentmer). On Eigentum (property), see above
Ak. 270.
62 Leibeigener, technically, "serf." In Ak. 241 Kant classed Leibeigene and
Sklaven together: They would be "men without personality." In Ak. 324 he
used grunduntertnig (glebae adscripti) as in the present passage he uses
Gutsuntertan (glebae adscriptus) and called serfs servi. Here too he refers to
a Leibeigener as servus in sensu stricto or simply servus. In Ak. 333, a criminal
is said to have reduced himself to the status of a slave (Sklavenstand). I shall
henceforth reserve "serf" for Gutsuntertan and "slave" for Sklave and use
the more general "bondsman" for Leibeigener.
63 As Natorp notes, here again something is apparently missing from the text,
regarding the first kind of crime. It would seem that in some cases an act
may be both a tort requiring compensation from the offending party (a
private crime), and a public crime requiring judicial punishment.
64 Strafgesetz. T h e principle of retribution, given in the following paragraph,
has been translated as "like for like." Kant's phrase Gleiches mit Gleichem, as
well as the context of the discussion, suggests both equality in the amount
or quantity of pain inflicted and similarity or resemblance in kind or
quality: repaying equally and (as far as possible) in kind.
2go Notes to Pages 14263
65 Arthur Elphinstone, 6th Baron Balmerino, who took part in the attempt of
17456 to put Prince Charles Edward Stuart on the British throne, was
captured in the defeat of the Scots forces at Culloden and subsequently
beheaded.
66 Kant is apparently referring to deportation to a province as distinguished
from exile. See below, Ak. 338.
67 Cesare Bonesana, Marchese Beccaria, whose influential Dei delitti e delta
pene (1764) argued for a reform of the harsh penal codes of the time.
Kant's interest in Beccaria may well have arisen from Beccaria's reliance on
a text from Rousseau's Social Contract, which had been published in 1762:
"All laws must be regarded as if they proceeded from the unanimous will
of the people." x
88 Here, and again in Ak. 461, Kant cites or refers to Albrecht Haller's poem
"Ueberden Ursprung des Uebels," and in Ak. 449 refers to his poem "Ueber die
Ewigkeit." Natorp's notes give the relevant portions of the poems.
8g Achtung. Although I have translated Achtung throughout as "respect," it
should be noted that Kant gives two different Latin equivalents: reverentia
in the context of one's feeling for the moral law and for oneself as the
source of the law (e.g., Ak. 402), and observantia aliis praestanda in the
context of duties of virtue to other men (e.g., Ak. 452).
90 einer das Gesetz ausfhrenden Gewalt. Kant seems to be drawing an analogy
between the will and the capacity for choice on the one hand and the
legislative and executive authorities in a state on the other hand.
91 Affekten and Leidenschaften. In my earlier translation of the Tugendlehre I
rendered these more descriptively, Affekt as "agitation" and Leidenschaft as
"obsession." However, they are so prominent in Kant's writings that I think
they can be considered technical terms. On the affects and passions, and
particular affects and passions, see Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
View, Ak. VII, 251-82, The Conflict of the Faculties, Part III, Ak. VII, and the
Rektoratsrede referred to in note 5 above. In these contexts Kant often uses
the Stoic principles stated in Ak. 419, along with vim vitalem excere (Reflex-
ion 1540, Ak. XV, 2, 965), "exercise your vital force," in discussing both
duties to oneself and a regimen for preserving one's health. His term
"apathy" is also of Stoic origin.
92 ein qualificiertes Bse. Qualificiert is used throughout the discussion of vices
opposed to duties of love (Ak. 45861) and is translated as "proper." As for
"evil," Kant uses Bse for moral evil and Uebel for what might be called
physical evil or "ills." In Ak. 460, when he uses the phrase Uebel oder Bses,
I have, as occasionally elsewhere, translated the latter as "wickedness." For
the most part, however, the context makes it clear which is intended and I
have sometimes used "evil" (or "evils") to translate Uebel.
93 Or "commit an offense," beleidigen knne. In discussing perfect duties to
oneself, as well as imperfect duties of respect to others, Kant often uses the
terminology of The Doctrine of Right, as e.g., in the preceding paragraph he
called killing oneself a Verbrechen, which in The Doctrine of Right was a
"crime" (crimen). Given the context in which these terms were introduced,
however, it does not always seem advisable to translate them precisely as
they were used in speaking of rights.
94 Frederick the Great.
95 der den Beschluss macht. It both concludes the case and is the conclusion
(Schluss) of the practical syllogism discussed above, Ak. 438.
g6 T h e quotations in this paragraph are taken from 1 Peter 1:16, Matthew
5:48, and Philippians 4:8.
97 The words translated as "sympathetic," "communicable," and "compas-
sion" are, respectively, teilnehmend, mitteilend, and Mitleidenschaft.
98 See also Kant's assertion, in "The End of All Things" (1784), Ak. VIII, that
if one considers not only what ought to be done but whether it actually will
be done, love is an indispensable supplement to the imperfection of human
nature, since unless it is added one could not count on very much being done.
Notes to Pages 95108 293
295
296 Bibliography
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University of Toronto Press, 1986).
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324-33-
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acceptance: of a benefit, 247, 262 (see also ambition, 217, 231, 257
gratitude); of a gift, 114; of a legacy, amphiboly, 237
110-11, 171-2; of a promise, 76, animality, 44, 191, 195,201,216
9 1 - 5 , 102 (see also contract(s)) animals, 66, 230, 238
Achenwall, 104, 121 anthropology, 44, 190, 206, 258
acquisition: division of 81 (see also right(s); antinomy, 76, 214-15
act of choice); ideal, 108, (by good rep- apathy, 208, 209
utation) 111-12, (by inheritance) appearance, 52, 71, 76, 85
11011, 712; (by prolonged posses- aptitude, 189, 2078, see also habit
sion) 10810, 16971; original and Aristotle, 205, 262
derived, 80,91, (of children) 98100, arrogance, 231, 257
(of persons) 95, (of promises) 9 0 - 5 , art (skill), 45, 191
(of servants) 100-1, (of spouses) ascetics, 211-12, 213, 2 7 3 - 4
9 6 - 8 , (of things, derived, see act, pos- author: of an action (deed), 50, 53; of a
sessory; contract(s); delivery; transfer- book, 106-7; f a ' aw > 53; f obliga-
ence), (of things, original, of land) 83, tion, 53,214
86, 88, 134, (of things, provisional authority: of moral law(s), 44, 51, 185;
only) 8 4 - 9 , 93, 133-4; principle of, supreme in a state, (origin o f ) 129,
80; provisional and conclusive, 85, 124 147, (resistance to) 1478, 12933,
1
act: of free choice, 45n; of freedom, 190; 75-7
of general will, 81; possessory, 95, authorities: function of, (executive)
109, 170; of public justice, 128; see also 127-8, 155 (judicial) 118, 128-9 (leg-
act of choice islative) 57, 118, 125, 127; relation of,
act of choice: as basis for acquisition, 81, 125, 127; i^eaiso right(s); state
(to bring object under control), 69, 80, authorization: corresponding to any duty,
(in contracts) 91-3, (to establish a 188; to break a lease, 168; to coerce,
right) 77, 80, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 98, (to 578, 5g, 122 (see also right(s)); to
take control) 84, 85, 87; see also acqui- defend someone's reputation,
sition 111-12; to do what is permitted, 49;
action: end of, 41-2, 186, 189-90, 193; innate, 6 3 - 4 ; to obligate others, 51,
external, 42, 457, 56, 64; forbidden, 69; to punish, 144, 253; to require an
4 8 - 9 ; inner, 196; internal, 4 5 - 7 ; oath, 119; to take possession of things,
legality and morality of, 46, 51, 196; 856, 171; t o u s e a t h i n g , 89
meritorious, 53, 194; morally indiffer- autocracy: as form of a state, 147; of prac-
ent, 49, 209, 251; permitted, 48g; tical reason, 188
and reaction, 43, 58; right, 50, 56; vir- autonomy: of practical reason, 188, 268;
tuous, 198; see also deed of a state, 129
advantage, 44, 195, 200, 239, 271; and avarice, 205n, 216, 225, 227-30, 246
principles of Right, 138, 141, 148,
159, 161 Balmerino, 142
aesthetic of morals, 207 Beccaria, 143
affects, 208-9, 262 beneficence, 56, see also love
301
302 Index
benevolence, 47, see also love concepts: and capacity for desire, 41; con-
book, 106-7, sec oZso author struction of, 37, 58, 204; deduction of,
Brown, 36 (acquisition by contract) g2-3, (end
Bsching, 159 that is also a duty) ig8, igg, (intelligi-
ble possession) 712, 74, (original
casuistical questions: avarice, 22930; acquisition) 889; preliminary to
beneficence, 248; defiling oneself by metaphysics of morals, 4854; system
lust, 2212; love generally, 251; lying, of pure rational, 44, 181 (see also meta-
227-8; murdering oneself, 21920; physics);^^ also definition
servility, 232; stupefying oneself by concupiscence, 41, 196
food and drink, 223-4 condition, civil or rightful, 67, 77-8, 81,
casuistry, 211,212 87, 120, 151, 152, 153, 253; as civil
catechism, see method constitution, 77-8, 123, 125, 161, 175;
Cato, 223 as distributive justice, 121-2, 124; and
causality, 81,90, 93, 95, 108; category of, ideal acquisition, 108, 110-11; and
70, 28m; of reason, 48, 215; of a rep- judgments about rights, 114-16; see
resentation, 162 also state of nature
chance, 83, 86, 99 conditions: of acquisition, see acquisition,
character, 140, 208, 217, see also virtue, as provisional and conclusive; for judicial
moral disposition decision, 59-61, 113-18; of posses-
Chesterfield, 223 sion, see possession
children: innate right of, 98, 101; moral conflict: between church and state, 137;
education of, 2668, 269-72; object of duties, 50; of maxims with law, 193;
of choice, 70, 96; obligation of, 99-100; about rights, 64, 778, 124 (see also
parental rights over, gg100, 140, 166; condition, civil or rightful)
state's concern with, 136-7, 144-5 conscience, 202; court of, 60, 233-5;
choice: determination of, 42, 46, 48, 201; regarding an oath, 120
distinguished from will, 42, 52; form constitution: and authorities in state, 125,
of, 49, 56, 181; freedom of, 42, 44, 127 (see also state); change of, 133,
232; matter of, 49, 56-7, 121, 181; 148-9, 156, 159, 176-7; duty to real-
perfection of, 207-8; as phenomenon, ize, 86, 129; Idea of, 168, 176-7; lim-
52; property of, 49, 51; a supersensi- ited, 133; moderate, 131; and natural
ble object, 52; use o f , 42, 6 8 - 9 ; see also Right, 77, 85, 113, 121, 124-5; f r
object of choice peace, 151, 160-1; and punitive jus-
church, 134-5, 137, 173-4 tice, 167; of a spiritual state, 173; see
Cicero, 64, 3i8n also condition, civil or rightful
citizens: ofastate, 1256, 146; of the constraint, 185-7: external, 47, 57, 77 (see
world, 99, 158, 265; see also right(s) also coercion); internal, 52 (see also
Cochius, 189 obligation, ethical); moral, 237, 276;
coercion: to ends, 186; and executive objective, 233; see also duty; impera-
authority, 128; as incentive, 47; and tive^); lawgiving; necessitation; obli-
Right, 56-8, (under private Right) 77, gation
85, 102, 114, 122, (under public contempt, 217, 254-6
Right) 114, 124, 148, (and rights) 59, contentment, 189, 195, 197
(spiritual) 119; see also right(s); con- contract(s), 47, 59, 70, 81, 90-5, 110; con-
straint fusion of rights acquired by, 106-7;
colonies, 86, 146, 154, 159 distributivejustice regarding, 11416,
command, 4g, 52, 84, 124-5, 17> 118; division of rights acquired by,
authority to, 44, 51, 101, 127, 147; 1013; marriage, g8; original, 87,
ethical, 47, ig4; positive, 208, 216 127; (and capital punishment) 143-4,
commerce, 1036, 113, 1201, 158 (as Idea) 127, 148, 151, (as Idea, and
commonwealth, 10g, 125, 126, 127, 137, league of nations) 151, (as Idea, and
149; authorities in, 146; defined, 123; republican constitution) 148; with ser-
obligation to, 136; see also state vants, 100-1; void, g7, 101, 139-40;
community: category of, 70; household, see also acceptance; acquisition
95; of possession, original and primi- court: defined, 53, 113, 121, 144; in
tive, 73, 80 equivocal Right, 59-61; judgments of
Index 303
and by reason, 11320; see also judge; jus- negative, 215-16, 259; of Right, 47-8,
tice, distributive 64, 74, 188, 198, (external and internal)
crime, 50, 130, 189, 227, 218: and per- 62, 65; sacred, 249; of virtue, 4 6 - 7 ,
sonality, 101, 1394o\ see also punish- 64, 188, 197-8; see also obligation
ment
critique, 38; of capacity for reason, 36; of end: and categorical imperative, 49, 190,
practical reason, 35, 76 198, 199; final, of man, 206; final, of
Critique of Judgment, 4 5 reason, 1 8 m ; matter of choice in
Critique of Pure Reason, 3 8 , 7 1 , 7 3 Right, 56; matter of choice in ethics,
Curtius, 219 181, 186; nature's, 2 2 0 - 2 ; perpetual
custom, 44, 107, 11516 peace as, 160-1; of pure reason, 186,
199, 396; see also action; virtue; duty
damages, 60, 107, 115-16 envy, 251-2
deduction: of division of system, 45n; see Epicurus, 58, 273
also concepts, deduction of equality; in marriage, 97; in friendship,
deed, 50, 53, 56, 203; a sensible object, 261-2, 264 (see also gratitude; ingrati-
1 7 6 ; see also i m p u t a t i o n tude); innate right of, 63; of citizens,
defamation, 257, 258 125-6, (and hereditary nobility) 138
defiling oneself by lust, 2 2 0 - 1 equity, 5 9 - 6 0
definition: of capacity for desire, 163; of ethics, 47, 56, 60; divisions of, 212-13; a
externally mine, 71; of freedom of doctrine of virtue, 185, 186-7, i88;
choice, 52; hybrid, 52; of money, moral relation within, 279
104-6; nominal and real, 71, 82, eudaemonism, 141, 183
104-6; of philosophy, 37; of right to evil, 201, 252; heart, 236; and lying, 227;
person akin to right to thing, 165; of principle in man, 235; as true vice,
right to thing, 82; of virtue and vice, 208; will in man, 236
205, 208 examples: in Doctrine of Right, 35; of
delight: inactive 41 (see also taste); see also free choice, 52; use in teaching ethics,
love 268
delivery, 9 4 - 5 , 102
desire: capacity for, 4 0 - 2 , 162, 207, 222 fault: distinguished f r o m crime, 50; dis-
(see also choice; will); habitual, 41 (see tinguished from vice, 228n
also inclination); and passion, 208, feeling, 40, 182; in friendship, 2612; of
222; for revenge, 253; unnatural, love and respect, 243, 248; moral, 48,
220-1 135, 182, 192, 201; susceptibility to be
dialogue, see method affected by duty, 2 0 0 - 4 ; of sympathy,
dignities, 127, 138 (see also nobility); civic, 250; see also affects; delight; love
127 force, rightful, 53, 118
dignity: absolute inner worth, 230; of citi- freedom: of choice, 42, 52 (see also
zen, 139 (see also personality, civil); of choice); of citizens, 125, 127, 148, 152,
humanity, 255 (see also humanity); of 154; innate right of, 63, 83; inner,
law, 200; of personality, 230-1, 255 186, 199, 2078, 215, 216; knowledge
(see also p e r s o n a l i t y ) of, 51,64, 215; lawless, 127, 150; laws
doctrine: of happiness, see happiness; of of, 4 2 - 3 ; as noumenon, 52; object of
method, 211 (see also method); of metaphysics, 44; outer, 186, 188, 199,
Right, 35, 47, 55; of virtue, 181, 185, 207, 2 3 0 - 3
186, 187-8, 193, 287; technically and friendship, 261-4
morally practical, 45, 198
duty: to animals, 66, 238; concept of, 49, Garve, 35
1856, 188, 193, 198, 370; conflict of, God, 66, 99n, 234, 238, 253, 270, 2 7 5 - 9
50; ethical, 186, 194, 198; to God, gratitude, 237, 100, 248-9, 251-2, 264
6 6 - 7 , 238, 276; of humanity, 250;
imperfect, 65, 194, 240, 241-2, (lati- habit, 189, 207-8, 210, 268
tude in) 58, 194, 2 i i , 228n, 240; as Haller, 244, 254
incentive, 4 6 - 7 , 186, 188, 191-2, 194; happiness, 4 3 - 4 , 192, 248, 269; of citi-
to oneself, 21415; perfect, 65, (to zens, 129; doctrine of, 4 3 - 4 , 183; as
oneself) 218-19, 241; positive and God's end for men, 2779; one's own
34 Index
happiness, (cont.) judge, 53, 59, 124, 128; God as, 277;
as indirect duty only, 190, 192-3; of practical reason as, 202, 2335; s e e
others, 190, 192, 196-7 (see also love, court; justice, distributive
as beneficence, duty of) judgment (imputation), 53; administra-
hatred, 203, 208, 274; vices of, 251-3 tion ofjustice, 113; see also verdict
Hausen, 37 judgment (subsumption), 45, 62, 125,
health, 189, 260; moral, 209, 216, 273 202, 233; in casuistry, 211
holiness, 185, 188-9, !99> 206; command justice: commutative, 11^5, 117, 120; dis-
to be holy, 241; see also virtue tributive, 113, 118, 121, 122, 124; pro-
honor, 43, 112, 142-3; feeling of, 144-5, tective, 120; public, 120, 124, 141,
168n; love of, 217; rightful, 62 145; punitive, 140-5, 168-g, 277-8
Horace, 223, 278
humanity: as capacity to set ends, 191, knowledge: anthropological, 266; a pri-
!95; dignity of, 216, 244, 252, 255; ori, 44; empirical, 43-5, 55, 205-6;
duty of, 250; duty to in one's own per- moral self-knowledge, 236, 241-2,
son, g8, 231; end of, 65, 195, 242; 271; practical, 51, 71, 734; rational,
Idea of, 205, 268; ideal of, 206; and 205; theoretical, 48, 71; see also meta-
innate right to freedom, 63; man as physics; philosophy
moral being, i85n, 219, 225, 236; and
personality, 255; respect for in wrong- land, 72-3, 83-4, 85-go, 133-5
doer, 168; Right of, 62, 65, 95, 97, Lavoisier, 36
194. 23 law: element of lawgiving, 46; form of
humility, 2312; false, see servility will, 182, ig3; an incentive, 191, 196
hypocrisy, 227, 231, 272 (see also incentive; virtue); and recom-
mendation, 191, 193
Idea (rational concept), 84, 176; of civil lawgiving: capacity of reason (will), 42,
constitution, 176, 177; of civil union, 52; elements of, 45-6; ethical or inter-
134; of community of all nations, 158; nal, 46-7, 52, 198; external or juridi-
of duty, 47; of friendship, 261; of God, cal, 46-7, 50-1, 55, 64, 198, (by
234, 238, 276; of head of state, 146; of general will) 77, 84, 88
humanity, 205, 268; of original com- laws: coercive, 77; distinguished from
munity of land, 73; of original contract, decrees, 128; of freedom, 42-3, of
127, 148, 151; of Right of nations, freedom, 42-3, (of inner freedom)
153, 157; of sovereign, 1467; of a 206, (of outer freedom) 69, 70, 71, 75,
state, 125; of will of all united, 85 see also freedom; moral, 42, 48, (a pri-
imperative(s): categorical, 129, 176, igo, ori basis of) 43, (external) 50, (exter-
(and conditional) 49, (and laws) 42, 48, nal, natural and positive) 501; of
49, 52, (of penal justice) 141, 145; the nature, 42, 45; penal, 60, 144; permis-
categorical (imperative), 51, 74, 183, sive, 49, 222 (see also principle(s))
188; the moral (imperative), 64, 185, league of nations, 151
188, 199, 233 legislator, 53; of positive Right, 63; see also
imputation, 50, 53; internal, 223, 227 authorities, legislative
incentive, 45, 51; duty or law as, 46-7, lie as violation of right, 63n, 225, 226
188, 196; principle of Right as, 5 6 - 7 life, 40, 215
inclination, 41; ends of, 186; ground of love: as beneficence, 246, (duty of)
choice, 42, 46; and habit, 268; mastery 246-8; as benevolence, 203, 222,
of, 188, 208 (maxim of) 244, 245, (in wishes) 246;
independence: civil, 125-6, 128; innate as delight in another, 203, 244, duties
right, 63 of, 243, 244-6; as sexual inclination,
infringement (wrong): on freedom, 56, 222
71; on rights, 77-8, 97, 173 lust, 220-2
ingratitude, 251, 252; see also gratitude lying, 216, 225-7, 270
inheritance, 110-11, 171-2
interest, 201; in being in rightful condi- malice, 251, 252-3, 258
tion, 123; of inclination and of reason, man: as end, 395 (see also happiness, of
41; in morality, 272 others); nature of, 44,52,191, 216, 254
intuition, 37, 58, 734, 21 in, 204 (see also anthropology); worth of, 230
Index 305
marriage, 96-8, 166, 222 85; and rights, 63, 64, 66, 69, 75,
Marsden, 119 77-8; self-imposed, 214-15; of things
mathematics, 37, 58, 204, 239 to persons, 82,163; wide, 194, 196,
maxim(s), 51; and ends, 187-8; of ends, 198
198; fitness of for law, 42,51, 193,
245; of internal morality, 66; law for, ownership, see property
193, 194; for right action, 56; of using
objects, 6 8 - 9 passions, 208, 252
Mendelssohn, 92 perfection: natural and moral, 191-2,
merit, 108, 139; for deed, 53-4; and 195-6; one's own, as imperfect duty,
imperfect duty, 194-5 190,195-6, 216, 241-2; of others, a
metaphysics, 44, 181; formal, 36; of negative duty, 197 (see also scandal)
morals, 35,44, 207, (division of) 35, performance, see contract(s)
45-7, 207, (first principles of) 2, 67, person: ideal, 234; in moral relations,
259; of nature, 43, 239; transition 237; in relations of rights, 66; subject
from, 260 of imputation, 50; subject of morally
method: of moral proof, 204; of practic- practical reason, 230; see also right(s);
ing virtue, see ascetics; of teaching use
ethics, 182, 211-12, (catechism) person, moral: authorities in state as, 127;
267-72, (dialogue) 267 court as, 113; state as, 150
moderation, 60, 209, 254 personality: as being endowed with inner
monarch, 13m, 133, 137, 147; monarchi- freedom, 215; dignity of, 255 (see also
cal constitution, 147, 174 humanity); as humanity, 65; moral
money, 59, 104-6, 140, 230 and psychological, 49; renunciation
morality: of an action, 42,46,51; an end of, 219, 226
in itself, 219; human, 188 (see also personality, civil, 66, 125, 126, 13940;
virtue); interest in, 272; teachings of, see also citizens
44 Phaedrus, 229
murder, 136,142-5; of oneself, 216, philosophy: critical, 36-8; defined, 181;
21820 practical, 4 1 , 4 4 - 5 , 50, 181, 27g; theo-
retical, 42-3, 45, 48, 239
necessitation: distinguished from neces- pleasure, 40-1; moral, 48, 183 (see also
sity, 48-9; will not subject to, 52; see feeling, moral); sexual, 95
also constraint; obligation possession: antinomy regarding, 76; in
necessity: case of, 119, 143; habit as, 207; appearance, 80; conclusive, 78; condi-
of laws, 43; objective, practical, 49,50; tion of use, 68; empirical concept of,
of possession of objects, 120; right of, 68-9, 70, 76; intelligible, 71, 72, 74,
601, 13m; of will, 52 81, (deduction of concept of) 71-2,
Nero, 219 73-4, (practical reality of concept of)
Newton, 43 74; of objects of choice, 6970 (see also
Nicolai, 38 right(s)); particular, 87; private, 72;
nobility, 138-9, 174 provisionally rightful, 78; rational
concept of, 71; taking, 80 (see also
oaths, 11819, 2 75 acquisition); understanding's concept
object of choice, 68; external as mine, of, 75,88
689,6970,75,77,165, (provision- postulates, see Right
ally mine) 779; see also acquisition; power : as belonging to executive author-
possession ity, 127-8; of head of state, 130, 177
obligation 48; and authorities, 128, 148, (see also sovereign); as physical capacity
149; author of, 53, 214; as burden of to use object, 69
proof, 64, 170; and categorical imper- powers: of spirit, mind, body, 239-40;
ative, 51; conflict of grounds of, 50; states as, 123, 133, 153
ethical, 47, 186-8, 198; narrow, 194; prayer, 236
and oaths, 119; reciprocity of in predisposition(s): to be affected by con-
rights, 77; and Right, 56-7, 194, (con- cepts of duty, 2004; conscience as
tract) 93, (marriage) 98, (of nations) intellectual and moral, 233; to the
151, (parental) 99, (property) 823, good, 236; moral, 2312; natural, 43,
191, 238; to vices, 254
306 Index
preservation of oneself, 215 - 1 6 , m one's tice) 113, 118, 121, 122, 124, (division
animal nature, 216, vices opposed to, into public and private) 121, (and
see defiling oneself by lust, murdering ideal acquisition) 109, 111, 169, 172,
oneself, stupefying oneself by food or natural and positive, 63, 778, postu-
drink, as moral being only, 216, vices late of public Right, 121-2, postulate
opposed to, see avarice, lying, servility with regard to rights, 68, 71, 79, 83,
pride, 257, 252, 261 88, 92, 109, private, division of, 67,
principle(s) a priori and concept of origi- (contract) 91, (domestic society) 95,
nal possession in common, 84, a prion 164-7, (property) 82, public, division
for division of contracts, 102, constitu- of, 123, in strict sense, 57, supreme
tive and regulative, 48, empirical, in a principle of, 57, 199, synthetic propo-
constitution, 124-5, empirical, of sitions of, 69, 71-5, 76-7, universal
Right, 55, expository, 52 (see also defi- principle of, 56, (laid down as postu-
nition), formal, of duty, 193, moral, late) 57, in wider sense, 5 9 - 6 0
and feeling, 182, permissive, 59, 6g, right(s) acquired, division of, (by act of
88, 95, supreme, of doctrine of choice as basis) 81 (see also act of
morals, 51, supreme, of doctrine of choice), (by kind of right, against a
Right, 199, supreme, of doctrine of person) 81,91, (by kind of right, to a
virtue, 198, theoretical, 67-8 person akin to right to thing) 81, 95,
property, 90, labor theory of, 86, 89, see 97, 100, 165, (by kind of right, to a
also Right, private, division of prop- thing) 81, 82-3, (by usable objects) 81
erty, right(s), acquired, division of, by (see also acquisition), (in state of nature
kind of right to a thing and in civil condition) 8 5 - 7 (see also
propositions analytic, 72, 92, 199, a pri- justice, distributive), of authorities in a
ori, 72, 73, 76, 92, synthetic, 71-2, 76, state (to administer economy,
92,396-7 finances, police) 135, (to banish,
Protagoras, 275 deport, exile) 146, (to control founda-
prudence, 44, 138, i68n, 190, 222, 228n, tions) 137, 138-40, 1725, (to dis-
248 tribute civil offices) 138, (to distribute
dignities) 138-40, (to encourage
punishment, 3, 60, 140-5, 278 immigration) 146, (to grant clemency)
140, 143, 145, (to inspect associations)
Qumtilian, 275 135, (to punish) 140-5, 168-9, (to
reason morally and technically practical, require performance of services) 135,
191, pure practical, (a capacity for (to tax) 135, 136, of citizens of a state,
ends) 198, (virtue the product of) 266, 125-6, 127, 138, 139, 152, (to emi-
(and will) 42 grate) 146, (to resist supreme author-
relation(s) of moral beings, 243-4, ity) 129-33, 176-7, of citizens of the
276-7, reciprocal in rights, 55-8, 77 world, 158-9, division of by beings
religion, 119, 137, 173,235, 238,275-6 related, 66, division into innate and
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, acquired, 63, (innate, to be on land)
276 83, (innate, of children) 98, (innate, to
respect for a benefactor, 251, 264, in freedom) 63-4, moral concept of, 57,
friendship, 261-3, 264, for the law, of states with regard to war (after a
204, 256, for oneself, 200, 203-4, war) 154-5, (during a war) 153-4,
221, 230, 243 (see also self-esteem), for 155, (to go to war) 152-3, see also pos-
other men, 243-4, 277> (duties of) session, conclusive, acquisition
254-7, (vices opposed to) 257-9, f r Rousseau, 129, 239
Right, 194
revenge, 253 scandal, 197, 249, 256, 265
ridicule, 257, 258-9 schema, ggn, 260
Right, 56, and authorization to coerce, self-constraint, see obligation, ethical
57, axiom of, 72, 88, construction of self-esteem, 230-1, 236, 244, 252, 255
concept of, 58, duties of, 47, 64, 188, Seneca, 219
189, 207, of humanity, 62, 65, 95, 97, sensation, 4on, 41, 237
metaphysics of, 35, moral and empiri- sensibility, 4on, 48, 53, 209
cal, 56, natural, (and distributivejus- servility, 216, 225, 231-2
Index 37
Shaftesbury, 38 vice(s), 241, 265, 266, 271, definition of,
Smith, Adam, 106 ig4, 205, 228, of disrespect, see arro-
society civil, 67, 121, 125 (see also condi- gance, defamation, ridicule, of
tion, civil, state), domestic, see Right, hatred, see envy, ingratitude, malice,
private, in state of nature, 67, 121, and lack of virtue, 189, 194, 208, and
and virtues of social intercourse, 265 passion, 208, predisposition to, 254,
Socrates, 1 g2, see also method regarding one's preservation, see
sovereign, 134, 139, 148, 149, 176-7, as preservation of oneself, see also virtue
legislative authority, 125, 149, as violence, 60, 122, 124
thought-entity and as physical person, virtue as courage, 186, 235, 266, 273, and
1467, as united will of citizens, 147 duties of virtue, 188 (see also duty), (divi-
state, 124-5, authorities in, 125, 127-9 sion of) 190-1, 212, 143, and ends,
(see also authorities, nght(s)), constitu- 187, 188-90, 193, form and matter
tion of, 125, 147-9 {see also constitu- of, 188, 198, 210-11, 215-16, and
tion), forms of, 148-9 habit, 189, 207-8, 210, 268, and holi-
state of nature, 67, 72, 77-8, 85, 123-4, ness, 185, 188-g, 199, 206, 241, and
143, defined, 121, ideal acquisition in, inner freedom, 197, 207, 215, 216,
109, judgments about acquisition in, and mean between vices, 228-9, and
115, 117, among states, 150, 151, 152, merit, 194-5, 207, 243, 248, as moral
156 see also condition, civil disposition, 186, 191-2, 194, 231-2,
stupefying oneself by food or drink, and moral weakness, 189, 2045, 206,
220-3 254, 256, 268, and obligation, 187,
superannuation of claims, 108, 170 188, 190-5, as strength, 194, 197,
200, 242, and vice, 189, 204-5, 206,
taste, 41, 222, 239-40, 260, negative, 135 254, 256, see also doctrine, of virtue
Terence, 253 voting, 126, see also citizens, of a state
thing, 50, 216, 226, in itself, 71, 176
transference, 91, 93, 94, 103, 110 war punitive, 153, 154, reason's veto of,
transgression, 48, 50, 54, 194, and vice, 161, of subjugation, 153, 155, see also
nght(s), of states with regard to war
wealth, distribution of, 136, and injustice,
Ulpian, 62 248
understanding concepts of, 74, 88, (hav- what is mine or yours, see nght(s)
mg) 75, 88, function of, 4on, practical, will distinguised from capacity for
233 choice, 42, 52, 208, divine, 53, gen-
use of choice, 42, 6 8 - g , of persons, eral, 77, 81, 84-5, 139, law of, 193,
95-7, 101, 139-40, 151-2, 165-6, pure, 48, virtue a property of, 208, see
255, of things, go also choice
wisdom, 45, 18m, 206, 236, 239
verdict, 53, 233, of conscience, 2335, wishes, 56, 236, 246, 270, and capacity for
required by conditions of a court, desire, 42, 163
5 9 - 6 i , 113-18 Wolff, 37