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G.R. No. L-51353 June 27, 1988

SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On May 1, 1970, Congress approved the Act imposing a stabilization tax on consignments abroad (RA 6125)that there shall be
imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the
time of receipt of such proceeds, whether partial or total, of any exportation. And that "Any export products the aggregate annual F.O.B.
value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be
subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said aggregate value."

The apellee Shell Philippines reach 5 M dollars of their by product petroleum, the Monetary Board issued its Resolution No. 47 to the
stabilization tax effective January 1, 1972. Under the Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by Resolution No. 47, appellee had
to pay the stabilization tax beginning January 1, 1972, which it did under protest. The n later filed a suit against Central Bank praying
that the resolution be declared bul and void. The lower court sustained that the resolution as void. The TC opined mentioning the
difference between calendar year and fiscal year wherein calendar year refers to one year starting from January to December. Fiscal
year, as it is usually and commonly used, refers to the period covered between July 1 of a year to June 30 of the following year. The
Central appealed the above cited decision of TC

ISSUES:

WON Monetary Board Resolution No. 47is null and void?

Which should prevail in case of discrepancy, the basic law or the rule and regulation issued to implement said law?

HELD:

1) YES.

While it is true that under the same law the Central Bank was given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
statutory provision in question but its authority is limited only to carrying into effect what the law being implemented provides. The trial
court was correct in declaring that "Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 is void insofar as it imposes the tax mentioned in Republic Act
No. 6125 on the export seria residue of (plaintiff) the aggregate annual F.O.B., value of which reached five million United States dollars
in 1971 effective on January 1, 1972." The said resolution runs counter to the provisions of R.A. 6125 which provides that "(A)ny export
product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the
effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate
value."

2) In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because
said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091) The rule or
regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis,
Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558)

The respondent was liable to pay the tax and that the Central Bank merely collected the said tax prematurely. There is likewise no
controversy over the rate of tax in force when payment became due. Thus, the tax refund granted by the trial court was not proper
because the tax paid was in fact, and in law due to the government at the correct time.

The Court decline to grant to the respondent an amount equivalent to the interest on the prematurely collected tax because of the well
entrenched rule that in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing payment of interest on the
amount to be refunded to the taxpayer, the Government cannot be required to pay interest. Likewise, it is the rule that interest may be
awarded only when the collection of tax sought to be refunded was attended with arbitrariness (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. v. Commission on
Internal Revenue, 100 SCRA 556). There is no indication of arbitrariness in the questioned act of the appellant.

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), Petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy
Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-
entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for payment of holiday pay. The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank
were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208. Accordingly, on February
16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and
regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. - Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number
of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be
paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
divided by twelve"

On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule,
pertinent . When the petitioner filed motion for the writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision whereby the respondent bank was
ordered to pay for the daily waged for the unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award, respondent bank opposed claiming that
it is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules implementing P. D. 850. NLRC dismissed the
respondents bank appeal but Minister of Labor through Deputy Minister Amado Inciong set aside the decision of NLRC and instead
dismissed the instant case for lack of merit.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding payment of regular holiday pay can still be set aside on appeal by the Deputy
Minister of Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially executed, the finality of which was affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission sitting en banc, on the basis of an Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the
Ministry of Labor long after the said decision had become final and executory.c

HELD:

NO.

Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and
void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope
of their exclusion.

Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides:

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. ...
The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof which reads:
Art. 82. Coverage. - The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not,
but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of the family of the employer who are dependent
on him for support domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by
the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the
implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits
by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2 which provides that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage
shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay
are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. This violates Article 4 of the Labor Code,
which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs.
Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code
authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.c

G.R. No. 141020, June 12, 2008]

CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC)
AND PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar started with the consolidated cases[4] filed by the petitioner
labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In an Order[5] dated 20 July 1987, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated
cases for lack of jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine
Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC). Petitioner attempted to file different motions insisting on the jurisdiction of NLRC over the case
but repeatedly denied. The petition was then brought to CA but the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari as it found no grave abuse
on the part of NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over employer-employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC?

HELD:

NO.

The respondent corporations were created by an original charter in accordance with the Constitution and jurisprudence, corporations
with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Labor Department." The present
Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section 2(1) that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters

The Court stated further that P.D. 1869 exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the
employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are "subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and
corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.

It is the Civil Service Commission, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the employer-employee problems in PAGCOR, PCOC
and PSSC.
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G.R. No. 84111 December 22, 1989

JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN,
VICENTE D. YUTANGCO,

FACTS:
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.
The petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District
Collector of Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar. At first the District Collector ordered for the release of
the bag but when the entire records of the case where transmitted to Commissioner of Customs, the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, for "further hearing on the merits", based on evidence that the seized
sugar was of foreign origin. Petitioner opposed the decision based on the contention that June 7, 1988 decision of the District Collector
of Customs became final and executory, in view of the absence of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-
day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar must be upheld. On
the other hand, the District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs argue that since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to the
government, the case should go to the Commissioner of Customs on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87,
dated May 18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla

ISSUE:

WON the Commissioner of Customs has the power to automatically review over the decision of the Collector of Customs
in protest and seizure cases?

HELD:

YES.

Under the memorandum order implements Section 12 (Art. IV, Part. IV, Vol. I) of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (hereafter, "PLAN")
which provides:

12. The Collector of Customs at each principal port of entry shall be the official head of the customs service in his port and district
responsible to the Commissioner. He shall have the authority to take final action on the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within
his collection district and on administrative matters in accordance with Chapter III, Part II of this Plan. Decisions of the Collector of
Customs in seizure and protest cases are subject to review by the Commissioner upon appeal as provided under existing laws;
provided, however, that where a decision of a Collector of Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the government, it
shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated for final review by
the Secretary of Finance; provided, further that if within thirty days from receipt of the records of the case by the Commissioner of
Customs or the Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance, the
decision under review shall become final and executory.

In Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, former President Marcos decreed and ordered that the Plan be (4 adopted,
approved, and made as part of the law of the land." Under the 1987 Constitution, "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII). While some provisions of the Plan have ceased to be operative because of
subsequent reorganizations, other provisions, such as Section 12 have not been repealed by subsequent legislation.
Section 12 of the Plan applies to petitioner's shipment of 9,000 bags of sugar. Taxes being the lifeblood of the Government, Section 12,
which the Commissioner of Customs in his Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87, enjoined all collectors to follow strictly, is intended
to protect the interest of the Government in the collection of taxes and customs duties in those seizure and protest cases which, without
the automatic review provided therein, neither the Commissioner of Customs nor the Secretary of Finance would probably ever know
about.

PETITION FOR REVIEW IS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IS MADE PERMANENT.
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[ G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996

THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
EMMANUEL A. MENESES, Respondents

FACTS:

The complainant is a regular rank and file employee of HSBC, was charged with dishonesty for not telling the truth why he was absent
on leave for days. The respondent claiming that he was having a stomach upset but when the bank called up the number, was informed
that he is not at home and that his alibi of having himself checked- up by a doctor the bank find out when called the doctor to verify that
it was of not true.

With this the bank came out with a memorandum from the Vice-President, Human Resources Department terminating his services
effective March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the union of the rank and
file employees of the bank and the company and the banks Code of Conduct.

The following day, February 17, 1993, the bank sent complainant another memorandum directing him to settle his outstanding loan
amounting to PHP179,834.00, net of a months salary the bank was paying him in lieu of notice not later than June 16, 1993. NLRCs
arbiter declared the termination illegal and ordered petitioner bank to reinstate private respondent to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and with backwages.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondents act of making a false statement as
to the real reason for his absence on February 3, 1993 did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant his termination from
service.
2) WON the bank can exercise power and prerogative to terminate an employees services?

HELD:

1) NO.

Private respondents false information concerning his whereabouts on February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of
the bank; neither is it a failure to turn over clients funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything "analogous" as to constitute a
serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of dismissal. NLRC effectively penalized him by disallowing compensation for the three
years counted from the time he received notice of his dismissal on February 23, 1993.

Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, "an employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing."

None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify
the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over
backwards in favor of the working class, and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favour.

2) NO.

The employers prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an employees services may not be exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner as to erode or render meaningless the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process

Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural, require strict compliance before an employee may be dismissed. 8 Clearly, it is the
NLRCs right and duty to review employers exercise of their prerogative to dismiss so as to prevent abuse and arbitrariness.

Indeed, upholding petitioners argument (that the NLRC cannot review petitioners disciplinary rules) would mean upsetting the entire
labor arbitral machinery, for it would result in depriving the labor arbiter and the NLRC of their jurisdiction to determine the justness of a
cause for dismissal as granted by Arts. 217 and 218 of the Labor Code.

PETITION DISMISSED.