CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
MIDTERMS – PROVISIONS AND CASES
The 1973 Constitution
CASES
Aquino v. Enrile (1973)
Marcos’s proclamation of Martial law on September
23, 1973 was sustained by the Court.
PBA v. COMELEC (1985)
Calling of the snap presidential election was a political
question resolvable only by the sovereign electorate.
The 1987 Constitution
CASES
Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines v.
Aquino (1986)
“The people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is no
longer a de facto government, but in fact and in law a
de jure government.”
In Re Saturnino Bermudez (1986)
Petition for declaratory relief, clarifying who is being
referred to as the President and Vice President inder
sec. 7 of art XVII of the transitory provisions of the
proposed 1986 constitution DISMISSED OUTRIGHT
for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, as
the petitioners were after mere intellectual
satisfaction.
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
February 2, 1987. According to this constitution,
term of office of baranggay officials shall be
determined by law. Brgy election act of 1982, which
fixes the term of 6 years, should therefore govern,
until the term of office of brgy officials has been
determined by law.
II. THE CONCEPT OF STATE
Elements:
a. People (Art IV)
i. Citizens
RA 9139
Art. IV, sec. 1
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this constitution
(2) those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines
(3) those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
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citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
CASES
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commission on Immigration
(1971)
An alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
In Re Application for Admission to the Bar of
Vicente Ching (1999)
Ching, a legitimate child born under the 1935
constitution of a Filipino mother and alien father may
no longer validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years
after reaching the age of majority.
In Re Florencio Mallare (1974)
Esteban Mallare, natural child of a Filipina mother, is
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, his son, Florencio, is also a Filipino.
Therefore, his name should not be stricken out from
the roll of attorneys on issues of citizenship.
Aznar v. COMELEC (1990)
Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmena
had lost Filipino citizenship by any of the modes in CA
no. 63, like naturalization in a foreign country, express
renunciation of citizenship, subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to the consti of a foreign country.
Furthermore, his father is a Filipino. His certificate of
alien registration as an American citizen doesn’t mean
he’s not still a Filipino, when there is no renunciation,
express or implied. He’s an Osmena. (at sya dahilan
bakit bopols ung unang recit ko!)
ii. natural-born citizens
Art. IV, sec. 2
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
CASES
Co v. HRET (1991)
Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would have resulted in absurdity,
because he was already a Filipino citizen at age 9, his
mother being a natural born citizen, and his father
being naturalized when he was that age.
Bengzon III v. HRET (2000)
Private respondent can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship after he became an American citizen.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. Respondent is deemed to have recovered
his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
iii. loss and reacquisition
RA 8171
Art. IV, sec. 3
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
CASES
Bengzon III v. HRET (2000)
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
CA no. 63 enumerates 3 modes of reacquiring
Philippine citizenship by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, (3) by direct act of
Congress.
Labo v. COMELEC (1989)
Petitioner, having voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and knowingly embraced
Australian citizenship, can not claim to have
reacquired Filipino citizenship when his Australian
citizenship was annulled, as it turned out that his
marriage to the Aussie girl was bigamous.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
Frivaldo, a natural-born citizen who re-assumed
citizenship on the very day the office of the governor
began was qualified to be proclaimed and to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. His
repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for
candidacy, such retroactivity being curative or
remedial in nature.
Valles v. COMELEC (2000)
Private respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. We follow the
principle of jus sanguinis, whereby it is the nationality
of the parents which is controlling. Private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
filipno father. The fact of her being born in Australia is
not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, she is not disqualified from running for
governor.
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago (1989)
Petitioner’s act of renewing his Portuguese citizenship
despite his naturalization as Philippine citizen
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amounts to his declaring his nationality as
Portuguese. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing
acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship. He cannot claim it to save him from
deportation. Philippine citizenship is not a commodity
to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
Republic v. Guy (1982)
Having been convicted by final judgment of the crime
of perjury, a crime involving moral turpitude,
committed during the pendency of his petition for
naturalization, appellant cannot now claim that he was
of good moral character at the time his petition for
naturalization was still pending adjudication by the
court. Hence, his having been able to obtain
Philippine citizenship despite this misconduct,
rendered his acquisition thereof fraudulent or illegal.
Granting that it was not, judgments granting
citizenship are not res judicata, and his naturalization
may be cancelled because of his conviction of rape.
Jao v. Republic (1983)
Repatriation by judicial proceedings is null and void.
iv. effect of marriage
Art. IV, sec.4
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
v. dual allegiance
Art. IV, sec. 5
Dual allegiance of citizens in inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
CASE
Mercado v. Manzano (1999)
In including sec. 5 in art. IV, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens
per se but with the naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, “dual citizenship” in RA
no. 7160 and 7854 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance”. Persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification (to run for office).
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be
subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
b. Territory – Art. I

c. Government
i. Definition – EO 292, secs 1, 2,
4, 10
ii. de jure and de facto
governments
CASES
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
Kinds of de facto government:
1. government that gets possession of, or
usurps, by force if the voice of majority, the
rightful legal government and maintains itself
against the will of the latter.
2. that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war –
government of paramount force
3. that which is established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country
whose rise in insurrection against the parent
state
In re Saturnino Bermudez (1986)
Petition for declaratory relief, clarifying who is being
referred to as the President and Vice President inder
sec. 7 of art XVII of the transitory provisions of the
proposed 1986 constitution DISMISSED OUTRIGHT
for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
The Arroyo government is de jure government.
In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno
(1992)
The new Court of Appeals established under EO #33
was an entirely new Court. As head of a new
revolutionary government, Aquino can disregard any
precedence or seniority ranking in the former Court.
Estrada v. Desierto (2001)
Discussion of de facto and de jure governments not
important because Arroyo’s rise to power was intra-
constitutional, unlike Aquino’s.
iii. constituent and ministrant
functions
CASE
ACCFA v. CUGCO (1969)
Implementation of the land reform program, by
compelling urgency of social justice, is not an optional
but a compulsory function of sovereignty.
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iv. Parens Patriae
CASE
Gov’t of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad
(1916)
Government has a right to file a case for the State as
parens patriae or guardian of the rights of the people
in representation of the legitimate claiamants.
d. sovereignty
CASES
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
General MacArthur’s proclamation that all laws,
regulations, and processes of any other government
other than that of the Commonwealth are null and
void doesn’t include judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts of justice which do not have political
complexion.
Macariola v. Asuncion (1992)
Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting judges
from engaging in commerce was political in nature
and so was automatically abrogated with the end of
Spanish rule in the country.
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff (1946)
The rule suspending political laws affects only the
civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and is not
intended to bind enemies in arms. Thus, members of
the armed forces continued to be covered by the
National Defense Act, the Articles of War and other
laws relating to the Armed forces during the Japanese
occupation.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons (1945)
Judicial decisions are valid during the occupation and
even beyond except those of political complexion,
which are automatically annulled upon the restoration
of the legitimate authority. Thus, a person convicted
of treason against the Japanese Imperial Forces was,
after occupation, entitled to be released in the ground
that the sentence imposed in him for his political
offense has ceased to be valid.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons (1945)
The Constitution of the Commonwealth, being a
political law, was not effective in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation.
State Immunity
Art. XVI, sec. 3
The State may not be sued without its consent.
i. Characterization of Suit
CASES
 Begosa v. Chairman, Phil Veterans Admin (1970)
The doctrine of non-suability has no application where
the suit against a functionary had to be instituted
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed
by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of,
plaintiff or petitioner. In this case, plaintiff sought to
obtain the benefits he was entitled to under the
Veterans’ Bill of Rights.
Republic v. Feliciano (1987)
The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent
herein, is directed against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency. The doctrine of nonsuability of
the State has proper application when the plaintiff has
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as
defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to
court just like any private person who is claimed to be
usurping a piece of property.
ii. Rationale for immunity
CASES
Sanders v. Veridiano (1988)
The acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. As they have acted on behalf of
that government, and within the scope of their
authority, it is that government that is responsible for
their acts. Assuming claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be
satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as
their principal.
US v. Guinto (1990)
Unless proven that the petitioners in these cases
have acted in discharge of their official functions as
officers or agents of the US, the US, which has not
given its consent to be sued, cannot answer for their
personal torts.
The Holy See v. Rosario (1994)
The determination of the executive arm of the
government that an instrumentality is entitled to
diplomatic immunity is a political question. The Holy
See, being a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the
Philippines, is exempt from local jurisdiction and is
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in the country.
iii. Waiver of immunity
Act no. 3083
CA no. 327, as amended by PD 1445
CASES
Sayson v. Singson (1973)
Mandamus is not the correct remedy in a money
claim against the government. This is a suit against
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the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by
the Court except with the consent of the State. The
respondent should have filed his claim with the
General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com.
Act 327, which prescribe the conditions under which
money claim against the government may be filed
Republic v. Purisima (1977)
Waiver made by the lawyer for the Rice and Corn
Administration is not binding upon the State because
the express consent of the State to be sued must be
embodied in a duly enacted statute and may not be
given by a mere counsel of the government.
Amigable v. Cuenca (1972)
Plaintiff may sue government for recovery of the value
of her land which has been taken by the government
without just compensation even though she had not
previously filed her claim with the Auditor General as
normally required. Immunity from suit cannot be
invoked to perpetrate injustice.
Ministerio v. City of Cebu (1971)
When the government takes property without going
through the process of expropriation, they cannot
claim government immunity as this would then
become an instrument of perpetrating injustice on a
citizen.
Santiago v. Republic (1978)
Plaintiff may sue government for revocation of his
donation when it did not comply with the stipulated
conditions. The suit could prosper because it did not
involve a money claim against the State.
Lim v. Brownell (1960)
When the government files a complaint in intervention
to join the defendant in invoking the doctrine of State
immunity to secure a dismissal of an action, it doesn’t
impliedly waive its immunity, because it didn’t ask for
affirmative relief; it merely intervened for the purpose
of resisting the plaintiff.
US v. Ruiz (1985)
Suability would follow only if the contract is entered
into by the government in its proprietary capacity.
Governmental contracts do not result in implied
waiver of the immunity.
Republic v. Villasor (1973)
Writ of execution against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a judgment
rendered against the Philippine Government was held
invalid. The State may not be sued without its
consent, and corollarily, public funds cannot be the
object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent
to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged.
iv. Suits against government
agencies
CASES

Phil. National Railways v. IAC (1993)
The Philippine National Railways does not enjoy
immunity from suit. Not all government entities are
immune from suit. Immunity is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was
organized. When the government enters into a
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other private
corporation. It would be unjust if the heirs of the
victims of an alleged negligence of the PNR
employees could not sue them for damages. PNR is
subject to obligations of persons engaged in a private
enterprise. It is not performing a governmental
function.
National Irrigation Administration v. Fontanilla
(1991)
The National Irrigation Administration is a government
agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency
of the government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its
driver who was not its special agent.
SSS v. CA (1983)
SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can
sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be
sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal
action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it
claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity
performing governmental functions, by virtue of the
explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the
Government must be deemed to have waived
immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability. Whether the SSS
performs governmental or proprietary functions thus
becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver,
a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives.
v. Suability v. liability
CASE
Meritt v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands (1916)
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the
Jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. The State is only liable
for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents (one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent. (in short,
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defendant was allowed to sue the Government but
was unable to hold it liable)
III. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
i. Separation of powers
CASE
Springer v. Government of the Philippines (1928)
Acts of the Philippine legislature creating a coal
company and a bank, providing that the power to vote
the stock shall be vested in the Governor-general, the
President of the Senate, and the House of
representatives, violate the doctrine of separation of
powers because voting of the stock in the election of
directors and managing agents of the corporations is
an executive function. It cannot be reposed in
legislative officers.
Angara v. Electoral Commission (1936)
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between departmental powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.
ii. Non-delegation doctrine
CASES
Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)
Tests of a valid delegation of legislative power: Law
must:
a. be complete in itself – it must set forth
therein the policy t be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate
b. to fix a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable – to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Without these tests, it would not be possible to
determine whether the delegate is acting within the
scope of his authority, and may easily arrogate to
himself the power to make or unmake a law.
US v. Ang Tang Ho (1922)
Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-
General to fix the price at which rice should be sold,
and, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying, out the
purposes of the Act is an unconstitutional delegation
of power, inasmuch as by its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-
General.
People v. Rosenthal (1939)
“Public interest” is sufficient standard to guide the
Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits. The intention of the Blue skies
law is to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of the blue sky”
Ynot v. IAC (1987)
The executive order is an invalid delegation of power.
It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
Rodriguez v. Gella (1953)
Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorized the President
"during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
the Act." To be constitutional, this Act must be
construed to be for the limited period fixed or implied
therein. Express repeal is not necessary; otherwise it
would be unconstitutional since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter attempts to
do so, the President may wield his veto, making it
easier for the Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back.
Araneta v. Dinglasan (1949)
Executive orders nos. 62, 192, 225, and 226 were
issued without authority, them being issued after CA
no. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session on May 25, 1948.
Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)
There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative
power in conferring on the president the power to
merge administrative regions. In conferring on the
President the power to merge regions, congress
merely followed the pattern set forth in previous
legislation. The choice of the president as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions
is intended to facilitate not only the administration of
local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires to have regional
offices. Also, a legislative standard need not be
6
expressed. It may be implied. It need not be found in
the law challenged because it may already be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject.
People v. Dacuycuy (1989)
By providing for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a
maximum duration, there is undue delegation of
legislative power. Courts should not be given a wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment.
iii. Amendments and revision
CASES
Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967)
Submission of certain proposed constitutional
amendments at a plebiscite scheduled in the same
day as the regular elections was held to be valid.
Nothing in the constitution indicates that the election
referred to is a special, not general election. The
circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification on special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Tolentino v. COMELEC (1967)
Advanced plebiscite on the proposal to lower the
voting age from 21 to 18 was prohibited by the SC.
Constitution speaks of an ELECTION. Singular.
Meaning, the entire Constitution must be submitted
for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the
people were not given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time
no idea yet of what the rest of the Constitution would
ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess
the proposed amendment in the light of the entire
document.
Javellana v. Executve Secretary (1973)
Petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid the ratification of the 1973 Constitution were
dismissed. The Court concluded: "This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. "It
could even be said that there was a need for it. It
served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that
as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution
came into force and effect. Thereafter, as a matter of
law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution
is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. Since
then, this Court has invariably applied the 1973
Constitution.
Occena v. COMELEC (1981)
The Interim Batasang Pambansa had the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution. Whether
they are revisions or amendments doesn’t matter, as
they will be submitted to the people for ratification
anyway. In proposing amendments, only a majority
vote is needed
. amendments on national and local legislation, and not
Almario v. Alba (1984)
SC denied postponement of the plebiscite of the 1984
constitutional amendments, holding that 67 seven
days for the amendment of section 11 and 42 days for
the amendment of section 12, art. XIV was enough
time.
Proposal
Art. XVIi, sec. 1
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed by:
(1) the Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or
(2) a constitutional convention
CASE
Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967)
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of
the inherent powers of the people as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to
make, and hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution - they are the very source of all
powers of government, including the Constitution
itself.
Direct proposal
Art. XVII, sec. 2
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
CASE
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC (1997)
The right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative cannot be exercised if Congress doesn’t
implement for its implementation. RA 6735, which
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intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is inadequate to
cover the system. Apparently, its attention is on
on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Constitutional convention
Art. XVII, sec. 3
The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
members, call a constitutional convention, or by a
majority vote of all its members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
CASE
Tolentino v. COMELEC (1967)
A Constitutional Convention is supreme within the
domain of its legitimate authority. However, the acts
of the convention, its officers, and members are not
immune from attack of Constitutional grounds.
Though it is not subject to any degree of restraint or
control by any other authority than itself, it cannot
rightfully deprive any person of his rights in disregard
of the Bill of Rights in the existing Constitution. In
upholding its jurisdiction over this case, it doesn’t
mean that the Court is superior to the Convention. It’s
just that they are both subject to the Constitution and
the rule of law.
Plebiscite requirement
Art. XVII, sec. 4
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Any amendment under section 2 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the commission on elections of the sufficiency of
the petition.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
i. democracy and republicanism
Art. II, sec. 1.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
ii. renunciation of war as instrument of
national policy
 CASE belongs to the PNP. The Marines render nothing
more than assistance required in conducting the
Lim v. Executive Secretary (2002) patrols.

Art. II, sec. 2 v. protection of the people

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy,
iii. the incorporation clause
Art. II, sec. 2, con’t
... adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
CASES
Lim v. Executive Secretary (2002)
The Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but also when it runs counter to an act of
Congress. US forces are prohibited from engaging in
an offensive war in our territory; but WON they are
engaged in a war under the guise of the Balikatan
exercises is a fact that the SC can’t take judicial
notice of.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (2000)
The Court will not tolerate the least disregard of the
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law
or treaty. Between a citizen’s basic right to due
process and the government’s ironclad duties under a
treaty, the Court upholds the former.
Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources (1995)
The government adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law. Being a member of the
UN and a party to the Convention on the privileges
and immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
UN, it adheres to the doctrine of State immunity
granted to the UN and its specialized agencies.
Therefore, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over
this case for illegal dismissal filed against the
UNRFNRE.
Art. II, sec. 4
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
Art. II, sec. 5
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
vi. separation of Church and State
Art. II, sec. 6
The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
vii. independent foreign policy
Art. II, sec. 7
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
viii. freedom from nuclear weapons
Art. II, sec. 8
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.
CASES
BAYAN v. Executive Secretary (2000)
Sorry talaga, di ko pa rin makuha yung konek. Mukha
naming di siya super important kasi di naman nag-
dwell sa kanya si sir.

iv. civilian supremacy ix. promotion of social justice

Art. II, sec. 3
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the
protector of the people of the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory.
CASE
IBP v. Zamora (2000)
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling
of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines is limited. The real authority still
Art. II, sec. 9
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social
order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard
of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Art. II, sec. 10
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
x. respect for human rights
Art. II, sec. 11

8
The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xi. recognition of the sanctity of family
life
Art. II, sec. 12
The State recognizes the sanctity if family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
CASES
Silva v. CA (1997)
Provisions of the Constitution address both legitimate
and illegitimate relationships. In all cases involving a
child, his interests are always of paramount
consideration. Thus, petitioner was rightly awarded
visitation rights over his children, as long as he
doesn’t take them out without the consent of their
mother (babaero kasi siya and nagsusugal)
Hernandez v. CA (1999)
The dismissal of the annulment case was proper.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its validity. Expert
testimony has not been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage.
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that her ties
with the company were dissolved principally because
of the company's policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
xiv. advancement of the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology
Art. II, sec. 16
The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
CASES
Oposa v. Factoran (1993)
The issue of WON to grant timber licenses is
justiciable, basing on sec. 16, linked with the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala (1997)
There is good reason to deny the reinstatement of
petitioner’s timber licenses as this could negate
efforts to conserve forest resources. This is not a
new policy; it is merely a reiteration of conservation
and protection contained in the Constitution.

xii. recognition of the role of the youth

Art. II, sec. 13
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.

xiii. recognition of fundamental equality

before law
Art. II, sec. 14
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.

CASE

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. NLRC

(1997)
Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women