CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Jimenez v Sorongon
Facts:
Jimenez is the president of Unlad Shipping &
Management Corporation, a local manning agency.
Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and
Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of thelisted
incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc.
(TMSI), a local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated
and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged
that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation to
secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed
their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits
allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not
submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the
respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his
recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-
8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina
T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City
Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed
a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The
petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their
opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion
to withdraw information as it found the existence of
probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the
RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza
filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for
deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a
September 2, 2005 order, the RTC denied the omnibus
motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on
whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion
for judicial determination of probable cause with a
request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition
with motion to expunge, contending that respondent
Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to
seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005
resolution, already found probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial.
In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied respondent
Alamils motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it
had already found probable cause against the respondents in
the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the
September 2, 2005 order.
1
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for
reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali,
for being biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, the
petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge,
reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek
relief from the RTC.
In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily
inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve
respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and the
petitioners motion to expunge.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge
Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent
Alamils motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent
Alamils motion for judicial determination as a motion to
dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found:
(1) no evidence on record to indicate that the
respondents gave any false information to secure a license
to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and
(2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the
RTCs jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking
affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and
set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration,
stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the
respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to
seek any relief from the RTC.
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did
not have the public prosecutors conformity.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioners
MR, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments
in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the
motion expunged from the records since the motion did not
have the public prosecutors conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the
petitioners notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did
not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil
interest in the case.
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the
motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party,
he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the
case; the respondents fraudulent acts in forming
TMSI greatly prejudiced him.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the
petitioners notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it
without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who
is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in
criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered
the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the
CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs
March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
2
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA
dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack
of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the
People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of
the Solicitor General has the legal personality to represent
the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
Petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the
case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the
respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment
business.
Denied the MR that followed.
The Petition
Petitioner:
o He has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since he is the private complainant and
a real party in interest who had been directly
damaged and prejudiced by the respondents illegal
acts;
o Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from
the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
Respondents:
o Petitioner lacks a legal standing since the power to
prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a
public prosecutor;
o Petitioner acted independently and without the
authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution
and appeal of the case.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of
legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines?
NO. Petitioner has no legal standing. In a criminal case, the real
party in interest is the People of the Philippines.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case
"Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to
the avails of the suit."
Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.
By real interest is present substantial interest, not a mere
expectancy or a consequential interest.
When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in
interest, the suit is dismissible.
"All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor."
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this
Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code)
o SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of
3
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or
any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal
case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
EXCEPTION: Offended party may be allowed to pursue
the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a
denial of due process).
The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary
interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents.
2. WON Alamil is a fugitive justice and therefore has no right to
seek any relief from the RTC?
NO. Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs
jurisdiction
One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Dispositive: Appeal Denied. CA Affirmed.
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao
Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in
Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police
officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago
City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila.
The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon
automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified the petitioners as the ones
responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting
Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or
quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent
motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court.
4
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion
to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the
accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the
law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail,
but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver
of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.
Romera v People
One evening in October 1998, Roy Mangaya-ay was drunk and was
banging on the door of Arturo Romera. Mangaya-ay was thrusting
his bolo at the door and walls of the house of Romera. Romeras
wife woke him up. Stirred by the commotion, Romera went outside
through another door and approached Mangaya-ay. The two had a
scuffle and during which Romera stabbed the stomach of Mangaya-
ay. Mangaya-ay was later brought to the hospital where he was
treated and he survived. Meanwhile, Romera voluntary surrendered
to the authorities.
Romera was later found guilty of frustrated homicide but the trial
court considered his voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance.
Romera appealed as he averred that the mitigating circumstances
of provocation (Par. 4, Art. 13, RPC) and passion and
obfuscation (Par. 6, Art. 13, RPC) should have been considered by
the court, that ultimately, the penalty imposed should have been
lowered by one degree due to the presence of two or more mitigating
circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romera is correct.
HELD: Yes, he is partly correct. Provocation and passion and
obfuscation should have been considered by the trial court however,
it is a rule that if the mitigating circumstances
of provocation and passion and obfuscation or those found in
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code all
arise from the same facts, they shall only be considered as one.
In this case, provocation and passion and obfuscation all arise from
the act of Mangaya-ay of thrusting his bolo at the house of Romera
while the latter was resting. As such, there are two mitigating
circumstances present, to wit:
1. Voluntary surrender;
2. Provocation and passion and obfuscation (taken as one).
That being, since there are two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances, the penalty to be imposed shall be
lowered by one degree.
5
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
People v Torpio
Anthony Rapas and Dennis Torpio were drinking liquor. When
defendant did not want to drink anymore, Rapas got angry and then
bathed defendant with gin. Rapas then boxed and tried to stab him
but failed he was crawling under the table. Defendant was able to
escape and went to his house. There, defendant's father tried to stop
him from pursuing Rapas - but failed to do so.
Defendant then looked for Rapas and successfully stabbed him. The
morning after, he voluntarily surrendered to the police.
The trial court found defendant guilty of murder qualified by
treachery or evident premeditation but found mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party preceded the act; the accused acted to vindicate immediately a
grave offense committed by the victim, and voluntary surrender.
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, as the penalty was
reclusion perpetua, that there was no treachery as he did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack to ensure the accomplishment of
his criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer nor there was evident
premeditation as the prosecution failed to prove that he had planned
and prepared any plot to kill the victim. Further, no direct and
positive evidence had been shown that sufficient time had elapsed
between his determination to commit the crime and its execution to
enable him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
ISSUES: Whether there was treachery or evident meditation and
whether all the mitigating circumstances the trial court found are
present.
RULING: NO. It should be clear that treachery and evident
premeditation, must be proven with equal certainty as the
commission of the crime charged. Such circumstances cannot be
presumed; nor can they be based on mere surmises or speculations.
In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the accused.
In this case, there was no evidence showing any method or means
employed by the defendant in order to ensure his safety from any
retaliation that could be put up by the victim. Defendant only acted
to avenge Rapay's acts done against him and confronted Rapay while
bleeding from his wounds.
Evident premeditation requires that the execution of the criminal act
by the accused be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
In this case, there is no evident premeditation as it was not shown
that defendant had definitely resolved to commit the offense and had
reflected on the means to bring about the execution following an
appreciable length of time.
The utterance of defendant that he must kill Rapay was not
considered by the Court as a product of serious and determined
reflection. The interval between the time when the appellant made
this statement and when he actually stabbed Anthony was not
sufficient or considerable enough as to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
The Court held that defendant should only be guilty of homicide.
6
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
NO. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and the
immediate vindication of a grave offense were only present.
Voluntary surrender was present as defendant lost no time in
submitting himself to the authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a
police officer.
The immediate vindication of a grave offense was appreciated as
defendant was humiliated and wounded by the Rapay. Although the
unlawful aggression had ceased , it was nonetheless a grave offense.
Sufficient provocation, however, cannot be considered apart from the
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. The two
circumstances should only be considered as one because it arose
from one and the same incident.
People v Espinosa
Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public
officers were filed before the SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then provincial
administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3) Romeo
Sanano.
Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
of the cases. The SBN Fourth Division granted the Motion directed
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence.
While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN
a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad. On the date set for the hearing
of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth Division) issued an Order resetting
the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private respondent to be
conditionally arraigned on that date before it would act on his
Motion to Travel.
Private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion
to Travel. The Order of Arraignment stated that upon being duly
arraigned, [he] entered a plea of Not Guilty to both
Informations. The Court also ordered the deferment of the pretrial of
the cases, pending the reinvestigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman.
OMB -- through the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to
withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent. The
SBN granted the Motion.
OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation
of Public Funds against Espinosa and several others.
Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that
double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been
arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to
Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without his express
consent.
Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases
was conditional, because it was made solely for the purpose of
accommodating private respondents request to travel abroad while
the matters were pending reinvestigation.
SB: SBN First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached in the first
instance It noted that the dismissal had been sought and obtained
without respondents knowledge, much less express consent.
7
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Issue: Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
Criminal Cases Nos. 34622 to 24628 as against Respondent
Espinosa.
Ruling:
Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court will
point out some procedural lapses. First, prior to submitting the
instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have filed a motion
for reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Clearly then, the
remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For unexplained
reasons, it chose not to pursue this recourse. Its cavalier disregard of
procedural requirements, especially its erroneous choice of remedy,
is indeed enough reason to throw out this Petition summarily.
Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, the Petition
should nonetheless be dismissed for its lack of substantive merit.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against
private respondent on the ground of double jeopardy had no factual
or legal basis, because his arraignment in the earlier cases was only
conditional. We are unconvinced.
Previous cases have mentioned the SBNs practice of conditionally
arraigning the accused pending the Ombudsmans reinvestigation of
the case. This practice is not mentioned or provided for in the regular
rules of procedure.
The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, promulgated by
this Court, do not mention any conditional arraignment. Neither do
the regular Rules of Court.
Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. The
accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. Thus,
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily.
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally. No unusual ceremony
punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple
process inconsistent with its studied manner of conditionally
arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation in other cases.
Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is
pending review, and in order that the Court might not lose
jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the accused and counsel are
advised as part of the arraignment process, that the arraignment is
conditional, i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results
of the reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution should
recommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge,
which would necessarily include or be included in the present
accusation, the accused would now be understood as having waived
his right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution sought
to withdraw the information, the arraignment would be deemed to
have been of no effect. If the accused accepts these conditions for
arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In other
words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going
on; at the time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against
the protection against double jeopardy as a condition for his
travel. (Italics supplied)
8
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the
arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days
when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the
Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, we
should stress that the court does not lose control of the proceedings
by reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is not
handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority.
In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his
right to invoke double jeopardy in the light of his allegedly
conditional arraignment.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of
Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by
Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following
must be demonstrated:
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid
plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[26]
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial
rights cannot be trifled with or cast aside on the basis of mere
suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of a constitutional
right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must be clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent.
As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, the alleged
waiver falls short of the above requirement:
As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal
of the estafa and the corruption cases was made upon petitioners ex
parte Motion for the withdrawal of the Informations. Petitioner does
not dispute the fact that private respondent was not notified of this
Motion. Neither was a hearing held thereon.
On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that he
learned of the Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It is
clear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without
the express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of
the right against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show the
fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.
In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must
be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. They must be
expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
9
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Potot v People
NATURE
Review on certiorari on a decision of RTC of Catarman, Northern
Samar
FACTS
Dec.12,1999: Potot was charged with homicide before the
RTC for assaulting and stabbing a certain Rodolfo Dapulag
with a knife, thereby causing his death.
Feb.1, 2000: Upon arraignment, Potot pleaded guilty and
invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender. He was later convicted of homicide w/
the above stated mitigating circumstances.
Feb.3, 2000: Potot filed a manifestation with motion
informing the TC that he is not appealing from the
Decision and praying that a commitment order be issued so
he could immediately serve his sentence.
Feb.11, 2000: Private complainant Rosalie Dapulag (wife of
the victim), with the conformity of the public prosecutor,
filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the
decision be set aside and that the case be heard again
because of certain irregularities committed before and during
the trial.
She alleged that there were 2 other men involved in the
commission of the crime and that the eyewitness deliberately
withheld the information upon solicitation by a certain
Mayor Dapulag and upon the eyewitnesses own belief that
such inclusion would complicate the case and make it more
difficult.
Petitioner opposed this motion, asserting that the decision
can no longer be modified or set aside because it became
final when he formally waived his right to appeal.
May 3, 2000: The trial court granted Rosalie Dapulags
motion, set aside its previous Decision as well as ordered
that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and
filing of the corresponding charge.
Petitioner filed a MFR, contending that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to issue the Feb.1 order as the Decision had
become final, and that the said order would place him in
double jeopardy.
May 26, 2000: The trial court denied the MFR for the reason
that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its
prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
Petitioner now assails the May 3rd and May 26 orders with
the Sol.Gen. agreeing that the challenged orders should be
set aside and that the Feb. 1 Decision should be reinstated.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court, upon motion by a private complainant, can
set aside a previous judgment of conviction and remand the records
of a case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation
of the evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge
2. WON the manifestation by the accused that he is not appealing
from the trial courts Decision render the judgment final
3. WON the trial court err in granting private complainants motion
for reconsideration/retrial
4. WON the assailed orders violate petitioners constitutional right
against double jeopardy
10
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of
a judgment of conviction which he must do before the said judgment
becomes final or before he perfects his appeal.
Reasoning
- Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of conviction may,
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
2. YES
Ratio The waiver by the accused of his right to appeal from a
judgment of conviction has the effect of causing the judgment to
become final and unalterable.
Reasoning
- It is an undisputed fact that after the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his
right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further
indicated by his prayer in the same manifestation for the immediate
issuance of a commitment order so he could serve his sentence. Such
waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and
unalterable.
3. YES
Ratio When the MFR of the judgment of conviction is not initiated
by the accused or at the instance of the trial court with the consent of
the accused, the same should be denied outright.
Reasoning
- Sec. 1 Rule 121 of the same Rules provides:
Sec.1. New trial or reconsideration At any time before a judgment
of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused
or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a
new trial or reconsideration.
- Since the MFR of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by
the accused or at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the
same should have been denied outright as being violative of the
above provision.
4. YES
Ratio The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously
been acquitted or convicted.
Reasoning
- To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites
must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court
has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
- These requisites have been established. Records show that
petitioner was charged with homicide under valid information before
the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and
pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was
convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has
been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew. DISPOSITION The petition is granted. The
assailed orders dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued by the
trial court are set aside. Its decision dated Feb. 1, 2000 is reinstated.
11
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Lasoy v Zearosa
FACTS:
- In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn
Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996, accused
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
o That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of
42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
- Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty. Both
accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No.
968.
- People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to
admit amended Information, and second, to set aside the
arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the
trial court dated 16 July 1996. In plaintiffs motion to admit
amended information. It stated that the Information indicated
that the accused were carrying 42.410 grams when in truth
they were caught carrying 45 pieces of dried marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to
Metro Manila.
- The Trial Court denied the Motion to Admit Amended
Information. However, the same court GRANTED the
amending of the Information. This information was assigned
to Branch 76 of RTC-QC presided by Judge Monina
Zenarosa.
- Both accused filed a Motion to Quash which was opposed
by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed before the
trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash before
the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which they
later moved to withdraw to pave the way for Branch 76 of
the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on their motion to
quash. The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15
November 1996 noted the motion and considered the
petition withdrawn.
- In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, the
trial court denied accuseds motion to quash, and
scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Accuseds Motion for
Reconsideration, duly opposed by the prosecution, was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: WON the first information is valid YES.
HELD:
- An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
- In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a
person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what
is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to
law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid.
It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in
12
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
the information. The information will be sufficient if it
describes the crime defined by law.
- Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that
the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently
alleges the manner by which the crime was committed.
Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused
of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably
complied with.
- the first information, applying Rule 110, Section 6, shows on
its face that it is valid.
o Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein
the offense was committed.
- SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts
point of view that the accused cannot claim their right
against double jeopardy because they
participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold that
while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard
evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that
accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and
convicted under the first information.
Cudia v CA
Facts: Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City where
a preliminary investigation was conducted and as a result, the City
Prosecutor filed an Information against him. The case against him
was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City. Upon his arraignment, the court called the attention of the
parties and contrary to the information, Renatio Cudia had
committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus
the judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court
involving crimes committed outside Angeles City. Consequently it
was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. However, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information
charging Renato Cudio with the same crime and it was likewise
assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted
into two Information filed with the same crime. This prompted the
City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/ Withdraw the
Information which the trial court granted. Renato filed a Motion to
Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the
ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been
arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be
put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Issue: WON there was violation of the prohibition against double
jeopardy
Held: NO. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles
City had no authority to file the first information, the offense
having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which
is beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations
for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles
City. An information, when required to be filed by a public
13
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited
or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by
law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. In fine, there
must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the
information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a
bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. As the first
information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer
filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all
the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
Galman v SB
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino,
Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-
blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who
shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-
hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day
period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the
contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;
that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy,
not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the
killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court
from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the
Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order
prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to
file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent
Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued
ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a
new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served
on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
14
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting
all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted
that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case
had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process
of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an
accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy
clause.
RULING: Petitioners second motion for reconsideration was
granted. The ordering of a re-trial should be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months
later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were
ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution
was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned
a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial.
A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to
the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice
by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President.
During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres.
Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that
on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to
the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus)
had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all
criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by
his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun.
It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his
15
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in
the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of
the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody
of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in
a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments
from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in
favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of
the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst."
Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address
any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any
case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and
the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal
was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction.
No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal
effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are
void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In
this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt
dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should
not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the
accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must
16
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the
crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts.
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as
they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Ivler v San Pedro
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason
Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On
2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the
second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought
from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the
filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his
petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponces husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from,
17
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple,
are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge
a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article
48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
Petition granted.
People v Velasco
There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting
claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his twin
brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot.
Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two
(2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed against Honorato
Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the
alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were
withdrawn and a new set was filed against the same accused
upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor
18
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 for
unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated
murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the
same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him
from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that
the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the
Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of
Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded
certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently
gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a
re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that
this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be
nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States
that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals
decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial
is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine
concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the
case of Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this
jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on
appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take
the same directional course.
ISSUES
- Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal
in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy is
permissible
HELD/RATIO
NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal
convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of
criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is
so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or
matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which
consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was
based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would
lie. In the case at bar, the records show that respondent trial judge
based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem
to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The
judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case.
The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had
been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is a new trial, is
applicable in this case.
Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;
19
CRIMPRO COMPILATION RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH)
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do
not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or
on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes
the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as
mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of
acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be
had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double
jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when
the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal
case was denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
People v Lacson
Petitioner asserts that according to jurisprudence and a long-standing
judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to
the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal
procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent
insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new
provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application
thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from
March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection
of the law.
ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused ,
can the time-bar rule be applied retroactively?
HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused. It has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of
criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused.
It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed
cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the
time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to
run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal
cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead
of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases,
the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
20