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Rubias vs Batiller d. CA confirmed the decision of this Court which dismissed the
G.R. No. L-35702 May 29, 1973
Teehankee, J.
(Jeka)
Nature: An appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
dismissal order rendered by the Iloilo court of first instance after pre-trial and
submittal of the pertinent documentary exhibits.
Doctrine: With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming
the dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the lack of any rightful
claim or title of Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively judicially
determined.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the
ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu-99791
located in Barrio General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought
from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956
a. Complaint against its present occupant defendant, Isaias
Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot
2. Defendants counterclaim:
a. the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the
matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
always been in actual, open and continuous possession
since time immemorial
3. It was also found out that:
a. That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of
land located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of
Barotac.
b. Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the land
which was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of
Forestry and other oppositors.
c. The Court of First Instance heard the land registration case
on November 14, 1952, and after the trial this court
dismissed the application for registration.
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application for Registration filed by Francisco Militante.
Issue/s:
1. WON the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law,
the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-
99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of
his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in
dispute
2. WON the plaintiff is the real owner of the property in question.
Held: Yes and no.
Ratio:
1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established
plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of
the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question
was predicated on the sale thereof for P2,000.00 made in 1956 by
his father-in- law, Francisco Militante, in his favor, at a time when
Militante's application for registration thereof had already
been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals.
a. With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming
the dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the
lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was
conclusively and decisively judicially determined.
b. There was no right or title to the land that could be
transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in
favor of plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client
(assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown
above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected)
was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409,
paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts
"expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that
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"(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up
the defense of illegality be waived."
a. The Philippine Civil Code which does recognize the absolute
nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by
law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from
the beginning."
3. The lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's
motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged
purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged
cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against
defendant-appellant.
In re Intestate of the deceased Mauricia de Guzman.
PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. TRINIDAD
MACTAL, administratrix-appellee.
G.R. No. L-39720 ; April 4, 1934 -<NiLo>-
Doctrine: In order to bring the sale within the part of article 1459 (old civil code),
quoted above, it is essential that the proof submitted establish some agreement
between the buyer and administrator of the estated of the deceased to the effect
that buyer should buy the property for the benefit of administrator.If there was no
such agreement, either express or implied, then the sale cannot be set aside.
FACTS:
Nature of the case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija
1. The appellants Pedro, Catalina and Benigno Rodriguez, and the appellee
Trinidad Mactal, are all heirs of Mauricia de Guzman whose estate is under
administration of the CFI.
the appellee Trinidad Mactal was appointed as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Mauricia de Guzman.
2. Claims against the estate of de Guzman was approved by the court:
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- Irene de Gonzales and Isidro Gonzales- P3,050;
- Esperanza Fernandez and Fruto Aquino for P200;
- Philippine National Bank for P200.88, a total of P3,450.88
- fees of the members of the committee of claims which amounted
to P104.
3. Juliana del Rosario, the mother and guardian of the appellants, all of whom
were minors and under her care at that time and Trinidad Mactal executed
on July 6, 1922, a contract of lease of this same land to Timoteo de
Guzman,
4. The court authorized the administratrix to sell the land and was sold to
Silverio Choco for P4,000.
5. Silverio Choco sold the same land to the spouses PioVillar and Trinidad
Mactal for P4,500, who in turn mortgaged it to the Philippine National
Bank
The appellants allege that this sale was fictitious, that there was collusion
between Silverio Choco and Trinidad Mactal and that the former never paid the
latter the sum of P4,000.
The appellants rely on article 1459 of the Civil Code:
The following persons cannot take by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
2. An agent, any property of which the management or sale may have been
intrusted to him;
3. Executors, the property intrusted to their care;
The contentions of the appellants are founded on the following grounds:
1. They insist the administratrix bought the land indirectly through the
mediation of Silverio Choco and that both sales should be annulled under
the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code.
2. The appellants also allege that the order of the court authorizing the
administrator to sell the land in question is null and void due to the fact the
motion of Trinidad Mactal, praying that she be authorized to sell, was not
accompanied by the written consent of the heirs or their duly authorized
guardian.
ISSUE: Is the sale of the land valid based on the following grounds alleged by the
petitioner?
RULING:All the sale were valid.
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1. On the first ground alleged by the petitioner:
In order to bring the sale in this case within the part of article 1459,
quoted above, it is essential that the proof submitted establish some
agreement between Silverio Choco and Trinidad Mactal to the effect
that Choco should buy the property for the benefit of Mactal. If there
was no such agreement, either express or implied, then the sale
cannot be set aside. The evidence before this court does not
establish such agreement.
2. On the second ground alleged by the petitioner:
Appellants (petitioners) rely upon section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Where a testator has made no sufficient provision for the payment of
debts, the court on application of the administrator with the written consent of
the heirs may grant a license to the administrator to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber for that purpose real, if it clearly appears that such sale would be
beneficial to the persons interested and will not defeat any devise of land.
Supreme Court held that:
Said section was already amended by Act No. 3882, approved November
14, 1931, section 714 reads:
When there is no personal estate of the deceased or its sale would redound to the
detriment of the interests of the participants in the estate and the deceased has lef
no testamentary disposition for the payment of his debts
the court, on application of the executor or administrator, and on written
notice to the heirs, devisees, and other persons interested, may grant him
a license to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber for that purpose real
estate.
The last paragraph of this Act provides that it "shall take effect on its approval and
shall be applicable to all testamentary or intestate proceedings pending at the time
of its approval."
The record in this case shows that the intestate proceeding of Mauricia de
Guzman, deceased, is still pending in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija.
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The Supreme Court also added that the payments to the claims by
Gonzales, Fernandez, Aquino, and PNB, were all made afer the sale in
favor of SilverioChoco, conclusively prove that sale was not fictitious as
alleged by the appellants because it is beneficial to the persons interested.
The appealed order of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the appellants.
Theodore BRITANICO, Complainant vs. JUDGE WENIE D. ESPINOSA, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF DUMAGUETE CITY, BRANCH 42, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1568; December 29, 1928; P: Ostrand (Mickz)
Doctrine: A judge should restrain himself from participating in the sale of properties
it is incumbent upon him to advise the parties to discontinue the transaction if it is
contrary to law.
NATURE: An administrative complaint filed by Theodore C. Britanico against Judge
Wenie D. Espinosa
FACTS:
1. Sometime in June 1999 Theodore Britanico, complainant was introduced
to respondent and his wife, Eprol Z. Espinosa, because they were selling
beach properties.
2. Trusting in the stature of respondent as a judge, complainant agreed to buy
six parcels of land for P3,500,000 and made several downpayments
amounting to P100,000.
3. Complainant questioned the authenticity of the signatures of the lot
owners, aware that they were all living in the United States.
Respondent assured complainant of the regularity of the sale and
said that he was putting his position as judge on the line for the
transaction.
4. Upon closer scrutiny of the properties titles, complainant discovered that
the alienation of the properties within five years of the issuance of the
title was prohibited by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
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The certificates of title were issued on October 21, 1997. The
negotiations and initial payments were made in 1999 or within
two years of the issuance of the titles.
Complainant learned later on that the same properties were
being sold to another buyer.
This forced complainant to place a notice of adverse claim on the
titles to protect his interests over the properties.
5. In response to a referral by the Court Administrator the commented that:
the complaint are mere restatements of allegations filed before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City in a complaint for
swindling which was eventually dismissed for insufficient
evidence.
During the entire transaction with respondents wife,
complainant was aware of the nature of the properties being
sold.
Prior to complainants decision to buy the properties, he
examined and scrutinized the titles. He, therefore, cannot claim
that he was being deceived.
Respondent Judge admits the preparation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. He claims, however, that he made it at the
insistence of the complainant and that such was only a draft and
was not intended to formalize the transaction and that he was
also present at some of the meetings.
Respondent Judge also claimed that at the outset he did not know
anything about the nature of the subject properties since they
belonged to the family of his wife and he was not very particular
about them for ethical reasons.
6. Complainant in his reply affidavit countered that:
That the deed of absolute sale the respondent Judge prepared
was not a mere draft because the deed was already signed by all
of the owners of the properties when complainant received it.
alleged that the various documents attached by respondent as
Annexes "A" to "H" to his Joinder Affidavit were falsified
documents.
He further averred that respondents allegations on the return of
the down payments are inconsistent.
ISSUES:
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1. Is the respondend Judge guilty of participating in a sale to which he is
disqualified? Yes
2. Was the sale of the property prohibited by law? Yes
HELD:
1. Respondents act of drafing the Deed of Absolute Sale is highly improper
As a judge, he should know that the transaction being undertaken
was highly irregular since the certificates of title of the real
properties were issued as Free Patents, making the land subject to
the prohibition against sale for a period of five (5) years from
their date of issuance.
He did not call his wifes attention to the prohibition, but allowed
her to continue with the transaction and even accompanied her
to the meetings with complainant to discuss the terms of the sale.
The Deed of Absolute Sale prepared by respondent shows that it
was undated but one of its clauses contains the month and year,
November 2002 the time when the real properties could be
legally alienated.
His complicity in the transaction is indubitable. He even used his
position to lend credence to the transaction.
2. There is sufficient evidence to hold the respondent liable under the current
Canon 4 , Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities."
Respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, should have
restrained himself from participating in the sale of the properties.
In fact, it was incumbent upon him to advise the parties to
discontinue the transaction because it was contrary to law.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the deed of sale he
prepared was only a draf, it is still an act which pursued the
continuance of the sale. Being a judge, he should have taken
steps to prevent the sale, or at least he should have informed the
parties that the sale was illegal.
3. The sale of the property was prohibited by law.
The Original Certificate of Title was a Free Patent which on its face
cited Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 18, which prohibits
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alienation of the property within five years of the grant of the
patent.
The Free Patent was granted on October 21, 1997. Therefore, the
negotiations which took place and the down payments which
were made in 1999 were well within the prohibited period.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Wenie D. Espinosa is found guilty of
gross misconduct constituting a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of P20,000 and
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
respondent.
Osh
Doctrine: The prohibition to judges from acquiring properties in litigation applies
only where the sale takes place during the pendency of the litigation
Nature: PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
FACTS:
1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition
of conjugal properties.
2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.
3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for
lack of an appeal.
4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on
November 11, 1963.
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5. Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge
Asuncion's court while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters
was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. ArcadioGalapon.
6. On March 6, 1965, Dr. ArcadioGalapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E
to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, which particular portion
was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
7. On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc."
Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,
8. BernarditaMacariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with acts unbecoming of a judge.
9. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of
the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.
ISSUE:
1. Can a Judge Asuncion purchase the said lot despite the prohibition stated
in Article 1491 par. 5? YES.
HELD:
1. The prohibition applies only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
2. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property"
3. In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6,
1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties
therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period
4. The lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation..
5. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March
6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
ArcadioGalapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from
three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa afer the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.
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6. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent
was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two
aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
7. The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234
can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
effected and consummated long afer the finality of the aforesaid decision
or orders.
8. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
9. However, improper for him to have acquired the same.
He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach."