AISPORNA vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. L-39419 APRIL 12, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.
Context of the Whole Text

DOCTRINE:
Legislative Intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.

CASE SUMMARY:
Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent was charged for violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
having acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor of Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc.
without having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.

FACTS:
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla
Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was
issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of
the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form.

In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the
phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husbands desk to inform him
of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services)

Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court.
In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating paragraph 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating
that she didnt violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. The receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner

ISSUE:

Whether the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found
on its second paragraph.

HELD/ RATIO:

Yes. The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word agent
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. In its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition
of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence

Any person who for compensationshall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section,

The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term agent mentioned in both
the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits
a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring
a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines, who is an insurance
agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate
courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible
error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any person who for
compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly,
received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit
insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's
Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while
acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the
case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation.
This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this
case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

SC DECISION: The judgement appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.