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), to deny the
existence or truth of. Thus I observe that the burden of the negative is merely to prove that the United States
does not have a prima facie obligation to compel nation service. Thus, the question of the resolution is not
answered by a mere analysis of net benefits or positive externalities. For example, while a child may benefit
from eating a can of spinach once a week, one would not say that the United States is obligated to compel all
children to each a can of spinach each week.
Autonomy is the basis of freedom, and is the primary condition for determining morality. Wolf writes:
Robert Paul Wolff. Professor Emeritus, University of Massachusetts Amherst. In Defense of Anarchism, University of California Press: 1998.
Since the responsible man arrives at moral decisions which he expresses to himself in the form of
imperatives, we may say that he gives laws to himself, or is self- legislating. In short, he is autonomous. As
Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which
one has made for oneself: The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He may do
what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free.
Nozick Writes:
[Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, 1974.]
Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to
avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good. Why not,
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.
Using one of these people for the benefit of others uses [them] him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for
the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take
account of the fact that [they are] he is a separate person, that [theirs] his is the only life [they] he has. [They do] He does
not get some overbalancing good from [their] his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon [them]
him- least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore must be neutral between its citizens. The moral side constraints upon what
we may do, I claim, reflect the fact of our separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act
can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater
overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others.
This is directly reflected in the founding document of this country, the constitution, and amendments therein
limiting regulatory power. Finally, obligations to the self must come before our obligations to others.
Hills Writes:
Alison Hills [Clare College, Cambridge University] Duties and Duties to the Self American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 Apr., 2003
Could you have a duty of beneficence but no self-regarding duty to promote your own well-being? If your own well-being was of lesser normative significance to
you than other people's well-being, then you could have duties to promote other people's well-being but
no duties to promote your own wellbeing. 12 Anti-egoism is the theory according to which the agent's own well-being is less normatively significant to her than everyone else's
well-being. If anti-egoism is true, then there might be duties to others concerning well-being, but no duties to the self. But how could your own well-being be of lesser
normative significance to you than the well-being of others? If there is such a normative distinction, it must concern
whether or not it is the agents own well-being which will be promoted. Well-being must generate agent-
relative reasons for action (reasons that are not valid for every agent), not agent-neutral reasons (reasons valid for any agent).13 Even if agent-relative reasons are
acceptable, however, anti-egoist theories are much less plausible than egoist theories. Anti-egoism claims that one's well-being has greater normative significance to others than it does to oneself. But the normative
significance to you of other people's well-being depends on how important their wellbeing is to them. You should be concerned about how well other people's lives are going, because their well-being matters to them. The
agent-relative reasons are acceptable. So we cannot reject duties to the self on the grounds of anti-egoism.
This means that if an action has the potential to harm us, we cannot be compelled to take that action.
Thus, my thesis and sole contention is that compulsory national service is a violation of autonomy.
Robinson writes:
Robinson 04, Braden. [JD, Law University of Michigan Law School (2005-2008)]. An Analysis of Conscription. Austrian Student Scholars Conference. October 1st, 2004, p 5-6.
From a natural rights perspective, the idea of conscription is incomprehensible. If Roth- bard is right and states do
not have a right to tax a citizenry to defend the nation, then they surely do not have the right to force citizens into service (Rothbard 193). Even if
one were to accept the premise that a defensive war would be a sure loss without conscription, then it
would still not be justified in sending conscripts to fight. It is the individuals responsibility to determine
how much value he places in protecting his property from foreign invaders, if he does not feel it is worth
his life, then to force him to risk his life is an unwarranted act of aggression.
This logic is already in place here in the US. Individuals cannot be compelled to put their life at risk to stop a
gunman at a mall, individuals cannot be compelled to risk their lives for the sake of military service to others.
That is not to say that life threatening service is the only type of national service that cannot be obligated.
Hornbergere writes:
Hornbergere 13. Jacob Hornberger. Destroying Freedom to Protect Freedom Cato Unbound. September 16th, 2013. https://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/09/16/jacob-hornberger/destroying-freedom-protect-freedom
Only in issues where assignable blame for directly and substantially interfering with the lives of others can an
individuals autonomy be compelled to be abridged. Additionally, the reverse is true, it is irrefutable that for
national service, even nonmilitary service, to be meaningful that a large sacrifice must be made. The litmus test
for limiting a persons autonomy is not met and thus you negate.