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21.09.2017 WP 24135 (W) of 2017

(Subhankar Chakraborty & Anr. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.)
Court No. 01
Item No. SL-1, 2 & 3 with
SKB & SN
WP 23527 (W) of 2017
(ORDER PASSED) (Uttam Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.)
with
WP 24530 (W) of 2017
(Youth Bar Association of India (Regd.). Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.)

Mr. Partha Ghosh, Advocate

Mr. Sumit Chowdhury, Advocate
Mr. Amajit De, Advocate
Ms. Sanchita Burman Roy, Advocate
Mr. Shamik Chatterjee, Advocate
Mr. Hemraj Adhikary, Advocate
Mr. Ashima Roy Chowdhury, Advocate
Mr. Mohan Roy, Advocate
Mr. Jiten Paul, Advocate
Mr. Manabendra Bandopadhyay, Advocate
Mr. Saptarshi Dutta, Advocate
Mr. Narendra Gupta, Advocate
Mr. Amrit Lal Dhar, Advocate
Mr. Tarunjyoti Tewari, Advocate
for the Petitioner (in WP 24135 (W) of 2017)
Mr. Smarajit Roy Chowdhury, Advocate
Mr. Uttam Basak, Advocate
Mr. Radha Mohan Roy, Advocate
for the Petitioner (in WP 23527 (W) of 2017)
Mr. Raj Dip Ray, Advocate
Mr. Kuldeep Rai, Advocate
Mr. Ricky Ray, Advocate
Mr. Somnath Adhikary, Advocate
Ms. Mousomee Shome, Advocate
Mr. Debanjan Gupta, Advocate
Mr. Sunny Nandy, Advocate
for the Petitioner (in WP 24530 (W) of 2017)
Mr. Kishore Datta, Learned Advocate General
Mr. Abvhrotosh Majumdar, Ld. Addl. Advocate General
Mr. Pantu Deb Roy, Advocate
Mr. T.M. Siddiqui, Advocate
Mr. Nilotpal Chatterjee, Advocate
Mr. Lal Mohan Basu, Advocate
for the State

These three writ-petitions are filed by some public

spirited persons to achieve the identical desired reliefs
with the common aims through different path. The fact
emanates from the aforesaid three writ-petitions are
common and in order to avoid the prolixity of repetition of
facts, the short details would suffice to address the points
raised before this court.

The first writ-petition being WP 24135 (W) of 2017

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was filed and duly affirmed on September 8, 2017

challenging the action of the State in relation to the
immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30, 2017
beyond 06.00 p.m. and complete embargo is created for
October 1, 2017. It is stated therein that an
announcement was made by the Honble Chief Minister
of West Bengal that there would be a restriction on the
immersion of Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 beyond
06.00 p.m. and a complete prohibition on October 1,
2017. The aforesaid announcement was widely
published and circulated through different medias and
affects the religious sentiments of the Hindu community,
more particularly, the citizens of the State where the
Durga Puja is considered to be one of the major festivals.
The petitioners therein have impinged the said decision of
the State in absence of any policy or the
declarations/notifications issued in this regard.

The second writ-petition being WP 23257 (W) of

2017 is at the instance of a practicing Advocate of this
court for the identical reliefs based upon the similar facts.
The said writ-petition was affirmed on September 5, 2017
but was filed after the earlier writ-petition. It is
categorically stated in the said petition that putting
restriction on immersion of Durga Idol upto 06.00 p.m. on
September 30, 2017 and an absolute prohibition on
October 1, 2017 has no foundation or basis. The
aforesaid decision of the government is impinged on the
fact that the order restricting or prohibiting the religious
ceremony to be performed by a particular section of the
society without any declaration/notice, is par se illegal
and in colourable exercise of power.

The third writ-petition being WP 24530 (W) of 2017

is filed by an Association, registered under the Society
Registration Act, 1860 along with their office bearers on
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the basis of the statement of the Honble the Chief

Minister posted on the official twitter account
communicating her decision that except for 24 hours
period on the day of Muharram, the immersion of the
Durga Idol can take place on the subsequent three days.
It was further indicated therein that on an auspicious day
of Bijaya Dasami, immersion of the Idol is permitted upto
06.00 p.m.. According to the said writ-petitioners such
decision hurts the sentiments of the Hindus and has also
percolated a wrong signal in the orderly society governed
by the rule of law.

All the aforesaid writ-petitions are filed founding

basis on the statement of the Honble Chief Minister of
the State of West Bengal posted on her twitter account or
published through various visual and printed media.

At the time of hearing of the aforesaid writ-petitions,

a copy of the order dated September 9, 2017 issued by
the Principal Secretary, Home and Hill Affairs Department
of the State was submitted before the court to negate the
stand of the aforesaid writ-petitioners that the said
decision has been taken without following the procedure
of law. The said order reveals that the decision to restrict
the immersion of Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 till
06.00 p.m. and total prohibition on October 1, 2017 due
to Muharram has been taken in the interest of maintaining
law and order and to rule out the possibility of any
untoward incidents. By a subsequent clarificatory order
dated September 14, 2017, the time for immersion of
Idols on September 30, 2017 was extended till 10.00 p.m.

A uniform argument is advanced on behalf of the

petitioners of three respective writ-petitions that the
aforesaid orders have no reasonable basis and issued on
mere caprice, surmise and conjecture and violative of the
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rights guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of

India. According to the petitioners, every citizen of the
country enjoys the right of freedom to prefess and
propagate religions subject to public order and such
public order should have been based on rational and
reasonable foundation and not at the whims of the
executive authority. The public order therefore, should
not be confused with the disturbance of law and order as
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner
of Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda
Avadhuta & Anr. reported in (2004) 12 SCC 770. A
decision to restrict or prohibit the celebration of the
festivals must involve an element of subjectivity on the
cogent and convincing materials and placed reliance
upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. Dr. Praveen Bhai
Thogadia reported in (2004) 4 SCC 684.

It is ardently submitted that the performance of the

rites, rituals and ceremonies are essential to the tenets of
the religion and in view of Article 26(b) of the Constitution,
the State cannot interfere therewith. To buttress the
aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed upon a Division
Bench judgment of this court rendered in case of
Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya
Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr. reported in AIR
1991 Cal 263. A further reliance is placed upon a
judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Rabindra
Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh Vs. Republic of India
reported in (2011) 2 SCC 490 in support of the contention
that the State must treat all religions and the religious
groups equally as opposed to any decision or order
defeating the very solemn object of the founding fathers
of the Constitution and the Constitution itself.

On the other hand, the learned Advocate General

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submits that the right expressed under Article 25 and 26

of the Constitution is not inchoate or absolute right but is
subject to the public order meaning thereby the sovereign
can restricts and prohibits any individual or the group
belonging to a particular religious community from
performing or observing the religion ceremonies.
According to the learned Advocate General, if an order is
passed by the State to maintain the law and order,
restricting and prohibiting the immersion of an Idol on a
particular date coinciding with the mourning of the
Muharram by a Muslim community, it cannot be impinged
on the ground of unreasonableness and relies upon a
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gulam Abbas
& Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in (1984) 1
SCC 81. It is ardently submitted by the learned Advocate
General that the maintenance of law and order is within
the realm of the executive powers and executive
functions leaving hardly any room for interference by the
judiciary under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support
of the aforesaid contention the reliance is placed upon a
judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Rama
Muthurtamalingam Vs. Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Mannagudi & Anr. reported in AIR 2005 Madras
1. It is vehemently submitted that the judgment rendered
in Gulam Abbas (supra) was considered by the Supreme
Court in a subsequent decision rendered in Mohd.
Hamid & Anr. Vs. Badi Masjid Trust & Ors. reported in
(2011) 13 SCC 61 interpreting the expression public
order to mean an order to maintain and place the rights
of the respective religious communities in the larger
interest of the society.

It is arduously submitted that Regulation 135 of the

Police Regulation of Bengal, makes it imperative on any
person or class of person to apply for a license in respect
of an assembly or procession with the Superintendent in
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a prescribed format in tune with Section 30(2) of the

Police Act, 1861. According to the learned Advocate
General, the identical provision is contained in Regulation
32 under Chapter 4 of the Police Regulation of Calcutta
empowering the Officer-in-charge of the police station to
consider the procession, assemblies and meetings. The
learned Advocate General put more emphasis on Section
62 of the Calcutta Police Act wherein the power is
conferred upon the Commissioner of Police to pass an
order with a view to secure public safety and
convenience. Several sections viz. Sections 30, 30A, 34,
34B of the Police Act, 1861 are pressed in action by the
learned Advocate General to uphold the aforesaid order.
The learned Advocate General emphasized on the
maintenance of law and order in the decision restricting
the immersion of an Idol till 06.00 p.m. on September 30,
2017 and an absolute embargo on October 1, 2017 i.e.
day of Muharram.

We are not unmindful of the fact that the aforesaid

public interest litigations are filed impugning the action of
the State in putting restriction on immersion of the Idol on
Bijaya Dashami and prohibition in this regard on the day
of Muharram. Durga Puja is celebrated throughout the
State and epitomizes the victory of the good against the
evil. It is one of the major festivals of the Hindu
community and the performance of each rituals which is
inherent and inbuilt is followed in a time schedule as
provided in various almanac or panjikas. One of the
important customs is Devi Baran followed by Sindoor
Khela which can only be performed after sunset and are
sine qua non to customary rites and ceremonies before
the immersion of the Idol. Large sections of the Hindu
community are performing the Puja privately or through
community, which not only attached to their sentiments
and religious belief but the sense of security as well that it
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would bring all good in their life. Equally, the Muslim

communities are sensitively attached to mourning on the
eve of Muharram. Both the sections of the society can
profess and propagate their religion with harmony and
unified manner. The founding father of the Constitution
never dreamt of any artificial or real distinction amongst
each religions in the country and incorporated Articles 25
and 26 in Part-III of the Constitution.

The enlighting observations of the Supreme Court

in Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh (supra) may be
noticed in this regard wherein it is held:-

96. In a country like ours where discrimination on the

ground of caste or religion is a taboo, taking lives of persons
belonging to another caste or religion is bound to have a
dangerous and reactive effect on the society at large. It
strikes at the very root of the orderly society which the
Founding Fathers of our Constitution dreamt of. Our concept
of secularism is that the State will have no religion. The
State shall treat all religions and religious groups equally and
with equal respect without in any manner interfering with
their individual right of religion, faith and worship.

97. The then President of India, Shri K.R. Narayanan once

said in his address that Indian unity was based on a
tradition of tolerance, which is at once a pragmatic concept
for living together and a philosophical concept of finding truth
and goodness in every religion. We also conclude with the
hope that Mahatma Gandhi's vision of religion playing a
positive role in bringing India's numerous religion and
communities into an integrated prosperous nation be
realised by way of equal respect for all religions. There is no
justification for interfering in someone's religious belief by
any means.

It is axiomatic to record that the State has no

religion, which is one of the fundamental facets
underlying secularism. There should not be any order of
precedence in performance of the religious rites, rituals,
ceremonies and mourning amongst the religious
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communities. There should be an equality in every

citizens right with corresponding obligation of very State
to protect the same. The Division Bench in the case of
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (supra)
reported in AIR 1991 Cal 263, interpreted the religion
within the contour of Article 25 of the Constitution to be
understood in contradistinction to what is secularism. It
has been held therein that the expression matter of
religion used in Article 26(b) of the Constitution should
be read and construed as religion simplicitor and not a
religion meaning thereby that it express the right of every
religious denomination or a section thereof to manage its
interference in the matter of religion. The order of the
Division Bench in the above case was challenged before
the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of
Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda
Avadhuta & Anr. reported in (2004) 12 SCC 770 and an
argument was advanced on the interpretation of public
order appearing both in Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution.

The provisions from the different Police Regulations

and the Police Act, 1861, relied upon by the learned
Advocate General essentially applies in different field
occasioning the application for license when an
apprehension is anticipated of public tranquility on an
impeccable and discreet materials and report and not on
a mere surmise and conjecture, assumption or
presumption. Though the power is enshrined under the
aforesaid provisions upon the Magistrate or the
Superintendent of Police, as the case may be, but such
power can only be exercised in the event, the condition
set forth therein is truly satisfied and supported on the
basis of an incorrigible materials or the reports.

The reliance upon the aforesaid provisions is

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thoroughly misplaced and does not apply in the instant

case, more particularly, the manner in which the
impugned orders have been passed. We do not find that
the State Instrumentality have laid any foundation on the
basis of cogent materials. There is no material available
with the State, far to speak of any cogent or convincing
material and the impugned orders which can be decided
by the court on the ground of fairness, reasonableness,
arbitrariness, discriminatory and colourable exercise of
power.

Though it is not expressly recorded therein the

various provisions of the Police Act, 1861 and the Police
Regulations of Bengal as well as Calcutta, but it can be
succinctly inferred from the observations made in
Paragraph 60 and 61 thereof that the aforesaid provisions
were duly noticed in the following words:-
58. In India, persons of whatever sect are entitled to conduct
religious procession through public streets so long as they do not
interfere with the ordinary use of such streets by the public and
subject to such directions as the Magistrates may lawfully give to
prevent obstruction of thoroughfare or breaches of public peace.

The power to suspend is extraordinary and the Magistrate should

resort to it only when he is satisfied that other powers are
insufficient. This authority of the Magistrate should be exercised in
defence of rights rather than in their suspension.

The Apex Court interpreted the public order to be

of wide amplitude than the law and order in the following
manner:-
60. Moreover, public order has a larger connotation than law and
order. Contravention of law to affect public order must affect the
community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and
order leading to disorder is not one which affects public order.

The right to perform the religious rituals were duly

recognized in the said report and protected under Article
25 of the Constitution. It would be apt to quote the
observations recorded in paragraph 91 of the said report
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which runs thus:-

88. Therefore, Ananda Margis have the right to take out a

procession in public places after obtaining necessary permission
from the authorities concerned and they are also entitled to carry
trishul or trident, conch or skull so long as such procession is
peaceful and does not offend the religious sentiments of other
people who equally enjoy the fundamental right to exercise their
religious freedom. An Ananda Margi is entitled to transmit or
spread religion by taking out procession in public places and also
carry trishul, conch or skull. However, any religious right is subject
to public order. The State has got ample powers to regulate the
secular activities associated with religious practices. Religious
activities are protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. No
doubt, such religious freedom is subject to health and subject to
laws made for social welfare. Every person has got the right to
follow, practise and propagate his religion.

Clause I of Article 25 of the Constitution puts a

reasonable restriction upon the freedom of conscience
and right to profess, practice and propagate religion. The
said clause starts with the expression subject to public
order morality and healthy and to other provisions of the
Act and, therefore, it would not be correct to say that the
same is an absolute right. The aforesaid Article though
guarantees every person in India to have freedom of
conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate
religion but subject to restrictions imposed by the State
on the ground of public order, morality, health and other
provisions of the Constitution which does not authorize to
outrage the religious feelings of any religious class or the
community with deliberate intent.

Both the Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

protects the right of a citizen to practice rituals, profess
their religion and does not abridge or overturn the faith
which is the foundation of any religion.

Apart from the same, Article 26 confers a positive

right on an individual or religious denomination or any
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section thereof to manage its own affairs in the matter of

religion which cannot be abridged or interfered with at all
unless there is a solid and concrete foundation leading to
any apprehension or possibility of untoward incidents. In
such a case, where there is any possibility or
apprehension for disturbance of peace, the State is to
take steps to prevent or regulate which in the instant case
can be done by issuance of license, then to stop a
religious sect or community from exercising its faith and
rituals on any day.

It is certainly not a case of morality, health and to

other provisions of the said part but the restrictions and/or
prohibitions are based upon the maintenance of law and
order and on possibility of untoward incidents.

A query was raise by the court to the learned

Advocate General on the number of applications seeking
license from the Muslim community for procession (Tazia)
to observe mourning on the eve of Muharram or on a
Muharram day. Only one application could be produced
which does not reveal any discord or disharmony
because of the conflict between these two religious
communities in the State of West Bengal. There should
be a reasonable basis to form an opinion that there may
be a possibility of untoward incident if both the religious
sections of the society performs or observe the
procession under their religious compulsions. No case
has been made out in course of an argument that there
was any past antecedent, which may reasonably lead to
the possibility to untoward incidents for which the
reasonable restriction or prohibition can be made in the
interest of maintaining law and order.

There is not the slightest of doubt in our mind that

the State can regulate the procession or the religious
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ceremonies to be performed but it does not vest them an

absolute and/or inchoate power to prohibit a performance
of ceremony in absence of any materials sufficient
enough for formation of such opinion/decision. We are
unable to comprehend from the submissions advanced at
the Bar, more particularly, from the State any reasonable
basis for putting restriction on immersion of Durga Idol till
06.00 p.m. on September 30, 2017 and absolute
prohibition on October 1, 2017. The maintenance of law
and order is within the domain of the State and the
decision to prevent and protect any untoward incident
should be founded on the cogent and convincing material
and not merely on ones perception.

The petitioners have relied upon a chart indicating

that on many years the Durga Puja and Muharram had
coincided yet there was no restrictions and/or prohibition
imposed by the then Government. Furthermore, no
incident has reportedly been disclosed by the State which
may reasonably lead to possibility of untoward incidents.

We are tempted to quote the observations of the

Single Bench dealing with the writ-petition being WP
24471 (W) of 2016 when an identical restriction and
prohibition was imposed in the following manner:-
It has been ascertained from Mr. Majumder that number of
processions (tajia) taken out on the roads, streets and
thoroughfares in the State of West Bengal on the eve of Muharram
is not known to the administration. No effort worth the name has
been made to satisfy this Bench that processions (tajia) on the eve
of Muharram are an inseparable part of the mourning that is
associated with Muharram. There has never been a holiday
declared either by the Central Government or the State
Government, on the eve of Muharram to facilitate processions
(tajia). There has been a clear endeavour on the part of the State
Government to pamper and appease the minority section of the
public at the cost of the majority section without there being any
plausible justification. The reason therefor is, however, not far to
seek.
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It also does not appear that there has been any study undertaken by
the police administration of the State for identification of routes to be
followed by those associated with immersion of Durga idols and
those associated with processions (tajia). The administration has
failed to take note of the fact that Muharram is also not the most
important festival of people having faith in Islam. To put it curtly, the
State Government has been irresponsibly brazen in its conduct of
being partial to one community, thereby infringing upon the
fundamental rights of people worshipping Maa Durga.

In Mohd. Hamid & Anr. Vs. Badi Masjid Trust &

Ors. (supra) reported in (2011) 13 SCC 61, the Apex
Court held that Article 25 of the Constitution though
express the ritual rights of every person and every
religion but subject to public order and the maintenance
thereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society.
The said judgment is not a pointer to an issue involved in
the instant public interest litigation and does not in fact
decide the basis of putting restriction or the prohibition on
performance of ceremony by the majority sections of the
country with the minority section.

There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid

down by the Madras High Court in the case of Rama
Muthurtamalingam Vs. Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Mannagudi & Anr. (supra) reported in AIR 2005
Madras 1, that the court should not ordinarily interfere
with the matters related to public order provided it is in
violation of some Constitutional or Statutory provisions
and is clearly illegal or shockingly arbitrary. Though the
public order is a matter within the domain of the State
legislature and executives and it would not be proper in
all cases to make interference yet the same is not an
absolute proposition and depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.

We make it clear that the State being a welfare

State, does not have any right to curb or do away with the
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rituals of any community on a certain date or dates.

In the instant case, as indicated above, the order

dated September 9, 2017 and clarificatory order dated
September 14, 2017 are issued without any reasonable
basis and clearly creates a distinction between the rights
of the two religious communities which does not appear
to be sound and healthy for unified secular country.

The judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate

General in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur
Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat reported in (2005) 8 SCC
534 does not throw light on the clinching issue involved in
the instant public interest litigation. The paragraphs
relied upon by the learned Advocate General
unequivocally says that the Regulation includes
prohibition and the State can put a reasonable restrictions
to practice any profession or any occupation, trade or
business enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution.

There is no ambiguity that by regulating a

reasonable provision, prohibition or restriction can also be
imposed but such prohibition or restriction must be
judged on the touchstone of fairness, transparency,
reasonability and rationality. It would be apt to quote the
observations made in paragraphs 75 and 77 of the said
judgment wherein the Apex Court succinctly held that the
restriction must be judged on the decree of prohibition
and on other materials surfaced before the competent
authority.

75. Three propositions are well settled: (i) restriction

includes cases of prohibition; (ii) the standard for judging
reasonability of restriction or restriction amounting to
prohibition remains the same, excepting that a total prohibition
must also satisfy the test that a lesser alternative would be
inadequate; and (iii) whether a restriction in effect amounts to
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a total prohibition is a question of fact which shall have to be

determined with regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case, the ambit of the right and the effect of the restriction
upon the exercise of that right.

77. In Krishna Kumar the Constitution Bench held that when

the prohibition is only with respect to the exercise of the right
referable only in a particular area of activity or relating to a
particular matter, there was no total prohibition. In that case,
the Constitution Bench was dealing with the case of adatiyas
operating in a market area. A certain field of activity was taken
away from them, but they were yet allowed to function as
adatiyas. It was held that this amounts to a restriction on the
exercise of the writ petitioners' occupation as an adatiya or a
seller of grain but does not amount to a total ban.

The judgment rendered in Gulam Abbas & Ors. Vs.

State of U.P. & Ors. (supra) reported in (1984) 1 SCC
81 is totally misplaced and is not relevant in the present
context. A miscellaneous application was filed as an
offshoot of the order passed by the Apex Court in the
writ-petition on a dispute inter se between the members
of the Sia and Sunni section of the Muslim community of
Banaras on the performance of the religious rights. Five
fatawas were issued by the religious heads of the Sunni
sects from Delhi, Benaras and Patna on the statement of
Sheriat Law. Under the aforesaid fatawas, the shifting of
the deadbodies after digging the old grave was stated to
be impermissible in the Sheriat Law as it would amount to
interference with their religious rights. By overruling the
same, the court held:-

6. Counsel for the Sunnis relied upon five Fatwas issued by their
religious heads (Head Muftis and Shahi Imams) from Delhi, Banaras
and Patna stating the position under Sheriat Law. The common
theme in all these Fatwas is that under Sheriat Law respecting of
graves is the religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of
dead bodies after digging old graves in which they are lying buried
is not permissible and to do so would amount to interference with
their religious rights. True, this position under Sheriat Law cannot be
doubted but as explained earlier the religious rights of every person
and every religious denomination are subject to public order, the
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maintenance whereof is paramount in the larger interest of the

society. For instance, the ecclesiastical edict or right not to disturb
an interred corpse is not absolute as will be clear from Section
176(3) of Criminal Procedure Code which permits its exhumation for
the purpose of crime detection and this provision is applicable to all
irrespective of the personal law governing the dead. In fact, quoting
a Hadit, one of the Fatwas relied upon by the contesting
respondents states unnecessary shifting of graves is also not
permissible. The edict clearly implies that it may become necessary
to shift graves in certain situations and exigencies of public order
would surely provide the requisite situation, especially as the
fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 are expressly made
subject to public order. In the circumstances in directing the shifting
of two graves in question for the purpose of maintaining public order
which would be in the larger interest of the society, we do not think
that we are doing anything irreligious. In the circumstances the first
objection is overruled.

It is thus apparent from the aforesaid observations

that the order passed by the State in larger public interest
and the then avowed object to bring a harmony between
to classes of the Muslim religion. The aforesaid
consideration is conspicuously absent in the instant case
and this court does not find any reasonable basis or
foundation for issuance of the aforesaid orders abridging
and/or curtailing the right to profess religion and
performance of rituals.

Neither any case has been made out in course of

argument nor any material or any iota of evidence which
can be deciphered by the court for coming to the
conclusion that there is or there was possibility of any
untoward incident or that any such incident was there in
the past.

It appears in course of hearing that as per the three

Panjikas which are followed by the Hindu community,
permit the immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30,
2017 till 1.26 a.m. of October 1, 2017. There is no case
made out in the instant writ-petition that the immersion of
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Idol can be made on October 1, 2017 as per the said

Almanac. It is within the competence of the State to
designate a separate route both for the procession
(Tazia) by the Muslim community and the procession for
immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 or
even on October 1, 2017 if the immersion is found
permissible, shall ensure that adequate protections are
provided to maintain the public order or the peace and
harmony.

This court hereby directs the Director General of

West Bengal Police and Commissioners of all respective
Commissionerates in the State to specify a separate
route for immersion of Durga Idols and Tazias and shall
ensure that such routes do not overlap each other.

The aforesaid authorities shall make a wide

publication through various media, the routes earmarked
for immersion of the Durga Idols and Tazias. The
immersion of idols shall be allowed till 12 midnight and
shall ensure that any procession that reaches before the
aforesaid time shall be permitted to immerse the idol.
The aforesaid arrangement shall continue on all days
commencing from September 30, 2017.

The police administration is directed to provide

adequate personnel inside the State to meet any
exigencies at the spot and shall handle with care and
caution and circumspection to get the harmony between
the two religious communities.

The respondents are directed to file affidavit in

opposition within three weeks after reopening of this court
following Puja Vacation for the year 2017. Reply thereto,
if any, be filed two weeks thereafter.

Matter to appear in the list five weeks after

 Bar & Bench (www.barandbench.com)
18

reopening of this court following Puja Vacation for the

year 2017.

(Rakesh Tiwari, A.C.J.)

(Harish Tandon, J.)

Later:

After the delivery of the order in open court the learned

Advocate General prays for stay of operation of this order.

After due consideration, we do not find that this is fit

case where the operation of the order should be stayed.

The prayer is thus rejected.

(Rakesh Tiwari, A.C.J.)

(Harish Tandon, J.)