VERGARA v.

CA
G.R. No. 77679
Sept. 30, 1987

PADILLA, J.:

An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent against
petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin
Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private
respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo
truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-
out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and
that the said accident was an act of God for which he cannot be held liable."
Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said
cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant insurance
company. Petitioner asked that the latter be ordered to pay him whatever amount he may be ordered by the court to pay to the
private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance
and Surety Corporation, to the private, respondent the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. On the third
party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party
liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is not tenable. It was
established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of
whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon by the trial court. The
findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of
occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman
Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police
report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and
went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the
store warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character.
Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in
the selection and supervision of his driver.
Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner, the
petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
------------------xxx-----------------------

TITLE: PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

G.R. NO. and DATE: G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PONENTE: BARREDO, J.:

PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION: ARTICLE 2177

FACTS:

It is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants
(Hill), the complaint of plaintiffs (Elcano) for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

ISSUE/S:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence
from his father, was already legally married?

RULING:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability
and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

It results that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

The clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent

--------------------------------xxx--------------------------------

JARANTILLA V. CA

FACTS:

-Jose Kuan Sing was side-swepped by a vehicle one evening, the vehicle was a Volkswagen driven by Jurantilla, Sing sustained
physical injuries.

-Jarantilla was charged for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, Sing did not reserved his right to institute a
separate civil action and he also intervened in the prosecution, Jarantilla was later on acquitted in the crim. Case on reasonable
doubt.

-After the acquittal, Sing filed a separate civil action against Jarantilla involving same matter.

-Jarantilla contends that Sing is already barred from instituting a separate civil action because there was already a judgment on
the criminal case and Sing failed to reserve the civil aspect and even participated in the earlier criminal case.

CFI:

In favor of Sing. Ordered to pay damages for Sings hospitalization, medicine, actual expenses, moral damages, attys fees and
costs.

CA:

Affirmed CFI, reduced moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether Sing can file a separate civil action considering that he did not reserved his right to do so and he even
participated in the criminal proceeding.

SC:

-It is well settled that the same act/ omission can create 2 kinds of liability on the part of the offender: ex delicto and ex quasi
delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict/crimw or quasi-delict/ tort, either of these 2 types of civil
liability may be enforced against the culprit subject to caveat that offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability.

-A person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. The judgment of acquittal may extinguish the civil liability of the
accused ONLY WHEN it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

-Art. 29 CC: When an accused in a criminal case is acquitted because there was no reasonable doubt a civil action for damages
for the same act/ omission may be instituted, such action requires preponderance of evidence.

-Since the action is based on quasi-delict, the failure of Sing to reserve his rights to file a separate civil case and his intervention
in the crim case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.
-The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule III refers exclusively to civil liability founded on RPC;/ Civil liability for the
same act considered as quasi-delict is not extinguished even by declaration in criminal case that the crim act charged has not
happened nor committed by the accused.

-2 cases were anchored in 2 different causes of action:

Crim case-violation of RPC

Complaint for damages- based on quasi-delict

- And that the judgment in criminal case, the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved.
- Affirmed CA, Liable for damages.

---------------------------------xxx---------------------------

SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style SERGIO F. NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its
members, LEONARDO T. GALANG, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. 116123. March 13, 1997]

FACTS:

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi
services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.

Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers. During their employment, they were required to
pay a daily "boundary fee". All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the vehicles they were driving were accounted
against them, including gasoline expenses.

Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES
was dissolved, and the services of individual respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991.

The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations
as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated
drivers will be givenP500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in December
1991 and January 1992.

However, individual respondents herein refused to accept theirs.

Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through the National Organization of
Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint against "Sergio F.
Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services
(AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo
as President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out.

Said complaint was later amended to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI
with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.

In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises,
although their individual applications for employment were approved by CFTI.

They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI, and that the former thence
managed, controlled and supervised their employment. They averred further that they were entitled to separation pay based
on their latest daily earnings of US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a month.
 In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners claimed that the cessation of business of CFTI,
was due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about
by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement.
They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union, through its President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have
had blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driver-employees separation pay
equivalent to P500.00 for every year of service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay
them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier agreement between CFTI
and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of service.
The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was forced to close business due to "great financial losses and lost
business opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was profitably earning and the cessation of its business was
due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in accordance with the Labor Code, the labor-
arbiter explained:
"To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay separation pay would be inhuman to complainants
but to impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) down by force
majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the least." and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian
consideration."
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC DECISION:
In its Resolution, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the private
respondents.
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same
time the President and Vice-President and General Manager, respectively, should be joined as indispensable party
whose liability is joint and several.
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners was denied by the NLRC. Hence, this petition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
HELD:
I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;
Well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order to sustain retrenchment of personnel
or closure of business and warrant exemption from payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear and
satisfactory evidence. The records, however, are devoid of such evidence.
The labor arbiter; as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base
because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was not due to any great financial loss because petitioners' taxi
business was earning profitably at the time of its closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:
"x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered one (1 ) whole year."
Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that individual
respondents were entitled to separation pay in the amount $120.00 (one-half of $240.00 monthly pay) or its peso
equivalent for every year of service.
II: NOWM's Personality to Represent Individual Respondents-Employees
On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents, we hold petitioners in estoppel for not having
seasonably raised this issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC. NOWM was already a party-litigant as the organization
representing the taxi driver-complainants before the labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said
complaint did not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity of its representations in behalf of the complaining
taxi drivers before the quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from raising such question before this Court. In
any event, petitioners acknowledged before this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly represented by NOWM, are themselves
parties in this case
III: Liability of Petitioner-Corporations and Their Respective Officers
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat Enterprises actually managed, supervised and
controlled employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As adverted to earlier, factual findings of
quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly
and severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again remind those concerned that
decisions, however concisely written, must distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based. This
rule applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
IV. Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI, respondents rely on Articles
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however, found that individual respondents were
regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary or commission basis.
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to
an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises,
among others; and (2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to
the principal business of the employer. Independent contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise independent employment,
contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to control of their employer except as
to the result of their work.
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect
employer of individual respondents much less a labor only contractor. On the contrary, petitioners submitted documents such
as the drivers' applications for employment with CFTI, and social security remittances and payroll of Naguiat Enterprises
showing that none of the individual respondents were its employees. Moreover, in the contract between CFTI and AAFES, the
former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase from AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of vehicles to
be "ke(pt) on the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became the owner of the
taxicabs which became the principal investment and asset of the company.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their
employment. It appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the
president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business. They
presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director ]of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.,
was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however,
evince the truth of the matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and determining their employment terms,
was rather carrying out his responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate corporation does not
appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his employer, he could not deny that he received his
salary from the office of CFTI inside the base.
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the
trading business while CFTI was in taxi services.
In addition, the Constitution of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, admittedly, was the union of individual
respondents while still working at Clark Air Base, states that members thereof are the employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective
bargaining purposes, the definite employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc."
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual and direct employer of individual
respondents, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor labor-only contractor. It was not
involved at all in the taxi business.
V. CFTI president solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability of their officers. To bolster their position,
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due process since they were not parties to the
complaint below. In the broader interest of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI,
cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
 A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC is the case in point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the
stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973, it filed an application for clearance to close or cease
operations, which was duly granted by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of employees to
seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were subsequently
computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union filed about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation,
but none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable assets of said corporation. In its last motion for
execution, the union asked that officers and agents of the company be held personally liable for payment of the backwages.
This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is the
judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed employees with backwages, enforceable against its officer and
agents, in their individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where the judgment was
rendered?"
The NLRC answered in the negative, on the ground that officers of a corporation are not liable personally for official
acts unless they exceeded the scope of their authority.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In imposing joint and several liability upon the
company president, the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:
"(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) provisions be implemented when the employer
is a corporation? The answer is found in Article 212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:

'(c) 'Employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any
labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.'

The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it
must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the 'person acting in the interest of (the)
employer' RANSOM. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to say even criminally, liable for
nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of the law. x x x

(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have devious ways for evading payment of back
wages. x x x

(d) The record does not clearly identify 'the officer or officers' of RANSOM directly responsible for failure to pay the back
wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence of definite proof in that regard, we believe it should be presumed that the responsible
officer is the President of the corporation who can be deemed the chief operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal
responsibility is with the 'Manager or in his default, the person acting as such.' In RANSOM, the President appears to be the
Manager." (Underscoring supplied.)

Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A.
C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and
severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were "close family corporations" [34] owned by
the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:
"(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management or operation of the business and
affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among
themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained
reasonably adequate liability insurance." (underscoring supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate liability insurance;" thus, what remains is
to determine whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort."
Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. [] Simply stated,
tort is a breach of a legal duty.
Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation
of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation.
 Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should
be held personally liable.
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation
in the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice. [ In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily
liable for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of "general manager" as well, it had not
been shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his participation in the management
or operation of the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI and
Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.
VI. No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the NLRC Resolution holding Sergio F. Naguiat and
Antolin T. Naguiat jointly and severally liable with petitioner-corporations in the payment of separation pay, averring denial
of due process since the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of the corporation were not parties to the case when the
judgment in favor of the employees was rendered. The corporate officers raised this issue when the labor arbiter granted the
motion of the employees to enforce the judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the corporation president
solidarily liable with the corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when
they, in their individual capacities, filed a position paper [40] together with CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to
have been denied due process since they availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed February 28,
1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to
pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of
service, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;

(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the
payment of separation pay to individual respondents.

-----------------------------------------xxx-------------------------------------------

Albenson Enterprise v. Court of Appeals

TOPIC: Article 19 known as Principle of abuse of rights and malicious prosecution as source of Damages

FACTS:

Albenson Enterprises delivered steel plates to Guaranteed Industries located at V. Mapa St. Sta. Mesa, Manila. The payment
made by Guaranteed Industries was made through check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account name of
E.L. Woodworks.

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Albenson Ent. Traced the origin of the
check through the Securities and Exchange Commission and discovered that the president of Guaranteed Industries and the
recipient of unpaid steels was EUGENIO BALTAO. It was further discovered that E.L. Woodworks was registered in the name of
Eugenio Baltao and the signature on the check was from the same person, Eugenio Baltao.

Albenson Ent. Made extrajudicial demand to replace and/or make good the dishonoured check. However, respondent Baltao
denied that issuance of the dishonoured check and that the signature is his. He also alleged that Guaranteed was defunct and
could not have been able to transact with Albenson.

Albenson filed a case against Baltao for violation of B.P. 22. It appears however that Eugenio Baltao has a namesake in the same
building which is his son named Eugenio Baltao III who manages E.L. Woodworks.
Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In
filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting
evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona,
consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature
in said check was not his.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a cause of damages done by Albenson by filing a case of violation of BP 22 against Baltao

Ruling:

1. CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS; CONSTRUED. Article 19, known to contain what is

commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise

of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give

everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights;

that in their exercises, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal

because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised

in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is

thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is

different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With

this article (Article 21), combined with Articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly
broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable that the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive

of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of

the Philippines 72). There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of

abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in

damages under Article 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe

Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or

duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the

general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71).

Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall

indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following

elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3)
and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another

may be made the basis for an award of damages.

3. ID.; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE ABSENCE OF WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION OR OF

FRAUD OR BAD FAITH. The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the

amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means

by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will

naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the

check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be

awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment

of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA

488 [1986]).

4. ID.; ID.; AWARD THEREOF ON BASIS ON MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; ELEMENTS. To constitute malicious prosecution,

there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was

initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of

submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still,

private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise

includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious

prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In

order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the

prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with

an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or

impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved,

may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a

complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to

exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable

for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such

facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the

prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in

cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very

great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law

when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]). The presence of probable

cause signified, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not

motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent. "To constitute malicious prosecution,

there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated

deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges where false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a

case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the

institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly

established to entitle the victims to damages."

6. ID.; ID.; UNWARRANTED, WHERE THE ACTION WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH AND DAMAGE RESULTS FROM A PERSON'S

EXERCISING HIS LEGAL RIGHTS. The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is

possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent

Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonor check. However, the record shows that petitioners

did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private

respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation

Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent

mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if

respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by

Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the

complaint. Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the

payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious

that moral damages may be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso

facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]). Thus, an award of

damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's

exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

7. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; PECUNIARY LOSS MUST SUBSTANTIALLY BE PROVED. Coming now to
the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the same was based solely on his

allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he

claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, not did he present proof of the actual loss to his

business cause by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation,

conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous

(Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]). Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of

pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the

proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these

reason, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private

respondent in the absence of proof thereof.

--------------------------xxx-----------------------------
VIRATA v. OCHOA

---------------------------xxx----------------------------

G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992

M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS, petitioners, vs.
AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

FACTS: February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams
was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an
employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard.

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of
the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. . It is a telephone answering device in the office of the
Administrative Assistant. The Action Line is intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they
feel should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation. The matter of inquiry may be phoned in or mailed to the
POD. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military
personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD published, under
the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following:

The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her
division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and
appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the
Article was the private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal. Moreover, as a result of this
article, the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, the private respondent had been
the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.

M. H. Wylie, the action line naming "Auring" was received about three (3) weeks prior to its being published in the POD on
February 3, 1978. It was forwarded to Rarang's office of employment, the Provost Marshal, for comment. The Provost Marshal
office's response ". . . included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the name." (Exhibit 8-A, p. 5) The
Provost Marshal's response was then forwarded to the executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The
approval of the Commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A
certain Mrs. Dologmodin, a clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD.
Finally, M. H. Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to
"Auring" in the action line inquiry.

It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is far removed in the chain of command
from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on
the base. This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication
was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it.

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal. That the private
respondent was the same "Auring" referred to in the POD was conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978, petitioner M. H.
Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent then commenced an action for
damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that
the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English
language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. She prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral
damages; exemplary damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three grounds: 1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted
in the performance of their official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; 2. The
United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and 3. This
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties in this case. The motion was, however, denied.
In short, the trial court ruled that the acts and omissions of the two US officials were not imputable against the US government
but were done in the individual and personal capacities of the said officials. The trial court dismissed the suit against the US
Naval Base.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally, as follows:

1) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff Aurora Rarang the sum of one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos by way of moral and exemplary damages;
2) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos by way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
3) To pay the costs of this suit.
Counterclaims are dismissed.
Likewise, the suit against the U.S. Naval Base is ordered dismissed.

On appeal, the petitioners reiterated their stance that they are immune from suit since the subject publication was made in
their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy. They also maintained that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause
the questioned publication. CA modified RTCs decision:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is modified so that the defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the sum of P175,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages. The rest of the
judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Costs against the defendants-appellants.

ISSUE: Are American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the
principle of state immunity from suit?

HELD: The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United
States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued.
In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. The
general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. The petitioners have shown no
convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this
particular case and why their decisions should be reversed.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional or voluntary or negligent." (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).

Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages
for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and
reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because
under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and
cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act,
the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
for the damages they caused the private respondent.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. CA desion is affirmed.

---------------------------------------xxx---------------------------------

CULPA AQUILANA v. CULPA CONTRACTUAL

G.R. No. 129029 April 3, 2000
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward,
Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy), respondents.

FACTS: An amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol a duly licensed driver, with reckless imprudence resulting
in double homicide and damage to property. In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck Tractor bearing Plate No.
N2A-867 driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer
"Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino).
At around 4:00 o'clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane going
south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six
inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching
the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it.
This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of
the Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957. As a result, Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left
shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and
its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly from external and internal hemorrhage and
multiple fractures.

The accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and
Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the
offense charged. The offended parties actually filed a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases
and conducted a joint trial.

Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed
driver. Aside from the Corporation's memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each
trip, the SMC's Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989. In
addition to a professional driver's license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.

On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision:

1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months
and twenty days as maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00;
and
3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.

Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco
Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant
in the next preceding paragraph; petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental
decision. During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated
December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case. The Court of Appeals
rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended
decision but the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE: May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the
employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property?

HELD: To remand the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused
driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice
between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a
separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured
party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. , "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability
on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced
against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability."

The offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on
quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this
vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law.

The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on
quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would
necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The
enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be
insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be
held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when
the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable
to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless
imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it.
In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not
instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver
became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable
for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action
against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included
therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The
policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is
brought against the employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action
for damages he will bring.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela,
Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile law (R.A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum, 40 without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendant's counterclaim.

--------------------------------------------------xxx---------------------------------------

CASUPUNAN ET. AL. v. LAROYA