Supreme Court: Republic of The Philippines

9/6/2015 G.R. No.
196271
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

ENBANC

DATUMICHAELABASKIDA, G.R.No.196271
inhispersonalcapacity,andin
representationofMAGUINDANAO Present:
FEDERATIONOFAUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORSASSOCIATION,INC., CORONA,C.J.,
HADJIMUHMINAJ.USMAN, CARPIO,
JOHNANTHONYL.LIM, VELASCO,JR.,
JAMILONT.ODIN,ASRIN LEONARDODECASTRO,
TIMBOLJAIYARI,MUJIBM. BRION,
KALANG,ALIHALSAIDIJ.SAPI PERALTA,
E,KESSARDAMSIEABDIL,and BERSAMIN,
BASSAMALUHSAUPI, DELCASTILLO,
Petitioners, ABAD,
VILLARAMA,JR.,
PEREZ,
versus MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES,and
SENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES, PERLASBERNABE,JJ.
representedbyitsPresidentJUAN
PONCEENRILE,HOUSEOF Promulgated:
REPRESENTATIVES,thru
SPEAKERFELICIANO October18,2011
BELMONTE,COMMISSIONON
ELECTIONS,thruitsChairman,
SIXTOBRILLANTES,JR.,
PAQUITOOCHOA,JR.,Officeofthe
PresidentExecutiveSecretary,
FLORENCIOABAD,JR.,Secretary
ofBudget,andROBERTOTAN,
TreasurerofthePhilippines,
Respondents.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/196271.htm 1/45
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
xx
BASARID.MAPUPUNO, G.R.No.196305
Petitioner,

versus

SIXTOBRILLANTES,inhiscapacity
asChairmanoftheCommissionon
Elections,FLORENCIOABAD,JR.
inhiscapacityasSecretaryofthe
DepartmentofBudgetand
Management,PACQUITOOCHOA,
JR.,inhiscapacityasExecutive
Secretary,JUANPONCEENRILE,in
hiscapacityasSenatePresident,and
FELICIANOBELMONTE,inhis
capacityasSpeakeroftheHouseof
Representatives,
Respondents.
xx

REP.EDCELC.LAGMAN,
Petitioner, G.R.No.197221

versus

PAQUITON.OCHOA,JR.,inhis
capacityastheExecutiveSecretary,
andtheCOMMISSIONON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
xx

ALMARIMCENTITILLAH,DATU
CASANCONDINGCANA,and G.R.No.197280
PARTIDODEMOKRATIKO
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
PILIPINOLAKASNGBAYAN
(PDPLABAN),
Petitioners,

versus

THECOMMISSIONON
ELECTIONS,throughitsChairman,
SIXTOBRILLANTES,JR.,HON.
PAQUITON.OCHOA,JR.,inhis
capacityasExecutiveSecretary,HON.
FLORENCIOB.ABAD,JR.,inhis
capacityasSecretaryofthe
DepartmentofBudgetand
Management,andHON.ROBERTO
B.TAN,inhiscapacityasTreasurer
ofthePhilippines,
Respondents.
xx

ATTY.ROMULOB.MACALINTAL,
Petitioner, G.R.No.197282

versus

COMMISSIONONELECTIONSand
THEOFFICEOFTHEPRESIDENT,
throughEXECUTIVESECRETARY
PAQUITON.OCHOA,JR.,
Respondents.
xx

LUISBAROKBIRAOGO,
Petitioner,

G.R.No.197392
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
versus

THECOMMISSIONON
ELECTIONSandEXECUTIVE
SECRETARYPAQUITON.
OCHOA,JR.,
Respondents.
xx

JACINTOV.PARAS,
Petitioner,

versus G.R.No.197454

EXECUTIVESECRETARY
PAQUITON.OCHOA,JR.,andthe
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,
Respondents.
xx

MINORITYRIGHTSFORUM,
PHILIPPINES,INC.,
RespondentsIntervenor.

xx

DECISION
BRION,J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
SynchronizationoftheElectionsintheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao(ARMM)with
the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the
ARMMelectionsfromthe8thofAugust2011,tothesecondMondayofMay2013andevery
three(3)yearsthereafter,tocoincidewiththecountrysregularnationalandlocalelections.The
lawaswellgrantedthePresidentthepowertoappointofficersincharge(OICs)fortheOffice
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of the Regional Governor, the Regional ViceGovernor, and the Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officialsdulyelectedintheMay2013electionsshallhavequalifiedandassumedoffice.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned
petitionsagainsttheirvalidityHouseBillNo.4146andSenateBillNo.2756werechallenged
inpetitionsfiledwiththisCourt.ThesepetitionsmultipliedafterRANo.10153waspassed.

FactualAntecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the
creationofautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandtheCordilleras.Section15states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
commonanddistinctivehistoricalandculturalheritage,economicandsocialstructures,andother
relevantcharacteristicswithintheframeworkofthisConstitutionandthenationalsovereigntyas
wellasterritorialintegrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.

Section18oftheArticle,ontheotherhand,directedCongresstoenactanorganicactfor
theseautonomousregionstoconcretelycarryintoeffectthegrantedautonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistanceandparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act
shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal,familyandpropertylawjurisdictionconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitution
andnationallaws.

Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbyamajorityof
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces,cities,andgeographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedinthe
autonomousregion.

OnAugust1,1989ortwoyearsaftertheeffectivityofthe1987Constitution,Congress
actedthroughRepublicAct(RA)No.6734entitledAnActProvidingforanOrganicActforthe
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as
requiredbySection18(2),ArticleXofRANo.6734,thusfullyestablishingtheAutonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
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Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawitawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regionalofficialsoftheARMMonadatenotearlierthan60daysnorlaterthan90daysafterits
ratification.

RANo.9054(entitledAnActtoStrengthenandExpandtheOrganicActfortheAutonomous
RegioninMuslimMindanao,AmendingforthePurposeRepublicActNo.6734,entitledAnAct
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next
legislativeactpassed.ThislawprovidedfurtherrefinementinthebasicARMMstructurefirst
defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officialstothesecondMondayofSeptember2001.

[1]
CongresspassedthenextlawaffectingARMMRANo.9140 onJune22,2001.This
lawresetthefirstregularelectionsoriginallyscheduledunderRANo.9054,toNovember26,
2001.ItlikewisesettheplebiscitetoratifyRANo.9054tonotlaterthanAugust15,2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of
BasilanandMarawiCityvotedtojoinARMMonthesamedate.

[2]
RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
UnlikeRANo.6734andRANo.9054,RANo.9333wasnotratifiedinaplebiscite.

PursuanttoRANo.9333,thenextARMMregionalelectionsshouldhavebeenheldon
August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificatesofcandidaciesforthevariousregionalofficestobeelected.ButonJune30,2011,
RANo.10153wasenacted,resettingtheARMMelectionstoMay2013,tocoincidewiththe
regularnationalandlocalelectionsofthecountry.

RANo.10153originatedintheHouseofRepresentativesasHouseBill(HB)No.4146,
seekingthepostponementoftheARMMelectionsscheduledonAugust8,2011.OnMarch22,
2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191)
Membersvotinginitsfavor.

AftertheSenatereceivedHBNo.4146,itadopteditsownversion,SenateBillNo.2756
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(SBNo.2756),onJune6,2011.Thirteen(13)Senatorsvotedfavorablyforitspassage.OnJune
7,2011,theHouseofRepresentativeconcurredwiththeSenateamendments,andonJune 30,
2011,thePresidentsignedRANo.10153intolaw.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with
[3]
thisCourtG.R.No.196271 assailingtheconstitutionalityofbothHBNo.4146andSBNo.
2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for noncompliance with the
constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
[4]
196305filedanotherpetition alsoassailingthevalidityofRANo.9333.

WiththeenactmentintolawofRANo.10153,theCOMELECstoppeditspreparations
for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions
againstitsconstitutionality:

[5]
a)PetitionforCertiorariandProhibition filedbyRep.EdcelLagmanasamemberofthe
House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary)andtheCOMELEC,docketedasG.R.No.197221

[6]
b)PetitionforMandamusandProhibition filedbyAtty.RomuloMacalintalasataxpayer
againsttheCOMELEC,docketedasG.R.No.197282

[7]
c) PetitionforCertiorariandMandamus,InjunctionandPreliminaryInjunction filedby
LouisBarokBiraogoagainsttheCOMELECandExecutiveSecretaryPaquitoN.Ochoa,
Jr.,docketedasG.R.No.197392and

[8]
d)PetitionforCertiorariandMandamus filedbyJacintoParasasamemberoftheHouse
of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,
docketedasG.R.No.197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters
fromtheARMM,withthePartidoDemokratikoPilipinoLakasngBayan(apoliticalpartywith
candidatesintheARMMregionalelectionsscheduledforAugust8,2011),alsofiledaPetition
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[9]
for Prohibition and Mandamus against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to
assailtheconstitutionalityofRANo.9140,RANo.9333andRANo.10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao PartyList, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and
BangsamoroSolidarityMovementfiledtheirownMotionforLeavetoAdmittheirMotionfor
Intervention and CommentinIntervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court
granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the
petitionsrelatingtotheconstitutionalityofHBNo.4146,SBNo.2756,RANo.9333,andRA
No.10153.

OralargumentswereheldonAugust9,2011andAugust16,2011.Thereafter,thepartieswere
instructedtosubmittheirrespectivememorandawithintwenty(20)days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continuetoperformtheirfunctionsshouldthesecasesnotbedecidedbytheendoftheirtermon
September30,2011.

TheArguments

ThepetitionersassailingRANo.9140,RANo.9333andRANo.10153assertthattheselaws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to
becomeeffective.

ThepetitionsassailingRANo.10153furthermaintainthatitisunconstitutionalforitsfailureto
complywiththethreereadingrequirementofSection26(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.Also
citedasgroundsaretheallegedviolationsoftherightofsuffrageofthepeopleofARMM,as
well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the
power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
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Constitution.

TheIssues

Fromthepartiessubmissions,thefollowingissueswererecognizedandarguedbythepartiesin
theoralargumentsofAugust9and16,2011:

I.Whetherthe1987Constitutionmandatesthesynchronizationofelections

II.WhetherthepassageofRANo.10153violatesSection26(2),ArticleVIofthe
1987Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and
plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an
amendmenttoSection7,ArticleXVIIIofRANo.9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or
revisionstoRANo.9054violateSection1andSection16(2),ArticleVI
ofthe1987Constitutionandthecorollarydoctrineonirrepealablelaws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of
autonomousregionsunderparagraph2,Section18,ArticleXofthe1987
Constitution?

IV.WhetherRANo.10153violatestheautonomygrantedtotheARMM

V.WhetherthegrantofthepowertoappointOICsviolates:

A.Section15,ArticleXofthe1987Constitution

B.Section16,ArticleXofthe1987Constitution

C.Section18,ArticleXofthe1987Constitution

VI.Whethertheproposaltoholdspecialelectionsisconstitutionalandlegal.

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Weshalldiscusstheseissuesintheordertheyarepresentedabove.

OURRULING

WeresolvetoDISMISSthepetitionsandtherebyUPHOLDtheconstitutionalityofRA
No.10153intoto.

I.Synchronizationasarecognizedconstitutionalmandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(TransitoryProvisions)ofthe1987Constitution,whichprovides:

Section1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldon
thesecondMondayofMay,1987.
ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybe
simultaneouswiththeelectionoftheMembersoftheCongress.Itshallincludetheelectionofall
MembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first
electedunderthisConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.
OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberof
votesshallserveforsixyearandtheremainingtwelveforthreeyears.
xxx
Section 5. The sixyear term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noonofJune30,1992.
ThefirstregularelectionsforPresidentandVicePresidentunderthisConstitutionshallbeheld
onthesecondMondayofMay,1992.
Weagreewiththisposition.

WhiletheConstitutiondoesnotexpresslystatethatCongresshastosynchronizenational
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
[10]
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
ConstitutionalCommission,bydeliberatelymakingadjustmentstothetermsoftheincumbent
[11]
officials,soughttoattainsynchronizationofelections.

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The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least
numberofvotes,istosynchronizetheholdingofallfutureelectionswhethernationalorlocalto
[12]
once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
[13]
ConstitutionalCommissiondeliberations.
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
ProvisionsoftheConstitution,allserveaspatentindicatorsoftheconstitutionalmandatetohold
synchronizednationalandlocalelections,startingthesecondMondayofMay,1992andforall
thefollowingelections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and
[14]
local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections, we
explained:

Itisclearfromtheaforequotedprovisionsofthe1987Constitutionthatthetermsofoffice
ofSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,thelocalofficials,thePresidentandthe
VicePresidenthavebeensynchronizedtoendonthesamehour,dateandyearnoonofJune30,
1992.
ItislikewiseevidentfromthewordingoftheabovementionedSectionsthatthetermof
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,Vol.II,p.605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials(underSec.2,Art.XVIII)willhavetobesynchronizedwiththeelectionforPresident
andVicePresident(underSec.5,Art.XVIII)islikewiseevidentfromthexxxrecordsofthe
proceedingsintheConstitutionalCommission.[Emphasissupplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
electionstobesynchronizedasitisalocalelectionbasedonthewordingandstructureofthe
Constitution.

Abasicruleinconstitutionalconstructionisthatthewordsusedshouldbeunderstoodin
the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when
[15]
technicaltermsareemployed,inwhichcasethesignificancethusattachedtothemprevails.
[16]
AsthisCourtexplainedinPeoplev.Derilo, [a]stheConstitutionisnotprimarilyalawyers
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document,itslanguageshouldbeunderstoodinthesensethatitmayhaveincommon.Itswords
shouldbegiventheirordinarymeaningexceptwheretechnicaltermsareemployed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the
[17]
needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vicegovernor and regional
assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the
electedofficialswhowillservewithinthelimitedregionofARMM.

FromtheperspectiveoftheConstitution,autonomousregionsareconsideredoneofthe
forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local
Government.AutonomousregionsareestablishedanddiscussedunderSections15to21ofthis
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is
considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution,whichprovides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao,andtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided.

Thus,wefindthecontentionthatthesynchronizationmandatedbytheConstitutiondoes
not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to
synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the
considerationofthevariousissuesposedinthiscaseandmustberecalledtimeandagainforits
completeresolution.

II.ThePresidentsCertificationontheUrgencyofRANo.10153

ThepetitionersinG.R.No.197280alsochallengethevalidityofRANo.10153forits
[18]
allegedfailuretocomplywithSection26(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution whichprovides
that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the
necessityofthebillsimmediateenactment.

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[19]
TheCourt,inTolentinov.SecretaryofFinance, explainedtheeffectofthePresidents
certificationofnecessityinthefollowingmanner:

Thepresidentialcertificationdispensedwiththerequirementnotonlyofprintingbutalso
thatofreadingthebillonseparatedays.Thephrase"exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothe
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditionsbeforeabillcanbecomealaw:[i]thebillhaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays
and[ii]ithasbeenprintedinitsfinalformanddistributedthreedaysbeforeitisfinallyapproved.

xxx
ThatuponthecertificationofabillbythePresident,therequirementofthreereadingson
separatedaysandofprintinganddistributioncanbedispensedwithissupportedbytheweightof
legislativepractice.Forexample,thebilldefiningthecertiorarijurisdictionofthisCourtwhich,
inconsolidationwiththeSenateversion,becameRepublicActNo.5440,waspassedonsecond
andthirdreadingsintheHouseofRepresentativesonthesameday[May14,1968]afterthebill
hadbeencertifiedbythePresidentasurgent.

Inthepresentcase,therecordsshowthatthePresidentwrotetotheSpeakeroftheHouse
ofRepresentativestocertifythenecessityoftheimmediateenactmentofalawsynchronizing
[20]
theARMMelectionswiththenationalandlocalelections. FollowingourTolentino ruling,
thePresidentscertificationexemptedboththeHouseandtheSenatefromhavingtocomplywith
thethreeseparatereadingsrequirement.

On the followup contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of
thesebillssincetherewasnopubliccalamityoremergencythathadtobemet,againwehark
backtoourrulinginTolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifyingthedelegationofextraordinarypowerstothePresidentunderArt.VI,Section23(2)is
subjecttojudicialreviewbecausebasicrightsofindividualsmaybeofhazard.Butthefactual
basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress,
certainlyshouldelicitadifferentstandardofreview.[Emphasissupplied.]

TheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateintheexerciseoftheirlegislativediscretion
gavefullrecognitiontothePresidentscertificationandpromptlyenactedRANo.10153.Under
thecircumstances,nothingshortofgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofthetwohousesof
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[21]
Congresscanjustifyourintrusionunderourpowerofjudicialreview.

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this
course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the
acceptanceofthePresident'scertificationbyboththeHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate,
prudentexerciseofourpowersandrespectdueourcoequalbranchesofgovernmentinmatters
[22]
committedtothembytheConstitution,cautionastayofthejudicialhand.

In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the twofold purpose that underlies the
requirementforthreereadingsonseparatedaysofeverybillmustalwaysbeobservedtoenable
our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.
Specifically,thepurposewithrespecttoMembersofCongressis:(1)toinformthelegislatorsof
thematterstheyshallvoteonand(2)togivethemnoticethatameasureisinprogressthrough
[23]
theenactmentprocess.

Wefind,basedontherecordsofthedeliberationsonthelaw,thatbothadvocatesandthe
opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this
light,noreasonexiststonullifyRANo.10153onthecitedground.

III.A.RANo.9333andRANo.10153arenotamendmentstoRANo.9054
TheeffectivityofRANo.9333andRANo.10153hasalsobeenchallengedbecausethey
didnotcomplywithSections1and3,ArticleXVIIofRANo.9054inamendingthislaw.These
provisionsrequire:

Section1.ConsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution,thisOrganicActmaybereamended
orrevisedbytheCongressofthePhilippinesuponavoteoftwothirds(2/3)oftheMembersof
theHouseofRepresentativesandoftheSenatevotingseparately.

Section3.AnyamendmenttoorrevisionofthisOrganicActshallbecomeeffectiveonlywhen
approvedbyamajorityofthevotecastinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,whichshallbeheld
not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendmentorrevision.

Wefindnomeritinthiscontention.

Inthefirstplace,neitherRANo.9333norRANo.10153amendsRANo.9054.As an
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examinationoftheselawswillshow,RANo.9054onlyprovidesforthescheduleofthefirst
ARMMelectionsanddoesnotfixthedateoftheregularelections.Aneedthereforeexistedfor
the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by
enactingRANo.9333andthereafter,RANo.10153.Obviously,thesesubsequentlawsRANo.
9333andRANo.10153cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
changeorreviseanyprovisioninthelatterlawtheymerelyfilledinagapinRANo.9054or
supplementedthelawbyprovidingthedateofthesubsequentregularelections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of
succeedingARMMelectionstolegislativediscretionfindssupportinARMMsrecenthistory.

Torecall,RANo.10153isnotthefirstlawpassedthatrescheduledtheARMMelections.
TheFirstOrganicActRANo.6734notonlydidnotfixthedateofthesubsequentelectionsit
[24]
didnotevenfixthespecificdateofthefirstARMMelections, leavingthedatetobefixedin
[25] [26]
another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No.
[27] [28] [29]
8746, RANo.8753, andRANo.9012 wereallenactedbyCongresstofixthedates
oftheARMMelections.SincetheselawsdidnotchangeormodifyanypartorprovisionofRA
No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to
submitthemtoanyplebisciteforratification.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
[30]
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly,whileRANo.9140alsoscheduledtheplebiscitefortheratificationoftheSecond
OrganicAct(RANo.9054),thenewdateoftheARMMregionalelectionsfixedinRANo.
9140wasnotamongtheprovisionsratifiedintheplebisciteheldtoapproveRANo.9054.
[31]
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM
regionalelections.Again,thislawwasnotratifiedthroughaplebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
whichfixthedateofthesubsequentARMMelectionsasseparateanddistinctfromtheOrganic
Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without
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requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3,
ArticleXVIIofRANo.9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the
characterofanirrepealablelaw

EvenassumingthatRANo.9333andRANo.10153didinfactamendRANo.9054,the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
[32]
9054 hastobestruckdownforgivingRANo.9054thecharacterofanirrepealablelawby
requiringmorethanwhattheConstitutiondemands.

Section16(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovidesthatamajorityofeachHouseshall
constituteaquorumtodobusiness.Inotherwords,aslongasmajorityofthemembersofthe
House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to
conductbusinessandholdsession.Withinaquorum,avoteofmajorityisgenerallysufficientto
enactlawsorapproveacts.

Incontrast,Section1,ArticleXVIIofRANo.9054requiresavoteofnolessthantwo
thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting
separately,inordertoeffectivelyamendRANo.9054.Clearly,this2/3votingrequirementis
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts
[33]
pronouncementinCityofDavaov.GSIS onthissubjectbestexplainsthebasisandreason
fortheunconstitutionality:

Moreover,itwouldbenoxiousanathematodemocraticprinciplesforalegislativebodyto
havetheabilitytobindtheactionsoffuturelegislativebody,consideringthatbothassembliesare
regardedwithequalfooting,exercisingastheydothesameplenarypowers.Perpetualinfallibility
isnotoneoftheattributesdesiredinalegislativebody,andalegislaturewhichattemptsto
forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

xxx

Astatelegislaturehasaplenarylawmakingpoweroverallsubjects,whetherpertainingto
personsorthings,withinitsterritorialjurisdiction,eithertointroducenewlawsorrepealtheold,
unlessprohibitedexpresslyorbyimplicationbythefederalconstitutionorlimitedorrestrainedby
its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
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predecessors.Thispowerofrepealmaybeexercisedatthesamesessionatwhichtheoriginalact
waspassedandevenwhileabillisinitsprogressandbeforeitbecomesalaw.This legislature
cannotbindafuturelegislaturetoaparticularmodeofrepeal.Itcannotdeclareinadvance
the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
[34]
statutes. (Emphasisours.)

Thus,whileasupermajorityisnotatotalbanagainstarepeal,itisalimitationinexcess
of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious
becauseitsignificantlyconstrictsthefuturelegislatorsroomforactionandflexibility.
III.C.Section3,ArticleXVIIofRANo.9054excessivelyenlargedtheplebisciterequirement
foundinSection18,ArticleXoftheConstitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but
enlargedaswelltheplebisciterequirement,asembodiedinitsSection3,ArticleXVIIofthat
Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite
requirementrequiredunderSection18,ArticleXoftheConstitutiontobeexcessivetopointof
absurdityand,hence,aviolationoftheConstitution.

Section18,ArticleXoftheConstitutionstatesthattheplebisciteisrequiredonlyforthe
creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic
areaswillbeincludedintheautonomousregions.Whilethesettledruleisthatamendmentsto
the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,
[35]
questionsontheextentofthemattersrequiringratificationmayunavoidablyarisebecause
oftheseeminglygeneraltermsoftheConstitutionandtheobviousabsurditythatwouldresultif
aplebisciteweretoberequiredforeverystatutoryamendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we
interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionallyessential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratificationthroughaplebiscite.TheseamendmentstotheOrganicActarethosethatrelateto:
(a) the basic structure of the regional government (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the
specialcourtswithpersonal,family,andpropertylawjurisdictionand,(c)thegrantandextent
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ofthelegislativepowersconstitutionallyconcededtotheregionalgovernmentunderSection20,
[36]
ArticleXoftheConstitution.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the
ConstitutionspecificallymandatedCongresstoprovideforintheOrganicAct.Therefore,even
assumingthatthesupermajorityvotesandtheplebisciterequirementsarevalid,anychangein
the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that
wouldrequirecompliancewiththeserequirements.

IV.Thesynchronizationissue

Aswediscussedabove,synchronizationofnationalandlocalelectionsisaconstitutional
mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM
elections.Onthispoint,anexistinglawinfactalreadyexistsRANo.7166astheforerunnerof
the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local
electionswiththenationalandcongressionalelections.Thus,whatRANo.10153providesisan
old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan
elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of
whatisalreadyreflectedinthelaw,giventhatregionalelectionsareinrealitylocalelectionsby
[37]
expressconstitutionalrecognition.

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No.
9333)withthefixedscheduleofthenationalandlocalelections(fixedbyRANo.7166tobe
heldinMay2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
ordertoresolvethisproblem.Theseoptionsare:(1)toallowtheelectiveofficialsintheARMM
to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No.
[38]
9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office (2) to hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronizedelectionsassumeofficeor(3)toauthorizethePresidenttoappointOICs,pursuant
to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
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office.

Aswillbeabundantlyclearinthediscussionbelow,Congress,inchoosingtograntthe
PresidentthepowertoappointOICs,chosethecorrectoptionandpassedRANo.10153asa
completelyvalidlaw.

V.TheConstitutionalityofRANo.10153

A.BasicUnderlyingPremises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be
fullyunderstood.ThefirstistheextentofthepowersofCongresstolegislatethesecondisthe
constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections and the third is on the concept of
autonomyasrecognizedandestablishedunderthe1987Constitution.

[39]
ThegrantoflegislativepowertoCongressisbroad,generalandcomprehensive. The
[40]
legislativebodypossessesplenarypowerforallpurposesofcivilgovernment. Anypower,
deemedtobelegislativebyusageandtradition,isnecessarilypossessedbyCongress,unlessthe
[41]
Constitutionhaslodgeditelsewhere. ExceptaslimitedbytheConstitution,eitherexpressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general
[42]
concernorcommoninterest.

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The
express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other
constitutionalprovisions(suchastheinitiativeandreferendumclauseofArticle6,Sections1
and32,andtheautonomyprovisionsofArticleX)providetheirownexpresslimitations.The
impliedlimitationsarefoundintheevidentpurposewhichwasinviewandthecircumstances
andhistoricaleventswhichledtotheenactmentoftheparticularprovisionasapartoforganic
[43]
law.

Theconstitutionalprovisionsonautonomyspecifically,Sections15to21ofArticleXof
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theConstitutionconstituteexpresslimitationsonlegislativepowerastheydefineautonomy,its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of
Congresstolegislateonthegovernanceoftheautonomousregion.

Ofparticularrelevancetotheissuesofthepresentcasearethelimitationsposedbythe
prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government must have an executive
departmentandalegislativeassembly,bothofwhichmustbeelectiveandrepresentativeofthe
constituentpoliticalunitsnationalgovernment,too,mustnotencroachonthelegislativepowers
grantedunderSection20,ArticleX.ConverselyandasexpresslyreflectedinSection17,Article
X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regionsshallbevestedintheNationalGovernment.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that
Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous
regions.ThetermsofthesesectionsleavenodoubtonwhattheConstitutionintendstheideaof
selfrule or selfgovernment, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
[44]
expressed in the abovequoted Section 17 and in Section 15. In other words, the
Constitutionandthesupportingjurisprudence,astheynowstand,rejectthenotionofimperium
[45]
etimperio intherelationshipbetweenthenationalandtheregionalgovernments.

Inrelationwithsynchronization,bothautonomyandthesynchronizationofnationaland
local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as
compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coveragesynchronizationoperatesonandaffectsthewholecountry,whileregionalautonomy
asthetermsuggestsdirectlycarriesanarrowerregionaleffectalthoughitsnationaleffectcannot
bediscounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress
whenitactedonRANo.10153.TosuccinctlydescribethelegalsituationthatfacedCongress
then,itsdecisiontosynchronizetheregionalelectionswiththenational,congressionalandall
other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the
problemofhowtoprovidetheARMMwithgovernanceintheinterveningperiodbetweenthe
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expirationofthetermofthoseelectedinAugust2008andtheassumptiontoofficetwentyone
(21)monthsawayofthosewhowillwininthesynchronizedelectionsonMay13,2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with
thetermsoftheConstitutionanditsestablishedsupportingjurisprudence,andwiththerespect
duetotheconceptofautonomy.Interimmeasures,tobesure,isnotastrangephenomenonin
thePhilippinelegallandscape.TheConstitutionsTransitoryProvisionsthemselvescollectively
[46]
providemeasuresfortransitionfromtheoldconstitutiontothenew andfortheintroduction
[47]
ofnewconcepts. Aspreviouslymentioned,theadjustmentofelectivetermsandofelections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The
adjustments,however,failedtolookfarenoughordeeplyenough,particularlyintotheproblems
thatsynchronizingregionalautonomouselectionswouldentailthus,thepresentproblemiswith
ustoday.

Thecreationoflocalgovernmentunitsalsorepresentsinstanceswheninterimmeasures
[48] [49]
arerequired.InthecreationofQuezondelSur andDinagatIslands, thecreatingstatutes
authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vicegovernor and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character the
appointiveofficialsweretoserveuntilanewsetofprovincialofficialsshallhavebeenelected
[50]
and qualified. A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
[51]
governmentfromasubprovincetoaprovince.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity outoftheway
arrangementsandapproacheswereadoptedorusedinordertoadjusttothegoalorobjectivein
sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressionaldiscretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts
and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems
broughtaboutbythesynchronizationoftheARMMelections,properlyunderstoodasinterim
measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim
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measuresassumeprimematerialityasitisunderthesetermsthatthepassageofRANo.10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot
legallybefaulted,didCongressgravelyabuseitsdiscretionorviolatetheConstitutionwhenit
addressedthroughRANo.10153theconcomitantproblemsthattheadjustmentofelections
necessarilybroughtwithit?

B.HoldoverOptionisUnconstitutional

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and
legislativepositionsintheARMMduringthe20082011termasanoptionthatCongresscould
havechosenbecauseaholdoverviolatesSection8,ArticleXoftheConstitution.Thisprovision
states:

Section8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,which
shallbedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethan
threeconsecutiveterms.[emphasesours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution they cannot extend their term through a
[52]
holdover.AsthisCourtputinOsmeav.COMELEC:

Itisnotcompetentforthelegislaturetoextendthetermofofficersbyprovidingthatthey
shallholdoveruntiltheirsuccessorsareelectedandqualifiedwheretheconstitutionhasineffect
orbyclearimplicationprescribedthetermandwhentheConstitutionfixesthedayonwhichthe
official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that
period,eventhoughthesuccessorsfailtoqualifywithinthetime.

InAmericanJurisprudenceithasbeenstatedasfollows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the
Constitution,extendthetermoftheincumbentbeyondtheperiodaslimited
bytheConstitution.[Emphasisours.]

IndependentlyoftheOsmearuling,theprimacyoftheConstitutionasthesupremelawof
the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its
mandate,thenthematterssodeterminedormandatedshouldberespecteduntiltheConstitution
itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A
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necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the
[53]
constitutionalmandateexceptonlyastheConstitutionitselfmayallow. Ifatall,Congress
mayonlypasslegislationfilingindetailstofullyoperationalizetheconstitutionalcommandor
toimplementitbylegislationifitisnonselfexecutingthisCourt,ontheotherhand,mayonly
[54]
interpretthemandateifaninterpretationisappropriateandcalledfor.

Inthecaseofthetermsoflocalofficials,theirtermhasbeenfixedclearlyandunequivocally,
allowingnoroomforanyimplementinglegislationwithrespecttothefixedtermitselfandno
vaguenessthatwouldallowaninterpretationfromthisCourt.Thus,thetermofthreeyearsfor
localofficialsshouldstayatthree(3)yearsasfixedbytheConstitutionandcannotbeextended
byholdoverbyCongress.

IfitwillbeclaimedthattheholdoverperiodiseffectivelyanothertermmandatedbyCongress,
thenetresultisforCongresstocreateanewtermandtoappointtheoccupantforthenewterm.
This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress
cannotdoindirectlywhatitcannotdodirectly,i.e.,toactinawaythatwouldeffectivelyextend
the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
[55]
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectivelyappointtheoccupantofthepositionforthenewterm.Thisiseffectivelyanactof
appointmentbyCongressandanunconstitutionalintrusionintotheconstitutionalappointment
[56]
power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirmoptionthatCongresscouldnothaveundertaken.

Jurisprudence,ofcourse,isnotwithoutexamplesofcaseswherethequestionofholdoverwas
brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
[57] [58] [59]
COMELEC, Adapv.Comelec, andMontesclarosv.Comelec, wheretheCourtruled
thattheelectiveofficialscouldholdontotheirpositionsinaholdovercapacity.

Allthesepastcasesrefertoelectivebarangayorsangguniangkabataan officials whose
termsofofficearenotexplicitlyprovidedforintheConstitutionthepresentcase,ontheother
hand,referstolocalelectiveofficialstheARMMGovernor,theARMMViceGovernor,andthe
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membersoftheRegionalLegislativeAssemblywhosetermsfallwithinthethreeyeartermlimit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term,
Congresscannotlegislateanextensionbeyondthetermforwhichtheywereoriginallyelected.

Evenassumingthatholdoverisconstitutionallypermissible,andtherehadbeenstatutory
[60]
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
rememberthattheruleofholdovercanonlyapplyasanavailableoptionwherenoexpress
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists it cannot apply where such contrary
[61]
intentisevident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision.ThedeletionisapolicydecisionthatiswhollywithinthediscretionofCongressto
makeintheexerciseofitsplenarylegislativepowersthisCourtcannotpassuponquestionsof
[62]
wisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation, exceptwhereanattendantunconstitutionality
orgraveabuseofdiscretionresults.

C.TheCOMELEChasnoauthoritytoorderspecialelections

AnotheroptionproposedbythepetitionerinG.R.No.197282isforthisCourttocompel
COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas
PambansaBilang(BP)881.
Thepowertofixthedateofelectionsisessentiallylegislativeinnature,asevidentfrom,
andexemplifiedby,thefollowingprovisionsoftheConstitution:

Section8,ArticleVI,applicabletothelegislature,provides:

Section8.Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandthe
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasisours]

Section4(3),ArticleVII,withthesametenorbutapplicablesolelytothePresidentandVice
President,states:
xxxx

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Section4.xxxUnlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentand
VicePresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.[Emphasisours]

whileSection3,ArticleX,onlocalgovernment,provides:

Section3.TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshallprovidefor
xxxthequalifications,election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
anddutiesoflocalofficials[.][Emphasesours]

Theseprovisionssupporttheconclusionthatnoelectionsmaybeheldonanyotherdate
forthepositionsofPresident,VicePresident,MembersofCongressandlocalofficials,except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congressmayhavedelegatedeitherthepowerortheauthoritytoascertainorfillinthedetails
[63]
intheexecutionofthatpower.

Notably,CongresshasactedontheARMMelectionsbypostponingthescheduledAugust
2011electionsandsettinganotherdateMay13,2011forregionalelectionssynchronizedwith
thepresidential,congressionalandotherlocalelections.Bysodoing,Congressitselfhasmadea
policydecisionintheexerciseofitslegislativewisdomthatitshallnotcallspecialelectionsas
anadjustmentmeasureinsynchronizingtheARMMelectionswiththeotherelections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congressnullandvoidforbeingunconstitutionalorforhavingbeenexercisedingraveabuseof
[64]
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contraveningactofCongressitisnottosupplantthedecisionofCongressnortomandate
whatCongressitselfshouldhavedoneintheexerciseofitslegislativepowers.Thus,contrary
towhatthepetitioninG.R.No.197282urges,wecannotcompelCOMELECtocallforspecial
elections.

Furthermore,wehavetobearinmindthattheconstitutionalpoweroftheCOMELEC,in
contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to
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[65]
enforcingandadministeringalllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection.
Statutorily,COMELEChasnopowertocallfortheholdingofspecialelectionsunlesspursuant
to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881,
COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is
limitedto,andcanonlybeexercisedwithin,thespecifictermsandcircumstancesprovidedfor
inthelaw.Wequote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism,lossordestructionofelectionparaphernaliaorrecords,forcemajeure,andother
analogouscausesofsuchanaturethattheholdingofafree,orderlyandhonestelectionshould
becomeimpossibleinanypoliticalsubdivision,theCommission,motupropriooruponaverified
petitionbyanyinterestedparty,andafterduenoticeandhearing,wherebyallinterestedparties
areaffordedequalopportunitytobeheard,shallpostponetheelectionthereintoadatewhich
shouldbereasonablyclosetothedateoftheelectionnotheld,suspendedorwhichresulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponementorsuspensionoftheelectionorfailuretoelect.

Section 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud,orotheranalogouscausestheelectioninanypollingplacehasnotbeenheldonthe
datefixed,orhadbeensuspendedbeforethehourfixedbylawfortheclosingofthevoting,or
afterthevotingandduringthepreparationandthetransmissionoftheelectionreturnsorinthe
custodyorcanvassthereof,suchelectionresultsinafailuretoelect,andinanyofsuchcases
thefailureorsuspensionofelectionwouldaffecttheresultoftheelection,theCommissionshall,
onthebasisofaverifiedpetitionbyanyinterestedpartyandafterduenoticeandhearing,callfor
theholdingorcontinuationoftheelectionnotheld,suspendedorwhichresultedinafailureto
electonadatereasonablyclosetothedateoftheelectionnotheld,suspendedorwhichresulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponementorsuspensionoftheelectionorfailuretoelect.[Emphasisours]

AclosereadingofSection5ofBP881revealsthatitismeanttoaddressinstanceswhere
electionshavealreadybeenscheduledtotakeplacebuthavetobepostponedbecauseof(a)
violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force
majeure,and(e)otheranalogouscausesofsuchanaturethattheholdingofafree,orderlyand
honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of
ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or
unexpectedeventsthatpreventtheholdingofthescheduledelections.Theseanalogouscauses
arefurtherdefinedbythephraseofsuchnaturethattheholdingofafree,orderlyandhonest
electionshouldbecomeimpossible.

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have
already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c)
terrorism,(d)fraud,or(e)otheranalogouscausestheelectioninanypollingplacehasnot
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been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closingofthevoting,orafterthevotingandduringthepreparationandthetransmissionofthe
electionreturnsorinthecustodyorcanvassthereof,suchelectionresultsinafailuretoelect.
AsinSection5ofBP881,Section6addressesinstanceswheretheelectionsdonotoccurorhad
tobesuspendedbecauseofunexpectedandunforeseencircumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by
congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the
samecharacterasthecircumstancescontemplatedbySection5orSection6ofBP881,which
allpertaintoextralegalcausesthatobstructtheholdingofelections.Courts,tobesure,cannot
enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not
[66]
providednorintendedbythelawmakers. Clearly,neitherSection5norSection6ofBP881
can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the
COMELECtoholdspecialelections.

D.TheCourthasnopowertoshortenthetermsofelectiveofficials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to
hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM
officialsshallholdofficeonlyuntiltheARMMofficialselectedinthesynchronizedelections
shallhaveassumedoffice.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials.
BasedontheConstitution,thepowertofixthetermofofficeofelectiveofficials,whichcanbe
[67]
exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congressitselfmaybedeniedsuchpower,asshownwhentheConstitutionshortenedtheterms
[68]
oftwelveSenatorsobtainingtheleastvotes, andextendedthetermsofthePresidentandthe
[69]
VicePresident inordertosynchronizeelectionsCongresswasnotgrantedthissamepower.
[70]
ThesettledruleisthattermsfixedbytheConstitutioncannotbechangedbymerestatute.
More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the
terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
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[71]
mandatedthreeyears asthistinkeringwoulddirectlycontraveneSection8,ArticleXofthe
ConstitutionasweruledinOsmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
throughaholdover,thetermcannotbeshortenedbyputtinganexpirationdateearlierthan
thethree(3)yearsthattheConstitutionitselfcommands.Thisiswhatwillhappenaterm
of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronizationisachieved,theresultisatthecostofaviolationofanexpressprovisionofthe
Constitution.

NeitherwenorCongresscanopttoshortenthetenureofthoseofficialstobeelectedin
the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the
severalincumbentsshallsucceedoneanother,whilethetenurerepresentsthetermduringwhich
[72]
the incumbent actually holds the office). As with the fixing of the elective term, neither
Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
Theywouldcommitanunconstitutionalactandgravelyabusetheirdiscretioniftheydoso.

E.ThePresidentsPowertoAppointOICs

TheaboveconsiderationsleaveonlyCongresschoseninterimmeasureRANo.10153and
theappointmentbythePresidentofOICstogoverntheARMMduringthepresynchronization
periodpursuanttoSections3,4and5ofthislawastheonlymeasurethatCongresscanmake.
Thischoiceitself,however,shouldbeexaminedforanyattendantconstitutionalinfirmity.

Attheoutset,thepowertoappointisessentiallyexecutiveinnature,andthelimitations
onorqualificationstotheexerciseofthispowershouldbestrictlyconstruedtheselimitations
[73]
orqualificationsmustbeclearlystatedinordertoberecognized. Theappointingpoweris
embodiedinSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,whichstates:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministersandconsulsorofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
providedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongress
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may,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthe
courts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards.[emphasisours]

ThisprovisionclassifiesintofourgroupstheofficersthatthePresidentcanappoint.These
are:

First, the heads of the executive departments ambassadors other public ministers and
consuls officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captainandotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentinthisConstitution

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
providedforbylaw

Third,thosewhomthePresidentmaybeauthorizedbylawtoappointand

Fourth,officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentstheCongressmaybylawvestinthe
[74]
Presidentalone.

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
underthethirdgroupofofficialsthatthePresidentcanappointpursuanttoSection16,Article
VIIoftheConstitution.Thus,theassailedlawfaciallyrestsonclearconstitutionalbasis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
underSection3ofRANo.10153istheassertionthattheConstitutionrequiresthattheARMM
executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political
units.Thisrequirementindeedisanexpresslimitationwhosenonobservanceintheassailedlaw
leavestheappointmentofOICsconstitutionallydefective.

Afterfullyexaminingtheissue,weholdthatthisallegedconstitutionalproblemismore
apparentthanrealandbecomesveryrealonlyifRANo.10153weretobemistakenlyreadasa
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No.
10153,however,doesnotinanywayamendwhattheorganiclawoftheARMM(RANo.9054)
setsoutsintermsofstructureofgovernance.WhatRANo.10153infactonlydoesistoappoint
officersincharge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
MembersoftheRegionalLegislativeAssemblywhoshallperformthefunctionspertainingtothe
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite
requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures
that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the
[75]
manneritwaswrittenandbasedonitsunambiguousfacialterms. Asidefromitsorderfor
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments
thatthesynchronizationrequires.

Thus,theappropriatequestiontoaskiswhethertheinterimmeasureisanunreasonable
move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably
broughtwithit.Inmoreconcretetermsandbasedontheaboveconsiderations,giventheplain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the
choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure,andasallowedunderSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionanunconstitutional
orunreasonablechoiceforCongresstomake?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the
powerofappointmentwouldextendbeyondtheadjustmentperiodforsynchronizationwouldbe
to foster a government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to
choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of
fosteringanundemocraticregime.Thisisthegrantthatwouldfrontallybreachtheelectiveand
representativegovernancerequirementofSection18,ArticleXoftheConstitution.

Butthisconclusionwouldnotbetrueundertheverylimitedcircumstancescontemplated
inRANo.10153wheretheperiodisfixedand,moreimportantly,thetermsofgovernanceboth
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touchednoraffectedatall.Torepeatwhathaspreviouslybeensaid,RANo.9054willgovern
unchangedandcontinuously,withfulleffectinaccordancewiththeConstitution,saveonlyfor
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
theinterimandtemporarymeasuresthatsynchronizationofelectionsrequires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
processinalocalcommunity,theARMM,aswellasthecommunityschoiceofleaders,butthis
will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that
[76]
interimmeasureshavebeenadoptedandusedinthecreationoflocalgovernmentunits and
[77]
theadjustmentsofsubprovincestothestatusofprovinces. Thesemeasures,too,areusedin
lightofthewidernationaldemandforthesynchronizationofelections(consideredvisvisthe
regionalinterestsinvolved).Theadoptionofthesemeasures,inotherwords,isnodifferentfrom
theexercisebyCongressoftheinherentpolicepoweroftheState,whereoneoftheessential
testsisthereasonablenessoftheinterimmeasuretakeninlightofthegivencircumstances.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be
affectedbytheappointmentofOICsasthisrequirementisreallyafunctionoftheappointment
processonlytheelectiveaspectshallbesupplantedbytheappointmentofOICs.Inthisregard,
RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing,underSections3,4and5oftheassailedlaw,concretetermsintheAppointmentof
OIC,theMannerandProcedureofAppointingOICs,andtheirQualifications.

Basedontheseconsiderations,weholdthatRANo.10153viewedinitspropercontextis
a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one
thatisreasonableaswellunderthecircumstances.

VI.OtherConstitutionalConcerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that
upholdingtheconstitutionalityofRANo.10153wouldsetadangerousprecedentofgivingthe
Presidentthepowertocancelelectionsanywhereinthecountry,thusallowinghimtoreplace
electiveofficialswithOICs.
Thisclaimapparentlymisunderstandsthatanacrosstheboardcancellationofelectionsis
amatterforCongress,notforthePresident,toaddress.Itisapowerthatfallswithinthepowers
of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is
limitedinwhatitcanlegislativelyundertakewithrespecttoelections.

9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
IfRANo.10153cancelledtheregularAugust2011elections,itwasforaveryspecific
andlimitedpurposethesynchronizationofelections.Itwasatemporarymeanstoalastingend
thesynchronizationofelections.Thus,RANo.10153andthesupportthattheCourtgivesthis
legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other
causeforthecancellationofelections.Anyotherlocalizedcancellationofelectionsandcallfor
specialelectionscanoccuronlyinaccordancewiththepoweralreadydelegatedbyCongressto
theCOMELEC,asabovediscussed.

GiventhattheincumbentARMMelectiveofficialscannotcontinuetoactinaholdover
capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to
conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in
governanceintheARMM.

Toemphasizethediresituationavacuumbrings,itshouldnotbeforgottenthataperiod
of21monthsorcloseto2yearsintervenesfromthetimethattheincumbentARMMelective
officialstermsexpiredandthetimethenewARMMelectiveofficialsbegintheirtermsin2013.
AsthelessonsofourMindanaohistorypastandcurrentteachus,manydevelopments,someof
themcriticalandadverse,cantranspireinthecountrysMuslimareasinthisspanoftimeinthe
[78]
waytheytranspiredinthepast. Thus,itwouldberecklesstoassumethatthepresenceofan
actingARMMGovernor,anactingViceGovernorandafullyfunctioningRegionalLegislative
Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs
underthepresentcircumstancesisanabsolutenecessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor
[79]
innovative.WeharkbacktoourearlierpronouncementinMenzonv.Petilla,etc.,etal.:

ItmaybenotedthatunderCommonwealthActNo.588andtheRevisedAdministrative
Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices,incaseofanyvacancythatmayoccur.Albeitbothlawsdealonlywiththefillingof
vacanciesinappointivepositions.However,intheabsenceofanycontraryprovisioninthe
LocalGovernmentCodeandinthebestinterestofpublicservice,weseenocogentreason
whytheprocedurethusoutlinedbythetwolawsmaynotbesimilarlyappliedinthepresent
case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This
argumenthasnomerit.AsbetweenthePresidentwhohassupervisionoverlocalgovernmentsas
providedbylawandthemembersoftheboardwhoarejuniortothevicegovernor,wehaveno
problemrulinginfavorofthePresident,untilthelawprovidesotherwise.
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
Avacancycreatesananomaloussituationandfindsnoapprobationunderthelawforit
deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.

Inarepublicanformofgovernment,themajorityrulesthroughtheirchosenfew,andif
one ofthemisincapacitatedorabsent, etc., themanagement ofgovernmental affairsis,tothat
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of
[80]
basicservicestothepeopleofLeyte if the Governor or the ViceGovernor is missing.
(Emphasisours.)

AsinMenzon,leavingthepositionsofARMMGovernor,ViceGovernor,andmembers
of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly
cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionallyrecognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our
judgment,areasonablemeasuretotake.

B.AutonomyintheARMM

Itisfurtherarguedthatwhilesynchronizationmaybeconstitutionallymandated,itcannot
be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM.
Phrasedinthismanner,onewouldpresumethatthereexistsaconflictbetweentworecognized
Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to
chooseoneovertheother.

Wefindthistobeanerroneousapproachthatviolatesabasicprincipleinconstitutional
constructionutmagisvaleatquampereat:thattheConstitutionistobeinterpretedasawhole,
[81]
andonemandateshouldnotbegivenimportanceovertheotherexceptwheretheprimacy
[82]
ofoneovertheotherisclear. WerefertotheCourtsdeclarationinAngAngcov.Castillo,et
[83]
al., thus:

Aprovisionoftheconstitutionshouldnotbeconstruedinisolationfromtherest.Rather,
theconstitutionmustbeinterpretedasawhole,andapparently,conflictingprovisionsshouldbe
reconciledandharmonizedinamannerthatmaygivetoallofthemfullforceandeffect.
[Emphasissupplied.]

9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
Synchronizationisaninterestthatisasconstitutionallyentrenchedasregionalautonomy.They
areintereststhatthisCourtshouldreconcileandgiveeffectto,inthewaythatCongressdidin
RANo.10153whichprovidesthemeasuretotransittosynchronizedregionalelectionswiththe
leastdisturbanceontheintereststhatmustberespected.Particularly,regionalautonomywillbe
respectedinsteadofbeingsidelined,asthelawdoesnotinanywayalter,changeormodifyits
governingfeatures,exceptinaverytemporarymannerandonlyasnecessitatedbytheattendant
circumstances.

Elsewhere,ithasalsobeenarguedthattheARMMelectionsshouldnotbesynchronizedwith
thenationalandlocalelectionsinordertomaintaintheautonomyoftheARMMandinsulateits
own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This
argumentleavesusfarfromconvincedofitsmerits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political
autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
ARMMasaregionalentitythuscontinuestooperatewithinthelargerframeworkoftheState
andisstillsubjecttothenationalpoliciessetbythenationalgovernment,saveonlyforthose
specificareasreservedbytheConstitutionforregionalautonomousdetermination.Asreflected
duringtheconstitutionaldeliberationsoftheprovisionsonautonomousregions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central
government,butratheranefficientworkingrelationshipbetweentheautonomousregionandthe
centralgovernment.Weseethisasaneffectivepartnership,notaseparation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete
independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of selfgovernment within the larger political
[84]
frameworkofthenation. [Emphasissupplied.]

ThisexchangeofcourseisfullyandexpresslyreflectedintheabovequotedSection17,Article
XoftheConstitution,andbytheexpressreservationunderSection1ofthesameArticlethat
autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
wellastheterritorialintegrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.

Interestingly,theframersoftheConstitutioninitiallyproposedtoremoveSection17of
Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to
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autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the
framersdecidedtoreinstatetheprovisioninordertomakeitclear,onceandforall,thatthese
are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are
[85]
actually to be exercised by the national government[.] Of note is the Courts
[86]
pronouncementinPimentel,Jr.v.Hon.Aguirre whichwequote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the
locallevels.Inturn,economic,politicalandsocialdevelopmentatthesmallerpoliticalunitsare
expectedtopropelsocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Buttoenablethecountryto
develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policysetting for the entire country
stillliesinthePresidentandCongress.[Emphasisours.]

Inotherwords,theautonomygrantedtotheARMMcannotbeinvokedtodefeatnational
policiesandconcerns.Sincethesynchronizationofelectionsisnotjustaregionalconcernbuta
nationalone,theARMMissubjecttoittheregionalautonomygrantedtotheARMMcannotbe
usedtoexempttheregionfromhavingtoactinaccordancewithanationalpolicymandatedby
nolessthantheConstitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the
synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court
cannotquestionthemannerbywhichCongressundertookthistasktheJudiciarydoesnotand
[87]
cannotpassuponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation. Asjudges,we
canonlyinterpretandapplythelawand,despiteourdoubtsaboutitswisdom,cannotrepealor
[88]
amendit.

NorcantheCourtpresumetodictatethemeansbywhichCongressshouldaddresswhat
isessentiallyalegislativeproblem.ItisnotwithintheCourtspowertoenlargeorabridgelaws
[89]
otherwise,theCourtwillbeguiltyofusurpingtheexclusiveprerogativeofCongress. The
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
petitioners,inaskingthisCourttocompelCOMELECtoholdspecialelectionsdespiteitslack
ofauthoritytodoso,areessentiallyaskingustoventureintotherealmofjudiciallegislation,
which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
governmenttheseparationofpowers.

Thepetitionersallege,too,thatweshouldactbecauseCongressactedwithgraveabuseof
discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and
whimsicalexerciseofjudgmentthatispatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositive
dutyortoavirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylawortoactatallincontemplationof
thelawaswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassion
[90]
andhostility.

WefindthatCongress,inpassingRANo.10153,actedstrictlywithinitsconstitutional
mandate.Givenanarrayofchoices,itactedwithindueconstitutionalboundsandwithmarked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore,cannotbeaccusedofanyevasionofapositivedutyorofarefusaltoperformitsduty.
Wethusfindnoreasontoaccordmerittothepetitionersclaimsofgraveabuseofdiscretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the
[91]
established rule that every statute is presumed valid. Congress, thus, has in its favor the
presumptionofconstitutionalityofitsacts,andthepartychallengingthevalidityofastatutehas
[92]
theoneroustaskofrebuttingthispresumption. Anyreasonabledoubtaboutthevalidityof
[93]
thelawshouldberesolvedinfavorofitsconstitutionality. AsthisCourtdeclaredinGarcia
[94]
v.ExecutiveSecretary:

Thepolicyofthecourtsistoavoidrulingonconstitutionalquestionsandtopresumethat
theactsofthepoliticaldepartmentsarevalidintheabsenceofaclearandunmistakableshowing
tothecontrary.Todoubtistosustain.Thispresumptionisbasedonthedoctrineofseparationof
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines,alawhasbeencarefullystudiedanddeterminedtobeinaccordancewiththe
[95]
fundamentallawbeforeitwasfinallyenacted. [Emphasisours.]

Giventhefailureofthepetitionerstorebutthepresumptionofconstitutionalityinfavorof
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RANo.10153,wemustsupportandconfirmitsvalidity.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,weDISMISStheconsolidatedpetitionsassailing
thevalidityofRANo.10153forlackofmerit,andUPHOLDtheconstitutionalityofthislaw.
WelikewiseLIFTthetemporaryrestrainingorderweissuedinourResolutionofSeptember13,
2011.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

IjointhedissentofJ.Velascowithrespecttotheappointment
oftheOICGovernorandvotetoholdthelawasunconstitutional
RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

SeeDissentingOpinion IjointhedissentofJ.Carpiobutdisagreeon
ANTONIOT.CARPIO thepowerofthePres.toappointOIC
AssociateJustice GovernorofARMM
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

IjointhedissentofJusticeVelasco DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMIN MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

IjointhedissentofJ.Velasco MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
ROBERTOA.ABAD AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio JOSECATRALMENDOZA
JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice
IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
aboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourt.

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

[1]
EntitledAnactfixingthedateoftheplebiscitefortheapprovaloftheamendmentstoRepublicActNo.6734andsettingthedate
oftheregularelectionsforelectiveofficialsoftheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanaoonthelastMondayofNovember2001,
amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
RegioninMuslimMindanao,amendingforthepurposeRepublicActNo.6734,entitledAnActProvidingfortheAutonomousRegion
inMuslimMindanao,asamended,andforotherpurposes.
[2]
Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
MindanaopursuanttoRepublicActNo.9054,entitledAnActtoStrengthenandExpandtheOrganicActfortheAutonomousRegion
in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
AutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao,asamended
[3]
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao Federation of
AutonomousIrrigatorsAssociation,Inc.,HadjiMuhminaUsman,JohnAnthonyL.Lim,JamilonT.Odin,AsrinTimbolJaiyari,Mujib
M.Kalang,AlihAlSaidiJ.Sapie,KessarDamsieAbdil,andBassamAluhSaupi.
[4]
PetitionforProhibitionwithVeryUrgentPrayerfortheIssuanceofaWritofPreliminaryInjunctionand/orTemporaryRestraining
OrderdatedApril11,2011wasfiledagainstSixtoBrillantes,asChairpersonofCOMELEC,tochallengetheeffectivityofRANo.
9333fornothavingbeensubmittedtoaplebiscite.SinceRANo.9333isinoperative,anyotherlawseekingtoamenditisalsonull
andvoid.
[5]
WithPrayerfortheIssuanceofaTemporaryRestrainingOrderand/orWritsofPreliminaryProhibitiveandMandatoryInjunction
datedJune30,2011.
[6]
WithExtremelyUrgentApplicationfortheIssuanceofaStatusQuoOrderandWritofPreliminaryMandatoryInjunctiondated
July1,2011.
[7]
WithPrayerfortheissuanceofaTemporaryRestrainingOrderdatedJuly12,2011.
[8]
WithInjunctionandPreliminaryInjunctionwithprayerfortemporaryrestrainingorderdatedJuly11,2011.
[9]
WithPrayerforTemporaryRestrainingOrderandtheIssuanceofWritsofPreliminaryInjunction,BothProhibitoryandMandatory
datedJuly1,2011.
[10]
Section1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthesecondMondayof
May,1987.

ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybesimultaneouswiththeelectionofthe
MembersoftheCongress.ItshallincludetheelectionofallMembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.

Section2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelectedunderthisConstitutionshall
serveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.

OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshallserveforsixyearsandthe
remainingtwelveforthreeyears.

xxx

9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
Section5.ThesixyeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheFebruary7,1986electionis,forpurposesof
synchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.

ThefirstregularelectionsforPresidentandVicePresidentunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay,1992.
[emphasisours]
[11]
Toillustrate,whileSection8,ArticleXoftheConstitutionfixesthetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficialsatthreeyears,under
theabovequotedprovisions,thetermsoftheincumbentlocalofficialswhowereelectedinJanuary1988,whichshouldhaveexpired
onFebruary2,1991,werefixedtoexpireatnoonofJune30,1992.Inthesamevein,thetermsoftheincumbentPresidentandVice
PresidentwhowereelectedinFebruary1986wereextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.Ontheotherhand,inordertosynchronizethe
electionsoftheSenators,whohavesixyearterms,thetwelveSenatorswhoobtainedthelowestvotesduringthe1992electionswere
madetoserveonlyhalfthetimeoftheirterms.
[12]
JoaquinBernas,S.J.,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary(1996ed.),p.1199,citingRecords
oftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V,p.4294.
[13]
MR.MAAMBONG.Forpurposesofidentification,IwillnowreadasectionwhichwewilltemporarilyindicateasSection14.It
reads:THESENATORS,MEMBERSOFTHEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESANDTHELOCALOFFICIALSELECTEDIN
THEFIRSTELECTIONSHALLSERVEFORFIVEYEARS,TOEXPIREATNOONOFJUNE1992.
ThiswaspresentedbyCommissionerDavide,somayweaskthatCommissionerDavideberecognized.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Rodrigo).CommissionerDavideisrecognized.
MR.DAVIDE.Beforegoingtotheproposedamendment,IwouldonlystatethatinviewoftheactiontakenbytheCommissionon
Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVESANDTHELOCALOFFICIALSFIRSTELECTEDUNDERTHISCONSTITUTIONSHALLSERVEUNTIL
NOONOFJUNE30,1992.
IproposedthisbecauseoftheproposedsectionoftheArticleonTransitoryProvisionsgivingatermtotheincumbentPresidentand
VicePresidentuntil1992.Necessarilythen,sincethetermprovidedbytheCommissionforMembersoftheLowerHouseandforlocal
officialsisthreeyears,iftherewillbeanelectionin1987,thenextelectionforsaidofficerswillbein1990,anditwouldbeveryclose
to1992.Wecouldneverattain,subsequently,anysynchronizationofelectionwhichisonceeverythreeyears.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local
electionoranelectionforMembersoftheLowerHousein1990forthemtobeabletocompletetheirtermofthreeyearseach.Andif
wealsostaggertheSenate,uponthefirstelectionitwillresultinanelectionin1993fortheSenatealone,andtherewillbeanelection
for12Senatorsin1990.Butfortheremaining12whowillbeelectedin1987,iftheirtermisforsixyears,theirelectionwillbein
1993.So,consequentlywewillhaveelectionsin1990,in1992andin1993.Thelaterelectionwillbelimitedtoonly12Senatorsand
ofcoursetolocalofficialsandtheMembersoftheLowerHouse.But,definitely,thereafterwecanneverhaveanelectiononceevery
three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and
anothersixyearsfortheSenatorswiththepossibilityofstaggeringwith12toserveforsixyearsand12forthreeyearsinsofarasthe
first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean,
necessarily,abonusoftwoyearstotheMembersoftheLowerHouseandabonusoftwoyearstothelocalelectiveofficials.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Rodrigo).Whatdoesthecommitteesay?
MR.DECASTRO.Mr.PresidingOfficer.
THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Rodrigo).CommissionerdeCastroisrecognized.
MR.DECASTRO.Thankyou.
Duringthediscussiononthelegislativeandthesynchronizationofelections,Iwastheonewhoproposedthatinordertosynchronize
theelectionseverythreeyears,whichthebodyapprovedthefirstnationalandlocalofficialstobeelectedin1987shallcontinuein
officeforfiveyears,thesamethingtheHonorableDavideisnowproposing.Thatmeanstheywillallserveuntil1992,assumingthat
thetermofthePresidentwillbeforsixyearsandcontinuebeginningin1986.Sofrom1992,wewillagainhavenational,localand
presidentialelections.Thistime,in1992,thePresidentshallhaveatermuntil1998andthefirsttwelveSenatorswillserveuntil
1998,whilethenext12shallserveuntil1995,andthenthelocalofficialselectedin1992willserveuntil1995.Fromthenon,we
shallhaveanelectioneverythreeyears.
So,IwillsaythatthepropositionofCommissionerDavideisinorder,ifwehavetosynchronizeourelectionseverythreeyearswhich
wasalreadyapprovedbythebody.
Thankyou,Mr.PresidingOfficer.
xxxxxxxxx

MR.GUINGONA.Whatwillbesynchronized,therefore,istheelectionoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentin1992.
MR.DAVIDE.Yes.
MR.GUINGONA.Notthereverse.WillthecommitteenotsynchronizetheelectionoftheSenatorsandlocalofficialswiththeelection
ofthePresident?
MR.DAVIDE.Itworksbothways,Mr.PresidingOfficer.TheattempthereisontheassumptionthattheprovisionoftheTransitory
ProvisionsonthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentwouldreallyendin1992.
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
MR.GUINGONA.Yes.
MR.DAVIDE.Inotherwords,therewillbeasingleelectionin1992forall,fromthePresidentuptothemunicipalofficials.
[emphasisours](VRecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,pp.429431October3,1986)
[14]
G.R.Nos.100318,100308,100417and100420,July30,1991,199SCRA750,758.
[15]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 Ordillo v.
CommissiononElections,192SCRA100(1990).
[16]
271SCRA633,668(1997)Occenav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.52265,January28,1980,95SCRA755.
[17]
WebstersThirdNewInternationalDictionaryUnabridged,p.1327(1993).
[18]
Section26(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays,andprinted
copiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifies
tothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendment
theretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.
[19]
G.R.No.115455,August25,1994,235SCRA630.
[20]
A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of Representatives
datedMarch4,2011isreproducedbelow:
OFFICEOFTHEPRESIDENT
ofthePhilippines
Malacaang

14March2011
HON.FELICIANOR.BELMONTE,JR.
Speaker
HouseofRepresentatives
QuezonCity

DearSpeakerBelmonte:

PursuanttotheprovisionsofArticleVI,Section26(2)ofthe1987Constitution,Iherebycertifytothenecessityoftheimmediate
enactmentofHouseBillNo.4146,entitled:

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE
NATIONALANDOTHERLOCALOFFICIALS,AMENDINGFORTHEPURPOSEREPUBLICACTNO.9333,ENTITLEDAN
ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN
MUSLIMMINDANAO,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES

toaddresstheurgentneedtoprotectandstrengthenARMMsautonomybysynchronizingitselectionswiththeregularelectionsof
nationalandotherlocalofficials,toensurethattheongoingpeacetalksintheregionwillnotbehindered,andtoprovideamechanism
toinstitutionalizeelectoralreformsintheinterim,allforthedevelopment,peaceandsecurityoftheregion.

Bestwishes.
Verytrulyyours,
(Sgd.)BENIGNOSIMEONC.AQUINOIII

cc:HON.JUANPONCEENRILE
SenatePresident
PhilippineSenate
PasayCity
Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS64b031611.pdf. Last accessed on September 26,
2011.
[21]
SeeGutierrezv.HouseofRepresentatives,G.R.No.193459,February15,2011.
[22]
Tolentinov.SecretaryofFinance,G.R.No.115455,October30,1995.
[23]
Tolentino,id.,citing1J.G.Sutherland,StatutesandStatutoryConstruction10.04,p.282(1972).
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
[24]
Section7,ArticleXIXofRANo.6734states:ThefirstregularelectionsoftheRegionalGovernor,ViceGovernorandMembers
oftheRegionalAssemblyunderthisOrganicActshallbeheldnotearlierthansixty(60)daysorlaterthanninety(90)daysafterthe
ratificationofthisAct.TheCommissiononElectionsshallpromulgatesuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessaryfortheconduct
ofsaidelection.
[25]
EntitledAnActProvidingfortheDateofRegularElectionsforRegionalGovernor,RegionalViceGovernorandMembersofthe
RegionalLegislativeAssemblyfortheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanaoandforotherpurposes,whichfixedthedateofthe
ARMMelectionsonthesecondMondayaftertheMuslimmonthofRamadhan.
[26]
Entitled An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao,
AmendingforthePurposeSectionOneofRepublicActNumberedSeventySixHundredandFortySevenEntitledAnActProviding
for the Date of the Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional ViceGovernor and Members of the Regional Legislative
AssemblyfortheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanaoandforotherpurposes,whichchangedthedateoftheARMMelectionsto
thesecondMondayofMarch,1993andeverythree(3)yearsthereafter.
[27]
EntitledAnActProvidingfortheDateoftheRegularElectionsofRegionalGovernor,RegionalViceGovernorandMembersof
the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further Amending for the Purpose
RepublicActNo.7647entitledAnActProvidingfortheDateofRegularElectionsforRegionalGovernor,RegionalViceGovernor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, As
Amended,andforotherpurposes,whichmovedtheregionalelectionstothesecondMondayofSeptemberandeverythree(3)years
thereafter.
[28]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes, which reset the regional elections, scheduled on September 13,
1999,tothesecondMondayofSeptember2000.
[29]
Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the
SecondMondayofSeptember2001,AmendingforthePurposeRepublicActNo.8953,whichresettheMay2001electionsinARMM
toSeptember2001.
[30]
EntitledAnActFixingtheDateofthePlebiscitefortheApprovaloftheAmendmentstoRepublicActNo.6734andsettingthe
dateoftheregularelectionsforelectiveofficialsoftheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanaoontheLastMondayofNovember
2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the
AutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao,asamended,andForOtherPurposes.
[31]
EntitledAn Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
PursuanttoRepublicActno.9054,EntitledAnActtoStrengthenandExpandtheOrganicActfortheAutonomousRegioninMuslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended, which rescheduled the ARMM regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of
November2004tothesecondMondayofAugust2005.
[32]
Section1.ConsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution,thisOrganicActmaybereamendedorrevisedbytheCongressof
thePhilippinesuponavoteoftwothirds(2/3)oftheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesandoftheSenatevotingseparately.
[33]
G.R.No.127383,August18,2005,467SCRA280.
[34]
Id.at295297,citingDuartev.Dade,32Phil.36(1915)LEWISSOUTHERLANDONSTATUTORYCONSTRUCTION,Vol.1,
Section244,pp.456457.
[35]
ThishasbeenestablishedbythefollowingexchangeduringtheConstitutionalCommissiondebates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What segment of the population will
participateintheplebiscite?Inwhatcapacitywouldthelegislaturebeactingwhenitpassesthis?Willitbeaconstituentassemblyor
merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution?
Finally,ifwearegoingtoamendthisorganicact,whatprocesswillbefollowed?
MR.NOLLEDO.MayIanswerthat,please,inthelightofwhatisnowappearinginourreport.
First,onlythepeoplewhoareresidingintheunitscomposingtheregionshouldbeallowedtoparticipateintheplebiscite.Second,the
organic act has the character of a charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and,
therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless the
Gentlemanhasanotherpurpose.
FR.BERNAS.Butwithplebisciteagain.[Emphasisours.]
IIIRecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,pp.182183August11,1986.
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
[36]
Section20.WithinitsterritorialjurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws,theorganicactof
autonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover:
(1)Administrativeorganization
(2)Creationofsourcesofrevenues
(3)Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources
(4)Personal,family,andpropertyrelations
(5)Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment
(6)Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment
(7)Educationalpolicies
(8)Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritageand
(9)Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareofthepeopleoftheregion.
[37]
Seediscussionsatpp.1415.
[38]
Section 7.Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor,
RegionalViceGovernorandmembersoftheRegionalAssemblyshallbeforaperiodofthree(3)years,whichshallbeginatnoonon
the30thdayofSeptembernextfollowingthedayoftheelectionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatethree(3)yearsthereafter.The
incumbentelectiveofficialsoftheautonomousregionshallcontinueineffectuntiltheirsuccessorsareelectedandqualified.
[emphasisours]
[39]
Fernando,ThePhilippineConstitution,pp.175176(1974).
[40]
Id.at177citingtheconcurringopinionofJusticeJoseP.LaurelinSchneckenburgerv.Moran,63Phil.249,266(1936).
[41]
Verav.Avelino,77Phil.192,212(1946).
[42]
Oplev.Torres,etal.,354Phil.948(1998)seeconcurringopinionofJusticeJoseP.LaurelinSchneckenburgerv.Moran,supra
note40,at266.
[43]
Stateexrel.Greenv.Collison,39Del245,citedinDefensorSantiago,ConstitutionalLaw,Vol.1(2000ed.)
[44]
Sec.15.ThereshallbecreatedautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandintheCordillerasconsistingofprovinces,citiesand
municipalities,andgeographicalareassharingcommonanddistinctivehistoricalandculturalheritage,economicandsocialstructures,
andotherrelevantcharacteristicswithintheframeworkofthisConstitutionandthenationalsovereigntyaswellastheterritorial
integrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
[45]
Anempirewithinanempire.
[46]
Bernas,Joaquin,ConstitutionalStructureandPowersofGovernmentNotesandCasesPartI,2005ed.,p.1249.
[47]
Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article VI of the
Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential Commission on Good Government to issue sequestration, freeze
orders,andtheprovisionaltakeoverordersofillgottenbusinessenterprises,embodiedinSection26oftheTransitoryProvisions.
[48]
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province in the
plebisciteofNovember13,2008.
[49]
RANo.9355.
[50]
Section50,RANo.9355andSection52ofRANo.9495.
[51]
Section462,RANo.7160.
[52]
Supranote14.
[53]
InMutucv.CommissiononElections[146Phil.798(1970)]theCourtheldthat,"Thethreedepartments of governmentin the
discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitutions] commands.
Whateverlimitsitimposesmustbeobserved.146Phil.798(1970).
[54]
InJ.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration[No. L21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423], the Court,
speakingthroughformerChiefJusticeEnrique,stated:AstheConstitutionisnotprimarilyalawyersdocument,itbeingessentialfor
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptanceandnegatesthepowerofthecourtstoalterit,basedonthepostulatethattheframersandthepeoplemeanwhattheysay.
Thusthesearecaseswheretheneedforconstructionisreducedtoaminimum.
[55]
TawangMultiPurposeCooperativev.LaTrinidadWaterDistrict,G.R.No.166471,March22,2011.
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
[56]
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES:ACOMMENTARY(1996ed.)768.
[57]
481Phil.661(2004).
[58]
G.R.No.161984,February21,2007,516SCRA403.
[59]
G.R.No.152295,July9,2011.
[60]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor,
RegionalViceGovernor,andmembersoftheRegionalLegislativeAssemblyshallbeforaperiodofthree(3)years,whichshallbegin
atnoononthe30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end atnoon of the same date three (3) years
thereafter.Theincumbentelectiveofficialsoftheautonomousregionshallcontinueineffectuntiltheirsuccessorsareelected
andqualified.
[61]
Guekekov.Santos,76Phil.237(1946).
[62]
Lozanov.Nograles,G.R.187883,June16,2009,589SCRA356.
[63]
Ututalumv.CommissiononElections,No.L25349,December3,1965,15SCRA465.
[64]
SeeCONSTITUTION,ArticleVIII,Section1.
[65]
SeeCONSTITUTION,ArticleIX(C),Section2(1).
[66]
BalagtasMultiPurposeCooperative,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.159268,October27,2006,505SCRA654,663,citing
Lapidv.CA,G.R.No.142261,June29,2000,334SCRA738,quotingMoralesv.Subido,G.R.No.29658,November29,1968,26
SCRA150.
[67]
CONSTITUTION,ArticleX,Section8.
[68]
ArticleXVIII,Section2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelectedunderthis
ConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.
OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionsin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshallserveforsixyearsandthe
remainingtwelveforthreeyears.
[69]
ArticleXVIII,Section5.ThesixyeartermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentelectedintheFebruary7,1986election
is,forpurposesofsynchronizationofelections,herebyextendedtonoonofJune30,1992.
ThefirstregularelectionsforthePresidentandVicePresidentunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay,
1992.
[70]
Cruz,Carlo.TheLawofPublicOfficers,2007edition,p.285,citingMechem,Section387.
[71]
Ponencia,p.21.
[72]
SeeTopacioNuenov.Angeles,76Phil.12,2122(1946)Alba,etc.v.Evangelista,etc.,etal.,100Phil.683,694(1957)Aparri
v.CourtofAppeals,No.L30057,January31,1984,127SCRA231.
[73]
Hon.LuisMarioM.General,Commissioner,NationalPoliceCommissionv.Hon.AlejandroS.Urro,etal.,G.R. No. 191560,
March29,2011,citingSarmientoIIIv.Mison,No.L79974,December17,1987,156SCRA549.
[74]
SarmientoIIIv.Mison,supra.
[75]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.DeJesusv.CommissiononAudit,451Phil.812(2003).
[76]
Supranotes47and48.
[77]
Supranote50.
[78]
TheaftereffectsoftheMaguindanaomassacrewheretheAmpatuansstandcharged,theinsurrectionbytheMILFanditsvarious
factions,andtheongoingpeacenegotiations,amongothers,areimmediatelypastandpresenteventsthatthenationhastovigilant
about.
[79]
274Phil.523(1991).
[80]
Id.at532.
[81]
Macalintalv.PresidentialElectoralTribunal,G.R.No.191618,November23,2010,635SCRA783.
9/6/2015 G.R. No. 196271
[82]
Asnotedunderfootnote37.
[83]
118Phil.1468(1963).
[84]
RecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.III,August11,1986,p.179.

[85]
RecordsoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.III,p.560.
[86]
391Phil.84,102(2000).
[87]
Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139(1936).
[88]
CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.Santos,343Phil.411,427(1997)citingPangilinanv.Maglaya,225SCRA511(1993).
[89]
ManotokIVv.HeirsofHomerL.Barque,G.R.Nos.162335and162605,December18,2008,574SCRA468,581.
[90]
Ligeraldev.Patalinghug,G.R.No.168796,April15,2010,618SCRA315.
[91]
HeirsofJuanchoArdona,etc.,etal.v.Hon.Reyes,etc.,etal.,210Phil.187,207(1983)Peraltav.CommissiononElections,
Nos. L47771, L47803, L47816, L47767, L47791 and L47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30 ErmitaMalate Hotel & Motel
OperationsAssociation,Inc.v.CityMayorofManila,No.L24693,July31,1967,20SCRA849.
[92]
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001) Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra
Peraltav.CommissiononElections,supra.
[93]
HeirsofJuanchoArdona,etc.,etal.v.Hon.Reyes,etc.,etal.,supraPeraltav.CommissiononElections,supra.
[94]
G.R.No.100883,December2,1991,204SCRA516.
[95]
Id.at523.

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