VEDANTA SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

OF EVIL
KALI PRASAD. M.A.

VEDANTA endeavpurs to base itself essentially on the facts of

experiencein the fullest sense of the term. It recognizes the occur-
rence of everyday experience and the so-called fact of evil, but it
refuses to view them as real. The real, it says, like Hegel, does not
exist, and that which exists is not real. Evil is only an "existent"
as all this Samsara isbut not the ultimate Real. But it will be at
once objected that if evil is an appearance, a Maya, why should this
appearance appear at all ? If it has no foundation in reality, how and
why does it occur at all? Further, how can anything be known as
real unless it should appear (to us) ? Reality must appear. If it is
said that the appearance of evil dissolves ultimately, the question
arises, How about its existence at the present moment of its being?
Is it not at least real then? To the person having an illusion, it is
real and present. Of course, when he attains knowledge through
experience, the illusion (e.g., of the snake in the rope) is destroyed.
But the question is, What about the time when he does have the
illusion? Was it not real at that moment? In view of this difficulty
the realists, and even the "critical" realists, adopt the easy way of
treating evil as a fact, here and now, which constitutes an inalien-
able element in the texture of experience. We have not, it is urged,
to speculate the problem, but to face the reality of evil; not to
explain it away as an abstraction of thought, but to make room
for its stern reality in our theory of knowledge. "It is no longer a
problem, it is a fact."
The Advaita-Vada, on the other hand, accepts no such line of
least resistance. The fact of evil it never cares to dispute, it merely
repudiates the claim of the fact to reality. The "fact" turns out to be
illusory when it is viewed in a suitable context. The very fact that
the illusion of the snake is destroyed shows that it was never real,
for the real is never destroyed; it always endures, it is eternal. It
may evolve and grow, but it never suffers annihilation. The Real,
according to Vedanta, is that which continues in all the three forms
of time, past, present, and future. It is timeless, for time has meaning
and reality only in reference to it. Continuance and eternality thus
constitute the ultimate, absolute criterion of truth and reality.
It is not correct to maintain, as Bradley seems to, that ultimately
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the contradictions, incoherences, and discords will all be transmuted
into the harmony of an all-embracing Real. This suggests that the
contradictions were really contradictions. But if a contradiction is
real, how can it ever be dissolved? The point is that, according to
Vedanta, the so-called contradictions, discords, and evils were never
such, were never real at all, not even in the moment of their so-
called being. They should not be regarded as lesser, incomplete
"reals" (r), which are absorbed into the perfect, complete Real (R).
The fact is that the lesser "reals" are not real at all. The Real is
eternally full and perfect. It is the One, the whole which has no
"many." If the "reals" were real in any form, there would be no dis-
illusionment, for there could not have been any illusion at all.
Illusion occurs only when we take something to be that which it
can never be and never really is. The "many" are mere "existents,"
but never real. We treat the "existent" as real when we superimpose
on it attributes which cannot belong to it. "Extra-personal attri-
butes are, for instance, superimposed on the Self, if a man con-
siders himself sound and entire, or as long as his wife and children
are sound and entire. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the
Self, if a man thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, one-eyed,' etc.; attributes
of the internal organs, when he considers himself subject to desire,
intention, doubt, determination, etc."1 Why there should be this
superimposition, may well be asked. How, if all be consciousness,
Sakti or Brahman, is that "principle," viz. of unconsciousness, Maya,
the veiling "principle" there? The answer is given in the definition
of "Sakti". It is the function of Sakti to determine or determinate,
i.e. to impose the subject-object relationship, the dualistic and
pluralistic categories on the universe of human experience. It is we
who, in ignorance of our essential reality, construct barriers between
our individual, differentiated selves and the absolute undifferenced
Self. The immature, unevolved intellect, incapable of envisaging
reality as a whole, makes cross-sections in the Real, and views each
section as the true symbol and representative of the whole. It
enjoys the narrow circle of its own making, for it has not yet deve-
loped a comprehensive grasp. It cannot help thinking in terms of
itself and the other, non-self.
In truth, however, the whole universe is the self 2an intensive,
thoroughgoing unitywhether as I (Aham) or "this" (Idam);
subject or object, the one or many. The self becomes its own object.
And it becomes its own object that it may enjoy, as it were, this
dualistic experience. Yet in reality it ever remains what it was in its
unitary blissful experience. This is the eternal play in which the self
1
Shankara Bhasya, I.
* "Brahman, indeed, is this whole world, this widest extent." Cf. Munda-
kopanisad, II, n . *
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hides and seeks itself. "The formless cannot assume form unless
formlessness is negated. Eternity is negated into finality, the all-
pervading into the limited; the all-knowing into the'little knower,'
the almighty into the 'little doer,' and so forth. It is only by negating
Itself to Itself that the Self becomes its own object in the form of the
universe." This superimposing and self-limiting characteristic of
the SaktiNisedhavyapararupasaktiis completely sui generis,
though not in the least mysterious, for we find its closest analogue
in our own self-consciousness. We "enjoy" this dualistic experience
in the intimate consciousness of our being. Why we should do so
seems to be a meaningless question, for here we are concerned with
the immediate, ultimate, and fundamental fact of experience. But
more of this later.
Further, the conception of error and evil is based on atomism.
Why do we call an object, an event, "a slice of history," evil ? Simply
because we do not take the object or the "slice" in the totality of its
being, in its indissoluble relations with the universe. When we take a
partial view, things are apt to appear in a wrong perspective. We
fail to take an all-round view, and hasten to stigmatize an object
as evil.1 So far as the mere stigmatizing of an experience as evil is
concerned, we may not be far wrong, for it is a matter of name and
form. The real mistake or confusion occurs when we regard the
"evil" object of experience as per se evil and eternally such. This is
atomism. An object taken in this sense of a relationless entity is
nothing but an "apotheosis of a particular." It is a perfectly arbitrary
and unwarrantable division of space-time. But an object in and by
itself is nothing at all. Apart from the universe of its relations it
means nothing and is naught. A patch of colour in a painting which
it glorifies appears ugly and monstrous when by itself. A note played
by itself is meaningless noise, but in its appropriate relations it
produces a symphony which enthrals the soul. This is the familiar
coherence view, only its application here is more thoroughgoing.
It may be objected that the practical necessities of life leave no
time to view an object in all its relations or even in most of them,
1
As to the possibility of an all-round view, it may be said that it is not
attainable by our finite and limited intellect and experience. But this is
dogmatism. Science proves that we enlarge our perspective every day as the
intellect grows and as "the instruments of perception" become" more and more
perfect. Vedanta recommends various Sadhnas, and Patanjali in Yoga
Dar$ana suggests "Abhyasa" (Practice) and "Vairagya" (Renunciation) for
the control of the different "Vrittis" (Senses) with a view to the attainment
of "Nirodha"the realization of the ultimate experience. Nor is it merely a
matter of theory. A great many"Rsis" have acquired this universal cognition
and an ubiquitous outlook which is necessary for the true evaluation of
the human experience in their life. That is why they are called "Jivan
Muktas."
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and we cannot wait for perfect knowledge to pronounce upon
matters in regard to which some sort of definiteness and direction
is essential for the guidance of thought and action. Indecision and
inertia will mean death. But it is one thing to dogmatize, quite
another to be conscious of our limitations. For a long time to come
our knowledge (as also our capacities for action) is bound to remain
imperfect and provisional, but it is a great step forward to be aware
of its tentative and imperfect character. For in that case we shall
not be deluded into the snares of "Avidya" or "Maya." We shall
ever have that healthy suspicion, if not a robust conviction, that
what we are experiencing, however great and vivid an air of reality
it may possess, is ultimately an appearance only. A mirage never
deceives the wary, though it may possess all the credentials of
sensuous reality. The uninitiated, says the Gita, take the joys and
sorrows of their mortal existence as immutable elements in the life
of the soul, but the wise heed them not. They live and move in the
atmosphere of mortality, but have their being in the serene calm of
the Eternal. Like the lotus, they bloom with the fullness of being,
and remain uncontaminated by the surrounding mud and mire.
They are not affected by the law of Karma, inexorable as it may be.
For they have lived through and destroyed all their KSrmic bondage.
They are beyond good and evil. Though in the world, they are not
of it.

MAYA REPRESENTS DEGREES OF REALITY

Further, there is a misconception in the mind of some thinkers

that Advaita Vada does not recognize the externality and existence
of the tangible world of everyday experience, that it is solipsistic or
acosmistic. But this is a great mistake. That the world of everyday
experience is a fact and exists is, as we have seen, never disputed
by Vedanta. It does not regard it as an "Idea." It merely affirms
that it is "real" only from the empirical point of view, not from
the transcendental point of view. Though existent, it regards it as
"Mithya," i.e. unreal. Just as a dreamer when awakened regards the
events of the dream-experience as unreal and false, in the same way
the sage awakened from the dream of Samsara regards the latter as
"Mithya." Both the dream-world and the world of everyday
experience continue to be existent and true as long as we are in
them, but once awakened or liberated we recognize the unreal
character of either. From the Vyavaharika point of view, this world
of objective experience is a fact and an existent, but once this
jj standpoint is transcended it ceases to appear real. And the growth
f of experience stands for the gradual transcending of this Vyava-
k hSrika standpoint and the eventual attainment of PSram5rthika
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excellence.1 VedSnta gives to the world as much objectivity and
reality as the most extreme realists would desire. But it transcends
realism, and stands for the assimilation, correlation, and re-evaluation
of common experience. Realism judges each event and slice of history
as it occurs, the Vedanta, after having taken stock of individual
details, organizes them into systematic unity, and surveys the whole
before finally recognizing its value and reality. Confronted with
the bewildering multiplicity of objects, the realist loses sight of the
unity that permeates them through and through and makes even
their apparent manifoldness possible. The Vedanta keeps this unity
steadily in view. In one sense Vedanta is thus a pronouncedly
realistic system, in another and more exact and exalted form it is
eminently idealistic. It is important to grasp this apparently
dualistic character of Vedanta in order to understand the rather
illusory conception of Mayathe so-called evil principle. By calling
it "apparently dualistic" we only mean to point out that ultimately
and in the highest sense it is a system of objective, Absolute Idealism.4'
Throughout we find the two strands running concurrently, and
the whole texture of this philosophy is closely interwoven with them.
It prepares a distinction between the higher and lower aspect of
truth, or rather its apprehension. The lower ministers to the unde-
veloped minds, and the higher is meant to satisfy the more highly
evolved intellect. The one is "Vyavaliarika" (empirical), the other
"Paramarthika" (transcendental). What is real according to the
one may be illusory according to the other. The "many," for instance,
seem to be real from the point of view of imagination, as Spinoza
said, "the one" from that of the "intellect." Kant made a similar
distinction between phenomena and noumena. But while in many
passages Kant takes noumena to be only a hypothetical, meta-
physical necessity, unknown and unrealizable in experience, Vedanta
considers them to be ultimately real, and as perfectly and completely
realizable as the phenomena themselves. That is, while Kant seems
to have fixed a rigid, generic distinction between the two, Vedanta
views them as fluctuating elements in the one real. They represent
only degrees of real existence. For reality has degrees or gradations
according to the assimilative capacity of the mind or self. As the mind
1
I t is not necessary for the attainment of Moksa to renounce and forget
the objective world altogether. Had it been so "susupti"' (dreamless sleep)
and fits of unconsciousness would amount to Moksa, for in these states there
is no memory. But this is not so. All that is essential is to recognize the Sam-
saxa as MithyS., not to refuse to regard it as objective and external, otherwise,
again, "Jivanmukti" would not be possible. Cf. Panchadasi, I.
This seems to be the nearest equivalent of Advaita Vada, which literally
means "Non-dualism": a system which believes only in the reality of the
Absolute Brahman.
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grows and develops, experience becomes richer and more varied
and values change. The world of imagination, illusion and dreams,
the sensible world, and the absolute, are all, in a sense, real. Only
their status differs. The first is the lowest type of "real," because
it is negated by the second, the second, though a higher type of real,
is also negated by the intimations of Absolute experience; hence
this too is not real. The third is the only reality which is
ultimate, because there is no further experience which negates or
transcends it. In this way, by an inductive elimination of the false
values of "Prakritti," we arrive at the Real. By its definition the
Absolute Brahman is ultimate "Paramarthika sat" par excellence.
Nothing is beyond it, for it is beyond all. As the sage of the Taittriya
Upanisad says:
Wherefrom words turn back
Together with the mind, not having attained
The bliss of Brahman he who knows.
Fears not anything at all. II. 4.

Or, as the Kenopanisad puts it:

Yasyamatam tasya matam
Matarp Yasya na Veda sah
Avijfiatam vijanatam
Vijnatam a vijanatam

It is conceived by him by whom It is not conceived of,

He by whom It is conceived of knows It not.
It is not understood by those who (say they) understand It,
It is understood by those who (say) understand It not. II. 11.

To the Yogin who has attained the broad intellectual vision of

the sage evil ceases to appear as real at all. He discovers that it was
not real, it did not really exist, and was naught. Or it was something
which he had mistaken for something else. In the illusion of the
snake in the rope, the snake never really formed any part of the
object (rope) perceived. Thus, when reflection corrects the illusion
it shows that the illusory object was never partly or wholly any
part of the entity which was perceived as the illusory object. The
snake perceived never was, nor is, nor ever will be any part of the
"this" of the rope which was mistaken for the snake. Accordingly,
falsehood of an appearance consists in the fact that its existence
may be denied in all the three possible temporal relations. The
standard of truth and reality, on the other hand, is possibility of
eternal perception, eternal existence. The so-called evil principle or
Maya does not conform to this criterion, and hence it is not real in
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the ultimate, Paramarthika sense.1 The only reality that completely
fulfils this test is the Absolute Brahman. It alone stands while
everything else changes.
The one remains, the many change and pass, [
Heaven's light forever shines, earth's shadows fly. I
i
But it does not follow that the Absolute of the Advaita-VSdin is \
a blank, unchanging, featureless identity, that it is static, wooden, |
and stagnant. This is the common criticism. But though in itself I
unchangingfor change implies imperfection and finitudethe j
Absolute is the permanent substratum of all change. It is the standard I
or measure of change, and as such it cannot itself change. \
t

ABSOLUTE AND PERSONALITY. \

Again, it is sometimes feared that the Absolute swallows up our i
personality, that the attainment of the ideal (if possible at all) I
means the eventual dissolution of the individual, and all the values
which had supplied the urge and inspired him in the pursuit of the
goal. This is the Pluralist criticism. Personality, it is argued, has
value, a value that must be conserved in any scheme of the Universe.
If it is annihilated, there is no incentive to good, and ethics falls to
the ground. The ultimate must be, according to this way of thinking,
an irreducible plurality, a vast domain of independent principalities
and centres of power, a community of windowless monads. But this
is another illustration of the insidious influence of atomistic meta-
physics, though here a little dignified by some plausibility and show
of reason. What is meant by attributing absolute reality to person-
ality? Is there, or can there be, such a thing at all? It is only by a
false abstraction that we deify individuality. What can an individual,
a particular be in and by itself apart from other particulars, i.e. the
universal? Our personality is nothing except in relation to another
Personality. The Absolute Personality (if the expression be allowed)
is not anything by itself, apart from concrete, particular "per-
sonalities"; it is the same as these. The individual come to himself
is the Absolute. Each personality is not distinct from another
there is no "another"it is but the common unity appearing in
1
I t is necessary to remember that Maya might be viewed from three
different points of view. From the standpoint of the liberated it does not
exist at all; from that of the learned,it is something mysterious, both real and
non-real, something which is contradictory and "Anirvacya"; and from the
point of view of the uncritical man of common sense, it is real and existent.
The latter experiences the Samsara, its joys and sorrows, and is inexorably
bound by the laws of Karma, taking births after births. But on the attain-
ment of Brahman knowledge the veil of Maya is rolled up and disappears
like a painted curtain. Cf. Panchadasi, Pt. VI, Chap. 5.
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many. The criticism assumes that each person is meant to be and is
eternally distinct from another. Had it been soand on no other
hypothesis can the claim for independent "eternality" be based
all experience would be chaos and scepticism the result of thinking.
Some sort of an occasionalism or pre-established harmony or a
similar deus ex machina would have to be invoked in order to bring
together the relationless mass of particulars into which the real is
pulverized. But more than two centuries after Descartes were
necessary to prove the utter futility of such attempts. But, thanks
to the genius of our great philosophical sages, we, on this side of
the waters, have never suffered atomism in any name or form to
run riot. We have avoided false and foolish abstractions, and have
kept the facts of experience steadily in view. Vedanta thus explains
that there is a process of evolution of personality. Each level yields
place to the next higher, which is its promise and fulfilment. One
might as well be afraid that infancy is absolutely annihilated when
adolescence is attained and adolescence abolished in age. But just
as youth is the fulfilment of childhood and age of youth, in the same
way the lower stages in the development of self-hood are fulfilled
in and by the higher. In the scheme of cosmic evolution nothing is
lostthe lower is transcended by and transformed into the higher,
the less developed into the more developed. That indeed is the
purpose for which the lower exists: to become greater, to be utilized
by the higher. The lower itself is the consummation of the still
lower. It is transformed into the higher only to find its true function
and being. The glory of the seed is to be a tree, that of the embryo
to be man; of the so-called ugly and evil to be good and beautiful.
We lose ourselves only to find our Self. Like the snake, to take the
illustration given by Vedanta, which sheds its slough only to put
on its refulgent skin, we leave one narrow sheath after another, only
to discover our ultimate Beatitude. This is surely not destruction.
It is the highest attainment. Life must come to its own.
Then, as a matter of fact, we never had the so-called individuality
which it is sought to protect and perpetuate. We are always and
strictly, says Vedanata,1 the infinite: "God though in the germ,"
"I am Brahman," may be claimed by the meanest of us, much
as the meanest of the subjects of Louis XIV could have (equally
well with him) exclaimed "I am the State." In the earlier stages the
veiling influence of the Upadhis prevented us from recognizing the
Infinite Brahman in us. The embryo can little dream of the worlds
1
As Oil in the seasame seeds, as butter in cream.
As water in river-beds, and as fire in the friction-stick.
So is the soul apprehended in our own soul,
If one looks for Him with true austerity (Tapas).
Cf. Svetasvatara Upanisad, I. 15.
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of growth awaiting for it. It is, so to speak, struggling to find them,
and in time does find them. Just as we cannot see our own hand
in darkness, so environed by the mists of Avidya we do not see the
Real in us. Indeed, it is AvidyS which deludes us into believing that
we have a separate personality. But when this immense ignorance
is destroyed by the illumination of Brahman knowledge, we realize
our true place in the cosmic consciousness. We then attain to the
completest attunement to, and harmony with, the Absolute self,
which is the eternal goal and purpose of the Samsara. The appearance
of "mayic" manifoldness yields to the realization of the ultimate
One. Until this is attained there is no "moksa," no freedom from
births and deaths (in the self itself), from transmigrationwhich
means stages in the evolution of the Self. This is what the Upanisad
says:
Their never ending death they weave
Who here a manifold perceive.

Maya, then, is not something separate and independent. It is

not a principle of evil, and our soul is not like an arena where the
two forces of light and darkness, Brahman and Maya, are for ever
battling for supremacy. To believe that there are such two things
is wholly inconsistent with the Advaita point of view. That would
again be lapsing into the quagmires of atomism. In Itself and
ultimately Maya is nothing at all. It merely represents successive
phases in the growth of self-hood. It is the self itself in one of its
aspectsthe dynamic aspect. As long as there is evolution Maya
is necessarily there, for it is the principle of dynamism and individua-
tion. That is why the world, the SamsSra, is known as Mayathat is,
not something evil, but something which has to be experienced
Bhogafor the eventual emancipation of the soul from the thraldom
of ignorance or Avidya. From the point of view of the Absolute,
however, Maya does not exist at all. Nor must it be regarded as
inherent in the nature of the absolute Self. That would be a contra-
diction in terms.1 How does it then originate, will be asked? From
the absolute point of view such a question is meaningless. It is
of the nature of darkness, and how can one who is in the atmosphere
of pure luminosity perceive or be affected by it. Once Brahmanhood
is attained, the veil of Maya is torn asunder, and our imperfect,
empirical existence and individuality disappears. Intuition of such
experience of the inmost intimacy of our deepest Self always beggars
1
For the Absolute is nothing but itself. As soon as Ahankara (egoism),
makes it reflect over its greatness, or even its own nature, it is degraded and
becomes Isvara, or the omniscient Lord, the creator of the universe, the
principle of mayic manifoldness. It no longer remains the Absolute. It is
individualized.
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description. It is Anirvacya (indescribable), for language is too crude
and imperfect an instrument to handle it. But because it is "anir-
vacya" and "avyakta" (ineffable), it does not mean that it is chimeri-
cal. The sensation of rose-smell is equally indescribablefor we
attempt to describe itfigurativelyas sweet, delicious, lovely, etc.but
it is intensely real to the percipient subject. The experience is alogical
and sui generis, and the abstract, dualistic categories of logic are
ill-adapted to do justice to it. The sage of the Upanisad, when asked
to describe his intimations of Brahman experience, answered by
remaining silent. The fact is that the Brahman-seeker ultimately
reaches a level of experience where he intuits and gains reality "by
a leap" as it were. That such a state is real and possible is proved by
the actual attainment of the great jivan-muktas, the Rsis, who have
left some record of their great experience in the Upanisads. The
so-called mysticism of Vedanta is nothing mysterious and esoteric.
Brahmanhood is always attainable by all who must pursue it
earnestly. It is a systematic, scientific process. Western thinkers
often view such mysticism with suspicion, and regard it as something
which is more or less inconsistent with the life of reason. But Advaita
Vada regards reason from a much more comprehensive point of
view so as to prepare the way for intuitions, intimations, and other
such experiences as ordinarily defy our narrow and abstract logical
categories. Those who challenge its truth are enjoined to practise
its doctrine to see its reality. That is why Vedanta is not only a
philosophy: it is also a kind of living practical "religion," a demon-
stration of Truth and Reality.