Krieger 1952

The Intellectuals and European Society
Author(s): Leonard Krieger

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Jun., 1952), pp. 225-247
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
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THE INTELLECTUALS AND EUROPEAN SOCIETY'
R ECENT evaluations
have tendedto pass one of two
judgments upon theEuropeanintellectuals.It has been
concludedeitherthat theylive in isolationfromtheir
societyand say nothingrelevantto it or thattheyare entirely
submerged in the societyand merelyreflectit.2 The factsto
which thesejudgmentsreferare clear enough. On the one
hand,intellectuals have adopteda criticalpositionvis-'a-visall
theimportant socialand politicalforcesof the day,whichoffer
no footholdfor theirideas. The continentalmiddle classes
have movedintoconfessional partiesin whichclericaland eco-
nomic interestspredominate;the secularliberalpartieshave
beenreducedto splintergroupsof theRight;theworkingclass
adhereseitherto a communism whichhas a set,unalterable doc-
trineor to socialistpartieswhichcan no longerafforda clear
theoreticalbasis;theorganizations of the Resistanceare dead-
Sartrewrotetheirepitaphwithhis withdrawalfromthe Ras-
semblementDemocratique Re'volutionnaire, which he had
helpedto found in theirimage. On the otherhand, intel-
lectualshave adoptedan apologeticpositionvis-'a-visinstitu-
tional forces-state,party,church,or university-onwhich
theyare increasingly forcedto dependfortheirlivelihoodand
fortheircontinuedintellectualexistence. The factorsbehind
thisdevelopment rangefromthe ibureaucratization of the in-
tellectualswhich has grownout of the shrinkageof middle-
classinheritedincomesand rthefinancialinstability of the gen-
eral periodical-thedisappearance of Horizon and Die VWand-
1 This paper was originallydeliveredbeforethe EuropeanSeminarof Columbia
EuropeanInstitutein March 1951.
University's
2 An excellentarticlewhich goes beyondthesecategories
is by KennethDouglas,
"The French Intellectuals:Situationand Outlook", in Edward Mead Earle, ed.,
Modern France: Problemsof the Third and Fourth Republics (Princeton,1951),
pp. 61-81.
[225]
226 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXVII
lung are outstandingcases in point-to the threatwhich the

Sovietdangerposesforfreedom of expression as theintellectuals
have knownit.
These alternative
,conclusionsare susceptibleof two rather
obviousexplanations.The firstis that'thesamephenomenon is
judged by different writersfromdivergent pointsof view. A
prevalenceof esotericthemes,for example,can be interpreted
eitheras a productof intellectual isolationor as an evasionof
responsibilityaccruingto the intellectuals'uncriticalsubmer-
gencein society. The secondexplanationis thatthejudgments
referto differentgroupsof intellectuals:the liberalintellectuals
are in generalidentifiable as the critics;Communistintellec-
tuals,orthodoxreligiousthinkers, academiciansand civil serv-
ants are identifiedas the apologists. But despitethe variant
judgmentsand distinctionsan importantproblemremains:
whatarethegeneralconceptions heldby theintellectuals which
formthe backgroundof theirsocial ideas and on which the
judgmentsof themmust'be based? Interestin thesegeneral
conceptionsrepresents morethan mereidle curiosity, for it is
oftenthe generaloutlookof an intellectual ratherthan his so-
cial positionas such 'thatdefines'him. Thus, the extentto
whicha Catholic,an academic,or even a governmental intel-
lectualis subordinated to the institutionwithwhichhe is as-
sociatedmaywell dependnot simplyupon his associationwith
that institutionbut also upon his ideas about the natureof
realityin general,social realityin particular,and the specific
role of his institution
in it. This functionof ideas permitsa
varietyof socialrelationshipsfortheintellectuals.Conceptions
which allow or encourageintellectuals to finda securehaven
with some recognizedsocial or politicalorganizationare of
littleinterest,
forby and largetheycometo termswithofficial
doctrines whichare well known. Likewise,conceptions which
influenceintellectualstoward a total unconcernwith society
supplylittlesubstanceforan understanding of Europeansoci-
ety. But thoseconceptionswhichimplya tensionin the in-
tellectualbecausetheyare addressedto social realityand yet
are unalblewhollyto penetrateit-such conceptionsare ob-
jectsof generalconcern.
No. 2] INTELLECTUALS AND EUROPEAN SOCIETY 227
The importance of thiskindof generalconceptionliesin the

promisewhichit holdsout to .menthatideascan build a plat-
formout fromthe worldinto an absoluterealmfromwhich
the world can be moved. For an age in whichthe unitary
strandsof socialexperience havetendedto unraveland in which
tinkering withtheresultant partshas beenrelegatedto theeffi-
ciencyexpert,the presenceof total viewswhichare somehow
connectedwithexperience seemsto offertheonlypossibility of
organizingand improvingthe elementsof this concreteex-
istence. To revertto a previousillustration, religiousthinkers
who seeknot so muchto rationalizethe existingrOleof faith
and thechurchesby exegesesof traditional doctrineas to inter-
pretanewt'heir functionon the'basisof thenew generalinsights
of 'theage, academicians who are not contentto remainwithin
the framework of theirspecialfieldsbut go beyondthemto
apply theirknowledgeand'theirmethodsto generalproblems
of humanity-suchmen participatein the crucialissuebefore
themodernintellectual.
However variousits manifestations, this kind of problem
be
may accountedthepr6blempar excellenceof the li'beralin-
if liberalbe definedforthispurposeas referring
tellectuals, to
thathalbitof mindwhichmanifests anxietyaboutthe concrete
organizationof life,is yet dissatisfiedwith currentformsof
organization, and is everopento new idealimpulseswhichseek
to developthisorganization beyondthoseforms. In thissense,
liberal" includesnot only representatives of the familiar
secularpoliticaltraditionnor only 'theintellectualsfreeof all
institutionalattachment, but ratherall thoseintellectualswho,
whatevertheirmundaneties,are responsive to generalcurrents
whichcomefrombeyondthoseassociations and createa tension
in them.
The attemptwill be madehereto deal withsomeof thegen-
eral attitudeswhich formthe backgroundfor the social and
politicalorientationof Europeanintellectualswho are " liberal"
in thisbroadsense.
II
Somebackgroundis requiredto givean idea of the direction
in whichEuropeandhinkers
have beentraveling, fortwentieth-
228 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXVI
centurythoughtis composedof such a peculiarmelangeof old

and new elementsthatonly a historicalanalysiswill enableus
to discoverwhatis distinctive aboutit.
Althoughthereis somedoubtas to whetherthelay intellec-
tual has hisoriginsin the Romanrhetorician or the Italianhu-
manist,we mayfinessethatissue. The story,forour purposes,
beginsin the eighteenth century. It is at thispointthat the
socialpositionof theliberalintellectualand thesubstanceof his
thoughtmeetin such a way as bothto makehim an effective
forcein societyand to createthe problemwhichis his main
concerntoday. The positionof the intellectualcombinedtwo
elements:he still carriedover fromthe humanistshis con-
sciousness of beinga memberof an autonomous spiritualestate,
with all ithecriticalfunctionsof the clerc attributedto this
estate by JulienBenda ('himselfa good' eighteenth-century
type); but he was at the sametime,usuallyby originand al-
mostunanimously by conviction,representative of the aimsof
theliberalaristocracy and themiddleclasses,so rthat thestand-
ardsof hiscriticism werenot simplythoseof theconscienceof
thesocietybut entaileda programfora new order. This posi-
tionof the intellectual manifested itselfin the characterof his
message. In 'thefirstplace,he had no needto concernhimself
with" purethought", since'thepresuppositions of histhinking
had 'beenworkedout in themetaphysical and scientificsystems
of the seventeenth-cenitury, and since,on the basisof thisse-
curity,he could limithimselfto whatconcernedhumanaffairs.
In the second place, 'the so-called rationalsynthesisof the
eighteenth centurywas,in content,theperfectmeeting-ground
for the cosmosand the individual. The externalframeof
meaningand the goalsof 'theindividualwereconsideredto be
entirelyconsonant; reality and ideals were homogeneous.
Hence therewas no 'bar'totherealizationof ideals,and thein-
strument of thisrealization
was thefreesociety. Consequently,
therewas no hindranceto the initellectual's immersing himself
in socialreality,forit was to thisarenathat he was naturally
led, withoutfearof corruption, even by his contemplation of
theeternalverities.And so theinrtellectual salliedforthto do
battleagainstthosephenomena of existence whichweremalevo-
lent and, in a sense,illusory,therebyfulfilling his traditional

functionwhileyetpointingtheway fora specificsocialgroup
withwhosematerialgoalshe did not identifyhimself.
The collapseof this rationalsynthesis, manifestedin Im-
manuelKant and the FrenchRevolution,broughta real crisis
of conscienceto the intellectuals.The worldof existences had
shownitselfto be, whetherthroughthe Revolutionor the re-
action,infinitely morecomplexand less manageablethan had
beensupposed. Nevertheless, despitean initialreactionduring
theearlyyearsof thenineteenth centuryin whichthesynthesis
was replacedby a confusionof partialcomplexesof thought,
suchas romanticism and Destuttde Tracy'ssensationalism, and
intellectuals
recoiledback beforethe problemsof politicaland
socialreality(it is notentirely fortuitous thatDestuttde Tracy
coinedthe term" ideology" at thistime), theysoon returned
to the charge,built up systematic world-viewsand operated
sociallywithinthem. But theirideas and theirsituationhad
undergonea significant change. The externalframework of
man's activitywas no longer consideredhomogeneouswith
men'spurposes;but whilenot of the samestuffas thesepur-
poses,yet it was compatiblewith them. T-hecosmicpattern
imposedcertainlimitsupon man's activitybut yet permitted
and even encouragedmen to achievetheirgoals withinthose
limits. But this impliedan ambivalentattitudetowardthe
worldof existence, and in a sensetheemphasison realitywhich
has beencalled the hallmarkof the nineteenth centurywas a
functionof the necessityfor carefulexaminationof and ab-
stractionfromthisrealityto securewhatwas usableformanin
it-the rationalforphilosophical idealists,thelawfuland prag-
matic for positivistsand scientists. Historybecameessential
evento systematic thinkers fortheworkingout of theimplicit
conflictbetweenthe two aspectsof reality-thatis, the ex-
ternalworldand the internalideal.
The immediateconsequenceof such preconceptions, visible
particularlyin themiddlethirdof thenineteenth century,was
to bringthe systematizers into more intenseparticipation in
politicaland social realitythan ever before,for theirsystems
demandedman'sconcreteactivityto workout the oppositions
withinthe world (hence'thedifficulty of classifyingmen like

Comte, Marx, Mill and Spencerwithinany specificfieldof
rthought).Whileconservative appearedupon the
intellectuals
sceneand underlined thecomplexity of reality,the bulkof the
thinkerscontinuedto plug the same libertarian values,realiz-
able throughsociety,as had been advancedin the eighteenth
century. However,as the centurywore on into the 70s and
80s,theever-growing consciousnessof the multiplicity of real-
ity began to take its itoll. With conflicting materialinterests
comingto dominatethe politicaland social scene in an un-
precedentedly unabashedform,the intellectuals tendedto split
up in a way farmorelbasicthanthepoliticalor even thephilo-
sophicaldifferencesbetweenthem. One section,perceiving this
arenato be impervious to theirideals,withdrewto the Olym-
pian heightsof generalcriticism, whilethe otherssubordinated
theirtheoriesto theinterests of theinstitutionswithwhichthey
cast theirlot and becamerootedin a self-consciously middle-
class society. The lattertendencywas reinforced by the de-
velopmentamong academiciansof a characteristic type of
scholarwho lived offthe new specialization of discilplinesand
addressedhimselfto the studyof isolatedaspectsof existence.
Though neithernecessarilynor universallydefinitiveof the
academicprofession, thisdevelopment, by slighting the general
relationshipsof particularstudies,has 'hadthe effectof exclud-
ing a sizablegroupof lay thinkersfromthe ranksof the in-
tellectuals.
III
Even allowingfor the inevitalble errorsof perspective, the
thinkingof our own centuryseemsinfinitely comiplex. The
positionswhichWesternman has takenforthe past 'twothou-
sandyearsall seemto reappearuponthesceneand demandonce
moreto be recognizedas ultimatesolutions. Religiousthought
in mystical,eschatological,or humanisticinterpretations, ra-
tionalism,scientific
materialism, idealism,are all in the arena
still,not simplyas the remnantsof intellectualtraditionsbut
revivified,almostblatantin theirpresentclaims. But thisvery
coexistence bespeaksa commonelementin theintellectual situ-
ationin whichtheyspawn. A frameof reference whichper-

mitsof so manydivergent interpretations is hardlyany longer
a singleframeof reference.Karl Jaspers hassaid thatcomplete
systems of thoughtareno longerpossible,thatthereis no longer
any possibilityof comprehending the wholeof reality. What
has happenedis thattherealitywhichwas so ambivalently con-
ceivedby the nineteenth-century thinkershas lost that aspect
whichmade it rational'to man and compatiblewith his pur-
poses. It has lost its cohesivepower and has become frag-
mented;its total meaninghas disappeared. And since reality
in thissenseis taken to includesocietyas well as cosmos,it
would seemthat the tendencies exhibitedin the latterpart of
the nineteenthcentury-hypercriticism, withdrawal,or sub-
ordination-havebeencarriedthroughto theirlogicalconclu-
sions,thattheideasof theEuropeanintellectuals tendto escap-
ism or to treasonand theirconsequentpositionin societyto
impotence.
Certainly,this seemsto be the reigningconceptionof the
presentstatusof theEuropeanintellectuals, one thatis inherent
in the mood of theirliteratureand that constitutes the chief
impression fromcurrentsurveysof the situation.3Moreover,
therewouldseemto be goodevidence,asidefromliterature, for
sucha conclusion.An important segmentof Europeanthought
betweenthewarswas dominatedby a combination of nihilism
and activism, by theconception,,thatis, thata meaningless and
mechanizedworld was closingdown upon man and that the
only possibilityfor man's self-assertionin such a world-and
thispossibilitywas limited-layin thepowerfuldeed,in which
would be harnessedthe primitivelife-forces of elementalna-
ture; theveryfactof suchdeeds,ratherthantheirends,would
be the triumphagainst the encroachingmeaninglessness of
whichmen's apathyand 'powerlessness were consideredan in-
tegralpart.
A corollarywas the tendencyto adhereto the social unit
fromwhichsuch powercould be mosteffectively drawn and
the hierarchicalorganizationof societywhichwould permitit
to be utilized. This group,exemplifiedin thecircleof Die Tat
3 For example, Saturday Review of Literature, January 13, 1951.
in Germany,was balancedby thosewho continuedto believe

in thevaluesinherited fromtheeighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turiesbut who, confrontedwith the utterimperviousness of
realityto thosevalues,could do littlebut talk of crisis. If the
firstgroupmovedone stepfurther alongtheroadto immersion
of thoughtin life,the secondmanifested an extensionof the
movement of late nineteenth-icenturycriticismin the direction
of withdrawal, since theyhad lost the notionof an essential
systemof realitywhichthiscriticism had had and consequently
had lostthetoeholdin socialrealityfromwhichto work.
For thesemovements to be understood arightit mustbe em-
phasizedthat theywere reactionsagainstthe nineteenth-cen-
turysystemsand particularly reactionsagainstthe formwhich
thosesystemstook duringtheearlypartof thetwentieth cen-
in
tury theirfirstattempt to accommodate themselves to the
new conceptionof reality;for the period fromabout 1890
until just afterthe FirstWorld War witnessedthe returnof
theolderidealism, in bothitsphilosophical and itsgeneralmoral
sense,to the attemptto impregnate a balkyrealitywithvalue.
This was, significantly, the period of the neo-neo-idealism,
withbothvariantsof a neo-Kantianism and a neo-Hegelianism,
as wellas a revisionismwhichamountedto a neo-Marxism, both
of the Rightand theLeft.
This was the period,too, in whichit was realizedthat the
formerconceptionsof a rationalrealitywhichpermittedthe
realizationof the ideal mustbe replacedby a new synthesis in
which the ideal had to be worked,throughthe inteinsified
activityof man,into a realitywhichcould no longerbe con-
ceivedsystematically and to whichconsequently concessions had
to be made. Thus the new Germanintellectual liberalism,of
theMax Weber-Naumann stamp,combininga socialethicwith
nationalpower. Thus theFabianmarriageof convenience with
trade unionism. Thus the Frenchinsistence, in an Alain, a
Peguy,a Juares,on justiceand integrity not as qualifyingbut
as replacinga generalsystemof thought. And thus,on a philo-
sophicalplane,thetendencyof the neo-Kantiansto scrap the
Ding-an-sichand to proceedto emphasizebeyondKant the
activityof humanconsciousness and particularly the necessity
No. 2] INTELLECTUAL AND EUROPEANSOCIETY 233
of communalaction for ethicalends. For thesegroups,the

natureof realityno longeraffordeda coherenttotality,but
society,whichrepresented the mediatingspherebetweenman
and thisgeneralrealityand partookof elementsof both,was
still accessibleto man. It was the FirstWorld War and its
aftermath whicheffectively broughtthisattemptat reintegra-
tionto a close,whichlinedup societyon thesideof alienpower,
and whichconsequentlyfed into the undercurrent of general
skepticismwhich had 'been developingfrom Nietzsche and
Pareto.
This is not thewholestoryof the period,however. At this
pointwe mustdistinguis'h betweenlevelsof intellectual
activity.
The processdescribedabove-that is, ithenew attemptaltthe
realizationof idealsand the subsequentcombinationof disap-
pointment, pessimism and activism-certainly reflectedthe cli-
mateof the age, but at the sametimeit represented what we
may call the secondarystage of ideas: that is, it represented
attemptsat adaptationby originalthinkersand attemptsat
applicationby publicizersof ideas developedin a previous
period. Simultaneously, however,thinkersbegan to work on
another, a primary, level: apartfromthesocialand thematerial
forcesof theirage, they'beganto developnew philosophies to
interpretdirectly,ratherthan throughthe mediumof older
ideasand values,thegeneralexperience of theirage. That this
experience called for a new approachis perhapsevidentin the
fact that for the firsttime since Hegel men demandedthat
philosophy retrieveitselffromthe functioninto whichit had
fallenof examiningthemethodsand assumptions of thespecial
disciplines,notablyin the relationship of positivismto the
naturalsciences,and undertakea new and fundamentalex-
aminationof reality. Hence some characterization-however
superficial-ofthesenew philosophies is probablymoreappro-
priateto and revealingof the generalassumptions of the age
whichhas producedthemthan the generalmood expressedon
otherlevelsof thinking.
What is immediately strikingaboutthenew linesof thought
is the difficultyof definingthem. Not onlyhas noneof them
achievedany positionof predominance but even withineach
generaltendencyindividualthinkers divergemarkedly, thereby

testifying to the(breakdown of any acceptedgeneralframework
of realityor of thought. " Schools" of thought,then,in the
strictsense,are not to be looked for. With this reservation,
however,certainclassifications: of philosophiesof recentvintage
can be discerned. The phenomenologists and the logicalposi-
tivistsrepresenttransitions fromoldertypesof thoughtinto
thepresentage,thelatter,to be sure,onlyin thelogicalrather
thanthechronological senseof transition.Consequently, they
containelementslikephenomenology's aim of establishingphi-
losophyas a rigorousscienceand its assumption of theessential
rationality of realityand like logicalpositivism'sself-dedication
to explicatingthe basesand methodsof thesciences,whichare
not whollytypicalof contemporary thinking. But in other
elementstheyare trulyrepresentative: not only does the phe-
nomenologicalmethod,which is radical and dynamicrather
thananalyticand static,receivewidespread currentapplication,
but its attitudetowardtheworldof existence, in requiringthe
suspensionof existencefor the comprehension of rationales-
sences,recognizesboth its potentialities and its obfuscations;
logicalpositivism revealsan implicittensionin its superimposi-
tionof " convenient " systems of symboliclogic,fortheexpli-
cationof meaning,upon theempiricalbasiswhichis, forit, the
onlyknowablerealityand yetof whichthesesystems arestruc-
turallyindependent.
Here thesetwo kindsof thoughtfallintolinewiththetypes
of thinking whicharepeculiarly characteristicof ourtime:first,
the philosophies of experienceor processor life, manifested
variouslyin metaphysicians like Alexanderand Whitehead,
idealistslike Croce and Collingwood,and the philosophies of
historyassociatedwithhistoricism, withor withouttheirneo-
Kantianattemipts at an absolute,but generallyhavingin com-
mon the rejectionof stalbleconceptsbased upon an organized
realityin favorof approximations to autonomous entitiessome-
how experienced or intuitedor pragmatically comprehended in
theirflightthroughtimeand history(the Americancounter-
part would 'be pragmatism, and only here does this category
show a genuineschool); secondly,the familiardoctrinesof
existentialism,in its Christianand secularforms. One might

add, of thedlderschoolswhichhave ibeendecisivelyinfluenced
by this newerthought,the Catholicpersonalism of Mounier
and Marcel,4 and the Protestantwritings of the Barth and Til-
lichstripe.5What,forour purposes, can 'besaid to be common
to all thesemodernphilosophies?
The basicattitudewhichmustbe emphasized, becauseit is so
contraryto the generalconceptionof modernthought,is its
confidence.The fragmentation of reality,thelossof meaning,
is to theseschoolsnothingabsolute;it is notthemarkof failure
of nerveor of mind,butratheris theresultof errorsof previous
philosophywhichposed a falseset of questionsand emerged
with a falseset of answersthe illusorycharacterof whichis
simplybeingprovedin our age. Abjuringsystemsand arbi-
trarydistinctions, distinction,
such as the suhbject-object upon
whichsystemshave been founded,contemporary thoughtbe-
ginsfromwhat it considersto be irreducibles-theindividual
4 Catholic personalismrepresentsthe organizationand developmentof a more
generalmodeof thoughtgoingback to the latteryearsof the nineteenth century.
Born in the reactionagainstthe dissolution empiricism
of the individualby scientific
(particularlyin psychology)and objectiveidealism,the explicationof the integral
" person" as a central concept found its chief early representatives in Charles
Renouvierand WilhelmStern,and, in this country,at the Universityof California
from 1919. The conceptwas takenup by the group of FrenchCatholicsaround
Mounierand Marcel (Denis de Rougemontis the one Protestantprominently repre-
sented) as a resultof the world depression of 1929, and in this formhas foundan
organ in the periodicalEsprit,foundedin 1932; its Germancounterpartcan be
studiedin WalterDirks and his Frankfurter Hefte. While this latestformof the
conceptmay be said to be responsible for the " ism" in personalism,the movement
is not to be regardedas constituting eithera philosophicalsystemor a political
doctrine. Its proponentsview it ratheras an approach,an attitude,with nothing
exclusiveabout it. What is characteristic of this approachis the equal emphasis
upon the absoluteand the relative,the ideal and ,thematerial,the moral and the
social,the individualand the community.The " person", for thesethinkers, repre-
sentsthe focalpointfor the necessary interplayof thesevital elements:as opposedto
the conceptof the "individual", now taintedby scientificthoughtand classical
economics,the "persons" is the incarnationof totalityin disperseand partial
temporalhistoryand consequently is the necessarycenterfor any actionwhichis to
be both ethicallydetermined and practicallyeffective.
5 It is, of course,arbitraryto lump recentProtestantthoughttogetherin this
way. Karl Barth'sneo-orthodoxy, for example,is verydifferent
in its originalfrom
Paul Tillich's religioussocialism. In their later development,
however,these two
movementshave drawn closer together,with Barth'sprovisionfor a social theory
and Tillich's constructionof a generalphilosophy.
entityand immediateexperience. The characterof the indi-

vidualentitiesvaries,of course,withthespecificphilosophy: in
the theoriesof processand in logicalpositivism, theyare the
individual"'occasion" and the individualsense-datum which
is experienced;in phenomenology and existentialism they are
the individualmind or consciousness whichexperiences.For
our purposes,however,these distinctionsare not decisive.
Whatis decisiveis thecommonsurrender or at leastsuspension
of the convictionthatithegraspingof realitymustbe' sought
throughits totalcoherencein favorof theconvictionthatthe
individualentityis a microcosm and is therefore theproperand
indispensable'basisfora new approachto reality. Moreover,it
followsthattheverydissolution of realitythroughthedestruc-
tionof the absolutesubjectby historyand the destruction of
theabsoluteobjectby thenew science-thisverydissolution of
realityintoprocesswhichthrowsthetotalityof theprocessinto
the realmof the unknown-makespossilble an unprecedently
certaingraspof theindividualconstituents of thatprocess;for
theknowerand theknownareintegralin experience.Knowl-
edge can be attainedonly throughconcreteparticipation in a
life-processwhich is made up of autonomousindividuals.
Knowledgethen comes,not from contemplation, but from
creativeactivity;thisactivityconcretizes beingintoindividual
experience.Thus free,concreteparticipation makesup, accord-
ing to thisview,the individuallife-process whichis the basic
stuffof reality.
The problemraisedby thisconceptionis clear: how does the
individualentity,immersed in itsownprocess,getbeyonditself,
how does it come to a relationship with the otherentitiesand
the otherprocessesand therdbyattainsomeknowledgeof the
whole? How, in otherwords,is meaninginfusedinto the ex-
perienceof the individualentity? This, of course,is the de-
cisivequestion;for,havingattainedsomesecurityof knowledge
throughtransferring the 'basisof theirconsideration fromthe
realityof the worldin generalto the arenaof the individual
world,thisquestioninvolvesthereturnto thetraditional prob-
lemof thegeneralcoherence of reality. The issueis notshirked
No. 23 INTELLECTUALS AND EUROPEAN SOCIETY 237
by modernthinkers, who are proudof havingescaped,to their

own satisfaction, thedangersof solipsismand who extendtheir
feelingof confidence fromthecomprehension of individualen-
titiesto the possibilityof buildingthe generalstructureof
realityon -thisbasis. Thus the phenomenological methodin-
cludesnot onlya processof reduction, 'butone of the " consti-
tutionof theworld", whilesomelogicalpositivists, at least,re-
ject what theycall the " reductivefallacies" of old-fashioiied
positivism in favorof an " attitudeof reconstruction ".
The acknowledgement of the problem,however,does not
mean that completesolutionshave been workedout, but the
generallineswhichsuch solutionsshouldtake have been indi-
cated. In general,the answersgivenin modernthoughtre-
volve aroundthe conceptof transcendence, a conceptwhich
has undergonea change in meaningalong with the general
shiftin thelocusof thinking.Whereasformerly transcendence
referred to a realitybeyondand abovethewholecosmosknown
by man and was therefore simplydescriptive of two realmsof
reality,it now refersto a realityto be knownor createdwithin
the cosmos'beyondtheparticularexperience of individualmen
at a certaintimeand a certainplace and consequently becomes
not simplya description 'but an actual powerin the lives of
men,openingthem'tothepossibilities of actionin a meaningful
worldbeyondthe hereand now. By reason,then,of the in-
dividualizedbasisof reality,the conceptof transcendence has
becomecentralin modernthought, notonlyforthequestionof
ultimatereality,but even for the questionof this-worldly
reality.
The specificinterpretations of thisconceptvary with each
thinker,but forour purposewe may distinguish two different
typesof treatment of the problemof transcendence.In the
firsttype,transcendence is filledby God,in thesecondby man.
In thefirsttype,onlyfaithin God givesassuranceof thecoher-
ence of all processand consequently of a meaningwhichcan
give direc'tionto the individual thatis, whichcan
life-process;
draweachmomentof theprocessbeyonditselfand thereby pro-
vide not only'thegoals but also the verybasisfor continuous
creation. Mostof contemporary thoughtexpoundsor assumes
a transcendence of thiskind. The secondtypeof transcendence

is represented primarilyby Heideggerand Sartre: through
" conscience"and " decision", man,by an exerciseof his sov-
ereignfreedom,engageshimselfin existence,fromhis inter-
actionwithexistencehe establishesgoalsforhisown actionand
thereby, by creatingbeing,transcends his immediatesituation,
his immediateexperience.It shouldbe notedthat forneither
type is the substantivedirectionof the transcendence clear,
save for the specifically
Christiansectionof the divinetrans-
cendentalistswho fillthe gap withrevelation.For the others,
transcendence seemsitorepresentsimplythecategoricalimpera-
tive to go beyondthe ipresent;the substanceof the absolute
therebypostulatedseemsto be no morethanthesumof thein-
dividualalbsoluteswhichby its richnessand diversity
manifests
the value of humanfreedom.
IV
This has been a difficult and abstractexcursion,but one
necessaryto uncoverthe assumptions behindthe kindof writ-
ing whichthe intellectuals have been doingsincethe war; for
undoubtedly thechiefissuefortheintellectual has 'becomethat
of engagement, and what thismeanscan hardlybe understood
withoutreference to thetotalassumptions of theage. The ex-
ternalevidencesof engagement aremanifold. Not onlydo the
generalreviewsintermingle philosophical,literary,
politicaland
social articles-with the purpose,as Dolf Sternbergeran-
nouncedin Die Wandlung, " of drawingSpiritinto practical
responsibilityand illuminating politicswithSpirit"-but lead-
ing exponentsof thenew philosophies havecomedownintothe
puiblicistic
and even into the politicalarena (with the notable
exceptionof Heidegger).
Whatwe havecalledtheprimaryand thesecondary stagesof
ideas now meeton even termsin the discussionof European
socialand politicalproblems.Moststrikingherehave beenthe
yearlymeetings of theRencontresInternationales de Geneve,
wherephilosophers like Karl Jaspers,Georg Lukacs, Nicholas
Berdyaev,Merleau-Ponty, Guido de Ruggieroand Karl Barth
and men of letterslike Andre Siegfried, JulienBenda, Pierre
Herve,GeorgesBernanos,StephenSpender,Hans Paeschkeand
Denis de Rougemonthavemetto discussproblems. whichlivein
thatintermediate zone of value betweenphilosophy and society
-problems like the EuropeanSpirit,TechnicalProgressand
Moral Progress,Toward a New Humanism. The temperof
thesediscussions is well illustrated by an incidentwhichtook
place earlyin the discussionof technicaland moralprogress.
One participantaroseand tenderedto the assemblya piece of
advice,taken,he said,froman old Eskimoproverb:whenyou
wantto huntthesealin thesea,don'tgo whistling in themoun-
tains. This admonition to presentconcreteproposalsforaction
tooktheconference by storm,thereby revealing thedeep-rooted
desireof Europeanintellectuals to applythemselves to thesolu-
tionof politicaland socialproblems.
Froman externalpointof view,then,it wouldseemthatthe
mostrecentperiodof Europeanthoughthas beencharacterized
not so muchibythe development of new philosophies as by the
generalrecognition of the necessityfor the intellectualto en-
gage himselfin the politicaland social arena. Tlis simplein-
terpretation of engagement, however,does not suffice eitherto
explaintheconceptas theEuropeansholdit or to exiplain what,
underits aegis,the intellectuals -aretryingto do. It mightbe
men.tioned, in the firstplace, that such an interipretation is
hardlydistinctive, for in the 1840s this kind of engagement
wasprecisely therallying cryof theYoung Hegeliansin general
and of theyoungKarl Marx in particularfortheirrevisionof
Hegel. But secondly,and moreimportant, the injunctionto
engagein socialrealityseemsrathersuperfluous to an age which
has lbeenthinkingalong the lines which have been analyzed
above: whenthe individualis so immersed in process,in exist-
ence,it is hardlya contribution to tellhimto immersehimself
still further.
Actually,engagement meanstwo things. First,it statesthe
fact,impliedin all contemporary thinking,that men are en-
gagedin existence, willy-nilly,and thatconsequently contem-
plative,staticthoughtis an illusion. But secondly,it means
that men shouldbe engagedto transcendence, that is, to the
moralpurposewhichreachesout beyondman's immediateex-
istenceand in the light of whichhe undertakesthe creative

activitywhichgivesmeaningto his life. This doublemeaning
is clearnot onlyin GabrielMarcel,who,incidentally, seemsto
havecoinedtheterm" engagement " in itscontemporary philo-
sophicalusage,butin Heideggeras well. The implication of the
doublemeaningof engagement is a dual attitudetowardsociety.
In the firstplace, the individualis engagedin society;the
existenceof otherindividualsabouthim,theexistenceof social
and politicalinstitutions, help to make up the total situation
whichgoesto formthe experience of theindividualand hence
to helipmakehimwhathe is: in thissense,societyis on theone
handnecessary and on theotherneutralor nauseousforthein-
dividual.
In thesecondplace,however,theindividualshouldstriveto
transform theoriginalengagement to societyinto a moralone;
throughengagementto his own transcendent goal, he opens
himselfto an absolute (which he eitherattainsor creates)
whichbecomesthegroundnot onlyof his own personality but
of his recognition of the personality of othersand of his es-
sentialpersonalrelationship to them.
The fundamental natureof thisdualityis reflected widelyin
contemporary thought,for societyis seen increasingly as the
arenain which the crucialstrugglesthat are to decideman's
destinymustbe foughtout: societyis viewedboth as an em-
bodimentof the concreteexistencein whichman is immersed
and as an instrument for the transcending of that existence.
In the abstractformwhich much of contemporary German
writinggivesit, the dualityappearsin the prevalenceof such
themesas sleep,silence,phantasy,which are deemedto give
man, apart from society,the continuityand the coherence
whichthe broken-uprationalarticulation of societylacks and
withwhichit mustbe suppliedfromoutsideitself. It appears
too in such discussions as the one gracedby the Eskimoprov-
erb mentionedabove; for,despitethe acclaimaccordedthe de-
mand for practicalsolutions,the subsequentdebate was in-
terrupted periodically by equallyurgentwarningsof the perils
of unremitting socialconcretionand by demandsforpurifica-
tionthroughdiscussion of philosophical principles.The duality
is striking
in ImmanuelMounier'sidea of thebasicallydramatic
qualityof humanhistory, of theeternalwithdrawaland return
of Christianfaith,characterized at once by transcendenceand
incarnation, fromand to humansociety,which alternately is
fructifiedby that faith,attractingit into socialparticipation,
and corruptsit, repellingit into an extra-socialrealmfor its
self-purgation.The dualityis evidenttoo in themanycurrent
spiralconceptionsof humanhistory,whichbespeakthe alter-
nation betweenman's creativetransformation of his social
worldand theoppressive weightof thisworlduponman'sfree-
dom. Indeed,in theseideasthe infinitedrama,withits impli-
cationsof ultimateimperfection and incompleteness,
is notonly
necessarybut desirable,becauseit providesan ever-recurring
challengeto man's assertion of his freedomand of his creative
capacities. This line of thoughtis closelyassociatedwith the
conceptionof man'sself-alienation whichare
and self-recovery
presentin thethoughtof Hegel and emphaticin thethoughtof
Marx. It is the presentrelevanceof this concepition which
helpsto explaintherecentrevival,in Franceat least,of interest
in the youngHegel and the youngMarx. It helpsto explain
too why the sameclimatewhichleadsintellectuals towardex-
istentialformsof thoughtleadsso manyalso to Marxism.
V
Giventheemphasisupon engagement, theconcernof thein-
tellectualswithspecificsocial and politicalissuesfollowsnatu-
rally,but,sincetheconceptof engagement is partof a general
attitudeand not of a philosophical the
system, applications are
not logicallyconsequent. The contentof such applicationsis
not given in structuredsocial and politicaltheories. If the
ideasin thisfieldcontaina pattern,it mustbe elicitedfroma
seriesof concreteproposals. Here two examplesof such pro-
posalswill be examined:on thesocialproblemand on theprob-
lem of the nation-state.
The connectionbetweenthe intellectuals' generalconceptof
man and theirjudgmentupon the presentconditionof Euro-
pean societylies in theirconvictionthat the presentsituation
represents an epitomein the processof man's self-alienation.
There is widespreadpreoccupationwith the problemof the

technicalcivilizationin all its ramifications:
mechanization of
labor, of the state,of pulblicopinion,of war, and even of
thought-thelastin theformusuallyof a critiqueof theolder
Cartesianbasisof scientific thinking. This concernis hardly
new, and it must be owned that the solutionsproffered are
hardlymuchof a noveltyeither. Theyarein agreement on the
necessityof what in generalseemsto be a liberalsocialism.
Whatis surprising is,first,
theenthusiasticpropounding of such
a solution,secondly,the generaltheoreticalagreement on the
subject,and, thirdly, the basisof theirposition. For the basic
motifis neitherdemocraticnor socialistic,but ratherindivid-
ualistic. And t'hisin two senses: first,that ultimatelythe
highestvalues to be servedare values of the individual,and
second,thattheonlypossiblemeansof socialsalvationare these
samevaluesof theindividual.
What are thesevalues? The namesgiventhemare familiar:
humanism,liberty,moral spirit. Only these forces,coming
fromthe inherentcreativepowerof individuals-and partic-
ularlyintellectuals-cancreatea societyin whichtheseforces
will be safeguarded.'Where'thendoes the socialismcome in?
Socialismis simplya requiredconditionof engagement and par-
takesof the dual natureof engagement.It is consideredboth
as an inevitableaspectof 'thehostilesocialworldin whichthe
spiritmustwork and as a portionof the transcendent goal to
whichthe spiritmustcommititselfif manis to recovercontrol
over his destiny. This kindof thinkingscarcelyconstitutes a
rigorouspoliticalsystemand actuallywithinits framework
thereis at leastone imiportant distinction.For thosewho fill
the labels humanism,liberty,moral spirit,with a traditional
content,the emphasisis upon the individual,upon the liberal
in liberalsocialism.
This tendencyis particularly trueformenlike Karl Jaspers,
whoseacceptanceof the necessityof socialismis reluctantin-
deed,and findsitsextremeexpression in theMoralRearmament
group,now activeon thecontinentas well as in England. For
the Catholicpersonalists, who seek to infusetraditionalChris-
tian values with a radicallynew interpretation, individualism
and socialismare in delicatebalance-and tension. For those

thinkers,finally,who considerthe commonlabels simplyas
formswhichprovidethe necessaryconditionsof social action
but whichrequirea new contentthatcannotbe definedin ad-
vance,theemphasistendsto be upon thesocialism, in the faith
thatexperiencewill createa new and genuinerelationship be-
tweentheindividualand societyand will therebyalso createa
newethic. Thus whenSartrehelpedfoundhispoliticalorgani-
zation in 1948, he definedits programsimplyto be revolu-
tionarydemocratic socialismas a transcendent goal arisingfrom
the projectionof man's freedomin his actual social situation,
but at the same timehe admittedthat a theorywhichwould
bridgethe gap betweenthe conditionsand the goal could be
established only throughdiscussionbased upon the experience
of the associationitself. It can be said that this pattern,in
whichthe initialrealityis firmlycomprehended, the finalgoal
generallyenvisaged,and the connectingsocial meansentirely
confused,is a qualitybequeathedto politicalthinkingby the
generalcharacterof contemporary thought.
The absenceof a clearlinecapableof resolving in actionthe
dual conceptionof engagement leavesthe impression that the
Europeanintellectuals feel the need both to take accountof
and yetcarefullyto skirtaroundeveryvitalforcein European
society. The repeatedinjunctionthatmen remain" open" to
all possibleexperience,the convictionthat all systemscontain
partialtruths,the emphasisupon attitudeas opposedto doc-
trine,withtheconcomitant strivinigto penetrateall groupsand
partiesratherthanto formpartiesthemselves (hencetherecent
emphasison the " Rally" and the " Movement" as againstthe
"Party ")-all these ideas testifyto the eclecticism of con-
temporary politicalthought.
At the sametime,however,it mustTbesaid that the vague-
nessof thesocialthinkingby Europeanintellectuals todayis at
leastin partattributableto theconvictionthatthesocialprob-
lem is not, as such, the ultimateone in the currentpolitical
scene. This consideration bringsus to our secondillustration
of itheresultsof the intellectuals'
engagement-their proposals
concerning thenation-state; forwhatdoesseemto be ultimate,
for them,is the generalproblemof transcendingthe old nation-

state and of achievinga new level fromwhich European society
may take a new start and on which the old formulasmay as-
sume new meanings. The prevalent concern with European
unity is, for the intellectuals,not so much an issue in itself as a
possiblewedge into the solutionof this generalproblem. Silone
has written that 'the old distinctionbetween Right and Left,
as measuredin political or social terms,is an anachronism,and
must give way to what is today the essentialdistinction-pro-
union and antiunionof Europe-on the grounds that the social
problem cannot be resolved within the traditional framework
given by the national state.
As far as the internationalrelationsof the intellectualsthem-
selves are concerned,the problemof European integrationseems
to presentno great obstacles. Writersof differentnationalities
meet togetherin discussion,write in one another'sjournals, and
study one another's output. Again, although no system of
thoughtexiststo which intellectualsof various nationalitiescan
subscribe-save possibly Catholic personalism,and this has ob-
vious limitationsfor unity-the break-up into various schools
has not followed national lines. It is true that the empirical
traditionremainsstronglydominantin England-and thismust
be accounted an elementin the generalpositionof England vis-
a-vis Europe- ibuton the continent the influentialr8le of ex-
istentialismin France and Germany,and of Crocean idealismin
Italy, is hardly exclusive. In any case, the day has long passed
when adherenceto a philosophyimplied a definitepolitical posi-
tion or vice versa, and the general presuppositionsbehind con-
temporary thought are sufficientlyuniform and sufficiently
flexibleto permit the kindlof agreementon general social and
political principlessuch as those discussedabove.
Consequently, the intellectuals agree that there is such a
thing as a particularEuropean spiritand that it should have its
counterpartin a European political union. The basis of the
agreementfollows the general pattern of contemporaryEuro-
pean thinking: it begins from a recognitionof the evils of the
national state, which is seen as simply another aspect of con-
temporarysociety alien to the human spirit,and it postulatesa
Europeanunionas a goal whichwill do away withthe evil by

establishing a new politicalenvironment.But on thisbasisthe
goal is not definedpreciselyenoughto permita clear view of
the meansto it. For,if the Europeanunionmustnot become
anothernationalstate,a dangeragainstwhich most intellec-
tualswarn,and if the Europeanspiritis definedin termsof a
universalhumanism, as theydo defineit, thenwhatis thepoint
of a merelyEuropeanunion? And so indeedmanyEuropean
intellectuals,includingthe French existentialists, the French
personalists,and the Protestants influenced by Karl Barth,re-
fuseto considerEuropein ultimatepoliticalterms;rejectingthe
whole notionof power blocs,rejectingalliancewith the na-
tionalstatesof both East and West, theyinvestEuropewith
the taskof workingout, in freedom,universalproblemscom-
mon to all humanity. Neutralism,then,is justifiedfor such
intellectuals,to applythe termsusedpreviously, by a dualistic
conceptionof engagement whichviewstheexistingstatesas its
arenaand absolutegoalsas its transcendent.
This idea was clearlyformulated in an open lettersignedby
a largegroupof Frenchintellectuals underthe aegisof Esprit
to theUnitedNationsin 1949: referring equallyto theWarsaw
Congressand statements of Americanatomicscientists, the in-
tellectualspetitionedfor a radical peace policyin orderthat
libertymightbe securedand socialismachievedin theEuropean
nations. Consequently,neitherthe Frenchexistentialists nor
the personalists are particularlyenthusiasticabout the move-
mentto EuropeanUnion. The existentialists pass over it in
silence,whilethe personalists see the projectnot as a creative
enterprisebut ratheras a collectionof countriespoolingthedis-
honorand ithehumiliation whichtheyfeelvis-'a-vistheUnited
States. Manyof theGermanintellectuals, excludingthe social
democrats and the Protestants underBarth'sand Niemoller's
influencebut includingthe Germanpersonalists, are, on the
otherhand,emphatically in favorof Europeanunion and op-
posedto neutralism.Britishwriterslike BertrandRusselland
RichardCrossmantendto glossoverEuropeanunionin favor
of the Atlantic community,while the nonsocialistBarbara
Wardgivesequal emphasisto both. For theGermansthemoti-
vationseemsclear. For themtheEuropeanunionis an arenaof

freedomin threerespects:it freesthemfromthe dangersof a
Germanstateand fromforeignoccupationwhilestillgranting
protectionfromSovietinvasion. The British, whotalkin terms
of whatCrossmancalls' democratic realism", tendto associate
theirvalueswith the existingstate-system; Russell'sinsistence
thatonlya philosophy of empiricismcan supportliberalpolitics
would seemto be relevantto thisline of thinking. Thus, for
thosewho are prounionand antineutralism the arenaand goal
of engagement meetat theintermediate levelof Europe,while
forthosewho are bothantiunionand antineutralism transcend-
enceis subordinatedto theexistingarenaor powerpolitics.
This generaldisparityof the viewsof theEuropeanintellec-
tuals on the questionof Europewithina common,vague ac-
ceptanceof theneedforsomekindof Europeancollaboration is
anotherexpression of the familiarpattern:theyare aware of
thedifficulties
of theexistingsituationand have someidea of a
goal whichshouldovercomethem,but no clearidea of thepath
fromone to the other. Indeed, we may conclude further:
muchof theconfusionseemsto comefromthe factthatwhen
theysay that theywant Europeanunity,it is oftena cover-
nameforsomething elsethattheyreallydo want. Actually,it
is any of the possiblepermutations afforded by the combined
problemsof peace or war and of greateror less social change
that determines theirrespectiveconceptionsof Europeanco-
operation,and sincethereis no agreement on how theseprob-
lemsare to be handledit is hardlysurprisingthatthe viewson
the questionof Europeare variousand thatthe concernwith
realizing unity is not urgent.
VI
What,then,can we concludefromthisanalysisof theEuro-
pean intellectuals?
First,theyareconvincedthattheycan understand thereality
of our worldand our societyand thatthisreality,by reasonof
can be acted upon, withinlimits,by
its very discontinuity,
man.
Second,as theirdifficult conceptof engagement attests,they

aremakingtheeffort themselves to cometo gripswithpolitical
and socialrealitywhileavoidingsubmergence in it. In thisre-
specttheyaretryingto steera difficult coursein orderto arrive
at a positionapproximating theone heldin theeighteenth cen-
tury.
Third, they differmarkedlyfrom the eighteenth-century
intellectualsin that their political and social ideas do not
lead societybut ratherseem to lag behind it. Despite the
new contextwhich theybringto values like humanism,the
person,liberty,progress, theydo not have sufficient contentto
distinguishthem fromthe-samehackneyed termswhichareused
in the official
languageof every-daypoliticsand whichare no
longerwhole-heartedly believedin.
Fourth,one of thereasonsforthelack of new contentis the
incompletestatusof contemporary thought-incomplete par-
ticularlyin theabsenceof an effective socialtheory.
Fifth,theabsenceof newsocialand politicaltheoryis in part
theconsequenceof the factthatthe intellectuals do not know
to what particularsocial forcestheycan engagethemselves in
order'to concretizetheirgeneralideas. Sartre'swithdrawal
fromtheorganization on,whichhe dependedto developa social
theory, on thegroundsthathe felttherewas no place forit in
thecontemporary worldof politics,is a case in point.
Finally,then,the intellectuals seem to have completedthe
in
circlestarted the eighteenth century. Once more,theyare
themiddle-class lilberals
par excellence. But now theirpromi-
nenceseems.tobe that,not of the vanguard,but of the strag-
glers. It is hardlysurprising, then,thatthe themeof political
and socialengagement has alreadybeenlabeledthethemeof the
1940s and thatotherintellectual developments, suitableto the
new decade,are anticipated.
LEONARD KRIEGER
YALE UNIVERSITY

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The Intellectuals and European Society

Author(s): Leonard Krieger

lung are outstandingcases in point-to the threatwhich the

The importance of thiskindof generalconceptionliesin the

centurythoughtis composedof such a peculiarmelangeof old

lent and, in a sense,illusory,therebyfulfilling his traditional

withinthe world (hence'thedifficulty of classifyingmen like

ationin whichtheyspawn. A frameof reference whichper-

in Germany,was balancedby thosewho continuedto believe

of communalaction for ethicalends. For thesegroups,the

generaltendencyindividualthinkers divergemarkedly, thereby

existentialism,in its Christianand secularforms. One might

entityand immediateexperience. The characterof the indi-

by modernthinkers, who are proudof havingescaped,to their

a transcendence of thiskind. The secondtypeof transcendence

istenceand in the light of whichhe undertakesthe creative

There is widespreadpreoccupationwith the problemof the

and socialismare in delicatebalance-and tension. For those

for them,is the generalproblemof transcendingthe old nation-

Europeanunionas a goal whichwill do away withthe evil by

vationseemsclear. For themtheEuropeanunionis an arenaof

Second,as theirdifficult conceptof engagement attests,they

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