Republic Act No.
9262 March 08, 2004
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004".
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or
likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as
but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member
of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to
unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make
a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited
to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family
Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or
solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
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 (b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or
her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern
of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in
battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who,
knowingly and without lawful justification follows the woman or her child
or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or
a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not
result in the bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD
for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of
which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but
are incapable of taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act
No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the
victim and other children under her care.
SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
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(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her
child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children
of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of
a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the
victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force,
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or
private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
 (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the woman's child/children.
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children,
under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or
consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance
with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries
shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious
physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those
constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two
degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as
specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto
mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by
prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or
committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be
the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the
amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but
not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo
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mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.
SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime
or any of its elements was committed at the option of the compliant.
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act
for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child
specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.
The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement
agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay
protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent
protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in
Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no
property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent
to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to
stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any
specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or
household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and
other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the
appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to
the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or
to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the
petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her
child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of
support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of
court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any
firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the
court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a
firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order
the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses,
childcare expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner
may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to
protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated
family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated
family or household member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the
absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage.
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The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not
preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO
or PPO.
SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. A petition for protection
order may be filed by any of the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity;
(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local
government units (LGUs);
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's
desks;
(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or
municipality where the violence against women and their children
occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.
SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. Applications for BPOs shall
follow the rules on venue under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO may be
filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of
the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the place of
residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. The application for a protection
order must be in writing, signed and verified under oath by the applicant. It may be
filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the
subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A
standard protection order application form, written in English with translation to
the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate applications for
protections order, and shall contain, among other, the following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;
(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
 (d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section
8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection
order in another court.
If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an
affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by
the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of
the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to
her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall
attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has
territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service
processing.
An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an
application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of
the application. Law enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the
application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.
SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. All TPOs and PPOs issued under
this Act shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines and a violation thereof
shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. If the
woman or her child requests in the applications for a protection order for the
appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to hire a counsel de
parte, the court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to
represent the petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the PAO determines
that the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall
facilitate the legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack
of access to family or conjugal resources by the applicant, such as when the same
are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation
by the PAO.
However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from
representing the petitioner.
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. -
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
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the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date
of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs)
refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the
application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court
may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be
effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who
may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. Permanent Protection Order (PPO)
refers to protection order issued by the court after notice and hearing.
Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or the
non-availability of his lawyer shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing
the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the respondents appears
without counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a
lawyer for the respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the
respondent fails to appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte
presentation of the evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence presented. The court shall allow the introduction of any history of
abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed against the
applicant or the person for whom the applicant is made.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where the court is unable to conduct the hearing
within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the court shall continuously
extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until
final judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO may be modified by the
court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a
PPO. A PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court upon application of the
person in whose favor the order was issued. The court shall ensure immediate
personal service of the PPO on respondent.
The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse
of time between the act of violence and the filing of the application.
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must
determine whether or not the PPO shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO
shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing that the act from which the
order might arise did not exist.
SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. The following statement
must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on the protection order
issued by the Punong Barangay or court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW."
SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For Protection Orders
Failure to act on an application for a protection order within the reglementary
period specified in the previous section without justifiable cause shall render the
official or judge administratively liable.
SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. In cases of legal separation, where violence
as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The
court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as
possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the
petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. Ex parte and
adversarial hearings to determine the basis of applications for a protection order
under this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings. Barangay officials and
the courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection
order under this Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other
proceedings in order to hear applications for a protection order.
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. A complaint for a violation of a BPO
issued under this Act must be filed directly with any municipal trial court,
metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial
jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other
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criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts
committed.
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court.
During trial and upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection
order as it deems necessary without need of an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute
contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without
prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for
any of the acts committed.
SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. The foregoing
provisions on protection orders shall be applicable in impliedly instituted with the
criminal actions involving violence against women and their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. The Court may order any person against
whom a protection order is issued to give a bond to keep the peace, to present two
sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented.
Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a
period which shall in no case exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty
(30) days, if for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(I).
The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs issued
only by the courts.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe
in ten (10) years.
SECTION 25. Public Crime. Violence against women and their children shall be
considered a public offense which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint
by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the
commission of the crime.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victim-survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from
battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts
shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit
drug, or any other mind-altering substance shall not be a defense under this Act.
SECTION 28. Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall be entitled
to the custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old
older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the
mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified
from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be
given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman
syndrome.
SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. Prosecutors and court
personnel should observe the following duties when dealing with victims under this
Act:
a) communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or
her child; and
b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and
procedure, and privileges for indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. Barangay officials
and law enforcers shall have the following duties:
(a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or
protection of the victim by entering the necessary whether or not a
protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;
(b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or
within plain view;
(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a
clinic or hospital;
(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house;
(e) assist the barangay officials and other government officers and
employees who respond to a call for help;
(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong
Barangy or the courts;
(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the
acts of violence defined by this Act is occurring, or when he/she has
personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed, and
there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this
Act; and
(h) immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSWD,
social Welfare Department of LGUs or accredited non-government
organizations (NGOs).
Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable
for a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable
criminal, civil or administrative liability.
SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse Any healthcare provider,
including, but not limited to, an attending physician, nurse, clinician, barangay
health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by
the victim of violence shall:
(a) properly document any of the victim's physical, emotional or
psychological injuries;
(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions, observations and
circumstances of the examination or visit;
(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate
concerning the examination or visit;
(d) safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon
request at actual cost; and
(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and
remedies provided under this Act, and services available to them.
SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs Other government
agencies and LGUs shall establish programs such as, but not limited to, education
and information campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature, causes,
incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the
public on its social impacts.
It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU's to ensure the
sustained education and training of their officers and personnel on the prevention
of violence against women and their children under the Act.
SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court
hearing an application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any
way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or
abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act.
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of

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the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is
sought under this Act.
Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively
liable.
SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. In every case of violence
against women and their children as herein defined, any person, private individual
or police authority or barangay official who, acting in accordance with law,
responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to
ensure the safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or
administrative liability resulting therefrom.
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. In addition to their rights under existing laws,
victims of violence against women and their children shall have the following rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or any public legal assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs'
(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under
the Family Code; and
(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them
including their right to apply for a protection order.
SECTION 36. Damages. Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to
actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. The court shall expedite the process of
issuance of a hold departure order in cases prosecuted under this Act.
SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. If the
victim is an indigent or there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger or
threat of danger to act on an application for a protection order, the court shall
accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of
transcript of stenographic notes.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their Children
(IAC-VAWC). In pursuance of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby
established an Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and their children,
hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following
agencies:
(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);
(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)
(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(i) Department of Health (DOH);
(j) Department of Education (DepEd);
(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW
based on their mandates as well as develop capability programs for their employees
to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council will also serve as
the monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.
The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall
have a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent. These
representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations.
SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. The DSWD, and LGU's
shall provide the victims temporary shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social
services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.
The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.
SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. The DSWD shall provide
rehabilitative counseling and treatment to perpetrators towards learning
constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and reforming
their ways. When necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit
to psychiatric treatment or confinement.
SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence Against Women
and their Children Cases. All agencies involved in responding to violence against
women and their children cases shall be required to undergo education and training
to acquaint them with:

8
 a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their
children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against
women and their children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer
protection and assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their
children that minimize the likelihood of injury to the officer and promote
the safety of the victim or survivor.
The PNP, in coordination with LGU's shall establish an education and training
program for police officers and barangay officials to enable them to properly handle
cases of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a
paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves under the
Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the necessity
arises as specified in the protection order.
Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be
penalized in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any person for
assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for
discrimination.
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. All records pertaining to cases of violence against
women and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and
all public officers and employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate
family member, without the latter's consent, shall be liable to the contempt power
of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
SECTION 45. Funding The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this
Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
9
The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGU's
shall be used to implement services for victim of violence against women and their
children.
SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Within six (6) months from the
approval of this Act, the DOJ, the NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the
PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be identified by the NCRFW, shall
promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.
SECTION 47. Suppletory Application For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
SECTION 48. Separability Clause. If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions shall not be affected.
SECTION 49. Repealing Clause All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 50. Effectivity This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of
its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as
alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused,
with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild
chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in
the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said
Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the
deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in
that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest,
there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards
secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound.
appealed. Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point where the
chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant within a few
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to
minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left
the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of
his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called
January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo,
Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for
and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant
some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward the woods and came
took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens
back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased
after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so
lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily
and then went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration
observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass.
which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on
During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were
the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On
working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the
the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle,
laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the
had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season.
accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified that she received
The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in
the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally.
shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working
They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about
at something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the
seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen,
accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest
top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the
near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between the
accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that
testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point. The
the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant
uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other
prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the
mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with
the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.
him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga
tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the
What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land
subject he testified as follows: belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant
relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where
been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has
the wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the
not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have
first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to
for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between
eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I
them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and
shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw
that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions were
law.
working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary
and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa unless the contrary shall appear.
heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead body.
10
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows: constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by
doubt.
mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
conviction.
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his
discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is
taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
SECOND DIVISION
(Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U.
S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3
G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990
L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
vs.
accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a
DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN, accused-appellant.
lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and
Carlito A. Corpuz for accused-appellant.
denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
PARAS, J.:
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, This is an appeal interposed by the accused Dante Marcos y Sibayan, from the
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City, in
State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the Criminal Case No. 2890-R finding him guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited Drugs) and sentencing
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the
The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct
the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds and declares the accused
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
properly held to be erroneous. crime of illegal sale and distribution of marijuana as charged and
hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to pay a fine of
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution insolvency; and to pay the costs.
for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which

11
 In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with
his preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions
prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The confiscated marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-9") are
hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government, and upon
the finality of this decision, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed
to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian (NBI),
through the Chief, PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit No. 1,
Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, for disposition in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.
An information was filed by the Second Assistant Fiscal Alberto G. Gorospe at the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City on December 3,
1985 charging the accused, Dante Marcos y Sibayan, of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited Drugs), having
been committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of December, 1985, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, and without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and distribute dried marijuana leaves weighing about nine (9)
kilos, more or less, contained in a big sack, for P700.00 per kilo or
a total of P6,300.00, Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that
said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited drug in violation of the
above-mentioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits
ensued.
As gathered from the records, Major Florencio Junio, Commanding Officer of the
First Narcotic Regional Unit, Baguio City, acting upon an information given by a
confidential informer that accused-appellant Dante Marcos was selling marijuana at
the Holy Ghost Hill Proper, Baguio City, organized on December 4, 1985 a "buy
bust" operation team composed of A2C Serafin Artizona who was to pose as the
buyer of the prohibited stuff, with Major Junio, Maximo Peralta, Freddie Cortel and
Philip de Vera providing the back-up support (Rollo, pp. 58-59). The testimony of
this team which eventually apprehended the accused, constitutes the major part of
the prosecution's evidence
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
12
Lt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist at the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that on January 2, 1986, he received a
request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985 (Hearing of March 18,
1986; TSN, p. 3; Record, p. 4) for nine (9) bundles of marijuana stuff, weighing 9.2
kilos. He examined the same by means of the Duquenois-Levine test and the thin-
layer chromatography test. Both tests showed that the bundles were positive for
marijuana (Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 4; Records, pp. 5-6).
A2C Serafin Artizona, a soldier, assigned at the lst Regional Narcotics Command,
Baguio City, testified that on December 4, 1985, he was assigned by his immediate
chief Major Florencio Junio to compose a team to entrap accused Dante Marcos in
the Holy Ghost Proper (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 13-14; Records, pp. 14-
15). Thereafter, together with the confidential informer they went to the Holy
Ghost Proper. He was also accompanied by the back-up team strategically
positioned within the vicinity, namely Major Junio, Maximo Peralta, Freddie Cortel
and Philip de Vera (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 14-15; Records, pp. 15-16).
Once at the Holy Ghost Proper, he was introduced by the confidential informer as a
buyer of marijuana to the accused who was then standing at the stairway together
with his companion. After a while, they were asked to proceed to the second floor
(Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 20-22; Records, pp. 21-23). He then ordered ten
(10) kilos of marijuana priced at seven hundred pesos per kilo (P700.00). The
accused left the room to get the stuff, and returned with a light blue sack and gave
it to him. After inspecting the contents of the aforesaid sack, he gave the
prearranged signal to his companion by spitting through the window. Accordingly,
the back- up team went inside the house. Meanwhile, he introduced himself to the
accused as a NARCOM agent (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 16-17; Records,
pp. 17-18). Eventually, the accused was arrested while his companion was able to
evade the arrest. He also testified that he did not execute any affidavit to support
his complaint against the accused (Heating of April 28, 1986; TSN, p. 18; Records, p.
19).
Pat. Maximiano Peralta, an investigator of the lst Narcotics Regional Unit, testified
that on December, 1985, he was a member of the back-up team of A2C Artizona
who negotiated with the accused. He rushed to the house when Major Junio who
posted himself near the house of accused gave the prearranged signal that the
accused was already held by A2C Serafin Artizona (Hearing of January 14, 1987;
TSN, pp. 31-32; Records, pp. 32-33). Inside the house, he saw Artizona holding the
accused. He further disclosed that the sack contained ten (10) bundles of marijuana
weighing more or less 9-1/2 kilos (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 33-34;
Records, pp. 34-35). Moreover, he testified that he was the one who prepared the
affidavit of arrest and other supporting papers (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN,
pp. 34-35; Records, pp. 35-36).
With the presentation of the oral testimonies of the witnesses by the prosecution
and the documentary evidence which consist of: (a) Letter-request for laboratory
examination dated December 16, 1985, signed by Murphy Bugtong, Chief of
Narcotics Division, Baguio City Police Station (Exhibit "A", Original Record, p. 195);
(b) Blue sack which contained marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B" -"B-10", ibid., p. 196);
(c) Chemistry Report (Exhibit "C", ibid., p. 197); (d) Sketch (Exhibit "D", ibid., p. 198);
(e) Joint Affidavit (Exhibit "E", ibid., p. 199); as well as the physical evidence, the
prosecution rested its case.
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Dante Marcos as its
principal witness who vehemently denied the accusation against him and claimed
instead that the sack of marijuana belonged to a certain Roland Bayogan.
He testified that he was a security guard of the Freeport and Vito Security Agency
and an Architectural drafting student at the University of Baguio. He was boarding
at the ground floor of No. 23-C Sumulong St., a two- storey boarding house owned
by Melita Adase (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 2-3; Records, pp. 74-75). On
December 4, 1985, he went to his class until 2:30 p.m. Thereafter, he went to his
boarding house and reviewed for his last subject at 3:30 p.m. (Ibid., pp. 4-5; 15;
Records, pp. 76-77; 87). However, while reviewing, Roland Bayogan, a student from
Kalinga-Apayao who was occupying a room on the second floor (Ibid., p. 4; Records,
p. 76) knocked at his door and asked him to go to his (Roland's) room to entertain
his visitors as he was to go somewhere for a while. Accordingly, he went to Roland's
room, and there met Roland's visitors, an American, a Filipino and a Negro boy. He
was introduced to the three visitors and then Roland left (Ibid., pp. 5-7; Records, pp.
77-79). Ten (10) minutes after, Roland returned carrying a big sack which he
brought near the bed which was hidden from his view by a curtain. Roland then
called for the Negro boy who in turn called for the American. When the American
saw the contents of the sack he overheard him say, "Okay , I'll pay it," at the same
time brought out his money as he emerged from behind the curtain (Ibid., pp. 7-8;
Records, pp. 79-80). He testified that as Roland was sitting on his bed he was called
by the Filipino visitor, who held the former. He was also called by the same visitor
who held his hands saying, "Relax lang kayo, this is NARCOM." He saw the Negro
boy jump out of the window while panicked-stricken Roland tried to free himself
from the hands of the Filipino, but the Filipino visitor pulled them both outside the
door. When they were near the stairs Roland was able to free himself. Roland ran
downstairs and fled. Suddenly, he heard a shot. The Filipino held on to him while
the American went back to the room and got the sack. Later, accompanied by the
Filipino and the American, they were met by two male persons at the foot of the
stairs. He was pulled inside a vehicle and brought to the police station. He further
declared that once inside the said vehicle, he heard one of them say, "Hindi ito
talaga ang target natin, iyong nakatakbo." (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 8-
10,; Records, pp. 80-82). He further stated that A2C Serafin Artizona was not one of
13
the visitors of Roland Bayogan. He and Pat. Peralta were never at the boarding
house during the incident. He also claimed that the sketch of the place as presented
by A2C Artizona is erroneous (Ibid., p. 12; Record, p. 84) and insisted that his only
purpose in going to the room of Roland Bayogan was to entertain the latter's
visitors.
On cross examination, the accused admitted that he came to know Roland Bayogan
only on November 15, 1985. Their relationship was casual and he had been to the
room of Bayogan for the second time only on December 4, 1985, the day of the
incident.
Renato Padua, a law student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation, testified and
corroborated the testimony of the accused that at about 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock p.m.
of December 4, 1987, he was reading in the second floor of No. 23-D Holy Ghost
Proper, about 1.5 meters from No. 23-C where the accused Dante Marcos lived
(Hearing of March 11, 1987; TSN, pp. 1-5; Record, pp. 49- 53); that on the said
afternoon he heard a commotion at 23-C which was followed by successive
stamping of feet going down to the first floor. He went out from his room and
stayed at the porch of his boarding house. Later, he saw Roland Bayogan, a boarder
of 23-C running toward a small alley (Ibid., pp. 7-10; Record, pp. 55-58). Meanwhile,
he saw two persons who were then standing fire a shot into the air (Ibid., p. 1 0;
Record, p. 58). Thereafter, the two men came down to 23-C and met the accused
(Ibid., p. 11; Record, p. 59). At the same time, the accused was being held by a
certain man followed by an American holding a sack. Finally, they boarded a jeep
and then left (Ibid., pp. 11-14; Records, pp. 59-61).
Lastly, the defense presented Raul Bayangdan an AB-BSE student at Baguio
Colleges Foundation, a board mate and province mate of the accused. He testified
that he has been a boarder at the first floor of 23-C Holy Ghost St. from June 1984
to March 1986. He corroborated the testimony of the accused as to the boarders of
that house including Roland Bayogan and his sister Anita. He declared that he came
to know about the incident from Melita Adasen and Renato Padua, a neighbor,
when he went home from school. He also learned that Roland Bayogan ran away
and never returned. He asserted that he has no knowledge of the incident except
that which has been told to him (Hearing of February 8, 1988; TSN, pp. 2- 9;
Records, pp. 94-100).
The trial court gave more weight to the evidence of the prosecution and found the
accused-appellant Dante Marcos guilty as charged.
Hence, this appeal.
On October 28, 1988, accused-appellant through his counsel filed his brief (Rollo, p.
35), while on May 19, 1989, the appellee's brief was filed (Rollo, p. 54).
The crucial issue of this case is whether or not there is instigation or entrapment of
the accused.
Appellant contends that there was an instigation or even frame up and not a real
entrapment. The "buy-bust" operation team who went to the place does not know
the accused. In fact, the alleged buyer had to be introduced. There was no
marijuana yet when the authorities came or when the alleged poseur buyer came
to buy the prohibited drug. Thus, the accused was not about to commit a crime or
committing a crime.
The contention is without merit.
The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and convincing and
demonstrated that the accused needed no instigation or prodding to commit a
crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the fact that the
accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and
disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material.
Thus, the acts of the arresting officers here constituted entrapment, a process not
prohibited by the Revised Penal Code (People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 77588, May 12,
1989; People v. Borja G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990).
It must be noted that in instigation, where the officers of the law or their agents
incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense, which he
otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused
cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to
commit the offense charged originates from the mind of the accused and law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the accused
cannot justify his conduct. Instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent."
Entrapment is a trap for the unwary criminal (Cabrera v. Judge Pajares, Adm. Mat.
R-278-RTJ & R 309-RTJ, May 30, 1986, En Banc, Per Curiam, 142 SCRA 124).
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a
lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation the
instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into committing the offense,
and himself becomes a co-principal (People v. Natipravat, infra). Entrapment is no
bar to prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant would have to
be acquitted (People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159).
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the means originate from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the
resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt
the criminal from liability. Instigation does (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
534 [1986]).
14
The mere fact that the authorities deceived the appellants into believing that the
former were buyers of heroin does not exculpate the latter from liability for selling
the prohibited drugs. The police can legitimately feign solicitation to catch criminals
who habitually engage in the commission of the offense (People v. Natipravat, 145
SCRA 483 [1986]).
Moreover, as noted by this Court, the defense that the accused was framed by the
apprehending officer can be easily fabricated and not acceptable for accused being
a drug pusher or seller almost always uses such defense. (People v. Francia, 154
SCRA 694 [1987]). For the defense of having set up or framed up to prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense, that
is easy to concoct and is difficult to prove (People v. Nabunat, No. 84392, February
7, 1990, First Division, Gancayco, J.).
But the more important consideration is the fact that the appellant was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses. This should prevail over his denial and
inadmission of having committed the crime for which he was charged, since greater
weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses
than the accused's denial (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 52 [1986]; People v. Khan,
161 SCRA 406 [1988]; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71681, September 5,1989). As
between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
statement of the accused, the former deserves more credence (People v. Melgar,
G.R. No. 75268, 157 SCRA 718; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71861, September 5,
1989). Moreover, even if the appellant denied the participation in the crime, his
presence during the negotiation and actual delivery indicates a common purpose
with other accused to sell marijuana (People v. Natipravat, supra).
In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court are as follows:
On the other hand, the accused's pretension that he went to
Roland's room that afternoon of December 4, 1985 only to
entertain the latter's visitors lacks appeal to reason. Considering
his own admission that he met Roland only on November 15,
1985; that he had gone to Roland's room only once before
December 4, 1985; that they are not even townmates as Roland is
from Kalinga-Apayao while the accused is from Pinged Sabangan
Mt. Province, there is simply no discernible special relationship
between them that could have moved Roland to pick on the
accused as his surrogate to entertain his visitors. What is more,
the accused had a scheduled examination at 3:30 o'clock for
which he had to review. Why should he accede to Roland's
request and thereby lose precious time he badly needed for his
review? To top it all, even as Roland had already returned to
attend to his visitors, the accused still did not leave. The Court is
 thus inclined to believe that Roland and the accused were
together that afternoon because both were engaged in the illegal
trafficking of marijuana.
It must be pointed out that ownership and possession are not indispensable
elements of the crime. The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of
marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime (People v.
Madarang, 147 SCRA 123 [1987]).
Furthermore Artizona's testimony was corroborated by the "buy-bust" operation
team especially Pat. Maximo Peralta who confirmed that appellant was truly a
marijuana dealer. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction (People v. Macuto,
G.R. No. 80112, August 25, 1989). In the case at bar, the appellant handed over the
blue sack containing the ten kilos of marijuana upon the agreement with Artizona
to exchange it for money. The circumstances show that there was an agreement
between the poseur-buyer and the appellant to consummate the sale. The fact that
the appellant returned with the amount of marijuana corresponding to the
aforesaid price suffices to constitute if not sale, then delivery or giving away to
another and distribution of the prohibited drug punishable under Section 4, Article
11 of Republic Act 6425 (People v. Rodriguez, April 25, 1989, G.R. No. 81332; People
v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989). What is important is the fact that the
poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the contents
were presented as evidence in court. Proof of the transaction suffices (People v.
Macuto, supra).
Neither can the appellant aver that no consideration or payment was made. In the
case of People v. Tejada, supra, this Court held that so long as the marijuana
actually given by the appellant was presented before the lower court the absence
of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence
(People v. Teves, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989). Recently, this Court ruled:
It is true that police officers did not have the amount of P1,600
with them to buy marijuana from the appellants during the
incident. Be that as it may, it was not indispensable for their
operation. Sgt,. Raquidan went through the motion as a buyer and
his offer was accepted by the appellant who produced and
delivered the marijuana. There was no need to hand the marked
money to the appellants in the payment thereof. The crime was
consummated by the delivery of the goods. (People v. Galtongo-o,
168 SCRA 716 [1988]).
The alleged contradiction in the date of the affidavit or the fact that prosecution
witnesses Artizona and Peralta did not know the number and owner of the raided
15
house will not impair their testimonies. There is no cogent reason for the witnesses
to know the number nor the owner of the house at Holy Ghost Hills in Sumulong
Street because Artizona who posed as a buyer was accompanied by a confidential
informer, who was familiar with the place. It has been ruled that contradictions in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not on material points is not fatal
(People v. Pulo, 147 SCRA 551 [1987]). The doctrinal jurisprudence has consistently
held that minor contradictions are to be expected but must be disregarded if they
do not affect the basic credibility of the evidence as a whole (People v. Ancheta,
148 SCRA 178; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People v. Reriodica, Jr.,
September 29, 1989).
Conversely, the actuations of the appellant during his arrest during which he did not
make a protest, indicates his Unusually submissive stance of the appellant after his
entrapment and absence of vigorous protest when he was arrested, destroy his
alleged innocence (People v. Madarang, supra).
Appellant failed to show that the police officers were actuated by any improper
motive in testifying as they did. There is nothing in the records to suggest that the
arrest was motivated by any reason other than the desire of the police officers to
accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith and credit to police officers
for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner (Rule
131, Section 5(m), Rules of Court; People v. Lamong et al., G.R. No. 82373, April 17,
1989; People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85; People
v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1989; People v. Natipravat, supra; People
v. de Jesus, supra). As such, their testimonies cannot be discredited where no
motive is shown why they would frame up the appellant (People v. Ranola, April 12,
1989, No. 71752; People v. Line, 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
the witnesses' testimonies are accorded great weight and respect on appeal
because the trial judge has first hand opportunity to examine and observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the giving of their testimonies
(People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989; People v. Tejada, supra; People
v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989; People v. Turla, G.R. No. 70270,
November 11, 1988; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33154 February 27, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGEL REYES Y ALCANTARA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
Ruben Roxas (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th
Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-279 (70), dated October 27, 1970, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond i reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of murder qualified by the
treachery and there being proved the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position, without any mitigating in
circumstance to offset the same the Court sentences him to
DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, the sum of P8,000.00 by
way of moral damages, P8,000.00 by way of exemplary damages,
and to pay the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution has established that on October 1, 1970, at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Garcia and his cousin, the deceased Norberto
Flores, were on their way to the place where they drive a taxi, which was near their
respective residences on G. Tuason, Sampaloc, Manila. Along the way, they stopped
awhile and joined a group of people watching and observing an insane person.
While thus engaged, two men, one of whom was the accused Angel Reyes,
approached them and inquired about a certain Oscar Solomon, who lives in that
place. Thereupon, the deceased Norberto Flores, approached the accused and
asked for a cigarette light but the latter struck him with a karate chop to the
stomach using the side of his open palm, at the same time poking a gun on them
saying: "Ang sama ng porma ninyo." The accused and his companion appeared to
have taken liquor as they had alcoholic breath. Thereafter, Jose Garcia and the
deceased Norberto Flores, went to the house of the latter and stayed by the door,
while the accused and his companion proceeded to look for Oscar Solomon.
Immediately after the accused and his companion had left, Jose Garcia together
with the deceased Norberto Flores, Ernesto Bautista and Isagani Reyes went to
Police Precinct No. 4 on G. Tuason, Sampaloc, Manila, where they reported and
complained about the "gun-poking" incident. Thereafter, the accused and his
companion were picked up by three police officers and brought to the police
16
precinct for investigation. Accused made known that he was a policeman from
Police Precinct No. 8, Manila Police Department, but that he was in civilian clothes
because he was on emergency leave that day.
At the police precinct, they were told to go to the investigation room located at the
second floor. While inside the investigation room, the accused tried to settle the
matter with Jose Garcia. Meanwhile, Conchita Flores, mother of the deceased
Norberto Flores, arrived. She refused to settle the case with the accused and soon
they shouted at each other. The accused said to Conchita Reyes: "Ayaw ninyong
paareglo gusto ninyo cuarta, cuarta." Thereafter, the accused Angel Reyes
approached Norberto Flores, who was seated on a chair in front of the table of the
investigator'. Det. Domingo Gomez of the MPD, and sat on the edge of the table,
about two feet away from the deceased Norberto Flores. He uttered bad words and
said: "I will shoot you now", and immediately, pulled his gun from his waistline and
shot Norberto Flores, who was then seated, stooping and smoking, hitting the said
Norberto Flores in the abdomen which gunshot wound caused his death a few
hours thereafter.
Immediately after the shot, the people inside the investigation room scampered for
cover. However, Det Domingo Gomez remained inside the investigation room. Then
Det. Ferrera arrived and immediately disarmed the accused, who was placed under
arrest by Det. Domingo Gomez. The accused, however, refused to give any
statement.
For his defense, appellant claims that the shooting was accidental. His testimony-
which was rejected by the trial court-is to the effect that when he approached the
deceased Norberto Flores, who was then seated in front of the table of the
investigator, he heard Norberto Flores say that he (accused) was only brave
because he had a gun. This prompted the accused to answer: "You are always
saying about my gun, here is my gun", after which he drew his gun from his right
waist to hand it over to the deceased. While the accused was in the process of
handing over the gun to the deceased Norberto Flores, the gun suddenly fired
hitting the latter in the abdomen.
Appellant now maintains that the trial court erred in holding that the shooting was
not accidental, and assails the trial court in giving weight and credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jose Garcia and Conhita Flores, claiming that
their testimonies were not only contradictory and conflicting in material and
substantial points but also because they are biased and prejudiced, being the cousin
and mother, respectively of the deceased.
Upon review of the records, We find that the appellants contentions are devoid of
merit. As correctly observed by the trial court, his testimony that he accidentally
shot the victim defies belief because the shooting of the victim was preceded by his
threatening words. Besides, had it really been accidental, then the natural tendency signify that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the truth in their
of the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate victim narrations. The discordance in their testimonies on collateral matters heightens
and even to plead and express his regret to the mother of the deceased. But such their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached nor
was not the case. After shooting the victim, the accused still aimed his gun at the rehearsed. 1 Far from being evidence of falsehood they could justifiably be regarded
prostrate body on the floor, which prevented the mother of the victim, Conchita as a demonstration of their good faith. 2
Flores, from going to the side of her son.
We likewise, find no merit in appellant's claim that because these two witnesses are
Furthermore, as pointed out by the Solicitor General in his belief, appellant's claim related to the deceased, their testimonies are necessarily biased and prejudiced.
of accidental shooting is negated by the following facts: (1) a revolver is not prone Relationship to the victim alone does not impair the positive and clear testimony of
to accidental firing if it were simply being handed over to the deceased as appellant witnesses. 3
claims because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked
Appellant claims the absence of treachery in the commission of the offense. There
and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over If
is no merit to the contention. The victim was unarmed at the time he was shot,
it were uncooked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to
seated of a chair at the investigator's table, stooping and smoking, completely
fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been
unaware of the impending attack. The accused was seated on the edge of the table
intentional because pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire,
two feet away from the deceased when the former pulled out his gun from his
cocked or uncooked; (2) even assuming for the sake of argument as correct the
waistline and shot the victim, immediately after the accused had uttered the words,
appellant's pretense of merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the barrel
"I will shoot you now". It is evident that appellant employed a method of attack
or muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant
which tended directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
should know as a police officer; the proper handling of the gun dictates the handing
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery
over of the same, butt first. It is indeed, strange, why in the case at bar the
therefore, qualified the killing to murder. 4
appellant allegedly handed over the gun to the deceased with the barrel or muzzle
of the gun pointed to the latter, instead of handing it over butt first. The crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public
position. 5 Appellant was in civilian clothes at the time he was apprehended by
Moreover, after his arrest the appellant refuse to give any statement to the police.
policemen of Precinct 4. He Identified himself as a policeman of the Manila Police
Such conduct of the appellant strongly argues against his claim of accidental
Department belonging to Precinct 8. Because of his position he was not relieved of
shooting. He could have easily explained the matter to the Police. But he did not.
his service firearm which he had on his' person in spite of the fact that the charge
This is another circumstance that casts doubt upon his claim of accidental shooting.
against him was grave threats. At the investigation room of Precinct 4, appellant
We find, therefore, no error in the trial court's conclusion that the shooting of the had the run of the place, in a manner of speaking, again because of his position. In
deceased was not accidental but intentional. the course of the investigation being conducted by Det. Domingo Gomez, appellant
had the effrontery and arrogance to sit on top of the table of the investigator, at
Appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
the edge thereof, in utter disregard of the respect due the investigator, let alone
witnesses Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores. For example, appellant claims as
the elementary rules of courtesy. From this position, appellant, with his service
inconsistent their testimonies as to whether it was the deceased Norberto Flores
firearm, shot the deceased who was then seated on a chair in front of the
who approached the accused or it was the accused who approached the deceased
investigator's table, stooping and smoking. Instead of upholding the law, appellant
after which the accused struck the latter with his open palm, at the same time
broke it; instead of using his service firearm for good, he used it for evil. Clearly, his
poking a gun on him; whether appellant poked a gun on the two of them, or only on
crime is graver and his responsibility greater. 6
the deceased; whether after the gun-poking incident, the deceased Norberto Flores
and Jose Garcia went to the former's house before proceeding to the-police As to the mitigating circumstances of (a) sufficient provocation; (b) passion and
precinct, or simply went directly to the police precinct; whether Conchita Flores and obfuscation; (c) drunkenness; (d) voluntary surrender; and (e) lack of intent to
the accused talked for about 20 minutes inside the police precinct, or they did not commit so grave a wrong, which the appellant claims to have attended the
talk to each other; and whether or not they shouted at each other inside the police commission of the crime, We find the contention to be without merit.
precinct. The above inconsistencies refer only to minor and collateral matters that
do not impair the credibility of Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores. The discrepancies
17
Since the alleged provocation 7 which caused the obfuscation 8 of the appellant did
not come from the deceased but from the latter's mother, Conchita Flores, the
same may not, be appreciated in favor of appellant. Besides, it may be pointed out
that in the present case, provocation and obfuscation cannot be considered as two
distinct and separate circumstances but should treated as one, having arisen from
the same incident. 9 Voluntary surrender may not also be credited to the appellant
because the fact that he did not try to escape or did not resist arrest after he was
taken into custody by the authorities does not amount to voluntary surrender. 10 A
surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused
to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the accused after
shooting the deceased was immediately disarmed and placed under arrest. There is,
therefore, no voluntary surrender to speak of because the appellant was in point of
fact arrested. 11
As to the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed the
same cannot likewise be considered in favor of appellant. His clear intention to kill
the deceased may be inferred from the fact that he used a deadly weapon and fired
at the deceased almost point blank, thereby hitting him in the abdomen and
causing death.
And as to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it suffices to state that the
medical certification 12 shows that appellant was not intoxicated.
Finally as to the civil liability of the accused, We find that the award of moral
damages in the sum of P8,000.00 is in accordance with law. This has been
sufficiently discussed in the case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913,
Feb. 28, 1969. 13 Likewise, in view of our finding that the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the award of exemplary
damages is also justified
WHEREFORE, finding the appealed judgment in accordance with the law and the
evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
18
TITLE I
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 1
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as the "Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006."It shall cover the different stages involving children at risk
and children in conflict with the law from prevention to rehabilitation and
reintegration.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed
at all times:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child
protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings
before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child
and in a manner which allows the child to participate and to express
himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the program and
policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the State recognizes the right of every child alleged as,
accused of, adjudged, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of
dignity and worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of
promoting his/her reintegration. Whenever appropriate and desirable, the
State shall adopt measures for dealing with such children without resorting
to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards
are fully respected. It shall ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being by providing for, among others, a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders,
 counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training
programs and other alternatives to institutional care.
(e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system shall take
into consideration the cultural and religious perspectives of the Filipino
people, particularly the indigenous peoples and the Muslims, consistent
with the protection of the rights of children belonging to these
communities.
(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative justice in all its laws,
policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of doubt, the interpretation of any
of the provisions of this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs),
shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be
defined as follows:
(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of the person in
custody of the law, furnished by him/her or a bondsman, to guarantee
his/her appearance before any court. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate security, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the circumstances
and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and
feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's
physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social
circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the
parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide
protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and
inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a
parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug
abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as,
accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine
laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a
community setting developed for purposes of intervention and diversion,
as well as rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for
reintegration into his/her family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where there are no family
courts, any regional trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of detention or
imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in conflict with the law in a
public or private custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the
law is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial or
administrative authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of
determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the
law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or
educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the child in conflict with
the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an
offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension or taking
into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law enforcement officers
or private citizens. It includes the time when the child alleged to be in
conflict with the law receives a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6(a) or
Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary

19
investigation or where there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be
in conflict with the law under immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are designed to
address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the
form of an individualized treatment program which may include
counseling, skills training, education, and other activities that will enhance
his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a system dealing with
children at risk and children in conflict with the law, which provides child-
appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for prevention,
diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure their
normal growth and development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in authority or his/her
agent as defined in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, including a
barangay tanod.
(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether punishable under
special laws or the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a bond assumed by a
parent or custodian who shall be responsible for the appearance in court
of the child in conflict with the law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a process of
resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the
offender and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim;
reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the community; and
reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It
also enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the
community in prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which discriminate only against a
child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar
acts. These shall include curfew violations; truancy, parental disobedience
and the like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
managed by accredited local government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or
accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing short-term
residential care for children in conflict with the law who are awaiting court
disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction.
20
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour residential care facility
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
LGUs, licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD, which
provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services for children in conflict
with the law. Rehabilitation services are provided under the guidance of a
trained staff where residents are cared for under a structured therapeutic
environment with the end view of reintegrating them into their families
and communities as socially functioning individuals. Physical mobility of
residents of said centers may be restricted pending court disposition of the
charges against them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is no private
offended party.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every child in conflict with the
law shall have the following rights, including but not limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment or life
imprisonment, without the possibility of release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of his/her liberty;
detention or imprisonment being a disposition of last resort, and which
shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the inherent
dignity of the person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs
of a person of his/her age. In particular, a child deprived of liberty shall be
separated from adult offenders at all times. No child shall be detained
together with adult offenders. He/She shall be conveyed separately to or
from court. He/She shall await hearing of his/her own case in a separate
holding area. A child in conflict with the law shall have the right to
maintain contact with his/her family through correspondence and visits,
save in exceptional circumstances;
(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as
well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his/her
liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial
authority, and to a prompt decision on such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;
 (g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf under the rule on
examination of a child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all stages of the
proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily avails of the
same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the gravity of the
offense where his/her best interest, the rights of the victim and the needs
of society are all taken into consideration by the court, under the principle
of restorative justice;
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the
minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine
whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine being
preferred as the more appropriate penalty;
(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if qualified
under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or
misrepresentation; and
(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and regulations.
The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or the "Riyadh Guidelines",
and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise
be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws.
21
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with
the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a
child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons,
the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt
as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing
of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide
the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in
the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the
child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said
motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.
TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the Department of Justice and
placed under its administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an
undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. It shall
ensure the effective implementation of this Act and coordination among the
following agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
 (g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention
programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower
than director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the following
departments or agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by the
Secretary of Justice and the other to be designated by the Secretary of
Social Welfare and Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act. The
Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall
determine the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper
discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC shall have the following duties
and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to juvenile
justice and welfare;
22
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in line with the
provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national juvenile
intervention program, with the participation of government agencies
concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention
programs and activities by national government agencies and other
activities which may have an important bearing on the success of the
entire national juvenile intervention program. All programs relating to
juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in consultation
with children for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the
administration of justice, as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation of
the children in conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research and
support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice
and welfare, such as but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the local government units and
other government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement of the
administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are involved in
research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the
agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular inspections
in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections
on their own initiative in order to check compliance with the standards
provided herein and to make the necessary recommendations to
appropriate agencies;
 (i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of
the agencies involved in the administration of the juvenile justice and
welfare system and the juvenile intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the implementation of
this Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to implement the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. - All government
agencies enumerated in Section 8 shall, with the assistance of the JJWC and within
one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, draft policies and procedures consistent
with the standards set in the law. These policies and procedures shall be modified
accordingly in consultation with the JJWC upon the completion of the national
juvenile intervention program as provided under Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child Rights Center of the
Commission on Human Rights shall ensure that the status, rights and interests of
children are upheld in accordance with the Constitution and international
instruments on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the monitoring of
government compliance of all treaty obligations, including the timely and regular
submission of reports before the treaty bodies, as well as the implementation and
dissemination of recommendations and conclusions by government agencies as
well as NGOs and civil society.
TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for the primary nurturing and
rearing of children which is critical in delinquency prevention. As far as practicable
and in accordance with the procedures of this Act, a child in conflict with the law
shall be maintained in his/her family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational institutions shall work together with
families, community organizations and agencies in the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and in the rehabilitation and reintegration of child in conflict with the
law. Schools shall provide adequate, necessary and individualized educational
schemes for children manifesting difficult behavior and children in conflict with the
law. In cases where children in conflict with the law are taken into custody or
23
detained in rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the opportunity to
continue learning under an alternative learning system with basic literacy program
or non- formal education accreditation equivalency system.
SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media shall play an active role in
the promotion of child rights, and delinquency prevention by relaying consistent
messages through a balanced approach. Media practitioners shall, therefore, have
the duty to maintain the highest critical and professional standards in reporting and
covering cases of children in conflict with the law. In all publicity concerning
children, the best interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount
concern. Any undue, inappropriate and sensationalized publicity of any case
involving a child in conflict with the law is hereby declared a violation of the child's
rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local Councils for the Protection of
Children. - Local Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be established
in all levels of local government, and where they have already been established,
they shall be strengthened within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.
Membership in the LCPC shall be chosen from among the responsible members of
the community, including a representative from the youth sector, as well as
representatives from government and private agencies concerned with the welfare
of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to coordinate with and assist the
LGU concerned for the adoption of a comprehensive plan on delinquency
prevention, and to oversee its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of barangays, municipalities
and cities shall be allocated for the strengthening and implementation of the
programs of the LCPC: Provided, That the disbursement of the fund shall be made
by the LGU concerned.
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and Development Officer. - All LGUs
shall appoint a duly licensed social worker as its local social welfare and
development officer tasked to assist children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) shall
coordinate with the LCPC in the formulation and implementation of juvenile
intervention and diversion programs in the community.
CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile Intervention Program. - A
Comprehensive juvenile intervention program covering at least a 3-year period shall
be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to the provincial level.
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to implement their respective
juvenile intervention programs in their annual budget.
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all sectors concerned,
particularly the child-focused institutions, NGOs, people's organizations,
educational institutions and government agencies involved in delinquency
prevention to participate in the planning process and implementation of juvenile
intervention programs. Such programs shall be implemented consistent with the
national program formulated and designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the
comprehensive juvenile intervention program shall be reviewed and assessed
annually by the LGUs in coordination with the LCPC. Results of the assessment shall
be submitted by the provincial and city governments to the JJWC not later than
March 30 of every year.
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. -
Community-based programs on juvenile justice and welfare shall be instituted by
the LGUs through the LCPC, school, youth organizations and other concerned
agencies. The LGUs shall provide community-based services which respond to the
special needs, problems, interests and concerns of children and which offer
appropriate counseling and guidance to them and their families. These programs
shall consist of three levels:
(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to promote social
justice and equal opportunity, which tackle perceived root causes of
offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist children at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid unnecessary contact
with the formal justice system and other measures to prevent re-
offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has been
determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in
the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to
the local social welfare and development officer who will determine the
appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having
custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be
24
located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the
following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay
official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC);
a local social welfare and development officer; or when and where appropriate, the
DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare
and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in
the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise ,known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code".
TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From the moment a child is
taken into custody, the law enforcement officer shall:
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that he/she can
understand why he/she is being placed under custody and the offense that
he/she allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and advise the child of
his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect understood by
him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper identification to
the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing
or abusing, or making sexual advances on the child in conflict with the law;
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other
instruments of force or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and only
after all other methods of control have been exhausted and have failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to greater
restraint than is necessary for his/her apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;
 (i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension, turn
over custody of the child to the Social Welfare and Development Office or
other accredited NGOs, and notify the child's apprehension. The social
welfare and development officer shall explain to the child and the child's
parents/guardians the consequences of the child's act with a view towards
counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from the criminal justice system,
and reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and health officer for
a thorough physical and mental examination. The examination results shall
be kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family Court.
Whenever the medical treatment is required, steps shall be immediately
undertaken to provide the same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be
necessary, the child shall be secured in quarters separate from that of the
opposite sex and adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were
used, and if so, the reason for such;
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and the PA0
have been informed of the apprehension and the details thereof;
and
3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a child and
the precise details of the physical and medical examination or the
failure to submit a child to such examination; and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during investigation shall
be witnessed by the child's parents or guardian, social worker, or legal
counsel in attendance who shall affix his/her signature to the said
statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law enforcement officer
of the same gender and shall not be locked up in a detention cell.
SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law enforcement officer shall, in
his/her investigation, determine where the case involving the child in conflict with
the law should be referred.
The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the presence of the
following: (1) child's counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the
Public Attorney's Office; (2) the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, as the
case may be; and (3) the local social welfare and development officer. In the
25
absence of the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social
welfare and development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the
presence of a representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the BCPC.
After the initial investigation, the local social worker conducting the same may do
either of the following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is fifteen (15) years
or below or above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old, who
acted without discernment; and
(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen (18) and
who acted with discernment, proceed to diversion under the following
chapter.
CHAPTER 2
DIVERSION
SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law shall undergo
diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings subject to the conditions
herein provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is not more than
six (6) years imprisonment, the law enforcement officer or Punong
Barangay with the assistance of the local social welfare and development
officer or other members of the LCPC shall conduct mediation, family
conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous
modes of conflict resolution in accordance with the best interest of the
child with a view to accomplishing the objectives of restorative justice and
the formulation of a diversion program. The child and his/her family shall
be present in these activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six
(6) years imprisonment, the local social welfare and development officer
shall meet with the child and his/her parents or guardians for the
development of the appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program, in
coordination with the BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds six (6)
years imprisonment, diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
court.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. - Diversion may be conducted
at the Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or
preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and phases of the proceedings
including judicial level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A child in conflict with law
may undergo conferencing, mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice
system or prior to his entry into said system. A contract of diversion may be entered
into during such conferencing, mediation or conciliation proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the conferencing, mediation or
conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a diversion
program shall be developed when appropriate and desirable as determined under
Section 30. Such admission shall not be used against the child in any subsequent
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings. The diversion program shall be
effective and binding if accepted by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be
in writing and signed by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities. The
local social welfare and development officer shall supervise the implementation of
the diversion program. The diversion proceedings shall be completed within forty-
five (45) days. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until the
completion of the diversion proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days.
The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities that imposed
the diversion program at least once a month for reporting and evaluation of the
effectiveness of the program.
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of diversion, as
certified by the local social welfare and development officer, shall give the offended
party the option to institute the appropriate legal action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the effectivity
of the diversion program, but not exceeding a period of two (2) years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is No Diversion. - If the offense
does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian
does not consent to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling the case shall,
within three (3) days from determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the
case or termination of the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the
records of the case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the
appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of the corresponding
document, certifying to the fact that no agreement has been reached by the
parties, the case shall be filed according to the regular process.
SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When There is No Diversion. - If the
offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Women and Children Protection Desk
of the PNP, or other law enforcement officer handling the case of the child under
custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or
preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the child should remain
26
under custody and correspondingly charged in court. The document transmitting
said records shall display the word "CHILD" in bold letters.
SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In determining whether
diversion is appropriate and desirable, the following factors shall be taken into
consideration:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity, intelligence, etc.);
(d) The influence of the family and environment on the growth of the child;
(e) The reparation of injury to the victim;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;
(g) The safety of the community; and
(h) The best interest of the child.
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In formulating a diversion
program, the individual characteristics and the peculiar circumstances of the child
in conflict with the law shall be used to formulate an individualized treatment.
The following factors shall be considered in formulating a diversion program for the
child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense he/she committed;
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and supervise the child;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the measures to be imposed;
and
(d) The availability of community-based programs for rehabilitation and
reintegration of the child.
SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion program shall include
adequate socio-cultural and psychological responses and services for the child. At
the different stages where diversion may be resorted to, the following diversion
programs may be agreed upon, such as, but not limited to:
(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:
(1) Restitution of property;
(2) Reparation of the damage caused;
(3) Indemnification for consequential damages;
 (4) Written or oral apology;
(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders;
(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the law and the child's
family;
(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and lectures on:
(i) anger management skills;
(ii) problem solving and/or conflict resolution skills;
(iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills which will aid the child in dealing with
situations which can lead to repetition of the offense;
(8) Participation in available community-based programs,
including community service; or
(9) Participation in education, vocation and life skills programs.
(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the prosecutor:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(9)
herein; and
(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of
the crime;
(c) At the level of the appropriate court:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs(a)and (b)
above;
(2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(3) Fine:
(4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or
(5) Institutional care and custody.
CHAPTER 3
PROSECUTION
SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a specially trained
prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of cases
involving a child in conflict with the law. If there is an allegation of torture or ill-
treatment of a child in conflict with the law during arrest or detention, it shall be
the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.
27
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information. - The prosecutor shall
conduct a preliminary investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in
conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion: (b) when the child, his/her
parents or guardian does not agree to diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28;
and (c) when considering the assessment and recommendation of the social
worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in
conflict with the law.
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the prosecutor shall
notify the Public Attorney's Office of such service, as well as the personal
information, and place of detention of the child in conflict with the law.
Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the information against
the child shall be filed before the Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the
start of the preliminary investigation.
CHAPTER 4
COURT PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount of bail, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority shall be considered.
SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is detained, the court shall
order:
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her parents and other
suitable person;
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on bail; or
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention home/youth
rehabilitation center.
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail pending trial or hearing of
his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children detained pending trial may
be released on bail or recognizance as provided for under Sections 34 and 35 under
this Act. In all other cases and whenever possible, detention pending trial may be
replaced by alternative measures, such as close supervision, intensive care or
placement with a family or in an educational setting or home. Institutionalization or
detention of the child pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last resort
and for the shortest possible period of time.
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth detention
homes established by local governments, pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts
Act, in the city or municipality where the child resides.
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in conflict with the law may be suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
committed to the care of the DSWD or a local rehabilitation center recognized by maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
the government in the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be
court. The center or agency concerned shall be responsible for the child's
credited in the services of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual
appearance in court whenever required.
commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it
offense with which the child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of
shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law, and upon
not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of
application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her
the amount, and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Section
shall determine whether or not diversion is appropriate.
4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976",
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen is hereby amended accordingly.
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
CHAPTER 5
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All records and proceedings
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen of the case shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public shall be
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. excluded during the proceedings and the records shall not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the
any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child in conflict with the law
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in
may have his/hes sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted probation under
the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the
The component authorities shall undertake all measures to protect this
recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the court shall
confidentiality of proceedings, including non-disclosure of records to the media,
dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been suspended and against
maintaining a separate police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the
whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of
law and adopting a system of coding to conceal material information which will lead
the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
to the child's identity. Records of a child in conflict with the law shall not be used in
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability subsequent proceedings for cases involving the same offender as an adult, except
resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in when beneficial for the offender and upon his/her written consent.
accordance with law.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held under
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has thereto in response to any inquiry made to him/her for any purpose.
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
TITLE VI
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the

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SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The objective of
rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with the law is to provide
them with interventions, approaches and strategies that will enable them to
improve their social functioning with the end goal of reintegration to their families
and as productive members of their communities.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in any rehabilitation or
training facility without a valid order issued by the court after a hearing for the
purpose. The details of this order shall be immediately entered in a register
exclusively for children in conflict with the law. No child shall be admitted in any
facility where there is no such register.
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation or training facilities, it
shall be mandatory that children shall be separated from adults unless they are
members of the same family. Under no other circumstance shall a child in conflict
with the law be placed in the same confinement as adults.
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in conflict with the law
shall provide a home environment where children in conflict with the law can be
provided with quality counseling and treatment.
SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the law placed in an
institution shall be given special attention as to their personal needs and problems.
They shall be handled by female doctors, correction officers and social workers, and
shall be accommodated separately from male children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of rehabilitation and training
facilities shall handle children in conflict with the law without having undergone
gender sensitivity training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The LGUs shall set aside an
amount to build youth detention homes as mandated by the Family Courts Act.
Youth detention homes may also be established by private and NGOs licensed and
accredited by the DSWD, in consultation with the JJWC.
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - The
expenses for the care and maintenance of a child in conflict with the law under
institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents or those persons liable to
support him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or those persons liable to
support him/her cannot pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality where the
offense was committed shall pay one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof;
the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the
remaining one-third (1/3) shall be borne by the national government. Chartered
cities shall pay two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot
pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid
portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said
obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that the child in conflict with the
law is not a resident of the municipality/city where the offense was committed, the
court, upon its determination, may require the city/municipality where the child in
conflict with the law resides to shoulder the cost.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the immediate
establishment of local detention homes for children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other
Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made
to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict
with the law, whose sentences are suspended may, upon order of the court,
undergo any or a combination of disposition measures best suited to the
rehabilitation and welfare of the child as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in conflict with the
law, he/she shall be released to parents, guardians, relatives or any other
responsible person in the community. Under the supervision and guidance of the
local social welfare and development officer, and in coordination with his/her
parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the law shall participate in community-
based programs, which shall include, but not limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.

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In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the law shall SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in Conflict with the Law. -
endeavor to actively participate in the community-based rehabilitation. Children in conflict with the law whose cases have been dismissed by the proper
court because of good behavior as per recommendation of the DSWD social worker
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final report will be
and/or any accredited NGO youth rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care
forwarded by the local social welfare and development officer to the court for final
services by the local social welfare and development officer for a period of at least
disposition of the case.
six (6) months. The service includes counseling and other community-based services
If the community-based programs are provided as diversion measures under designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-offending and make the
Chapter II, Title V, the programs enumerated above shall be made available to the children productive members of the community.
child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth rehabilitation center shall provide
24-hour group care, treatment and rehabilitation services under the guidance of a
TITLE VII
trained staff where residents are cared for under a structured therapeutic
GENERAL PROVISIONS
environment with the end view of reintegrating them in their families and
communities as socially functioning individuals. A quarterly report shall be CHAPTER 1
submitted by the center to the proper court on the progress of the children in EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
conflict with the law. Based on the progress of the youth in the center, a final report
SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized
will be forwarded to the court for final disposition of the case. The DSWD shall
if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be
establish youth rehabilitation centers in each region of the country.
punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The objectives of community-
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below eighteen (18) years
based programs are as follows:
of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under Presidential
in conflict with the law in case he/she is studying, working or attending Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such
vocational learning institutions; prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her
treatment program.
parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered by their
relationship and to create greater awareness of their mutual and SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. - The provisions of the
reciprocal responsibilities; Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict
notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with
with the law and encourage community support and involvement; and
the law.
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law
CHAPTER 2
by preventing jail detention.
PROHIBITED ACTS
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every LGU shall establish
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In the conduct of the
community-based programs that will focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration
proceedings beginning from the initial contact with the child, the competent
of the child. All programs shall meet the criteria to be established by the JJWC
authorities must refrain from branding or labeling children as young criminals,
which shall take into account the purpose of the program, the need for the consent
juvenile delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in any manner any other
of the child and his/her parents or legal guardians, and the participation of the
derogatory names. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and practices shall be
child-centered agencies whether public or private.
allowed particularly with respect to the child's class or ethnic origin.

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SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any other similar acts shall be
considered prejudicial and detrimental to the psychological, emotional, social,
spiritual, moral and physical health and well-being of the child in conflict with the
law and therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive measures such as
cursing, beating, stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms of punishment
such as shaving the heads, pouring irritating, corrosive or harmful
substances over the body of the child in conflict with the law, or forcing
him/her to walk around the community wearing signs which embarrass,
humiliate, and degrade his/her personality and dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude in any and all
forms under any and all instances.
CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules or Regulations in General. -
Any person who violates any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation
promulgated in accordance thereof shall, upon conviction for each act or omission,
be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not
more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less
than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court, unless a higher penalty is provided for
in the Revised Penal Code or special laws. If the offender is a public officer or
employee, he/she shall, in addition to such fine and/or imprisonment, be held
administratively liable and shall suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification.
CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged to the Office of the President.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of
this Act shall be included in the succeeding General Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for the purpose of setting
up the JJWC shall be taken from the proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office.
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TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. - Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time
of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall
be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such
officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release
the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be
released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is detained pending trial, the
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary
and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention.
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.
SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. -
The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC,
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in
conflict with the law under their custody.
SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and
Court Proceedings. - If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending
diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation
with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in
consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in
conflict the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603
or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law.
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the IRRs for the implementation
of the provisions of this act within ninety (90) days from the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act
is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the Supreme Court, the other sections or
provisions hereof not dfected by such declaration shall remain in force and effect.
SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

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