31. Inocente v. St.

Vincent Foundation For Children And Aging,

Inc./Veronica Menguito, G.R. No. 202621, 22 June 2016.

BRION, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was hired by St. Vincent Foundation for

Children and Aging, Inc. as program assistant and thereafter
promoted her as Program Officer. Petitioner, during employment,
met Marlon who was assigned in St. Vincents sub-project who
became her lover. St. Vincent adopted the CFCAs Non-
Fraternization which strongly discourage, among others,
employees from engaging in consensual romantic or sexual
relationship with any employee or volunteer of CFCA. CFCA,
upon discovering Zaida and Marlons relationship, ordered Zaida
to submit an explanation but was unable to convince CFCA which
prompted the latter to terminate the former for immorality, gross
misconduct and violation of CFCAs Code of Conduct.

ISSUE: Was Zaida illegally dismissed?

RULING: YES. The court found Zaida's dismissal illegal for lack
of valid cause. St. Vincent failed to sufficiently prove its charges
against Zaida to justify her dismissal for serious misconduct and
loss of trust and confidence. While their actions might not have
strictly conformed with the beliefs, ways, and mores of St.
Vincent - which is governed largely by religious morality - or with
the personal views of its officials, these actions are not
prohibited under any law nor are they contrary to conduct
generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. Moreover,
aside from the relationship that St. Vincent considered to be
immoral, it did not specify, nor prove any other act or acts that
Zaida might have committed to the prejudice of St. Vincent's
interest. A mere allegation that Zaida committed act or acts
prejudicial to St. Vincent's interest, without more, does not
constitute sufficient basis for Zaidas dismissal. The court also
said that the phrase under CFCAs Code of Conduct that says
strongly discourage does not constitute prohibition.
32. Intec Cebu Inc., Et Al, V. Hon. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No.
189851, 22 June 2016.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Intec Cebu Inc. (Intec), engaged in the

manufacture and assembly of mechanical system, hired
respondents as production workers. Respondents alleged that
their working days were reduced from 6 to 2-4 days. Intec
apparently explained that reduction in working days was due to
lack of job orders however, respondents discovered that Intec
hired around 188 contractual employees tasked to perform tasks
which respondents were regularly doing. Private respondents
claimed that they were effectively terminated from employment
as shown in the Establishment Termination Report submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Two (2) days
later, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Did Intec Cebu Inc. Illegally dismissed respondents?

RULING: YES. Intec committed illegal reduction of work hours.

Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to
the employee.
Intec's unilateral and arbitrary reduction of the work day scheme
had significantly greatly reduced respondents' salaries thereby
rendering it liable for constructive dismissal.
33. Sps. Mercade, Jr., et al. v. Sps. Bardilas, G.R. No. 163157, 27
June 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

The issue concerns the right of way between the owners of three
parcels of land situated within Clarita Village in Brgy. Punta
Princesa, Cebu City. Wherein Sps. Bardillas informed Sps.
Mercader of the encroachment by about 14 sq. m. of their
residential house and fence on the right of way requesting
payment thereof. Which in reply, Sps. Mercader insisted that
they were equally entitled to the right of way thus there was no
encroachment.

ISSUE/S: Is the owner of the servient estate have the ownership

of the portion on which the easement is established and may use
the same?

RULING:
Yes.
Art. 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the owner of
the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such manner
as not to affect the exercise of the easement. Spouses Bardilas
remained entitled to avail themselves of all attributes of
ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus
fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Hence,
the court held that Sps. Bardilas may rightfully compel Sps.
Bardilas to pay the value of the land which their house
encroaches, and in case of failure to pay, they may remove or
demolish the encroaching portion thereof.

34. Republic of the Phils v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., et al.,

G.R. No. 184666. 27 June 2016.

SERENO, CJ.

FACTS:

R.A. 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use an automated

election system for 1998 elections however, the automated
system failed to materialize and votes were canvassed manually
during the 1998 and the 2001 elections. For the 2004 elections,
the COMELEC again attempted to implement the automated
election system. For this purpose, it invited bidders to apply for
the procurement of supplies, equipment, and services. The
COMELEC evaluated various bid offers after due assessment, the
Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) recommended that the
project be awarded to MPC. Despite the award to MPC, the
COMELEC and MPEI executed on 2 June 2003 the Automated
Counting and Canvassing Project Contract (automation contract).

ISSUE/S: Is there fraud as to constitute issuance of a writ of

preliminary attachment against the properties of individual
respondent?

RULING: Yes.
While fraud cannot be presumed, it need not be proved by direct
evidence and can well be inferred from attendant circumstances.
In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently discharged the
burden of demonstrating the commission of fraud by respondent
MPEI in the execution of the automation contract. Hence,
petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary attachment in
relation to its recovery of the expended amount under the voided
contract. The court held that a writ of preliminary attachment is
a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court where an
action is pending. With that, the property or properties of the
defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff
as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be
secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant.

35. Ren Transport Corp. and/or Reynaldo Pazcoguin III v. NLRC

et al./Samahang Manggagawa sa REN Transport-Association of
Democratic Labor Associations (SMART-ADLO) represented by
Nestor Fulminar v. REN Transport Corp. and/or Reynaldo
Pazcoguin III, G.R. No. 188020/G.R. No. 188252, 27 June 2016.

SERENO, C.J
.
FACTS:

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a

registered union, which had a five-year collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with Ren Transport Corp. (Ren Transport) set
to expire on 31 December 2004. The 60-day freedom period of
the CBA passed without a challenge to SMART's majority status
as bargaining agent. SMART thereafter conveyed its willingness
to bargain with Ren Transport, to which it sent bargaining
proposals; Ren Transport, however, failed to reply to the demand.
Subsequently, two members of SMART wrote to the DOLE-NCR,
informing the latter office that a majority of the members of
SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother federation
to form another union, Ren Transport Employees Association
(RTEA). During the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute at the
DOLE-NCR, Ren Transport stopped the remittance to SMART of
the union dues that had been checked off from the salaries of
union workers as provided under the CBA.

ISSUE:
Did Ren Transport commit acts of unfair labor practice?

RULING:
YES; Ren Transport violated its duty to bargain collectively with
SMART and interfered with the exercise of the employees' right
to self-organize. Violation of the duty to bargain collectively is an
unfair labor practice under Article 258(g) of the Labor Code.
Given that SMART continued to be the workers' exclusive
bargaining agent, Ren Transport had the corresponding duty to
bargain collectively with the former. Ren Transport's refusal to
do so constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Interference with the employees' right to self-organization is
considered an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (a) of the
Labor Code. In this case, the labor arbiter found that the failure
to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition
of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the
employees' right to self-organization.

36. Emmanuel D. Quintanar v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, GR No.

210565, 28 June, 2016

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:
Complainants allege that they are former employees directly
hired by respondent Coca-cola. Complainants allege that the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an
inspection of Coca-Cola to determine whether it is complying
with the various mandated labor standards, and relative thereto,
they were declared to be regular employees of Coca-Cola, which
was held liable to pay complainants the underpayment of their
13th month pay, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA),
and other claims. As soon as respondents learned of the filing of
the claims with DOLE, they were dismissed on various dates in
January 2004.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners illegally dismissed from their

employment with Coca-Cola?

RULING:
Contrary to the position taken by Coca-Cola, it cannot be said
that route-helpers, such as the petitioners no longer enjoy the
employee-employer relationship they had with Coca-Cola since
they became employees of Interserve.
The basic law on the case is Article 280 of the Labor Code.
The Court determined the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties therein considering that the
contract of service between Coca-Cola and Interserve showed
that the former indeed exercised the power of control over the
complainants therein.
37. Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. v. Hon. Aquino III and PHIC, G.R.
No. 210761, 28 June 2016.

BRION, J.

FACTS: PhilHealth Board Resolution No. 1571, Series of 2011,

approved the increase in annual premium contributions under
the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) for the Calendar
Year 2012. On September 2013, PhilHealth issued 3 circulars
fully implementing the new premium rates for 2014. The
minimum rates for members of the Individually Paying Program,
Overseas Workers Programs, and Employed Sector were
adjusted to Php 2,400.

ISSUE: Did the increase of the minimum annual contribution

violate the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, which
prescribed the non-increase of fees charged by any government
office on OFWs?

RULING:
No. The NHIP is a social insurance program, the premium
collected from members is neither a fee nor an expense but an
enforced contribution to the common insurance fund. Moreover,
any distinction between OFWs and all the other sectors are not
germane to the NHIAs purpose, and any obstruction to the
increase of premiums under the NHIP amounts to unreasonable
classification. The Court further stated that a non-increase in the
minimum premium contribution of OFWs would create a
situation where the poorest of the poor are required to
contribute more than a member employed abroad, violating the
standard of a progressive and equitable contribution scheme.
38. Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., G.R. No. 214399, 28 June
2016.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Puncia was a Marketing Professional tasked to

sell 7 vehicles as monthly quota. However, Puncia failed to
comply with the quota for the months of July and August. Toyota
sent Puncia a Notice to Explain, to which Punchia replied that he
was a trainee and thus is only required to sell 3 vehicles per
month. Thereafter a hearing was conducted but Puncia failed to
appear despite notice. Hence, Toyota dismissed Puncia on the
ground of insubordination.

ISSUE: Was Puncia illegally dismissed?

RULING: Yes, Puncias dismissal did not comply with the proper
procedural requirements. In the Notice to Explain, Puncia was
made to explain why no disciplinary action should be imposed
upon him for repeatedly failing to reach his monthly sales quota.
However, a reading of the Notice of Termination shows that
Puncia was dismissed not for the ground stated in the Notice to
Explain, but for gross insubordination on account of his non-
appearance in the scheduled 17 October 2011 hearing without
justifiable reason.
39. Republic v. Apolonio Bautista Jr., G.R. No. 166890, 28 June
2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
After acquiring Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic Cadastre, located
in Capisanan, Subic, Zambales from Mario Jardin on February
15, 1971 and Cornelia Villanueva on May 25, 1973, Apolonio, Sr.
had the property declared for taxation purposes. He had been
the sole and exclusive possessor and occupant from the time of
acquisition until his death in 1987. He was succeeded by his
children, namely: respondent Apolonio, Jr. and his siblings.
Apolonio, Sr.'s children executed an extra-judicial settlement of
their father's estate, whereby Apolonio, Jr.'s brothers and sisters
waived their rights in his favor.

On October 21, 1996, Apolonio Jr. commenced LRC Case No. N-

12-10-96 in the MTC. He later on testified that his father had
been in actual possession since 1969 and had eventually
acquired the land from Jardin and Villanueva through the
notarized Deeds of Absolute Sale dated February 15, 1971, and
May 25, 1973; and that his father had paid taxes on the land. The
Government did not interpose any timely objection to the
testimony of Apolonio, Jr. It did not also object to the
documentary evidence offered by him. Hence, the MTC admitted
all the evidence presented by Apolonio, Jr. In due course, the
MTC granted Apolonio, Jr.'s application, and declared him as the
owner in fee simple of the land and confirmed his ownership
thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the MTCs decision
granting Apolonio, Jr. as the owner of the land in question?

RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in its decision on affirming the MTCs decision
dated November 17, 1998 in LRC Case No. N-12-10-96. Apolonio,
Jr. failed to establish the requisite length of the possession of the
predecessors-in-interest of the applicant. His personal
incompetence to attest to the possession of the property within
the time required by law underscored the weakness of the
evidence on possession, particularly as it has not been denied
that the applicant had arrived in the Philippines only on
November 28, 1987.

40. Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development

Corporation and/or Paul Aquino and Ester R. Guerzon Vs.
Amelyn A. Buenviaje/ Amelyn A. Buenviaje Vs. Philippine
National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation and/or
Paul Aquino and Ester R. Guerzon, G.R. Nos. 183200-01/G.R.
Nos. 183253 & 183257. 29 JUNE 2016.

JARDALEZA, J.

FACTS:
Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation (PNOC-EDC) hired Buenviaje as Assistant to the
then Chairman/President and Chief Executive Officer Apostol,
her father. Buenviaje's employment contract provided that she
will serve until June 30, 2004 or co-terminous with the tenure of
Apostol, whichever comes first. On August 4, 2003, Apostol
approved the creation of PNOC-EDC's new Marketing Division
composed of thirty (30) positions. Seven (7) of these thirty (30)
positions were also newly created, one of which was that of a
Marketing Division Manager. Buenviaje assumed this position as
early as the time of the creation of the Marketing Division.
On February 2, 2004, Paul Aquino, the new President of PNOC-
EDC, appointed Buenviaje to the position of Senior Manager for
Marketing Division effective February 1, 2004. In line with
PNOC-EDC's policies, Buenviaje was subjected to a performance
appraisal and received an unsatisfactory grade of four (4). Thus,
Ester Guerzon (Guerzon), Vice President for Corporate Affairs of
PNOC-EDC, informed Buenviaje that she did not qualify for
regular employment. PNOC-EDC, through Guerzon,
communicated in writing to Buenviaje her non-confirmation of
appointment as well as her separation from the company
effective July 31, 2004.
Buenviaje responded by filing a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, unpaid 13th month pay, illegal
deduction with claim for moral as well as exemplary damages,
including attorney's fees and backwages.

ISSUE/s:
I. Whether Buenviaje was a permanent employee?
II. Whether Buenviaje was illegally dismissed?

RULING:
I. Yes, Buenviaje is a permanent employee. She was hired
as a Marketing Division Manager, a position that
performs activities that are usually necessary and
desirable to the business of PNOC-EDC and is thusly,
regular wherein the right to security of tenure
immediately attaches at the time of hiring. It is in line
with the right or privilege of the employer to choose who
will be accorded with regular or permanent status and
who will be denied employment after the period of
probation. It is within the exercise of this right that the
employers may set or fix a probationary period within
which it may test and observe the employee's conduct
before hiring him permanently.

II. The foregoing discussion proves Buenviaje was hired

as a permanent employee on February 1, 2004. As a
 permanent employee, she may only be dismissed by
PNOC-EDC after observing the following substantive and
procedural requirements:
1. The dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause;
2. The employer must furnish the employee with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected. The first notice states the particular acts
or omissions for which dismissal is sought while the
second notice states the employer's decision to dismiss
the employee; and
3. The employee must be given an opportunity to be
heard.
PNOC-EDC failed to observe the requirements because it
operated on the wrong premise that Buenviaje were a
probationary employee. But even if we were to assume
that she was, she would still be illegally dismissed in light
of PNOC-EDC's violation of the provisions of the Labor
Code in dismissing a probationary employee.
41. Hilario Dasco, et al. Vs. Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc.,
G.R. No. 211141. June 29, 2016.

REYES, J.

FACTS: This is a complaint for regularization, underpayment of

wages, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay, and
attorney's fees, filed by the petitioners against Philtranco Service
Enterprises Inc., (PSEI), a domestic corporation engaged in
providing public utility transportation, and its Manager,
Centurion Solano. From 2006 to 2010, the petitioners were
employed by the respondents as bus drivers and/or conductors.
On July 4, 2011, the petitioners filed a case against the
respondents alleging that: ( 1) they were already qualified for
regular employment status since they have been working with
the respondents for several years; (2) they were paid only
P404.00 per round trip, which lasts from two to five days,
without overtime pay and below the minimum wage rate; (3) they
cannot be considered as field personnel because their working
hours are controlled by the respondents from dispatching to end
point and their travel time is monitored and measured by the
distance because they are in the business of servicing
passengers where time is of the essence; and ( 4) they had not
been given their yearly five-day SIL since the time they were
hired by the respondents. In response, the respondents asserted
that: ( 1) the petitioners were paid on a fixed salary rate of P0.49
centavos per kilometer run, or minimum wage, whichever is
higher; (2) the petitioners are seasonal employees since their
contracts are for a fixed period and their employment was
dependent on the exigency of the extraordinary public demand
for more buses during peak months of the year; and (3) the
petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay and SIL pay because
they are field personnel whose time outside the company
premises cannot be determined with reasonable certainty since
they ply provincial routes and are left alone in the field
unsupervised.
ISSUE: Are the petitioners as bus drivers and/or conductors field
personnels and thus, entitled to overtime and SIL pay?

RULING: No, the petitioners are not field personnels but are
rather regular employees who are entitled to overtime and SIL
pay. The petitioners are not field personnel because as bus
drivers and/or conductors, they are directed to transport their
passengers at a specified time and place; they are not given the
discretion to select and contract with prospective passengers;
their actual work hours could be determined with reasonable
certainty, as well as their average trips per month; and the
respondents supervised their time and performance of duties. the
petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, are left alone in
the field with the duty to comply with the conditions of the
respondents' franchise, as well as to take proper care and
custody of the bus they are using. Since the respondents are
engaged in the public utility business, the petitioners, as bus
drivers and/or conductors, should be considered as regular
employees of the respondents because they perform tasks which
are directly and necessarily connected with the respondents'
business. Thus, they are consequently entitled to the benefits
accorded to regular employees of the respondents, including
overtime pay and SIL pay.

42. PMI-Faculty and Employees Union Vs. PMI Colleges Bohol,

G.R. No. 211526, June 29, 2016.

BRION, J.

FACTS: The PMI union filed a strike before (NCMB) against PMI-
Bohol for violation of certain provisions of their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). On the last day of the cooling off
and strike vote periods, the security guards of PMI Bohol did not
allow the teachers to get into the school. The union admitted that
they staged the strike a day earlier than the 22 days cooling off
period because they were left with no choice. Consequently, PMI-
Bohol filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
ISSUE: Is the strike staged by the PMI union illegal?

RULING: No, the strike was not illegal. The strike staged before
the proper period was only a reaction school's locking out of the
Union members.

43. Florencio Morales vs Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208086, 27 July

2016.

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: After Atty. Demetria Hilbero was gunned down near his
home, his son, Atty. Allan Hilbero, prepared his Sinumpang
Salaysay claiming that the shooting was committed by herein
petitioner, Sandy Pamplona, Lorenzo Pamplona and Primo Lopez.
After the preliminary investigation, the Regional State
Prosecutor found probable cause for the filing of information for
Murder against Lorenzo Pamplona and Primo Lopez but
dismissed the charges against petitioner and Sandy Pamplona.
After Hilberos appeal was dismissed by the DOJ, he filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted. Petitioner then
filed for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which dropped his
charge. Hilbero filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Petitioner thereafter filed a Complaint-Affidavit before
the Office of the Ombudsman charging the Secretary of Justice
Devanadera, Atty. Ocampo, who inhibited himself from handling
the investigation due to his familiarity with Hilbero, and
Assistant City Prosecutors who handled the case with (1) Grave
abuse of authority, (2) Grave misconduct, (3) Falsification of
Public Documents (alleged to have falsely made it appear that
treachery and abuse of superior strength were established
during the preliminary investigation), and (4) violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman dismissed petitioners complaint and motion for
reconsideration, which prompted petitioner to file present
petition for certiorari against Ombudsman. Ombudsman held
that there was an absence of substantial evidence to support the
finding of an administrative liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse

of discretion in not conducting a preliminary investigation and
dismissing petitioners complaint against respondent
prosecutors?

RULING: No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of

discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman has full discretion to
determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including
whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. This, it is still
acting within its powers when it finds that preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and that the complaint should be
dismissed. The court thus gives due deference to said decision
and will not interfere with such exercise of power.
As for the second issue, petitioner failed to bring sufficient
evidence to charge respondent prosecutors. His basis must be
duly supported by evidence. The court ruled that the power to
determine whether said allegations would suffice to support a
finding of probably cause belongs, in this case, to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The court thus dismisses the petition for lack of merit.
44. Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Dr. Gerard C. Salgado vs Luis
Anson, G.R. No. 204494, 27 July 2016
REYES, J.

FACTS: Luis Anson filed a complaint against spouses Salgado

and the spouses Maya seeking annulment of 3 unilateral Deeds
of Sale and the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate of the
deceased Severina de Asis in 2002, to said spouses Salgado and
Maya, claiming the deeds were executed without his knowledge
and consent. Alleging that he is the surviving spouse of the late
Severina, and Jo-Ann being her daughter from a previous
relationship, respondant claims that there was no marriage
settlement between them and their properties formed part of
their conjugal partnership. Luis claimed that he was divested of
his lawful share in the conjugal properties of his inheritance as a
compulsory heir of Severina.
Jo-Ann, however, countered that she was unaware that Severina
married Luis; all she knew was that they had a common-law
relationship. Maria Louisa, of the spouses Maya, daughter of
respondent and the late Severina, also claimed she was unaware
that the couple were married. Petitioners further alleged that
said marriage of Luis and Severina were null and void for not
having a marriage license.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court which declared that the marriage between Luis and
Severina was valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said marriage between Severina and

Luis was valid?

RULING: No, the marriage was not valid. The marriage was
contracted before the Family Code took effect, and although the
Civil Code states that a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage except marriages of exceptional character, the
marriage in this case is not of exceptional character, that is, both
parties are not already married to each other in accordance with
law, and there is no ratifying ceremony that is purely religious in
nature. Luis also testified that he did not apply for a marriage
license and relied mainly on the presumption of the validity of
the marriage.
However, Luis acknowledged his partition agreement with
Severina prior to the termination of their relationship. The court
thus ruled that since there is no showing that Luis and Severina
were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their
cohabitation and considering that the marriage is void from the
beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code would
apply: that property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. For
having executed a partition agreement with Severina and having
already receivied his share prior to the termination of their
common-law relationship, said agreement cannot be declared
null and void absent any circumstance rendering it invalid or
voidable.
Thus, the court grants the petition.

45. Magaway v. Atty. Avecilla, A.C. No. 7072, July 27, 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Out of pity and kindness, Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla

notarized a ready-made deed of sale brought by an elderly
woman claiming to be Elena Gongon who turned out to be an
impostor. The complainants seek the disbarment of the
respondent alleging that his incompetence adversely affected
their rights on their existing interest in the property involved in
such instruments. The IBP recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for two years. The respondent
sought reconsideration, but the IBP Board of Governors rejected
his motion.

ISSUE/S: By notarizing yet failing to ascertain the identity of the

person executing the deed of sale, was Atty. Avecilla grossly
negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public?
What penalty should be imposed?

RULING: YES. By not ensuring that the person then appearing

before him as the executor of the documents was really Elena
Gongon, not the impostor, he clearly did not exercise the
precautions and observe the protocols that would have easily
insulated the performance of his notarial duties from forgery and
falsification. He thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, the duties of
attorneys under Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the
rules on notarial practice, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court REVOKES the notarial commission of
respondent; DISQUALIFIES him from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years effective
immediately; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately with the WARNING that
the repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

46. Momarco Import Company, Inc. v. Villamena, G.R. No.

192477, July 27, 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: On August 19, 1998, Villamena filed a motion to declare

Momarco in default for failure to file its answer as of said date
despite the filing of an Entry of Appearance by its counsel dated
May 4, 1998. On September 10, 1998, Momarco filed its Answer
with Counterclaim which denied the allegations in the complaint.
Under the order dated October 15, 1998, Momarco was declared
in default, and its answer was ordered stricken from the records.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the Villamena to present her
evidence ex parte. The petitioner appealed the default judgment
to the CA, arguing that the RTC had gravely erred in nullifying
the questioned deed of absolute sale and in declaring it in
default. CA denied the appeal and affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE/S: Considering that Momarco was not yet declared in
default when it filed the answer on September 10, 1998, should
not its answer have been admitted by the RTC?

RULING: NO. The RTC correctly affirmed by the CA acted in

accordance with the Rules of Court and the pertinent
jurisprudence. Momarco was insincere in assailing the default
judgment, and its insincerity became manifest from its failure to
move for the lifting of the order of default prior to the rendition
of the default judgment. The CA rightly observed that the
petitioner had apparently forsaken its "expeditious remedy" of
moving soonest for the lifting of the order of default in favor of
"wagering" on obtaining a favorable judgment. Momarco would
not do so unless it intended to unduly cause delay to the
detriment and prejudice of the respondent.

47. Sulpicio Lines, INC., v. Napoleon Sesante, G.R. No. 172682,

27 Julay 2016.

Bersamin, J.

FACTS: On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V

Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated
by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas.
Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who
survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of
contract and damages.
Sesante alleged that because petitioner had committed bad faith
in allowing the vessel to sail despite the storm signal, the
petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages of
P500,000.00 and P1,000,000.00, respectively.
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the
M/V Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail
from the Port of Manila by the proper authorities; that the
sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had not been
negligent.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the defendant. It was
pending the appeal in the CA when Sesante passed away. He was
substituted by his heirs.

ISSUE/s: 1. Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages

a personal action that does not survive the death of the plaintiff
(Sesante)?

2. Is the petitioner liable for the breach of contract of

carriage?

RULING:
1.No.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the
proper procedure in the event of the death of a litigant:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever
a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor
or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process.It protects the right of due process
belonging to any party, that in the event of death the deceased
litigant continues to be protected and properly represented in
the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate.

2. Yes, petitioner is liable for the breach of contract of

carriage.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in the event of death or
injury of its passenger:
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an express finding
of the common carrier's fault or negligence. Even the mere proof
of injury relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or
negligence of the carrier or its employees.The presumption of
negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a)
a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier;
and (b) the injury or death took place during the existence of
such contract. In such event, the burden shifts to the common
carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and
that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury.
Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and
consequent sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient where he was a
passenger.The petitioner was directly liable to Sesante and his
heirs.
48. ISAA v. Greenpeace, en banc, G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276,
209301, & 209430, July 26, 2016.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for
"bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
eggplant (Bt talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum
of Undertaking (MOU) entered into by herein petitioners
University of the Philippines Los Banos Foundation, Inc.
(UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the
Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others.
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los
Baiios (UPLB), the implementing institution of the field trials,
conducted a contained experiment on Bt talong under the
supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP).
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines) (Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa
Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others
(respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
(petition for Writ of Kalikasan) against herein petitionersalleging
that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional right to
health and a balanced ecology considering, among others, that:
(a) the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), as required
by PD 1151, was not secured prior to the field trials; (b) the
required public consultations under the LGC were not complied
with; and (c) as a regulated Bt talong is presumed harmful to
human health and the environment, and that there is no
independent, peer-reviewed study showing its safety for human
consumption and the environment. Further, they contended that
since the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt
talong remained insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary
scientific evaluation shows reasonable grounds for concern, the
precautionary principle should be applied and, thereby, the field
trials be enjoined.

ISSUE: Is the respondents petition for the Writ of Kalikasan is

already moot and academic?

RULING: Yes.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies.62 The requirement of the existence of a "case" or
an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of
judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already
been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between
the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already
mooted by the expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the
completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with
none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly
attending, the Court grants the instant motions for
reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With
this pronouncement, no discussion on the substantive merits of
the same should be made.

49. Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426-212444, 26 July 2016.

SERENO, CJ.
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration questioning the
ruling of the court in Saguisag et. al. vs Executive Secretary,
January 2016 on both substantive and procedural grounds. The
petitions in Saguisag et. al. questioned the constitutionality of
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.
There the court ruled that the petitions be dismissed. At the
outset of this petition, petitioners questioned the procedural
findings of the Court despite acknowledging the fact that the
Court had given them standing to sue. Therefore this issue is
now irrelevant and academic, and deserves no reconsideration.
As for the substantive grounds, petitioners claim this Court erred
when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty. In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in
order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section
25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their
arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and
nuclear weapons. Petitioners do not present new arguments, but
certain claims must be addressed.

Claim 1: On Verba Legis Interpretation.

ISSUE: Does the Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the

word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases,
troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of
the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of
foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate.

RULING:
Firstly, verba legis is a mode of construing the provisions of
law as they stand. This takes into account the language of the
law, which is in English, and therefore includes reference to the
meaning of the words based on the actual use of the word in the
language.
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an
initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of
the words in the particular provision. Necessarily, once entry has
been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry
need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the
Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines. Petitioners'
own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in
fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction strictly
abhors.

Claim 2: On strict construction of an exception

ISSUE: Did the court add an exception to Section 25, Article

XVIII of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING: No. To be clear, the Court did not add an exception to

Section 25 Article XVIII. The general rule is that foreign bases,
troops, and facilities are not allowed in the Philippines. The
exception to this is authority granted to the foreign state in the
form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate. It is
in the operation of this exception that the Court exercised its
power of review. The lengthy legal analysis resulted in a proper
categorization of EDCA: an executive cagreement authorized by
treaty. This Court undeniably considered the arguments
asserting that EDCA was, in fact, a treaty and not an executive
agreement, but these arguments fell flat before the stronger
legal position that EDCA merely implemented the VF A and MDT.

Claim 3: On EDCA as a treaty.

ISSUE: Is EDCA a treaty?

RULING: We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a

treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature
of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably
categorize it as an executive agreement - a class of agreement
that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction - in
painstaking detail.

Claim 4: On EDCA as basing agreement.

ISSUE: Did the court not consider the similarity of EDCA to the
previous Military
Base Agreement as grounds to declare it unconstitutional?

RULING: Firstly, the Court has discussed this issue in length and
there is no need to rehash the analysis leading towards the
conclusion that EDCA is different from the MBA or any basing
agreement for that matter.
Secondly, the new issues raised by petitioners are not weighty
enough to overturn the legal distinction between EDCA and the
MBA.
Furthermore, Petitioners reassert that EDCA provisions on
operational control, access to Agreed Locations, various rights
and authorities granted to the US "ensures, establishes, and
replicates what MBA had provided." However, as thoroughly and
individually discussed in Saguisag, et. al., the significant
differences taken as a whole result in a very different instrument,
such that EDCA has not re-introduced the military bases so
contemplated under Article XVIII Section 25 of the Constitution.

50. Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land Inc.,

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, 26 July 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: In the resolution promulgated on July 15, 2014, 1 the

Court: declared Joseph B. Usita guilty of two counts of indirect
contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, but deferred the determination and imposition of the
penalties against him; and ordered him to disclose the name of
all members of the Board of Directors AMA Land, Inc. and
required Usita and a certain Garry de Vera to shed light on the
true interest of JC-AT-JC Law Offices.
Consequently, Usita submitted his compliance dated August
11, 2014, wherein he again apologized for his actions, but
appealed for the understanding and forgiveness of the Court. He
denied having disobeyed the decision of March 11, 2014, and
pointed out that the other complaint against respondent
Associate Justices of the CA had been filed earlier than the
present complaint; that he had filed the present complaint
against respondent Associate Justices of the CA "in good faith
and merely to petition this Honorable Court for redress of what
he believed to be a judicial wrong; " and that he was anyway
withdrawing the complaint.
De Vera submitted a salaysay ng pagpapaliwanag, which
contained explanations similar to those made by Usita that JC-AT-
JC Law Offices did not have any involvement in the filing of
administrative complaints. And Finally, Usita disclosed by name
the members of the AMALI Board of Directors who had
authorized him to file the present complaint.

ISSUE: Can a corporation and its officers and agents ne held

liable for contempt of court for disobeying judgments, decrees,
or orders of a case issued within its jurisdiction?

RULING: Yes, the general rule is that a corporation and its

officers and agents may be held liable for contempt of court for
disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court issued in a
case within its jurisdiction, or for committing any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
The abovenamed members of the AMALI Board of Directors
specifically claimed that they had brought the complaints against
respondent Associate Justices of the CA in their belief in good
faith that they were thereby raising a valid legal issue. Their
claim is preposterous, however, because the complaints were
identical, and palpably designed to intimidate or influence
respondent Associate Justices of the CA in respect of AMALI's
case in their Division.
The abovenamed members of the AMALI Board of Directors
could not allowed to hide behind the shield of good faith because
their charges were from the beginning bereft of factual and legal
merit. Moreover, there is no doubt that the abovenamed
members of the AMALI Board of Directors, led by the late Atty.
Acsay, were well aware, or, at least, ought to have known that no
judicial officer could be legitimately held administratively
accountable for the performance of his duties as a judicial officer
for the reason that such performance was a matter of
discharging a public duty and responsibility.
The abovenamed members of AMALI' s Board of Directors are
hereby found and pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of
court for thereby causing the bringing of the unfounded and
unwarranted administrative charges against respondent
Associate Justices of the CA in order to intimidate or harass
them, thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing or
degrading the administration of justice.
51. Department of Justice v. Judge Rolando Mislang, en banc,
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 & RTJ-14-237, 26 July 2016.

PER CURIAM

FACTS: Judge Mislang granted Lees petition for the issuance of

TRO without waiting for the DOJ's memorandum. This prompted
petitioners to file a complaint against him alleging that he acted
in patent disregard of the rules on injunctive relief and
prejudicial question, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and/or
procedure, and manifested partiality and gross misconduct.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that Judge
Mislang guilty of gross ignorance of the law and dismissed him
from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporation.

ISSUE: Is Judge Mislang guilty of gross ignorance of law in

granting Lees petition without waiting for the DOJ's
memorandum?

RULING: Yes, gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic

rules and settled jurisprudence. Judge Mislang issued two (2)
TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction and a status quo order,
both of which did not satisfy the legal requisites for their
issuance, in gross violation of clearly established laws and
procedures which every judge has the duty and obligation to be
familiar with. Unfortunately, he miserably failed to properly
apply the principles and rules on three (3) points, i.e., the
prematurity of the petition, the inapplicability of the prejudicial
question, and the lack of jurisdiction of the court. His persistent
disregard of well-known elementary rules in favor of Lee clearly
reflects his bad faith and partiality.
52. Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for
Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission
Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission, en
banc, A.M. Nos.12-8-07-CA/ 12-9-5-SC/ 13-02-07-SC, 16 June
2015.

BRION, J.

FACTS: Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity pay for

services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of
their compensation package. To support the claim to longevity
pay, they cited the case of Justice Pardo where one-time service
outside of the judiciary was considered part of Justice Pardos
service in the judiciary for purposes of determining his longevity
pay. The Court based on its reading of Section 3 of B.P. Blg.
129 did not consider Justice Pardo intervening service in the
COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his
service in the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Should services rendered by Justices Veloso and

Fernando outside the Judiciary be part of their longevity pay?

RULING: No, Section 42 of B.P 129 states that a monthly

longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be
paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for
each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
rendered in the judiciary. Moreover, Section 3 of BP 129 states
that the judicial service is uninterrupted even if the judge or
justice left the judiciary, served in a single non-judicial
governmental post, and then returned to the judiciary. In this
case, Justice Salazar-Fernando services in between her judicial
services were not continuous and uninterrupted. On the other
hand, , Justice Gacutans past service as NLRC Commissioner
cannot be credited as judicial service for longevity pay purposes
since she did not render such service while with the Judiciary.

53. Galang v. Boie Takeda Chemicals, Inc., G.R. No. 183934, July
20, 2016.

JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS: On April 28, 2004, petitioners intimated their intention to

retire in a joint written letter of resignation22 dated April 28,
2002 to Nomura, effective on April 30, 2004. Thereafter,
petitioners received their retirement package and other
monetary pay from BTCI. Chan received two checks in the total
amount of P2, 187,236.642. On October 20, 2004, petitioners
filed the complaint for constructive dismissal and money claims
before the NLRC Regional Arbitration

ISSUE/S:
I. Were petitioners constructively dismissed from service
II. Are petitioners entitled to a higher retirement package

RULING:
I. NO. It is true that in constructive dismissal cases, the
employer is charged with the burden of proving that its
 conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for
valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business
necessity. However, it is likewise true that in constructive
dismissal cases, the employee has the burden to prove
first the fact of dismissal by substantial evidence. Here,
records show that petitioners failed to establish the fact
of their dismissal when they failed to prove that their
decision to retire is involuntary. Consequently, no
constructive dismissal can be found.

II. NO. The entitlement of employees to retirement benefits

must specifically be granted under existing laws, a
collective bargaining agreement or employment contract,
or an established employer policy. Based on both parties'
evidence, petitioners arc not covered by any agreement.
There is also no dispute that petitioners received more
than what is mandated by Article 28771 of the Labor
Code. Also, these employees, including Sarmiento, all
retired in the same year of 2001, or only within a one-
year period. Definitely, a year cannot be considered long
enough to constitute the grant of retirement benefits to
these employees as company practice.

54. Intellectual Property Association v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605,

July 19, 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL)

implemented reforms to that would benefit the country and help
raise the level of competitiveness for Filipino brands. Thus, they
concluded that accession to Madrid Protocol is the answer. The
DFA endorsed to the President the country's accession to the
Madrid Protocol. Conformably with its express authority under
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, the DFA determined that
the Madrid Protocol was an executive agreement. President
Benigno C. Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol through an
instrument of accession, The Madrid Protocol entered into force
in the Philippines on July 25, 2012. Petitioner IPAP challenged
the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol
without the concurrence of the Senate. According to the IPAP, the
Madrid Protocol is a treaty, not an executive agreement; hence,
respondent DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario acted with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an
executive agreement. The IPAP has also argued that the
implementation of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines;
specifically the processing of foreign trademark applications,
conflicts with the IP Code.

ISSUE/s:
I. Does IP AP have locus standi to challenge the President's
ratification of the Madrid Protocol
II. Is the President's ratification of the Madrid valid and
constitutional;
III. Is Madrid Protocol is in conflict with the IP Code.

RULING:
I. YES. Legal standing refers to "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question." the IPAP also
emphasizes that the paramount public interest involved has
transcendental importance because its petition asserts that
the Executive Department has overstepped the bounds of its
authority by thereby cutting into another branch's functions
and responsibilities. The Court has adopted a liberal
attitude towards locus standi whenever the issue presented
for consideration has transcendental significance to the
people, or whenever the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public.

II. YES. Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario;s

determination and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an
executive agreement; being in apparent contemplation of
 the express state policies on intellectual property as well as
within his power under Executive Order No. 459, are
upheld. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of
entering into a treaty or an executive agreement on a given
subject as an instrument of international relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of
agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft their
international agreement in the form they so wish to further
their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back
seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the
enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement;
inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form, become
obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored
principle of pacta sunt servanda. The principle binds the
parties to perform in good faith their parts in the
agreements.

III. NO. The method of registration through the IPOPHL, as laid

down by the IP Code, is distinct and separate from the
method of registration through the WIPO, as set in the
Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol does not amend or
modify the IP Code on the acquisition of trademark rights
considering that the applications under the Madrid Protocol
are still examined according to the relevant national law. In
that regard, the IPOPHL will only grant protection to a
mark that meets the local registration requirements.
55. Mercullo v. Atty. Ramon, A.C. No. 11078, 19 July 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Atty. Ramon received 350,000php to satisfy the

redemption price of a mortgage covering the complainants
mothers residential property. Following up on the redemption,
respondents discovered Atty. Ramon had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for
redeeming property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramon is guilty of violating Canon 1,

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath.

RULING:
Yes, Atty. Ramon is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. which
provides;
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or
omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. She concealed from them
the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption
proceedings that she had assured them she would do.

56. Labao v. Comelec, en banc, G.R. Nos. 212615 & 212989, July
19, 2016.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Labao

Disqualifying him as candidate for the position of Mayor as well
as nullifying his proclamation as the duly elected Mayor. Labao
was considered a fugitive from justice and therefore disqualified
according to Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.

Issue/s:
1. Was the petition against Labao, Jr. one for disqualification, or a
pre-proclamation controversy?
2. Was Labao Jr. a fugitive from justice at the time that he was a
candidate for Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz during the May 13,
2013.

RULING:
1. Disqualification, The petition against Labao, Jr. was for
disqualification and not a pre-proclamation controversy. A pre-
proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers or any
matter raised in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns
2. No, Labao, Jr. was not a fugitive from justice at the time that
he was a Candidate for Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz during the
May 13, 2013. "Fugitive from justice includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. There can
only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. No other
substantial evidence was presented to prove that Labao, Jr, tried
to hide from the authorities or that he left Mambusao, Capiz to
avoid being arrested and prosecuted.

57. Arroyo vs People, G.R. No. 220598 & 220953, 19 July 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with

plunder as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following:
(1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the
Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the
PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of
the Commission on Audit (COA).

ISSUE/S: 1) Did the Prosecutor sufficiently established the

existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte? 2) Did
the prosecution successfully prove the constitutive element of
plunder?

RULING:
1) No. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of
a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be
a main plunderer and her co-conspirators. The court is not
talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the
allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of
the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the
main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required
such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly
informed of the charges they were being made answerable
for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the
crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the
accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constituted the offense charged. A perusal of the information
suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused
on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after
the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not
allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.
2) No. The common thread that binds all the four terms in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 together
(misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds) is that the public officer used the property
taken. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the
public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.

58. Napoles v. De Lima, G.R. No. 213529, 13 July 2016.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Napoles assails the decision of the CA which found no

grave abused of discretion in the filing of information for serious
illegal detention against her and the subsequent issuance of a
warrant for her arrest. She contended that there was no
probable cause to charge her with serious illegal detention, and
that Judge Alameda erred in issuing the arrest warrant despite
the pendency of her Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause.

ISSUE/S: Was there grave abuse of discretion?

RULING: No. A decision convicting an accused moots any

proceeding that questions the determination of probable cause,
either in the filing of the information in court or in the issuance
of the warrant of arrest. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt had then
been established, and questioning whether a lower quantum of
proof exists, i.e., probable cause, would be pointless. During the
pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the Petition
for Certiorari stemmed was decided by the trial court. In its April
14, 2015 Decision, Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City found Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
serious illegal detention, punished under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. She was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay Benhur Luy
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
61. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 213847, 12 July 2016

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Respondents pray for the reversal of the Courts 2015

decision granting Enrile bail. They contend that the grounds for
granting Enrile bail ran counter to the principles embodied in
our constitution. Furthemore, they also point out that the
decision accorded preferential treatment to Enrile that was not
ordinarily enjoyed by persons similarly situated.

ISSUE/s:
1. Is the grant of bail for the purpose of preventing the accused
from committing additional or licensing the commission of a
crime or punishing a person accused of crime?
2. In granting Enrile bail, did the Court accord him preferential
treatment that is not ordinarily enjoyed by persons similarly
situated?

RULING/s:

1. NO. Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the

accused answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly
restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's
right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function
of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion
that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is,
therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in
pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at
trial.
2. NO. To ignore his advanced age and unstable health condition
in order to deny his right to bail on the basis alone of the judicial
discretion to deny bail would be probably unjust. To equate his
situation with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly
serious offense would be inherently wrong when other conditions
significantly differentiating his situation from that of the latter's
unquestionably existed.

62. Duty Free Philippines Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.

210991, 12 July 2017.
BRION, J.

FACTS: The Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. (DFPSI), a

private contracting agency, initially provided the manpower
needs of the Duty Free. Duty Free then subsequently terminated
its contact with DFPSI and assumed the obligations of the latter
as the employer of contractual employees. Duty Free granted the
14th Month Bonus to its officials and employees. However the
COA Director disallowed the payment of such as it constituted
irregular expenditures and unnecessary use of public funds.

ISSUE: Did COA gravely abuse its discretion when it disallowed

the payment of the 14th Month Bonus?

Ruling: The COA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
disallowed the payment of the 14th Month Bonus. as government
employees working in a government entity, the Duty Free
personnel's compensation structure must comply with and not
contradict the SSL which stated that only incumbents as of July
1, 1989 were to receive additional compensation not included in
the standardized salary rates. The COA thus correctly ruled that
the 14th Month Bonus had no legal basis as far as the employees
hired after July 1, 1989 are concerned.

63. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of

Manuel Bolanos, G.R. No. 221636, 11 July 2016.

JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS: The DAR subjected the 71 hectare land of private

respondents to the coverage of the CARP. Private respondents
rejected the LBPs valuation of P1.6M but LBP still deposited the
amount in their favor. On March 11, 1996, farmer-beneficiaries
were awarded with certificates of land ownership.
On October 29, 1998, private respondents filed before the RTC
Naga City (Special Agrarian Court) a case for determination of
just compensation. The SAC ordered LBP to re-value the
property, which it did, coming up with a new valuation of Pl.8M.
The SAC upheld the new valuation in its May 14, 2013 Decision.
ISSUE: Is ordinary appeal under Rule 41 a proper mode of
appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts?

RULING: No. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, it has

been settled that the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
RTCs sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court. Section 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657
clearly and categorically states that said mode of appeal should
be adopted. Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review
dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of
records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition
for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived
landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not
foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.

64. Calilung v. Paramount Insurance, G.R. No. 195641, 11 July

2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: On March 16, 2005, the Court promulgated its resolution

in G.R. No. 136326 entitled Paramount Insurance Corporation v.
Tarcisio S. Calilung and RP Technical Services, Inc. holding the
respondents jointly and severally liable to pay to the petitioner
the principal obligation of P718,750.00, with interest at 14% per
annum from October 7, 1987 until full payment. The resolution of
the Court became final and executory and the decision was
remanded to the RTC for execution.

ISSUE: Can a party seek for the recovery of the compounded

interest even if the final and executory decision does not include
the same?

RULING: No. There was no basis for the petitioner to claim

compounded interest pursuant to Article 2212 18 of the Civil
Code considering that the judgment did not include such
obligation. Being already final and executory, the judgment is
immutable, and can no longer be modified or otherwise
disturbed.
65. Fenix v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189878, 11 July 2016.

SERENO, C.J.

FACTS: Doble a member of the AFP Intelligence Service was

brought to a Seminary in Makati by petitioner Santiago, where
he overheard a certain Ong making a press statement about an
audio tape regarding then President Arroyo and a COMELEC
commissioners rigging of the elections. Later that day, he was
told by Ong that they would present him to the media as the
source of this tape and so he was confined from room to room
where his movements were closely monitored and was asked to
stay put. Thereafter a certain Bishop Villegas fetched him and
turned him over to the AFP leading to a charge against
petitioners for serious illegal detention. In the proceedings
before the RTC the case was dismissed for lack of probable cause
on the ground that the investigating panel did not consider the
counter-affidavits of petitioners Ong and Santiago.

ISSUE: Did the RTC erred in dismissing the case?

RULING: No, in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not compelled to
follow the prosecutor's certification of the existence of probable
cause. It bears stressing that the RTC never considered any
evidence other than that which the panel had already passed
upon only that unlike the RTC, the panel did not give any serious
consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, the
recantation of Santos or the affidavit of Bishop Bacani which
spelled the difference between the divergent findings. Based on
Bishop Bacani's affidavit, Ong, Santiago, Cortez, Doble and
Santos all sought sanctuary at the San Carlos Seminary because
of fear and not because of petitioners and Ong who were in the
same predicament.
66. Saguinsin v. Liban, G.R. No. 189312, 11 July 2016.

JARDELEZA, C.J.

FACTS: Cristino owned a parcel of land which was placed under

coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) where seven
hectares (7) were sold to Lito three (3) hectares of said land
were sold to petitioner. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents were
rewarded in favor of the respondent farmers and thus made
Isabel, widow of Cristino, file an application for retention of said
property sold to petitioner. But the DAR Regional Office (DARRO)
declared the sale between Cristino and petitioner as null and
void as it is prohibited to transfer the ownership of tenanted
rice/corn lands. The Court of Appeals even further explained the
denial of her right of retention as it was not proven that Cristino
had no knowledge of the OLT coverage of his property and that it
is presumed that his right of retention have already been
exercised through his sale over the first seven hectares to Lito.

ISSUE: Is the sale of a portion of the land an implied exercise of

the right of retention?
RULING: No, the court finds no basis for the declaration that
Cristino is presumed to have already exercised his right of
retention over the first seven hectares sold to Lito. Under
Section 3 of DAR Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1991,
cited by the CA, the heirs may exercise the original landowner's
right to retention if they can prove that the decedent had no
knowledge of OLT Coverage over the subject property. In this
case, the heirs did not have the opportunity to prove Cristino's
intent because the DARRO, without requiring proof of such
intent, granted the application for retention filed by Isabel,
Cristino's widow. Further, Isabel, or Cristina's heirs, if any, were
not given the opportunity to present evidence when the issue of
intent to retain was raised in the proceedings below, since
petitioner has already substituted Isabel. The record shows that
respondents presented no evidence or legal basis to prove the so-
called implied exercise of retention. This was a mere allegation
on the part of the respondents.

67. Barrio Fiesta Restaurant vs. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, 11

July 2016.

BRION, J.

FACTS: Helen Beronia was hired as a receptionist in Mikimito.

Later she was assigned as a cashier at Bakahan at Manukan
restaurants and also in two branches of Barrio Fiesta. Beronia
used the P582.00 overage of the previous cashier transactions
to offset the shortages of her transaction. Personnel Officer
Cristobal directed Beronia to submit a written explanation on the
incident within 24 hours and Beronia admitted that she had
applied the overage to her shortages. Cristobal gave her a
termination employment memorandum and Beronia stopped
reporting to work. Ilagan ask her to report back as a waitress
and during which she was made to train new cashiers. 30 TH June
2009, she was completely discharged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Beronia was illegaly dismissed?

RULING: Yes. The CA ruled that the petitioners failed to show or
prove that the company prohibited the act of offsetting and the
memorandum requiring all the cashiers to explain in writing
shortages or overages was submitted for the first time- together
with their opposition to Beronias motion for reconsideration-and
was neither an original or certified copy.
The CA added that the petitioners in fact also failed to prove the
theft Beronia allegedly committed when she released amounts of
money, without prior consent and authority of the management.
The violation report shows that they simply warned Beronia for
her failure to report the release of cash and not for committing
theft. Thus, absent proof of bad faith and ill motive in this release
of money, the loss of trust and confidence simply has no basis.
Finally, the CA noted that the petitioners' subsequent rehiring of
Beronia as acting supervisor negates the charge of loss of trust
and confidence, An employer would not likely require a
previously dismissed employee charged with theft to train its
incoming cashiers.

68. Alfornon v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 203657, 11 July 2016

BRION, J.

FACTS: Alfornon worked as a casual employee for the

Municipality of Argao, Cebu and eventually became a permanent
employee after submitting her Personal Date Sheet (PDS) as one
of the requirement. Edsel Galeos, the Municipal Mayor of Argao,
issued a memorandum order informing Alfornon that a copy of
her warrant of arrest in the estafa case had been forwarded to
his office and required Alfornon to show cause within 24 hours
from receipt of the memorandum. Rodulfo Delos Santos, a
security aid in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Argao,
executed an affidavit formally charging Alfornon of Serious
Dishonesty. LGU-Argao issued a report recommending that
Alfornon be dismissed from the service.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfornon was afforded due process before

she was dismissed from the service?

RULING: Yes. The essence of due process is simply the

opportunity to be heard. Due process in administrative
proceedings is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given opportunity to explain or defend himself.
The filing of charges and a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain ones side suffice to meet the minimum requirements of
due process. In this case, Alfornon was given an opportunity to
face the charges of dishonesty against her and she was able to
give her answer during the initial investigation before Galeos and
before the formal investigation conducted by the LGU-Argao
Fact-Finding Committee.

69. Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc v. Feb Mitsui Marine Insurance

Co., Inc, G.R. No. 194121, 11 July 2016.
BRION, J.

FACTS: The shipper, Sony, engaged the services of TMBI to

facilitate the release of its shipment and deliver the goods to its
warehouse. In turn, TMBI subcontracted a portion of its
obligation the delivery of the cargo to BMT. Upon delivery of
the goods, one of the trucks found abandoned with both the
driver and the shipment missing. Sony then claimed from Mitsui
the insurance and the latter had been the subrogated as an
insurer. RTC and CA held both BMT and TMBI solidary liable for
damages to Mitsui. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S:
1. Is TMBI consider a common carrier?
2. Is the liability of BMT and TMBI solidary in favor of Mitsui?

RULING:
1.Yes. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public. That TMBI does not own
trucks and has to subcontract the delivery of its clients goods, is
immaterial. As long as an entity holds itself to the public for the
transport of goods as a business, it is considered a common
carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle used or has to
actually hire one. TMBIs customs brokerage services including
the transport/delivery of the cargo are available to anyone
willing to pay its fees. Given these circumstances, we find it
undeniable that TMBI is a common carrier.
2. No. TMBIs liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi-delict
(culpa aquiliana) but from its breach of contract (culpa
contractual). In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to
establish the existence of the contract and the obligors failure to
perform his obligation. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to
prove or even allege that the obligors non-compliance was due
to fault or negligence because Article 1735 already presumes
that the common carrier is negligent. The common carrier can
only free itself from liability by proving that it observed
extraordinary diligence. It cannot discharge this liability by
shifting the blame on its agents or servants. Note: BMT is liable
to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage as well.

70. Century Properties, Inc. v. Babiano, G.R. No. 220978, 05 July

2016.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Babiano was hired as Vice-President for Sales of CPI with

an employment contract which contained a Confidentiality of
Documents and Non-compete Clauseand that any breached the
terms thereof, his forms of compensation, including commissions
and incentives will be forfeited. Received reports that Babiano
provided a competitor with information regarding CPI and its
marketing strategies, spread false information and recruited
CPIs personnel to join the competitor that resulted its
termination. Respondent filed a complaint for non-payment of
commissions in which NLRC and CA holds the petitioner liable
of.

ISSUE/S: Did CA err in holding CPI liable for the unpaid

commissions of Babiano?

RULING:
Yes. The Court based its ruling in Article 1370 of the Civil Code
and that the contract in this case is not only clear and
unambiguous in stating that Babiano is barred to work for
whatsoever capacity with any person whose business is in direct
competition with CPI while he is employed and for a period of
one year from date of his resignation or termination from the
company, it also expressly provided in no uncertain terms that
should Babiano breach any term of the employment contract,
forms of compensation including commissions and incentives will
be forfeited. It is only fair and reasonable to have those
stipulations in the contract as protection for CPI from Babiano as
the latter having the managerial position had knowledge on the
highly sensitive and confidential information in the course of
business. Thus, the employment contract had a force of law
between the contracting parties with its stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions which are not contrary to law, morals,
public order or public policy.

71. Bishop of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, 05 July 2016

LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA
RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354 while the second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team
Buhay with a checkmark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified
by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who
voted against it form Team Buhay.

ISSUE/s:
1. Can COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens?
 2. Is the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom
of expression?
3. Is order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
4. Is there violation of petitioners right to property?
5. Is the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech?

RULING:
1. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power
to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of
these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
2. Yes. The Court held that every citizens expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held
that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the
law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
3. The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size
of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and
present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
4. Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as
an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.
Fifth Issue: No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied
upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position
of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
73. Ever Electrical vs PBCom, G.R. Nos. 187822-23, 03 August
2016

REYES, J.

FACTS:
Ever, represented by Vicente, took out a loan from PBCom in the
amount of P65,000,000.00. The parties entered into a
compromise agreement whereby Vicente voluntarily undertook
to pay for Ever's loan with PBCom. However, Vicente was not
able to make the necessary payments as stipulated in the
compromise agreement. PBCom, thus, filed with the RTC a
motion for execution.
The RTC found merit in PBCom's application for a writ of
execution and granted the same. The petitioners then filed with
the CA two petitions for certiorari. The Court of Appeals,
however, dismissed the petitions.

ISSUE: Was there novation of the original loan agreement?

RULING: Under the Civil Code, novation is one of the means to

extinguish an obligation. However, novation is never presumed.
In the present case, the compromise agreement entered into by
the parties does not contain any provision releasing Ever, the
debtor, from its liability to PBCom the lender. Thus, absent the
release of Ever from the original obligation, PBCom may still
enforce the obligation against it. Since there was no novation,
PBCom may proceed to collect from the original debtor, Ever,
under the terms of the original loan agreement.
74. INDIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PHILS., INC. v.
FILIPINO INDIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 184008, 03 August 2016

JARDELEZA, J

FACTS:
On January 20, 2005, Mr. Naresh Mansukhani reserved the
corporate name "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce
in the Philippines, Inc." (FICCPI). Ram Sitaldas alleged that the
corporate name has been used by the defunct FICCPI since 1951,
and that the reservation by another person who is not its
member or representative is illegal. The CRMD ruled that after
the expiration of the defunct FICCPFs corporate existence,
without any act on its part to extend its term, its right over the
name ended. Thus, the name "Filipino Indian Chamber of
Commerce in the Philippines, Inc." is free for appropriation by
any party. Meanwhile, Pracash Dayacanl, who allegedly
represented the defunct FICCPI, filed an application with the
CRMD for the reservation of the corporate name "Indian
Chamber of Commerce Phils., Inc." (ICCPI). Mansukhani opposed
the application.
In a letter dated April 5, 2006 the CRMD denied
Mansukhani's opposition. Thus, respondent FICCPI, through
Mansukhani, appealed the CRMD's decision to the SEC En Banc,
which reversed and set aside the decision of CRMD. The CA
affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc.
ISSUE: Is the name Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines, Inc." confusingly similar to "Indian Chamber of
Commerce Phils., Inc?

RULING:

Yes. Section 18 of the Corporation Code expressly prohibits the

use of a corporate name which is identical or deceptively or
confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation.
In Philips Export B. V. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that to
fall within the prohibition, two requisites must be proven, to wit:
1. that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over
the use of such corporate name; and
2. the proposed name is either:
(a) identical; or
(b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any
existing corporation or to any other name already protected
by law; or
(c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing
law.
These two requisites are present in this case.
Petitioner cannot argue that the combination of words in
respondent's corporate name is merely descriptive and generic,
and consequently cannot be appropriated as a corporate name to
the exclusion of the others. Save for the words "Filipino," "in
the," and "Inc.," the corporate names of petitioner and
respondent are identical in all other respects.

75. People of the Philippines v. Vivencio Ausa. G.R. No. 209032,

03 August 2016.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: Appellant was charged before the RTC with the crime of
rape. The evidence shows that while AAA was in the town plaza
watching a contest when a neighbor, appellant, dragged her to
the back of a nearby school building. AAA struggled to free
herself but appellant overpowered her and forcibly inserted his
male organ into AAA's. Appellant interposed the defenses of
denial and alibi. He claimed that he had been blind since he was
a year old and needed assistance to go around since then,
rendering it impossible for him to commit such a crime. RTC
found appellant guilty of the crime of simple rape. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Is the defense of disability is sufficient to acquit the

accused?

RULING: No. The Court rejects appellant's defenses of denial

and alibi. Aside from being weak, these are self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof as in the case at bar, and hence cannot prevail
over AAA's clear narration of facts and positive identification of
appellant. Otherwise stated positive identification of the
appellant, when categorical and consistent and without any ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial.
The prosecution significantly disputes appellant's claim of
complete blindness. It is also noteworthy that appellant had a
common-law wife for seven (7) years. In any event, the Court
notes that the absence of the sense of sight in itself does not
completely disable a person from performing sexual congress. In
the absence of any allegation to the contrary, for all intents and
purposes, he remains a sensual man in complete possession of
faculties to gratify one's corporeal needs.

76. Spouses Ernesto Tatlonghari and Eugenia Tatlonghari v.

Rural Bank, Inc. G.R. No. 219783, 03 August 2016.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: A certain Pedro V. Ilagan (Pedro) filed a complaint for

annulment of special power of attorney (SPA), promissory notes,
and real estate mortgage (civil case) against respondent Bangko
Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. (the bank) and the Provincial
Sheriff of Batangas Province (defendants) before the RTC. After
the original complaint was filed, Pedro convinced Sps.
Tatlonghari to join him in the civil case against the bank. He
informed them that the bank used a falsified SPA and made it
appear that they had authorized him to obtain a loan from it,
secured by a real estate mortgage on their property which was
the subject of foreclosure proceedings. Sps. Tatlonghari
and Pedro, together with Valdez and Brual, as plaintiffs, filed an
amended complaint (First Amended Complaint) against
defendants. Subsequently, the RTC admitted the Second
Amended Complaint. While the case was pending, Sps.
Tatlonghari allegedly discovered evidence which led them to
believe that it was Tolentino, one of their co-plaintiffs, who was
responsible for involving their property in the purportedly
anomalous transactions with the bank. Subsequently, Atty.
Villanueva filed a motion for leave to file third amended
complaint on behalf of Sps. Tatlonghari. The RTC denied Sps.
Tatlonghari's motion. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the denial of
Sps. Tatlonghari's motion for leave to file third amended
complaint and in finding that there was no valid substitution of
counsels of record insofar as Sps. Tatlonghari were concerned.

RULING: Yes. The rules of procedure allow a party in a civil

action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the
pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading
is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply,
within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only
amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. Apart from the
prayers seeking the declaration of nullity of the SPA that Sps.
Tatlonghari allegedly executed on behalf of Pedro and the award
for damages, the Second Amended Complaint did not seek any
relief in favor of Sps. Tatlonghari. It would have been more
prudent on the part of the RTC, in the exercise of its discretion,
to allow the amendments proffered by Sps. Tatlonghari and to
admit the Third Amended Complaint.

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

 In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change
shall be given to the adverse party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute

another in his place.

It is the client's - in this case, the Sps. Tatlonghari's - sole

prerogative whom to engage to represent their interests and
prosecute the case on their behalf, which prerogative cannot be
negated or supplanted by the non-existent requirement of
written consent of the previous attorney.

77. People vs. Briones GR. No. 212930, 03 August 2016.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Around 10 pm, Kenneth went to Alpa Farm to apologize to his
employer Rommel, who scolded him that day. However, upon
reaching the farm, he saw the accused and 2 unidentified men
alight from a vehicle. While Rommel was unwarily texting inside
the tent, the two men suddenly restrained his arms behind his
back and delivered several blows. Inside the hut, appellant shot
the victim using sumpak. Kenneth, on the other hand, went to his
friend's house and out of fear, decided to keep the information to
himself. Meanwhile, Kenneth told the police that he had no
knowledge about Rommel's death. Appellant was also invited by
the police and underwent fingerprinting analysis and paraffin
test on the same day. Overwhelmed by conscience and pity,
Kenneth revealed to Marissa what he saw. RTC rendered a
decision finding appellant guilty of Murder and affirmed by CA.

ISSUE/s:
1. Is the case attended with a qualifiying circumstance of
treachery?
2. Is the denial of appellant cannot be given more weight over a
witness` positive identification?
3. Is the lapse of considerable length of time before witness
comes forward taint his credibility?
4. Is the fingerprint analysis and Paraffin Tests are conclusive
evidence?

RULING:
1. YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party. In this case, the victim was
merely unwarily texting inside the tent and was too unprepared
and helpless to defend himself against these three men.
Appellant's acts of dragging him to the nearby hut and using a
sumpak evidently shows that he consciously adopted means to
ensure the execution of the crime.
2. YES. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of
the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of
such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the
crime charged such as murder. Motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness. During
the Direct Examination, Kenneth positively identified appellant
as the person who killed Rommel.
3. NO. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits
different reactions from the witnesses, and for which no clear cut
standard form of behavior can be drawn. Death threats, fear of
reprisal, and even a natural reluctance to be involved in a
criminal case have been accepted as adequate explanations for
the delay in reporting crimes. In this case, appellant's threat that
he will kill Kenneth if he informs the former's wife of his
philandering is an acceptable reason for the witness' delay in
coming forward and disclosing the identity of the appellant.
4. NO. The positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses bears more weight than the negative fingerprint
analysis and paraffin tests results conducted the day after the
incident. Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered
inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in the view
that the paraffin test was extremely unreliable for use. The
presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a
possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a
person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found
in substances other than gunpowder.

78. JAVIER Vs. CADIAO, G.R. No. 185369, 03 August 2016.

REYES, J.

FACTS:
Vice Governor Cadiao, was the presiding officer of the SP. On the
first regular session of the SP, Lakas-CMD block was considered
as the majority party. On the other hand, the NPC was
considered as the minority party with four members.
Subsequently upon realizing that the NPC had gained superiority
in numbers, Combong proposed Resolution No. 42-2008, which
sought to reorganize the standing committees of the SP. The
resolution was included as an "urgent matter" in the agenda6 of
the SP's fifth regular session. During the SP's fifth regular
session, all the SP members were in attendance and the
Combong Resolution was approved with seven (7) voting in its
favor, and six (6) against it. To challenge the legality of the
passage of the Combong Resolution, the Lakas-CMD block, filed
a Complaint and maintained that since all 14 members of the SP
were present during the deliberations, 9 affirmative votes were
necessary.

ISSUE:
Should the Vice Governor, as the presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, be counted in the determination of
what number constitutes as the majority?

RULING:
NO. The Vice Governor, as the Presiding Officer, shall be
considered a part of the SP for purposes of ascertaining if a
quorum exists. In determining the number which constitutes as
the majority vote, the Vice Governor is excluded. The Vice
Governor's right to vote is merely contingent and arises only
when there is a tie to break as mandated under Section 49 of RA
7160. In the instant petition, when the Combong Resolution was
deliberated upon, all the ten (10) regular and three (3) ex-officio
members, plus the Presiding Officer, were present. Seven
members voted for, while six voted against the Combong
Resolution. There was no tie to break as the majority vote had
already been obtained.

79. Picop Resources, Inc. Vs. Social Security Commission and

Mateo A. Belizar, G.R. No. 206936, 03 August 2016.

DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS: On October 28, 2004, herein respondent Mateo A.
Belizar (Belizar) filed SSC Case No. 11-15788-04 before the
Social Security Commission (SSC), his correspondent in this
Petition, to establish his actual period of employment with herein
petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. and compel the latter to remit
unpaid Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions, in
order that he may collect his SSS retirement benefits.

ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of the provisions of RA 9903?

RULING: No. SSS Circular No. 2010-004, Series of 2010, which

provides for the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9903,
states that any employer who is delinquent or has not
remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail
of the condonation program under the law. In order to be
covered by the program, the employer must a) remit within the
period of the Program the full amount of the delinquent
contributions through any SSS Branch with tellering facility or
authorized collection agents of the SSS e.g. banks, payment
centers, or b) [submit a proposal x x x within the period of
the Program to pay the delinquent contributions in
installment to the SSS Branch having jurisdiction over its
place of business or household address.
80. Hon. Alvin P. Vergara, in his capacity as City Mayor of
Cabanatuan City, and Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cabanatuan
City Vs. Lourdes Melencio S. Gredia, et al., G.R. No. 185638, 10
August 2016.

REYES, J.

FACTS: The record showed that sometime in 1989, the subject

land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-way and road
widening projects. Despite the taking of the subject land and the
completion of the road widening projects, the Sanggunian failed
to tender the just compensation to the respondents. The
Appraisal Committee then issued Resolution No. 20-S-20017
recommending the payment of P2,295.00 per sq m as just
compensation. Pursuant to the said resolution, Mayor Vergara
executed a Memorandum of Agreement10 (MOA) with Lourdes
as Attorney-in-fact of the respondents, whereby the Sanggunian
bound itself to pay the respondents the amount of
P17,028,900.00 in 12 years at the rate of P1,419,075.00 every
year starting the first quarter of 2002 as payment of the subject
land. More than four years had lapsed after the signing of the
MOA but no payment was ever made by the petitioners to the
respondents despite the fact that the subject land was already
taken by the petitioners and was being used by the constituents
of the City of Cabanatuan.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation.

Hence, the pertinent point of inquiry is whether the subject land
of the respondents is beyond the commerce of man as provided
for in Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529

RULING: Petition is bereft of merit. ONE. The alleged

encumbrance in the respondents' title and the interpretation and
application of Section 5040 of P.D. No. 1529 are no longer novel
since this Court had already made a definitive ruling on the
matter in the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership,41 where the Court ruled that
therein petitioners' reliance on Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529 is
erroneous since it contemplates roads and streets in a
subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private
property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A
public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street. TWO.
The petitioners are liable to pay the full market value of the
subject land. Without a doubt, the respondents are entitled to the
payment of just compensation. The right to recover just
compensation is enshrined in the Bill of Rights; Section 9, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution states that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation. THREE. The
undue delay of the petitioners to pay the just compensation
brought about the basis for the grant of interest. Apart from the
requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be
fair and reasonable, compensation, to be "just", must also be
made without delay. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" if the property is immediately taken
as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both
his land and its fruits or income.
85. People of the Philippines v. Mario Galia Bagamano, G.R. No.
222658, 17 August 2016.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS:
Bagamano was charged with the crime of rape of AAA. Dr. Daisy
Ann-Artuz testified during trial that although AAA is already 20
years old, she has a mild to moderate mental retardation with a
mental age of 6 to 7 years old. Bagamano pleaded not guilty to
the charge but did not show any evidence. The RTC found him
guilty; affirmed by the CA taking into consideration AAAs mental
retardation. Thus, Bagamano appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is Bagamano guilty of the crime of rape?

RULING:
The Court denied appellants appeal. The Court agrees with the
findings of both the RTC and CA. However, AAAs mental
retardation, while proven during trial, cannot be considered in
view of the fact that it was not specifically alleged in the
Information charging Bagamano with rape. Bagamano is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape a defined
and penalized under Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

86. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. Vs. Director Emma C.

Francisco, et al., G.R. No. 174379, 23 August 2016.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

E.I. Dupont Nemours and Company (E.I. Dupont Nemours) is an

American corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware. Therapharma, Inc. alleged that on January 4, 2003, it
filed before the Bureau of Food and Drugs its own application for
a losartan product "Lifezar," a medication for hypertension,
which the Bureau granted. It argued that it made a search of
existing patent applications for similar products before its
application, and that no existing patent registration was found
since E.I. Dupont Nemours' application for its losartan product
was considered abandoned by the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. Merck informed
Therapharma, Inc. that it was pursuing a patent on the losartan
products in the Philippines and that it would pursue any legal
action necessary to protect its product.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner's
appeal for the revival of its patent application on the grounds
that (a) petitioner committed inexcusable negligence in the
prosecution of its patent application; and (b) third-party rights
and the public interest would be prejudiced by the appeal

RULING:
Public interest will be prejudiced if, despite petitioner's
inexcusable negligence, its Petition for Revival is granted. Even
without a pending patent application and the absence of any
exception to extend the period for revival, petitioner was already
threatening to pursue legal action against respondent
Therapharma, Inc. if it continued to develop and market its
losartan product, Lifezar. Once petitioner is granted a patent for
its losartan products, Cozaar and Hyzaar, the loss of competition
in the market for losartan products may result in higher prices.
For the protection of public interest, Philippine Patent
Application No. 35526 should be considered a forfeited patent
application.

87. National Transmission Corporation vs Misamis Oriental I

Electric Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. No. 195138, 24 August 2016

SERENO, CJ:
FACTS: NPC and Misamis Oriental I Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(MORESCO I) signed a Transition Supply Contract (TSC),
whereby the former obligated itself to supply and sell electricity
to the latter.

During the life of the contract, Transco discovered that it

inadvertently used an incorrect multiplier of 3,500 instead of
5,250 in billing MORESCO I. So, Transco and Genco sent an
adjustment bill to MORESCO I of P17,926 ,706.66 in total.

However, MORESCO I will only pay P4,220.047.17 pursuant to

Section 25 of Annex C to the TSC. It claimed that since the
omission or failure of Transco and Genco to apply the right
multiplier is considered a wrong reading, omission or
arithmetical mistake, under Section 25 of Annex C to the TSC.

ISSUE: Whether Transcos failure to install the correct device

that was reflective of the multiplier used in the billing indeed
constituted an omission under Section 25 of the Transition
Contract, which should thus be rectified within 90 days from
receipt of the bill?

RULING: YES, it is an omission under Sec 25 of the Transition

Contract.

Section 25. In the event that a billing is found

erroneous due to a wrong reading, arithmetical
mistakes or omissions, SUPPLIER shall send
CUSTOMER a debit/credit memo within ninety (90)
days from the date of bills receipt to correct the error.
SUPPLIER shall also be deemed to waive any claim on
any billing error if it fails to send notice for such billing
error to CUSTOMER within ninety (90) days from
billing date.

SC agrees the decision of the ERC when it concluded that

Transco failed to provide the correct meter multiplier a clear
omission that resulted in an erroneous billing. By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgement thereon; thus their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts.

A contract exists between the parties, the obligations arising

therefrom have the force of law between the parties and must be
complied with in good faith.
88. Zoleta-San Agustin vs Sales, GR No. 189289, 31August 2016.

REYES, J.

FACTS: Brothers Teodoro and Ernesto Sales filed an action for

recognition as the illegitimate children of the late Louis C.
Fernandez claiming to be his children with Epitacia, the
househelper. The brothers presented two public documents
bearing the thumb marks of Louis where he acknowledged and
formally recognized both as his children. Gloria Zoleta-San
Agustin opposed the claim and sought a DNA test to prove that
the two were not Louis sons. The RTC found in favor of brothers
Sales and denied Glorias motion for DNA test.

ISSUES:
a. Was the court correct in declaring illegitimate filiation
based on the documents presented?
b. Was the court correct in denying the motion for DNA test?

RULING:
a. Yes. Legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any
of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a
final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

The SC ruled that these requirements likewise apply to

establish filiation of illegitimate children.
 b. Yes. The RTC already arrived at a definitive conclusion that
Teodoro and Ernesto are the illegitimate children of the
deceased Louis rendering Glorias request for DNA Testing
immaterial.

89. Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. Vs. Attys. John G. Reyes, et al., A.C. No.
9090, 31, August 2016

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: The case is a Petition for Reconsideration of the 2012

Court Resolution which found respondent Reyes guilty of
"negligence of contumacious proportions. He was accused of
handling a case involving conflict of interest, appearing as
counsel for Mayor Velarde in a COMELEC case, in which he
claimed that he did not know about the true nature of the case,
not properly apprised of the facts and circumstances, and was
just called by Atty Bello to handle it. He was accused of
falsification as well, as he was asked also by Atty Bello to attend
a hearing for a candidate who was being disqualified. It was only
at the hearing when he found out that his client really was a
nuisance candidate and that the copy of the Answer that was
given to him was unsigned.

ISSUE: Is failure to evaluate the factual backdrop to a case

tantamount to negligence of contumacious proportions to
warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension?
RULING: No. The court agrees with respondent that such
negligence is not of contumacious proportions as to warrant the
imposition of the penalty of suspension. "The power to disbar or
suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty."
The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion taking into consideration the
facts surrounding each case. His folly, though, consists in his
negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully
apprised of and evaluating the circumstances surrounding them.
We, nevertheless, agree with respondent that such negligence is
not of contumacious proportions as to warrant the imposition of
the penalty of suspension.

90. Jocelyn S. Limkaichong Vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, et

al., G.R. No. 158464. 2, August, 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
In August 19 1999, Petitioner filed in the RTC in Dumaguete City
a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands.
DARAB responded that the May 28, 1999 order had become final
and executory because there had been no appeal filed within the
reglementary period provided by law, Section 5112 of R.A. No.
6657. Petitioner insisted that the RTC sitting as special agrarian
court (SAC) was not barred from acquiring jurisdiction over the
complaint for determination of just compensation, because her
cause of action was anchored on the respondents' violation of her
right to due process and their taking of her property without just
compensation due to the DARAB valuation being too low and
having been arbitrarily arrived at.

ISSUE:
1. Is the question of constitutional right to equal protection of
law, the court of appeals decision dated November 22, 2002
ruling that the petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy
is contrary to the law and jurisprudence as applied to the
evidence on record?
2. Was the trial court's dismissal of her petition because of her
failure to file it before the decision/order of the DARAB became
final and executory pursuant to Section 51 of R.A. No. 6657 fair
and proper?
3. Within what period must the adjudicator's preliminary
determination of just compensation be brought to the Special
Agrarian Court [SAC]?

RULING:
1. Yes, Certiorari was a proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal.
The Court does not hesitate or halt on its tracks in granting the
writ of certiorari to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a
party in cases where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment, or where there may be a failure of
justice; or where the assailed order is a patent nullity; or where
the grant of the writ of certiorari will arrest future litigations; or
for certain considerations, such as public welfare and public
policy.
Here, the petitioner laments that she had not been accorded
equal protection and treatment by the trial court which had
awarded to other landowners a higher valuation of their property
despite the belated filing of their petitions. For sure, the petition
for certiorari thereby plainly alleged that the RTC had committed
grave abuse of discretion by violating the petitioner's
constitutional right to due process or equal protection.
2. No. The prevailing rule at the time she filed her complaint on
August 19, 1999 was that enunciated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals on October 30, 1996. The pronouncement in Philippine
Veterans Bank was promulgated on January 18, 2000 when the
trial was already in progress in the RTC. At any rate, it would
only be eight years afterwards that the Court en banc
unanimously resolved the jurisprudential conundrum through its
declaration in Land Bank v. Martinez that the better rule was
that enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank. The Court must,
therefore, prospectively apply Philippine Veterans Bank. The
effect is that the petitioner's cause of action for the proper
valuation of her expropriated property should be allowed to
proceed. Hence, her complaint to recover just compensation was
properly brought in the RTC as the SAC, whose dismissal of it
upon the motion of Land Bank should be undone.
3. The more recent jurisprudence uphold the preeminence of the
pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals
to the effect that the parties only have 15 days from their receipt
of the decision/order of the DAR within which to invoke the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC; otherwise, the
decision/order attains finality and immutability.
91. Atty. Rodolfo D. Mateo Vs. Executive Secretary Alberto G.
Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 177875, 08 August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Atty. Rodolfo Mateo was employed on 1990 as Attorney

IV by the National Water Resources Board and was later
appointed as Executive Director in 2002. The Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission found him administratively liable for falsifying
his Personal Data Sheet when he denied any conviction of any
crime or violation of law, when in fact he was convicted of
Homicide in 1976; the penalty of which is reclusion temporal
with an accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
from holding public office or employment. He had been granted
conditional pardon by then President Marcos but such pardon
did not expressly remit the accessory penalty. He was dismissed
from public service.

ISSUES: Will the failure to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet

(PDS) the fact of his conviction amount to dishonesty? Was the
petitioner dismissed from public service without being afforded
administrative due process?

RULING: The failure of a public servant to disclose in his PDS

the fact of his conviction by final judgment of a crime punished
with reclusion temporal is guilty of dishonesty, and may be
dismissed from the service even if the charge is committed for
the first time. He had actually committed dishonesty on two
separate occasions by having falsely denied his conviction of any
crime or violation of law by a competent court or tribunal in the
two PDSs filed in 1997 and 2000.
No, his dismissal was with administrative due process when he
was given the opportunity to be heard and explain his side and to
seek a reconsideration of such action. The PAGC did actually
conduct formal hearings in which the petitioner had been given
the opportunity to be heard; that he had participated in the
hearings by filing his verified answer to the complaint; that he
had also been accorded the opportunity to submit his
memorandum or position paper, but he had failed to do so;that he
had been silent about the absolute pardon granted by President
Aquino on May 27, 1987, alleging it for the first time only in the
motion for reconsideration; and that the pardon, being the
private act of the President, must still be pleaded and proved by
him as the person claiming to have been pardoned.
Administrative due process need not be a formal trial-type
hearing addressing his constitutional right to confront his
accusers.

92. Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al. Vs. Pilipino Banana Growers &

Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, 16 August
2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:
Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007 to
impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice
by all agricultural entities within Davao City; it took effect on
March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper and would
be strictly enforced 3 months after pursuant to Section 5 of the
ordinance. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance, alleging that it exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to
Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Issues:
1. Was the ordinance inconsistent with the equal protection
clause wherein the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State?
1. Did the Davao LGU arbitrarily, whimsically, and despotically
enact the ordinance violating the Due Process clause of the
Constitution?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause as it is
underinclusive because the classification does not include
all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate. The occurrence of pesticide drift is not
limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application, including manual spraying or
truck-mounted boom spraying; the drift may still bring about
the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks
to the community and to the environment. The ordinance is
also "overinclusive" and discriminatory because its impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose; it will
unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on
the purpose of the law.

2. Yes. Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unreasonable and

oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three
months after publication of the ordinance; three months being
an inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted
boom spraying or another mode of pesticide application,
given the vast area of the affected plantations and the
corresponding resources required therefor.
93. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Regions v.
Juan Antonio Muoz, G.R. No. 207342, 16 August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: Muoz was the Head of the Treasury Department of the
Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) and Mr. Ho CHI was the
head of The Mocatta Group Hong Kong (MHK) a branch of the
Mocatta Group in London (Mocatta London). CHI approached
Mocatta London and indicated that to get business it would be
necessary to pay for rebates to an unnamed group of people at
CBP. Invoking the Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of Hong Kong
for the surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons (RP-HK
Agreement) the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) filed 10 criminal cases, 3 counts of accepting as
advantage as an agent and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud.

ISSUE/S: Does accepting an advantage as an agent comply with

the double criminality rule?

RULING: No. One of the requisites of an extradition treaty (RP-

HK Agreement) is that offenses are criminal in both places
(Double Criminality Rule). The crime of accepting an advantage
as an agent did not have an equivalent in the private sector.
Muoz should be charged not as a regular agent but as a public
servant or employee of the Philippine Government. The HKSAR
charge against him is one that deals with private sector bribery.
94. Manuel A. Roxas v. Jojomar C. Binay, P.E.T No. 004, 16
August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: On July 9, 2010, Manuel A. Roxas, protestant issued

initiated a protest against Jejomar C. Binay, protestee. The latter
became the Vice President duly elected in May 10, 2010 by a
margin of 727,084 votes. The protestant prayed that the
Honorable Tribunal take the necessary precautions to protect
and safeguard the integrity of all ballot boxes and conduct
Manual Audits as required by Section 29 of Republic Act No.
8436 as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. The protestee
submitted his answer by way of counter-protest whereby he
posited that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the protest
because it sought to invalidate the elections as a whole. He
prayed that preliminary hearing be held, and the protest
dismissed.

ISSUE/S: Does the tribunal have jurisdiction over the protest?

RULING: Yes, the Tribunal issued a Precautionary Protection

Order (PPO) and thereafter set the preliminary conference on
September 30, 2010. On September 24, 2012 the Tribunal held
another preliminary conference. The (Commission on Elections)
COMELEC scheduled the retrieval of the ballot boxes for use in
May 13, 2013. On May 9, 2016 the parties filed for candidacy for
presidency and on May 30, 2016 it proclaimed that Rodrigo R.
Duterte, President and Ma. Leonor G. Robredo as the Vice
President making the subject matter moot and academic.
95. Nilo B. Diongzon Vs. Atty. William Mirano, A.C. No. 2404, 17
August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Complainant retained the services of respondent lawyer

for all legal matters in connection with his fishing business.
Respondent oversaw the execution of two deeds of sale covering
boats which complainant was selling to the spouses Gonzales.
Sometime after, the spouses sued herein complainant for
replevin and damages, and sought the annulment of the
aforementioned deeds of sale. They were initially represented by
one Atty. Flora, an associate of respondent in his law office, but
then respondent eventually entered his appearance as the
counsel for the spouses against herein complainant.

ISSUES: Was the respondent lawyer guilty of representing

conflict of interest?

RULING: Yes. A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's

interests in the latter's business dealings is duty-bound to keep
the confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client
relationship had ended. If he represents any other party in a case
against his former client over a business deal he oversaw during
the time of their professional relationship, he is guilty of
representing conflicting interests, and should be properly
sanctioned for ethical misconduct.
96. Mary Jane G. Dy Chiao Vs. Sebastian Bolivar, et al., G.R. No.
192491, 17 August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was a subsidiary judgment debtor in a case

against respondent. Because the principal obligor had no assets
that could be levied on execution, the RTC (Branch 19) directed
the respondent to levy as much properties of the petitioner as
would be sufficient to satisfy the amount, and to sell the
properties at public auction. To fend off the public auction, the
petitioner filed a so-called Petition for Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. The case was raffled to the RTC (Branch 23) where
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, opining that the
processes being undertaken by the respondent were deemed
proceedings in the same civil case assigned to and still pending
before the RTC (Branch 19); and that the RTC (Branch 19)
continued to exercise general supervision and control over such
proceedings.
ISSUES: Was the denial of the petition for prohibition before the
RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction proper?

RULING: Yes. A losing party cannot seek relief from the

execution of a final judgment by bringing a separate action to
prevent the execution of the judgment against her by the
enforcing sheriff. Such action contravenes the policy on judicial
stability. She should seek the relief in the same court that issued
the writ of execution.

97. The Chairman and Executive Director, et al. Vs. Ejercito Lim,
et al., G.R. No. 183173. 24 August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Respondent was the operator of a domestic air carrier;

his business operation was primarily that of transporting live fish
from Palawan to fish traders. Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development (PCSD) issued A.O. No. 00-05 to ordain that
transport of fish from Palawan would only be allowed through
carriers who were accredited by PCSD. Respondent claims his
business is of the common carrier therefore exempt from
accreditation requirements. Resolution No. 03-211 amended A.O.
No. 00-05 that now required PCSD accreditation for all carriers
except those belonging to the government. Petitioner served two
(2) separate show cause orders to respondent which he denied
receiving.

ISSUE: Is the A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-
211; and the the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order null
and void for having been issued in excess of the PCSDs
authority?

RULING: No. The issuance of the assailed A.O. No. 00-05,

Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other issuances by the PCSD was
in the exercise of the agency's quasi-legislative powers. R.A. No.
No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for
Palawan. Towards this end, the PCSD was established as the
administrative machinery for the SEP' s implementation. The
creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 of R.A. No.
7611. The PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose
penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the
SEP and the other provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the
PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-211
was well within its statutory authority.

98. People of the Philippines v. Delia Camannong, G.R. No.

199497, 24 August 2016.

BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: Delia allegedly recruited five (5) persons for employment
abroad without first securing the necessary license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment. The offended
parties claimed that through the misrepresentation of accused-
appellant they parted with their money without receipt in the
hopes of employment abroad. They were never employed, thus
they brought a case for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

ISSUE: Is Delia guilty for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale? Will

the lack of receipt for the money supposedly given by petitioners
defeat their claim for actual damages?

RULING: Yes. Both the courts below unanimously found that the
accused-appellant had misrepresented to the complainants her
capacity to send workers abroad for employment. Believing her
misrepresentation, they parted with their money for her to
process their deployment papers. It was established that she did
not have the necessary license or authority to engage in
recruitment. The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the
lower courts.
No. It is true that actual damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must also be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty, for the courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages. Yet, in this case, despite the
complainants uniformly testifying that they had parted with their
money without asking for receipts, there seemed to be no dispute
about each of them having actually paid to the accused-appellant
that amount asked of them. To still deny them their right to
recover actual damages only because they had no receipts to
show for their payments would be a travesty of justice One of the
constant lessons from our experience as judges is that the non-
issuance of receipts by the illegal recruiters was also essential to
the scheme to defraud the victims. By all means, then, should the
lack of receipts not hinder the courts from vindicating the
victims of the fraud.
99. Emilio A. Aquino v. Carmelita Tangkengko, et al., G.R. No.
197356. 24 August 2016

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Aquino has filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the RTC
to recover custody over his minor child after the death of his
wife. The trial court has dismissed the petition observing that it
was for the best interest of the child for his custody to remain
with the maternal grandmother (respondents). The motion of
reconsideration of petitioner was denied due to lack of time and
the decision attained finality, undeterred, petitioner brought a
petition for relief from judgment for the nullification of RTCs
rulings contending that his motion for reconsideration was filed
on time. RTC denied the petition; the court is of the opinion that
the petition is a second motion for reconsideration that was
prohibited by the Rules of Court. Petitioner assailed the dismissal
of his petition in the Court of Appeals via a petition for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud and denial of
due process (Rule 47), the court denied his petition pointing out
infirmities therein and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
because his arguments has been judicially evaluated and passed
upon, and no compelling reason existed to change that.

ISSUES: Is the lower court correct in dismissing Aquinos

petition without touching on the merits of the case?

RULING: Yes, the court of appeals correctly and justly dismissed

the petition without touching the merits of the case. Petitioner
already brought a petition for relief under Rule 38 and thus
foreclosed his recourse for annulment of judgment under Rule
47. The ground of extrinsic fraud relied upon was available when
petitioner initiated the petition in the RTC; if he did not raise it
then, he is precluded from trying to raise it before the CA. The
ground of denial of due process is also untenable as the
petitioner actively participated in every stage of the proceedings
and was given reasonable opportunity and time to present
evidence and counter-evidence. The facts and merits of the case
were already tried with finality by the trial court and the SC does
not find any compelling reason to disturb the same.