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not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the
neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call
for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever
proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its
vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in
. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America,
novel, unexpected ways
make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.
Imperialism DA Soft Power Link 1NC
US soft power is key to US power projection globally.
Nye 04 (Joseph Professor of International Relations at Harvard, Soft Power, pg. 26-27)
The 2003 Iraq War provides an interesting example of the inter- play of the two forms of power.
Some of the motives for war were based on the deterrent effect of hard power. Donald Rumsfeld is re-
ported to have entered office believing that the United States "was seen around the world as a paper tiger, a weak giant that couldn't take a punch" and
determined to reverse that reputation.40 America's military victory in the first Gulf War had helped to produce the Oslo process on Middle East peace,
and its zoo3 victory in Iraq might eventually have a similar effect. Moreover, states like Syria and Iran might be deterred in their future support of
terrorists. These were all hard power reasons to go to war. But another set of motives related to soft power. The neoconservatives believed that
American power could be used to export democracy to Iraq and transform the politics of the Middle East. If successful, the war would become self-
legitimizing. As William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan put it, "What is wrong with dominance in the service of sound principles and high ideals?"41
Even when a military balance of
Part of the contest about going to war in Iraq became a struggle over the legitimacy of the war.
power is impossible (as at present, with America the only super- power), other countries can still band together to
deprive the U.S. policy of legitimacy and thus weaken American soft power. France, Russia, and
China chafed at American military unipolarity and urged a more multipolar world. In Charles
Krauthammer's view, Iraq "provided France an opportunity to create the first coherent challenge to that dominance.'"+* Even without directly
countering the superpower's military power, the weaker states hoped to deter the U.S. by making it more costly for us to use our hard power.43 They
were not able to prevent the United States from going to war, but by depriving the United States of the legitimacy of a second Se- curity Council
resolution, they certainly made it more expensive. Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena. Outside the UN,
diplomacy and peace movements helped transform the global debate from the sins of Saddam to the threat of American empire. That made it
difficult for allied countries to provide bases and sup- port and thus cut into American hard
power. As noted earlier, the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow transport of ground troops and Saudi Arabia's reluctance to allow American use of
air bases that had been available in 1991 are cases in point. Since the global projection of American military force in
the fu- ture will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing
can have real effects on hard power. When sup- port for America becomes a serious vote loser,
even friendly leaders are less likely to accede to our requests. In addition, bypassing the UN raised the economic
costs to the United States after the war, leading the columnist Fareed Zakaria to observe, "The imperial style of foreign policy is backfiring. At the end
of the Iraq war the administration spurned any kind of genuine partnership with the world. It pounded away at the United Nations.""
Soft Power Link - Ext
SOFT POWER IS KEY TO IMPERIALIST HEGEMONY extend Nye 04 soft power
increases our ability to gain support for interventionist policies that leads to
international imperialism
Roland G Simbulan, Professor and Faculty Regent at University of the Philippines System,
Apr 30, 2003, Villegas, E.M. et al. (2002); Unmasking the U.S. War on Terror: U.S. Imperialist
Hegemony and Crisis; The Nature of Modern Imperialism, Left Curve, Iss. 27, pg 134, proquest,
accessed 07/11/07
The cultural hegemony of modern imperialism is not neglected by this book. The use of the so-called "soft power"--
winning hearts and minds of the world--through McDonalds, Levis, Hollywood, Microsoft and other U.S. commercial icons, has
effectively captivated hearts and minds in a globalized environment already dominated by
the military (or hard power) and economic terms of a single superpower. This is not just about the
Americanization of our eating habits. We must not underestimate this "soft power" being effectively
mobilized and used as an asset by this hegemonic hyperpower that is fast replacing
multilateralism with its own active brand of unilateralism in international politics, i.e., "the rule
of force" instead of the multilaterally-defined "rule of law" in United Nations conventions. Also, on the ideological battleground, is
U.S. imperialism's methodical efforts to secure effective legitimacy for American policy in other countries, such as Henry Kissinger's
invocation of European-style raison d'etat or Samuel Huntington and Jeanne Kirkpatrick's glorification of authoritarian rule and U.S.
imperialism's support for it. I am glad that an entire chapter was devoted to a critique of Francis Fukuyama and Huntington, two of
imperialism's foremost contemporary rightwing ideologues today. This has been a serious arena for U.S. hegemonic winning of hearts
and minds, both in the American heartland as well as among the educated elites in other countries.
No US credibility
Cottrell Assistant Professor of Political Science at Linfield College 2011 M. Patrick Hope or
Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in a Global Age Foreign Policy Analysis 7.3 wiley online
However, such a goal is extremely difficult to achieve and sustain. The world is chafing at perceived US double
standards with respect to international institutions. Most treaty-based institutions establish a principle of legal
equality, but in political reality this is simply not the case, especially in terms of the distribution of the costs and benefits of
institutional participation. Power
disparities and corresponding social roles can have a profound
impact on institutional legitimacy. Powerful states do, of course, provide a disproportionate share of the
resources for institutions to function, and their support is usually required to manage the institution and secure compliance. But they
also use this leverage
to pursue their strategic interests and perpetuate their relative power in
the international system, which can undermine institutional legitimacy both in terms of
process and substance.8
The United States, in particular, has received much criticism along these lines, causing a general
perception of an American problem in international politics (Mian 2004). Many perceive that
the United States enjoys disproportionate amount of institutional outputs, contradicts collective
values and norms, and uses its power to design procedural advantages (for example, the UN veto or
appointment of the Chairman of the World Bank Group) that fuel perceptions of a democratic deficit in
institutions. While there are some exceptions, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo deemed by many to represent an illegal,
yet legitimate action, the view that the United States too frequently acts above the law is widespread.9
difference. The gesture that will initiate the Apocalypse will not differ from any of the
other gestures and it will be performed, like all other identical gestures, by a similarly
routine-guided and routine-bound operator. If something symbolizes the satanic nature of
our situation, it is precisely that innocence of the gesture,' Anders concludes: the negligibility of the effort and
thought needed to set off a cataclysm - any cataclysm, including 'globocide' . . . What is new is the drone', aptly
called 'predator', which has taken over the task of gathering and processing information. The electronic equipment of the drone excels
in performing its task. But what task? just as the manifest function of an axe is to enable an axeman to execute a convict, the manifest
function of a drone is to enable its operator to locate the object of an execution. But the
drone that excels in that function and
keeps flooding the operator with tides of information he is unable to digest, let alone process promptly and
swiftly, 'in real time', may be performing another, latent and unspoken function: to exonerate the
operator of the moral guilt that would haunt him were he fully and truly in charge of selecting the convicts for
execution; and, more importantly still, to reassure the operator in advance that if a mistake
happens, it won't be blamed on his [or her] immorality. If 'innocent people' are killed, it is a technical fault,
not a moral failure or sin - and, judging from the statute books, most certainly not a crime. As Shanker and Richtel put it, 'drone-based
sensors have given rise to a new class of wired warriors who must filter the information sea. But sometimes they are drowning.' But is
not the capacity to drown the operator's mental (and so, obliquely but inevitably, moral) faculties
included in the drone's design? Is not drowning the operator the drone's paramount function? When in February 2011,
twenty-three Afghan wedding guests were killed, the button-pushing operators could blame it on the screens that had turned into 'drool
buckets': they got lost just by staring into them. There were children among the bomb victims, but the operators 'did not adequately
focus on them amid the swirl of data* - 'much like a cubicle worker who loses track of an important e-mail under the mounting pile'.
Well, no one would accuse such a cubicle worker of a moral failure ...Starting off a cataclysm - including, as Anders insists,
'globocide' - has now became even easier and more plausible than it used to be when Anders wrote down his
warnings. The 'routine-bored operator' has been joined by his [or her] colleague and his probable replacement and successor the
[person] chap with his [or her] eyes fixed on a 'drool bucket', his mind drowning in a 'swirl of data' . . .
Democracy Bad Drones Link Ext
Democracies causality aversion drones
Sauer Lecturer & Research Associate Political Science Dept @ Bundeswehr University,
Munich & Schrnig Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2012
Frank & Niklas Killer drones: The silver bullet of democratic warfare? Security Dialogue
43.4 Sage Journals
One might say that every military is interested in low casualty rates in order to ensure that it remains
able to fight another day. However, it is plausible to assume that democracies are indeed distinct owing to a
particularly low tolerance for casualties for two reasons, one utilitarian and one normative.
The utilitarian argument suggests that decisionmakers in democracies fear losses among their own more
than authoritarian leaders because rising numbers of casualties in a conflict will have
adverse effects on public support for the military mission (Mueller, 1973; Gartner and Segura, 1998). More
precisely, pertinent research suggests that the relevance of casualties for public opinion differs according to the type of
conflict and is inversely related to the national interest understood to be at stake. In wars of necessity (Freedman, 2006/7) for self-
defense and national survival, any democratic population is willing to tolerate high casualties among its own troops. Yet, the tolerance
for casualties is comparably lower in so-called wars of choice (Freedman, 2006/7), such as humanitarian missions (Larson, 1996).
Democratic publics are thus casualty-phobic insofar as additional casualties create more
disapproval if the public perceives them as being unnecessary or in vain (Gelpi et al., 2006). This is of crucial
relevance with regard to unmanned systems and the types of wars democracies fight, as we will
argue in the third section of this article.
Democracies are more likely to deploy drones programs turns their ability to
prevent conflict
Sauer Lecturer & Research Associate Political Science Dept @ Bundeswehr University,
Munich & Schrnig Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2012
Frank & Niklas Killer drones: The silver bullet of democratic warfare? Security Dialogue
43.4 Sage Journals
Stating that democracies are characterized by a set of distinctive interests and norms, we argued that
this setup causes killer drones and armed robots to appear as a silver bullet for political and
military decisionmakers. These systems are seemingly cheaper and supposedly help states to heed the provisions of
the law of armed conflict. They are considered especially suitable for the casualty-averse risk-transfer
war that democracies prefer. However, we further argued that this supposed silver bullet might well
come back as a boomerang. By fielding more weaponized and autonomous systems, in the long
run democracies will not only be burdened with the mounting costs of an arms race but will
also be rendered more war-prone (in relation to non-democracies), all while employing weapons that are at best
dubious from the perspective of morality and the laws of armed conflict.
Democracy Bad - Drones Advanced Weapons
Drones are the first step democracies will continue to develop advanced
weapons
Sauer Lecturer & Research Associate Political Science Dept @ Bundeswehr University,
Munich & Schrnig Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2012
Frank & Niklas Killer drones: The silver bullet of democratic warfare? Security Dialogue
43.4 Sage Journals
Unmanned systems seem a perfect fit for democratic warfare through their appeal to the
utilitarian and normative characteristics of democracies. Because they are ascribed the
unique capability of satisfying the rule of risk-transfer war, respecting the laws of armed
conflict and limiting expenditure at the same time, they are even more than the weapon of
choice: they seemingly provide a silver bullet for democratic decisionmakers. Yet, with
current killer drones as only a first stepping stone in what Robert Mandel (2004) has termed the quest
for bloodless war, democracies currently fuel two trends.
The first of these is weaponization. UAVs, for example, started out as single-purpose observation
drones, but have since become both communication relays and multi-sensor ISR and weapon platforms. Since
the sensor (formerly the UAV) and the shooter (formerly a manned airplane, an artillery unit, etc.) no longer have to be coordinated
but are now two-in-one, unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) reduce the sensor-to-shooter gap from hours to minutes or seconds,
increasing efficiency and thus providing an extremely valuable capability from a military point of view. Only a limited number of
countries currently operate weaponized systems. However, the trend is already well underway, and there is little to no opposition to it.
New, small-yield missiles will make weaponized UAVs appear even more suitable for
precision warfare in the future.
The second trend is autonomy that is, the capacity to operate in the real-world environment
without any form of external control, including, eventually, independent intelligent
decisionmaking (Lin et al., 2008: 105; see also Sparrow, 2007: 656). Starting out as mere remote-controlled devices, modern
UAVs are capable of performing a number of tasks on their own for extended periods of
time. Following a preprogrammed route is routine. Even complex tasks like take-off, landing, or responding to emergencies like
damage or even partial wing loss are safely handled. Consequently, UAV operators are changing their role from
pilots in-the-loop to mere supervisors on-the-loop, splitting their attention between several airborne drones. And, even
though current unmanned systems lack strong artificial intelligence, there is an unfaltering trend towards greater
autonomy. Some fully autonomous weapon systems already exist, such as automatic close-in weapon
systems for terminal defense against missiles or artillery shells (like the US Phalanx) and fixed border sentries in South Korea and
Israel (Lin et al., 2008: 1314, 1819; Marchant et al., 2011: 2767). More are likely to follow, as we will argue below.
To sum up our argument so far, killer drones seemingly lend themselves as the silver bullet of democratic warfare, explaining the
distinct democratic eagerness to employ them. Yet, we are going to claim that many of the characteristics ascribed to drones are not
holding up under closer scrutiny. More importantly, in the long run democracies
may be disregarding numerous
problematic normative consequences while striving for more, weaponized, and eventually
autonomous systems.
the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the means by which a life
becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes
noteworthy. As a result, we have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building. The matter is not a simple one, for, if a life is not grievable, it is
not quite a life; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if
not the unburiable.
It is not simply, then, that there is a discourse of dehumanization that produces these effects, but
rather that there is a limit to discourse that establishes the limits of human intelligibility. It is not
just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is unmarkable. Such a death vanishes, not in explicit
discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds. The queer lives that vanished on September 11 were not
publicly welcomed into the idea of national identity built in the obituary pages, and their closest relations were only belatedly and selectively (the martial norm holding sway once
again) made eligible for benefits. But this should come as no surprise, when we think about how few deaths from AIDS were publicly grievable losses, and how, for instance, the
extensive deaths now taking place in Africa are also, in the media, for the most part unmarkable and ungrievable.
The aff is partaking in the same method of threat inflation that justified
invasion of Iraq -
Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
2006 (Edward, ZNet Magazine, March 15,
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?itemid=9910)
A third principle is inflating the menace that would follow from Iran's possession of nuclear
weapons. This of course parallels closely the earlier inflation of the Iraq threat, where the Bush
administration propagandists were not laughed off the stage for talking about mushroom clouds off New York and
other dire threats. Then and now the media have not pointed out that Saddam Hussein had only used chemical weapons
in the 1980's against Iran (and Iraqi Kurds) at a time when he was serving U.S. interests--and therefore with tacit U.S.
approval--but that he didn't use them at all in the Persian Gulf War when the United States was the opponent and could
retaliate in kind and with greater force. By the same token, as the United States and Israel have enormous
retaliatory capability, the Iranians could never use nuclear weapons as an offensive tool without
committing national suicide. But nuclear weapons would serve as a default weapon if Iran were
attacked; that is, it would contribute to self-defense. This line of argument is carefully avoided in
the mainstream propaganda flow.
Enemy construction turns the aff arms race in the Middle East and serial
policy failure
Zarif Former Representative of Iran to the UN & PhD in Intl Law and Policy U of Denver,
2007(Mohammad Javad, Journal of International Affairs, 3/22, page lexis)
Sanctions and pressure against Iran may satisfy some domestic constituencies or settle some old
scores. (93) But it is the overwhelming view of informed observers that they will not achieve their stated objectives.
They more likely will unravel the non-proliferation regime, exacerbate tension, perpetuate the
enemy paradigm and lead to unwanted--even accidental--escalations. Recent reports indicate that a
proliferation-sensitive race may have already become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the region,
even though this race is against an imaginary threat.
We have all been through this before. The Persian Gulf region and the world at large have paid dearly for similar
policies in the past. There are real crises that need to be resolved, before embarking on manufacturing new ones.
Ending the quagmire in Iraq is a formidable challenge that requires not only collective effort but also a reassessment
and reversal of policies and approaches that have brought so much misery to all concerned .
The interests of Iran and the United States, as well as security and stability in the Persian Gulf region, have long been
hostage to an outdated paradigm sustained by mutual mistrust and heavy historical baggage, and nurtured with fact or
fiction generated by those benefiting from confrontation and war .
Iran has a national security interest in restoring regional stability and preserving and strengthening disarmament and
non-proliferation. But, preventing the manufactured "Iran threat" from becoming the next global
nightmare requires a drastic change in the U.S. approach--an approach that until now has impeded
a genuine search for alternatives.
AT: WARMING ADVANTAGE
Apocalyptic Rhetoric 1NC
Apocalyptic rhetoric should be abandoned as a political strategy it
incorrectly levels questions of probability and actual magnitude of events
Gross new media strategist & Gilles domestic abuse advocate 2012 Matthew Barrett & Mel
The Atlantic 4/23
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-
taking-political-action/255758/
Flip through the cable channels for long enough, and you'll inevitably find the apocalypse. On
Discovery or National Geographic or History you'll find shows like MegaDisasters, Doomsday Preppers, or The Last Days on Earth
chronicling, in an hour of programming, dozens of ways the world might end: a gamma ray burst from a
nearby star peeling away the Earth's ozone layer like an onion; a mega-volcano erupting
and plunging our planet into a new ice age; the magnetic poles reversing. Turn to a news
channel, and the headlines appear equally apocalyptic, declaring that the "UN Warns of Rapid Decay
in Environment" or that "Humanity's Very Survival" is at risk. On another station, you'll find people
arguing that the true apocalyptic threat to our way of life is not the impending collapse of
ecosystems and biodiversity but the collapse of the dollar as the world's global currency.
Change the channel again, and you'll see still others insisting that malarial mosquitoes, drunk on
West Nile virus, are the looming specter of apocalypse darkening our nation's horizon.
How to make sense of it all? After all, not every scenario can be an apocalyptic threat to our
way of life -- can it? For many, the tendency is to dismiss all the potential crises we are
facing as overblown: perhaps cap and trade is just a smoke screen designed to earn Al Gore billions from his clean-energy
investments; perhaps terrorism is just an excuse to increase the power and reach of the government. For others, the panoply
of potential disasters becomes overwhelming, leading to a distorted and paranoid vision of
reality and the threats facing our world -- as seen on shows like Doomsday Preppers. Will an epidemic
wipe out humanity, or could a meteor destroy all life on earth? By the time you're done
watching Armageddon Week on the History Channel, even a rapid reversal of the world's
magnetic poles might seem terrifyingly likely and imminent.
The last time apocalyptic anxiety spilled into the mainstream to the extent that it altered the course of history -- during the
Reformation -- it relied on a revolutionary new communications technology: the printing press. In a similar way, could the current
surge in apocalyptic anxiety be attributed in part to our own revolution in communications technology?
The media, of course, have long mastered the formula of packaging remote possibilities as
urgent threats, as sociologist Barry Glassner pointed out in his bestseller The Culture of Fear. We're all familiar with
the formula: "It's worse than you think," the anchor intones before delivering an alarming report on date-rape drugs, stalking
pedophiles, flesh-eating bacteria, the Ebola virus (ne avian flu cum swine flu). You name it (or rename it): if a threat has
even a remote chance of materializing, it is treated as an imminent inevitability by television
news. It's not just that if it bleeds, it leads. If it might bleed, it still leads. Such sensationalist speculation attracts
eyeballs and sells advertising, because fear sells -- and it can sell everything from pharmaceuticals to handguns to duct tape
to insurance policies. "People react to fear, not love," Richard Nixon once said. "They don't teach that in Sunday school, but it's true."
Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward
overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse.
Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language, from birds falling out of the
sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!).
Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the
equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge
before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry
about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has
already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten
the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the
possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of
casualties?
Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally
probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a
possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming.
Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is
readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable
channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our
planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in
the distant future. Using
dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied
scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer
with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally
probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly
not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, after
millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of
terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth
as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents.
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a
terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off
a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype.
This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to
mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the
difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed
apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are
preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?
In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The
apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic
eruptions -- are extraordinarily rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the
extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are
unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist
attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively
small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The
apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable,
and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or
can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.
The danger of the media's conflation of apocalyptic scenarios is that it leads us to believe
that our existential threats come exclusively from events that are beyond our control and
that await us in the future -- and that a moment of universal recognition of such threats will be obvious to everyone when
they arrive. No one, after all, would ever confuse a meteor barreling toward Earth as anything other than apocalyptic. Yet tangled
up in such Hollywood scenarios and sci-fi nightmares are actual threats like global warming
that aren't arriving in an instant of universal recognition; instead, they are arriving amid
much denial and continued partisan debate.
Apocalyptic Rhetoric ext
Apocalyptic rhetoric failed political solutions to catastrophe
Gross new media strategist & Gilles domestic abuse advocate 2012 Matthew Barrett & Mel
The Atlantic 4/23
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-
taking-political-action/255758/
Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for
good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't
mobilized the world into action. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands
between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of
global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a
radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known.
Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and
overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview
that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and
gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't
that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists?
The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead
consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real.
Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you
believe in the threats before us.
By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline,
we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will
become apparent to all -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed
prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we
imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The
evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak
oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our
very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come.
The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global
warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic
collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly
underpaid work in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a
community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by
Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining
natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the
rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in
accord with your dreams.
The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the
more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action.
We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the
apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its
inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by
either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone
tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid
confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns,
and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap
us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away).
None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our
apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a
culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the
zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance
from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing,
nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or
simply brace for it, but to avert it.