Dimanahan Caluzor vs.

Llanillo, 761 SCRA 68, July 01, 2015

Dimanahan Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Lepanto Capataz Union, 691 SCRA 11, February 18, 2013
Dimanahan Status Maritime Corporation vs. Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968. January 18, 2017

G.R. No. 155580. July 1, 2015.*

ROMEO T. CALUZOR, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE LORENZO LLANILLO,
and MOLDEX REALTY, INC., respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the
special civil action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to review and pass upon the DARABs adjudication by of the petitioners appeal of
the PARADs ruling. As such, his only proper recourse from such decision of the CA was to further appeal to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Despite his allegation of grave abuse of discretion
against the CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil action for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
were mutually exclusive, for the special civil action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is
no appeal, or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In certiorari, only errors of
jurisdiction are to be addressed by the higher court, such that a review of the facts and evidence is not done; but, in
appeal, the superior court corrects errors of judgment, and in so doing reviews issues of fact and law to cure errors in the
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. Based on such distinctions, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

Agrarian Reform; Tenants; Words and Phrases; A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latters
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.The
petitioners insistence on his being the tenant of Leonardo and on his entitlement to disturbance compensation required
factual and legal bases. The term tenant has a distinct meaning under the law. Section 5, subparagraph (a) of R.A. No.
1199 provides: A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latters consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

Same; Tenancy Relationship; Elements of.For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements must be
shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial
evidence; this means that the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to be covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Same; Same; Harvest Sharing; Harvest sharing is a vital element of every tenancy.We underscore that harvest sharing
is a vital element of every tenancy. Common sense dictated, indeed, that the petitioner, if he were the de jure tenant that
he represented himself to be, should fully know his arrangement with the landowner. But he did not sufficiently and
persuasively show such arrangement. His inability to specify the sharing arrangement was inconceivable inasmuch as he
had depended on the arrangement for his own sustenance and that of his own family. The absence of the clear-cut
sharing agreement between him and Lorenzo could only signify that the latter had merely tolerated his having tilled the
land sans tenancy. Caluzor vs. Llanillo, 761 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 155580 July 1, 2015

Same; Same; Disturbance Compensation; If tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act (RA) No.
3844, as amended by RA No. 6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to the payment of disturbance compensation.
With the restoration of his possession having become physically impossible because of the conversion of the land being
already a fact, could the petitioner be granted disturbance compensation? If tenanted land is converted pursuant to
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to the
payment of disturbance compensation. Reflecting this statutory right, the conversion order presented by Moldex included
the condition for the payment of disturbance compensation to any farmer- beneficiary thereby affected. Yet, the query has
to be answered in the negative because the petitioner was not entitled to disturbance compensation because he was not
the de jure tenant of the landowner. It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance compensation to be validly made
by a de jure tenant must meet the procedural and substantive conditions listed in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844.
Caluzor vs. Llanillo, 761 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 155580 July 1, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175999 July 1, 2015

NELSON LAI y BILBAO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the assailed decision promulgated on May 27,
2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA).1 The conviction had been handed down by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Nelson Lai y Bilbao.2

Antecedents

The Prosecution's version was summarized by the RTC as follows:

On December 16, 1995, at around 9 o'clock in the evening, the victim Enrico Villanueva, Jr. together with his friends
Burnie Fuentebella (a prosecution witness), Butsoy Arenas, Raffy Gustilo, Nonoy Martinez, and Mark Anthony Merre,
were seated inside the passenger jeepney owned by the accused, Nelson Lai y Bilbao, which was parked at the back of
Pala-pala, Brgy. 6, comer North Capitol Road - San Juan Streets, Bacolod City, where they were waiting for a female
friend of theirs who was supposed to arrive at 9:30 o'clock of the same evening per their agreement. While they were
waiting for their friend to arrive, the accused Nelson Lai y Bilbao suddenly approached the vehicle and ordered all the
persons who were seated inside (including the deceased Enrico Villanueva, Jr.) to alight therefrom. After all of them have
alighted from the jeepney, the accused instantaneously grabbed the victim by the latter's left arm and accused him (the
deceased) of having stolen the antenna of his (Lai's) vehicle. Denying that he was responsible for the theft of the antenna,
the victim was able to free himself from the hold of the accused and ran away towards the direction of the house of
Christopher Padigos located at Purok Narra Bukid North, Brgy. 8, Bacolod City, across the Pala-pala. Upon arriving at the
house of Christopher Padigos, the victim ran all the way to the second floor room he shared with Jemuel V. Gepaya (a
prosecution witness). Finding his roommate inside the room, the victim confided to the former that Nelson Lai had just
accused him of stealing his (Lai's) car antenna and that he (the deceased) was grabbed and hit by the accused at the
neck but that he (the victim) was able to retaliate by kicking the accused. There the victim remained until about 11 :00
o'clock of the same evening when he left the house of Christopher Padigos to go to the dancehall located at nearby Purok
Azucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod City where a benefit dance was being held.

At around 11 :00 o'clock of the same evening, both the accused and the victim were inside the dancehall, the latter being
seated on a bench together with his friends while the former was dancing to the tune of the cha-cha. After dancing the
accused stood immediately in front at about one and a half arms length (sic.) from where the victim was seated.
Thereafter, the accused stepped towards where the victim was seated. As the accused was about to approach the victim,
a brownout suddenly occurred. Immediately after the lights went out, a spark was seen and a gunshot rang out right in
front where the victim was seated. Suddenly, the victim fell down bloodied. Immediately thereafter, the victim was rushed
to the provincial hospital by his friends led by Burnie Fuentebella, a prosecution witness, for treatment. Similarly, Jemuel
V. Gepaya, a cousin of the victim, also followed to the hospital after hearing the news that the victim was shot.
Inside the Emergency Room of the Provincial Hospital, while the victim lay (sic) bleeding from a gunshot wound in the
neck and awaiting medical attention, he was able to tell Burnie Fuentebella and Jemuel Gepaya, both prosecution
witnesses, that the accused Nelson Lai was the one who shot him. Moreover, the victim likewise shouted the name
"Nelson Lai" when he was asked by PO3 Homer Vargas who shot him. Likewise, when Enrico Villanueva, Sr., the father
of the victim, arrived at the Emergency Room and asked the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was "Nelson
Lai". (parenthetical citations omitted)3

In contrast, the CA summed up the Defense's own version in its assailed decision, to wit:

Appellant Nelson Lai drives his own passenger jeep plying the Banago-Libertad route. At around 8:30 o'clock in the
evening of December 16, 1995, appellant parked his jeepney at the back of his house located at Purok Azucena,
Barangay 6, Bacolod City. After resting for a while, he went to the house of their Purok President, Ramero Jarabelo,
where he drank three bottles of beer. Thereafter, he went home at around 9:00 o'clock, passing by the dancehall were
(sic.) a benefit dance was being held as a thanksgiving party for the Sangguniang Kabataan. There, he was invited by
Merlyn Rojo, who acted as emcee of the program, to open the first dance. Appellant acceded and danced the first dance
with Merlyn Rojo. After their dance, appellant went home as he still had to work early the next morning.

When appellant arrived home, he noticed that eight (8) persons, including the. victim, were seated inside his jeepney. He
approached them and requested them not to stay inside his jeepney. Thereafter, all of them went away without any
untoward incident. When the accused and his wife were about to have their late dinner at around 11 :00 o'clock, a
brownout occurred. About two seconds after the lights went out; he heard a gunshot which he initially thought was merely
a firecracker. Later, when he overheard that someone was shot at the dancehall which was only 40 meters away from his
house, he went out to look for his two sons. Along the way, he met Daisy Panes, who, together with her husband, were
also on their way to the dancehall. At the dancehall, someone told appellant that his son, Windel, was the one who carried
the victim to the hospital. So appellant went home and proceeded to eat his dinner. At around 11:45 o'clock of the same
evening, while appellant was already resting, three policemen came to his house and told him that the victim mentioned
his name as the one who shot him. Believing that he has done nothing wrong, appellant volunteered to go with the
policemen. Appellant claims that when they arrived at the police station, he even asked that a paraffin test be conducted
on him, the result of which was negative.4

Judgment of the RTC

In its judgment dated August 22, 2001,5 the R TC, through Judge Elumba, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused NELSON LAI y BILBAO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and, in the absence of neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances which may be considered in the
imposition of the penalty thereof, this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, 8 months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim Enrico Villanueva,
Jr. in the amount of Fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos only without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency as well
as to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner raised the following errors, to wit:

[T]hat the lower court:

1. ERRED in giving full credence to the alleged dying declaration of Enrico Villanueva, Jr.;

2. ERRED in considering the alleged earlier untoward incident between accused and the group of Enrico
Villanueva, Jr. as sufficient to motivate the former to kill the latter;

3. ERRED in discarding en (sic) toto the defense of alibi and the negative result of the paraffin test conducted on
the accused;
 4. ERRED in failing to see that the entire evidence presented by both the prosecution and defense engender a
reasonable doubt which should be resolved in favor of the accused;

5. ERRED as accused was deprived of due process when this case was decided by the honorable presiding
judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench;

6. ERRED when it completely disregarded appellant's motion for reconsideration below with nary a look into any
issue raised therein; and

7. ERRED when it denied appellant's motion for new trial.7

On May 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision,8 disposing:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42, in Criminal Case No. 17446
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the Court

In this appeal, the petitioner continues to assail the conviction, but the Court has immediately noted that the right to due
process of the petitioner had been denied to him by Judge Elumba, the trial judge, by not disqualifying himself from sitting
on and trying Criminal Case No. 17446 despite having participated in the trial as the public prosecutor. Thus, it is
necessary for the Court to first determine if the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba prejudiced the petitioner's right to a
fair and impartial trial.

As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March 23, 1998 as the public prosecutor in Branch 42 of
the RTC in Negros Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor,10 but became the Presiding Judge of Branch 42
on April 27, 2000.11 Branch 42 was the trial court hearing and ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the
petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from having anything to do with the case once he
became the trial judge because he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge Elumba's
disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration,12 but the latter ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case. Judge Elumba argued that he did not
personally prosecute the case, and that, at any rate, the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the
rendition of the judgment of conviction.13

On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of due process to him by the non-disqualification of
Judge Elumba, but the CA upheld Judge Elumba's justifications, stating: As to the fifth assigned error, appellant claims
that he was denied due process because the judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public
prosecutor of the instant case. First, the record of this case shows that when the judge, who was then a public prosecutor,
entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested its case, more specifically, he appeared therein only
when the last witness for the defense was presented, not to mention the fact that it was a private prosecutor who cross-
examined the last witness, Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said that the presiding judge personally prosecuted the instant
case, nor supervised the prosecution thereof when the same was still pending. Second, settled is the rule that a petition to
disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the disqualification of
the judge, appellant cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn about (sic.) and say
that he was denied due process. 'One surely cannot have his cake and eat it too.'14

It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any accused. The Constitution has
expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."15 An essential
part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of
procedural due process.16 The Court has said:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to
no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence
is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.17

The adoption of rules governing the disqualification of the judges from hearing and deciding cases should there be any
cause that diminishes or negates their impartiality is a firm means of ensuring their impartiality as judges. In particular,
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on self-disqualification by a sitting judge, viz.:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.

Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, contemplates two kinds of self-disqualification. The first paragraph enumerates the
instances when the judge is prohibited and disqualified from sitting on and deciding a case.18 The prohibition is
compulsory simply because the judge is conclusively presumed to be incapable of impartiality.19 The second paragraph
speaks of voluntary inhibition; whether or not the judge can sit in and try the case is left to his discretion, depending on the
existence of just and valid reasons not included in the first paragraph, but in exercising the discretion, he must rely only on
his conscience.20

Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,21
which pertinently demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a lawyer of any of the parties, to
wit:

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the
matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially.
Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances where:

xxxx

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein; x x x.

Given the foregoing, the CA's justifications directly contravened the letter and spirit of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and
Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supra. The words counsel in the
first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and lawyer in Section 5 of Canon 3, supra, are understood in their general
acceptation because their usage by the rules has not been made subject of any qualifications or distinctions. As such, the
mere appearance of his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446 sufficed to disqualify
Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the State in the prosecution of the petitioner, he
could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should
have removed himself from being the trial judge in Criminal Case No. 17446.

To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his
appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not really
matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's degree
of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification
that applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them should
be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court
that would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and determined by a
judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. As the Court has amplified in Garcia v. De la
Pena:22

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge
should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty
of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to
his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that
reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties
concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
17446 is to ignore that all criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. That a
private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no consequence, for such private prosecutor still came under the
direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. In this connection, we note that it was only on May 1, 2002, or two
years after Judge Elumba's appointment in the Judiciary, when Section 5,24 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, was
amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC in order to expressly authorize the intervention of the private prosecutor to prosecute a
criminal case in case of heavy work load or lack of the public prosecutor, provided that the private prosecutor was
authorized in writing for the purpose by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor. Even so, the
records do not indicate that the private prosecutor who appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 had been duly authorized in
writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case by himself.

We have also observed that the CA appeared too eager to sustain the refusal of Judge Elumba to disqualify himself as
the trial judge. Such overeagerness was uncharacteristic of the CA as an appellate court in a criminal case whose
unmistakable duty was to thoroughly sift and scrutinize the records of the trial court to search for errors that would reverse
or modify the judgment in favor of the accused. Had it done its duty, it would have quickly noticed a hard indication
existing in the trial records of Criminal Case No. 17446 exposing Judge Elumba to have actually taken an active
participation in the trial. The indication was in the form of the Motion to Present Rebuttal Evidence that then Public
Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25, 2000, the text of which is reproduced herein:

MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

xxxx

That the records of the above-entitled case would show that the accused rested his case on October 29, 1999;

That, however, after going over the records of the case, the prosecution feels that there is a need to present rebuttal
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the prosecution be
allowed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the evidence presented by the accused.

(Sgd.)
FERNANDO R. ELUMBA
Trial Prosecutor25

The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had come to the conclusion that "there is a need to
present rebuttal evidence" after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly, he had formed an opinion that was
absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner.

The CA's reliance on Lao v. Court of Appeals26 was inappropriate. In Lao, the Court opined and declared that the petition
to disqualify the trial judge must be filed prior to the rendition of judgment.27 But the supposed disqualification of the judge
in Lao was premised on bias as perceived by a party.28 We should point out that perceived bias was a ground covered by
the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 3 7, supra, and would justify only the voluntary inhibition of the judge. In
contrast, Judge Elumba's situation rested on a ground for mandatory disqualification because it emanated from the
conclusive presumption of his bias.29 Such a ground should have been forthwith acknowledged upon Judge Elumba's
assumption of the judgeship in Branch 42, or, at the latest, upon the ground being raised to his attention, regardless of the
stage of the case.
Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be expected to render
impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-disqualification resulted in
the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings
held against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case
No. 17446 should be remanded to the R TC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial consequences of the
violation of the right to due process. The case shall be raffled to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge
Elumba under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. For, as we said in Pimentel v. Salanga:30

This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and
impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest
of justice. Such was the view taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the
filing of charges by a party against a judge generated 'resentment' or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice,
which is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed on the 'principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on
the part of the judge' which 'is as old as the history of courts.' We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the
circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge's finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice.
Accordingly, we set

aside the judgment and directed a new trial.31

WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals
and the judgment rendered on August 22, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court; REMANDS Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao to the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City with instructions to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court to assign it to any Regional Trial Judge not disqualified under Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; and INSTRUCTS the new trial judge to resume the trial in Criminal Case No. 17446
starting from the stage just prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando R. Elumba as the trial judge, and to hear and
decide Criminal Case No. 17446 with reasonable dispatch.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Lepanto Capataz Union, 691 SCRA 11, February 18, 2013

G.R. No. 157086. February 18, 2013.*

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The requirement of the timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari accords with the principle of exhausting
administrative remedies.The requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration as a precondition to the filing
of a petition for certiorari accords with the principle of exhausting administrative remedies as a means to afford every
opportunity to the respondent agency to resolve the matter and correct itself if need be.

Same; Same; Appeals; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Any decision, resolution or ruling of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Secretary from which the Labor Code affords no remedy to the aggrieved party may be reviewed
through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the Court of Appeals in deference to the principle of the hierarchy of
courts.The ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma, 304 SCRA 405 (1999) reiterates St. Martin Funeral
Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), where the Court has pronounced that the special
civil action of certiorari is the appropriate remedy from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
view of the lack of any appellate remedy provided by the Labor Code to a party aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC.
Accordingly, any decision, resolution or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from which the Labor Code affords no remedy to the
aggrieved party may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the CA in deference to the principle of the
hierarchy of courts.

Labor Law; Capatazes; Words and Phrases; Capatazes or foremen are not rank-and-file employees because they are an
extension of the management, and as such they may influence the rank-and-file workers under them to engage in
slowdowns or similar activities detrimental to the policies, interests or business objectives of the employers.We note
that Med-Arbiter Lontoc found in her Decision issued on May 2, 2000 that the capatazes were performing functions totally
different from those performed by the rank-and-file employees, and that the capatazes were supervising and instructing
the miners, mackers and other rank-and-file workers under them, assess[ing] and evaluat[ing] their performance, mak[ing]
regular reports and recommend[ing] new systems and procedure of work, as well as guidelines for the discipline of
employees. Hence, Med-Arbiter Lontoc concluded, the capatazes differ[ed] from the rank-and-file and [could] by
themselves constitute a separate bargaining unit. xxx xxx In any event, we affirm that capatazes or foremen are not
rank-and-file employees because they are an extension of the management, and as such they may influence the rank-
and-file workers under them to engage in slowdowns or similar activities detrimental to the policies, interests or business
objectives of the employers. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Lepanto Capataz Union, 691 SCRA 11, G.R. No.
157086 February 18, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 157086 February 18, 2013

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Capatazes are not rank-and-file employees because they perform supervisory functions for the management;
hence, they may form their own union that is separate and distinct from the labor organization of rank-and-file
employees.
The Case-

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) assails the Resolution promulgated on December 18, 2002,1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed its petition for certiorari on the ground of its failure to first file a
motion for reconsideration against the decision rendered by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE); and the resolution promulgated on January 31, 2003,2 whereby the CA denied Lepanto's
motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

As a domestic corporation authorized to engage in large-scale mining, Lepanto operated several mining claims
in Mankayan, Benguet. On May 27, 1998, respondent Lepanto Capataz Union (Union), a labor organization
duly registered with DOLE, filed a petition for consent election with the Industrial Relations Division of the
Cordillera Regional Office (CAR) of DOLE, thereby proposing to represent 139 capatazes of Lepanto.3

In due course, Lepanto opposed the petition,4 contending that the Union was in reality seeking a certification
election, not a consent election, and would be thereby competing with the Lepanto Employees Union (LEU),
the current collective bargaining agent. Lepanto pointed out that the capatazes were already members of LEU,
the exclusive representative of all rank-and-file employees of its Mine Division.

On May 2, 2000, Med-Arbiter Michaela A. Lontoc of DOLE-CAR issued a ruling to the effect that the
capatazes could form a separate bargaining unit due to their not being rank-and-file employees,5 viz:

xxxx

We agree with petitioner that its members perform a function totally different from the rank-and-file employees.
The word capataz is defined in Websters Third International Dictionary, 1986 as "a boss", "foreman" and "an
overseer". The employer did not dispute during the hearing that the capatazes indeed take charge of the
implementation of the job orders by supervising and instructing the miners, mackers and other rank-
and-file workers under them, assess and evaluate their performance, make regular reports and
recommends (sic) new systems and procedure of work, as well as guidelines for the discipline of
employees. As testified to by petitioners president, the capatazes are neither rank-and-file nor
supervisory and, more or less, fall in the middle of their rank. In this respect, we can see that indeed the
capatazes differ from the rank-and-file and can by themselves constitute a separate bargaining unit.

While it is claimed by the employer that historically, the capatazes have been considered among the rank-and-
file and that it is only now that they seek a separate bargaining unit such history of affiliation with the rank-and-
file association of LEU cannot totally prevent the capatazes from disaffiliating and organizing themselves
separately. The constitutional right of every worker to self-organization essentially gives him the freedom to
join or not to join an organization of his own choosing.

The fact that petitioner seeks to represent a separate bargaining unit from the rank-and-file employees
represented by the LEU renders the contract bar rule inapplicable. While the collective bargaining agreement
existing between the LEU and the employer covering the latters rank-andfile employee covers likewise the
capatazes, it was testified to and undisputed by the employer that the capatazes did not anymore participate in
the renegotiation and ratification of the new CBA upon expiration of their old one on 16 November 1998. Their
nonparticipation was apparently due to their formation of the new bargaining unit. Thus, while the instant
petition was filed on 27 May 1998, prior to the freedom period, in the interest of justice and in consonance with
the constitutional right of workers to self-organization, the petition can be deemed to have been filed at the time
the 60-day freedom period set in. After all, the petition was still pending and unresolved during this period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and a certification election among the capataz employees of the
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company is hereby ordered conducted, subject to the usual preelection and
inclusion/exclusion proceedings, with the following choices:

1.Lepanto Capataz Union; and

2.No Union.

The employer is directed to submit to this office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof a copy of the certified
list of its capataz employees and the payroll covering the said bargaining unit for the last three (3) months prior
to the issuance hereof.

SO DECIDED. 6

Lepanto appealed to the DOLE Secretary.7

On July 12, 2000, then DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis- Baldoz (Baldoz), acting by authority of the
DOLE Secretary, affirmed the ruling of Med-Arbiter Lontoc,8 pertinently stating as follows:

xxxx

The bargaining unit sought to be represented by the appellee are the capataz employees of the appellant. There
is no other labor organization of capatazes within the employer unit except herein appellant. Thus, appellant is
an unorganized establishment in so far as the bargaining unit of capatazes is concerned. In accordance with the
last paragraph of Section 11, Rule XI, Department Order No. 9 which provides that "in a petition filed by a
legitimate labor organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall, pursuant to Article
257 of the Code, automatically order the conduct of certification election after determining that the petition has
complied with all requirements under Section 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules and that none of the grounds for
dismissal thereof exists", the order for the conduct of a certification election is proper.

Finally, as to the issue of whether the Med-Arbiter exhibited ignorance of the law when she directed the
conduct of a certification election when appellee prays for the conduct of a consent election, let it be stressed
that appellee seeks to be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all capataz employees
of appellant. There are two modes by which this can be achieved, one is by voluntary recognition and two, by
consent or certification election. Voluntary recognition under Rule X, Department Order No. 9 is a mode
whereby the employer voluntarily recognizes the union as the bargaining representative of all the members in
the bargaining unit sought to be represented. Consent and certification election under Rules XI and XII of
Department Order No. 9 is a mode whereby the members of the bargaining unit decide whether they want a
bargaining representative and if so, who they want it to be. The difference between a consent election and a
certification election is that the conduct of a consent election is agreed upon by the parties to the petition while
the conduct of a certification election is ordered by the Med-Arbiter. In this case, the appellant withdrew its
consent and opposed the conduct of the election. Therefore, the petition necessarily becomes one of a petition
for certification election and the Med-Arbiter was correct in granting the same.9

xxxx

In the ensuing certification election held on November 28, 2000, the Union garnered 109 of the 111 total valid
votes cast.10

On the day of the certification election, however, Lepanto presented an opposition/protest.11 Hence, on February
8, 2001, a hearing was held on Lepantos opposition/protest. Although the parties were required in that hearing
to submit their respective position papers, Lepanto later opted not to submit its position paper,12 and contended
that the issues identified during the hearing did not pose any legal issue to be addressed in a position paper.13

On April 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep of DOLE-CAR rendered a decision certifying
the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all capatazes of Lepanto.14

On May 18, 2001, Lepanto appealed the decision of Med-Arbiter Gacad-Ulep to the DOLE Secretary.

By her Resolution dated September 17, 2002,15 DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas affirmed the decision
dated April 26, 2001, holding and disposing thus:

Appellant accused Med-Arbiter Ulep of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction based on her
failure to resolve appellants motion to modify order to submit position papers and on rendering judgment on
the basis only of appellees position paper.

We deny.

Section 5, Rule XXV of Department Order No. 9, otherwise known as the New Rules Implementing Book V of
the Labor Code, states that "in all proceedings at all levels, incidental motions shall not be given due course, but
shall remain as part of the records for whatever they may be worth when the case is decided on the merits".

Further, the motion to modify order to submit position papers filed by appellant is without merit. Appellant
claimed that the issues over which Med-Arbiter Ulep directed the submission of position papers were: (1)
failure to challenge properly; (2) failure (especially of LEU) to participate actively in the proceedings before the
decision calling for the conduct of certification election; and (3) validity of earlier arguments. According to
appellant, the first issue was for appellee LCU to reply to in its position paper, the second issue was for the LEU
and the third issue for appellant company to explain in their respective position paper. It was the position of
appellant company that unless the parties filed their position paper on each of their respective issues, the other
parties cannot discuss the issues they did not raise in the same position papers and have to await receipt of the
others position paper for their appropriate reply.

Section 9, Rule XI of Department Order No. 9, which is applied with equal force in the disposition of protests
on the conduct of election, states that "the Med-Arbiter shall in the same hearing direct all concerned parties,
including the employer, to simultaneously submit their respective position papers within a non-extendible
period of ten days". The issues as recorded in the minutes of 28 February 2001 hearing before the Med- Arbiter
are clear. The parties, including appellant company were required to submit their respective positions on
whether there was proper challenge of the voters, whether LEU failed to participate in the proceedings, if so,
whether it should be allowed to participate at this belated stage and whether the arguments raised during the
pre-election conferences and in the protests are valid. The parties, including appellant company were apprised
of these issues and they agreed thereto. The minutes of the hearing even contained the statement that "no order
will issue" and that "the parties are informed accordingly". If there is any matter that had to be clarified,
appellant should have clarified the same during the said hearing and refused to file its position paper
simultaneously with LCU and LEU. It appears that appellant did not do so and acquiesced to the filing of its
position paper within fifteen days from the date of said hearing.

Neither is there merit in appellants contention that the Med- Arbiter resolved the protest based solely on
appellee LCUs position paper. Not only did the Med-Arbiter discuss the demerits of appellants motion to
modify order to submit position papers but likewise the demerits of its protest. We do not, however, agree with
the Med-Arbiter that the protest should be dismissed due to appellants failure to challenge the individual voters
during the election. We take note of the minutes of the pre-election conference on 10 November 2000, thus:
"It was also agreed upon (by union and managements legal officer) that all those listed will be allowed to vote
during the certification election subject to challenge by management on ground that none of them belongs to the
bargaining unit". (Underscoring supplied)

It is therefore, not correct to say that there was no proper challenge made by appellant company. The challenge
was already manifested during the pre-election conference, specifying that all listed voters were being
challenged because they do not belong to the bargaining unit of capatazes. Likewise, the formal protest filed by
appellant company on the day of the election showed its protest to the conduct of the election on the grounds
that (1) none of the names submitted and included (with pay bracket 8 and 9) to vote qualifies as capataz under
the five-point characterization made in 02 May 2000 decision calling for the conduct of certification election;
(2) the characterization made in the 02 May 2000 decision pertains to shift bosses who constitutes another
union, the Lepanto Local Staff Union; and (3) the names listed in the voters list are members of another union,
the Lepanto Employees Union. This constitutes proper challenge to the eligibility of all the voters named in the
list which includes all those who cast their votes. The election officer should have not canvassed the ballots and
allowed the Med-Arbiter to first determine their eligibility.

Notwithstanding the premature canvass of the votes, we note that appellant company failed to support its
grounds for challenge with sufficient evidence for us to determine the validity of its claim. No job description of
the challenged voters was submitted by appellant from which we can verify whether the said voters are indeed
disqualified from the alleged five-point characterization made in the 02 May 2000 decision, either before the
Med-Arbiter or on appeal. Neither was the job description of the shift bosses whom appellant company claims
pertain to the alleged five-point characterization submitted for our perusal. The challenge must perforce fail for
lack of evidence.

As to the alleged membership of appellee LCUs member with another union LEU, the issue has been resolved
in the 02 May 200[0] decision of Med-Arbiter Lontoc which we affirmed on 12 July 2000.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 26
April 2001, certifying Lepanto Capataz Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all capataz workers
of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, is AFFIRMED.

SO RESOLVED.16

Ruling of the CA

Still dissatisfied with the result, but without first filing a motion for reconsideration, Lepanto challenged in the
CA the foregoing decision of the DOLE Secretary through a petition for certiorari.

On December 18, 2002, the CA dismissed Lepantos petition for certiorari, stating in its first assailed
resolution:

Considering that the petitioner failed to file a prior motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the public
respondent before instituting the present petition as mandated by Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, the instant "Petition for Certiorari Under Rule 65 with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction" is hereby DISMISSED.

Well-settled is the rule that the "filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution generally warrants the petitions outright dismissal. As we
consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration by a concerned party is indispensable for it
affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the
courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondents. Here, the plain and adequate remedy expressly
provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, based on palpable or patent
errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned resolution of the
NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or
decision of NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof." (Association
of Trade Unions (ATU), Rodolfo Monteclaro and Edgar Juesan vs. Hon. Commissioners Oscar N. Abella,
Musib N. Buat, Leon Gonzaga, Jr., Algon Engineering Construction Corp., Alex Gonzales and Editha
Yap. 323 SCRA 50).

SO ORDERED.17

Lepanto moved to reconsider the dismissal, but the CA denied its motion for reconsideration through the second
assailed resolution.18

Issues

Hence, this appeal by Lepanto based on the following errors, namely:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT NO PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
FILED. THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY BEING FINAL AND EXECUTORY, A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR PETITIONER.

II

ON THE MERITS, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION, [O]R WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUNG THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002, WHEN
SHE DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE FACTS AND RULED IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT
UNION, DESPITE HER OWN FINDING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PREMATURE CANVASS
OF VOTES. 19

Lepanto argues that a motion for reconsideration was not an available remedy due to the decision of the DOLE
Secretary being already classified as final and executory under Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997;20 that the Unions
petition for consent election was really a certification election; that the Union failed to give a definite
description of the bargaining unit sought to be represented; and that the capatazes should be considered as rank-
and-file employees.

The issues to be resolved are, firstly, whether a motion for reconsideration was a pre-requisite in the filing of its
petition for certiorari; and, secondly, whether the capatazes could form their own union independently of the
rank-and-file employees.

Ruling

The petition for review has no merit.

 I.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari to
assail the decision of the DOLE Secretary

We hold to be untenable and not well taken Lepantos submissions that: (1) a motion for reconsideration was
not an available remedy from the decision of the DOLE Secretary because of Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) the ruling in National Federation of
Labor v. Laguesma21 (recognizing the remedy of certiorari against the decision of the DOLE Secretary to be
filed initially in the CA) actually affirms its position that an immediate recourse to the CA on certiorari is
proper even without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.

To start with, the requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration as a precondition to the filing
of a petition for certiorari accords with the principle of exhausting administrative remedies as a means to afford
every opportunity to the respondent agency to resolve the matter and correct itself if need be.22

And, secondly, the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma reiterates St. Martins Funeral Home v.
National Labor Relations Commission,23 where the Court has pronounced that the special civil action of
certiorari is the appropriate remedy from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
view of the lack of any appellate remedy provided by the Labor Code to a party aggrieved by the decision of the
NLRC. Accordingly, any decision, resolution or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from which the Labor Code
affords no remedy to the aggrieved party may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the
CA in deference to the principle of the hierarchy of courts.

Yet, it is also significant to note that National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma also reaffirmed the dictum
issued in St. Martins Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission to the effect that "the remedy of
the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 x x x."24

Indeed, the Court has consistently stressed the importance of the seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration prior to filing the certiorari petition. In SMC Quarry 2 Workers Union-February Six Movement
(FSM) Local Chapter No. 1564 v. Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation25 and Manila Pearl Corporation v.
Manila Pearl Independent Workers Union,26 the Court has even warned that a failure to file the motion for
reconsideration would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner.27 Due to its extraordinary nature as a remedy,
certiorari is to be availed of only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.28 There is no question that a motion for reconsideration timely filed by Lepanto was an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of the possibility of the Secretary of Justice
reconsidering her disposition of the matter, thereby according the relief Lepanto was seeking.1wphi1

Under the circumstances, Lepantos failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration prior to filing its petition
for certiorari in the CA rendered the September 17, 2002 resolution of the DOLE Secretary beyond challenge.

II.

Capatazes are not rank-and-file employees; hence, they could form their own union

Anent the second issue, we note that Med-Arbiter Lontoc found in her Decision issued on May 2, 2000 that the
capatazes were performing functions totally different from those performed by the rank-and-file employees, and
that the capatazes were "supervising and instructing the miners, mackers and other rank-and-file workers under
them, assess[ing] and evaluat[ing] their performance, mak[ing] regular reports and recommend[ing] new
systems and procedure of work, as well as guidelines for the discipline of employees."29 Hence, Med-Arbiter
Lontoc concluded, the capatazes "differ[ed] from the rank-and-file and [could] by themselves constitute a
separate bargaining unit."30

Agreeing with Med-Arbiter Lontocs findings, then DOLE Undersecretary Baldoz, acting by authority of the
DOLE Secretary, observed in the resolution dated July 12, 2000, thus:31

The bargaining unit sought to be represented by the appellee are the capataz employees of the appellant. There
is no other labor organization of capatazes within the employer unit except herein appellant. Thus, appellant is
an unorganized establishment in so far as the bargaining unit of capatazes is concerned. In accordance with the
last paragraph of Section 11, Rule XI, Department Order No. 9 which provides that "in a petition filed by a
legitimate labor organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall, pursuant to Article
257 of the Code, automatically order the conduct of certification election after determining that the petition has
complied with all requirements under Section 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules and that none of the grounds for
dismissal thereof exists", the order for the conduct of a certification election is proper.32

We cannot undo the affirmance by the DOLE Secretary of the correct findings of her subordinates in the DOLE,
an office that was undeniably possessed of the requisite expertise on the matter in issue. In dealing with the
matter, her subordinates in the DOLE fairly and objectively resolved whether the Union could lawfully seek to
be the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit of capatazes in the company. Their factual findings, being
supported by substantial evidence, are hereby accorded great respect and finality. Such findings cannot be made
the subject of our judicial review by petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because:

x x x [T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall
raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor
and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise
in their respective field. Judicial review of labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence
on which the labor officials findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of
both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at
bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis
of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative
value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45.
Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the
conclusions made by the appellate court may be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual
findings.33

In any event, we affirm that capatazes or foremen are not rank-andfile employees because they are an extension
of the management, and as such they may influence the rank-and-file workers under them to engage in
slowdowns or similar activities detrimental to the policies, interests or business objectives of the employers.34

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review for lack of merit, and AFFIRMS the resolutions
the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 18, 2002 and January 31, 2003.

Petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Ung third case mo wala sa SCRA kasi 2017

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198968, January 18, 2017

STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, AND ADMIBROS SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD.,

Petitioners, v. RODRIGO C. DOCTOLERO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners Status Maritime Corporation (Status Maritime) and Admibros Shipmanagement Co., Ltd.
(Admibros) appeal to assail the March 17, 2011 decision1 and October 6, 2011 resolution2 promulgated in CA-
G.R. SP No. 113206, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA), modifying the decision3 rendered on August 18,
2009 by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), awarded permanent and total disability benefits in
favor of respondent Rodrigo C. Doctolero. chanrob lesvirtuallawlibrary

Antecedents

On July 28, 2006, Status Maritime, acting for and in behalf of Admibros as its principal, hired Doctolero as
Chief Officer on board the vessel M/V Dimitris Manios II for a period of nine months with a basic monthly
salary of US$1,250.00. Doctolero underwent the. required. Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME)
prior to his embarkation, and was declared "fit to work." He boarded the vessel in August 2006.

On October 28, 2006, while M/V Dimitris Manios II was in Mexico, Doctolero experienced chest and
abdominal pains. He was brought to a medical clinic in Vera Cruz, Mexico. When no clear diagnosis could be
made, he resumed work on board the vessel. In the evening of the same day, however, he was brought to Clinic
San Luis, also in Mexico, because he again complained of abdominal pains. He was then diagnosed to be
suffering from "Esophago-Gastritis-Duodenitis." The attending physician, Dr. Jorge Hernandez Bustos,
recommended his repatriation.

On October 29, 2006, Doctolero again experienced difficulty of breathing while waiting for his return flight
schedule. He informed the ship's agent of his condition and requested assistance, but the latter extended no
assistance to him. Thus, he, by himself, went to the Hospitales Nacionales, where he was admitted. He paid the
hospital bills amounting to MXN$7,032.17 on his own.4 Upon discharge, he sought assistance from the
Philippine Embassy until his repatriation to the Philippines in the second week of November 2006.5

On November 16, 2006, the company-designated physician evaluated Doctolero's condition and found normal
upper gastro-intestinal endoscopy and negative H. pylori test.6 Doctolero was recommended for several other
tests that were, however, not administered.

On January 22, 2007, on account of the illness suffered while working on board the M/V Dimitris Manios II,
Doctolero filed in the NLRC his complaint demanding payment of total and permanent disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, sickwage allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and legal
interest on his claims.7
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On July 18, 2008, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.8 He opined that the initial diagnosis of gastritis-duodenitis was not one of those listed as an occupational
illness in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC);
and that no evidence was adduced to establish that such illness had been caused or aggravated by the working
conditions on board the vessel.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Decision of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's finding no basis for the award of sickness allowance and
disability pay but held the petitioners liable to reimburse to Doctolero the cost of his medical treatment in the
amount of $7,040.65. It ratiocinated and disposed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx The illness was clearly suffered during the term of his contract and insofar as work relatedness is
concerned, there being no contrary evidence adduced by the respondents-appellees of the nonexistence of
causative circumstances of complainant-appellant's illness, We are constrained to rule in the latter's favor. The
latter finding is likewise supported by the consistent ruling that it is not required that the employment be the
sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits
incident thereto. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small measure, to the development
of the disease.

That said, complainant-appellant is thus entitled to reimbursement of his medical expenses in Veracruz, Mexico
equivalent to $7,040.65. (Records, p. 28) However, with respect to his claims for sickness allowance and
disability pay, there being no declaration as yet of complainant-appellant's fitness to return to work or degree of
disability made by the company designated physician, entitlement thereto has not attached. We take note of the
fact that the initial evaluation of the company designated physician was that the Gastroscopy was normal and
after such evaluation there had been no other assessment on his condition made. We also note that there had
been no other assessment made by any other doctor of complainant-appellant's condition that would controvert
the findings of the company designated physician and that this complaint has been filed before the 120 days
period given to company designated physician to make a fitness to return to work assessment or a disability
grading in the latter case. It is clear therefore that the instant case has been prematurely filed and that the cause
of action for disability claims has not arisen.

Moreover, to this date there had been no evidence showing that complainant-appellant is permanently and
totally disabled.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding no basis for award of sickness
allowance and disability pay. However, respondents-appellees are hereby ordered to reimburse complainant-
appellant the cost of his medical treatment in the amount of $7,040.65. Accordingly, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated July 18, 2008 is hereby MODIFIED.

SO ORDERED.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Doctolero moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied his motion for reconsideration on January 8,
2010.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Decision of the CA

By petition for certiorari, Doctolero assailed the adverse decision of the NLRC in the CA, insisting that the
NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On March 17, 2011,12 the CA granted the petition for certiorari, and declared Doctolero's illness as work-
related because it had been contracted by him while on board the vessel; that he had undergone rigid pre-
employment medical examinations by virtue of which the company physicians had declared him fit to work;
that he was entitled to disability benefits because he had been unable to perform his customary job for more
than 120 days; and that he was further entitled to moral and exemplary damages because the petitioners had
failed to shoulder the expenses he had incurred while he was awaiting his repatriation.

The CA decision disposed thusly:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed Decision of public respondent in that
private respondents are ordered to pay petitioner the following:

1. US $60,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine peso at the time of actual payment, as permanent
and total disability benefits:

2. Moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.

3. US$7,040.65 by way of reimbursement of the cost of medical treatment in Mexico City; chanrobleslaw

4. Legal interest on the monetary awards to be computed from the time of this decision up to the
actual payment thereof; chanrobleslaw

5. Sick wage allowance equivalent to 120 days of his basic salary; chanrobleslaw

6. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total awards.

SO ORDERED.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Upon the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA amended the dispositive portion of its decision through
the resolution promulgated on October 6, 2011, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed Decision of public respondent in that
private respondents are ordered to pay petitioner the following:

1. US $60,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine peso at the time of actual payment, as permanent
and total disability benefits; chanrobleslaw

2. Moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00; chanrobleslaw

3. $7,040.65 (MXN) by way of reimbursement of the cost of medical treatment in Mexico

City;

4. Legal interest on the monetary awards to be computed from the time of this decision up to the
actual payment thereof; chanrobleslaw

5. Sick wage allowance equivalent to 120 days of his basic salary; chanrobleslaw

6. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total awards.

SO ORDERED.

In all other respects, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioners argue that the PEME did not reveal the real state of health of Doctolero; that he
did not show that his illness had occurred during the term of his contract and had been work-related or had been
aggravated by the conditions of his work; and that his illness was not listed either as a disability or as an
occupational disease under Section 32 and Section 32-A, respectively, of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Doctolero counters that the CA did not err because its assailed decision was based on law and jurisprudence.

It their reply, the petitioners stress that there was no finding by an independent physician that Doctolero's illness
had been work-related or had been aggravated by his working conditions; and that Doctolero's complaint was
premature for being filed before the expiration of the 120-day period of treatment by the company-designated
physician and in the absence of the disability grading.

Based on the foregoing, the issue to be determined is whether Doctolero was entitled to claim permanent and
total disability benefits from the petitioners. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Permanent and total disability ts defined m Article 1 98(c)(1) of the Labor Code, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided for in the Rules.

xxxx ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The relevant rule is Section 2, Rule X, of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code,
which states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning the Jirst day of such disability. If caused
by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive clays except where such injury or
sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability
in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and
permanent status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

These provisions have to be read together with the POEA-SEC, whose Section 20(3) states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to
his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.15 ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary

Applying the aforementioned provisions, we find the filing of the respondent's claim to be premature.

In order for a seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper, any of the following
conditions should be present:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty
or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical
treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240
days;
 (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;

(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day
period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-8(3) of
the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;

(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other
doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not
only permanent but total as well;

(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is
a dispute on the disability grading;

(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-
related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-
B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;

(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and

(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-
day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of
said periods.16
Although the degree and extent of the seafarer's disability constitute a factual question that this Court should not
re-assess on review, the conflict between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, on one hand, and
those of the CA, on the other hand, compel the Court to dwell on the factual matters and to re-examine the
evidence adduced by the parties.17 Upon its re-evaluation of the records, therefore, the Court concludes that the
CA's findings in favor of entitling Doctolero to permanent and total disability benefits were erroneous. While
the fact that Doctolero suffered the disability during the term of his contract was undisputed, it was evident that
he had filed his complaint for disability benefits before the company-designated physician could determine the
nature and extent of his disability, or before even the lapse of the initial 120-day period. With Doctolero still
undergoing further tests, the company-designated physician had no occasion to determine the nature and extent
of his disability upon which to base Doctolero's "fit to work" certification or disability grading. Consequently,
the petitioners correctly argued that Doctolero had no cause of action for disability pay and sickness allowance
at the time of the filing of his complaint.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the March 17, 2011 decision and October 6, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals awarding permanent disability benefits to respondent Rodrigo C. Doctolero;
REINSTATES the decision rendered on August 18, 2009 by the National Labor Relations Commission; and
ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Reyes, Jardeleza, and Caguioa,*JJ., concur.

chanRob lesvirtualLawlibrary