Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,

DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-
CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO,
PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA,Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1

The Facts

The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
(1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and
(3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name
of respondent Julia Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the
name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and
Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins
children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that
were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went
to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias
death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.

Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from
petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to
respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in
1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners claim and
granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land
subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including
intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the old
title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia
Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to
the enumerated plaintiffs; and

3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorneys fees and damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006
provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution9 dated
January 17, 2007.

In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and
Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and
Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11

Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:

A.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT

PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM
THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.

B.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS

MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF
THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties
came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the
properties in representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers
of Exequiel.13

Ruling of the Court

This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in
this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to
this rule, one of which is when the CAs findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being
the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of
the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise one, whether the properties in dispute are
reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.

Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous
title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which
the property came.15

The lineal character of the

reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title

Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the
ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of
the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who
belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.16

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property.17It was also immaterial
for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the
ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.

Ascendants, descendants and

collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.

Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants,
and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:

Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is
1wphi1

that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants
and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)

Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents
and so on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be her children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made
to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the
case of Julias collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her
mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents
(second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias
collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.

First cousins of the

descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within
the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of
the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v.
Florentino,22 the Court stated:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the
designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the
reservable property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character,
petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second,
because petitioners are not Gregorias relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition
that the complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what
should apply in the distribution of Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code,
which provide:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.

Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of
Gregorias estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed
with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail
reception of evidence on Gregorias entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best
accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.

A reservista acquires ownership of

the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished

Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTCs disposition of the case. In
upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the
properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have
done, assuming for arguments sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature
of the property registered on respondents titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to
reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the
reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of ownership belong to him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)

It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not
detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution
dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the
Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without
prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the
properties in question.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA
Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.: 1wph1. t

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following:1w ph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada

a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1w ph1.t

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six
children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1wph1.t

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado
a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes
que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
proceden
 ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel
of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in
1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-
half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Maalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.
When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by

affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return
such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1w ph1.t

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14530 April 25, 1962

LEONA AGLIBOT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ANDREA ACAY MAALAC, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Nemesio Balonso for plaintiff-appellees.

Ruperto G. Martin and Associates for dependants-appellants.

DIZON, J.:

Leona and Evarista Aglibot commenced the present action (Civil Case No. 1482) in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales on July 31, 1952 to recover from Andrea Acay Maalac and her children
Ramona, Gregorio, Felix, Angela, Juanita and Purisima, all surnamed Maalac the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in barrio Namanaan, Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales,
more particularly described in paragraph 2 of their complaint, and damages.
Briefly stated, the allegations of the complaint are that the Aglibots inherited the property subject
matter thereof from their deceased niece Juliana Maalac; that upon the death of Anacleto Maalac,
father of Juliana, the defendants took possession of said property, claimed it as their own and had
since then appropriated for themselves all the palay annually harvested therefrom amounting to 30
cavanes; that nothwithstanding demands made upon said defendants by the Aglibots, they had
refused to surrender the property to the latter.
1w ph1.t

In their answer, after denying some material averments of the complaint, appellants alleged
substantially the following as affirmative defense: that the land in question was purchased from
Esteban Garcia by the spouses Anacleto Maalac and Maria Aglibot for P1,000.00; that when Maria
Aglibot died, only P300.00 of this amount had been paid; that the remaining P700.00 was paid to the
vendor during the marriage of Anacleto Maalac and appellant Andrea Acay; that Juliana Maalac,
the only daughter of Anacleto and his first wife, died in 1920, while Anacleto died in 1942; that upon
his death, his widow, Andrea Acay, and their children acquired the property in question as his sole
legal heirs. Their answer likewise claimed the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees by way of
counterclaim. After due trial, upon the issue thus joined, the lower court rendered judgement as
follows: .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment

declaring the plaintiffs owners pro-indiviso of one half (1/2) of the land covered by Original
Certificate No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint, ordering the
defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of the said one-half (1/2) of the property
covered by said title; ordering the defendants jointly and severally to deliver to the plaintiffs
15 cavanes of palay yearly as the share of the plaintiffs from the produce of the land or its
equivalent value at P10.00 a cavan from the date of the filing of the complaint until the said
one-half (1/2) portion of the property described in Original Certificate No. 10 is delivered to
the plaintiffs and ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

From the above judgment Andrea Acay and her children took the present appeal.

The evidence shows that, originally, the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Anacleto Maalac and Maria Aglibot, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10
of the Register of Deeds of Zambales in the name of Anacleto Maalac, married to Maria Aglibot;
that said spouses had an only child named Juliana Maalac; that Maria Aglibot died on October 2,
1906; that on April 25, 1910, Anacleto Maalac married appellant Andrea Acay with whom he had
six children (the other appellants herein); that Juliana Maalac died intestate on October 22, 1920,
leaving no other relatives except her father, Anacleto Maalac, and her half brothers and sisters
already mentioned; that upon the death of Anacleto on June 2, 1942, his widow, Andrea Acay, and
her six children took possession of the parcel of land in controversy and since then have refused to
surrender the ownership and possession thereof to the appellees; that the land produces thirty
cavanes of palay yearly.

On May 18, 1951, appellees Leona and Evarista Aglibot filed a verified petition in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales for the summary partition or distribution of the properties left by the deceased
Juliana Maalac among her rightful heirs (Special Proceeding No. 594). The court, after proper
proceedings, issued an order dated October 30, 1951, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
.

Wherefore, the Court declares that the applicant Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot are the
only heirs within the third degree of Juliana Maalac, and belonging to the same line from
which these properties originally belonged, that is, from Maria Aglibot, being the sisters of the
latter; that the value of these properties does not exceed six thousand pesos (P6,000); and
 that each of the applicants is entitled to receive and enter into possession of one-half of the
first five parcels and one-fourth of the last two, after paying such debts of the estate if there
be any and the proportionate expenses of this special proceedings, subject to the
provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. (Page 10, Rec. on App.).

After securing the decision abovequoted appellees made the unsuccessful demands upon
appellants for the surrender of the property in question to them, and subsequently filed the present
action.

The main question to be resolved now is: Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto Maalac
inherited from his daughter, Juliana, as between appellees(sisters of Maria Aglibot, first wife of
Anacleto Maalac), on the one hand, and appellants (Anacleto's second wife and their children), on
the other?.

It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable property in accordance
with the provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 891 of the New Civil Code). Both
parties now admit that the entire parcel covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10 belonged to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Anacleto Maalac and Maria Aglibot; that upon the death of
the latter on October 2, 1906, their only daughter, Juliana Maalac, inherited one-half of the
property, the other pertaining to her father as his share in the conjugal partnership; that upon the
death of Juliana Maalac on October 2, 1920 without leaving any descendant, her father inherited
her one-half portion of said property. In accordance with law, therefore, Anacleto Maalac was
obliged to reserve the portion he had thus inherited from his daughter, for the benefit of appellees,
Leona and Evarista Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her
relative within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

Appellants' contention that the major portion of the purchase price of the land in question was paid to
the original owner, Esteban Garcia, after the death of Maria Aglibot is rendered clearly untenable not
only by the lack of sufficient evidence to this effect but also by the very significant circumstance that
the property was titled in the name of Anacleto Maalac "married to Maria Aglibot" circumstance
that strongly indicates that said spouses had acquired full ownership thereof during the lifetime of
Maria Aglibot.

A Secondary question raised by appellants is to the effect that the lower court erred in ordering
them, jointly and severally, to deliver to appellees fifteen cavanes of palay yearly or pay their
equivalent value of P10.00 a cavan, from the date of the filing of the complaint. Considering the
belief of appellants that the property in controversy formed part of the estate of Anacleto Maalac
and that upon the latter's death ownership thereof was transmitted to all his heirs, subject to the
usufructuary rights of the surviving spouse, Maria Acay, their contention not sufficiently rebutted
that only the latter enjoyed possession of the property since her husband's death and received
the annual share pertaining to the landlord seems to be reasonable and logical. She should be the
only one, therefore, sentenced to pay the fifteen cavanes of palay yearly from the date of the filing of
the complaint.

The remaining contention of appellants that the lower court should have ordered appellees to refund
to them 50% of the annual realty tax paid on the property cannot be sustained, this matter having
been raised by them for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.

Salas & Villareal for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR
CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:

a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2)
shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall
be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property,

including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to
render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;

c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00

for and as attorney's fees plus costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December,
1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by
her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on
July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding
paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third
degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not
far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters
of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p.
115, Rollo).

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons:
(1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the
decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.

On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of
the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980
(or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already
been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.

In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On
January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision
of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540)
were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;

2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No.
2540 through extrinsic fraud;

3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of

Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had
inherited them; and

4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to
place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and
notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has
been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.

I. The question of jurisdiction

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court,
there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus
far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:

2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio
as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the
notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other
heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further
appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was
established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and
without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an
elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always
been living with [sic] during his lifetime.

xxxxxxxxx

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole
and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26,
1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.

The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate
so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now
RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the
court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for
the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January
31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her
mother:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in
 the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the
proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of
the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be
made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)

A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5
Phil. 436)

partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1
SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30).
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v.
Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)

In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased
to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired
during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court,
we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper,
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation
of the project of partition. (p. 378).

However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated
for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate
proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring
Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition
of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive
competence of the probate court.

II. The question of extrinsic fraud

Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed
by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint
in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud
was alleged for the first time.

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the
prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v.
David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting
all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through
fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his
defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in
the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was
deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against
such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited
in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96
Phil. 248)

A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as

distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed
by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day
in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45
SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 318, 323)

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:

1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by

Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that
the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations
of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:

6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause
the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by
law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff,
[although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by
choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio,
and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of
hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec.
3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was
published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197,
Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record).
The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole
world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she
had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate
court in its order of October 27, 1978:

... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after
Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .

Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as
required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now, then she
is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from
judgment nor a motion for new trial.

The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court

and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on
collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on
his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia
was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's
own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of
the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National
Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d
1144, 1149)

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any
"interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.

III. On the question of reserva troncal

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who

inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.

3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution
of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within

the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship
 by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate.
(p. 57, Rollo)

IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation
in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:

4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for
(sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)

she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance
in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even
testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly
indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but
he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her
share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).

The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following
principal purposes:

1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such

deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least
one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University of the
Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist
Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a
priest.

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement
and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary
arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent
benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
 4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.

5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-
Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the
Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for
the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this
foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of
his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and
October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids

or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined
by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge,

exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted
by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or any interest
herein.

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any
time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including the
exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban
Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and
two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was
a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School,
the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as
the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained
this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City.
The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives
yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or
brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana
Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose

Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has
 likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst
other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is
obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private
respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court
an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas,
absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to
costs.

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.

Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her,
ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land
above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter
Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born
Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased
father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the
said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants
the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint,
invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged
natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in
its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article
811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural
daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while
unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother
until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and
exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio
de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente
vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion
and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate
of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)

The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not
an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article
811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his
son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana
Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and
she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo
obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the
third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the
defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.
1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva.
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms
"ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be
legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel
for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or
tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives
to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of
that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that
the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of such
commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better
than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the
persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father
or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural
ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching
the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family.
Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that
it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not
recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established
by acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges and the
acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in
said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the
exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks
only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course
made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in
the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for
example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained
that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the
legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime.
The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly
included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class
being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811
occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were
any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the
provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of
the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their
testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
 Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to
succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire
that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which
they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and
whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the
patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate
ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from
the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws
of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal
properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the
duty to reserve.

The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised
just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised;
but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the
interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with
respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)

The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:

Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate
points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is
established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which the properties came.

It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to

articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established
between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to
favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which
is just what this article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate

ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which
the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the
patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not
be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to
inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the
two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the
natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The
reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil,
Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

 A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives
so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO

PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-
appellants.

NARVASA, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was
submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and
Partial Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a

common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship
of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an
integral part of this stipulation.

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels
of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166
and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and
16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary
right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his
only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half
(1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her
mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said
parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon,
or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal
issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of
the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the
one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-
eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
 Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-
half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds
that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-
fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all
their claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court
renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven
(7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166,
T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of
determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in
the rentals of the property in question.

SO ORDERED. 2

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court,
all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art.
891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. (811),

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of
each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva

troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some
are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should
the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews
of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half
blood?

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants
is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).

xxx xxx xxx

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further
occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of
the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and
that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to
those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-
490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within
the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right
of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.
 In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary

intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right
of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
p. 250):

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras
fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las
reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se crea.

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression
of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-
980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively,
of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
 Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces
who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of
the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A.
386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated
by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the
latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable
property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property
subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property
from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of
the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista,
the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of

the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista,
and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the
plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of
intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a
"detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera,

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE,

INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS,
ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.

Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.

Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-
9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of
this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw)
Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father
Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10)
parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother,
Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-
mentioned.

On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:

I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido varios
hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.

II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de
Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.

III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.

IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo
tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.

V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.

VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la
Provincia de Laguna.

VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per
herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
 xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, p. 29)

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil
Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex
"C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in
the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in
turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain
any annotation of its reservable character.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers
in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo,
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos,
filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective
complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter
of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question
of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the
plaintiffs

a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership, pro-
indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in paragraph three (3) sub-
paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;

b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership, pro-
indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described in paragraph three (3),
sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;
 c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to be
conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all
surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the
other plaintiffs who are their uncles:

2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to
the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the
plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income being for the period from January 3, 1968
until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:

3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs

a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.

b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 46, Rollo)

This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in
toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no
cogent reason to reverse the decision.

This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in
good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of the
reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) has not yet prescribed.

IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by
virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.

Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court
affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they
agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista,
Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate
of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose,
Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled
that said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds
of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the
affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving
properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the
said affidavit.

It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were
free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby
showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this
is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering.

Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited
in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v.
CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380
and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein . . .

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .

In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a
document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration.
However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95
SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.

That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as
the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In
cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of
deeds.
 On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary
registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment
he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the
day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of
title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it.
(See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).

In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which
contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise
inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate
of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.

Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable
character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the
deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the
property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion
of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said
portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul
Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free
from any encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)

It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such
admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable
character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered
with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.

Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time
acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna
Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the
petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo
from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited
these properties from his son Raul.

The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891
of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register
the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent
third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No.
42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether
the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for
the benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom
the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the
relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate,
natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter
dictum this Court stated therein:

The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant

reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant
reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New
Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to said
relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this
case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of succession. The
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the
reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have
nothing to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to
the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons
entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p.
292, Ibid)

Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this
Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value.
Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See
also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).

Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang
has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their
reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to
the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith,
free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised
not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?"
Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914,
that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had any knowledge of the
reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land
from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his
mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not
been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for
the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in
regard thereto.

Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse)
had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property,
in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the
latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate
also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real
property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition
of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis
supplied)

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration
of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor
Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the
right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property
during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the
latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree
(See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part
of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil
Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in
thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved
property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed
yet.

Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil
Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable
character of a property subject of reserva troncal.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA
Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.: 1wph1. t

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following: 1w ph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;
 1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada

a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1w ph1.t

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six
children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1wph1.t

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado
a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes
que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel
of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in
1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-
half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Maalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.
When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by

affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return
such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1w ph1.t

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
 temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
 The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
 That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."

From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:

Legal mortgage is established:

1. . . .

2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
 What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the
father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:

Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
 no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.

But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in
law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to
the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without
special findings as to costs.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made
on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made,
the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the
death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale
of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that
the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
 Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang
as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.

From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey
of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by
Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to
inherit said land.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the
properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record
were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton,
Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of
the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in
the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter
said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-
sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he
may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso
in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this
event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a
position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not
appeal therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and
Paredes, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE
LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre, respondents.

Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.

Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of
petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S.
Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom
he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and
his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias
Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of
P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in
favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua;
and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-
indiviso of Lot No. 399.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue.
After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No.
399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then
on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the
complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on
May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that
the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that
the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private
respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
Hence this instant.

The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a
descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was
not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other
fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the
lot in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not
subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa
which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not
whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that
the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives
or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is
that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of
a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;

2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor

de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San
Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiadades:

14483

La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo
No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas
gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed
upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias
Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816
dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is
gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias
Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent
heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and
testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of
Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of
the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the
Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to
deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for
the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be
made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito
Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the
latter's second marriage.

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his
death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art.
891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which
originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966.
We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees
did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were
very much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la
Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.