I Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial Development
Corporation, an industrial asbestos manufacturer, needed a
A. A. ADDISON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARCIANA FELIX
and BALBINO TIOCO, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914, the plaintiff sold to
the defendant Marciana Felix, with the consent of her husband,
the defendant BalbinoTioco, four parcels of land, described in
the instrument. The defendant Felix paid, at the time of the
execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000 on account of the
purchase price, and bound herself to pay the remainder in
installments, the first of P2,000 on July 15, 1914, and the
second of P5,000 thirty days after the issuance to her of a
certificate of title under the Land Registration Act, and further,
within ten years from the date of such title P10, for each
coconut tree in bearing and P5 for each such tree not in
bearing, that might be growing on said four parcels of land on
the date of the issuance of title to her, with the condition that
the total price should not exceed P85,000. It was further
stipulated that the purchaser was to deliver to the vendor 25
per centum of the value of the products that she might obtain
from the four parcels "from the moment she takes possession
of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her
favor."
Issue: WON Was there a delivery made and, therefore, a
transfer of ownership of the thing sold?
Held:
No, for non-delivery of the thing to be sold, the thing is
considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and
possession of the vendee." (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that
the same article declares that the execution of a public
instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that
the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that,
at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have
been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the
ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be
placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to
prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery
through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser
cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it himself or through another in his name,
because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality the
delivery has not been effected.
POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
REYNALDO and ANGELITA R. QUIAMBAO and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
Facts:
bigger office space and warehouse for its products. For this
purpose, on January 31, 1979, it entered into a contract of sale
with the spouses Reynaldo and Angelita R. Quiambao, herein
private respondents. The contract involved a 612-sq. m. parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-6686
located at the corner of Bagtican and St. Paul Streets, San
Antonio Village, Makati City. The parties agreed that petitioner
would pay private respondents P108,000.00 as down payment,
and the balance of P295,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed of transfer of the title over the property. Further, petitioner
assumed, as part of the purchase price, the existing mortgage
on the land. In full satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to
Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity).
Issue:
WON there was a substantial breach of the contract between
the parties warranting rescission
Held:
1) No. The alleged failure of respondent spouses to eject the
lessees from the lot in question and to deliver actual and
physical possession thereof cannot be considered a
substantial breach of a condition for two reasons: first, such
failure was not stipulated as a condition -- whether resolutory
or suspensive -- in the contract; and second, its effects and
consequences were not specified either.[13]
Effective Symbolic Delivery
The Court disagrees with petitioners allegation that the
respondent spouses failed to deliver the lot sold. Petitioner
asserts that the legal fiction of symbolic delivery yielded to the
truth that, at the execution of the deed of sale, transfer of
possession of said lot was impossible due to the presence of
occupants on the lot sold. We find this misleading.
II
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Facts: On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as
charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner
questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts
jurisdiction.The appellate court, however, in the challenged
decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated
in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the
RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting
the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to
reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the
petitioners conviction.
Issue: WON petitioner is barred by laches to assail the
jurisdiction of the trial court
Held:
No. In this case, at the time the criminal information for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the
Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code)
was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691
which lodged jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding 6 years to the MTC. As the
imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is
prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on
the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC
of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction. In Tijam vs
Sibonghanoy, we expounded thus: A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is,
however, the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches
may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in
cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the
cited case.Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the
actionIn Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the
Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered.Clearly, the factual settings attendant
in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner
Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals
resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a
Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts
jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action.
Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a
single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered
as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to
take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the
natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead
to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.the petitioner
is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his
appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable
period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone,
though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel
by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his
rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be
then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the
principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of
Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and
revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment
creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15
years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant
case.
G.R. No. 139031 October 18, 2004
MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, petitioner,
vs.
FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts:
On May 20, 1994, Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City a
complaint for sum of money with damages against Fastforms
Philippines, Inc., respondent. The complaint alleges that on
June 2, 1993, respondent, through its president Dr. Eduardo
Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount of One
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P170,000.00). Later,
despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent refused to
pay its principal obligation and interests due.Respondent, in its
answer with counterclaim,[5] denied that it obtained a loan from
petitioner; and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr.
Eduardo Escobar, to secure any loan from petitioner or issue
various checks as payment for interests. After trial on the
merits, the court a quo rendered a Decision in favor of
petitioner. Respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning for the first time the trial courts
jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioners
principal demand (P195,155.00) does not
exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No.
7691.Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration,
stressing that respondent is barred from assailing the
jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the latters
jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the
complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial. The
trial court denied respondents motion for reconsideration,
holding that it has jurisdiction over the case because the
totality of the claim therein exceeds P200,000.00. The trial
court also ruled that respondent, under the principle of
estoppel, has lost its right to question its jurisdiction. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Court held
that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, petitioners claim being only P195,155.00; and that
respondent may assail the jurisdiction of the trial court anytime
even for the first time on appeal.
Issue: whether the trial court has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 94-1788.
Held:
Yes. the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of
money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages being
claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main
cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining
the jurisdictional amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the Metropolitan
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the instant case.
Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of
a debt, and the prayer for damages is not one of the main
causes of action but merely a consequence thereto, it should
not be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. . The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice
of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his
case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.
III
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989
ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when
employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17,1975.
About four years later, she began suffering from severe and
recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to
take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical
treatment in Manila. The petitioner was diagnosed at the
Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that
time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power
had been lost. A claim for disability benefits filed by her
husband with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS)was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly
denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation
Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS
decision. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation
Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor
Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of
"presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and
substituted a system based on social security principles. The
present system is also administered by social insurance
agencies the Government Service Insurance System and
Social Security System under the Employees' Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium
between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation
for work-connected death or disability.
Issues:
Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but
contracted during employment is compensable under the
present compensation laws.
Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely
inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a
disease is not listed as occupational disease.
Held:
The Court saw no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing
vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for
brain cancer. What the law requires for others is proof. The
law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive
thing The illness was caused by employment and the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust
fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal
requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of
otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .The Court
has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted
and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no
infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.
G.R. No. L-62157 December 1, 1987
EULALIO MORA JR., in representation of his deceased
wife, LETICIA ADOR MORA petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of
Telecommunication), respondents.
Facts:
The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979
a telegraph operator of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Tacloban City. During the course of her employment, and more
particularly in January 1978, she complained of frequent
epigastric pain radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy
conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed
a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a
certain portion of the small intestine). She underwent
"exploratory laparotomy with resection of ileocaecal junction"
but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a claim for
disability benefits under PD 626, as amended, with respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was,
however, denied by the GSIS on the ground that her ailment is
not an occupational disease considering her particular
employment as telegraph operator. Not satisfied, she sent a
letter to the Chairman of respondent Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople,
requesting for a review of her case. She averred that her
cancer should be considered by the system as work-connected
since she acquired the same during her sixteen (16) years of
employment. On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal
to the ECC which was prosecuted by her husband after her
death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness which
caused Leticia Mora's death is not work-connected.
Issue:
WON adnocarcinoma is compensable
Held:
The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code,
PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness, disability
or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975. The new law on
employee's compensation makes compensable disability or
death arising from an ailment under any of the following
grounds namely: (a) when the illness is definitely accepted as
an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation
Commission, or (b) when said illness is caused by employment
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the work conditions.
The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said Annex
"A" as occupational disease. To be compensable thereby the
law requires that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the employment of the deceased. But this
requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease
cancer can itself be known. However, despite scientific
advances on the matter, even professional experts have not as
yet determined its cause.
IV
G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, *
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE
DE GUZMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a
reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a Supernumerary
Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee
whos having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she
signed, her employment was to immediately terminate upon
the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again
hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as
a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever
status was then formally completed until she was asked again
to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In
the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil
status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also made the same
representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The
branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy
sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said
discrepancy and she was reminded about the companys
policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her
reply, she stated that she wasnt aware of such policy at that
time and all along she hadnt deliberately hidden her true civil
status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this
reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed from
the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for
illegal dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of
living allowances.
Issue:
Whether or not PT&T is liable against Graces illegal dismissal
due to certain company policy
Ruling:
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations.
Wheres accompany policy disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated
such policy as it not only runs a foul the constitutional provision
on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the
State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against
marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the
nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Graces illegal
dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages.
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on
Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
the existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees with competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a
prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with
stipulation that management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-counterchecking position or
preparation for employment outside of the company after 6
months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and got married with
Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Issue:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company is valid
Held:
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential
programs and information from competitors. The prohibition
against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be
denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held
in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated
requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
V Station, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, did then and there willfully,
G.R. No. 125185 May 5, 1999
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO BORREROS, defendant and appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
At bar is an appeal by accused Virgilio Borreros from the
Decision 1 dated May 13, 1996 of Branch 225 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21890,
finding him guilty of the crime of Murder. Accused-appellant
Virgilio Borreros, claims that Medina collared him and he
warded off Medina's hands which angered the latter. He also
cursed Medina who then drew his gun. He, however, managed
to grab the gun and he moved back, but Medina was attacking
him so he shot Medina. Almario, who was at the back of
Medina was about to get a pamalo, so he shot him at the feet
to warn him. Almario, however, faced him with thepamalo and
attacked him, so he shot him again in the thigh. Almario
continued on attacking him, so he shot him again.
Issue:
WON the act of drawing a gun constitutes unlawful aggression
Held:
Unlawful aggression, a condition sine qua non to a successful
invocation of self-defense, was not established. It bears
stressing that for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there
must be a real danger to life or personal safety. 19 Unlawful
aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack,
or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. 20 Here, the act of the deceased Federico
Medina of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be
categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in
real peril the life or personal safety of appellant. 21 Even
assuming for the sake of argument that there was really
unlawful aggression by Federico on appellant's person, it can
be deduced from the latter's own declaration during the trial
that the unlawful aggression had ceased the moment Federico
was dispossessed of the gun.
G.R. No. 191913 March 21, 2012
SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
That on or about February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac, a public officer, being then a member of
the Philippine National Police, assigned with the Dingras Police
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shoot one SPO1
Doddie Espejo with a gun resulting into the latters death.
Issue:
WON the act of drawing a gun constitutes unlawful aggression
Held:
The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be
differentiated from current jurisprudence on unlawful
aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He
was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to
settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning
shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left
unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at
petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending
himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if
We were to disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his
firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim.
G.R. No. 180046 April 2, 2009
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its
Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR),
PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC.
(PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE
REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
CARPIO, J.:
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing
"review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure
examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not
limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services
examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
2. ) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under
Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to
justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as the provision
clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers
and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is
no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722.

Facts:
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO
indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006
Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be
(Implementing Rules and Regulations).
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
Issue:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the
The President has control over the executive department,
Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs
bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume
jurisdiction
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to
Held:
the power of control, he is granted administrative power.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
Held:
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the
orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an
CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must
of higher education and degree-granting programs in all
be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
public and private post-secondary educational
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
legislative policy.
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar
entities.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power,
the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it
legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their
refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is
quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its
school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations"
jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review
given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program
centers and similar entities.
that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review
course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge
or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs
given by review centers could not be considered
"programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is
defined as "education beyond the secondary level or
"education provided by a college or university."