alleged that they were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the sale
[G.R. No. L-17299. July 31, 1963.]
JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS OMULON, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. MARIANO T. TIANO, defendant-appellant.
Pablito C. Pielago for plaintiffs-appellees.
Prud. V. Villafuerte for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; INTERRUPTION BY COMMENCEMENT OF
SUIT; COUNTED FROM DATE OF FILING COMPLAINT. The established rule then,
as it is the rule now, under the New Civil Code, is that the commencement of the suit prior
to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, interrupts the running of the statute, as
to all parties to the action. Since civil actions are deemed commenced from the date of the
filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account
the issuance and service of summons, the contention that the period was not interrupted
until after defendant received the summons is, therefore, without legal basis.
2. PRESCRIPTION; REQUIRES POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH WITH JUST
TITLE; EFFECT OF LACK OF FINDING OF FACT BY LOWER COURT. Appellant
cannot avail himself of the defense acquisitive prescription, no finding of fact having been
made by the lower court that his possession from the time of the sale was with just title, in
good faith and in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted,
appellant having chosen to appeal the decision directly to this Court, without passing
through the Court of Appeals.
DECISION
PAREDES, J p:
Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, were parents of five children, Isabelo, Lourdes,
Clemente, Josefina and Cresencia. Gregoria died before the second world war, together with
Clemente, single. During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties, among which was
a parcel of agricultural land, of about seven (7) hectares, located at barrio Manga,
municipality of Tangub, Misamis Occidental, planted to coconuts and fruit-bearing trees.
On July 2, 1947, Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three (3) children (Isabelo, Lourdes
and Cresencia), purportedly sold the above mentioned parcel to herein defendant
Mariano T. Tiano, for P3,500.00. At the time of the sale, Cresencia was a minor, and the
other child, Josefina, did not sign the deed of sale, and did not know about the transaction.
Under date of June 20, 1957, an action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with
Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the complaint, it was
and Cresencia was a minor; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions belonging to
them, to their damage and prejudice in the amount of P7,000.00, which consisted of their
share in the produce of the property, during the period of defendant's possession.
In Answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and that he was not
aware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense, defendant alleged that
he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, from
the date of purchase. Before the trial, the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts, parts of
which recite
xxx xxx xxx
"3. That at the time of the sale, appearing in Doc. No. 54, Page 81, Book No. 7, S. 1947,
in the book of Notary Public Basilio Binaoro of Tangub, Mis. Occ., Cresencia was a minor
being only 16 years old, while Josefina who was long married and of legal age did not give
her consent to the same;
4. That the plaintiffs commenced this case against the Defendant on June 20, 1957,
and the judicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but defendant
received the same on July 2, 1957."
After hearing, the court a quo rendered the following judgment
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring that the
plaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property in question and therefore, judgment is
hereby ordered declaring them entitled to partition the property in question in proportion
of 1/8 each of them, plus damages for both of them in the amount of P1,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P200.00."
The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff, to
partition the property in question and render a report within 30 days. Defendant moved for
a reconsideration of the decision, contending that prescription had already set in, and his
(defendant's, title, had become irrevocable, and that the award of damages had no factual
and legal basis. The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1960. The
Commissioner's report, partitioning the property was submitted on April 11, 1960.
Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, and on May 14, 1960, the same was given
due course and elevated to this Court.
In claiming that prescription had taken place, appellant insists that the period should be
counted from the date the summons was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It was
agreed, however, that the complaint for the recovery of the land in question was presented
on June 20, 1957, and the summons was sent out the following day. The Civil Code,
provides that
1
"The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs against
is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written appellant in both instances.
acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor." (Art. 1155)
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the ten (10) year period within JJ., concur.
which to file the action had not yet elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was
presented. While it is true that the sale in question had taken place before the effectivity of
the new Civil Code and the law then on matter of prescription was Act No. 190, said law,
however, contained no specific provision on the interruption of the prescriptive period; and
the established rule then, as it is the rule now, is that the commencement of the suit prior to
the expiration of the applicable limitation period, interrupts the running of the statute, as to
all parties to the action (34 Am. Jur., Sec. 247, pp. 202-203; Peralta, et al. v. Alipio, G.R. No.
L-8273, Oct. 24, 1955). The fact that summons was only served on defendant on July 2,
1957, which incidentally and/or coincidentally was the end of the ten (10) year period, is
of no moment, since civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filing and
docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the
issuance and service of summons (Sotelo vs. Dizon, et al., 67 Phil. 573). The contention that
the period was not interrupted until after defendant received the summons is, therefore,
without legal basis.

Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the property in
question because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession (Art.
1123 N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957. Conceding, for the purposes of
argument, that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail himself of
acquisitive prescription, for the simple reason that no finding was made by the trial court
that his possession from the time of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title, in good faith,
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 and
1118 N.C.C.). Good faith is a question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127 N.C.C.). For
the purposes of acquisitive prescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed
(Art. 1131 N.C.C.). The factual requisite of adverse possession do not appear in the
stipulation of facts and the trial court did not make findings to this effect. These
circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated, had the appeal been taken to the
Court of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen to appeal the decision directly to this
Court, he is deemed to have waived questions of fact and raised only questions of law.
There being no factual finding by the lower court of the presence of the requisites of
acquisitive prescription, this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, said defense.
Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10) years necessary for
acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period terminated on that very
day.

As to the award of damages, We find Ourselves devoid of ample authority to review the
same, since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found by the lower
court, that plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land. Verily, they should also share
in the produce, which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the defendant- appellant herein.

2

[G.R. No. 87617. April 6, 1990.]
JOE HODGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF LEON P. GELLADA,
plaintiff-appellee in Civil Case No. 6512, ROMEO MEDIODIA, plaintiff-appellant in
Civil Case No. 6513, and HEIRS OF FERNANDO MIRASOL, plaintiff-appellee in Civil
Case No. 6516, respondents.
Tivol & Tivol Law Office for petitioner.
Efrain Treas for Romeo Mediodia.
Villa and Partners for private respondents.
Norberto Posecion for Heirs of Gellada.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE;
LEGAL EFFECT. As early as Lazaro vs. Endencia, [57 Phil. 552 (1932)] this Court held
that an appeal is not deemed perfected if the appellate court docket fee is not fully paid. In
Lee vs. Republic, [10 SCRA 65 (1964)] this Court ruled that a declaration of intention to be a
Filipino citizen produced no legal effect until the required filing fee is paid. In Malimit vs.
Degamo, [12 SCRA 450 (1964)] We held that the date of payment of the docket fee must be
considered the real date of filing of a petition for quo warranto and not the date it was
mailed. In Magaspi vs. Ramolete, [115 SCRA 193, 204 (1982)] the well-settled rule was
reiterated that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filling in court. At the time, therefore, that the three (3) cases subject of the
herein petition were filed, the rule was already clear that the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over a case until after the prescribed docket is paid. In Manchester
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 562 (1987), this rule was
emphasized when this Court stated "The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading." The rule in Manchester was
relaxed in Sun Insurance vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, whereby this Court declared that
the trial court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Nevertheless, in Sun Insurance, this
Court reiterated the rule that it is the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests the
trial Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT DOES NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER; CASE AT BAR. In the present petition, it appears that in the case
of Gellada vs. Hodges the total amount of the claim for damages is about P460,000.00, the
estimated docket fee due is P770.00 but what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of
the trial court on August 31, 1972 and another order ten years later, that is on March 11,
1982, requiring plaintiff to pay the correct docket fee, Gellada paid the amount of P168.00
only. Thus his total payment amounts to just P200.00, which is still much less than the
amount of P770.00 due. Similarly, in Mediodia vs. Hodges where the claim is
approximately P360,000.00 and the appropriate filing fee would be about P570.00, the
plaintiff paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. After the two aforesaid orders of the
trial Court were issued, Mediodia paid on September 5, 1982 the amount of P168.00
bringing his payment to a total of P200.00 which is also much less than the amount of
P570.00 due for docket fee. Thus, the entire proceedings undertaken in said cases are null
and void. The plaintiffs in said cases are practicing lawyers who are expected to know this
mandatory requirement in the filing of any complaint or similar pleading. Their non-
payment of the prescribed docket fee was deliberate and inexcusable.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
What is the legal effect of the non-payment of the docket fees even before the
promulgation of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals? 1 This is
the decisive issue in this petition.
On April 7, 1964 Leon P. Gellada, a practicing lawyer, filed an action for damages against
Joe Hodges in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City, wherein plaintiff claimed damages
against defendant for some alleged defamatory statements of defendant against plaintiff
and his associates thus entitling him to moral damages of P400,000.00, damage to his law
practice of P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P30,000.00, and exemplary damages as well as
temperate damages. A special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the court on the
subject matter and the mode of extrajudicial service of summons dated June 24, 1964 was
filed by defendant. The defendant pointed out that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the case unless the corresponding docket fee is paid. The defendant maintained that
considering the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff, the docket fee to be paid
should be no less than P770.00 which is way beyond the P32.00 docket fee paid by plaintiff.
An answer, amended answer and a reply thereto were filed. The amended answer was
admitted.
On March 31, 1964, Romeo H. Mediodia, also a practicing lawyer, filed in the same court a
similar action for damages against Joe Hodges for alleged defamatory statements of
defendant against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed for moral damages of not less than
P300,000.00, damage to his law practice of not less than P20,000.00, attorney's fee of
P40,000.00 and exemplary damages as well as temperate damages. A special appearance
questioning the jurisdiction over the subject matter and the mode of extrajudicial service of
summons dated June 25, 1964 was also filed by defendant pointing that the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the case when plaintiff claimed damages of P360,000.00 and he
paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it should not be less than P570.00. After an answer,
amended answer, and a reply thereto were filed, the amended answer was admitted by the
trial court.
3
On April 8, 1964, another complaint for damages was filed by Fernando P. Mirasol, another
practicing lawyer, against Joe Hodges, for alleged defamatory statements of defendant
against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed moral damages of not less than P350,000.00,
damage to his law practice of not less than P25,000.00, attorney's fees of P35,000.00, and
exemplary damages as well as temperate damages. A similar special appearance for the
defendant questioning the jurisdiction on the subject matter of the court and the mode of
extrajudicial service of summons dated June 25, 1964 and pointing out that the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the case as the plaintiff claimed damages of P410,000.00 but he
paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it should not be less than P670.00. After an answer, an
amended answer and a reply thereto was filed, the amended answer were admitted by the
trial court.
On August 31, 1972, these three cases were ordered consolidated by trial court. On the same
date another order was issued directing the plaintiffs to pay the docket fee commensurate to
their respective demands. This was reiterated in another order dated March 11, 1982. cdrep
On March 16, 1982 plaintiff Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 bringing his total payment
of docket fees to P200.00. On September 5, 1972 plaintiff Mediodia paid P168.00 so he had
paid a total of P200.00 for docket fees. Plaintiff Mirasol failed to comply with the said
orders.
Plaintiff Gellada died on February 4, 1974 so an order was issued for the substitution of his
heirs. Plaintiff Mirasol also died on March 29, 1979, so another order was issued by the trial
court for the substitution of his heirs.
After trial on the merits, a judgment was rendered by the trial court on February 18, 1988,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Joe Hodges
In Civil Case No. 6512, to pay the heirs of plaintiff Leon Gellada, the sums of P50,000.00 and
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees and P10,000.00 as expenses of litigation, plus costs;
In Civil Case No. 6513, to pay the plaintiff Romeo Mediodia the sums of P50,000.00 and
P10,000 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees
and P10,000.00 as expenses of litigation, plus costs; and
In Civil Case No. 6516, to pay the heirs of plaintiff Fernando Mirasol, with the exception of
Ferdinand Mirasol, the sums of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as expenses of
litigation, plus costs." 2
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, wherein in due course
a decision was rendered on October 28, 1988 affirming the decision appealed from, with
costs against petitioner. 3
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision having been denied in are solution of
March 8, 1989 the instant petition was then filed in this Court, wherein nine (9) errors are
alleged to have been committed by the appellate court. The Court finds it necessary to
dispose of the first assigned error on the question of non-payment of docket fees.
As early as Lazaro vs. Endencia, 4 this Court held that an appeal is not deemed perfected if
the appellate court docket fee is not fully paid. In Lee vs. Republic, 5 this Court ruled that a
declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen produced no legal effect until the required
filing fee is paid. In Malimit vs. Degamo, 6 We held that the date of payment of the docket
fee must be considered the real date of filing of a petition for quo warranto and not the date
it was mailed. In Magaspi vs. Ramolete, 7 the well-settled rule was reiterated that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filling
in court. 8
At the time, therefore, that the three (3) cases subject of the herein petition were filed, the
rule was already clear that the court does not acquire jurisdiction over a case until after the
prescribed docket is paid. llcd
In Manchester, this rule was emphasized when this Court stated "The court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading." 9
The rule in Manchester was relaxed in Sun Insurance vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, 10
whereby this Court declared that the trial court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Nevertheless, in Sun Insurance, this Court reiterated the rule that it is the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests the trial Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the case. 11
In the present petition, it appears that in the case of Gellada vs. Hodges the total amount of
the claim for damages is about P460,000.00, the estimated docket fee due is P770.00 but
what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of the trial court on August 31, 1972 and
another order ten years later, that is on March 11, 1982, requiring plaintiff to pay the correct
docket fee, Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 only. Thus his total payment amounts to just
P200.00, which is still much less than the amount of P770.00 due.
Similarly, in Mediodia vs. Hodges where the claim is approximately P360,000.00 and the
appropriate filing fee would be about P570.00, the plaintiff paid only P32.00 upon filing the
complaint. After the two aforesaid orders of the trial Court were issued, Mediodia paid on
September 5, 1982 the amount of P168.00 bringing his payment to a total of P200.00 which is
also much less than the amount of P570.00 due for docket fee.
4
In the case of Mirasol vs. Hodges, the total claim is for P410,000.00 and the amount of filing
fee due is P670.00. Mirasol paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. He did not pay any
additional sum even after the two orders of the court had been issued. LibLex

No doubt, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter in said three (3)
cases due to the failure to pay in full the prescribed docket fee. Thus, the entire proceedings
undertaken in said cases are null and void. The plaintiffs in said cases are practicing
lawyers who are expected to know this mandatory requirement in the filing of any
complaint or similar pleading. Their non-payment of the prescribed docket fee was
deliberate and inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 28, 1988 and its resolution dated February 8, 1989 are hereby reversed and set
aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in said three (3)
cases. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. 149 SCRA 562 (1987).

2. Pages 85-86, Rollo.

3. Justice Cecilio L. Pe was the ponente, concurred in by Justice Lorna S. Lombos-De

la Fuente and Antonio M. Martinez.

4. 57 Phil. 552 (1932).

5. 10 SCRA 65 (1964).

6. 12 SCRA 450 (1964).

7. 115 SCRA 193, 204 (1982).

8. Citing Malimit and Lee, Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. G.R No. 79937-38, Feb. 13, 1989.

11. Ibid.

5

[G.R. No. 88421. January 30, 1990.]
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., AND FILIPINAS LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JOB B.
MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE
SABIO, respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente for petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES; ADDITIONAL
FILING FEE CONSTITUTES A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT WHEN DAMAGES AROSE
AFTER THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT. The trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3
of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the
determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint
there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the
discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any
award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES. In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had
occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the
pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading . . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing
of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination
of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on
the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper
assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited
only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for
then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the
material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for. As ruled in
Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did
not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time,
the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise
amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees
therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific
performance with damages is presented by this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private
respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary
damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The
trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition.
prcd
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of
P1,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value
of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners
contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages
sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 1 a similar case involving
an action for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should
be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the
assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for
specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real
estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be
computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the
amount of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed
in accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the
determination of the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and
that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix
the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent
case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its ruling.
6
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
(also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record
as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a
reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state
the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the
requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period. 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from
the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint,
the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable
time to private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying
the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive
period. No costs. Cdpr

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the SO ORDERED.
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court
wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in
the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective
damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to
specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. prLL

In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to
make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers
only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to
which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount
of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as
exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of
the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the
court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for
the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the
material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.

7

[G.R. No. 85200. February 19, 1991.]
ARTURO Q. SALIENTES, in his capacity as receiver of and representing the Heirs of the
Registered Co-Owners of the Maysilo Estate, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PACITA CANIZARES-NYE, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 92; DESTILLERIA LIMTUACO & CO. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY, respondents.
Lino L. Anover, Emiliano P. Espiritu and Jesus C. Concepcion for petitioner.
Antonio P. Barredo for respondent Destilleria Limtuaco & Co.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 19, 1988 decision * of the Court of
Appeals, Thirteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 14811 entitled "Arturo Q. Salientes,
petitioner v. Hon. Pacita C. Nye, et al., respondents", dismissing the petition filed by
petitioner before this Court and referred to the Court of Appeals for disposition. The latter
petition challenged the January 4, 1988 decision as well as the subsequent orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 ** in Civil Case No. Q-52034, "Arturo
Salientes, et al., plaintiff v. Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc., defendants", likewise dismissing
the complaint filed by herein petitioner for failure to pay the proper docket fees. LLjur
On September 29, 1987, petitioner Arturo Q. Salientes, in his capacity as receiver of and
representing the heirs of the registered co-owners of Maysilo Estate, filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to recover possession of a portion of said estate
allegedly occupied illegally by Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. to the extent of 6,885 square
meters, more or less, valued at P500,000.00 and praying among others for an Order to said
company to pay Salientes "actual or compensatory damages in the amount of not less than
P500,000.00 and such other exemplary damages as the Honorable Court may allow . . ."
Respondent company moved to dismiss or suspend the proceedings for failure to pay
proper fees which motion was opposed by Salientes. After Destilleria Limtuaco filed an
answer ad cautelam, the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City, Branch 92, filed a comment
on the motion to dismiss. In her Comment, the Clerk of Court stated that the "filing fee was
assessed and collected based on the value of the land (P500,000.00) and the damages
(P500,000.00) in the total amount of P1,000,000.00 (p. 112, Rollo). Judge Pacita Nye of the
same court dismissed the complaint as follows:
"Hence, the failure of the complaint to specify the amount of compensatory damages in
the prayer, the phrase 'in the amount of not less than P500,000.00' (par. 3, prayer) not
being a fixed amount for purposes of computing the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, the assessment and payment of docket fee based on P500,000.00 was not proper.
Consequently, in line with the foregoing ruling in the Manchester Development
Corporation case (supra), this Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction." (Rollo, pp. 53-54).
Salientes' motion and supplementary motion for reconsideration were both denied.
On March 25, 1988, Salientes then filed a petition with this Court which was eventually
referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court dismissed
the petition holding that:
"The doctrine in the Magaspi case relied upon by petitioner is no longer controlling. In the
Manchester case, it was held that 'the ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent
with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED." (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 102).
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Salientes was likewise denied, hence,
this petition. The sole issue in the case at bar is plain and simple, i.e., whether the court
acquires jurisdiction over a case when there is an alleged failure to pay the proper and
correct docket fees. prcd
The petition is impressed with merit.
This Court has already laid this issue to rest in the recent case of Maximo Tacay, et al. v.
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, et al., G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, which held
among others as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the
petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular avowedly
inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, has but limited application to said actions . . . Moreover, the rules therein laid
down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
8
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion,
supra, read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal
fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total
amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the
filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if
the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment
of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime. But where as in the case at bar the fees prescribed
for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may
not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real
property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of
the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may
not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages
as to which no amounts are stated, . . . or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages
and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period."
(Emphasis supplied).

In the light of the foregoing, it is very clear that the courts below erred in peremptorily
dismissing the complaint filed by Salientes.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals and to REMAND Civil Case No. Q-52034 to the Regional Trial Court for
further proceedings, so that among other things, the prayer in the complaint can on motion
be amended to make specific the amount of damages prayed for, the assessed fee can then
be completely paid within the period of prescription, and the case can be fully tried on the
merits.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Associate Justice Leonor Ines Luciano and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jaime M. Lantin and Fernando A. Santiago.

** Judge Pacita Canizares-Nye rendered the decision.

9

[G.R. No. 89747. July 20, 1990.]
MAERSK-TABACALERA SHIPPING AGENCY (FILIPINAS), INC., petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONET'S EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION AND/OR VICENTE TAGLE, respondents.
Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for petitioner.
Jesus F. Salazar for private respondent.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated July 12, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18124 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
in Civil Case No. 7480 which awarded damages to the plaintiff, now private respondent,
Monet's Export and Manufacturing (Monet for short) against the petitioner Maersk-
Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc., (Maersk for short) for breach of a contract of
carriage.
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On May 21, 1985, a complaint for damages was filed by plaintiff Monet's Export and
Manufacturing Corporation (Monet's) and/or Vicente Tagle against defendants Maersk
Tabacalera Shipping (Maersk) and the New Asia Enterprises (New Asia) and/or Manuel
Ranola, alleging, among other things, that plaintiff, like defendant New Asia, is engaged in
the export of locally-made handicrafts and products, while defendant Maersk Line is
engaged in furnishing containerized services through which Monet's and New Asia
normally ship their goods; that on March 11, 1984, plaintiff, after complying with all the
export and custom requirements, loaded its goods in Maersk's container to be delivered on
or before March 15, 1984 to Manila for immediate transshipment to its port of destination;
that through fraud and malice, and without prior notice to Monet's, Maersk unloaded the
goods at New Asia's factory site at Tagas, Daraga, Albay to give way to the latter's own
export shipment; that Monet's shipment was later returned to its warehouse at Banag,
Daraga, Albay; and that because of this occurrence, Monet's had to secure another shipper,
thereby incurring unnecessary expenses as well as suffering mental anguish, worry and
sleepless nights thinking of the possibility of losing its trading partners which would
seriously doubt Monet's capacity as a respectable exporter. Monet's likewise alleged having
suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages (p. 1, Record).
"Answering the complaint, Maersk contended that contrary to Monet's allegations, the
latter's shipment was loaded on March 10, 1984 in Maersk container subject to the condition
that the bill of lading would be issued upon Monet's compliance with all the necessary
export papers prior to the departure of the truck bearing said container for Manila on
March 11, 1984. Maersk further alleged that Monet's knew that the subject goods would not
be brought to Manila without submitting all the necessary export papers, as without them,
Maersk would incur charges on the cargo when deposited at the customs warehouse in
Manila and would subsequently be not allowed to export the goods by custom authorities.
(p. 16, Record).
"Defendant New Asia, for its part, denied any liability in favor of Monet's, alleging that
Monet's has no cause of action against it not being a party to the contract of carriage
between Monet and Maersk (p. 24, Record).
"Defendants during the hearing of February 17, 1986 were considered as in default for their
failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference despite proper notice. Subsequently, the
order of default in regard to defendant Maersk was lifted and the latter was allowed to
cross-examine all the witnesses of Monet's. Defendant New Asia did not move for the lifting
of the order of default and accordingly remained as in default." (p. 204, Record.).
On March 28, 1988, the appealed judgment was rendered:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Maersk Shipping Line is found to be liable
to plaintiff for damages in the following amounts: For breach of contract of carriage,
P50,000.00; for moral damages brought about by the wanton bad faith employed by
defendant shipping line in the performance of its contractual obligation, P50,000.00; and as
exemplary damages, another P50,000.00 and for attorney's fees, P20,000.00.
"Defendant New Asia Enterprises is exonerated of any liability, there being no valid cause
of action by plaintiff against it. New Asia Enterprises cannot be made answerable for
whatever action or violation of contracted obligation defendant Maersk Line may have
committed against plaintiff because they are 2 separate corporations and there is no proof of
any collusion between them." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.).
Maersk appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court on
July 12, 1989. prcd
Hence, the instant petition wherein Maersk raises the following issues:
1. Respondent court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court despite the
obvious fact that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
action because private respondents did not specify their claims for damages and the correct
filing fees were not paid.
2. It was error for respondent court to have awarded P50,000.00 for "breach of
contract" because this is not a form of damage and petitioner has a right to know for what it
is being made to pay.
10
3. Respondent court erred also in awarding moral damages to a corporation that was purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party
not shown to have a good reputation that was damaged. invoking the plea." (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 34.)

4. Again, respondent court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the absence of
evidence that petitioner acted in a wanton or malevolent manner.
5. Finally, respondent court erred in awarding attorney's fees without any
explanation for such an award. (pp. 13-14, Rollo.)
Petitioner's allegation that the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
void for lack of jurisdiction (p. 75, Rollo) as Monet did not pay the correct filing fee on its
claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, the amounts of which were not specified
in the body and prayer of its complaint, is anchored in the following ruling of this Court in
Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA (149 SCRA 562 [1987])
Since this is a case where some of the claims (for moral and exemplary damages) were
not specified in the plaintiff's pleading and were left for determination by the court, the
applicable rule is the third rule set out in the decision of this Court in Sun Insurance
Office Ltd., et al. vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, e al., 170 SCRA 274, to wit:
"3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specific, in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee."

". . . the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 The Clerk of Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the proper additional fees on the
as docket fee. . . . totality of the judgment for the private respondent (Id).

"To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with the
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading." (Emphasis supplied; pp. 568-569.)
Monet's counsel in the trial court, Attorney Jesus Salazar, is hereby reprimanded for his
unethical practice of not specifying the amount of damages sought in the body and prayer
of his complaint in order to defraud the Government of the proper fee for docketing said
complaint. He is warned that a repetition of that malpractice will be dealt with more
severely. cdrep
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. However, the Clerk of
Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the fees due on the judgment as if the same
amounts were specified in the complaint. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Unlike Manchester, however, where the jurisdictional issue arising from insufficiency of
the docket fee paid, was seasonably raised in the answer of the defendant in the trial
court, in this case the issue is being raised for the first time in this Court. Petitioner
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court without question. It filed a counterclaim
seeking affirmative reliefs, and actively took part in the trial (p. 53, Rollo). A party who
voluntarily participates in the trial cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of
jurisdiction (Tan Boon Bee & Co. v. Judge Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205).

Maersk should have raised its objection to the trial court's jurisdiction when the case was
still in that court. It should not have waited for an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals
before waking up to raise the question of jurisdiction. As this Court remarked in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 37: "Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced . . . and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting." "A party may be barred by
laches from invoking his plea (of lack of jurisdiction) for the first time on appeal for the
11

[G.R. No. 94677. October 15, 1991.]
ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates and Jose V. Marcella for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES; SHOULD SPECIFY THE AMOUNT PRAYED FOR; PURPOSE; CASE AT
BAR. ODECOR's first complaint as well as its amended complaint vaguely asserted its
claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages, "the amount of which will
be proved at the trial" and the demand for attorney's fees as "equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of this suit". Such terms are
certainly not definite enough to support the computation of the proper docket fees. While
it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in this
estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such
docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and
sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and
left to the judge "mere guesswork" as to these amounts, which is fatal. (Spouses Belen
Gregorio v. The Honorable Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 85847, December 21,
1989, 180 SCRA 490). In any event, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints,
petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer has not been
altered (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 443-444 [1989]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT; WHEN PROPER. Where a
complaint purely for money or damages did not specify the amounts being claimed, the
Court may allow amendment of the pleading and payment of the proper fees or where the
pleading specified the amount of every claim but the fees paid are insufficient, the defect
may be cured and the Court may take cognizance of the action by payment of the proper
fees provided that in both cases, prescription has not set in the meantime. Similarly where
the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and the prescribed fees
for an action involving real property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action on the real
property but may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Accordingly, the Court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of
the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the
prescriptive period (Ibid).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARDS OF CLAIMS NOT SPECIFIED THEREIN; REFER
ONLY TO DAMAGES ARISING AFTER THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT. As to
awards of claims not specified in the pleadings this Court had already clarified that they
refer only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, to which
the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. The amount of any claim for
damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should
be specified. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for the determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for
the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum,
supra; Ayala Corporation, et al. v. The Honorable Job Maddayag, et al., G.R. No. 88421, 181
SCRA 687 [1990]) (Emphasis supplied).
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision ** of the Court of Appeals dated July
31, 1990 in CA G.R. SP No. 18462 entitled "Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v.
Hon. Adriano R. Osorio and Original Development and Construction Corporation"
ordering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 3020-V-89 be expunged from the record and
declaring the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989 of the court a quo as null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction.
The factual background of the case appears undisputed, to wit:
On December 19, 1988, herein petitioner Original Development and Construction
Corporation (ODECOR for brevity) filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages
against private respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC for short),
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC for short) and Caloocan City
Public School Teachers Association (CCPSTA for brevity). The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3020-V-89 and assigned to Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
The questioned allegations in the body of the complaint, among others, are as follows:
"16. The organization, as earlier stated, of the Third District Public School Teachers
Homeowners Association, under the sponsorship and patronage of HIGC, unjustly
deprived ODECOR of not less than 10,000 committed buyers, and as a consequence suffered
a big financial loss; prcd
"17. As part of its scheme to destroy the viability of ODECOR's Housing project, HIGC
maliciously and unreasonably; (a) delayed action on ODECOR's request for the issuance of
Certificate of Completion of houses which have already been completed; (b) froze
ODECOR's requests for take-out' appraisals of the value of its houses and lots, instead,
approved very low appraisal values; (c) refused to allow ODECOR to construct smaller and
12
cheaper house and lot packages, and unreasonably required ODECOR to secure prior
clearance from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. before it (HIGC) will allow
ODECOR to construct smaller packages; and (d) delayed countersigning the checks, which
were issued by ODECOR to pay the suppliers of construction materials used in the protect,
which delay resulted in the pilferage of valuable construction materials and (e) delayed
action of ODECOR's labor payrolls, thus, demoralizing the employees of the ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
"19. HIGC's aforementioned acts not only resulted in ODECOR's financial crises
and/or reversals, but also brought about almost the total loss of its market; and such loss of
market renders HIGC liable for the actual and consequential damages suffered by
ODECOR;
"20. In order to prevent the total collapse of the Dona Helen Subdivision project, to
rescue ODECOR from its financial straits, and to enable the ODECOR to continue its
distressed operations, ODECOR's President, for the account of ODECOR, had to secure
personal loans from sympathetic friends, in which loans ODECOR bound itself to pay
monthly a high rate of interest; and accordingly, the principal and the interests should be
charged to or considered as a liability of the HIGC, by way of reparation for actual and
consequential damages, to ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
"24. Notwithstanding insistent demands by ODECOR, NHMFC has delivered to the
former, is staggered and delayed installments in a period of five (5) years, the amount of
P5,366,727.80 only, which malicious delays have caused ODECOR to incur unnecessary
expenses in the form of interests on its loans, unexpected administrative and operational
requirements, which interest payments and other expenses could have been avoided had
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation promptly paid over to ODECOR the
moneys which it (NHMFC) had guaranteed to pay;
"25. Notwithstanding ODECOR's repeated demands on NHMFC for the latter to effect
payment and delivery to it of the remaining balance of the originating banks' transmitted
loan proceed in the amount of P2,272,193.10 which amount represents the 'take out'
proceeds of twenty-two (22) House and lot buyers, NHMFC has maliciously refused or
rejected such demands; and this malicious non-payment aggravated the financial
difficulties and the deterioration of ODECOR and forced it to curtail its development
operations and to abandon its program to construct 10,000 units;
"26. NHMFC's aforestated unjust, if not illegal, acts subject NHMFC to liability to pay
ODECOR for actual, consequential and exemplary damages for the losses and injuries
which were sustained by it (plaintiff); prLL
"27. ODECOR, as a result of the aforedescribed illegal and unlawful acts committed by
the several defendants, and to protect its financial interests, good name and reputation, and
to recover its huge losses, has been needlessly compelled to file this action in Court, and for
this purpose, had to engage the professional services of a reputable law counsel for which it
agreed to pay 25% of its total money claims as attorney's fees excluding trial honorarium of
P3,000.00 per hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The prayer states:
"WHEREFORE, the plaintiff to this Honorable Court respectfully prays that judgment be
rendered:
1. Adjudging all the defendants guilty of breach of contracts and/or bad faith and/or
unfair business practice and, accordingly, liable for their unlawful acts which sabotaged
and ruined the financial resources and housing development enterprise of the plaintiff;
2. Adjudging all the defendants, solidarily liable to compensate the plaintiff or actual,
consequential, exemplary and moral damages, the amount of which will be proved at the
trial;
3. Requiring National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation to deliver and/or to pay
to the plaintiff the amount of P2,272,193.10 which sum is due and payable to the plaintiff
and is in its possession and custody;
4. Declaring the defendants liable to the plaintiff for attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation and the costs of this suit; and
5. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies which are just and
equitable in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
Simultaneous with the filing of the said complaint, ODECOR paid the following: P4,344.00
under O.R. No. 1772201-H; P4,344.00 under O.R. No. 007830; and P86.00; based on the one
numerical figure appearing in the complaint as P2,272,193.10 for alleged "loan take out
proceeds" which the other defendant NHMFC allegedly failed to remit to ODECOR. The
rest appears to be an unspecified amount of damages which the trial court could not assess
(Rollo, p. 71). cdphil
On March 4, 1989, HIGCC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction due to nonpayment of the proper docket fees, citing the case of
Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 56 [1987]). NHMFC,
on the other hand, filed its answer while CCPSTA was declared in default (Petition, Rollo,
pp. 6-7). The court, in its order dated June 1, 1989 denied the motion to dismiss and directed
the Clerk of Court in this wise:
13
". . . to issue the Certificate of Reassessment of the proper docket fee to include in the
Certificate the deficiency, if any. In case the payment is insufficient, plaintiff must pay the
deficiency within Five (5) days from receipt of the certificate of reassessment to the Clerk of
Court.
In the event that the judgment awards claim not specified in the complaint or such claim left
for determination by the court as proved at the trial, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien in the judgment and the Clerk of Court or her duly authorized deputy will
enforce said liens and after assessment to collect the additional fee.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED." (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 37).
Pursuant to the above order, the Clerk of Court filed an Ex-Parte motion dated June 6, 1989
(Rollo, pp. 38-39) stating that she has already issued the required certificate of reassessment
but the deficiency could not be included therein because the claim for attorney's fee
manifested in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the prayer. Hence, the docket
fees paid by ODECOR did not include the demand for attorney's fees. The Clerk of Court,
therefore, moved that the complaint be amended accordingly. This prompted HIGC to
move for a reconsideration of the aforecited order of the court, praying that the complaint
be dismissed or in the alternative, to amend ODECOR's complaint to reflect the specific
amount of damages both in the body as well as in the prayer (Rollo, p. 43). But the same
was denied in the subsequent order dated June 29, 1989. ODECOR thereafter filed its
amended complaint dated July 6, 1989 containing substantially all its allegations in the first
complaint except that it specified its claim for attorney's fees as equivalent to 25% of the
total monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Such amended
complaint was admitted by the court on July 11, 1989. HIGC then filed its answer thereto,
but after the issues had been joined and the case had been set for pre-trial conference, HIGC
filed a petition for certiorari with the appellate court questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court over the case on the same ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The
appellate court, in turn, restrained the lower court from taking further cognizance of the
case and on July 31, 1990, rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing, We find and so hold that the respondent court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3020-V-89. The complaint in the said Civil Case is ordered
expunged from the record and the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989 having been issued
without jurisdiction, are declared null and void. cdrep
SO ORDERED.' (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 19).
ODECOR moved for a reconsideration of this decision but later withdrew the same and
filed instead the present petition.
The issue now at hand is whether the court acquires jurisdiction over a case even if the
complaint does not specify the amount of damages.
The petition is devoid of merit.
ODECOR's first complaint as well as its amended complaint vaguely asserted its claim for
actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages, "the amount of which will be proved
at the trial" and the demand for attorney's fees as "equivalent to 25% of the total monetary
liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of this suit". Such terms are certainly not
definite enough to support the computation of the proper docket fees. While it is not
required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in this estimation, the
sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such docket and other
fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the
Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge
"mere guesswork" as to these amounts, which is fatal. (Spouses Belen Gregorio v. The
Honorable Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 85847, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA
490). The intent to defraud the government appears obvious, not only in the filing of the
original complaint but also in the filing of the amended complaint.
In any event, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleadings but also in the prayer has not been altered (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum,
Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 443-444 [1989]).
What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction on the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. The trial court now is
authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (Ibid).
Thus, where a complaint purely for money or damages did not specify the amounts being
claimed, the Court may allow amendment of the pleading and payment of the proper fees
or where the pleading specified the amount of every claim but the fees paid are insufficient,
the defect may be cured and the Court may take cognizance of the action by payment of the
proper fees provided that in both cases, prescription has not set in the meantime. Similarly
where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and the prescribed
fees for an action involving real property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action on the real
property but may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Accordingly, the Court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of
the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the
prescriptive period (Ibid). LLphil
Coming back to the case at bar, it is readily evident that none of the foregoing requisites
was complied with.
Petitioners invoke the liberal interpretation of the rules as enumerated by this Court in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 284-285 [1989] which is
not, however, applicable as in said case, private respondent amended his complaint several
14
times, stating the amount claimed and paying each time the required docket fees. While it is
true that eventually the docket fees paid are still insufficient, he nevertheless manifested his
willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

The same is not true in the case at bar where in line with the foregoing pronouncements, the
trial court allowed the amendment of the complaint for the determination of the fees, but
such amendment did not, however, in anyway help in specifying the amount of damages
claimed. At most, the demand for attorney's fees was stated as 25% of the total monetary
liability, another unspecified amount which cannot be the basis of computation.

As to awards of claims not specified in the pleadings this Court had already clarified that
they refer only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, to
which the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. The amount of any
claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading, should be specified. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to
claims although specified are left for the determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will
not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof (Tacay v.
RTC of Tagum, supra; Ayala Corporation, et al. v. The Honorable Job Maddayag, et al., G.R.
No. 88421, 181 SCRA 687 [1990]) . prLL

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

** Penned by Associate Justice Asali S. Isnani and concurred in by Associate Justices

Luis A. Javellana and Minerva P. Gonzales-Reyes.

15

[G.R. No. 97303. January 27, 1992.]
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR
TENSUAN and FILIPINAS CARBON AND MINING CORPORATION, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengzon & Jimenez for petitioner.
Bonifacio Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS; NOT AFFECTED BY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED. The fact
that the main action or principal relief sought in the complaint is for specific performance
and/or rescission is only determinative of jurisdiction in the sense that, regardless of the
amount of incidental or additional claims for damages, the case is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; DOCKET FEES; ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF DOCKET FEE
SHOULD BE PAID WHERE PARTY SEEKS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES ASIDE FROM
THE PRINCIPAL RELIEF OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; CASE AT BAR. This does
not mean, however, that the separate claims for damages therein are exempt from the
payment of docket fees. The prayer in private respondent's second amended complaint
reveals that, in addition to the principal relief of specific performance and/or rescission, it
categorically and unconditionally seeks the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, with attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Under paragraph 2 (c) to (d) of the
petitory portion of said amended complaint, the amount of damages being claimed as
additional relief by private respondent is P3,450,000.00, as set out in the third to the sixth
causes of action. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 141 then in force, the docket fee for such
additional claims by themselves would be P13,400.00, and it is admitted that only P2,626.00
has been paid by private respondent. We, therefore, find it appropriate to adopt the relevant
paragraph in the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Sun Insurance, as prayed for
by petitioner, so that this matter may be disposed of with dispatch. The clerk of court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that
should be paid by private respondent, considering the total amount of the claims sought in
the second amended complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and prayer thereof,
and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner merely seeks an order, which respondent
Court of Appeals allegedly refused to issue, requiring the clerk of court of the court a quo to
reassess and collect in full the prescribed docket fee in Civil Case No. 11209.
On July 10, 1985, private respondent Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation filed against
herein petitioner and Central Mining Consultants (CMC) an action for rescission or
annulment of contract with damages 1 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
146, docketed as Civil Case No. 11029, praying that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. After due trial, this Court render judgment:
a. On the First and Second Alternative Causes of Action, rescinding and/or declaring
rescinded, cancelled or terminated plaintiffs Agreement or in the alternative annulling
and/or declaring annulled the aforesaid Agreement, Annex "A", and in either case,
ordering defendants to deliver and surrender the Mining Area together with all the
infrastructure, facilities and equipment found thereon, to plaintiff and restore plaintiff in
possession, operation and administration of these properties without any obligation on the
part of plaintiff to defendants;
b. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff actual damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000 00;
c. On the Fourth Cause of Action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff moral damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00;
d. On the Fifth Cause of Action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P200,000.00;
e. On the Sixth Cause of Action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of at least P100,000.00 and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of at least P50,000.00;
f. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost of suit.
Before petitioner International Industrial Management and Development Corporation
(INIMACO) could file a responsive pleading, private respondent filed an amended
complaint dated October 8, 1988. 2 Thereafter, a second amended complaint dated January
30, 1989 was filed, 3 praying that:
xxx xxx xxx
16
2. After due trial, this Honorable Court rendered (sic) judgment:
a. Making the injunction permanent;
b. On the first and second alternative causes of action, rescinding and/or declaring
rescinded, cancelled or terminated plaintiffs agreement or in the alternative ordering the
defendants to comply with their obligations under the aforesaid agreement, Annex "A" and
in either case, ordering the defendants to deliver and surrender the Mining Area together
with all the infrastructure, facilities, and equipments found thereon to plaintiff and restore
plaintiff in its possession, operation and administration of these properties without any
obligation on the part of plaintiff to defendants;
c. On the third cause of action, to order the defendants CMC/INIMACO, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;
d. On the fourth cause of action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff moral damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00;
e. On the fifth cause of action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of at least P200,000.00;
f. On the sixth cause of action, ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of at least P100,000.00 and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of at least P50,000.00;
g. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost of suit.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case since the complaint does not specifically state the amount
of damages sought therein by private respondent, thereby rendering the docket fee
corresponding thereto undeterminable and, as a matter of course, unpaid. This was,
however, denied by the court below.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the
order of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss. Respondent court denied the petition
for certiorari after finding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case since the
claims for damages of private respondent as qualified by the phrase "at least," which is
equivalent to "not less than," are definite enough, 4 in line with a similar holding in Ng Soon
vs. Hon. Aloysius Alday, et al. 5 In said case, it was clarified that if what is proved is less
than what is claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be exacted.
In the present petition before us, petitioner does not seek a review of respondent court's
aforesaid decision but prays for the issuance of an order requiring the clerk of court of
the court below to reassess and collect in full the prescribed docket fee in the original
case, as was done in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Hon. Maximo C. Asuncion, et al. 6
It will be recalled that in said case, we ruled that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment thereof within a
reasonable time but not beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Petitioner avers that the aggregate of private respondent's claims amounts to P29,600,000.00,
hence the docket fee due is P118,000.00, allegedly pursuant to Section 5, subsections 7 and 8,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended on September 18, 1984. Since only P2,626.00 was
paid by herein private respondent, the former contends that the latter still has to pay the
balance of P115,374.00.
The computation submitted by petitioner, however, is partly based upon and includes what
private respondent, under the second alternative cause of action in its second amended
complaint, 7 claims should be paid or performed by petitioner or CMC in the event that
rescission or cancellation is no longer possible by virtue of the expiration of the agreement
entered into by the parties on September 30, 1988 which is the subject of the present
controversy. In other words, these are contingent or alternative reliefs, the demandability of
which arises only if the condition for the principal relief sought shall have occurred and has
been so determined by the trial court.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that considering that its main action is for
specific performance and/or rescission which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the particular relief
sought, the docket fee it has paid is reasonably sufficient.
The fact that the main action or principal relief sought in the complaint is for specific
performance and/or rescission is only determinative of jurisdiction in the sense that,
regardless of the amount of incidental or additional claims for damages, the case is within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. This does not mean, however,
that the separate claims for damages therein are exempt from the payment of docket fees.
The prayer in private respondent's second amended complaint 8 reveals that, in addition to
the principal relief of specific performance and/or rescission, it categorically and
unconditionally seeks the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, with
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Under paragraph 2 (c) to (d) of the petitory portion of said second amended complaint, the
amount of damages being claimed as additional relief by private respondent is
P3,450,000.00, as set out in the third to the sixth causes of action. Pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 141 then in force, the docket fee for such additional claims by themselves would be
P13,400.00, and it is admitted that only P2,626.00 has been paid by private respondent. We,
therefore, find it appropriate to adopt the relevant paragraph in the dispositive portion of
this Court's decision in Sun Insurance, as prayed for by petitioner, so that this matter may
be disposed of with dispatch. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The clerk of court of the court a quo is hereby
instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private
respondent, considering the total amount of the claims sought in the second amended
17
complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and prayer thereof, and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if any. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 18832, 59-81.

2. Ibid., id., 82-104.

3. Ibid., id., 23-42.

4. Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 18832, dated January 19, 1990, penned by Justice
Abelardo M. Dayrit with Justices Nathaniel P. de Pano, Jr. and Celso L. Magsino,
concurring; Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 18.

5. 178 SCRA 221 (1989).

6. 170 SCRA 274 (1989).

7. Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 18832, 35-36.

8. Ibid., id., 41-42.

9. Note should also be taken of the following amendment to Rule 141 by the
resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 14, 1990 and effective on November 2,
1990; "Sec. 2. Fees as lien. Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not
alleged, or a relief different or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned
shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of
said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees. (n)"

18

[G.R. No. 90742. May 6, 1991.]
LEONARDO A. AURELIO and YAO BUN SHIONG, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, Ninth Division, HON. JUDGE ALOYSIUS C. ALDAY, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH XCV of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, CAMILO L.
SABIO and MA. MARLENE A. LEDONIO-SABIO, respondents.
Neptali Gonzales II & Associates and Tomas C. Llamas for petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for himself and his co-defendants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT;
PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Sabio's "Counter-
Complaint" is a compulsory counterclaim, not a third-party complaint, hence, no separate
filing fee may be required for asserting it. In Arthur Balbastro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 48
SCRA 231, we ruled that "The crucial characteristics of a third-party complaint under
Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, is that the original defendant is attempting to
transfer to the third-party defendant, the liability asserted against him by the original
plaintiff." There is no attempt here on the part of the private respondents to transfer to the
petitioners the liability asserted by the plaintiffs against them. By joining the plaintiffs'
husbands as co-defendants of their wives under the "counter-complaint," the private
respondents merely complied with the general rule that married women may not sue or be
sued alone without joining their husbands (Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
2. ID.; ID.; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION; HUSBANDS SHOULD BE JOINED AS
FORMAL PARTIES; REASONS THEREFOR. Attorney Camilo Sabio's counterclaims
for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages arose from the supposedly defamatory
allegations made by his sisters-in-law against him, allegedly upon the advice and
instigation of their husbands, in their complaint against Attorney Sabio. Inasmuch as, if the
counter-complaint should prosper, the award for damages to Attorney Sabio may have to
be satisfied out of the assets of the conjugal partnerships of the original plaintiffs (Art. 163,
Civil Code), then necessarily, their husbands (the "counter-defendants"), as administrators
of their respective conjugal partnerships, should be brought into the suit as formal parties
(Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules of Court). By joining the husbands as additional counter-defendants in
the counter-claim against their wives (the original plaintiffs), instead of filing a separate
action against the husbands, multiplicity of suits is thereby avoided.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
On September 30, 1987, the sisters Ma. Esperanza Ledonio-Aurelio and Ma. Victoria A.
Ledonio-Yao, without joining their respective husbands, together with their mother, Emma
Alo-Ledonio, brothers Gerardo Ledonio III, Ramon A. Ledonio and sister Rosario A.
Ledonio, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint (Civil Case No. Q-
51968) against the spouses Camilo D. Sabio and Ma. Marlene A. Ledonio-Sabio, Gerardo A.
Ledonio, Jr., Edgar A. Ledonio and Salvador A. Ledonio, for annulment and rescission of
contract, recovery of possession, reconveyance and damages.
The defendants filed a 66-page "Answer with Compulsory Counter-Complaint" demanding
payment of P150 million in moral, nominal, and exemplary damages for the plaintiffs'
defamatory and libelous allegations in their complaint, and impleading as "counter-
defendants," Leonardo A. Aurelio, husband of plaintiff Ma. Esperanza Ledonio-Aurelio,
and Yao Bun Shiong, husband of plaintiff Ma. Victoria A. Ledonio Yao, because they
allegedly have not only been advisers and consultants of their wives, but conspired and
confederated with them and also actively participated in the acts and events leading to the
case.
The Sabio spouses filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Serve Summons on Leonardo Aurelio and
Yao Bun Shiong, which the trial court granted without requiring them to pay filing fees.
The counter-defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Expunge from the Records the
counter-complaint. The motion was denied by Judge Alday on April 11, 1988. The counter-
defendants' motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 29, 1988, they
filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction praying for
annulment of the lower court's orders.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that the counter-complaint was in fact a
compulsory counterclaim, hence, no separate filing fee may be required for asserting it; that
the designation of the pleading as a "Compulsory Counter-Complaint" instead of
"Compulsory Counterclaim" was not a fatal deviation from the Rules and did not invalidate
the pleading. llcd
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, the petitioners seek to annul
both the Court of Appeals' decision and the Regional Trial Court's orders.
After deliberating on the petition for review, the Court resolved to dismiss it. First,
because a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 is not the proper
remedy when no errors of jurisdiction are raised in the petition (Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. vs. Galauran Pilares Construction Co., 118 SCRA 664; M & M Management Aids,
Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 225; Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 527; Captain Mateo P. Francisco vs. Hon. Pelagio S. Mandi, 152 SCRA
711; Robert Young vs. Hon. Julio A. Sulit, Jr., 162 SCRA 659; Eufracia Vda. de Crisologo vs.
Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 132; Mely Tangonan vs. Hon. Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, 137
SCRA 245; Teofilo I. Marcelo vs. Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439; National
Investment and Development Corp. vs. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, 163 SCRA 153).
19
Secondly, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Sabio's "Counter-Complaint" is a
compulsory counterclaim, not a third-party complaint, hence, no separate filing fee may be
required for asserting it.

In Arturo Balbastro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 231, we ruled that "The crucial
characteristics of a third-party complaint under Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, is
that the original defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant, the
liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff." There is no attempt here on the part
of the private respondents to transfer to the petitioners the liability asserted by the plaintiffs
against them. By joining the plaintiffs' husbands as co-defendants of their wives under the
"counter-complaint," the private respondents merely complied with the general rule that
married women may not sue or be sued alone without joining their husbands (Sec. 4, Rule
3, Rules of Court).

Attorney Camilo Sabio's counterclaims for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages arose
from the supposedly defamatory allegations made by his sisters-in-law against him,
allegedly upon the advice and instigation of their husbands, in their complaint against
Attorney Sabio. Inasmuch as, if the counter-complaint should prosper, the award for
damages to Attorney Sabio may have to be satisfied out of the assets of the conjugal
partnerships of the original plaintiffs (Art. 163, Civil Code), then necessarily, their husbands
(the "counter-defendants"), as administrators of their respective conjugal partnerships,
should be brought into the suit as formal parties (Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules of Court). By joining
the husbands as additional counter-defendants in the counter-claim against their wives (the
original plaintiffs), instead of filing a separate action against the husbands, multiplicity of
suits is thereby avoided.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders of the trial courts denying the
petitioners' motion to dismiss the counter-complaint nor in the decision dated October 23,
1989 of the Court of Appeals affirming them (CA-G.R. SP No. 16067), the petition for review
is denied for lack of merit with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

20

[G.R. No. 75919. May 7, 1987.]
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE
RENDERS NULL AND VOID THE COMPLAINT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
THERETO. The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket
fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT OF DAMAGES MUST BE
SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. All complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record. The court acquires jurisdiction over any pleading upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J .:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January
28, 1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the
Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is
granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of
the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied by considering the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages, 2 while the present case is an action for torts and damages and
specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of
title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of
possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual, moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However,
in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture
of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such
property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the
subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees
and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing
the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the
nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated
were treated as merely ancillary to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only
P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned
from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action
for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the
amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance
where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous.
Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint
yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00
which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. prll
4. When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the
attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately
ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed
21
an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
Corporation as co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the
body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this
Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in
the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial
court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which
they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the
body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of
damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the
amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as
it did not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or incidental to the action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed
by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and
reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but
also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient,
nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10
Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of
damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.
11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of
the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount
of damages as alleged in the original complaint. cdtai
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." 12 Thus, in
the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are
null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment
of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not
in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged
in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another
counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this
Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified
in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical
practice. cdrep
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
22
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. Private
respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively
to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such
Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the
ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The
contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF
THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT
CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT
AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its
nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in
default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. cdasia
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional
defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs
of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent
Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases
assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court
thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-
raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No.
Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-
10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a
certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On
August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177 was thereafter assigned,
after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring
the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her
difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the
23
pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-
Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint
however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees
in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the
Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for
the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said
order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On
October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion
thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable
respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis
of the amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April
28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-
payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true
that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above
related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that
the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
In support of their theory, petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows:
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent
with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed."
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there
was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is
applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of
the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he
deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff
deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14)
days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did not
acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby
perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in
1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the
filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in
accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year
before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the
filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect
until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. llcd
24
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It
was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed
candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within
the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10 However, the
required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this
Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of
aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be
paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule
is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as
he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills
probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing
in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment
of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee, the complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed
that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and
that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time
the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the
amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the
docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for
the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and
that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff
to pay P3,140.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as
the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier
sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court
may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant
filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for
the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before
this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that
if he had to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have
filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the
rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an
honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the
action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct;
and that as the action is also for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional
docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original
complaint. LLjur
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves
an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the
property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient
to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order
requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and
annual defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the
defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for
attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purpose of payment, and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly
suffered by plaintiff. cdrep
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the
docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the
allegation of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for damages
and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the
same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed a amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating
any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case
and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985 the trial court directed the
plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking
for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages
alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the
prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
25
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For
all legal purposes they was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of
docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint,
the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the
amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium
and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only
P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an
amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint
was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of
P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After
the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein
private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the
pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988,
private respondent paid an additional docket fee on P62,132.92. Although private
respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee
considering the total amount of this claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a
docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and
the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing
of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on
the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in
Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the
additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for stance
by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the
lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine
and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay
the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. liblex
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a
quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original
complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
26
 [G.R. No. 59731. January 11, 1990.]
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO
ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.
Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION IN PERSONAM AND ACTION
IN REM, DISTINGUISHED. An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of,
real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land
registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that
a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or
given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the
former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter
are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real
action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
2. ID,; ID.; ACTION IN PERSONAM; COURT MUST HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON TO BIND PARTIES. Private respondent's action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was
commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as
the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and
he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His
juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death
(Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
3. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The real purpose of
the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]). A Torrens title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A
strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A
Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior
to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.
39272, May 4, 1988).
4. ID.; PROPERTY WRONGFULLY OR ERRONEOUSLY REGISTERED IN
ANOTHER'S NAME; REMEDY OF CONCERNED PARTY. The sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's
name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary
action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742;
Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
5. CIVIL LAW; LACHES; DEFINED. Failure to take steps to assert any rights over
a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private
respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988;
Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon.
Crisolito Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v.
Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District
Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex parte the cancellation of title registered in the
name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro
Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga, Barrio of San
Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters
(Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco,
Regina, Perfecta, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
LLpr
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No.
78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.)
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.
His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC)
Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in
the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and
December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965,
consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed
27
administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration
issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was
among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on
December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for
reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor
based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad
Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980,
p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng
and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that
the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the
defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other
processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng
and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The
summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of
general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19,
1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed
to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court
a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A
judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding plaintiff's causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated
by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the
property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property
in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of
his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of
T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No.
91137 is hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby
ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in
the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including
the realty taxes due the Government.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to
Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title
over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the
property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
cdll
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a
verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction
which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena,
Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was
reconsidered and set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the
order dated September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.).
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but
the same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.).
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same
was dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
or February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.).
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the
pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with
the resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June
18, 1982 (p. 159, Ibid.), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of
June 28, 1982 (p. 191, Ibid.).
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE
VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN
AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY
PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING
THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE
TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court. llcd
28
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and
the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate
by means of service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in
Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi
in rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in
rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of
the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be
allowed unto Ching Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the
Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in
rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate
of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing
or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the
whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam,
the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after
the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70
SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is
fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching
Leng's estate as co-defendant. It is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued
through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872).
Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T.C.T. No. 91137 and there is an on-
going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of
hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts
demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is
censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original
land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance
with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay
City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v.
Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been
notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte
proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado,
supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner
Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded
from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company. The action being a quasi in rem, summons by publication satisfied the
constitutional requirement of due process. llcd
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and
the amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978
dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the
evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since
1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set
aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has
passed unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011,
June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of
laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508,
June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid
the possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to
therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly
issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information
possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat
Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's
decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are
29
hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case
No. 6888-P is hereby DISMISSED. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

30
[G.R. No. 49475. September 28, 1993.]
JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES
COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J. ELUMBA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PERSONAL ACTION IN
PERSONAM; DISTINGUISHED FROM ACTION IN REM. In the case before us, it is
indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against petitioner affects the
parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. However, this does not
automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is
also a personal action. For, a personal action may not necessarily be an action in personam
and a real action may not at the same time be an action in rem. In Hernandez v. Rural Bank
of Lucena, Inc., we held thus In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2(a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real
property. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the
person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not
necessarily an action in rem.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON VENUE. Consequently, the distinction
between an action in personam and an action in rem for purposes of determining venue is
irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action filed is a personal action or a real
action. After all, personal actions may be instituted in the Regional Trial Court (then Court
of First Instance) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff's resides, at the election of the plaintiff. On the
other hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or part thereof lies.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING
BREACH OF LEASE CONTRACT; CASE AT BAR. While the instant action is for
damages arising from an alleged breach of the lease contract, it likewise prays for the fixing
of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious, private respondent will be
entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the recovery of the
portion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises under the
original contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided portion
thereof. While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of
possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action therefore does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to
recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the
ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be
deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
We are called upon in this case to determine the proper venue of an action to fix the period
of a contract of lease which, in the main, also prays for damages. Cdpr
Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA
INDUSTRIES COMPANY, a partnership represented by its General Manager JOSE J.
ELUMBA, entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a
building owned by petitioner in Ozamiz City. 1 The lease was for an indefinite period
although the rent of P150.00 per month was paid on a month-to-month basis. ELUMBA
INDUSTRIES COMPANY utilized the area under lease as the Sales Office of Allied Air
Freight in Ozamiz City.
On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing
a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession
was said to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager of ELUMBA,
2 although private respondent maintains that this is not the case. 3 At any rate, the validity
of the repossession is not here in issue.
On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages 4 which, at the same
time, prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years, before the then Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City. 5 Petitioner, a resident of
Ozamiz City, moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a real action which
should have been filed with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in
Ozamiz City where the property in question was situated. LLphil
On 6 November 1978, respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan denied the Motion to
Dismiss and held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely involved the enforcement of the contract
of lease, and while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership
raised. 6 Hence, venue was properly laid.
Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss. He
contended that while the action did not involve a question of ownership, it was
nevertheless seeking recovery of possession; thus, it was a real action which, consequently,
must be filed in Ozamiz City. 7
On 4 December 1978, respondent judge denied reconsideration. 8 While admitting that Civil
Case No. 2901 did pray for recovery of possession, he nonetheless ruled that this matter was
not the main issue at hand; neither was the question of ownership raised. Not satisfied,
petitioner instituted the present recourse.
PADERANGA argues that inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion
surrendered to him by the local manager of private respondent, as well as to fix the period
of lease at five (5) years, Dipolog City could not be the proper venue of the action. It being a
real action, venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the
property lies.
31
ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged
breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental.
ELUMBA further argues that the action is one in personam and not in rem. Therefore venue
may be laid in the place where plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.
Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and real
actions vis-a-vis actions in personam and in rem. The former determines venue; the latter,
the binding effect of a decision the court may render over a party, whether impleaded or
not. cdphil
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent
against petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in
personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 9
However, this does not automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the
period of the lease contract is also a personal action. For, a personal action may not
necessarily be an action in personam and a real action may not at the same time be an action
in rem. In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 10 we held thus
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, 15 such an
action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or any part thereof lies.
Respondent judge, therefore, in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. The Orders of 6 November 1978
and 4 December 1978 of respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan are SET ASIDE. The
branch of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City where Civil Case No. 2901 may be
presently assigned is DIRECTED to DISMISS the case for improper venue. This decision is
immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title
to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,
while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an
action in rem.
Consequently, the distinction between an action in personam and an action in rem for
purposes of determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action
filed is a personal action or a real action. After all, personal actions may be instituted in the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff. 11 On the other hand, real actions should be brought before the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or
part thereof lies. 12
While the instant action is for damages arising from an alleged breach of the lease contract,
it likewise prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious,
private respondent will be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but
also to the recovery of the portion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased
premises under the original contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the
subdivided portion thereof.
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of
possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. 13 The instant action therefore does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is
to recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. 14 Indeed,
where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession,
32