Table of Cases per reporter:

Angele, Leah Kristina

1. People v Cayat
2. Phil Telegraph and telephone v NLRC

Balt, Gamal L., Jr.

1. Dumlao vs. Comelec

GROUP 5
2. Parreno v CA

Biyo, Irish Samantha S.

MIDTERM
1. Goesart v Cleary
2. Central Ban Employees vs. BSP

David, Daniel Luis

PART 2 1. Ormoc Sugar Central vs. Ormoc City

2. Himaga vs. People
3. Serrrano vs Gallant

CASE Dilangalen, Al-jay Thollah M

1. Sison vs Ancheta

ASSIGNMENT 2. Bristish American Tobacco vs. Camcho

3. Quinto and Toletino v. Comelec

DIGEST Montero, Joseph

1. Phil Judges Assn vs. Prado
2. Disini Jr. vs. Sec. Justice

Savellano, Kristina Marie S.

1. DeGuzman vs. Comelec
2. SM Metals v. Reyeas

PART I
People v Cayat
68 PHIL 12, 18
Presented by: Angeles, Leah
FACTS:
Cayat is a native of a nonchristian tribe in Baguio. He was found
guilty of act 1639 which prohibits natives of non Christian tribes
from acquiring wines and liquors other than those native wines
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to. Cayat
said it violates equal protection, due process, improper exercise of
police power.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause, due process
and improper exercise of police power?
HELD:
Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. Classification to be reasonable (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions (2) germane to the purpose of the law (3)
not limited to existing conditions only (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class. In (1), not based on accident of birth or
parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. Non
Christian refers not to religious belief but to geographical area. In
(2), unquestionable because it is designed to insure peace and order
in and among Non Christian tribes. In (3), it applies for all times as
long as those conditions exist. In (4), its not an argument here. The
government raise their culture and civilization and secure for them
the benefits of their progress with the ultimate view of placing them
with Christians on the basis of true equality.
Dumlao v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245.
January 22, 1980
Presented by Balt, Datu Gamal
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution
He claimed that the specific provision was directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by
respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the
ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart from this,
they also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were
Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD:
No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots.
They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that must be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea
that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon to decide the
case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the
provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees
65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be
a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as
ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the
election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can
use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether
they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the
national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping
scale.
GOESAERT VS. CLEARY
335 US 464 (1948)
Presented by: Biyo, Irish
FACTS:
A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with
populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman
could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the
male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged
the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the ground
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access
to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

HELD:
NO. The Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the
States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect
sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires
them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found
that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have
determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and
social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The
Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine
either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators.
ORMOC SUGAR CO, INC. v. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
February 17, 1968
GR: L-23794
Presented by: David, Daniel
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc
Sugar Company. They then filed before the Court a complaint against the
City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging
that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ordinance violates equal protection
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1[1], Art. 111) In Felwa v.
Salas We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of
the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance
does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of
the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,
was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from
the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set
up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Sison v Ancheta
G.R. No. L-59431.
July 25, 1984.
Presented by: Dilangalen, Aljay
Facts:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 135. It amended Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on:
a. taxable compensation income,
b. taxable net income,
c. royalties, prizes, and other winnings,
d. interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary
benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar
arrangements,
e. dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of
taxable partnership,
f. adjusted gross income.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated
against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising
from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon
fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above
section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and
capricious in character.
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the
rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
The OSG prayed for dismissal of the petition due to lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived
from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally
infirm.
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation)
HELD:
No. Petition dismissed. The need for more revenues is rationalized by the
government's role to fill the gap not done by public enterprise in order to
meet the needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of
public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power of
the government. There are restrictions, however, diversely affecting as it
does property rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses
may properly be invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate
cases a revenue measure. If it were otherwise, taxation would be a
destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the
Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis without a factual foundation.
This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due
process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are
not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion.
It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing
statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An
obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of
property. That would be a clear abuse of power.
It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a
retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on
due process grounds.
For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this
was denied in the exercise of police power or eminent domain was the
presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
analogous. If law be looks upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of
approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being available to all and the
affairs of men being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity,
which is of the very essence of the idea of law.
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal
protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not
relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out
of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the
use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same.
Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust Company-
The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect
equality, because this is hardly attainable
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds
of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all
that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and
corporations placed in similar situation"
There was a difference between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal
objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all
deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to
the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all
taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied
to all of them. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers
are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they
are in the same situation more or less.
Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a
class.
On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their
calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses
necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard
the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately
impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income.
There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due
process and equal protection, and he reasonableness of the distinction
between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and
businessmen not being a dubious classification.
HIMAGAN v. People
October 7, 1994
GR: 113811
Presented by: David, Daniel
FACTS:
Petitioner, a policeman, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar,
Jr. and the attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar. After the informations
for murder and attempted murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court,
the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination
of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon
the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from
office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused.
The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on
Section 42 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension
should be limited to ninety (90) days. Petitioner claims that an imposition
of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.
ISSUE:
W/N the order of the trial court suspending the petitioner from office until
the case is terminated violates the Equal Protection clause.
HELD:
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as
the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in
the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications,
such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based
on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law;
applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as well as
future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and
reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as
that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
Philippine Judge Association vs. Pete Prado
227 SCRA 703
Presented by: Montero, Joseph
FACTS:
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain
government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to
certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk
of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciarys
use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the
postal service recommended that the franking privilege be
withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular
withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and
questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that
the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
judiciary is valid.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal
protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly
as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense
allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege
from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable
for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have
removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other
departments.
If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege,
the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it
is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different
because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court
processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books
to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the
youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts
of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes
the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should
not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.
AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., et. al. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000
Presented by: Savellano, Kristine
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act
No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter's Registration Act of
1996. It was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1996.
The provision in question states:
SECTION 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. No Election
Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more
than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of
the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at
least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station
outside the original congressional district."
Pursuant to the passing of RA 8189 the respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution Nos. 97-0002 and 97-0610 for the implementation of the law in
question.
Petitioners contend that it singles out City and Municipal Election Officers
of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. There is no valid classification
between them and other COMELEC officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in question is violates the equal protection
clause.
HELD:
YES, Section 44 of RA 8189 is constitutional and it enjoys the presumption
of validity.
Election officers being the highest ranking official of COMELEC in cities and
municipalities. Limiting their stay in that place to 4 years would prohibit
familiarity of the City or Municipal Election Officers with their place of
assignment and prevent corruption on the part of the said officers.
REQUISITES OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION: Phil Telegraph v NLRC
GR 118978
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
May 23, 1997
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; Presented by: Angeles, Leah
and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same FACTS:
class.
Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever
for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever
Agreement signed by Grace, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to
July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged
the services of Grace as reliever for Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave
during both periods.

On September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner company as a

probationary employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace, she
indicated in the civil status that she was single although she had in fact
contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This meant she was not single, as
she had represented herself, when she signed the reliever agreements on
June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the
company after learning about Graces real civil status and being
unconvinced of Graces explanation for the discrepancy. Grace immediately
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment
of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference, Grace volunteered the information that she

had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections, and
executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. The
Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private respondent,
who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally
dismissed by petitioner and ordered her reinstatement plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the
Labor Arbiter but modified the Labor Arbiters decision with the
qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three
months due to the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be
PART 2 condoned.

ISSUE:

Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the
services of an employee?
Whether the termination is unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the
disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social
and political life.
Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that The State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Corollary to this is Article XIII Section 3 which states that The State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all and Article XIII Section 14 which states that The
State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities
and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
2ND LT. SALVADOR PARREO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 162224
June 07, 2007
Presented by: Balt, Datu Gamal
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the 9 January 2003
Decision and 13 January 2004 Resolution of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
FACTS
Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the
Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed,
and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years
pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to
P13,680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen.
In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner's monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly
pension.
COA, ruling Premises considered, the request is denied for lack of
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. Claimant is advised to file his claim
with the proper court of original jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the
COA has the power and authority to incidentally rule on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged
that a direct recourse to the court would be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly
pension involves government funds, the reason for the termination of the
pension is subject to COA's authority and jurisdiction.
In its 13 January 2004 Resolution, the COA denied the motion. The COA
ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply if the administrative body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over
the case. The COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over
the claim, petitioner's entitlement to the retirement benefits he was
previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino
citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
ISSUE
Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;
Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended; and
Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective effect.
HELD
The petition has no merit. The petition was dismissed and the 9 January
2003 Decision and 13 January 2004 Resolution of the Commission on Audit
was affirmed.
Jurisdiction of the COA
Petitioner filed his money claim before the COA. A money claim is "a
demand for payment of a sum of money, reimbursement or compensation
arising from law or contract due from or owing to a government agency."
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1445, money claims against the government shall be filed before the COA.
The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government
does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of
laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner's money claim
essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner's money claim.
Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration
of his pension even without ruling on the constitutionality of Section 27 of
PD 1638, as amended. The COA ruled on the matter in its 13 January 2004
Resolution, thus:
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this Commission assumed
jurisdiction over the instant case, claimant's entitlement to the retirement
benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily be severed or
stopped upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship as prescribed in Section 27,
P.D. No. 1638, as amended by P.D. No. 1650.
The COA effectively denied petitioner's claim because of the loss of his
Filipino citizenship.
Application of PD 1638, as amended
Petitioner alleges that PD 1638, as amended, should apply prospectively.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner. The OSG
argues that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined
the military service after its effectivity, citing Sections 33 and 35, thus:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to
reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other
monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or is entitled to
receive under the provisions of existing law.
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this
Decree and to preserve the rights granted to retired or separated military
personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The OSG further argues that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor
of the retirees. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides: "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Section 36 of PD 1638,
as amended, provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. It was
signed on 10 September 1979. PD 1638, as amended, does not provide for
its retroactive application. There is no question that PD 1638, as amended,
applies prospectively.
However, we do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the
OSG that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined the
military after its effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new
system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it
should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval. In
fact, Section 2 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that "the[e] Decree shall
apply to all military personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." PD 1638, as amended, was signed on 10 September 1979.
Petitioner retired in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638, as amended.
Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to petitioner.
Petitioner Has No Vested Right to his Retirement Benefits. Petitioner
alleges that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, deprives him of his
property which the Constitution and statutes vest in him. Petitioner alleges
that his pension, being a property vested by the Constitution, cannot be
removed or taken from him just because he became a naturalized
American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the termination of his
monthly pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his life.
The allegations have no merit. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any
vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the
benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At the time of the
approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still
in active service. Hence, petitioner's retirement benefits were only future
benefits and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated
conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and
length of service. It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire
a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law.
Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous
in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employee
participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.
Constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12
shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.
The OSG agrees with petitioner that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is
unconstitutional. The OSG argues that the obligation imposed on petitioner
to retain his Filipino citizenship as a condition for him to remain in the AFP
retired list and receive his retirement benefit is contrary to public policy
and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The OSG argues that the retirement law is in the
nature of a contract between the government and its employees. The OSG
further argues that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, discriminates
against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.
We do not agree. The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is
not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable,
the classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to
each member of the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial
difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees
who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such
as petitioner in the case before us.
The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render
personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens
but also citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree who had
lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state.
Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory
military service when the need arises. Petitioner's loss of Filipino
citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from
other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
Republic Act No. 7077 (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the
state to a Citizen Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen
soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP.
Hence, even when a retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a
part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement
imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory,
or contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable
condition that is necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would
be detrimental to the interest of the state.
There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his
Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension
in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the
opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested
for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and
the termination of his pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the
request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Petitioner argues that he can reacquire his Filipino citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225[23] (RA 9225), in which case he will still be
considered a natural-born Filipino. However, petitioner alleges that if he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, he will still not be entitled
to his pension because of its prior termination. This situation is speculative.
In the first place, petitioner has not shown that he has any intention of
reacquiring, or has done anything to reacquire, his Filipino citizenship.
Secondly, in response to the request for opinion of then AFP Chief of Staff,
General Efren L. Abu, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued DOJ Opinion
No. 12, series of 2005, dated 19 January 2005, thus:
The AFP uniformed personnel retirees, having re-acquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, are entitled to pension
and gratuity benefits reckoned from the date they have taken their oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. It goes without saying that
these retirees have no right to receive such pension benefits during the
time that they have ceased to be Filipinos pursuant to the aforequoted P.D.
No. 1638, as amended, and any payment made to them should be returned
to the AFP.
Hence, petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his
monthly pension. Just recently, in AASJS Member-Hector Gumangan
Calilung v. Simeon Datumanong, this Court upheld the constitutionality of
RA 9225. If petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, he will even
recover his natural-born citizenship. In Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, this
Court reiterated that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship
Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he
reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the
benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the
resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with
the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits
provided he is a Filipino citizen.
We acknowledge the service rendered to the country by petitioner and
those similarly situated. However, petitioner failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the future, the AFP has to
apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES VS. BANGKO SENTRAL
GR 148208, 15 DECEMBER 2004
Presented by: Biyo, Irish
FACTS:
R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. almost eight years
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation,
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences,
but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position. Petitioner also claims
that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.
7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner posits that the classification is
not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent BSP contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is
construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA 7653
violates the equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
No. Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably
show that the classification created by the questioned proviso bears no
constitutional infirmities. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal
protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate -
so long as the classification is not unreasonable.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is
not palpably arbitrary.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME INDUSTRIES
March 24, 2009
GR: 167614
Presented by: David, Daniel
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated
to the Philippines. Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12
months but at the time of his repatriation he had served only 2 months and
7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23
days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of $26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits. In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary
of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of 3
months only - rather than the entire unexpired portion of 9 and 23 days of
petitioner's employment contract - applying the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Petitioner contends that it impinges on the equal protection clause, for it
treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by
putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are
entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same
monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal;
that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial
distinction between the two groups.
ISSUE:
W/N the aforementioned clause, in granting the petitioner the salary for
only 3 months rather than the unexpired portion of his contract, violates
Equal Protection.
HELD:
Yes. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of
the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare. Such rights are not absolute but
subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit,
a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is
not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the
middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification,
and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
The Court in the present case employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears
facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination
reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-
-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than
one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount
to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3)
months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a
term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for
every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x
for three months." To follow petitioners thinking that private respondent
is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser
amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the
statute while giving effect to some.
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of
the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal.
Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic
salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
The subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs
whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall
be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to
their salaries for three months only.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the
subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas
no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month
cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected
by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict
judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state
interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on
matters of public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause
is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be
rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same
burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed
of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged
sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be
elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
American Tobacco v. Camacho (2008)
G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008
Presented by: Dilangalen, Al-jay Thollah
FACTS:
June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky
Strike, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP
P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])
February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of
the current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the
purpose of the establishing and updating their tax classification
March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing
current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products
August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of
certain new brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based
on the survey of their current net retail prices. This increased the excise
tax to P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P 10/pack. This
cause petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction
with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of
the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and 6-2003 on the ground that
they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in violation of the equal
protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
RTC: Dismissed, While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending
Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among other took effect on January 1, 2005
which in effect increased petitioners excise tax to P25/pack
Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement
to the petition for review assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and
praying a downward classification of Lucky Strike products at the bracket
taxable at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based on their
price as of October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than
petitioner's product price.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco
Corp., Mighty Corp. and JT International Intervened.
Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the decision of the BIR in tax disputes
ISSUE:
 1. W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution
2. W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its
amendment by RA 9334 can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey
and reclassification.
HELD:
1. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "It suffices then that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. If the law be looked upon in terms of burden
on charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if rational in character is
allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax that a
state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of
one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation" SC previously held: "Equality and uniformity
in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes
of taxation"
Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation
A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. The
classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.
Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such
impact as the price is not the only factor that affects competition.
NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette
brands remains a prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by
the former. These are however modified by RA 9334
Quinto and Tolentino vs. Comelec
GR 189698
February 22, 2010
Presented by: Dilangalen, Al-jay Thollah
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in
the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the
third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679: Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy
ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the
second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and
employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political
campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is
not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials
and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing
authority.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 203335,
11 February 2014
Presented by: Montero, Joseph
FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the
libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of
presumed malice even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it
with the higher standard of actual malice as a basis for conviction.
Petitioners argue that inferring presumed malice from the accuseds
defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes
on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
cyberlibel affected the requirement of actual malice as opposed to
presumed malice as basis for conviction of libel.
HELD:
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice
in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense
of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false,
is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure,
as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive
Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal
code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of
malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the
offended party is a public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need
not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence
(malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement.
For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for
the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
SR METALS, INC., et. al. v. DENR
G.R. No. 179669.
June 4, 2014
Presented by: Savellano, Kristine
FACTS:
Petitioner companies were awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permit
(SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte.
They were allowed to annually extract should a maximum 50,000 MTs of
Nickel and Cobalt pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899.
Section 1. Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining
operation having an annual production of not more than 50,000
metric tons of ore . . . .
The Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) sent the petitioners a
Notice of Violation of the abovementioned provision of law. A technical
conference was held to hear the side of the petitioners. The DENR
Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against
the mining corporations suspending their operations.
DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to have been impliedly
repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law
mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small-scale
mining.
The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, stating that theres grave
abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in issuing the CDO.
The OSG claimed that the CDO issued shall be honored for it is for
ecological and health reasons and a preventive measure by the DENR.
The CA denied their petition for Certiorari. Petitioner companies then
moved for partial reconsideration where they again relied heavily on the
DOJ Opinion. They also questioned the constitutionality of Section 1, PD
1899 since it violates the equal protection clause because it should be
considered repealed by RA 7076.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
NO, it does not violate the equal protection clause. While these two laws
PD 1899 and RA 7076 tackle the definition of what small-scale mining is,
both have different objects upon which the laws shall be applied to. PD
1899 applies to individuals, partnerships and corporations while RA 7076
applies to cooperatives.
With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA
7076, the issue raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is
moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as the
production limit applies to all of them. There is therefore no more reason
for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the said
limitation.