Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals

204 SCRA 20 (310 Phil. 21) Civil Law Family Code Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

Note: This was the first case where the term psychological incapacity was discussed by the Supreme Court.

Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The
couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the
frequent interference of Julias parents, as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to, among
other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a
nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989.
She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay,
he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a
petition to nullify their marriage due to Julias alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure
to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed
an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion
between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological
incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition
since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also
notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is
not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required
to decree a nullity of marriage.

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Republic vs CA and Molina (G.R. No. 108763)

Posted: August 18, 2011 in Case Digests

Tags: Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Void Marriages

This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molinas marriage as void ab initio, on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his
tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents,
and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole
breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo
left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-
trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application
of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the
present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the
time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
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Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds
for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

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such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

SUAZO v. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:

Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any means to support
themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of
the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage,
Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both
her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to
comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink
and the next drinks but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to
the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate
medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show
that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on
the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and
its related jurisprudence.
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Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated
Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony
simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on
the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that
there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an
adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Veronica Alcazar vs Rey Alcazar

603 SCRA 604 Civil Law Persons and Family Relations Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity Sexual
Infidelity Per Se is not Psychological Incapacity

Article 45 Failure to Consummate the Marriage

In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other. They lived together for three weeks
thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated with Veronica despite Veronicas
efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went
straight to his parents. He did not even tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his husbands
return from someone else. Veronica went to Reys parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).

In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the ground for annulment was based on
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Reys failure to consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was
changed to psychological incapacity (Article 36).

During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who testified that Rey is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be having a grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too important,
too unique, and too special.

Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Reys alleged sexual infidelity because when he came home from
abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain Sally in his parents hometown.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey should be annulled.

HELD: No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that Veronica abandoned her cause under paragraph 5,
Article 45. The said provision states:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage
may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of
one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the
result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. No evidence was presented in the case
at bar to establish that Rey was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact,
Veronica admitted that she and Rey had sex before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not
exist int his case.

Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayags testimony on Reys NPD was not sufficient to establish
psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and Rey is merely a simple case of a married couple being apart too
long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much
as possible from his wife. To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.

Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey is a poor attempt to bolster the claim against Rey. Sexual
infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica failed to establish that Reys unfaithfulness is a manifestation of
a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536
and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
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The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage,
petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection
and safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-
known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the
offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262
would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN
THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision
on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents
had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the
case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by

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this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since
their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the
RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special
law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70
of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC
to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A.
No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
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Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women
and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, thatalarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the
woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the
acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with
the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the
present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will
best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here.
It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not
otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25

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The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot
be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial
on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court
will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be
an exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

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Footnotes

* The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.

1 Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora, records, p. 209.

2 Id. at 501.

3 Records, p. 21.

4 Id. at 22.

5 Id. at 23.

6 Id. at 1.

7 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting
to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical
or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, or controlling the
victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

xxxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:

xxxx

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial
of access to the woman's child/children.

8 Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".

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RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

Facts:

After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her
face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said
to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the
picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it
should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to
civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.

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Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid
and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his
death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though
they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after
the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172

FACTS:

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Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD:

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio

Carlos vs Sandoval

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos
II. Upon Teofilos death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995,
Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the
marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.

HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have
applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

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Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated
during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right
of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy
was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party
who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause
of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

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Braza vs Civil Register of Negros Occidental GR No 181174 04 December 2009

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Braza is the wife of Pablo Sicad Braza Jr., the latter died in a vehicular accident in
Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his (Pablos) remains in the Philippines, Respondent Lucille Titular and her
son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son respectively, of the deceased.
Petitioner Cristina thereupon made inquiries and in the course of which she obtained Patrick Alvins birth certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which had states that:

Pablo S. Braza as the father of Patrick Alvin; the latter was acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997;

Patrick Alvin was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents. Therefore, his name is changed to
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza.

Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing Pablo and Lucille were married.

Cristina and her co-petitioner filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate
record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and
subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo. Petitioner prayed for the:

Correction of the entries in Patricks birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his
acknowledgment and the use of the last name BRAZA;

A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

RTC: Trial Court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

MR: denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case?

Decision: Petition is dismissed. Petition to correct the entries (Rule 108) is a wrong remedy in this case because the trial
court herein has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

The allegations of the petition filed before the TC clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between
Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the
court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

It is well settled doctrine that validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT (vis a vis Art. 412 of the Civil Code)

Page | 16
It charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used ONLY TO CORRECT CLERICAL, SPELLING, TYPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER
INNOCUOUS ERRORS IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY.

CLERICAL ERROR/SUBSTANTIAL ERROR

A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.

Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Braza v Civil RegistrarG.R. No. 181174 | December 4, 2009 | Carpio-Morales

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristinas husband,

Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident inIndonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his
remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son.Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patricks birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowleged by
Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on
April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a
marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married onApril 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her
three legitimate children with Pablo) to file onDecember 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental a

petition tocorrect the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register

.Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille andPablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the

correction of the entries

in Patrick's birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of
the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to

submit Parick to DNA testing

to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his
birth certificate and, for this purpose, the

declaration of the marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous

. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is notacting as a
family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn
the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence,the controversy should be ventilated in
an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Page | 17
Issue:

WON the court

a quo

may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in anaction to correct entries in the civil
registrar. (WON substantial errors, such as those sought to be correctedin the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108)

Held:

NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacyand filiation.

Ratio:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

vis a vis

Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
anddue process is properly observed. The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucilles marriage as void forbeing bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively,hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.It is well to
emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attacksuch as the petition filed before the court

a quo

.Petition Denied.

SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

FACTS:

On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting
marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid
and subsisting.

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription.

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In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied
the motion to reconsider his order of denial.

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In
the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers
that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the
crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.

HELD:

No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well
entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for
liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by
its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned
the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He
likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage
in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which
circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said
crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

Vincent Mercado vs Consuelo Tan

337 SCRA 122 (391 Phil. 809) Civil Law Family Code Void Marriages Need for Judicial Declaration of Nullity Before
Remarriage
Criminal Law Bigamy Elements

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado married a second time. He
married a certain Consuelo Tan.

Page | 19
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.

In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).

In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.

In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought the dismissal of the
bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first
marriage to speak of, hence, his second marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before
a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of
bigamy.

Veronico Tenebro vs Court of Appeals

423 SCRA 272 (467 Phil. 723) Civil Law Family Code Bigamy Exists even if one marriage is declared void

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda
Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be
null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code

Page | 20
criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Read full text

Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug

Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages (except those falling under the principle of psychological
incapacity) should be allowed to be used as a valid defense for bigamy. Void ab initio marriages require no judicial
decree to establish their nullity. It is true that the Revised Penal Code does not require the first or second marriage to
be declared void to avoid a criminal case of bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable marriages because
again, void ab initio marriages really do not need such judicial decree.

ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES2004 Mar 30, G.R. No. 159218YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Facts: On September 18,
1967, petitioner Salvador married Narcisa Arceo. In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines
in 1992 when she learned that her husband was having anextra-marital affair and has left their home. Narcisa found
Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with FeCorazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989 Salvador
contracted a second marriage withZenaida Bias.On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against
Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a casefor bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.On May 18, 2001, the trial
court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court.Issue: Whether or not the petition for annulment is a prejudicial question to the proceedings
in the bigamy case.Held: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Petitioners assertion wouldonly
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition todeclare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in thecriminal case.The outcome of the
civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon thedetermination of petitioners
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage iscontracted.A marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his firstmarriage was void ab initio, the point is both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before thefirst marriage was annulled.The petition is denied

G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.

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The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila City Hall before Rev.
Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that
her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.

After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that
on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos
Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was
filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5

Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in
Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was
no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for
the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.

On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner
Zenaida Bias was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other
respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.

First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when
in fact it should have been 1989.

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.8 It is required
that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information.9

The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which
the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged
in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10

The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was
subsisting.

The information against petitioner alleges:

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa
Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989which has all the essential
requisites of a valid marriage.
Page | 22
CONTRARY TO LAW.11

The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the month of January,
1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a
subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the
information was defective is untenable.

The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by
evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial
and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of
criminal liability.

In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a bigamous
marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of
Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited
citizen who may come to know the same.14

Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question,
hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.17

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
Page | 23
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.20

In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision
mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term
should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner
Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.

Concurring Opinion

CARPIO, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of
bigamy.

The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. While his marriage with
Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Bias on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999,
Abunado obtained from the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of
bigamy.

The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Bias on 10 January 1989 constitutes the crime of bigamy
under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely, the issue turns on whether Abunados first marriage to
Arceno was still subsisting at the time Abunado married Bias.

Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, one
must first secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Page | 24
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado on 10 January 1989.

Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of nullity of the previous marriage
without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If subsequently the previous marriage were
judicially declared void, the subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous marriage
could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for bigamy,2 although the person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy"3 should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code
has changed this.

Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before he is freed from the
marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a
second marriage, then the second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals4 in
explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage, he is liable
for bigamy.

Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist for purposes of
remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of
the previous marriage subsists because of the absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is
contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab initio subsists only for
purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court held in
Cario v. Cario:5

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. x x x . (Emphasis supplied)

Cario, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in her present ponencia that
"under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding." I believe the ruling in Cario is correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug
explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from
the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of
nullity. The only recognized exception7 under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab
initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can
contract a subsequent marriage.

Page | 25
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers from nullity while the
second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not
the subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any
defect while the second is void.

Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Salvador S.
Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.

JARILLIO V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164435, [June 29, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS:

On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in
1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999.

On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before
the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo
and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of
bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.

On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing
at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that
her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back
as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE:

W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the
supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD:

No. Jarillos conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
Page | 26
consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of
a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Armas vs Calisterio

Armas vs. Calisterio

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel
of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with
William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the
disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds presumptive death.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter
and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that
her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be
adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive
death.

HELD:

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that
time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code
itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is

Page | 27
not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to
remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.

You are here: Home 2013 October Case Digest: Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NOLASCO

Published by paul on October 13, 2013 | Leave a response

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondents wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolascos attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a
bar in England during one of his ships port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondents hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seamans contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

The trial court granted Nolascos petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established
a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Issue:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
Page | 28
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified
and set aside.

Valdez vs Republic

Valdez vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued
constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their
house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have
passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and
executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007,
petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of
Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971
and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.

Page | 29
Ilusorio vs Bildner

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many
year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio,
herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in
Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner
lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children,
Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium
in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not
merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would
justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having
the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
of his right to privacy.

Page | 30
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Ilusorio vs Bildner (Ilusorio vs CA GR No 139808) GR No 139789 12 May 2000

11TuesdayOct 2016

Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Remedial Law Review 2

Leave a comment

Facts: This is a consolidated case of the following:

Petitioner (P) Erlinda Ilusorio seeks to reverse the Decision of the CA dismissing her application for habeas corpus to
have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio (Respondent, R for brevity) and enforce consortium.

Potenciano filed a petition to annul the portion of the Decision of the CA giving visitation rights her wife Erlinda to her.

Potenciano is about 86 years of age, possessed extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was, for many years,
the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

Erlinda and Potenciano are married couple but they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. They have
six (6) children (co-respondents).

On December 30, 1997, Potenciano arrived coming from USA here in the Philippines. He stayed for five (5) months with
Erlinda in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during such time, Erlinda gave Potenciano an
overdosed amount of Zoloft (instead of 100mg, she gave 200mg); thus, Potencianos health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo a petition for Guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, After attending a corporate meeting, Potenciano did not return to his wife in Antipolo but rather he
went and lived at Makati with his children.

Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have the custody of her lawyer husband,
Potenciano. CA denied such petition.

Issues:

Whether habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to compel Potenciano to live with her in conjugal bliss?

How about the issue of visitation rights?

Decision:

Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus.

Page | 31
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced
by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus because P never prayed for
such right.

In this case, Potenciano was found to be of sound mind and possesses the capacity to make own choices.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy

Ong v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Jaime Ong, on the one hand, and respondent spouses Miguel K. Robles and Alejandra Robles, on the other
hand, executed an "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" respecting two parcels of land situated at Barrio Puri, San Antonio,
Quezon. On May 15, 1983, petitioner Ong took possession of the subject parcels of land together with the piggery,
building, ricemill, residential house and other improvements thereon.

For failure of the vendee to pay the price as agreed upon, a complaint for rescission of contract and recovery of
properties with damages. Later, while the case was still pending with the trial court, petitioner introduced major
improvements on the subject properties. These prompted the respondent spouses to ask for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court granted the application and enjoined petitioner from introducing improvements on the
properties except for repairs. Eventually, the trial court ordered the rescission of the contract.

Issues:

(1) whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code

(2) whether the parties had novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment

Held:

Article 1191 of the New Civil Code refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. Reciprocal obligations are
those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the
obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the
performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.

A careful reading of the parties' "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell, as
distinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to
pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full
payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach
contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation. Failure to pay, in
this instance, is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendor's obligation to convey title from
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acquiring binding force. Hence, the agreement of the parties in the case at bench may be set aside, but not because of a
breach on the part of petitioner for failure to complete payment of the purchase price. Rather, his failure to do so
brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of respondent spouses to convey title from acquiring an
obligatory force.

Novation is never presumed, it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the parties or by implication
derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligation. In order for novation to take
place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation; (2)
there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract; (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old
contract; and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract. The aforesaid requisites are not found in the case at
bench. The subsequent acts of the parties hardly demonstrate their intent to dissolve the old obligation as a
consideration for the emergence of the new one.

Posted by princesslawyer at 9:47 PM

Ong vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-63025, November 29, 1991; 204 SCRA 297PONENTE:

Paras, J.

FACTS:

Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own loggingbusiness. In furtherance of said
business, she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix,private respondent. Due to mismanagement, she defaulted on her
obligation. Boix filed acomplaint, based on the promissory notes issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered infavor of
Boix, he then moved to execute the judgment.

The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and attached a parcel of land. An auction sale was held
and Boix was adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued.

Ramon filed a motion with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession and wasdenied. He then brought the case to
the CA to annul the auction sale, alleging that theproperty is conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal
debts contracted by thewife.

The CA found that the subject property is paraphernal property, it was declared in thename of Teodora Ong, while the
house erected thereon was declared in the name of Ramon Ong and Teodora Ong.

ISSUE:

Whether the parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife or part of the conjugalpartnership.

HELD:

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Yes, it is exclusive property.

The mere use of the husbands surname in the tax

declaration is not sufficient proof that the said property was acquired during the marriage andtherefore conjugal. It is
undisputed that the parcel of land was declared solely in t

he wifes name

but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. When the property isregistered in the name of the
spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property wasacquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to saidspouse. The party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage
belongs to theconjugal partnership must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.Under Art. 117
of the Civil Code, the wife is entitled to engage in business although the husband

may object. The wifes exclusive

(paraphernal) properties, as well as those of their conjugalpartnership, shall be liable for obligations incurred by the wife
in the course of her business.

NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C.
ONG, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of
the family.[1] In our society, the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the
family and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in the succeeding years.

It is in this light that we narrate the following undisputed facts:

Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video
coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the
newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United
States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet
processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased
by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on
September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby granted:

1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Go;

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2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong
for the following sums:

a) P450.00, the down payment made at contract time;

b) P75,000.00, as moral damages;

c) P20,000.00, as exemplary damages;

d) P5,000.00, as attorneys fees; and

e) P2,000.00, as litigation expenses;

Defendants are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that they
acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that
there is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.[2]

The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioners claim that for the video coverage, the cameraman was employed by Pablo Lim who also owned the video
equipment used. They further assert that they merely get a commission for all customers solicited for their principal.[3]

This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which states thus:

ART. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the
agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal.

In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the
transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered
into between private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. In the instant case, the contract
entered into is one of service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the
object of the contract was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of another person
is of no consequence.

It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below, petitioners did not even present Lim to
corroborate their contention that they were mere agents of the latter. It would not be unwarranted to assume that their
failure to present such a vital witness would have had an adverse result on the case.[4]

As regards the award of damages, petitioners would impress upon this Court their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in
the erasure of the tape. They insist that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days, as
agreed upon in their contract, the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to minimize
losses.[5]

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We are not persuaded.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to
claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such
assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that
private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would just
claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was
unjustified.

In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former
undertook to cover the latters wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners
failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to
said private respondents and are thus liable for damages.

The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the
downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners.[6]

Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not among those
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-
delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also
constitute a quasi-delict.[7] Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or abusive.[8]

Petitioners act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents wedding was precisely the
cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.

As the appellate court aptly observed:

Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in our
culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever,
the trial court was correct in awarding the appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75,000.00, which was a
great reduction from plaintiffs demand in the complaint, in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings,
sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as
allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.[9]

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar, the award of exemplary
damages by the trial court is justified[10] to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe
due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.

The award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are likewise proper, consistent with Article 2208[11] of the Civil
Code.

Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable
with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered into the contract
with private respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest.[12]

We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may
exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we
are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent.

Page | 36
Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the
principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.[13]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to
said private respondents for the judgment award. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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