G.R. No.
L-22533 February 9, 1967 Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this petition for review
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, pet, v. PEPSI-
COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO,
respondents.
FACTS: On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.1 and Andres Bonifacio in the CFI
of Manila as a consequence of a collision,
on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-
truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA.
Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos,
son and co-plaintiff of Placido.
PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-
defendant Andres Bonifacio.
CFI: rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio
negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently
proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the
plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages;
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees,
with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants appellee to the CA.
CA: On Jan 15, 1964, it affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar
as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by
absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that,
contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently
proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
of the Court of Appeals' decision.
ISSUE:
Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of
its employee
RULING: YES.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of Appeals in
PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel
manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant
driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the
production department;
that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking
into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the
pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of:
First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of defendant driver'.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794,
cited in appellee's brief, our SC had occasion to put it down as a rule that
"In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experiences and record of service." Defendant
Company has taken all these steps.2
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the
decision under review by taking issue with the testimony of Anasco
upon which the findings of due diligence aforestated are rested.
Thus, it is now contended that Aasco being PEPSI-COLA's
employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his
testimony is not believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an
issue of fact and credibility, something as to which this Court has
consistently respected the findings of the CA, with some few
exceptions, which do not obtain herein.3
Stated differently, Aascos credibility is not for this Court now to
re-examine.
And said witness having been found credible by the CA, his
testimony, as accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be
assailed.
As We said in Co Tao vs. CA, L-9194, April 25, 1957, assignments of error
involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect dispute the
findings of fact of the CA, cannot be reviewed in these proceedings. For
a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
And the distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must
be taken as established that, as testified to by Aasco, PEPSI-
COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio
as to his qualifications, experiences and record of service, taking
all steps mentioned by the CA in its decision already quoted.
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA
exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its
driver.
As ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In
order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the
mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have
carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications,
his experience and record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question
is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA
of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, this Court
said in Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article 2 things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and
(2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently may be rebutted.
 It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved
by PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver.
And, parenthetically, it is not surprising that appellants thus confine
their arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the record
as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reflects in quoting in part the
testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness would show sufficient
evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-
COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are likewise outside the
purview of this Court's reviewing power.
Thus, the question of whether PEPSI- COLA violated the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not
having been raised and argued in the CA, cannot be ventilated
herein for the first time.
And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the
negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
RESOLUTION ON MR
May 16, 1967
Petitioners seek a reconsideration of Our decision in the instant
case affirming in toto the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals absolving respondent PEPSI-COLA from liability.
In Our decision, We refrained from passing on the merits of the
question whether PEPSI-COLA, in operating the tractor-truck and
trailer, violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law and the rules and
regulations related thereto, for the procedural reason that it did not
appear to have been raised before the CA.
It now appears, however, that said question was raised in a motion
to reconsider filed with the CA which resolved the same against
petitioners.
Due consideration of the matter on its merits, convinces Us that
the decision of the Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in
toto.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars. 1 and
4(d), par. (a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1, dated
Sept. 1, 1951, in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck,
which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at
a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b)
was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a
helper for the driver.
The cited provisions read:
SECTION 27. Registration, operation, and inspection of truck-trailer
combinations, semi-trailers, and tractors.
(a) No trailer or semi-trailer having a gross weight of more than 2,000
kilograms and is not equipped with effective brakes on at least two
opposite wheels of the rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes will
act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the brakes of the
tractor-truck shall be registered for operation on public highways of the
Philippines;
provided, that the trialers without brakes may be registered from year to
year for operation under the following conditions:
1. No such trailer shall be operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15
kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck, the actual gross
weight of which is less than twice the weight of the trailer.
xxx xxx xxx
4(d) Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with rear-vision mirror to
enable the driver to see vehicles approaching mirror the rear or shall carry
a helper who shall be so stationed on the truck or trailer that he will
constantly have a view of the rear. He shall be provided with means of
effectively signalling to the driver to give way to overtaking vehicles.
4(e) No truck and trailer combination shall be operated at a speed greater
than 30 kilometers per hour.
It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit in subpar. 1, supra, refers only to
trailers or semi-trailers having a gross weight of more than 2,000 kgms.,
AND which are "not equipped with effective brakes on at least two
opposite wheels, of the rear axle and are so controlled that the brakes will
act in unison with or preceding the effective action of the brakes of the
tractor-truck..." This is the condition set in the proviso in par. (a), supra,
wherein "trailers without [such] brakes may be registered from year to year
for operation ..." i.e., they should not "be operated at any time at a speed
in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck ...".
But there was no finding by the Court of Appeals that the truck-trailer here
did not have such brakes. In the absence of such fact, it is subpar. 4(e),
supra, that will apply. And petitioners admit that the truck-trailer was being
driven at about 30 k.p.h.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the
night of the collision since he was found to be driving alone. However,
there is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror.
To be sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic
policeman who went to the collision scene, testified that he saw the
tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any rear vision
mirror.4
This cannot prove lack of rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision
subpar. 4(d) is complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having a
rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said provision
is violated only where there is a positive finding that the tractor-truck did
not have both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec.
8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, providing that:
No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed the following
dimensions:
Overall width ................ 2.5 meters.
xxx xxx xxx
since there was an express finding that the truck-trailer was 3 meters
wide. However, Sec. 9 (d) of the same law, as amended, providing that
SEC. 9. Special permits, fees for.-The chief of the Motor Vehicles Office
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
shall establish regulations and a tariff of additional fees under which
special permits may be issued in the discretion of the Chief of the Motor
Vehicles Office or his deputies, for each of the following special cases,
and without such special permit, no such motor vehicles shall be operated
on the public highways.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) For registration or use of a motor vehicle exceeding the limit of
permissible dimensions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section
eight-A hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
expressly allows the registration, or use of motor vehicles exceeding the
limits of permissible dimensions specified in subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A. So,
to conclude that there was a violation of law which undisputably
constitutes negligence, at the very least it is not enough that the width
of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also
appear that there was no special permit granted under Sec. 9.
Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing.
There was no proof much less any finding to that effect. And it was
incumbent upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack of such permit
since the tractor-truck and the trailer were registered.5
Compliance with law and regularity in the performance of official duty
in this case, the issuance of proper registration papers are presumed6
and prevail over mere surmises.
Having charged a violation of law, the onus of substantiating the same fell
upon petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that there was a
violation of the law lacks factual basis.
Petitioners would also have Us abandon the Bahia ruling.7 In its stead,
We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent
superior. We cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going
against the explicit mandate of the law.
A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages
caused by its driver.
Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility
shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what
that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and
supervision of the driver-employee.
Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own
negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for
failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
employees.
We do not and have never followed the respondent superior rule.8
So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said
doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners, v.
SPOUSES NICOLAS and TERESITA L. ZARATE, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Peres (Peres) were engaged in the
business of transporting students from their respective residences
in Paraque City to Don Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, and
back. They employed Clemente Alfaro (Alfaro) as driver of the van.
Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate (Zarates) contracted the
Peres to transport their son Aaron to and from Don Bosco.
Considering that the students were due at Don Bosco by 7:15 a.m.,
and that they were already running late because of the heavy
vehicular traffic on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to
an alternate route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow path
underneath the Magallanes Interchange. The railroad crossing in
the narrow path had no railroad warning signs, or watchmen, or
other responsible persons manning the crossing. In fact, the
bamboo barandilla was up, leaving the railroad crossing open to
traversing motorists.
At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing,
PNR Commuter No. 302 (train), was in the vicinity of the
Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound. As the train neared
the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward across the
railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view of
the oncoming train was blocked because he overtook the
passenger bus on its left side. The train blew its horn to warn
motorists of its approach. The passenger bus successfully crossed
the railroad tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not. The impact
threw nine of the 12 students in the rear, including Aaron, out of
the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which dragged his
body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him.
Thus, the Zarates sued the Peres for breach of contract of carriage
and the PNR for quasi-delict. The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Peres are liable for breach of contract
of carriage? YES.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
CIVIL LAW: common carrier; extraordinary diligence
A common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering
such services to the public. Contracts of common carriage are
governed by the provisions on common carriers of the Civil Code,
the Public Service Act, and other special laws relating to
transportation. A common carrier is required to observe
extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have
acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of passengers,
or the death or injuries to passengers. The true test for a common
carrier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually
transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used
in the activity, but whether the undertaking is a part of the activity
engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general public
as his business or occupation.
Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no
question that the Peres as the operators of a school bus service
were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a
business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
passengers over established roads by the method by which the
business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee.
Despite catering to a limited clientele, the Peres operated as a
common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school
living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier
should "carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." To
successfully fend off liability in an action upon the death or injury
to a passenger, the common carrier must prove his or its
observance of that extraordinary diligence; otherwise, the legal
presumption that he or it was at fault or acted negligently would
stand.
According to Article 1759 of the Civil Code, their liability as a
common carrier did not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee. The Peres were liable for the death
of Aaron despite the fact that their driver might have acted beyond
the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of the
common carrier.
DENIED.
G.R. No. 122445 Nov 18, 1997
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They
are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.
Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment . .
FACTS:
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical
malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of claim which
a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed
by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as
a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and
in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the RPC
with which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted.
It is via the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased
sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence and
negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death.
The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending
anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were
charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to
(sic) homicide" in an information which reads:
That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo. . . the
accused above named, being then the attending anaesthesiologist
and surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a negligence (sic),
. . . incompetent manner, and failing to supply or store sufficient
provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all exigencies
apt to arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing
by such negligence, . . . and incompetence, and causing by such
failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to
avert a tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day
following said surgical operation.
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
MTCC: On March 4, 1994, it rendered a decision, finds the
accused Dra. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch
Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on
March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the RPC,
and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and
1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs.
RTC: affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC
CA: affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is
further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged
medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.
First the antecedent facts.
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo,
accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General
Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived
at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. 9
Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found
a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation
on March 23,1991.
Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22,
1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon.
According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the
window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant
for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.
Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation.
The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating
room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed.
The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.
Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be
operated on as scheduled.
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two
aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation.
While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister
immediately bought.
About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to
ask them to buy blood for Lydia.
They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same
was brought by the attendant into the operating room.
After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation was finished.
The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating
room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there
was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a
person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank,
gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband
together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District
Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as
soon as it arrived.
But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her
transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a
respirator and further examined.
The transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without the prior
consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about
the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the
San Pablo District Hospital.
Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the
ambulance.
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled
into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on
her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.
The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the
Obstetrics and Gynecology Dept of the San Pablo District Hospital.
However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and
possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then
informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to
help save the patient.
While the petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died.
Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was
pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate
cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as
the antecedent cause.
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following
circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed
negligent in the performance of the operation:
. . . , the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood
and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen
during the operation.
The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San
Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was
something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the
operation.
There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dra.
Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of
the blood of the patient.
It was (sic) said in medical parlance that the "the abdomen of the
person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the
whole thing the moment it was open (sic) and surgeon must be
prepared for any eventuality thereof.
The patient (sic) chart which is a public document was not
presented because it is only there that we could determine the
condition of the patient before the surgery.
The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased
wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed
upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery.
The court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the negligence
and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of
loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident
unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the reason why the patient
was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital.
As such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence. With
respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no
evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra.
Cruz who actually did the operation.
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and
upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligence and
lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling
the subject patient before and after the operation." And likewise
affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed
similar observations, thus:
. . . While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the
clinic may not by itself indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows
the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate
employees.
Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were
the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions
in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the
petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to testify. This
could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good
to testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified
statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and
unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the
following facts: that the accused asked the patient's relatives
to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in
progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type
"A" blood for the patient; that after the surgery, they were again
asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not
anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to
the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient,
together with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San
Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen.
All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared
for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first
surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective
or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared
blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient
oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us.
Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least
a clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements
before a patient is subjected to surgery.
Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre-operative evaluation,
the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding time and
clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The
petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry to perform the
operation, even as the family wanted a postponement to April 6,
1991.
Obviously, she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get the
family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she did not prepare a
medical chart with instructions for the patient's care.
If she did all these, proof thereof should have been offered. But
there is none. Indeed, these are overwhelming evidence of
recklessness and imprudence.
This Court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing
circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and

(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of
the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science.
In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio,
et al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect
represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will
employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients.
He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that
any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish
not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is
the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard
of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the
conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses
in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of
the NBI only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not
venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care
that petitioner should have exercised.
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the
clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood,
oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to
a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission of any
form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the
circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond
cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon,
this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated
surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses.
For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which
laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in
good standing when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are
admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption
that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and
employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly
lacking in the case at bench.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and
untidiness of the clinic;
the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on
the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do
indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no
cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused
petitioner's death.
Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the
reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such
breach and the resulting death of his patient.
In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending
physician was absolved of liability for the death of the
complainant's wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes."
In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, "negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create
a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of."
And "the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
xxx xxx xxx
This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies
rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the
cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert
witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence.
The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was
unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this
Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our
hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which
hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the
death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
is required to establish civil liability.
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and
limb.
For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a
sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and
imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties.
A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto
exacerbated the grief of those left behind.
The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother
up to the present time and this Court is aware that no amount of
compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can
suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one.
Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of
the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH
CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Lydia Umali the amount of P50,000.00 as civil liability,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional

Regulation Commission (PRC) for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.