Probin in Islamic Philosophy:

Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina,

al-Ghazali and Other Major
Muslim Thinkers

Michael E. Marmura

University

Global Academic Publishing

Binghamton University
State University of New York at Binghamton
2005

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 Copyright 2005

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be duplicated in any way
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Marmura, Michael E., 1929-

Probing in Islamic philosophy : studies in the philosophies of Ibn Sina I To Betty
Michael E. Marmura.
p.cm.

ISBN l -58684-254-4 (pbk.: alk. paper)

1. Avicenna, 980-1037. 2. Ghazali, 1058-1111. 3. Philosophy, Islamic. I. Title

B751.Z7M33 2004
181'.5--dc22 2004018718

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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA

thur Hyman, ed. R. Link-Salinger (Washington, DC, The Catholic University of America
Press, 1988), pp. 195-205.
91 Risiila, pp. 183-84.
92
93
Risiila, p. 184.
Psychology, p. 13, lines 14-15.
Avicenna's Proof from ContinSJency
94
95
Ibid., pp. 223-24. for God's Existence in
Qur'iin, XV: 29, also XXXVIII: 72.
96
Risiila, pp. 184-85. the Metaphysics of the Shila'*

Introduction
rfn his Arabic writings, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (d. 1037) gives more than
J one version of his celebrated proof from contingency for the existence
of God. 1 A concise version, for example, is given in the short treatise, al
Risiila al- 'Arshiyya.2 The two best-known versions-certainly the ones usu
ally referred to in discussions of the proof-are those given in the meta
physical parts of the Najiit and the Ishiiriit, respectively.3 The question thus
naturally arises regarding the Metaphysics of his voluminous Shifii does it
not contain a version of the proof?
It would be anomalous if it did not, since this is Avicenna's major meta
physical work. One of its fundamental theses, it should be added, is that
metaphysics cannot take the existence of God as self-evident, but must
demonstrate it.4 Avicenna further states explicitly that he will be offering in
the Metaphysics a demonstration of God's existence and indicates the nature
of such a proof 5-a point to which we shall shortly return. A proof from
contingency for the existence of God is certainly found in the Metaphysics.
The problem, however, is locating it, more accurately, locating its parts and
assembling them.
For the proof in the Metaphysics is spread among various and often
widely separated chapters of this intricately argued and structurally complex
work. Its components are found mainly in Book l , chaps. 5 and 6, Book 4,
chap. l , Book 6, chap. 2 and Book 8, chap. 1. Moreover, in the entire Meta
physics, it is only in the heading of Book 8, chap. 3, that we find any men
tion of a proof for God's existence.6 But if we begin by looking for a proof
from contingency in this chapter, we will find a complementary argument
that presupposes the proof proper. For Avicenna's proof from contingency,
in its various versions, makes use of different arguments from the finitude
of efficient causes. Chapter 3 of Book 8 complements this by arguing for

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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
the finitude of formal and teleological causes. The argument in the Meta
physics that parallels the proof from contingency in the Arabic versions we
have mentioned ends in the first part of chapter 1 of Book 8,7 the rest of the
chapter being devoted to a complementary argument for the finitude of the
receptive, material causes.8
To this it should be added that the premises of the proof in the Meta
physics have often to be extracted from different contexts. Hence, in the
search for the proof, it is not simply a matter of tracing an argument that is
constantly being interrupted. It also means isolating such premises without
distorting the original intention of the discussions in which they appear.
There is also ambiguity in some of Avicenna's statements. Thus, for exam
ple, in chapter 6 of Book 1, in the discussion of the properties of "that
which is in itself necessary," i.e., God, the existence of God seems to be as
serted before the proof for this existence is completed. (Whether or not this
is the case, however, depends on how we read the text.) Moreover, some
times we have to go to other parts of the Shifii' and other writings of
Avicenna for a fuller understanding of the proofs premises. There is also an
instance, as we shall see, where Avicenna simply refers us back to the Phys-
; ics of the Shifii'for one of the arguments that can be used to prove the im
possibility of an actual infinite.
It is with all this in mind that we will endeavor to "reconstruct" the
proof from contingency as it occurs in the Metaphysics. Before we attempt
this, however, some remarks on the relation of this version to the more
closely related versions in the Najiit and the Ishiiriit are in order.
The Proof in the Metaphysics as it Relates to its
Versions in the Najiit and the Ishiiriit
The proof's versions in the Metaphysics, the Najiit and the Ishiiriit have
one fundamental thing in common. They offer a "metaphysical" proof,
rather than a proof from "physics," for God's existence. They do not, that is,
argue for the existence of God from our observation of the external world.
They all begin with an intellectual intuition of existence and through an
analysis of the concept of existence they arrive at the existence of "the nec
essary existent," God. Now, it is true that in the Najiit there is no explicit
reference to this. Avicenna simply starts by saying: "There is no doubt that
there is existence."9 He does not specify whether we have this certitude be-
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Probing in Islamic Philosophy
cause we intuit existence intellectually, or because of our sensory experi
encing of the physical world. But after this opening statement there is no
reference to the sensible external world in the proof. The argument is purely
rational and is substantially the same as the one offered in the /shiiriit
where, as we shall see, Avicenna tells us that the proof he has given is not
based on our experiencing of the physical world.
In Metaphysics, Book 1, chap. 3, where Avicenna discusses the "bene
fit" of metaphysics, he writes: 10
It will become clear to you anon through an intimation that
we have a way for proving the First Principle, not by way of in
ference from sensible things, but through universal rational
premises that make it necessary that there must be for existence a
principle that is necessary in its existence, that makes it impossi
ble for [this principle] to be in any respect multiple, and that
makes it necessary that it must be the principle of the whole [of
existence] and that the whole proceeds from Him according to
the order possessed by the whole.
Due to our incapacity, however, we are unable to adopt this
demonstrative method which is the method of arriving at the
secondary existents from the primary and at the effect from the
cause, except with reference to certain groupings of the order of
existing things, not in detail. 11
Again, in the Ishiiriit, after presenting the proof for God's existence and
discussing His unity, he writes: 12
Reflect on how our proof for the existence and oneness of
the First and His being free from attributes did not require reflec
tion on anything except existence itself and how it did not re
quire any consideration of His creation and acting, even though
the latter [provide] evidential proof (dalil) for Him.
This mode, however, is more reliable and noble, that is,
where when we consider the state of existence, we find that exis
tence inasmuch as it is existence bears witness to Him, while He
thereafter bears witness to all that comes after Him in exis
tence.13
Thus Avicenna is concerned with (a) proving the existence of God
through an analysis of existence and (b) showing the manner in which the
world proceeds from Him through a consideration of the nature of the God
head. Although our interest is in (a), the way in which the proof is presented
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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
in the Najiit and the Ishiiriit is relevant to (b). Broadly speaking, the form or
structure of the proof as it appears in these two works can be summarized as
follows. An existent is in itself either necessary or only contingent. If in it
self necessary, then this is what we are seeking, God. If in itself only con
tingent, then we will demonstrate that such a contingent (if it exists) re
quires the existent that is necessary in itself. In either case, then, there must
be an existent that is necessary in itself, the one God. We note that the ar
gument proves the existence of God, not of the contingent world. (For the
existence of the contingent is hypothesized. 14) Proving the existence of the
world is an argument from cause to effect-as Avicenna himself explicitly
I
states15-and involves Avicenna's emanative scheme and the argument that
the world proceeds as the necessary consequence of divine knowledge. 16
Does then the version of the proof in the Metaphysics have such a struc
ture? Now, the major premise of the proof, as we shall see, is given and ar
gued for in chapter 6 of Book l , though in a different but related context. It
is true that there is ambiguity in Avicenna's presentation of the premise and
subsequent discussion. But this, as we shall argue, can be resolved, so that
the presence of the premise there suggests very strongly that the form of the
proof in the Najiit and the /shiiriit is implicit in the argument in the Meta
physics. This is further supported by Avicenna's statements in the Meta
physics and the /shariit (quoted above) regarding the proof of God's exis
tence where the conception of a metaphysical proof in both works is the
same.
The proof in the Metaphysics, however, has three features that distin
guish it from its versions in the Najiit and the Ishiirat. First of all, it indi
cates the epistemological sense in which the concept of existence is for
Avicenna an intellectual intuition, giving us thereby a fuller understanding
of the a priori nature of the proof in all its versions. Secondly, it gives the
more detailed arguments to establish (a) the premise that the effect of the
proximate, essential efficient cause is necessitated and (b) its corollary that
such a cause is prior to its effect only "in existence," not in time. This con
cept of the efficient cause as coexisting with its effect underlies all three
, versions. Finally, it gives variant (though complementary) arguments to the
; one repeated in both the Najiit and the Ishariit to show that a chain of caus
ally connected contingent existents must terminate in "the necessary exis
I tent."
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Probing in Islamic Philosophy
The A Priori Nature of the Proof
For the a priori nature of the proof in the Metaphysics we must tum to
Book 1, chap. 5. He begins this chapter by stating that "the 'meanings' (al
ma 'ani) of the existent (al-mawjud), the thing (al-shay') and the necessary
(al-<f,arurf) are impressed on the soul in a primary way, this impression not
requiring better known things to bring it about." He then states that just as
in the realm of propositions there are self-evident first principles, there are
in conceptual matters "things that are principles for conception." 17
Thus, "the existent" and "the necessary" are primary concepts and
these, as we shall see, are the two basic concepts on which the proof from
contingency rests. Avicenna in this chapter, however, is largely concerned
with the logical and semantic sense in which such concepts are primary.
Thus, he maintains, they are the most general, the better known, and primi
tive in the sense that they cannot be defined in terms of other concepts: any
attempt to define them so, he argues, must lead either to circularity or to in
finite regression. The analysis is extensive. It extends, for example, to dis
tinguish between different meanings of "existence." Avicenna also devotes
a lengthy and interesting discussion to the problem of non-existence, more
specifically, to showing when and how one can use meaningful language to
describe the non-existent-a future event, for example.
Avicenna's logical and semantic discussion of these concepts is cer
tainly pertinent to understanding the a priori nature of his proof and we will
return to aspects of it. But it is not sufficient. There is a more epistemologi
cal side to the primacy of these concepts in Avicenna's system which we
must consider. In this chapter, he only alludes to this side when he tells us
that these concepts are "impressed on the soul in a primary way." To see
what he means we must tum to his emanative theory of knowledge-found
in his psychological writings-and the distinction he draws between two
kinds of intelligibles, primary and secondary. 18
For Avicenna the human soul acquires the intelligibles as emanations
from the active intelligence, the last of a series of celestial intelligences that
emanate successively from God. 19 The primary intelligible concepts consist
of the primitive concepts we have been discussing and of self-evident logi
cal propositions. As we have seen, these are primary in the sense that they \
are not derivable from more primitive intelligibles. But they are also pri
mary in that they are the first intelligibles to emanate on the human intellect.
Their reception from the active intelligence does not require the presence of
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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
other intelligibles, any type of instruction, or any activity of the soul on the
sensitive and imaginative levels. As such they are received by all men. The
)secondary intelligibles, on the other hand, consist of concepts derivable
;from more primitive concepts and propositions inferred from more primi
!tive propositions. These intelligibles are received only by men capable of
\abstraction. Normally, their reception must be anteceded by the presence of
the primary intelligibles and by such activities of the soul as sensation,
imagination, cogitation, or imaged thinking, by instruction in some form or
another. These activities prepare the soul for the reception of the secondary
intelligibles from the active intelligence.
What concerns us most is that such concepts as "the existent" and "the
necessary" are primary intelligibles. Their reception by the human soul
from the active intelligence does not require the preparatory activities of
sensation, cogitation and so on; that is, their acquisition is totally independ
ent of sensory experience. Thus the two concepts on which Avicenna's
proof from contingency rests are for him independent of our observation of
the physical world. But apart from the modal concept of "the necessary,"
the proof, as we shall see, employs the concepts of "the possible" and "the
impossible." Are these also primitive concepts? Avicenna raises the issue
by noting that it is difficult to define any of these three concepts. Attempts
to do so have led to circularity, he tries to show, since each of them has
been defined in terms of the other two. "Nonetheless," he argues, "of these
three, the one with the highest claim to be first conceived is the necessary."
"This," he continues, "is because the necessary points to the 'assuredness of
existence' (ta' akkud al-wujud), existence being better known than non-:
existence because existence is known in itself while nonexistence is, in
some way or another, known through existence."20 This suggests that Avi
cenna after all holds "the necessary" to be more primitive of the three modal
concepts, the other two, derivable from it--derivable, however, a priori.
We cannot discuss Avicennia' s a priori concept of the existent without
mentioning his well-known example of the person suspended in space. If
any one of us, he argues, supposes himself born all at once, mature and fully
rational, but suspended in the void in such a fashion that he is totally un
aware of his physical body, he will still know that he exists as an individual
self.21 Thus, for Avicenna, one's own existence can be known without ref
erence to the physical and the sensory. This argument, though important and
interesting in its own right, should perhaps not be unduly emphasized in the
reconstruction of the proof in the Metaphysics. For one thing, there is no al-
Probing in Islamic Philosophy
lusion to it in this part of the Shifii Secondly, it is presented neither to dis
pel doubt about existence nor primarily to show that we can have a purely
intellectual awareness of existence. The main intention of this argument is
really to prove that the human soul is an individual, immaterial substance. It
is the discussion in Book 1, chap. 5 that is the more immediately pertinent
to the proof.
The Proof's Causal Premise
Having affirmed in chapter 5 of Book 1 that such concepts as "the exis
tent" and "the necessary" are primary, Avicenna goes on in chapter 6 to dis
cuss what he regards as the two modes of existence: (1) that which is in it
self only possible and (2) that which is in itself necessary. It is in discussing
these two modes that in the Metaphysics he first enunciates the causal prem
ises underlying his proof from contingency. Avicenna writes: 22
The things that enter existence bear a twofold division in the
mind. They include that which when considered in itself, its exis
tence is not necessary and, clearly, not impossible, since other
wise it would not enter existence; this thing is within the bounds
of possibility. They will include that which when considered in
itself is necessary.
Before turning to the causal premise, however, two preliminary remarks are
in order.
The first is that we encounter an ambiguity in Avicenna's language. Af
ter stating that existents "bear a twofold division in the mind," either that
which in itself is only possible or that which is in itself necessary, there
seems to be a shift in the wording from the hypothetical to the categorical.
The language, particularly as the discussion progresses, lends itself to be
understood as conveying the pronouncement that things entering existence
in fact divide into these two types of existence. Thus interpreted, the exis
tence of God and the world is simply asserted. But since it is from an analy
sis based on this presumed assertion that the fundamental causal premise for
the proof of God's existence is derived, a glaring circularity ensues.
We have every reason to think, however, that this shift to the categori
cal is only seeming, that it does not reflect what is actually being said. The
key clause iri the chapter is in the opening statement that things entering ex
istence "bear a twofold division in the mind," tanqasimff al- aql ilii qis-
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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
mayn. The natural, and in our view, proper way to understand what Avi
) cenna is saying is that things entering existence can include either that
' which i itsel is only possible, tht hich is in itself necessary (without
; _
specifymg which), or both these distmct types of existence. As such, the
I statement is identical with the major premise of the proof in the Najiit and
the /shiiriit. Hence the discussion that follows this division should be under
stood as having the pattern: "If the existents include that which in itself is
necessary, then the latter would have such and such characteristics and if
the existents include that which is in itself only possible, then the latter
would have such and such characteristics." .Thus understood, there is no
: categolical assertion that both modes of existence are included among the
existents. This understanding of the text absolves the proof from the circu
larity we have mentioned. Absolved from this circularity, the opening
statement whose primary intention is to introduce a discussion of the char
acteristics of the two possible modes of existing things (not to give a proof
of God's existence) can now be interpreted as also constituting an implicit
premise for the proof as a whole.
The second remark is that the causal premise derived from the discus
sion of the two modes of existence is ultimately related to the distinction
between essence and existence. Since existence is not included in the quid
dity of the contingent, then, if such a contingent exists, its existence must
derive from something extraneous to the quiddity. It must have a cause. But
the main argument, as we shall see, is not simply to show that such a con
tingent must have a cause, but that it is necessitated by such a cause.
Avicenna begins by arguing that that whose existence is in itself neces
sary can have no cause. For if we suppose it to have a cause, then it would
become necessary through another and is no more necessary in itself. It also
follows, he tries to show, that the necessary existent is one, unique, simple
and changeless. The analysis is totally different when we consider the pos
sible in itself, the contingent. For the contingent is that which when consid
ered in itself can exist or not exist. If it exists, then it has been "specified"
with existence rather than non-existence; similarly, if it does not exist, it has
been "specified" with nonexistence rather than existence. But the quiddity
of the contingent-and it is here that the essence-existence distinction is
manifest-is not sufficient to account for this specification. Thus if the
contingent exists, this is due to something extraneous which is its cause; and
if it does not exist this is also due to something extraneous, namely, the ab
sence of its cause.23
Probing in Islamic Philosophy
Now, suppose, Avicenna argues in effect, that there is an existent, "A,"
that is in itself possible but which has been brought into existence by a
cause, "B." Although in itself only possible, "A" must become necessary
through "B" and "with respect to it." If it were not, then with the existence
of "B" and "with respect to it," "A" would remain possible. Since it exists,
however, we would have to suppose some other cause to have specified it
with existence and if "A" is not rendered necessary through this other cause,
then we would have to suppose yet another and so on ad infinitum. But an
infinity of such causes--even if for the moment we allow as possible
would not specify "A" with existence. Hence, since "A" exists, it must have
been specified with existence (rather than non-existence) and rendered nec
essary through "B."
Avicenna hence is not simply arguing that if a contingent exists it must
have a cause. He is also arguing that such a contingent is rendered necessary
by its cause-that it is necessitated. This is further confirmed by a comple
mentary argument in the first chapter of Book 4,24 a chapter devoted largely
to a discussion of causal priority. Just as the contingent effect must have in
itself the possibility of coming into being, Avicenna argues in essence, its
cause must have the possibility of generating it. This possibility in the
cause, however, is not sufficient for producing the effect. There must be
something else. This thing in addition to the possibility then necessarily
causes the effect. Otherwise, the cause would remain a mere possibility, in
sufficient for producing effect. Thus, if the causal conditions-including the
absence of impediments-are fulfilled, the effect follows necessarily. Im
plicit in the argument is that there can be no temporal delay between cause
and effect. Both for Avicenna coexist:25
Hence with the existence of the cause, the existence of every
effect is necessary and the existence of its cause necessitates the
existence of its effect. The two exist together in time, eternity, or
whatever, but are not together with respect to the attainment of
existence.
The argument from contingency, as we shall see, rests on the premise
that the necessarily connected efficient causes and effects coexist. For it is
the series of such causes that must be finite, thus having an uncaused cause,
the existent necessary in Himself, God. But what about the causes that pre
cede their effect in time? In chapter 2 of Book 6, devoted to the argument
that the efficient cause not only produces its effect but also sustains it and
hence must coexist with it, Avicenna points out that the causes that precede
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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
eir effects in time are "causes by way of accident or helpers."26 Not only
is the infinity of such temporally related events possible, but it is necessary,
since it is coordinate with the eternal movement of the heavens. Being infi
nite in the past and in the future, these temporal events have no finite first or
last terms. Elsewhere, Avicenna refers to the two causal series, the essential,
finite, and the accidental, infinite, as the vertical and the horizontal, respec
tively.27 This distinction is presupposed in his final argument to show that
the series of coexisting causes and effects must be finite. But for this we
have to tum from Book 6, chap. 2, to Book 8, chap. 1.
The Finitude of Efficient Causes
In chapter 1 of Book 8, Avicenna offers a main argument for the fini
tude of efficient causes, and an ancillary one. He also refers us back to the
Physics of the Shifiifor a standard argument to show the impossibility of an
actual infinite. He introduces the main argument by reminding us that effi
cient cause and its effect coexist and that this principle has already been es
tablished. He then writes: 28
If we suppose an effect, and suppose for it a cause and its
cause a cause, it is impossible that every cause would have a
cause ad infinitum. This is because the effect, its cause and the
cause of its cause, if all considered in the relation each has to the
other, the cause of the cause would be a first absolute cause to
the two things, the two things having the relation of being an ef
fect of it even though they would differ in that one is an effect
through an intermediary, the other an effect without an interme
diary. The last and the middle would not be like the first. This is
because the intermediary-which is the cause contiguous with
the last effect-is cause of one thing only, whereas the second
effect is not a cause of anything.
Each of the three thus has a special characteristic. The spe
cial characteristic of the one extreme which is caused is that it is
not the cause of anything. The special characteristic of the other
extreme is that it is the cause of everything other than itself. The
special characteristic of the intermediary is that it is the cause of
one extreme and the effect of another extreme.
The intermediary, Avicenna goes on to argue, will have this special
characteristic regardless of whether it is "one or more than one and, if more
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Probing in Islamic Philosophy
than one, whether it is finitely or infinitely arranged." For, if finite, "the
sum of the number between the two extremes would be an intermediary."
But could not the intermediary be infinite, that is, having no first term? This
would be impossible, Avicenna argues, for then it would be the cause of one
extreme without having the opposite extreme, the uncaused cause. This con
tradicts the very definition of an intermediary. Hence, he concludes, the se
ries of efficient causes and effects must be finite, having a last term, the ef
fect that is not also a cause, and a first term, the uncaused cause, the
Necessary Existent, God.
The ancillary argument raises the question of admitting the two ex
tremes yet allowing an infinite intermediary between them. To this Avi
cenna responds by stating that such a view would not impede the "purpose
we are after, namely, to prove the existence of the first cause." To affirm
such a view, he then adds, is to utter with the tongue something "without
conviction." But if we were to allow the possibility of such a series, it
would be essentially finite, infinity being "a meaning that pertains to the
enumerated, not to the thing itself."29
Turning back to the main argument, Avicenna bases it on the premise
that cause and effect coexist. Why is this premise necessary? The reasoning
underlying his thinking seems to be as follows: in the case of the accidental
cause that precedes its effect in time we never arrive at an effect which is
not a cause of a temporally succeeding effect, a last finite term in the series.
(Avicenna, it must be remembered, upheld the doctrine of the world's eter
nity.) This is not the case with the series of coexisting causes and effects
where we do reach such an effect. But if this is Avicenna's underlying rea
soning, then it is clear that he assumes the point at issue, namely, that in a
series of coexisting causes and effects there is a terminal effect. Again, in
defining the intermediary, he seems to include the concept of a first cause,
the very thing to be proven. It is difficult to see how one can defend the ar
gument against criticism that it is circular.
As we have mentioned, however, this is not the only argument Avi
cenna uses. He also refers back to the argument in the Physics of the
Shifii30 which relative to the mathematical concepts of Avicenna's time is
more persuasive. This is a standard argument for the impossibility of an ac
tual infinite that has its roots in Aristotle and which first appears in Arabic
philosophy in the writings of al-Kindi (d. c. 868).31 Although it has different
versions, in its essentials it maintains that the supposition of an infinite
magnitude, a body, or a series of naturally ordered coexisting causes and
J4I -
 MICHAEL E . MARMURA Probing in Islamic Philosophy

effects must lead to contradiction. For from such a supposed infinite one
2
lbn Sina, al-Risiila al- 'Arshiyya in Majmii 'Rasii'il al-Shaykh al-Ra' zs (Hyderabad,
can take out a finite quantity, leaving, however, another infinite, lesser than 1354 A.H.), pp. 23--24. For a translation, see the Appendix below.
3
lbn Sina, al-Najiit (Cairo, 1938), p. 235; al-Ishiiriit wa al-Tanbzhiit (vols. 3 and 4), ed.
the first by the finite quantity removed. This means that there are unequal
S. Dunya (Cairo, 1938), pp. 447-55. This edition includes the commentary of NaIr al-Din
infinites-a contradiction. Tiis1 (d. 1274). These two references will be abbreviated Najiit and Ishiiriit, respectively. For
Avicenna's formulation of the argument in the Physics of his Shifa'can a translation of the proof in these two versions, see the Appendix below.
be summed up as follows. If we suppose an infinite coexisting magnitude, it 4
Ibn Sina, al-Shifa': al-Iliihiyyiit (Metaphysics). ed. G. C. Anawati, S. Dunya, M. Y.
would be infinite either in many directions or only one. If infinite in more Musa and S. Zayid, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1960), I, p. 5, 1.18-p. 6, 1.13 (p. 6, I. 13 for the specific
than one direction, it can always be divided to form infinite magnitudes that reference to the statement that the existence of God is not self-evident). This work will be
abbreviated Iliihiyyiit in the notes.
have a finite starting point and hence infinite only in one direction. Thus, if 5
Ibid., p. 21, 11. 1-8; p. 27. 1. 9.
we suppose, for example, an infinite line, we can select a point where it is 6
The heading of 8.3 (Iliihiyyiit 2.340, 11. 11-13) reads as follows: "On showing the
divided into two infinite lines in opposite directions, both having the same Finitude of the Final and Formal Causes: On Proving (theExistence of ] the First Principle in
finite starting point. If then we take one of these lines infinite in one direc an Absolute Manner: On Making Decisive the Statement on the First Cause Unrestrictedly
tion, we can subdivide it at a point forming a finite segment of the original and [On Making it] on the First Cause Restrictedly; Showing that what is Absolutely a First
Cause is a Cause for the Rest of the Causes."
infinite line. But the distance from this new finite point in the direction of 7
Ibid.,p.329, 11. 6-7.
infinity is still infinite, so that we have now two infinite magnitudes in the 8
Ibid., p, 329,1. 7 to p. 321.
same direction. Since both have a finite starting point, one can in principle 9
See Appendix and n. 2 of Appendix.
apply one to the other. Since both are infinite, they must coextend. But they 10
Iliihiyyiit 1. 21, 11. 2-8.
11
cannot since one is less than the other by the finite distance separating their The reference seems to be to the triadic emanative scheme concerned with ,;some" or
"certain groupings (baq jumal)" of existents, namely, the celestial intelligences, souls and
starting points. They are thus both equal and unequal and this is a contradic
bodies, and then in a general, not detailed manner, with the kinds of existents in the world of
tion. "From this," Avicenna concludes, "it becomes clearly manifest that the generation and corruption.
existence of what is actually infinite in terms of magnitudes and ordered 12 Ishiiriit, p. 482.
numbers is impossible." 13
See A.-M. Goichon's French translation and comments on this: Ibn Sznii (A vicenne),
With Avicenna's referring us back to the Physics of the Shifii' for the Livre des Directions et remarques, traduction avec introduction et notes par A.-M. Goichon
above argument, the version of the proof from contingency in the Metaphys (Paris-Beirut. 1951), pp. 371-72 and n. 1 on p. 371.
14
Taking "P" and "N" to represent "the existent that in itself is only possible" and "the
ics that parallels his other version ends. Scattered as it is throughout the existent necessary in itself," respectively, and taking the connective "or" as inclusive, the
Metaphysics and not without its share of textual and logical difficulties, it overall structure of the argument can be represented as:
nonetheless remains in many ways the most detailed and comprehensive of
EitherN or P
his versions. EitherN or (If P thenN)
ThereforeN;
Or, more simply, as:
NOTES EitherN or P
If P thenN
* A shorter version of this paper was read on 26 February 1979 at the annual meeting of ThereforeN.
the Mid-West Branch of the American Oriental Society held at the University of Wisconsin, In the Najiit, the Ishiiriit and also the al-Risiila al- 'Arshiyya, (see Appendix), the main task is
Madison. to prove the statement, "If P then N." This is the argument from contingency proper. It dif
I For a related discussion based on the metaphysical part of Avicenna's major Persian
fers, however, from other versions of this argument by other philosophers in that the exis
work, the Danishniime-yi- 'Alii'z (The Book ofKnowledge Dedicated to 'Ala' al-Daw/a), see tence of "P" is hypothetical.
P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sina and Malcom and the Ontological Argument," The Monist 54.2 15
See the quotation above from the Metaphysics, Jliihiyyiit 1.21, 11. 2-8.
(April 1970), 234-49.

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 MICHAEL E . MARMURA Probing in Islamic Philosophy

16 See my article, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of

cedes existence when only mentally supposed, or whether it is in the state of
Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society 82.3 (July-September 1962), 299- existence. For the entry into existence of that whose existence is possible
312. 17 lliihiyyiit 1.29, 11. 5-16.
18
Ibn Sinii: Avicenna's De Anima, ed, F. Rahman (London, 1958), pp. 49 ff.: F1lthbiit
does not remove from it the possibility of existence. If it has no cause for its
al-Nubuwwiit (On the Proofof Prophecies), ed. M. E.Marmura (Beirut, 1968), pp. 42-32- existence in any manner whatsoever, then it is necessary of existence. Once
also pp. 32-33 the Arabic introduction and part N of the English introduction. this principle is established, then the proof that in existence there is an exis
19 This raises the difficulty that Avicenna's emanative epistemology rests on his affir
tent that has no cause for its existence is along the lines I say:
mation of God's existence and the manner in which the world proceeds from Him. Since the This existence is either an existence which is possible or an existence
"metaphysical" proof for God's existence (at least in the Shifii') rests in tum on this emana which is necessary. If it is that which is necessary, then what we have
tive epistemology, the argument, it would seem, becomes circular. The question, however, is
in need of further study and would have to take into account, among other things, the tradi sought after is established. If it is possible in existence, then that whose ex
tional Aristotelian order in which Avicenna presents his theories, as well as other arguments istence is possible does not enter existence save through a cause that renders
an Avicennian can use to establish that we can have knowledge of existence which is purely its existence more preponderant than its non-existence. If its cause also is
intellectual (see the concluding paragraph of this part of the article on pp. 343-44). possible in existence [and the latter's cause also only possible and so on]
20
lliihiyyiit, 1.36, 11. 4-6. then the possibles would connect with each other in this manner so that
21
Avicenna's De Anima, p. 16; Ishiiriit 2, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1957), p. 320.
there would be no existent at all. This is because the existent 1 we have sup
22
lliihiyyiit 1.37, I l. 7- IO.
23
Ibid., pp. 38-39. posed would not enter existence unless the existence of what is infinite pre
24 Ibid., p. 165, l. 15-p, 166, l. 16. cedes it-which is impossible. Hence the possible terminates in the neces
25 Ibid., p. 167, 11. 1-3. sary existent.
26
Ibid., p. 367, 11. 1-2.
27
Ishiiriit, p. 709. B. The Proof in the Najiit (p. 235)
28
lliihiyyiit 2, p. 372, I. 12-p. 328, 1. 3.
29
Avicenna's model here seems to be the supposition of an actual infinite by division,
that is, the actual division of a finite magnitude into infinite parts. Not that he accepts the There is no doubt that there is existence.2 Every existence is either nec
possibility of such an infinite. What he seems to be saying is that even if one concedes the essary or possible. If necessary, then it would be true that the necessary ex
possibility of such an infinite simply for the sake of argument, the magnitude remains finite, ists, which is the thing being sought after. If possible, we will make it evi
having a finite starting point and a finite end, and this is what matters. dent that the existence of the possible terminates with the necessary
30
Book 3, chap. 8 of the Tab"i 'iyyiit (Physics) of the Shift/ This part of the Shifii, is still
existent.
unpublished, but I have a microfilm of the Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit Arabic
MS. 1444 of the Shifii The argument is on fol. 195v. Substantially the same argument is Before [showing] the latter, we will set down premises, one of which is
given in Najiit, pp. 124-25 and The Metaphysics ofAvicenna (Ibn Sfnii), translated from the that for each thing that in itself is possible there cannot be at any one time
Persian text of the Danishniime-yi- 'Alii'f with notes and commentary by P. Morewedge an infinity of causes that are in themselves possible. This is because all of
(New York, I 973), pp. 44-45.
31
these [causes] would either coexist or not coexist. Let us, however, post
Aristotle Physics 3.5 (204a20-29); al-KindI, Rasii'il al-Kindf al-Falsafiyya, ed. A.H. pone discussion of the [latter alternative where] the infinite does not coexist
Abu Rida (Cairo. 1950), pp. 114-16.
in one time, each of [its components] existing before the other. For the infi
nite to coexist, however, without including a necessary existent, such an ag
APPENDIX gregate inasmuch as it is that aggregate, regardless of whether it is finite or
infinite, must then in itself be either necessary or possible in existence.
A. The Proof in the al-Risiila al- 'Arshiyya (pp. 2-3) If [the aggregate] is necessary in itself, when each of its components is
possible [in itself ], then the necessary existent would subsist in things that
Know that the existent either has a cause for its existence or has no are possible in themselves, which is self-contradictory.
cause. If it has a cause, then it is the possible, regardless of whether it pre-

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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
If, [on the other hand,] the aggregate is possible in itself, then it requires
for its existence that which bestows existence. [This bestow er of existence]
would then be either extraneous to the aggregate or included in it.
If included in it, then it is either the case that one of its members would
be a necessary existent when each member is a possible existent, which is
contradictory, or it would be contingent, in which case it would be the cause
of the existence of the aggregate.
But the cause of the existence of the aggregate is first of all a cause for
the existence of its parts of which it is one. Hence it would be a cause of it
self. This, in addition of being impossible, if true, would be the very thing
that is sought. For anything which is sufficient for bringing about its own
existence is necessary in existence. But we have supposed it not to be nec
essary, and this is contradictory.
It remains then that [the bestower of existence] is extraneous [to the ag
gregate]. But it cannot be a cause that is contingent. For we have brought
together every cause that is contingent within this aggregate. Hence [the be
stower of existence] is extraneous to the aggregate and in itself necessary in
existence. All possible existents hence terminate in a cause that is necessary
in existence. Hence it is impossible that every contingent has an infinite
number of contingent causes.
C. The Proof in the lshiiriit (pp. 447-55)3
REMARK
[In the case of ] every existent, if you turn to it in terms of itself, without
paying heed to another, it would be such that existence is either necessary
for it in itself or is not. If [existence is necessary for it in itself ] then this is
the Truth in Himself, whose existence is necessary from Himself. He is the
ever self-subsistent (al-qayyum). If not necessary, then it is not permissible
to say that it in itself is impossible after it has been supposed to exist.
Rather, if a condition is attached to its being considered in itself, for exam
ple, the condition of the non-existence of its cause, then it becomes impos
sible-or, alternatively the condition of the existence of its cause, then it
becomes necessary.
If no condition is attached, neither the realization nor the non-realiza
tion of a cause, there would then remain for it the third alternative, namely,
possibility. It would then be [the existent] which when considered in itself is
the thing that is neither necessary nor impossible.
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Probing in Islamic Philosophy
Hence every existent is either necessary of existence in itself or possible
of existence in itself.
DIRECTIVE
That which what is due to it in its own right is possibility does not of
itself become existent. For, inasmuch as it is possible, its existing of itself
ha no greater claim than its non-existing. If one of the two [alternatives]
attains a greater claim, this is due to the presence or absence of something.
Hence the existence of every possible is from another.
DIRECTIVE
This will either form an infinite chain where each of the units of the
'chain is in itself possible, the aggregate dependent on [these units], in which
case [the aggregate] would be also not necessary [in itself ], becoming nec
essary through another; [or it will not form such a chain].
Let us clarify this further.
COMMENTARY
Every aggregate of which each individual is an effect requires necessar
ily a cause extraneous to its individual [members]. This is because either:
[(l)] it fundamentally does not require a cause, in which case it
would be necessary, not possible (but how can this come
about when [we have supposed it] to be rendered necessary
by its individual units?);
it necessarily requires a cause, namely, the individual units
[(2)]
in their entirety, in which case it would be cause of itself
for the aggregate and the whole are one and the same,
though "the whole" in the sense of "each one [of the
units]" does not render the aggregate necessary;
[(3)] it necessarily requires a cause consisting of some of the in
dividual units, when some of the units have no greater
claim for this than others, since each of them is caused, its
cause having the higher claim for this;
or
[(4)] it requires a cause extraneous to all the individual units,
which is the remaining [only valid alternative].4
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 MICHAEL E. MARMURA
REMARK
[In the case of ] every chain arranged in terms of causes and effects
regardless of whether it is finite or infinite-it is evident that if it includes
nothing which is not an effect,5 it requires an extraneous cause which, how
ever, inevitably connects with it as an extreme. It is also evident that if it
includes that which is not caused then this latter is an extreme and a limit.
Hence every chain terminates with that whose existence is necessary in
Himself.
NOTES
I The printed text reads wujiid, 'existence.'
2 La shakka anna hunii wujiidan, 'no doubt there is here existence.'
3 Compare with Goichon's French translation of the lshiiriit (n. 13 above), pp. 357-60.
4 Wa huwa al-biiqf, translated as 'et c'est l'Eternel' by Goichon. This is a possible trans-
lation, though in our view al-biiql, 'the remaining,' is not used here as an adjective of God in
the sense of the enduring or eternal, but refers to the last alternative in the argument.
5 Idhii lam yakunffhii illii ma?u!, literally, 'if there is not anything in it but an effect.'
Avicenna on Primary Concepts in
the Metaphysjcs of his a/-Shjfa'
Introduction
"cs-rhe ideas of 'the existent,' 'the thing,' and 'the necessary,' " writes
U Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (d. 428/1036-1037), initiating the pivotal
Chapter 5 of Book 1 of the Metaphysics of his al-Shifa "are impressed in
the soul in a primary way, this impression not requiring better known things
to bring it about." Just as in the category of propositions, he then explains,
"there are first principles, in themselves found tobe true, causing [in turn]
assent to the truth of other [propositions], ... similarly in conceptual matters,
there are things which are principles for conception that are conceived in
themselves.'' 1
It is not difficult to identify Avicenna's first principles in the realm of
propositions or judgments.These are none other than the self-evident logical
truths which the human mind apprehends directly, without any need for per
ceptual experience of the external world. In his psychological writings,
Avicenna refers to them as "the primary intelligibles" (al-maqiilat al-iila)
which he distinguishes from "the secondary intelligibles" (al-maqiilat al
thaniya). 2 The latter include syllogistic inferences dependent on the primary
intelligibles. They also include those universal concepts that are normally
"acquired" (muktasaba ). By this, Avicenna means that, with the exception of
their being revealed to prophets.3these concepts are not directly apprehended
by the human intellect.They require for their apprehension (a) the presence
in the mind of the primary intelligibles, and (b) certain preparatory activities
of the human soul on the sensory, mnemonic and imaginative levels that in
clude cogitation, that is, thinking in terms of particular images.4
But what about the primary intelligibles, needed for the apprehension of
the acquired concepts? Does Avicenna in his psychological writings include
with them the primary concepts? There is nothing explicit to indicate such
inclusion.5 In these writings he simply identifies the primary intelligibles
with the self-evident logical truths. There is no mention of such primary
concepts as those of "the existent," "the thing," and "the necessary." Hence
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