SAJONAS VS.
CA In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
G.R. No. 102377
July 5, 1996
FACTS: The Sajonas couple are before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
praying inter alia to set aside the CAs decision, and to reinstate that of the RTC
On September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land
located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by
a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the
names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Rizal.
On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse
claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which
was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the
Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered
almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a Civil Case for
collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 1980, a Compromise
Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed
to pay the same in two years. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking
in the compromise agreement, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the
court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was
issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City. Pursuant to the order of
execution a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On the
same date, defendant sheriff Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on
execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at
the back of the TCT of the subject land.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August
28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated
by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the
auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.
On January 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of
levy on execution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand,
defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In
view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint in the RTC of Rizal, against Pilares,
the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The trial court rendered its decision in favor
of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from TCT
No. N-109417. The court a quo stated, thus:
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction that actual notice of an adverse claim is
equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could
not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse
claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs (Sajonas) are buyers in good faith of the
property of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant
that said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds
that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as
purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or
that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the
defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any
bad faith must be established by competent proof.
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the CA assigning errors on the part of the lower
court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the
annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title. The respondent
appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:
The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the
adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days
from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D.
1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of
its registration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY
PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE
INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS
ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE
PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.
HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent CA dated October 17,
1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC finding for the
cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
109417 is hereby REINSTATED. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on
TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the TCT still in force
when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and
annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed
since it was annotated ? (Pilares argues that the adverse claim ceases to have any
legal force and effect (30) days after August 27, 1984 pursuant to Section 70 of P.D.
1529)
effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided,
and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or
phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period
of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration.
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be
treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which
reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect
after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken
together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to
render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall
continue as a lien upon the property.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a
long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was
amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim.
In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was still
in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated
the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge
that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was encumbered by an
interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice
of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of
title in favor of the petitioners
GOLDEN HAVEN VS FILINVEST
ABAD, J.:
These cases are about which of two real estate developers, both buyers of the same
lands, acted in good faith and has a better title to the same.
The Facts and the Case
Petronila Yap (Yap), Victoriano and Policarpio Vivar (the Vivars), Benjamin Cruz
(Cruz), Juan Aquino (Aquino), Gideon Corpuz (Corpuz), and Francisco Sobremesana
(Sobremesana), and some other relatives inherited a parcel of land in Las Pias City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 67462 RT-1. Subsequently, the heirs
had the land divided into 13 lots and, in a judicial partition, the court distributed four
of the lots as follows: a) Lots 1 and 12 to Aquino; b) Lot 2 to Corpuz and
Sobremesana; and (c) Lot 6 to Yap, Cruz, and the Vivars. The other lots were
distributed to the other heirs.
On March 6, 1989 Yap, acting for herself and for Cruz and the Vivars, executed an
agreement to sell Lot 6 in favor of Golden Haven Memorial Park, Inc. (GHM), payable
in three installments. On July 31, 1989 another heir, Aquino, acting for himself and
for Corpuz and Sobremesana, also executed an agreement to sell Lots 1, 2, and 12 in
favor of GHM, payable in the same manner. In both instances, GHM paid the first
installment upon execution of the contract.
On August 4, 1989 GHM caused to be annotated a Notice of Adverse Claim on TCT
67462 RT-1. On September 20, 1989 the sellers of the four lots wrote GHM that they
were still working on the titling of the lots in their names and wanted to know if GHM
was still interested in proceeding with their agreements. GHM replied in the
affirmative on September 21, 1989 and said that it was just waiting for the sellers'
titles so it can pay the second installments.
Sometime in August of 1989, Filinvest Development Corporation (Filinvest) applied for
the transfer in its name of the titles over Lots 2, 4, and 5 but the Las Pias Register
of Deeds declined its application. Upon inquiry, Filinvest learned that Lot 8, a lot
belonging to some other heir or heirs and covered by the same mother title, had been
sold to Household Development Corporation (HDC), a sister company of GHM, and
HDC held the owner's duplicate copy of that title. Filinvest immediately filed against
HDC a petition for the surrender and cancellation of the co-owners' duplicate copy of
TCT 67462 RT-1. Filinvest alleged that it bought Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12 of the property
from their respective owners as evidenced by three deeds of absolute sale in its favor
dated September 10, November 18, and December 29, 1989 and that Filinvest was
entitled to the registrations of such sales. The Court upholds the validity of the contracts between GHM and its sellers. As the
trial court aptly observed, GHM entered into valid contracts with its sellers but the
On January 14, 1991 GHM filed against the sellers and Filinvest a complaint for the latter simply and knowingly refused without just cause to honor their obligations. The
annulment of the deeds of sale issued in the latter's favor before the Regional Trial sellers apparently had a sudden change of heart when they found out that Filinvest
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City in Civil Case 91-098. On March 16, 2006 the RTC was willing to pay more.
rendered a decision after trial, declaring the contracts to sell executed by some of the
heirs in GHM's favor valid and enforceable and the sale in favor of Filinvest null and As to the award of exemplary damages, the Court sustains the CA ruling. This
void. Only Filinvest appealed among the defendants. species of damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that exemplary
damages cannot be awarded unless the claimant first establishes a clear right to
On November 25, 2008 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision with moral damages.[9] Here, since GHM failed to prove that it is entitled to moral
respect to the validity of the contract to sell Lot 6 in GHM's favor. But the CA damages, the RTC's award of exemplary damages had no basis. But the grant of
declared the contracts to sell Lots 1, 2, and 12 in GHM's favor void and the sale of the attorney's fees is proper. As the RTC noted, this case has been pending since 1991,
same lots in favor of Filinvest valid. or for 19 years now. GHM was forced to litigate and incur expenses in order to
protect its rights and interests.
Both parties filed their petitions for review before this Court, Filinvest in G.R. 187824,
and GHM in G.R. 188265. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 188265 and DISMISSES the
petition in G.R. 187824. The Court likewise REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV 89448,
The Issue Presented andREINSTATES the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case 91-098 dated
March 16, 2006 with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
The issue presented in these cases is whether or not the contracts to sell that the is DELETED.
sellers executed in GHM's favor covering the same lots sold to Filinvest are valid and
enforceable. SO ORDERED.

The Court's Ruling

ESTANISLAO PADILLA, JR. PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE PRODUCERS'
To prove good faith, the rule is that the buyer of registered land needs only show COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT.
that he relied on the title that covers the property. But this is true only when, at the
time of the sale, the buyer was unaware of any adverse claim to the DECISION
property.[1] Otherwise, the law requires the buyer to exercise a higher degree of
diligence before proceeding with his purchase. He must examine not only the
certificate of title, but also the seller's right and capacity to transfer any interest in the CORONA, J.:
property.[2] In such a situation, the buyer must show that he exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the four corners of the title.[3] Failing in these, he In implementing the involuntary transfer of title of real property levied and sold on
may be deemed a buyer in bad faith.[4] execution, is it enough for the executing party to file a motion with the court which
rendered judgment, or does he need to file a separate action with the Regional Trial
Here, Filinvest was on notice that GHM had caused to be annotated on TCT 67462 Court?
RT-1, the mother title, as early as August 4, 1989 a notice of adverse claim covering
Lot 6. This notwithstanding, Filinvest still proceeded to buy Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12 on This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] from a decision
September 10, November 18, and December 29, 1989.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53085,[2] and its resolution denying
Filinvest of course contends that, although the title carried a notice of adverse claim, reconsideration,[3] both of which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
that notice was only with respect to seller Yap's interest in Lot 6 and it did not affect Bacolod City, Branch 51.[4]
Lots 1, 2, 12, and the remaining interests in Lot 6. The Court disagrees.
The undisputed facts of the case follow.[5]
The annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the claimant's interest in
the property. The notice is a warning to third parties dealing with the property that Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of the following real properties: Lot
someone claims an interest in it or asserts a better right than the registered Nos. 2904-A (covered by TCT No. T-36090), 2312-C-5 (covered by TCT No. T-3849),
owner.[5] Such notice constitutes, by operation of law, notice to the whole and 2654 (covered by TCT No. T-8053), all situated in Bago City.
world.[6] Here, although the notice of adverse claim pertained to only one lot and
Filinvest wanted to acquire interest in some other lots under the same title, the notice Respondent is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim against petitioner.
served as warning to it that one of the owners was engaged in double selling.
On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for collection of a
What is more, upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias, Filinvest also sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City.[6] Despite receipt of
learned that the heirs of Andres Aldana sold Lot 8 to HDC and turned over the co- summons on May 18, 1987, petitioner (then defendant) opted not to file an
owner's duplicate copy of TCT 67462 RT-1 to that company which had since then answer.[7] On March 3, 1988, respondent (then plaintiff) moved to have petitioner-
kept the title. Filinvest (referred to below as FDC) admits this fact in its defendant declared in default, which the trial court granted on April 15,
petition,[7] thus: 1988.[8] Respondent presented its evidence on October 9, 1989.[9] On November
28, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in respondent's favor.[10] Petitioner was
furnished a copy of this decision by mail on November 29, 1989 but, because of his
Sometime in August 1989, FDC applied with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias for failure to claim it, the copy was returned.[11]
the transfer and registration of Lots 2, 4, and 5 in its name and surrendered the co-
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1 given to it by the Vivar family, but On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. On June 4, 1990, the three
the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City refused to do the transfer of title in the name lots (Lot 2904-A, Lot 2312-C-5 and Lot 2654), all of the Bago Cadastre and registered
of FDC and instead demanded from FDC to surrender as well the other co-owner's in petitioner's name, were levied by virtue of that writ. On July 4, 1990, sheriff
duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1 which was issued to the heirs of Andres Renato T. Arimas auctioned off the lots to satisfy the judgment, with respondent as
Aldana. Upon further inquiry, FDC came to know that the heirs of Andres Aldana sold the only bidder. On July 10, 1990, ex-officio provincial sheriff and clerk of court
Lot 8 and delivered their co-owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1 to Antonio Arbis executed a certificate of sale in favor of respondent. On August 13,
Household Development Corporation, a sister company of respondent GHMPI. FDC 1990, the certificate of sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds.[12]
made representations to Household Development Corporation for the surrender of
said co-owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1 to the Register of Deeds of When petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption within the 12-month period
Las Pias City, but Household Development Corporation refused to do so. allowed by law, the court, on motion of respondent, ordered on February 5, 1992 the
issuance of a writ of possession for the sheriff to cause the delivery of the physical
Filinvest's knowledge that GHM, a competitor, had bought Lot 6 in which Filinvest was possession of the properties in favor of respondent.[13]
interested, that GHM had annotated an adverse claim to that Lot 6, and that GHM
had physical possession of the title, should have put Filinvest on its toes regarding the On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to direct the Register of Deeds to issue
prospects it faced if it bought the other lots covered by the title in question. Filinvest new titles over the properties in its name, alleging that the Register of Deeds (RD) of
should have investigated the true status of Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12 by asking GHM the Bago City would not issue new titles (in respondent's name) unless the owner's copies
size and shape of its interest in the lands covered by the same title, especially since were first surrendered to him. Respondent countered that such surrender was
both companies were engaged in the business of developing lands. One who has impossible because this was an involuntary sale and the owner's copies were with
knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation petitioner.[14]
cannot claim that he has acquired title to the property in good faith as against the
true owner of the land or of an interest in it.[8] On July 3, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting the motion. In a subsequent
order dated August 8, 1995, it denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner appealed. Four years later, the Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed decision affirming the order of the trial court.
Petitioner contends that respondent's motion for the RD to cancel the existing
certificates of title and issue new ones in its name was in fact a real action and that
the motion was procedurally infirm because respondent did not furnish him a
copy.[15] He also claims that under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the execution of the judgment was barred by prescription, given that the
motion was filed more than 5 years after the writ of execution was issued on March
23, 1990.[16] He also argues that respondent failed to follow the correct procedure
for the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of a new one, which is
contained in Section 107 of PD 1529.[17]
In itscomment,[18] respondent claims that the motion dated May 15, 1995 to direct
the RD to issue new certificates of title was but a continuation of the series of events
that began with the decision in its favor on November 28, 1989, and from there, the
auction of the properties and the issuance of a certificate of sale in 1990.
The two principal issues for consideration are:
(1) whether or not respondent's right to have new titles issued in its name is now
barred by prescription and
(2) whether or not the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling
petitioner's certificates of title and new ones issued in its name.
On the first issue, we rule that the respondent's right to petition the court for the
issuance of new certificates of title has not yet prescribed.
In Heirs of Blancaflor vs. Court of Appeals,[19] Sarmiento Trading Corporation,
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent Greater Manila Equipment Marketing
Corporation, secured a writ of execution in 1968 by virtue of which it levied real
property belonging to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Blancaflor. When the
property was auctioned, Sarmiento Trading bid successfully and, in 1970, after the
lapse of the one-year redemption period, consolidated its ownership over the lot.
Sarmiento Trading then filed a petition with the Court of First Instance to order the
cancellation of Blancaflor's title and the issuance of a new one in its name. In 1972,
Sarmiento Trading sold the lot to private respondent which, at the time, went by the
name Sarmiento Distributors Corporation.
In 1988, the Deputy Register of Deeds of Iloilo wrote to Blancaflor requesting him to
surrender his owner's duplicate copy of the TCT. Blancaflor did not comply and the
RD refused to issue a new title. On May 25, 1989, private respondent filed a petition
in the Regional Trial Court praying that the petitioners be ordered to surrender the
owner's duplicate copy of the title. The petitioners refused, claiming that
respondent's cause of action had already prescribed. Ruling otherwise, we stated:
It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such
execution sale with Sarmiento Trading Corporation as the highest bidder was that title
to Lot No. 22 of TCT No. 14749 vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to
the judgment debtor's right to repurchase. Therefore, upon Sarmiento Trading
Corporation's purchase of Lot No. 22 covered by TCT No. 14749 at the auction sale,
private respondent's successor-in-interest had acquired a right over said title.
The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not
become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right
of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate though it be, it is like any other
right, entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by
redemption. Gaudencio Blancaflor was not able to redeem his property after the
expiration of the redemption period, which was 12 months after the entry or
annotation of the certificate of sale made on the back of TCT No.
14749. Consequently, he had been divested of all his rights to the property.
(underscoring ours)
In this case, the rule being invoked by petitioner[20] states:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
As should be evident from Blancaflor, petitioner Padilla's reliance on Section 6 of Rule
39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is misplaced. The fact of levy and
sale constitutes execution, and not the action for the issuance of a new title. Here,
because the levy and sale of the properties took place in June and July of 1990,
respectively, or less than a year after the decision became final and executory, the
respondent clearly exercised its rights in timely fashion.
In addition, petitioner himself admits his failure to redeem the properties within the
one-year period by adopting the facts stated in the Court of Appeals'
decision.[21] There is thus no doubt he had been divested of his ownership of the
contested lots.
Respondent's position hinges on petitioner's failure to redeem the properties 12
months after the certificate of sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds on August
13, 1990. There is no uncertainty about respondent's having become the new lawful
owner of the lots in question by virtue of the levy and the execution sale.
On the other hand, the issue of whether to acquire new titles by mere motion or
through a separate petition is an entirely different matter.
Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondent's filing of a mere motion for
the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of
petitioner's refusal to surrender his owner's duplicate TCTs.
Indeed, this called for a separate cadastral action initiated via petition.
Section 107 of PD 1529,[22] formerly Section 111 of Act 496,[23] provides:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. Where it is necessary to issue
a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title
of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot
be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
the surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may
order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to
the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate
certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as
well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate
and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate.
Respondent alleges that it resorted to filing the contested motion because it could not
obtain new certificates of title, considering that petitioner refused to surrender his
owner's duplicate TCTs. This contention is incorrect. The proper course of action
was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new
titles. This was the procedure followed in Blancaflor by Sarmiento Trading which was
in more or less the same situation as the respondent in this case:[24]
Petitioners' reliance on prescription and laches is unavailing in this instance. It was
proper for Sarmiento Trading Corporation to file a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, acting as a cadastral court, for the cancellation of TCT No. 14749 in
the name of Gaudencio Blancaflor and the issuance of another in its name. This is a
procedure provided for under Section 78 of Act No. 496 and Section 75 of PD No.
1529
Section 78 of Act 496 reads:
Sec. 78. Upon the expiration of the time, if any allowed by law for redemption after
registered land has been sold on any execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement
of any lien of any description, the person claiming under the execution or under any
deed or other instrument made in the course of the proceedings to levy such
execution or enforce any lien, may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate
to him, and the application may be granted: Provided, however, That every new
certificate entered under this section shall contain a memorandum of the nature of
the proceeding on which it is based: Provided, further, That at any time prior to the
entry of a new certificate the registered owner may pursue all his lawful remedies to
impeach or annul proceedings under execution or to enforce liens of any description.
Section 75 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. Upon
the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the registered
land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of any
description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming
under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him.
Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal
and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.
It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondent's quandary. The reasons
behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner
(in this case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of
land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation. Petitioner contends
that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party
to the suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the
opportunity to prove as much.
While we certainly will not condone any attempt by petitioner to frustrate the ends of
justice the only way to describe his refusal to surrender his owner's duplicates of the
certificates of title despite the final and executory judgment against him respondent,
on the other hand, cannot simply disregard proper procedure for the issuance to it of
new certificates of title. There was a law on the matter and respondent should have
followed it.
In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the cadastral court for
the issuance of new titles in its name.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53085 is hereby REVERSED. The order of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City ordering the Register of Deeds of Bago City to issue new
certificates of title in favor of respondent is ANULLED. guaranty of petitioner Viewmaster, defendant Allen Roxas, eventually gained control
and ownership of State Investment Trust, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
"However, notwithstanding the lapse of two (2) years since defendant Allen Roxas
became the controlling stockholder of State Investment Trust, Inc., he failed to take
the necessary action to implement the Joint Venture Project with petitioner
VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. REYNALDO
Y. MAULIT IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND Viewmaster to co-develop the subject properties.
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY; AND EDGARDO CASTRO, ACTING REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, METRO MANILA; RESPONDENTS. "Thus, petitioner's counsel wrote defendant Allen Roxas, reiterating petitioner's
demand to comply with the agreement to co-develop the Las Pias Property and to
DECISION set in operation all the necessary steps towards the realization of the said project.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a proceeding directly
affects the title to the land or the buildings thereon; or the possession, the use or the
occupation thereof. Hence, the registration of such notice should be allowed if the
litigation involves the enforcement of an agreement for the co-development of a
parcel of
"On September 8, 1995, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance, Enforcement of Implied Trust and Damages against State Investment
Trust, Inc. Northeast Land Development, Inc., State Properties Corporation (formerly
Peltan Development, Inc.) and defendant Allen Roxas, in his capacity as Vice-
Chairman of State Investment Trust, Inc., and Chairman of Northeast Land
Development, Inc., State Properties Corporation, which was docketed as Civil Case
land.
No.65277.

"On September 11,1995, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the
Statement of the Case
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Las Pias for the annotation of a Notice of Lis
Pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473- A, registered in the
name of Peltan Development, Inc. (now State Properties Corporation).
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the February 27, 1998
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)[3] in CA- GR SP No. 39649 and its November
"In a letter dated September 15, 1995, the respondent Register of Deeds of Las Pias
12, 1998 Resolution[4] denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the
denied the request for annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the following
Resolution[5] of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta No. 2381, which
grounds:
ruled as follows:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Authority is of the considered view and so holds that 1. the request for annotation and the complaint [do] not contain an adequate
the Notice of Lis Pendens subject of this consulta is not registrable."[6] description of the subject property;

2. petitioner's action only has an incidental effect on the property in question.

The Facts

"On September 20, 1995, petitioner filed an appeal to the respondent Land
The undisputed facts were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: Registration Authority, which was docketed as Consulta No. 2381.

"The subject property is known as the Las Pias property registered in the name of
Peltan Development Inc. (now State Properties Corporation) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-A situated in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las
Pias, Rizal.
"On December 14, 1995, the Respondent Land Registration Authority issued the
assailed Resolution holding that petitioner's 'Notice of Lis Pendens' was not
registrable."[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

"The Chiong/Roxas family collectively owns and controls State Investment Trust, Inc. In affirming the ruling of the LRA, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to
(formerly State Investment House, Inc.) and is the major shareholder of the following adequately describe the subject property in the Complaint and in the application for
corporations, namely: State Land Investment Corporation, Philippine Development the registration of a notice of lis pendens. The CA noted that while Transfer
and Industrial Corporation and Stronghold Realty Development. Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-A indicated six parcels of land, petitioner's
application mentioned only one parcel.
"Sometime in 1995, the said family decided to give control and ownership over the
said corporations to only one member of the family, through the process of bidding Moreover, the CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens may be registered only when
among the family members/stockholders of the said companies. It was agreed that an action directly affects the title to or possession of the real property. In the present
the bidder who acquires 51% or more of the said companies shall be deemed the case, the proceedings instituted by petitioner affected the title or
winner. possession incidentally only, not directly.

"Defendant Allen Roxas, one of the stockholders of State Investment Trust, Inc. Hence, this Petition.[8]
applied for a loan with First Metro Investment, Inc. (First Metro for brevity) in the
amount of P36,500,000.00 in order to participate in the bidding.

"First Metro granted Allen Roxas' loan application without collateral provided, Issues
however, that he procure a guarantor/surety/solidary co-debtor to secure the
payment of the said loan.
Petitioner submits for the consideration of the Court the following issues:
"Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as guarantor for the aforementioned loan in
consideration for its participation in a Joint Venture Project to co-develop the real
estate assets of State Investment Trust, Inc. "I

"After a series of negotiations, petitioner Viewmaster and defendant Allen Roxas

Whether or not the petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject property in its
agreed that should the latter prevail and win in the bidding, he shall sell to petitioner
complaint and in the notice of lis pendens.
fifty percent (50%) of the total eventual acquisitions of shares of stock in the State
Investment Trust, Inc., at a purchase price equivalent to the successful bid price per
share plus an additiona1 ten percent (10%) per share.

II
"As a result of the loans granted by First Metro in consideration of and upon the
 no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of [a]
Whether or not the Las Pias property is directly involved in Civil Case No. 65277."[9] money judgment, though the title [to] or right or possession [of] a property may be
incidentally affected. It is thus essential that the property be directly affected where
The Court's Ruling the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the
enforcement [thereof], or an adjudication between the conflicting claims of title,
possession or right of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or
The Petition is meritorious. sale."[11]

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the civil case subject of the notice of lis
pendens directly involved the land in question, because it prayed for the enforcement
First Issue: of a prior agreement between herein petitioner and Defendant Allen Roxas to co-
Description of Property develop the latter's property.

Petitioner contends that the absence of the property's technical description in either
the notice of lis pendens or the Complaint is not a sufficient ground for rejecting its
application, because a copy of TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A specifically describing the
property was attached to and made an integral part of both documents.
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioner failed to provide an accurate
description of the Las Pias property, which was merely referred to as a "parcel of
land."
The notice of lis pendens described the property as follows:
"A parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Tindig na Manga, Municipality of Las Pias,
Province of Rizal x x x containing an area of Seven Hundred Eighty Six Thousand One
Hundred Sixty Seven (786,167) square meters, more or less."
By itself, the above does not adequately describe the subject property, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No.1529. It does not distinguish the said property from other properties similarly
located in the Barrio of Tindig na Manga, Municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal.
Indeed, by the above description alone, it would be impossible to identify the
property.
We agree with the petitioner. A notice of lis pendens, which literally means "pending
suit," may involve actions that deal not only with the title or possession of a property,
but even with the use or occupation thereof. Thus, Section 76 of PD 1529 reads:
"Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. -- No action to recover possession of real estate, or to
quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to
vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against
persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the
institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as
well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of
the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered."
In Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court did not
confine the availability of lis pendens to cases involving the title to or possession of
real property. Thus, it held:
"According to Section 24, Rule 14[13] of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No.1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
cases, viz.:

In the paragraph directly preceding the description quoted above, however, petitioner
specifically stated that the property referred to in the notice of lis pendens was the a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
same parcel of land covered by TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A:
b) An action to quiet title thereto;

"Please be notified that on 08 September 1995, the [p]laintiff in the above-entitled
case filed an action against the above-named [d]efendants for specific performance,
enforcement of an implied trust and damages, now pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 166, which action involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. (S-17992) 12473-A, registered in the name of Peltan
Development Incorporated which changed its corporate name to State Properties
Corporation, one of the [d]efendants in the aforesaid case. The said parcel of land is
more particu1arly described as follows:
'A parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Tindig na Manga, Municipality of Las Pias,
Province of Rizal x x x containing an area of Seven Hundred Eighty Six Thousand One
Hundred Sixty Seven (786,167) square meters, more or less.'
"Request is therefore made [for] your good office to record this notice of pendency of
the aforementioned action in TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A for all legal purposes."[10]
As earlier noted, a copy of the TCT was attached to and made an integral part of both
documents. Consequently, the notice of lis pendenssubmitted for registration, taken
as a whole, leaves no doubt as to the identity of the property, the technical
description of which appears on the attached TCT. We stress that the main purpose
of the requirement that the notice should contain a technical description of the
property is to ensure that the same can be distinguished and readily identified. In this
case, we agree with petitioner that there was substantial compliance with this
requirement.
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land
e)
or the use or occupation hereof or the buildings thereon."
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court further declared that the rule of lis
pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right in
specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it x x x."
Thus, this Court observed that the said notice pertained to the following:
"x x x all suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only those which
involve the question of title, but also those which are brought to establish an
equitable estate, interest, or right, in specific real property or to enforce any lien,
charge, or encumbrance against it, there being in some cases a lis pendens, although
at the commencement of the suit there is no present vested interest, claim, or lien in
or on the property which it seeks to charge. It has also been held to apply in the case
of a proceeding to declare an absolute deed of mortgage, or to redeem from a
foreclosure sale, or to establish a trust, or to suits for the settlement and adjustment
of partnership interests."
In the present case, petitioner's Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 65277 clearly
warrants the registration of a notice of lis pendens. The Complaint prayed for the
following reliefs:

Second Issue: Render judgment ordering the Defendant Allen Roxas to sell fifty percent (50%) of
Property Directly Involved "1.his shareholdings in Defendant State Investment to Plaintiff at the price equivalent
to the successful bid price per share plus an additional ten percent (10%) per
share and directing Defendants to co-develop with the Plaintiff the subject real
In upholding the LRA, the Court of Appeals held that "the doctrine of lis pendens has
 properties;
2. Render judgment ordering the Defendant Allen Roxas to:
Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
a. and/or such other amounts as may be proven during the course of the trial, by
way of actual damages;
Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), by
b.
way of moral damages;
Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), by
c.
way of exemplary damages;
Pay the Plaintiff the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
d.
(P250,000.00) by way of attorney's fees; and
e. Pay expenses of litigation and costs of suit."[15]
Undeniably, the prayer that Defendant Allen Roxas be ordered to sell 50 percent of
his shareholdings in State Investment does not directly involve title to the property
and is therefore not a proper subject of a notice of lis pendens. Neither do the various
amounts of damages prayed for justify such annotation.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals and the respondents that the prayer
for the co-development of the land was merely incidental to the sale of shares of
defendant company.
The Complaint shows that the loan obtained by Allen Roxas (one of the defendants in
the civil case) from First Metro was guaranteed by petitioner for
two distinct considerations: (a) to enable it to purchase 50 percent of the stocks that
the said defendant may acquire in State Investment and (b) to co-develop with the
defendants the Quezon City and the Las Pias properties of the corporation. In other
words, the co-development of the said properties is a separate undertaking that did
not arise from petitioner's acquisition of the defendant's shares in the corporation. To
repeat, the co-development is not merely auxiliary or incidental to the purchase of the
shares; it is a distinctconsideration for Viewmaster's guaranty.[16]
Hence, by virtue of the alleged agreement with Allen Roxas, petitioner has a direct --
not merely incidental -- interest in the Las Pias property. Contrary to respondents'
contention,[17] the action involves not only the collection of a money judgment, but
also the enforcement of petitioner's right to co-develop and use the property.
The Court must stress that the purpose of lis pendens is (1) to protect the rights of
the party causing the registration thereof[18] and (2) to advise third persons who
purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject
to the result of the pending litigation.[19] One who deals with property subject of a
notice of lis pendens cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessors-in-
interest.[20] In Tanchoco v. Aquino,[21] the Court held:
"x x x The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within
the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered;
otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree
shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. Purchasers pendente lite of
the property subject of the litigation after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds are bound by the judgment against their
predecessors. x x x."
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the Certificate of Title would be deemed a purchaser in good faith. Against
such third party, the supposed rights of petitioner cannot be enforced, because the
former is not bound by the property owner's undertakings not annotated in the
TCT.[22]
Likewise, there exists the possibility that the res of the civil case would leave the
control of the court and render ineffectual a judgment therein. Indeed, according to
petitioner, it was not even informed when Allen Roxas exchanged the Quezon City
property for shares of stock in Northeast Land Development, Inc.[23] Hence, it
maintains that there is a clear risk that the same thing would be done with the Las
Pias property.
In this light, the CA ruling left unprotected petitioner's claim of co-development over
the Las Pias property. Hence, until the conflicting rights and interests are threshed
out in the civil case pending before the RTC, it will be in the best interest of the
parties and the public at large that a notice of the suit be given to the whole world.
The Court is not here saying that petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its
Complaint pending in the RTC. Verily, there is no requirement that the right to or the
interest in the property subject of a lis pendens be proven by the applicant. The Rule
merely requires that an affirmative relief be claimed.[24] A notation of lis
pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien.[25] It merely
protects the applicant's rights, which will be determined during the trial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Las Pias Register of Deeds is directed to
cause the annotation of lis pendens in TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. DELGADO Case Digest
PEOPLE vs. DELGADO
189 SCRA 715, 1990
Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the
Election Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually
recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the
information against the private respondents as recommended.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the
warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing
the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a
reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that
it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and
resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the
actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside
from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election
contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public
prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and
the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent
court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case
must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by
the court.
CASIM VS RD
636 Phil. 725
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, taken directly on a
pure question of law from the April 14, 2005 Resolution[1] and June 24, 2005
Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 253 in Civil
Case No. LP-04-0071[3] one for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The assailed
Resolution dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition filed by J. Casim Construction
Supplies Inc. for cancellation of notice of lis pendens annotated on its certificate of
title, whereas the assailed Order denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
Petitioner, represented herein by Rogelio C. Casim, is a duly organized domestic
corporation[4] in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49936,[5] covering
a 10,715-square meter land was registered. Sometime in 1982, petitioner acquired
the covered property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[6] and as a result the
mother title, TCT No. 30459 was cancelled and TCT No. 49936 was issued in its
stead.[7]
cancellation of notice of lis pendens.[14] And, as opposed to petitioner's claim that
there was no carry-over of encumbrances made in TCT No. 49936 from the mother
title TCT No. 30459, the latter would show that it also had the same inscriptions as
those found in TCT No. 49936 only that they were entered in the original copy on file
with the Register of Deeds. Also, as per Certification[15] issued by the Register of
Deeds, petitioner's claim of lack of transaction record could not stand, because the
said certification stated merely that the corresponding transaction record could no
longer be retrieved and might, therefore, be considered as either lost or destroyed.

On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 an
original petition for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as of all the
other entries of involuntary encumbrances annotated on the original copy of TCT No.
49936. Invoking the inherent power of the trial court to grant relief according to the
petition, petitioner prayed that the notice of lis pendens as well as all the other
annotations on the said title be cancelled. Petitioner claimed that its owner's
duplicate copy of the TCT was clean at the time of its delivery and that it was
surprised to learn later on that the original copy of its TCT, on file with the Register of
Deeds, contained several entries which all signified that the covered property had
been subjected to various claims. The subject notice of lis pendens is one of such
entries.[8] The notations appearing on the title's memorandum of encumbrances are
as follows:
On April 14, 2005, the trial court, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over the
action, resolved to dismiss the petition and declared that the action must have been
filed before the same court and in the same action in relation to which the annotation
of the notice of lis pendens had been sought. Anent the allegation that the entries in
the TCT were forged, the trial court pointed out that not only did petitioner resort to
the wrong forum to determine the existence of forgery, but also that forgery could
not be presumed merely from the alleged non-chronological entries in the TCT but
instead must be positively proved. In this connection, the trial court noted
petitioner's failure to name exactly who had committed the forgery, as well as the
lack of evidence on which the allegation could be based.[16] The petition was
disposed of as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 - ADVERSE CLAIM - In an affidavit duly subscribed and
sworn to, BRUNO F. CASIM claims, among other things, that he has the right and SO ORDERED.[17]
interest over the property described herein in accordance with Doc. No. 336; Page Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[18] but it was denied in the trial court's June 24,
No. 69; Book No. 1; s. of 1981 of Not. Pub. of Makati, M.M., Romarie G. Villonco, 2005 Order.[19]
dated August 4, 1981.
Now, raising the purely legal question of whether the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch
Date of inscription - Aug. 5, 1981 - 2:55 p.m. 253 has jurisdiction in an original action to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds on the subject title as an incident in a previous case, petitioner, in this present
petition, ascribes error to the trial court in dismissing its petition for cancellation. An
Entry No. 82-4676/T-49936 - CANCELLATION OF ADVERSE CLAIM inscribed hereon action for cancellation of notice of lis pendens, petitioner believes, is not always
under Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 in accordance with Doc. No. 247; Page 50; Book ancillary to an existing main action because a trial court has the inherent power to
No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub. of Pasay City, M.M., Julian G. Tubig, dated April 21, cause such cancellation, especially in this case that petitioner was never a party to
1982. the litigation to which the notice of lis pendens relates.[20] Petitioner further posits
that the trial court has committed an error in declining to rule on the allegation of
Date of inscription - April 21, 1982 - 8:40 a.m. forgery, especially since there is no transaction record on file with the Register of
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds Deeds relative to said entries. It likewise points out that granting the notice of lis
pendens has been properly annotated on the title, the fact that its owner's duplicate
Entry No. 82-4678/T-49936 - AFFIDAVIT - In accordance with the affidavit duly title is clean suggests that it was never a party to the civil case referred to in the
executed by the herein registered owners, this title is hereby cancelled and in lieu notice.[21] Finally, petitioner posits that TCT No. 49936 is indefeasible and holds it
thereof TCT No. 49936/T-228 has been issued in accordance with Doc. No. 249; Page free from any liens and encumbrances which its mother title, TCT No. 30459, might
No. 80; Book No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub. of Pasay City, M.M., Julian G. Tubig, have suffered.[22]
dated April 21, 1982.
The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim (intervenor), in its Comment on the present
Date of inscription - April 21, 1982 - 8:44 a.m. petition, reiterates that the court a quo does not have jurisdiction to order the
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds cancellation of the subject notice of lis pendens because it is only the court exercising
jurisdiction over the property which may order the same that is, the court having
Entry No. 81-12423/T-30459 - NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS: By virtue of the notice of jurisdiction over the main action in relation to which the registration of the notice has
Lis Pendens presented and filed by CESAR P. MANALAYSAY, counsel for the plaintiff, been sought. Also, it notes that even on the assumption that the trial court had such
notice is hereby given that a petition for review has been commenced and now jurisdiction, the petition for cancellation still has no legal basis as petitioner failed to
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay, M.M, in Civil Case establish the grounds therefor. Also, the subject notice of lis pendens was validly
No. LP-9438-P, BRUNEO F. CASIM, Plaintiff, vs. SPS. JESUS A. CASIM & MARGARITA carried over to TCT No. 49936 from the mother title, TCT No. 30459.
CHAVEZ and Sps. Urbano Nobleza and Cristita J. Nobleza, and Filomena C. Antonio,
Defendants, involving the property described herein. In its Reply,[23] petitioner, in a semantic slur, dealt primarily with the supposed
inconsistencies in intervenor's arguments. Yet the core of its contention is that the
Date of the instrument - Sept. 17, 1981 non-chronological annotation of the notice stands to be the best evidence of
Date of the inscription - Sept. 18, 1981 - 3:55 p.m. forgery. From this, it advances the notion that forgery of the notice of lis
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds[9] pendens suffices as a ground for the cancellation thereof which may be availed of in
an independent action by the aggrieved party.
To justify the cancellation, petitioner alleged that the notice of lis pendens, in
particular, was a forgery judging from the inconsistencies in the inscriber's signature The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
as well as from the fact that the notice was entered non-chronologically, that is, the
date thereof is much earlier than that of the preceding entry. In this regard, it noted Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the jurisdiction, power
the lack of any transaction record on file with the Register of Deeds that would or control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the
support the notice of lis pendens annotation.[10] continuance of the action, and until final judgment.[24] Founded upon public policy
and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the
Petitioner also stated that while Section 59 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the
requires the carry-over of subsisting encumbrances in the new issuances of TCTs, judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.[25] Its notice is an announcement to
petitioner's duplicate copy of the title did not contain any such carry-over, which the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that
means that it was an innocent purchaser for value, especially since it was never a one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
party to the civil case referred to in the notice of lis pendens. Lastly, it alludes to the gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[26]
indefeasibility of its title despite the fact that the mother title, TCT No. 30459, might
have suffered from certain defects and constraints.[11] A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court
before which the action involving the property is pending. This power is said to be
The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim, representing Bruneo F. Casim, intervened in inherent in the trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of
the instant case and filed a Comment/Opposition[12] in which it maintained that the law.[27] Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RTC of Las Pias did not have jurisdiction over the present action, because the matter authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is properly shown
of canceling a notice of lis pendens lies within the jurisdiction of the court before that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
which the main action referred to in the notice is pending. In this regard, it necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated. Be that as
emphasized that the case referred to in the said notice had already attained finality as it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional
the Supreme Court had issued an entry of judgment therein and that the RTC of circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who
Makati City had ordered execution in that case.[13] It cited the lack of legal basis for caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of
the petition in that nothing in the allegations hints at any of the legal grounds for the the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the
case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non
prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the
party who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso
facto cancelled.[28]
In theorizing that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has the inherent power to
cancel the notice of lis pendens that was incidentally registered in relation to Civil
Case No. 2137, a case which had been decided by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62
and affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, petitioner advocates that the
cancellation of such a notice is not always ancillary to a main action.
The argument fails.
From the available records, it appears that the subject notice of lis pendens had been
recorded at the instance of Bruneo F. Casim (Bruneo) in relation to Civil Case No.
2137[29] one for annulment of sale and recovery of real property which he filed
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 against the spouses Jesus and Margarita
Casim, predecessors-in-interest and stockholders of petitioner corporation. That case
involved the property subject of the present case, then covered by TCT No. 30459. At
the close of the trial on the merits therein, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision
adverse to Bruneo and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.[30] Aggrieved,
Bruneo lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
54204, which reversed and set aside the trial court's decision.[31] Expectedly, the
spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim elevated the case to the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 151957, but their appeal was dismissed for being filed out of
time.[32]
A necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens is that the property covered
thereby is effectively placed, until the litigation attains finality, under the power and
control of the court having jurisdiction over the case to which the notice relates.[33] In
this sense, parties dealing with the given property are charged with the knowledge of
the existence of the action and are deemed to take the property subject to the
outcome of the litigation.[34] It is also in this sense that the power possessed by a
trial court to cancel the notice of lis pendens is said to be inherent as the same is
merely ancillary to the main action.[35]
Thus, in Vda. de Kilayko v. Judge Tengco,[36] Heirs of Maria Marasigan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[37] and Tanchoco v. Aquino,[38] it was held that the
precautionary notice of lis pendens may be ordered cancelled at any time by the court
having jurisdiction over the main action inasmuch as the same is merely an incident
to the said action. The pronouncement in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v.
Enriquez,citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[39] is
equally instructive
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the
court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an
extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. x x x[40]
Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case must have
been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather, before the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 62 as an incident of the annulment case in relation to which its
registration was sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has jurisdiction over the main
case referred to in the notice and it is that same court which exercises power and
control over the real property subject of the notice.
But even so, the petition could no longer be expected to pursue before the proper
forum inasmuch as the decision rendered in the annulment case has already attained
finality before both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on the appellate
level, unless of course there exists substantial and genuine claims against the parties
relative to the main case subject of the notice of lis pendens.[41] There is none in this
case. It is thus well to note that the precautionary notice that has been registered
relative to the annulment case then pending before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62
has served its purpose. With the finality of the decision therein on appeal, the notice
has already been rendered functus officio. The rights of the parties, as well as of
their successors-in-interest, petitioner included, in relation to the subject property,
are hence to be decided according the said final decision.
To be sure, petitioner is not altogether precluded from pursuing a specific remedy,
only that the suitable course of action legally available is not judicial but rather
administrative. Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 provides the appropriate measure to have
a notice of lis pendenscancelled out from the title, that is by presenting to the
Register of Deeds, after finality of the judgment rendered in the main action, a
certificate executed by the clerk of court before which the main action was pending to
the effect that the case has already been finally decided by the court, stating the
manner of the disposal thereof. Section 77 materially states:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. -- Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the
action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or
buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has
been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall
be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in
which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal
thereof. [42]
Lastly, petitioner tends to make an issue out of the fact that while the original TCT on
file with the Register of Deeds does contain the annotations and notice referred to in
this petition, its owner's duplicate copy of the title nevertheless does not reflect the
same non-chronological inscriptions. From this, petitioner submits its puerile
argument that the said annotations appearing on the original copy of the TCT are all
a forgery, and goes on to assert the indefeasibility of its Torrens title as well as its
supposed status as an innocent purchaser for value in good faith. Yet we decline to
rule on these assumptions principally because they raise matters that call for factual
determination which certainly are beyond the competence of the Court to dispose of
in this petition.
All told, we find that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has committed no
reversible error in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction the petition for cancellation of notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner, and
in denying reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 14, 2005 Resolution and the June 24,
2005 Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, in Civil
Case No. LP-04-0071, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PINEDA VS ARCALAS
563 Phil. 919
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Resolution[1] dated 25 January 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. CV No. 82872, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Arlyn Pineda
(Pineda) for failure to file her appellant's brief. Under the assailed Resolution, the
Order[2] promulgated by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
(Laguna RTC), on 2 February 2004, granting the petition of respondent Julie Arcalas
(Arcalas) for the cancellation of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated at the back
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094, became
final.
The subject property consists of three parcels of land, which are described as Lot No.
3762-D with an area of 42,958 square meters, Lot No. 3762-E with an area of 4,436
square meters, and Lot No. 3762-F with an area of 2,606 square meters, the total
area of which consists of 50,000 square meters. These three lots are portions of Lot
No. 3762, registered in the name of Spouses Mauro Lateo and Encarnacion
Evangelista (spouses Lateo) under TCT No. T-52319, with a total area of 74,708
square meters, located at Barrios Duhat and Labuin, Santa Cruz, Laguna. A certain
Victoria Tolentino bought the said property from the Spouses Lateo. Sometime later,
Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, for Sum of Money, was instituted by Arcalas against
Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a
promissory note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which Victoria Tolentino
owed Arcalas.[3]
On 9 September 1997, Branch 93 of the Quezon City RTC, rendered judgment in
favor of Arcalas and against Victoria Tolentino.[4]
On 15 December 1997, Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria L.
Tolentino.[5] Pineda alleged that upon payment of the purchase price, she took
possession of the subject property by allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate
the same. However, Pineda failed to register the subject property under her name. [6]
To execute the judgment, the Quezon City RTC levied upon the subject property and
the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution dated 12 January 1999 was annotated
as Entry No. 315074, in relation to Entry No. 319362, at the back of TCT No. T-
52319.[7]
Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of
the Quezon City RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim. Arcalas filed a motion
to set aside Pineda's Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim, which on 3 November
1999, the Quezon City RTC granted, to wit:
[Arcalas] showed that her levies on the properties were duly registered while the
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale between the defendant Victoria L. Tolentino and Analyn
G. Pineda was not. The levies being superior to the sale claimed by Ms. Pineda, the
court rules to quash and set aside her Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted. The Affidavit of Title and Third-Party Claim is or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
set aside to allow completion of execution proceedings.[8] This Court provided the rationale for requiring an appellant's brief in Enriquez v. Court
On 2 February 2000, after the finality[9] of the Order of the Quezon City RTC quashing of Appeals[17]:
Pineda's third-party claim, Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna another Affidavit of Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of [T]he appellant's brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the
adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094. [10] decision of the appeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically
assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be considered, except
On 3 February 2000, Arcalas and Leonardo Byron P. Perez, Jr. purchased Lot No. those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.
3762 at an auction sale conducted by the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City. The sale was Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to resolve an unassigned error,
evidenced by a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale issued on the same day and registered as which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain
Entry No. 324225 at the back of TCT No. T-52319.[11] or clerical error.
Thus, in Casim v. Flordeliza,[18] this Court affirmed the dismissal of an appeal, even
Arcalas then filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pineda's adverse claim when the filing of an appellant's brief was merely attended by delay and fell short of
before the Laguna RTC. The Laguna RTC ordered the cancellation of the Notice of some of the requirements of the Rules of Court. The Court, in Gonzales v.
Adverse Claim annotated as Entry No. 324094 at the back of TCT No. 52319 on the Gonzales,[19] reiterated that it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to submit or
ground of res judicata: file a memorandum of appeal, and that failing such duty, the Rules of Court
unmistakably command the dismissal of the appeal.
The court order emanating from Branch 91 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
having become final and executory and no relief therefrom having been filed by In this case, Pineda did not even provide a proper justification for her failure to file
[Pineda], the said order granting the [Arcalas's] "Motion to Set Aside Affidavit of Title her appellant's brief. It was merely alleged in her Motion for Reconsideration that her
and 3rd Party Claim" should be given due course and the corresponding annotation at counsel overlooked the period within which to file the appellant's brief. Although
the back of TCT No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094 dated February 2, 2000 should be Pineda filed no less than two motions for reconsideration, Pineda had not, at any
expunged accordingly.[12] time, made any attempt to file her appellant's brief. Nor did she supply any
Pineda appealed the Order of the Laguna RTC before the Court of Appeals under Rule convincing argument to establish her right to the subject property for which she seeks
44 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005,[13] the appellate vindication.
court dismissed the appeal and considered it abandoned when Pineda failed to file her
appellant's brief. Thus, this Court cannot reverse or fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful
compliance with the rules of procedure and established jurisprudence that it has been
Pineda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein it was plainly stated that Pineda's mandated to observe, nor turn a blind eye and tolerate the transgressions of these
counsel overlooked the period within which he should file the appellant's brief.[14] The rules and doctrines.[20] An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
said motion was denied in a Resolution dated 26 May 2005. Pineda filed a Second down in the Rules of Court since the right to appeal is a purely statutory right. [21]
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on 7 October 2005.[15] No appellant's
brief was attached to either motion for reconsideration. Even when this Court recognized the importance of deciding cases on the merits to
better serve the ends of justice, it has stressed that the liberality in the application of
Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues: [16]
rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the
rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.[22] The Court eyes with
disfavor the unjustified delay in the termination of cases; once a judgment has
I. become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict,
WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL through a mere subterfuge. The time spent by the judiciary, more so of this Court, in
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-96-27884 MAY EXEMPT THE taking cognizance and resolving cases is not limitless and cannot be wasted on cases
PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM VICTORIA TOLENTINO; [and] devoid of any right calling for vindication and are merely reprehensible efforts to
evade the operation of a decision that is final and executory.[23]

II. In the present case, there is a clear intent on the part of Pineda to delay the
termination of the case, thereby depriving Arcalas of the fruits of a just verdict. The
WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES PORTION OF LOT Quezon City RTC already quashed Pineda's third party claim over the subject
3762 IS ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF property, yet she filed another adverse claim before the Office of the Register of
REGISTRATION. Deeds of Laguna based on the same allegations and arguments previously settled by
the Quezon City RTC. Arcalas, thus, had to file another case to cause the cancellation
This petition must be dismissed. of Pineda's notice of adverse claim on TCT No. T-52319 before the Laguna RTC. After
the Laguna RTC gave due course to Arcalas's petition, Pineda filed a dilatory appeal
The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the case for Pineda's failure to file an before the Court of Appeals, where she merely let the period for the filing of the
appellant's brief. This is in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, appellant's brief lapse without exerting any effort to file one. The two motions for
which imposes upon the appellant the duty to file an appellant's brief in ordinary reconsideration and even the petition before this Court fail to present new issues.
appealed cases before the Court of Appeals, thus: They raised the very same issues which had been consistently resolved by both the
Quezon City RTC and the Laguna RTC in favor of Arcalas, upholding the superiority of
Section 7. Appellant's brief. It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, her lien over that of Pineda's unregistered sale. Considering all these circumstances,
within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, there is no basis for the lenient application of procedural rules in this case; otherwise,
oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly it would result in a manifest injustice and the abuse of court processes.
typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies
thereof upon the appellee. As a rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client.[24] The only exception
In special cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, such to this rule is when the counsel's negligence is so gross that a party is deprived of
as certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, a due process and, thus, loses life, honor or property on mere technicalities.[25] The
memorandum of appeal must be filed in place of an appellant's brief as provided in exception cannot apply to the present case, where Pineda is merely repeating
Section 10 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court arguments that were already heard and decided upon by courts of proper jurisdiction,
and the absolute lack of merit of the petition is at once obvious.
Section 10. Time of filing memoranda in special cases. In certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of Pineda avers that she is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, heard before the
briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days Quezon City RTC, and that the levy on the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case
from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and No. Q-96-27884 cannot affect her purchase of subject property. Such position runs
documentary, is already attached to the record. contrary to law and jurisprudence.

The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be
a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Non-filing of an appellant's brief or a memorandum of appeal is one of the explicitly
recognized grounds of dismissal of the appeal in Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
x x x x
Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provide that:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same
in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease,
or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration
shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where
the land lies. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease,
lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall,
if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the time of such registering, filing or entering. (Emphasis provided.)
It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the
registration of the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third persons, such as
Arcalas, cannot be bound thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what
validly transfers or conveys a person's interest in real property is the registration of
the deed. As the deed of sale was unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract
between the parties, namely Victoria Tolentino as seller and Pineda as buyer, which
may be enforceable against Victoria Tolentino through a separate and independent
action. On the other hand, Arcalas's lien was registered and annotated at the back of
the title of the subject property and accordingly amounted to a constructive notice
thereof to all persons, whether or not party to the original case filed before the
Quezon City RTC.
The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale.[26] A registered lien is entitled to preferential
consideration.[27] In Valdevieso v. Damalerio,[28] the Court held that a registered writ
of attachment was a superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale and
explained the reason therefor:
This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular
property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a
specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except
the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect,
means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of
it to pay the owner's debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had
under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondent appeared in the nature of
a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of
said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the
lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of
his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not
absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondent, a right
which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.
Pineda also contends that her possession of the subject property cures the defect
caused by her failure to register the subject property in her name. This contention is
inaccurate as well as inapplicable.
True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, this Court has
made an exception in a case where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant's
actual, open, and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time the levy
or attachment was registered. In such situations, the actual notice and knowledge of
a prior unregistered interest, not the mere possession of the disputed property, was
held to be equivalent to registration.[29]
Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much less prove, that Arcalas
had actual knowledge of her claim of ownership and possession of the property at the
time the levy was registered. The records fail to show that Arcalas knew of Pineda's
claim of ownership and possession prior to Pineda's filing of her third party claim
before the Quezon City RTC. Hence, the mere possession of the subject property by
Pineda, absent any proof that Arcalas had knowledge of her possession and adverse
claim of ownership of the subject property, cannot be considered as equivalent to
registration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 82872, promulgated on 25
January 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Order of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, directing the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel the Notice of
Adverse Claim inscribed at the back of TCT No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094
is SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bernardo Valdevieso vs Candelario Damalerio and Aurea C. Damalerio
February 17, 2005
Facts:
On 05 December 1995, Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) bought from spouses
Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a parcel of land. The deed of sale was not registered, nor was
the title of the land transferred to petitioner. It came to pass that on 19 April 1996,
spouses Candelario and Aurea Damalerio (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a complaint for a sum of money against spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy
with application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. On 23 April
1996, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which the
property, then still in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already been sold to
petitioner, was levied. The levy was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds. On 06
June 1996, TCT No. T-30586 in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-74439 was issued in the name of petitioner. This new TCT carried
with it the attachment in favor of respondents. On 14 August 1996, petitioner filed a
third-party claim to discharge or annul the attachment levied on the property covered
by TCT No. T-74439 on the ground that the said property belongs to him and no
longer to Lorenzo and Elenita Uy. The trial court ruled for the petitioner. Respondents
sought reconsideration thereof which was denied by the trial court. From the
unfavorable resolution of the trial court in the third-party claim, respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the resolution. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over that
of an earlier unregistered deed of sale?
Ruling:
We agree with the respondents.
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529. Said
Section provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the
same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage,
lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration
shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land lies.
It should also be observed that, at the time of the attachment of the property on 23
April 1996, the spouses Uy were still the registered owners of said property. Under
the cited law, the execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough
as a succeeding step had to be taken, which was the registration of the sale from the
spouses Uy to him. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or
conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed. Thus, when
petitioner bought the property on 05 December 1995, it was, at that point, no more
than a private transaction between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be
registered before it could bind third parties, including respondents. When the
registration finally took place on 06 June 1996, it was already too late because, by
then, the levy in favor of respondents, pursuant to the preliminary attachment
ordered by the General Santos City RTC, had already been annotated on the title.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a
prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the
property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the
fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the
subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a
proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or
levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an
indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt. The lien
continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated
in some manner provided by law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature
of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of
said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the
lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of
his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not
absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondents, a right
which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.
The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are hereby affirmed.