G.R. No.
L-16456 June 29, 1963 conformably to the doctrine expressed in the case
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES COQUIA, defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
From an incident which occurred on July 1, 1957, one
David C. Naval filed with the Municipal Court of the City
of Naga a complaint for grave oral defamation against the
herein defendant-appellee, Dolores Coquia. Thereafter
and by virtue of that complaint, the same court ordered
her arrest. On July 22, 1957, however, the same court
forwarded the records of the case to the Court First
Instance of Camarines Sur for the continuance of the
proceedings since the accused had renounced her right
to the second stage of preliminary investigation. In turn,
on August 2, 1957, the last mentioned court endorsed the
case to the Office of the City Attorney for reinformation.
For some explained reasons, the case was left completely
unacted on by the City Fiscal's office until January 26,
1959 when the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur the corresponding,
information for grave oral defamation against the
accused, appellee herein.
The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
prescription which was opposed by the prosecution
Ruling on the motion, the court a quo sustained the
movant and dismissed the case. A motion for
reconsideration therefor having been denied, the City
Attorney, represented by the Solicitor General's Office,
appealed to this Court.1wph1.t
The Solicitor General concedes that the delay in the filing
of the information for this case had been unduly long.
Quite subtly even, the concession extends to an
admission that prescription had indeed set in. It was
expressed, however, that the instant appeal was
nevertheless interposed so that a ruling may be secured
as to the precise period when a criminal proceeding
should be considered as having been "unjustifiably
stopped to mark the resumption of the running of the
period of prescription" pursuant to the provisions of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, hereunder quoted:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.
The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant a
resolution of the issue raised. It is sufficient to indicate and
of People v. Juan del Rosario, G. R. No. L-15140,
December 29, 1960, the prescriptive period for the case
at bar was never interrupted. In the said case, We
declared that
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light
offenses prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the
same Code provides that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day
on which the crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him." The complaint or information
referred to in the above provisions which
interrupts the running of the prescriptive period,
as ruled in the case of People v. Tayco (73 Phil.
509), is that which is filed in the proper court and
not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the
offended party in the Fiscal's Office . . . .
It should be recalled that the proper court in the present
litigation was the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur. The records of this case clearly show that no formal
complaint or information is contemplated by the
aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was ever
filed therein within the reglementary period. As a matter
of fact, the said formal complaint or information was filed
only after the lapse of more than one year. Considering
that under the Code, the prescriptive period for grave oral
defamation is six months (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code),
the only conclusion deducible is that the same has
prescribed.
Applying the principle laid down in the aforecited case of
People v. Del Rosario, supra, We can not speak of the
resumption of the prescriptive period since it has never
been interrupted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by the Government is
hereby dismissed and the order dismissing the
information is hereby affirmed in full. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-22465 February 28, 1967
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
ASCENSION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is the second time the present case is brought on
appeal to this Supreme Court on the identical issue of
prescription.
The antecedents of this case are briefly stated in the
decision of the previous appeal (L-13027):
 Defendant 'Ascension P. Olarte is charged with
libel. It is alleged in the information that on or
about the 24th day of February, 1954 and
subsequently thereafter said defendant had
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously written certain
letters which were libelous, contemptuous and
derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, 'with
evident and malicious purpose of insulting,
dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into
contempt the good name and reputation' of said
complainant.
It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris
lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan, who assigned it
to an assistant provincial fiscal; that upon the
latter's advice, on February 22, 1956, she filed
with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against
Ascencion P. Olarte that the defendant waived
her right to a preliminary investigation,
whereupon the justice of the peace court
forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, in which the corresponding
information was filed on July 3, 1956; that the
defendant seasonably moved to quash the
information upon the ground of prescription of the
offense; and that, after due hearing, the court of
first instance granted said motion and dismissed
the case, with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal
by complainant Miss Meris with the conformity of
the special counsel of the office of the provincial
fiscal of Pangasinan, who represented the
prosecution in said court.
This Court, likewise, stated in said previous appeal:
It is conceded that, as provided in Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, 'the crime of libel ... shall
prescribe in two (2) years, which, pursuant to
Article 91 of the same Code, 'shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information ....' In an affidavit,
attached to the complaint filed with the justice of
the peace court, Miss Meris stated that one
defamatory letter was received by her on
February 27, 1954 and that there were other
libelous letters, seemingly written after the first.
According to another affidavit, likewise, attached
to said complaint, the subsequent letters were
received on or about March 1 and 13, April 26 and
May 9, 1954. The issue in the lower court, as well
as in this appeal, is whether the statute of
limitations was suspended by the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace court on
February 22, 1956, as claimed by appellant, or
continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the
information was filed with the court of first
instance, as contended by the defendant. His
Honor, the trial Judge adopted the latter
alternative, and, accordingly, held that the
prescriptive period had expired before the filing of
said information. (Emphasis supplied)
Resolving the issue thus posed on the basis of the
abovequoted facts, this Court, speaking through the then
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Roberto
Concepcion, and after an extensive and exhaustive
dissertation on the applicable laws and pertinent
decisions on the subject, rendered a decision,
promulgated on June 30, 1960, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is our
considered opinion that the filing of the
complainant with the justice of the peace court of
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running
of the statute of limitations, as regards the crime
of libel with which defendant herein is charged,
and that said crime has not been extinguished,
therefore, by prescription, for which reason the
order appealed from is reversed, and the records
of this case are hereby remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings, conformably with
law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The above ruling became final and executory, and,
pursuant thereto, the lower court set the case for hearing
on the merits and the prosecution started presenting its
evidence. However, on August 26, 1963, the defense
presented anew a motion to quash the information,
supplemented by another motion of September 5, 1963,
on the ground of prescription of the offense charged in the
information. In said motions, the defense invoked the
subsequent ruling of this Court in the case of People vs.
Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, promulgated on June 29,
1963. On November 4, 1963, the prosecution opposed
said motions. The defense submitted its reply on
November 13, 1963.
After due hearing on this incident, the lower court issued
the appealed order, dated January 16, 1964, sustaining
the defense's new motion to quash upon the ground of
prescription. In this order, the lower court, after comparing
and finding that the set of facts obtaining in the case at
bar is practically identical with those of the Coquia case,
opined that inasmuch as the latter is inconsistent with or
contradicts the previous decision
(L-13027) in the case at bar, promulgated on June 30,
1960, the 1963 ruling in the Coquia case indicates that
this Supreme Court intended to abandon the one made in
1960 in the first appeal of this same case (L-13027).
Not satisfied, the prosecution (special counsel of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the
private prosecutor jointly) interposed the present appeal
to this Court on a pure question of law.
The complainant Miss Meris through her private
prosecutor, filed her brief. Subsequently, the Solicitor
General, in representation of plaintiff-appellant People of
the Philippines, instead of filing a brief, filed, on August
18, 1964, a manifestation, stating to the effect that they
are submitting the case without any brief, said
complainant having filed a brief in her behalf; and that
they are of the opinion that the order of the lower court
dismissing the case was well taken. In view of this
manifestation, defendant-appellee presented, on
September 7, 1964, a motion to dismiss the appeal.
This Court, by resolution dated October 2, 1964, denied
said motion for the present.
Defendant-appellee moved to reconsider said denial but
this Court, in its resolution of October 21, 1964, overruled
the defendant's motion.1wph1.t
Thereafter, said defendant-appellee filed her brief and the
case was submitted for decision.
The only issue presented for determination in this appeal
is the effect of this Court's ruling on the first appeal to this
very same case (L-13027) and whether the decision in the
later case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, June
29, 1963, warrants the dismissal of the information in the
case at bar on the ground of prescription.
Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered
on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and,
even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or
modified since it has become final long ago. A subsequent
reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases
but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined (People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May
30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. (21 C.J.S. 330). (cited in Pinuila
case, supra)
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of
the same case is held to be the law of the case
whether that decision is right or wrong, the
remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing (5
C.J.S. 1277). (also cited in Pinuila case)
It is also aptly held in another case that:
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court,
being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of
all legal question properly brought before it and
that its decision in any given case constitutes the
law of that particular case. Once its judgment
becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts,
and hence beyond their power and authority to
alter or modify. (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962).
More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court
in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, 1,14284-85, February
24, 1960:
It will be seen that the prisoner's stand assumes
that doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court
operate retrospectively, and that they can claim
the benefit of decisions in People vs. Hernandez;
People vs. Geronimo, and People vs.
Dugonon (L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; L-8936, Oct.
31, 1956; and L-8926, June 29, 1957,
respectively), promulgated four or more years
after the prisoner applicants had been convicted
by final judgment and started serving sentence.
However, the rule adopted by this Court (and by
the Federal Supreme Court) is that judicial
doctrines have only prospective operation and do
not apply to cases previously decided (People vs.
Pinuila, L-11374, promulgated May 30, 1958.)
In the foregoing decision, furthermore, this Court quoted
and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts
from People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, jam cit.:
'The decision of this Court on that appeal by the
government from the order of dismissal, holding
that said appeal did not place the appellants,
including Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy,
signed and concurred in by six justices as against
three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice,
promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long
become the law of the case. It may be erroneous,
judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently
interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may
not be disturbed and modified. Our recent
interpretation of the law may be applied to new
cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and
conclusively determined. As already stated, the
majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of
the case.'
The same principle, the immutability of the law of the case
notwithstanding subsequent changes of judicial opinion,
has been followed in civil cases:
Fernando vs. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585;
Padilla vs. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884;
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, L-
7252, February, 1955.
It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this
Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final
ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication
was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in
nature.
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription
discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds
that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace
(or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the
prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte L-13027, June 30,
1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106,
October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.
Another series of decisions declares that to produce
interruption the complaint or information must have been
filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case
on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December
29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the
case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely,
or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third,
it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that
the interrupted prescription " shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the
court in which the complaint or information is filed must
have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely,
the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or
acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court
should discharge the accused because no prima
facie case has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby
overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.
And it having been finally decided in the previous appeal
that the criminal action here was not barred, the issue of
prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that remains is to
try and decide the case on the merits. It is expected that
it will be done with the utmost dispatch, this case having
been already pending for many years.
Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set
aside and reversed, and the records of this case ordered
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
conformably with this decision. With costs against
defendant-appellee.
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE
MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals
and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the state of time,
effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law
expressly requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation.
This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the
accused to wager on the result of his appeal that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an
"escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate
court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated,
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within
the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and
P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General
Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to control
his outburst and blurted
You employees in this office are
all tanga, son of a bitches (sic),
bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga
anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . .
God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of
multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on
four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner
guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5)
cases filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206,
105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison
term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime
committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz,
Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,
plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim.
Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended
party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting
on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the
Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br.
59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated in his favor a
mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or
obfuscation. Thus
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he
uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been
angry and worried "about some missing
documents . . . as well as the letter of the
Department of Tourism advising ASPAC
about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . .
. . " the said defamatory words must have
been uttered in the heat of anger which is
a mitigating circumstance analogous to
passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a
STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment
. . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set
for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. Butbefore he
could be arrested petitioner filed an application for
probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition
on the following grounds
Initially, the Court notes that the
petitioner has failed to comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No.
28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation of
the circular is sufficient cause for
dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege
anywhere in the petition that he had
asked the respondent court to reconsider
its above order; in fact, he had failed to
give the court an.opportunity to correct
itself if it had, in fact, committed any error
on the matter. He is, however, required to
move for reconsideration of the
questioned order before filing a petition
for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is
a ground for dismissal of his petition
(Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA
823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA
18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent
court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise
of power in denying the petitioner's
application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was
filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows
the trial court to grant probation after conviction, upon an
application by the defendant within the period of appeal,
upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each
case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal
has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each
ground and seeks this Court's compassion in dispensing
with the minor technicalities which may militate against his
petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet
lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his
appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for
his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of
the benefits of the Probation Law because the original
Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that
he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends
that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court
precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties
imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to
qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still
qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his
conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except
with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its
benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included.
Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state
which may be granted by the court to a seemingly
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of
which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative
granted by law to a person or group of persons not
enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court
which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any of
the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed,
and no person should benefit from the terms of the law
who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which
clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado
v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted
provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such,
the application of the law should not be subjected to any
to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an
appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to
within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not
yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing which tinge words as to
law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice give them the color of a
Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. particular judicial theory
Court of Appeals are not only
unnecessary but
. . . we note at the outset that Probation decidedly harmful. That
Law is not a penal statute. We, however, which has caused so
understand petitioner's argument to be much confusion in the
really that any statutory language that law, which has made it
appears to favor the accused in acriminal so difficult for the public
case should be given.a "liberal to understand and know
interpretation." Courts . . . have no what the law is with
authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" respect to a given
or "the spirit of the law" where the words matter, is in
of the statute themselves, andas considerable measure
illuminated by the history of that statute, the unwarranted
leave no room for doubt or interpretation. interference by judicial
We do not believe that "the spirit ofthe tribunals with the
law" may legitimately be invoked to set at English language as
naught words which have a clear and found in statutes and
definite meaning imparted to them by our contracts, cutting the
procedural law. The "true legislative words here and inserting
intent" must obviously be given effect by them there, making
judges and all others who are charged them fit personal ideas
with the application and implementation of what the legislature
of a statute. It is absolutely essential to ought to have done or
bear in mind, however, that the spirit of what parties should
the law and the intent that is to be given have agreed upon,
effect are derived from the words actually giving them meanings
used by the law-maker, and not from which they do not
some external, mystical or metajuridical ordinarily have cutting,
source independent of and transcending trimming, fitting,
the words of the legislature. changing and coloring
until lawyers themselves
The Court is not here to be understood are unable to advise
as giving a "strict interpretation" rather their clients as to the
than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the meaning of a given
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by statute or contract until it
P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are has been submitted to
adjectives which too frequently impede a some court for its
disciplined and principled search for the interpretation and
meaning which the law-making authority construction.
projected when it promulgated the
language which we must apply. That The point in this warning may be
meaning is clearly visible in the text of expected to become sharper as our
Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as people's grasp of English is steadily
the nose on a man's face. The Courtis attenuated. 12
simplyreading Section 4 as it is in fact
written. There is no need for the involved Therefore, that an appeal should notbar the accused
process of construction that petitioner from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to
invites us to engage in, a process made reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and
necessary only because petitioner express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as
rejects the conclusion or meaning which amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no
shines through the words of the statute. application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
The first duty of the judge is to take and the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
apply a statute as he finds it, not as he of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said
would likeit to be. Otherwise, as this
Court in Yangco v. Court of First By its very language, the Rule is
Instance warned, confusion and mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
uncertainty will surely follow, making, we construction. negative words and
might add, stability and continuity in the phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
law much more difficult to achieve: while those in the affirmative are merely
directory. . . . the use of the term "shall"
. . . [w]here language is further emphasizes its mandatory
plain, subtle refinements character and means that it is imperative,
 operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should
not distinguish; where the law does not make exception
the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the
MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no
need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed
against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the
sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an
applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for,
nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple
prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of
the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation
Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to
probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.
The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the
penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as
amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says
that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to
those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to
take each penalty separately and distinctly with the
others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to
have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1)
day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to
serve the prison term for "each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and
in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged
with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on
four (4) different, separate days, he was stilleligible for
probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was
probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years
imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption
that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a
risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated
capability for serious wrong doing but because of the
gravity and serious consequences of the offense they
might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended,
disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave
felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The
Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who
have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single
proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence,
the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of
the offense committed and the concomitant degree of
penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term
not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered
callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who
is convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen (13)
counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed
thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to
a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who
has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six
(6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as
minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter
offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing
of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that
under the MeTC Decision he could not have availed of the
benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he
did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for
probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner,
however erroneous it may be, that the penalties imposed
against him should be summed up, still he would not have
qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if
the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen
(16) times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10)
years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the
limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the
Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months
multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided
by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence,
following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible
for probation as the total of his penalties exceeds six (6)
years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be
multiplied only four (4) times since there are only four (4)
Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for
probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to
understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot
be any clearer "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in
the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the
imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand,
the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely
reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the
MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating
circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave
oral defamationThere is no valid reason therefore why
the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied
only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering
that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the
culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds
the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in
his favor the mitigating circumstance
which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences
the said accused in each case to a
straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
 imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay
the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted
at that the accused was acquitted or absolved in any of
the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons,
or that any part of thejudgment of conviction was
reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was
dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the
twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can
we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction
rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification
on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should
not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of
all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have
immediately filed an application for probation as he was
already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if
indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit
his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the
MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or
even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to
assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that
petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the
sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him
eligible for probation since he was already qualified
under the MeTC Decision but rather to insist on his
innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other
purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he
raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly
committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in
finding that the guilt of the accused has been established
because of his positive identification by the witness for the
prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the
bare statements of the private complainants despite the
absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not
acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently,
petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in
relying on his positive identification considering that
private complainants could not have missed identifying
him who was their President and General Manager with
whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner
further argued that although the alleged defamatory
words were uttered in the presence of other persons,
mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients,
not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence,
according to petitioner, the trial court could not have
convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative
testimony of private complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote
profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence,
and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the
penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never
manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of
correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within the
probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal,
more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner
should be precluded from seeking probation. By
perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished
his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law the
purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who although
already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but
doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of
his conviction by the RTC to the Court of Appeals does
not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was
solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid
that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties,
which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision
had already become final and executory because of the
negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who
failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed
by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset
petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as
each of the four (4) Informations filed against him charged
four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so
however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of
the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in
the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the
Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way
beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way
beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the
records it is clear that the application for probation was
filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had
been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his)
receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant
fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote
with affirmance the well-written, albeit
assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific
issue
. . . the petition for probation was filed by
the petitioner out of time. The law in
point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as
amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of
Probation. Subject to
the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have
convicted and
sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by
said defendant within
the period for perfecting
an appeal. . . . place the
defendant on probation .
...
Going to the extreme, and assuming that
an application for probation from one who
had appealed the trial court's judgment is
 allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for
probation was filed out of time. In the
petition is a clear statement that the
petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application
for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the
application for probation must be filed
"within the period for perfecting an
appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that
the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom
was possible under the law. Even
granting that an appeal from
the appellate court's judgment is
contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to
the judgment rendered by the trial court,
that appellate judgment had become final
and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was
attempted by the petitioner. The
petitioner did not file his application for
probation before the finality of the said
judgment; therefore, the petitioner's
attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that
an application for probation may yet be granted even if it
was filed only after judgment has become final, the
conviction already set for execution and a warrant of
arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of
the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the
decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch
the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not
allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence
treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by
the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his
innocence and did not even raise the issue of the
propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he
filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible
for probation, the instant petition for review should be as
it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]
SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P.
DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B.
BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G.
GINETE, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The key issue raised in this special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a
complaint against a government official for grave oral
defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit
our attention. We thus resolved to give due course to the
petition, consider the private respondent's comment on
the petition[1] as the answer thereto, and decide it on the
basis of the pleadings which have sufficiently discussed
the issue.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not
disputed.
On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G.
Ginete, then officer-in-charge of the Physical Education
and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office
of Region VII in Cebu City of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
(hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave
oral defamation[2] allegedly committed on 23 September
1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education
Supervisor II of the same Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994,[3] Antonio B. Yap,
Graft Investigation Officer I of the said office,
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the
necessary information against the petitioner. This
resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cebu City an
information[4] for grave oral defamation against the
petitioner. This was docketed as Criminal Case No.
35684-R and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to
quash[5] the information on the ground that the "criminal
action or liability" has been extinguished. She contended
that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the
offense of grave oral defamation prescribes in months
and that since the information was filed only on 28 March
1994, or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its alleged
commission, the crime had then already prescribed. In
support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia[6] vs.
Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA
277," wherein this Court ruled that the filing of an
information at the fiscal's office will not stop the running of
the prescriptive period for crimes.
In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the rule
on summary procedure in special cases and which fall
within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the complaint
directly with the said court or with the fiscal's office
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. The filing of the complaint by the private
respondent with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the
fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under said Section 1
pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The private respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is
inapplicable because it involves an offense covered by
the rule on summary procedure and it explicitly stated that
Section 1 of Rule 110 excludes cases covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent
Judge Bajarias, denied the motion to quash in the order
of 18 July 1994.[8] It fully agreed with the stand of the
private respondent.
Her motion to reconsider[9] the above order having
been denied on 29 November 1994,[10] the petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil
action for certiorari,[11] which was docketed therein as
Civil Case No. CEB-16988. The case was assigned to
Branch 11.
In its decision of 3 July 1995,[12] the RTC, per public
respondent Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed the
challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and
29 November 1994. It ruled that the order denying the
motion to quash is interlocutory and that the petitioner's
remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,[13] reiterated in People
vs. Bans,[14] was to go to trial without prejudice on her part
to reiterate the special defense she had invoked in her
motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. Besides, the petitioner has not
satisfactorily and convincingly shown that Judge Bajarias
has acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
orders considering that the ground invoked by her does
not appear to be indubitable. And even assuming that the
MTC erred in venturing an opinion that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman is equivalent
to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office, such
error is merely one of judgment. For, there is no decided
case on the matter, and the substantive laws have not
clearly stated as to what bodies or agencies of
government should complaints or informations be filed in
order that the period of prescription of crimes or offenses
should be considered interrupted. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code simply states that the prescriptive
period shall be interrupted by the "filing of the complaint
or information" and has not specified further where such
complaint or information should be filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to
reconsider[15] the decision in the order of 23 August
1995,[16] the petitioner filed this special civil action wherein
she reiterates the arguments she adduced before the two
courts below. The private respondent likewise did nothing
more in her responsive pleading than reiterate what she
had raised before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of
offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No.
3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws.
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
grave oral defamation, which is the subject of the
information in Criminal Case No. 35684-R of the MTC of
Cebu, prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall
be understood to be of 30 days, then grave oral
defamation prescribes in 180 days.[17] Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words
were directly uttered in the presence of the offended party
on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for
the offense started to run on that date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period
due to the filing of the complaint or information had been
the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People
vs. Tayco,[18] People vs. Del Rosario,[19] and People vs.
Coquia,[20] this Court held that it is the filing of the
complaint or information with the proper court, viz., the
court having jurisdiction over the crime, which interrupts
the running of the period of prescription. On the other
hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,[21] a case for
libel, this Court held that the filing of the complaint with the
justice of the peace court even for preliminary
investigation purposes only interrupts the running of the
statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this
Court in the second case of People vs. Olarte[22] resolved
once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that the
filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court even
for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription
discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds
that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace
(now municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the
prescriptive term: People vs.Olarte, L-13027, June 30,
1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106,
October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.
Another series of decisions declares that to produce
interruption the complaint or information must have been
filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case
on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December
29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
"shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint
is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim
of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution
is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that
the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the
court in which the complaint or information is filed must
have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely,
the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or
acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court
should discharge the accused because no prima
facie case has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby
overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and
People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983
in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[23] this Court not only
reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by
holding that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. Thus:
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in
People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information
referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper
court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the
offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according
to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that
the period shall commence to run again when the
proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or
information terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the
Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or
conviction of the accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was
disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by the
Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the
Olarte case, there was diversity of precedents on the
issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of
the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal
judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This
view is found-in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960
and cases cited therein; People v. Uba, L-13106, October
16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other
pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the
complainant or information must have been filed in the
proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its
merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-
15140, December 29, 1960; People v. Coquia, L-15456,
June 29, 1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and
enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor
General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find
applicable to the case at bar read:
xxx xxx xxx
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in
the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with
equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine
in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of
a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the
City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the
preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of
prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is
generally
initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with
the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of
provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like
municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations,
they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with
respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x
x.
Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint
for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later
changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it
were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by
the accused interrupts the period of prescription. (Italics
supplied)
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1
October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila.[24]
The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution of
Offenses) of the Rules of Court. We quote the entire
Section for a better understanding of the last paragraph:
SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:
 (a) For offenses falling under the such that it interrupted the prescriptive period for grave
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial oral defamation.
Courts, by filing the complaint with
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution
the
provide:
appropriate officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary
SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
investigation therein;
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or
(b) For offenses falling under the
employees of the Government, or any subdivision or
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
Courts, by filing the complaint or
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
information directly with the said
thereof.
courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's
office. However, in Metropolitan
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
Manila and other chartered cities, the
following powers, functions, and duties:
complaint may be filed only with the
office of the fiscal.
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of
any public official, employee, office or
prescription of the offense charged. (Italics supplied)
agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No.
or inefficient.
3326, as amended, whose Section 2 explicitly provides
that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No.
institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the
6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
complaint or information with the court. The said section
which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8 [26] of
reads:
the aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, provide as follows:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies,
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
constituting double jeopardy. (Italics supplied)
service by the Government to the people.

And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,[25] this Court held that

the proceedings referred to in said Section 2 are "judicial
proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the
petitioner, and her invocation thereof is misplaced. In the
first place, it involved a violation of an ordinance, which is
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. By its
express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in
question partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326
is then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper court
of the complaint or information which suspends the
running of the period of prescription. In Zaldivia, this Court
categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure to mean that "the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that,"
which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
What is then left to be determined is whether the
filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is
equivalent to filing the complaint in the prosecutor's office
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage from any investigatory agency
of the Government, the investigation
of such cases.
SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall
apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his
tenure in office.
Needless to state, these broad constitutional and
statutory provisions vest upon the Ombudsman and his
Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary
investigations in criminal cases filed against public
officers or employees, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs.
[27]
Domingo, this Court held:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman
has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or
omission of any public official x x x when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13[1]) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case
the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action
against a public official x x x and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of
the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee
that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.
It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or omission of
any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is
a "shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."[28]
A public officer, as distinguished from a government
"employee," is a person whose duties involve the exercise
of discretion in the performance of the functions of
government.[29] The petitioner, being an Education
Supervisor II of the Regional Office of Region VII of the
DECS, is a public officer. The Ombudsman-Visayas then
has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the
private respondent's complaint against the petitioner for
grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the
first Olarte case, reiterated as the controlling doctrine in
the second Olarte case, which was broadened
in Francisco and reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must
apply to complaints filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman against public officers and employees for
purposes of preliminary investigation. Accordingly, the
filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-
Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of
the said offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13
October 1993, or barely twenty days from the commission
of the crime charged, the filing then of the information on
28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
want of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering
that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for
certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal
Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T.
Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash
the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to
quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations
dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan
with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article
212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
(Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section
4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case
No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer,
promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, consisting of accused DISINIs ownership of two
billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion
(4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with
both shares of stock having then a book value of 100.00
per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by
said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and
electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power
Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct, respectively, the
Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of his position and committing the offense in
relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid
gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to
said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to
do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute
the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct
intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and
Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction contract, for the
PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to
quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did
not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution
opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted
himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayans
favorable action on his motion for permission to travel
abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both
informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying
the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution
dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through
the second assailed resolution.10

Criminal Case No. 28002 Issues

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable certiorari, alleging that:
Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together
and confederating with the then President of the A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES
personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. CHARGED.
Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED
Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A)
relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the DO NOT APPLY SINCE
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED
("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND
Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and 14-A".
Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million
U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT
Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE),
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED
the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which
MET THEREQUISITE UNDER
entities were then having business, transaction, and
SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
application with the Government of the Republic of the
THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC
Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI
OFFICER.
securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and
obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural
SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT,
IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED,
and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for
AND DENIED
Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
PETITIONERSCONSTITUTIONAL AND
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos,
which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused
 THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE
OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002,
THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED
ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE
THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS
EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the
ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio
Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v.
HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini
and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No.
0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with
his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through them is appropriation of public funds,
plunder of the nations wealth, extortion, embezzlement,
and other acts of corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the
first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of
this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained
staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in
exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract
from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
collaboration and willing participation of defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their association and influence with
the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent
disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in
devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and
Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which
defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper
payments such as unconscionably large commissions
from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse
Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges
and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to
Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable
nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant
amount that included defendants staggering
commissions defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for
HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG
transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R.
Nos. 9231992320) dated October 2, 1990, we are
hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action
the records of the attached criminal case which we
believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain
aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also
parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed
with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of
the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the
respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by
the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for
proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco
case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGGs letter of transmittal was adverting
to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima
facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or
criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal
complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and
freeze orders against petitioners properties, it was on the
basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten
and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition
of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the
PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary
investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the
matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case,
the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the
aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It
cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary
investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of
justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited
from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of
this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and
take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted
by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court
in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to
file the informations that became the subject of Disinis
motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the
informations did not allege that the charges were being
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
(E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged
were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A because the allegations in the informations
neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG;
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in
the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses
charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section
4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from
the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal
cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses
and their immediately family but also of their relatives,
subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that
established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and
R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially
filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with
the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation
of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the
directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG
would not be an impartial office following its finding of a
prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No.
0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same
transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through
the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of
Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural
design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given
their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in
Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil
Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the
criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the
offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the
PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted
the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth
covered President Marcos immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without distinction as
to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disinis argument, too, the qualifying clause
found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand
Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which
follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and
other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National
Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade 27and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions
classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain
legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such
public officials. To include within the ambit of the
qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c
would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to
bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of
this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
despite Disinis being a private individual, and despite the
lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public official in the
commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must
be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for
the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the
prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that
Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and presents
to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in
consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the
contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and
that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded
the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of
corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the
Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed
upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
(direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in
consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times
the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this
specie of corruption of public officials charged against
Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with
a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express
provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under
R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the
amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It
became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however, that
the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply
to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16,
1982, because the longer period could not be given
retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused.
With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime
charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in
order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article
91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses
punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No.
332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved
person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right
to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An
exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under
this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts
would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this
accord that the Court confronted the question on the
running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque
which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent
cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed,
emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we
held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special
law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period
for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced
from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee
made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint
was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and,
hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for
this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it
was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the
1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public
officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime,
no person would have dared to question the legality of
these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when
the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns
& Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases
were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-
gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the
public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh
impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have
known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to
the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly
publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the
unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were
discovered only through the PCGGs exhaustive
investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima
facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case
No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP
contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed
the presumption of their execution having been regularly
done in the course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior
to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and
their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the
preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91
of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription.
According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited
v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the
nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent
to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case
is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of
whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the
complaint or information in the office of the public
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years
elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state
every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on
the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test
in determining whether a motion to quash may be
sustained based on this ground is whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the
law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the
presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there
would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to
proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption
of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation
of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied
with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules
of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that
Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila,
Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then
President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to
President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his
position as President, committed the offense in relation to
his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents
offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos
caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
the respective contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the
PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to
President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article
212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or
gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the
gifts or presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer
liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public
officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated
that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts
to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President
Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his
position and in committing said act in relation to his office,
was placed under circumstances that would make him
liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply
required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make
him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without
alleging that President Marcos received or accepted
Disinis offers, promises and gifts an essential element
in direct bribery the allegation that President Marcos
caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances
of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information
charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is
similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal
relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes
advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some
business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender
has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application,
request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the elements of the offense, considering
that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-
Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the
Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with
and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal
relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from
Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the
entities then having business, transaction, and application
with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3)
President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had
family or close personal relations, intervened to secure
and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on
January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court
acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala
with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the
case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing
of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order
was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford
time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor
General he recommended that the petition be given due
course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel
the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10,
1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the
letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of
August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to
file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the
Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed
by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency
of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary
of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged
to move for dismissal for the reason that the
check involved having been issued for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability
of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to
resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced before
the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
only disregards the requirements of due process
but also erodes the Court's independence and
integrity, the motion is considered as without
merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is
hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock
in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining
order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further
orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was
denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by
accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be
reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually
enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case,
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal
force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss
the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as
purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of
this Court without giving due course to the petition
required the respondents to comment to the petition, not
to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.
In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it
being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel
filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to
the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this
Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc.
In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En
Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective
briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in
lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge
be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file
the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the
evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot
be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers
under the power vested in them by law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who,
according to the evidence received from the complainant,
are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal
duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they
become convinced that the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary
investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of
a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of
a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the
fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him
on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon
by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the
Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an
information within a certain period of time, since this
would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the
dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit
no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-
investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or
that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable
doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of
the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand,
neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of
prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a
criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where
it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not
without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise,
that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the
fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the
fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the
Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and
whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it
and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant
the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive
of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in
the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case
cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice
who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution
nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution
of the case thereby defying the superior order of the
Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1wphi1 The role of the fiscal or
prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to
the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court
to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the
Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it
to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the
fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation
of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43602 January 31, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the
accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine years
old. 1 The prosecution will have to contend not only with
the presumption of innocence but also of impotence.
The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971
in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of Bago. 2 It was
reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and
the corresponding criminal complaint was filed on July 10,
1972. 4 Judgment was rendered on January 30, 1976,
sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the
costs. 5 He now wants this decision reversed.
The complainant is Anita Ibaez, who was fifteen years
old at the time of the alleged offense. She says that on
the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-
appellant to a bushy place on the seashore where she
was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because
he was threatening her with a scythe he was carrying. In
the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then
forcibly took her. She could not cry out because she was
afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother
because the accused-appellant bad warned her he would
kill her if she did. 6
The accused-appellant has a different version. He does
not deny he had sexual intercourse with Anita, but he
insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it was
the complainant who enticed him into the bushes, where
she wantonly opened herself to him. He was unable at
first to have an erection because of his age. But Anita
herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus stimulated, he
succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards, noticing some
people nearby who might have seen them, the girl put
back her panty on and left. He followed a few minutes
later. 7
As the medical examination of the complainant was made
more than two months afterwards, there naturally could
not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that
usually attend forcible rape. But there was the tell-tale
hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the
accused-appellant could not dispute. 8
Given the choice between the separate accounts of the
complainant and the accused-appellant, the court inclines
in favor of the latter. It is in our view more believable. Anita
never spoke of any difficulty on the part of Pailano in
violating her. She simply said he removed her panty and
entered her. No effort was mentioned; it seemed she was
talking of a vigorous stud. Yet, the accused-appellant was
not a teenager or even only in the prime of his life at the
time of their sexual encounter. He was all of sixty-nine
years old.
Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the
moment, we doubt if Pailano could have accomplished
the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution
has not offered any proof of his sexual prowess, and
under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant
did not hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride,
that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with
Anita and that it took some fondling from her before his
organ could respond. This was a hard and humiliating fact
but it had to be admitted.
We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo
Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita coupling on the
day in question, 9 but not on the other previous occasions
claimed by him. His presence in all of these meetings
seems too much of a coincidence to be credible.
However, Pailano is also corroborated by Natividad
Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and Pailano
caressing each other, with the girl in fact assuming the
more aggressive role. 10 There is no reason not to believe
this witness.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the
commission of the crime through the first method although
the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the
complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing
so is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-
appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she
was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction
could not have been possible under the criminal complaint
as worded. This described the offense as having been
committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then provided with
a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who)
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez,
15 years of age, against her will." No mention was made
of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he
had raped Anita while she was unconscious or otherwise
deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation,
which was the method alleged would have violated his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 11 This right is safeguarded by the
Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an
adequate defense against the charge against him.
Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is
concentrating his defense against the ground alleged
would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was,
of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.
In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged
with rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction,
which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint
against him. In the case of People v. Montes, 13 the Court
did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held
responsible for the suicide of the woman he was
supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of
and acquitted was not homicide but rape. More to the
point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, 14 where the
accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds
held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false
pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which
was not alleged in the information. The Court said such
conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.
It may be argued that although initially deficient, the
criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the
prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's
mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby
waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has
not been adequately establish established.
In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita reported
that he saw no evidence of insanity in her family history
nor was there any indication of such condition in the
complainant herself. 15 He did observe that she had the
mentality of a thirteen-year old, 16 which was not that
serious an impediment as her age at the time was only
fifteen.
Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not
proved that during that encounter in the bushes, Anita's
mental condition was so weakened that she could not
resist Pailano's supposed advances.
The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the
constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not been
overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno reported the
incident in the bushes on the same day to Anita's
mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, for reasons
not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half months later that
she decided to complain to the authorities, but then it was
already suspiciously late. The only possible explanation
for her delay is that the liaison between her daughter and
Pailano had already become a scandal by that time and
she must have thought she could redeem Anita's honor
by initiating the criminal complaint. The delay, however,
blunts the charge of rape.
What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last
lustful fling and a young girl with a rather weak mind and
a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his youth. We
do not mean to romanticize this sordid affair. It is wrong
and is not here excused, made light of, or dismissed. It is
disdained for what it is an unseemly seduction where it is
not clear who the tempter and the tempted are although
neither can really claim to be blameless. But, in our view,
it is definitely not rape.
WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED
and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75853 January 31, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES BUGTONG, defendant-appellant.
FERNAN, C.J.:
What makes this case of rape most unfortunate is that the
victim is a fifteen-year old lass with a mental age of
between five (5) and eight (8) years and a numerical I.Q.
of 47.
Irene Cutiam, the minor complainant, was born on
December 30, 1968 in Sitio Duban, Tublay, Benguet. The
accused, Andres Bugtong, is her neighbor.
Sometime in July, 1984, Luisa Cutiam noticed that the
stomach of her daughter Irene was growing bigger and
bigger. Dr. Salome Pilit, a government physician who
conducted a medical examination confirmed that Irene
was pregnant. Irene, at first, would not reveal the identity
of the man responsible for her condition, but when she felt
something moving inside her belly, she confessed to her
mother Luisa that accused raped her and that her refusal
to talk earlier was due to the fear that accused would
make good his threats to kill her should she squeal.
With this information, Luisa, together with Irene, went to
the Acop Tublay Police Station to report the crime which
resulted in Irene's pregnancy. Irene gave birth to a baby
boy later on. 1
Andres Bugtong was thereafter charged before the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet with the
crime of Rape allegedly committed as follows:
... the above-named accused by means
of force and intimidation and threats, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse and
carnal knowledge of one Irene Cutiam, a
 fifteen-year old girl against her will and
consent. 2
On accused's plea of not guilty, trial ensued. When Irene
was called to the witness stand, it was observed that she
had difficulty understanding the questions propounded to
her. On motion of the fiscal, she was made to undergo
pyschological testing which revealed that she had an
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of only 47, equivalent to the
mental age of a person between the ages of 5 and 8
years, far below her actual age of 15 years. Her mental
retardation was classified as moderate. 3
Her testimony, as summarized by the trial court, is as
follows:
On November 13, 1984, Irene Cutiam
testified. ... One day in January 1984, she
was sent by her mother Luisa Cutiam to
the house of Andres Bugtong, the herein
accused to pay her account to the latter
in the amount of TEN PESOS
(P10.00).This fact of indebtedness and
payment of the same was previously
testified on by Luisa Cutiam. 4 Witness
claimed that when she handed the
money to Andres Bugtong, the latter
grabbed her other hand and placed her
on the bed, and when she tried to shout,
the accused covered her mouth with his
hand and allegedly threatened her by
saying: 'If you will report the matter, I will
kill you, anyway our house (sic) are near
each other. 5 After having uttered those
threatening words, Irene was apparently
released from the hold of the accused as
could be inferred from the following:
Q After saying that, what is the next thing
he did, if any?
A While he was removing his pants, I
tried to open the door but it was locked
then he came again and pulled me.
Q And when he came again to pull you,
where did he bring you?
A In their bed just the same, Sir.
Q What did he do when you were already
in bed?
A He did the act and after doing the act
he opened the door and let me go out. 6
xxx xxx xxx
On recross-examination, complainant
disclosed that at one time the accused
came to their house when she was with
her two younger brothers. The accused
sent the two boys to the mountain to
gather guavas and after they have left,
had again sexual intercourse with her;
that when the two boys came back and
knocked at the door, accused barred her
from opening and again was threatened
with death if she would do so; that she
just kept on crying until the accused
sneaked out through the other door of the
house. 7
Accused Andres Bugtong, testifying on January 23, 1985
gave the following version:
... He and his wife are farmers with a
vegetables garden near their house and
another one which is farther. They
usually start working early in the morning
and go home for breakfast after having
watered the plants and then go back to
continue with their garden works (sic). At
2:00 o'clock noon they go home for lunch
after which the wife goes back to the
garden while the accused sometimes
stays behind for some works (sic) at
home. They have two houses which are
near each other. Seven (7) of their eight
(8) children occupy one of these two
houses while he and his wife stay in the
other house. 8 Occasionally especially
during harvesting season, they used to
engage the services of Irene Cutiam to
help them in the garden.
One day in January 1984, Irene came to
their house after lunch. Andres Bugtong
was then alone. Without any word, she
just entered the one-room house, sat on
the bed and kept on smiling and never
talked although repeatedly asked by the
accused of what she needed because he
was then about to leave for the garden.
He served her with coffee and while both
of them were drinking, the accused,
without any word sat beside the
complainant, who in turn leaned on the
former with her breast on his left
shoulder. At this juncture, the accused
said:
Q And what happened after that?
A So I told her, 'your breast is big.'
Q What did she answer you if any?
A None, she was just smiling.
Q So what did you do?
A And so I put my left arm around her
shoulders.
Q What did she do when you put your left
hand or arm around her shoulder?
 A I took hold of her breast.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did she do when you held her
breast?
A She was placing down her coffee and
then she encircled her two arms around
my body (Witness illustrating his both
hands.) 9
At this stage when accused was already
sexually aroused, he laid down the
complainant on the bed and after closing
the door, he removed his clothes, sat
between the legs of the former, lifted her
skirt and when he noticed that
complainant had no panty, he proceeded
with the sexual intercourse with both
hands holding her shoulders while the
latter took hold of his waist. This was the
first sexual intercourse which was
repeated four or five times during the
succeeding months of 1984. All were
done in his house after lunch time.
Accused said further that during all these
sex contacts with complainant and
thereafter, no words were uttered neither
they (sic) converse with each other. He
only learned that the latter was already
pregnant after this case was filed. (Ibid.,
pp, 12-16) 10
Giving credence to the prosecution's version, the trial
court rendered judgment finding Andres Bugtong guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined
in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; to recognize the child born to Irene Cutiam as
a result of the crime; to indemnify the complainant in the
sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages and to pay the costs. From said judgment,
Bugtong interposed the present appeal.
He alleges that:
The lower court erred:
I xxx xxx xxx
IN TAKING JURISDICTION OF THE
CASE
II
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AS
DEFINED IN ART. 335 (1) AND (2), AS
AMENDED, OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
III
IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE. 11
Appellant contends that as rape is a personal offense
which, under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section 5,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, must
be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended
party, the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
instant case on the basis of the Information signed by the
fiscal alone.
Only recently, did this Court reiterate its ruling on the
meaning and import of this requirement. We said
in People vs. Hon. Santiago Taada G.R. No. L-32215,
October 17, 1988, that:
... In the 1966 case of Valdepenas v.
People this Court, through then
Associate, later Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion clarified:
... It is true that pursuant to the third
paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised
Penal Code,
... the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents
...
... The provision does not determine,
however, the jurisdiction of our courts
over the offenses therein enumerated. It
could not affect said jurisdiction, because
the same is governed by the Judiciary
Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal
Code, which deals primarily with the
definition of crimes and the factors
pertinent to the punishment of the
culprit. The complaint required in said
Article is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of
the power to prosecute the guilty parties.
And such condition has been imposed
out of consideration for the offended
woman and her family who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather
than go through, with the scandal of a
public trial. 12
This ruling was followed in the
subsequent case of People v.
Babasa where the Court, citing
the Valdepeas case, ruled that Act 344
was not enacted for the specific purpose
of benefiting the accused. When it is said
that the requirement in Article 334 that
there should be a complaint of the
offended party or her relatives is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which
confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the
 case. The Court's jurisdiction is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the prosecution for
rape was initiated by the offended party herself with the
assistance of her mother. The Information filed by the
Fiscal said so, thus:
the undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial
Fiscal, upon a sworn originally filed by
the offended party accuses Andres
Bugtong of the crime of Rape... 13
And extant on record is Exhibit "B",14 the criminal
complaint 15 filed by Irene Cutiam with the assistance of
her mother. The appellant's insinuation that the
Information should have been signed and sworn to by the
complainant is incorrect for it is not necessary for the
complainant to sign and verify the Information for rape
filed by the Fiscal. 16
Based on the foregoing, no error can be imputed to the
trial court in taking cognizance of the Information filed by
the fiscal.
Appellant questions next the trial court's finding that he is
guilty of the crime of rape as defined in Article 335 (1) and
(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He contends that since it
is clear from the allegations in the Information that the
offense charged falls under par. 1 of Art. 335, to find him
guilty of rape under par. 2 thereof is violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against
him.
There is merit in this contention. While the conviction of
accused-appellant under paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code appears to be an
innocuous error as these paragraphs refer merely to the
modes of commission of the same crime of rape
punishable by the same penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
harm inflicted upon accused-appellant gains considerable
proportion when we consider not only the no win situation
in which appellant was placed by reason of such
conviction, but more importantly, the surprise attendant to
his conviction for a crime under a mode of commission
different from that alleged in the information.
Having been charged with Rape allegedly committed thru
force or intimidation, it is to be expected that appellant
should focus his defense on showing that the sexual
intercourse complained of was the result of mutual
consent, rather than of force or intimidation. This defense,
however, has been rendered futile and ineffective by the
appellant's further conviction under par. (2) of Art. 335, for
even if he should succeed in convincing us that the sexual
act under consideration was born out of mutual consent,
he nonetheless remains liable under par. (2) of Art. 335,
wherein consent of the offended party is not a defense,
the latter being considered to be legally incapable of
giving her consent.
Furthermore, and more importantly, as herein appellant
was tried on an information charging him with rape
committed thru force and intimidation, his conviction for
rape committed when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconcious would be violative of his
constitutional right as an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 17
This is not to say however, that the conviction of accused-
appellant should be set aside altogether. Only his
conviction under par. (2) of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code is nullified as his guilt of the crime of rape
committed thru force and intimidation, as charged in the
Information, has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. 18
That accused-appellant succeeded in obtaining carnal
knowledge of Irene thru force and intimidation has been
established by Irene's testimony that appellant uttered the
following threat:
If you will report the matter, I will kill you,
anyway our house (sic) are near each
other. 19
with respect to which we share the Solicitor-General's
observation, thus:
At first blush, it would seem that the force
employed by the appellant and the
resistance put up by Irene would not
meet the degree of force and resistance
required to qualify the sex act for rape.
However, it is to be stressed that force
and intimidation are not limited to
physical force, it includes the moral kind
such as fear especially in the case at bar
where it was established that Irene, had
the mental capacity of a child between
five (5) to eight (8) years old. 20
Moreover, it has been ruled that the force used need not
be irresistible. As long as it is present and brings the
desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or
less irresistible is beside the point. 21
WHEREFORE, except for the modifications that (1) the
conviction of accused-appellant under paragraph (2) of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is set aside and (2)
the civil indemnity to be paid to the victim is increased to
P30,000.00, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
in all other respect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179189 February 26, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO RESUMA y AGRAVANTE alias
"GEROM," appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 18
February 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),3 Branch
61, of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, finding
appellant Reynaldo Resuma y Agravante alias "Gerom"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
In separate Informations4 dated 5 December 1995 and 23
January 1996 filed by Provincial Prosecutor Reinaldo M.
Nolido, appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape,
thus:
Criminal Case No. 96-1619
That on or about the 8th day of December, [sic]
1994, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully [sic],
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with [sic] the above-named offended party
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-1644
That sometime in August, [sic] 1995, in the
Municipality of Ilog, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully [sic],
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with [sic] the above-named offended party
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Joint trial
on the merits ensued with the prosecution establishing the
following facts:
AAA5 is the younger of two (2) children6 born to parents
BBB7 and CCC.8 In 1990, BBB and CCC separated9 and
sometime later, CCC met appellant and began cohabiting
with him. CCC and appellant had three (3) children
together, although one (1) child died in infancy. CCC and
appellant, with all four (4) children, resided in one house
in Barangay Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. On
different dates,10 including 8 December 1994 and
sometime in August 1995, appellant raped AAA.
The rape subject of the first charge occurred at around
nine o'clock in the morning of 8 December 1994. AAA was
home washing the dishes and babysitting her two-year old
half-brother. Appellant was likewise home, repairing an
umbrella. CCC had left the house earlier with AAA's half-
sister to attend a baptism and other fiesta activities. AAA's
older sister, DDD,11 had gone to a distant deep well to do
laundry.
Per AAA's testimony, when she finished doing the dishes,
she went inside the bedroom and shortly thereafter,
appellant followed her. Appellant removed AAA's
underwear and made her lie on her stomach on the floor.
He then undressed himself, squatted on the floor, pulled
AAA's legs and laid them on his thighs. Appellant
repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt
pain in her private parts. AAA also felt wetness inside her
vagina after appellant had finished his dastardly act. AAA
was crying when DDD later returned to the house. When
asked, she told her older sister that appellant had again
raped her. DDD allegedly reported the incident to their
mother CCC, but the latter purportedly simply told them
not to disclose the matter to anyone.12
The second rape complained of occurred sometime in
August 1995 when AAA was again left in their home alone
with appellant and her toddler half-brother. In the
bedroom, appellant undressed AAA and ordered her to lie
on her stomach on the floor. He then had carnal
knowledge of her in the same manner as he did on 8
December 1994. AAA told DDD of what happened the
following day.13
To corroborate AAA's narration, the prosecution
presented DDD who testified that in the morning of 8
December 1994, she was washing clothes at a water
pump located at a distance from her house. When she
returned home at around nine o'clock or ten o'clock that
morning, DDD saw AAA weak and crying. When she
asked her sister what happened to her, AAA allegedly
said that appellant raped her. Later, DDD confided the
matter to their mother CCC, who advised her not to tell
anyone of the incident to avoid trouble.14
Witness Dr. Ricardo Garrido, a medical practitioner,
testified that he conducted the physical examination of
AAA on 9 October 1995. He affirmed the findings and
conclusions on his medico-legal examination report and
opined that the lacerations found in AAA's vagina were
caused by the penetration of a human penis.15
The sister of BBB, EEE,16 took the stand as a prosecution
witness. According to her, in June 1995, she visited her
nieces upon the request of BBB for her to check on the
condition of his daughters as he was then based in Manila
for work, and in that visit she learned from CCC that
appellant had raped AAA.17
BBB himself testified that he received a letter from EEE
on 20 August 1995, telling him that his children were
being maltreated. Thus, on 9 October 1995, he went to
see his children. BBB recounted that his daughter AAA
told him that appellant had raped her. This prompted him
to immediately take her to the police station to file charges
against appellant and then to the doctor for physical
examination.18
The defense presented appellant himself, CCC and
appellant's aunt, Maria Elisa Agravante Iligan (Iligan).
With denial and alibi as his defenses, appellant testified
that he could not have raped nor maltreated AAA as he
loved her and DDD as his own. Claiming frame-up,
appellant testified that BBB caused the filing of the
complaints against him to enable BBB to get custody over
AAA and DDD.19
According to appellant on the stand, on the day in
question, 8 December 1994, their barangay celebrated its
fiesta. He spent the day at the house of his friend Angelo
Cuachon, while AAA and DDD were in school. CCC,
together with her children AAA and DDD, purportedly left
their home at 7:30 that morning while he left shortly
thereafter or at about 8:00 a.m.20
He likewise claimed that in the month of August 1995, he
stayed at his grandfather's farm for one (1) week
harvesting corn. Apart from this, he spent his days
roaming from house to house in Guilungan, Cauayan,
Bocana, Ilog, Sonedco and other towns offering his
services as an umbrella repairman. On occasions, he had
lunch at Iligan's house where he did some umbrella
repairs.21 This was corroborated by Iligan on the witness
stand. Routinely, appellant visited Iligan's house around
six (6) times monthly.22
In her testimony, CCC sided with appellant. She denied
AAA's claim that she reported to her the rape incident of
8 December 1994. She asserted that appellant did not
sexually abuse AAA. Claiming that she did not have
knowledge of the purported rape until EEE told her about
it, she could not believe the charges against appellant to
be true as she was home with the children all the time and
did not see appellant committing any maltreatment or
sexual abuse against her children.23
The trial court found appellant guilty of qualified rape on
both charges. Thus, appellant was sentenced to suffer the
death penalty for each count and to indemnify the victim
in the amount of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case.24
Conformably with this Court's decision in People v.
Mateo,25 appellant's appeal by way of automatic review
was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Finding no
sufficient basis to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, the appellate court, on 30 November 2006,
rendered its decision affirming appellant's conviction but
modifying the penalty and damages imposed. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the
court a quo is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Reynaldo Resuma is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
liability, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape.26
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Finding that the Informations did not allege the two
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, the
appellate court ruled that appellant was charged only with
simple rape. Observing appellant's right to be informed of
the charges against him and right to due process, the
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed upon
appellant to reclusion perpetua.
Now, the case is with the Court again.
Before the Court, appellant has not filed a supplemental
brief, relying instead on the same brief originally filed with
this Court and later presented to the Court of Appeals
after the remand of the case. The assignment of errors in
appellant's brief reads27-
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITING [sic] THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
UPON HIM THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF
DEATH DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
RELATIONSHIP AND MINORITY WERE NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
Any review of a rape case begins with the settled reality
that accusing a person of this crime can be done with
facility. Thus, the testimony of the complainant must
always be scrutinized with great caution. It may not be
easy for her to prove the commission of rape; yet it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove his guilt. This principle must be viewed in relation
to that which holds that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.28When a rape victim's testimony, however, is
straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, then it deserves full faith and credit and
cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone
testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.29
After judicious and painstaking study of the arguments of
the parties and of the records a quo, we reach the
inescapable conclusion that the prosecution has
effectively established its case and appellant's
contentions thus deserve scant consideration.
Settled is the rule that the determination of the
competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily
with the trial court,30 because it has the unique position of
observing the witness' deportment on the stand while
testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the
reversal of the assessments and conclusions of the trial
court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings.31
In scrutinizing such credibility, jurisprudence has
established the following doctrinal guidelines: (1) the
reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower
court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that could affect the result of the
case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
even finality as it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and
(3) a witness who testified in clear, positive and
convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness.32
Applying the principles to the instant case, we find AAA's
narration of her harrowing experience trustworthy and
convincing. AAA was seven (7) years old when her
sufferings began. It is ludicrous to believe that a child of
such tender years would concoct such grave accusations
against her stepfather if the same were not true. Even
more, it is preposterous to imagine that a child of her age
would already have such intimate knowledge of the
sexual acts as she described in her testimony with such
clarity and coherence, unless the same were borne of
personal experience.33
We have no reason to believe that AAA was motivated by
any other reason than to seek justice and vindication for
the wrong done her. To be sure, a young girl's revelation
that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary
submission to medical examination and her willingness to
undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give
out the details of an assault to her dignity, cannot be so
easily dismissed as mere concoction.34
Likewise, appellant's imputation that BBB's desire to gain
custody over his children was the impelling motive behind
the filing of these cases is too trite and feeble to merit
consideration. As the Court of Appeals aptly pointed out,
"[N]o mother, or father in this case, would stoop so low as
to subject his daughter to [the] hardships and shame
concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage his own
feelings."35 Indeed, no parent in his right mind would
subject his child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma
attendant to a prosecution for rape, if the motivation were
not solely the desire to incarcerate the person responsible
for his child's defilement.36
The purported delay in the filing of the charges against
appellant does not infirm the credibility of AAA nor can it
be taken against her.37 We have ruled that delay in
making a criminal accusation does not impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.38 In this case, the following realities justified
the delay in filing the cases against appellant: (a)
Appellant was AAA's foster father and at that time, the
common-law husband of her mother. He thus exercised
moral ascendancy over her;39 (b) AAA was merely seven
(7) years old when her ordeal began. A child of such
tender years cannot be expected to know how to go about
filing a complaint against her abuser; and (c) As AAA's
complaints were ignored, if not disbelieved, by CCC, the
child was left without recourse until her father discovered
her plight. No malice can be convincingly ascribed against
BBB in the delay incurred in the filing of the complaints.
The allegations of frame-up are too weak to merit
consideration.
What is more, the medical certificate and testimony of Dr.
Garrido corroborate the allegations of rape. Dr. Garrido
found a "healed laceration cm. each with coranculae
formulation at 9 and 7 o'clock positions."40 His
examination of AAA likewise yielded the conclusion that
she had a ruptured hymen and had lost her physical
virginity.41
Upon the other hand, appellant's plain denial of any
wrongdoing cannot prevail. And so cannot his alibi. For,
in order for alibi to prosper, appellant must be able to
show the physical impossibility of his being at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed.42 This, appellant
failed to discharge. Moreover, his alibi is wanting in
material corroboration.43
Appellant avers that he could not have raped AAA on 8
December 1994 as AAA was at the school whereas he
was at the house of his friend, Angelo Cuachon. However,
apart from failing to present Angelo Cuachon to
substantiate his alibi, appellant himself testified that the
latter's house was but 50 to 100 meters from his home
and AAA's school was just in Barangay Dancalan
proper.44 Anent the allegation of rape in August 1995,
appellant proffered two (2) defenses: (1) he was at his
grandfather's farm for a week in August 1995 to help the
latter harvest corn; and (2) on 9 August 1995, he was at
Iligan's house repairing umbrellas from morning until
afternoon. Again, aside from appellant's failure to present
any material corroborative witness, he admitted that his
grandfather's house was only five (5) kilometers away
from his home and which distance can be covered in ten
(10) minutes by bus.45 Likewise, Iligan's testimony is too
inadequate to overcome the categorical declarations of
AAA.
In both cases, appellant did not demonstrate the physical
impossibility of his having committed the offenses as
charged. More importantly, the defense of alibi which is
inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of
AAA's unqualified and positive identification of appellant
as the author of the repulsive crimes against her.46 We
quote the observations of the court a quo:
[T]he Court does not believe accused's testimony
that some schools were holding classes although
it was the fiesta of their barangay, Dancalan.
Human experience tells us that schools do not
hold classes during fiestas. The testimony of
[AAA] that she was left at home to watch the
second child of the accused by [BBB] is more
believable because as testified to by [BBB], her
second child by the accused was only two (2)
years old in 1995, while [AAA] was only eight
years old (May 24, 1999 Hearing, page 45, TSN).
In other words, it would be unnatural to have a
two-year-old child to be (sic) left alone as
insinuated by herein accused. The Court also
cannot give credence to accused's testimony that
he could not have raped [AAA] on December 8,
1994 because he was in the house of his friend
Angelo Cuachon. He admitted that his friend's
house is near to (sic) his (accused's) house.
Accused did not even bother to present Angelo
Cuachon to corroborate accused's testimony of
 alibi. At any rate, the proximity of accused's amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
house and that of his friend will not render it moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
physically impossible nor difficult for the accused
to perpetrate the crime imputed to him. Costs de oficio.

Likewise, the Court cannot sustain the defense of SO ORDERED.

alibi simply because in the month of August 1995,
[accused] was either harvesting corn in the land
owned by his grandfather located at Kilometer
114 or he was in Guiljungan, Cauayan, Negros
Occidental roaming around to repair umbrellas of
customers. The defense failed to prove that the
land where he was harvesting corn is far from his
house, the scene where the alleged rape was
committed. The Court can likewise take judicial
notice of the distance from Dancalan, Ilog to
Guiljungan, Cauayan and travel time which is
merely twenty (20) minutes by bus. It was not
physically impossible for the accused to be
present at the crime scene or at the vicinity
thereof. Accused also failed to present his
grandfather Bonifacio Caldito to corroborate his
testimony. Although accused's defense of alibi
that he was in Guiljungan, Cauayan repairing
umbrellas was corroborated by his aunt, Maria
Elisa Agravante Iligan, the same is still extremely
weak.47

We uphold the Court of Appeals in affirming appellant's

contention that it was erroneous for the RTC to impose
the death penalty on him. For failure of the prosecution to
properly allege in the information the qualifying
circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and that the offender is a common-law-spouse of
the parent of the victim, the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship could not be
taken into consideration and appellant could only be
found guilty of simple rape which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua.48These qualifying circumstances,
even if proved at the trial and specifically alleged in AAA's
sworn affidavit, cannot be considered because they were
not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the information specify the qualifying
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for
them to be considered in the imposition of penalty. This
requirement is beneficial to an accused and may,
therefore, be given retroactive effect.49

Thus, we sustain the finding of guilt of appellant on both

counts and affirm the Court of Appeals in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. We likewise affirm the
award of damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape.50

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00081 is AFFIRMED. Appellant
REYNALDO RESUMA y AGRAVANTE alias "GEROM" is
found guilty of simple rape and sentenced, in each of the
criminal cases subject of this review, to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be
identified through the Informations in this case) the