Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 8

Quijada vs.

CA
G.R. No. 126444, December 4, 1998

FACTS: Trinidad Quijada, together with her siblings executed a Conditional Deed of Donation in favor of
the Municipality of Talacogon, being that the land shall be used exclusively for the construction of a
provincial high school. Trinindad remained in possession of the land. Thereafter, Trinidad sold the land
to Mondejar. The heirs to Trinidad, herein Petitioners, filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
respondents. The proposed campus did not materialize and the Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution
donating back the land to the donor. In the meantime, Mondejar conveyed portions of the land to
complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and ownership of the land.

ISSUE: Whether the sale between Trinindad and Mondejar was valid.

RULING: No. The Donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time that
ownership of the land has not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest maybe the subject of contracts
including a Contract of Sale. In this case, what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer
owns. It would have been different if the donor-seller sold her interest over the property under the
deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-
fulfillment of the resolutory condition.
Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. vs. Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc.
G.R. No. 154390, March 17, 2014

FACTS: In July 1984, Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) obtained a loan from Prosperity Credit Resources,
Inc (PCRI) in the amount of Php3.5 Million, represented by herein respondents Domingo and Caleb Ang.
The blank loan form had no entries specifying the rate of interest and schedules of amortization.
Petitioner Enrique and Vicky Ang entrusted to the respondents their seven titles to secure the Php3.5
Million loan. In September 1984, it was then that the petitioners named that PCRI had filled up the said
checks with dates and amounts reflected at 35% interest rate per annum, instead of just 24%, and a
two-year repayment period, instead of ten years.

ISSUE: Whether the action to assail the mortgage already prescribed.

RULING: Yes. Here, it is important to first determine if the mortgage was void or merely voidable. Where
consent was given through fraud alone, the contract was voidable, not void ab initio. Article 1390, in
relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the consent of the parties was obtained
through fraud, the contract is considered voidable and maybe annulled within four years from the time
of the discovery thereof. Thus, because the mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on
September 5, 1984, they had until September 5, 1988. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC on
October 10, 1991. Hence, the action had already prescribed.
Rural Bank of Cabadbaran vs. Malecio-Yap
G.R. No. 178451, July 30, 2014

FACTS: Ema Yap and her five siblings inherited a lot from their parents. Said lot had been a subject of a
real estate mortgage following a loan procedure from petitioner RBCI, as authorized by a notarized SPA
purportedly executed by Emas parents. Upon default in payment, the lot was sold to RBCI as the highest
bidder in the public auction sale. Respondents claimed that they were not aware of the loan obtained by
Ema and did not authorize the mortgage transaction, and that the SPA bore their falsified signatures.
RBCI claims to be a mortgagee in good faith.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the subject property was validly mortgaged and foreclosed
(2) Whether RBCI is a mortgagee in good faith.

RULING: NO, on both issues. The forged SPA is sufficient grounds to render the mortgage null and void,
in so far as the shares of the other co-owners, whose consent thereto were not actually obtained, are
concerned. Thus, RBCI may validly own by virtue of the foreclosure proceedings, only that portion of
property belonging to Ema.

The RBCI cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith since (1) such doctrine applies only to
lands registered under the Torrens System and not to unregistered lands, such as the property in the
suit; and (2) the principle is inapplicable to banking institutions who are called upon to exercise greater
care and prudence before entering into a Contract of Mortgage.
Spouses Sierra vs. PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank
G.R. No. 197857, September 10, 2014

FACTS: Goldstar Conglomerates, Inc. (GCI), obtained a loan from Summa Bank, now respondent PAIC
Savings and Mortgage Bank (PSMB). As security therefore, GCI executed in favor of PSMB six promissory
notes and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. As additional security, petitioners Sierra mortgaged four
parcels of land in Antipolo. GCI defrauded in the payment of its loan to PSMB. The properties were
foreclosed and new TCT were issued to PSMB since petitioners failed to redeem the subject properties
within the redemption period.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are deemed accommodation mortgagors

RULING: Yes. An Accommodation Mortgagor is a third person who is not a debtor to a principal
obligation but merely secures it by mortgaging his own property. Petitioners claim of lack of proper
instruction on the intricacies in securing the loan from the bank is belied by the fact that petitioners
Francisco and Rosario Sierra had previously mortgaged two (2) of the subject properties twice to the
Rural Bank of Antipolo. Moreover, petitioners did not: (a) demand for any loan document containing the
details of the transaction, and offer to pay the purported partial loan proceeds they received at any
time.
Shand Properties Realty Corp. vs. St. Francis Development Corp.
G.R. No. 190706, July 21, 2014

FACTS: Respondent, a domestic corporation, engaged in real estate business, used the mark St. Francis
to identify the numerous property development projects, such as a shopping mall called the St. Francis
Square, and a mixed-use realty project plan that includes the St. Francis Towers. The respondent
claimed that petitioners use the marks The St. Francis Towers and The St. Francis Shagri-la Place in
their own real estate development projects constitutes unfair competition as well as false or fraudulent
declaration.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of unfair competition in using the marks The St. Francis Towers
and The St. Francis Shangri-la Place

RULING: NO. The unfair competition concept refers to a passing off where the defendant give his
goods the general appearance of the goods at his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public
that the goods are those of his competitor. The test is whether the acts of the defendant have the intent
of deceiving. The Court finds that the element of fraud to be wanting; hence, there can be no unfair
competition.
Illaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition to enjoin petitioner from
manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to respondent. Since its
registration in 1992, respondent company has been manufacturing and distributing throughout the
Philippines plastic-made automotive parts while petitioner which is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items are made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the
respondent-company.

ISSUE: Whether there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors
and there is actually no damage on the part of respondent.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code. From the
foregoing it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not a competition per se but the use of
unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in
business or to earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition
where the means used are fair and legitimate.
ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon
G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015

FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed by ABS-CBN against GMA for violating Secctions 174 and 211 of
the Intellectual Property Code as amended by RA 8293. It was because respondent GMA aired footage
of the arrival and homecoming of Angelo dela Cruz from Iraq at NAIA without the consent of the
petitioner. The petitioner claimed that there was an agreement between them and Reuters in exchange
of the latters news and video material. However, the respondent not only alleged that its news staff
was not aware of the said agreement but also its staff had no knowledge that it aired petitioners
footage.

ISSUE: Whether there is a probable cause to find respondents to be held liable criminally for the case of
copyright infringement

RULING: YES. The respondent mere act of rebroadcasting of petitioners news footage without the
latters authority creates probable cause to find the formers personnel criminally liable for violating the
provisions of the Intellectual Property Code , particularly Sections 216-217 of RA 8293, as amended ,
since both have not exercised diligence in their function to prevent the footage from being aired on
television.
Taiwan Kolin Corporation vs. Kolin Electronics Co., Inc
G.R. No. 209843, March 25, 2015

FACTS: Taiwan Kolin Corp sought to register the trademark Kolin in Class 9 goods. Kolin Electronics
opposed the application on the ground that the trademark Kolin is identical, if not confusingly similar,
with its registered trademark Kolin. The latter argued that the products are not only closely-related
because they fall under the same classification but because they are inherently similar for being
electronic products and are played into electronic sockets and perform useful function.

ISSUE: Whether the products are closely related.

RULING: NO. To confer exclusive use of the trademark, emphasis should be on the similarity or
relatedness of the goods and/or services involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general
description of their properties or characteristics.