REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS & DELA ROSA On the first issue, SC held that indeed the areas where
d that indeed the areas where the lands
(1988)
Facts:
The present case was a consolidation of three cases. All three
cases originated from an application for the registration of 9
parcels of land on 1965 located as Benguet Province applied by
De la Rosa. The application was opposed by Benguet
Consolidated Inc., Atok Big-wedge Mining Company and,
Republic through the Director of Forest Development. Here are
the arguments of the parties:
De la Rosa According to respondents, they acquired the lots
1-5 from one Balbalio and lots 6-9 from Jaime Alberto on 1964.
During the trial Balbalio and Alberto claimed that they and their
predecessors-in-interest were already in open, continuous, and
exlusive possession of the parcels of land for a long time and
presented as evidence tax declarations and tax receipts dating
back from 1956.
Benguet Petioner Benguet opposed on the ground that lots 1-
5 or June Bug Mining Claim, to which they assert their right,
were sold to them by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly
who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 1909. They have been in actual possession thereof since
their purchase on 1934.
Atok Atok Big-wedge opposed on the premise that portions
of lots 1-5 and all lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located and registered by Harisson and Reynolds
on 1931 which they claim to have been purchased by them on
November 1931and had been occupying since then.
Republic Republic argues that all the land sought to be
registered was covered by Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
through Proclamation No 219 on year 1929. Moreover, by
reasons of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
1935 and 1973 Constitution.
The trial court denied the application however on appeal, CA
reversed the ruling of the trial court granting the registration
modifying however the decision recognizing the sub-surface
rights of the two mining companies. Benguet, Atok, and
Republic appealed to the High Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition on non-
alienation of lands of public domain other that
agricultural land applies to the lands in dispute?
2. Whether or not the CA erred in granting surface rights
to De la Rosa and sub-surface rights to the petitioning
mining companies?
HELD:
were located are forest lands. This should not however affect the
vested rights of Benguet and Atok. SC agreed with the finding of
the appellate court that having acquired the lots from their
predecessors-in-interest who on their part acquired valid location
of the lots prior to the 1953 Constitution and before the
constitutional ban on private alienation of mineral lands, the
June Bug claim by Benguet, and the Emma and Fredia claims of
Atok, were therefore removed from the public domain and had
become private properties. As cited by the highest tribunal, a
valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the
public domain. The moment the locator discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location
in accordance with law, the power of the Government to deprive
him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the located claim was gone. Citing further, the legal effect of a
valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area
from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of
the locator. CA, as upheld by SC, said that it is of no importance
whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long
as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent.
The oppositors that having complied with all the requirements
of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can
take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having
become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law.
Since the lots were already private, it can therefore be validly
conveyed by the locators to Benguet and Atok. These rights
were recognized by the 1935 Constitution.
On the second issue, SC also agrees with CA that the properties
being private are now subject to vicissitudes of ownership,
meaning,it can change ownership to the modalities provided by
the law like abandonment and acquisitive prescription like the
De las Rosas asserted as an alternative in this case.However, it
denied the claim of the latter first, because it failed to prove their
continuouss aand exclusive possession and second, because their
claim was premised on the assumption that the lots were
agricultural whereas they were not.
SC held therefore that CA erred in granting the surface rights to
De la Rosa and subsurface to the mining companies reiterating
the well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has
rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. SC believes
that the rights over the lands were indivisible and that it cannot
be half-argricultural and half-mineral at the same time. The
Court held that CA misinterpreted the provision of the law that
The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any
purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of,
nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface. This is an application of the
Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining.
The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in
the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may
not be used by any private party, including the registered owner
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by
such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under
the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.