TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
CASE BRIEF FACTS
Calalas v. Sunga Private Respondent rode a jeepney. As the jeepney
was full, she was given a stool as extension seat.
Then the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the passenger. Just as she was doing so, an
Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned
by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
Isuzu truck.
RTC: rendered judgement AGAINST Salva (truck
owner) and absolved Petitioner.
CA: RTC ruling was reversed and made Petitioner
liable on the ground that the real cause of action
was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict.
ISSUE/S DOCTRINES/DISCUSSIONS/DEFINITIONS
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Petitioner contends that the The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were
ruling in Civil Case No. liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other
3490 that the negligence of hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
Verena was the proximate The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has
cause of the accident as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
negates his liability and contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
that to rule otherwise obligation.
would be to make the
common carrier an insurer Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
of the safety of its because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
passengers. prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
He contends that the his destination.
bumping of the jeepney by
the truck owned by Salva There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
was a caso fortuito. finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
Petitioner further assails collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
the award of moral
damages to Sunga on the The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,
ground that it is not not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
supported by evidence. imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence
at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The fact that Sunga was seated
in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but
also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Mercury Drug Respondent was involved in an accident when he 1. Whether petitioner was In this case, the Court discussed the requisites before a claim under Article 2176 of
Corporation v. fell asleep while driving. It turned out that the cause negligent, and if so, the New Civil Code may arise:
Sebastian Baking of his sleepiness was the drug (Dormicum) whether such negligence
mistakenly given by Petitioner Durg Storess was the proximate cause of To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must
saleslady; the latter misread the prescription given respondents accident; and concur:
by Bakings doctor.
2. Whether the award of (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
Hence, respondent filed with the Regional Trial moral damages, attorneys (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
Court (RTC) a complaint for damages against fees, litigation expenses, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
petitioner. and cost of the suit is and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
justified.
RTC & CA: Both held Petitioner liable. Hence, this Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying
case at bar. patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines.
The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.

PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE

ACCIDENT WAS RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENCE IN DRIVING HIS CAR.
--- WRONG!!!!!!!!

PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED:

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the
result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy,
and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been
careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his
car, resulting in a collision.

As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order.

Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral
damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Spouses Guanio vs. Spouses Luigi and Anna Guanio (petitioner) entered
Makati Shangri-la into contract with Makati Shangri-La Hotel and
Hotel Resort, Inc. (respondent) for the latter to render its
catering services to the formers wedding reception.
Reportedly during the reception, respondents
representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and
Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez did not show up;
there was a delay in the service of the dinner;
certain items in the published menu were
unavailable; respondents waiters were rude and
unapologetic when confronted by the guest about
the delay; wine and liquor brought by the
petitioners in accordance with their open bar
agreement were not served to the guests and thus
the latter were forced to pay for their drinks; and
despite Sales Manager Alvarezs promise that
would be no charge for the extension of the
reception beyond 12:00 midnight, petitioners were
billed PHP 8,000.00 per hour for the three-hour
extension of the event which they paid for.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners sent a letter-
complaint to respondent and received an apologetic
reply from respondents Hotel Executive Assistant
Krister Svenson. Nevertheless, the former filed a
complaint for breach of contract and damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
In its Answer, respondent claimed that the
proximate cause of the delay in the service dinner
1. What is the proximate
cause of the injury incurred
by Petitioners?
2. Whether or not the
doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable to
actions involving breach of
contract.
the accident caused by the negligence of petitioners employee. There is no hard-
and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229
allows the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the
public good.
The Supreme Court held that proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delicts, not in action involving breach of contract. What applies in the instant case is
rather Art. 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable of damages.
The mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance
justify a corresponding right of relief by the injured contracting party.
However, it must be stressed that petitioners failure to inform respondent of the
change in the number of the guests is a clear failure on the part of the former to
discharge such obligation which is stipulated in the Banquet and Meeting Services
Contract between them.
The failure of petitioner to inform respondent about the change in the number of
guests notwithstanding, the Court notes that respondent could have managed the
situation better in view of its vast experience in the business which warrants the safe
presumption that this is not the first time they have encountered booked events
exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is therefore reasonable to expect that certain
measures are placed in case predicaments such as the instant case crops up. That
regardless of these measures, respondent still received complaints from the
petitioner. As such, the Court deems it just to award petitioners only nominal
damages.
3|Page
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to
470 from the guaranteed expected minimum
number of 350380. In bears mentioning in this
regard, that said increase of guests was not relayed
by petitioners to respondents beforehand.

RTC: rendered judgement in favor of the petitioners

and ordered respondent to pay the petitioners actual,
moral and exemplary damages; and attorneys fees.

CA: reversed the trial courts decision, it holding

that the proximate cause of petitioners injury
was the increase in their guests which
respondent did not expect.
Aonuevo v Court Private respondent Villagracia was travelling along Whether or not private
of Appeals, Jerome Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while petitioner
Villagracia Anonuevo, driving his Lancer, was traversing the
opposite lane when the collision occurred. The car
was owned by P&G Inc., employer of petitioners
brother. Villagracia sustained injuries due to the
collision.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
P&G and Anonuevo. Both the RTC and CA ruled in
favor of Respondent.
The present petition was based on Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration with the following
arguments:
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
NO. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
respondent Villagracia is although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding
guilty of contributory injury.
negligence?
Petitioner claims that Respondent violated traffic regulations when he failed to
register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon hence, Article 2185 should be
applied by analogy. However, the Court held that no, there is a historical reason why
there is segregation between motorized and non-motorized vehicle, since motor
vehicle are more capable of inflicting greater injury.
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater
degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of
greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of
the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in
averting an accident.

1. Article 2185 of the Civil Code should apply by
analogy to non-motorized vehicle;
2. Villagracias own fault and negligence serves to
absolve him from any liability for damages
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT:
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia,
this should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his part. While the
legal argument as formulated by Aonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that
Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants

4|Page
TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by
Villagracia himself.

Negligence
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the

personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent. Aonuevo asserts that
Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic
regulations. However, Aonuevo was speeding as hemade the left turn,
and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10)
meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would
have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was
the proximate cause of the accident.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of
an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence
of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory
only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.[61]
As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Aonuevo assole
ly responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why
this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the
same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had
been equipped with safety equipment.

NOTE (from Atty.s discussion):

Effect of Negligence on the plaintiff:

5|Page
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Phoenix At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private
Construction v. respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
IAC home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his
boss.
He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street
when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with
no lights or early warning reflector devices.
The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel,
a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio
tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late.
He suffered some physical injuries and nervous
breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the
accident to respondents own negligence in driving
at high speed without curfew pass and headlights,
and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Whether the collision was
brought about by the way
the truck was parked, or by
respondents own petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he
negligence?
not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
If his negligence is the proximate cause it will bar recovery of
damages)
If only contributory reduction of award of damages
The Court found private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a
valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the
reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection.
Petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private
respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone
off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds
before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient
to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we
draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night
and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights
at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked
in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car
with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
6|Page
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Estacion v Noe Respondent Noe was going home to Dumaguete
Bernardo from Cebu via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he
boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by respondent
Quinquillera and owned by Bandoquillo. He was
seated on the extension seat placed at the center of
the Fiera.
Whether or not
respondents negligence
hold them liable for the
accident?
No, but there was contributory negligence.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Noes act of standing on the rear carrier of
the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. We
find that the trial court and the CA erred when they failed to consider that
respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence.

Then, as an old woman wanted to ride, he offered
his seat, and he just hung on the left rear of the
vehicle. Then, on its journey, the Fiera began to
slow down and stepped to pick up passengers when
a Isuzu cargo truck hit the rear end portion of the
Feira which smashed respondent where his lower
left was amputated.
Respondent filed with the RTC compliant for
damages arising from quasi-delict alleging that the
truck drivers reckless imprudence was the
proximate cause of the incident.
Rakes v. Atlantic M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer
Gulf for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they
were working in the companys yard and they were
transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?);
each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The
cars were pulled by rope from the front and other
workers are pushing the cars from behind. There
were no side guards installed on the sides of the
cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track
where the cars move were also weakened by a
previous typhoon.
It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified
of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and
when it reached the depressed portion of the track,
and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the
ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing
to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection (Atty. asked this)
Still the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the truck driver for
driving it with faulty brakes and at a high speed.
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged
with carelessness:
1. First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
2.
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
the boards, either before or behind it.
3.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence,
barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his
witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On
this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the

7|Page
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued
Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000
pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court
alleging that they specifically ordered their workers
to be walking only before or after the cars and not
on the side of the cars because the cars have no side
guards to protect them in case the rails would slip.
Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the
foreman as it was him who neglected to have the
tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent
for having known of the depression on the track yet
he continued to work.
Ramos v. Court of Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
Appeals remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the
event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails.
**FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the
injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
Assumption of risk is a defense in the law of torts, which bars or reduces a
plaintiff's right to recovery against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can
demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks at
issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which he was participating at the
time of his or her injury.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be
also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or
culpa aquiliana).
Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed
to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already
existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
Whether or not the private
respondents were negligent RES IPSA LOQUITOR DEFINED
and thereby caused the
8|Page
TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured
them that he would find a good anesthesiologist.
But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka
arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra.
Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to
go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The
botched operation was witnessed by Herminda
Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College
of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital,
the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in
intubating Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying Ang hirap ma-intubate
nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang
tiyan.
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that
Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to
exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
good anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late
and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the
doctors and for not cancelling the operation after
the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held
jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.
comatose condition of A procedural or evidentiary rule which means the thing or the transaction
Ramos? speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda
Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete
and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain
damagedres ipsa loquitur!the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell
whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The
Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the captain of the ship in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to
confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. (Sir discussed
this)
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The
hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of
their consultants. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert
significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there
which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. Thus, the
hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
9|Page
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Spouses Africa v. In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank
Caltex truck was hosing gasoline into the underground
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from
the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned
several houses including the house of Spouses
Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a
passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was
being transferred which caused the fire. But there
was no evidence presented to prove this theory and
no other explanation can be had as to the real reason
for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch
owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete
firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
Layugan v. IAC Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages
against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and
a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo
truck which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff,
that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more
expenses as he recuperates from said injuries;
Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because
of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime
income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro
[owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows
his responsibilities as a driver and further contends
that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the
Whether or not Caltex and Yes.
Boquiren are liable to pay
This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the
for damages?
transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having
such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res
ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party
charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the
thing that caused the injury complained of.
Whether or not Isidro is The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that
liable as employer of the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form
Serrano? of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by
Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he
kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this
warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent
Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5,
of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the
selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In
disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the
negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
10 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used
plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which to instruct him to be careful in driving.
occupied a part of the highway and he did not even
put a warning sign. We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is
clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by
check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered
the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers
earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and
Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party
thus the accident could have been avoided. Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the
plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to
private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the
the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant
driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by
[Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution,
the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the
indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their
Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial.
insurance contract which covers the insurer's
liability for damages arising from death, bodily The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
injuries and damage to property. The Insurance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it is generally
company argued that it is only liable for the amount been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be
agreed in the policy and the complaint was availed of, or is overcome, where the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies, or
premature since no claim was made to it. presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of injury
complained of.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA
reversed the decision, stating that it is the
petitioners who were negligent since they did not
exercise caution by putting warning signs that their
truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Picart v Smith In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his Whether or not the Yes.
horse and while they were on a 75 meter long defendant in maneuvering
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his
bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car approaching. his car in the manner above
duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, to take the other side and pass
Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a described was guilty of
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. But he didnt.
distance away because Picart and his horse were on negligence such as gives
Smiths lane. But Picart did not move his horse to rise to a civil obligation to Likewise, it goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to repair the damage done? he is guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the left side of the road.
the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart
But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case, the problem is always to
without slowing down and when he was already so
discover which party is directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts
near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the
horse got scared so it turned its body across the of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got defendant succeeded plaintiffs negligence.
broken. Picart suffered injuries which required Under the circumstance, the law is that the person who has the last fair chance

11 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
several days of medical attention while the horse
eventually died.
Spouses Ong v. Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant,
Metropolitan damages, funeral expenses and attorneys fees for
Water District the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of
the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
TEST OF PRUDENT MAN/TO TEST NEGLIGENCE
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here
be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are
not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger.
EFFECT OF DOCTRINE TO DAMAGES AWARDED/EFFECT OF THE
DOCTRINE?
Modifies comparative negligence by allowing the plaintiff to collect damages from
the defendant, even if the plaintiff contributed to his injury, if the defendant had a
last clear chance to prevent the injury. In other words, could the defendant have
prevented the injury regardless of the plaintiff's negligence? If the answer is yes,
then the plaintiff will still be able to collect regardless of comparative negligence.
Whether or not the MWD No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees
is liable for the death of as all of them were duly certified. MWD has also provided all proper safety measure
Dominador? and precautions.
12 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
dismissed the complaint for it found the action of
the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Allied Banking On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of
Corporation v. P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
Bank of the Phil. International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit
Island and accepted at petitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit
Branch.
The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn
against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva)
with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt,
petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent
through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation
Likewise, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable. It was not established as
to how Dominador was able to go to the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand and after the peril is
or should have been discovered.
DOCTRINE OF THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding
his negligence.
The doctrine of last clear chance cannot apply if the:
a. Negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant (in pari
delicto);
b. Party charged is required to act instantaneously;
c. Injury cannot be avoided despite the application at all times of all the means to
avoid the injury (after the peril is or should have been discovered), at least in all
instances where the previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury at all.
1. What does the Doctrine 1. The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the
of Last Clear Chance plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
enunciate? appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs
2. Does the Doctrine of negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the
Last Clear Chance apply in defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply
this case? except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the doctrine
has been applied, it was defendants failure to exercise such ordinary care, having
13 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
(PCHC). The check was cleared by respondent and
petitioner credited the account of MMGI with
P1,000,000.00. On October 22, 2002, MMGIs
account was closed and all the funds therein were
withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the
debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account.
In response to Silvas complaint, respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration
Committee, asserting that respondent should solely
bear the entire face value of the check due to its
negligence in failing to return the check to
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as
provided in Section 20.1of the Clearing House
Rules and Regulations (CHRR) 2000.
In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent
charged petitioner with gross negligence for
accepting the post- dated check in the first place. It
contended that petitioners admitted negligence was
the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG PARTIES
Elcano V. Hill Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito
(son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of
intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a
civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin
Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by
his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
1. Is the present civil action
for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability,
was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd
and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the
the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the
occurrence of such loss or injury
2. YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the
unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent
who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility
without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by the
PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in
the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing
the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have
then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored,
petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to the payees account.
Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting
the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent
the amount credited to the payees account covering the check.
1. ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Therefore, the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
14 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with
and getting subsistence
from his father, was
already legally married?
him.
2. Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
SCHMITZ Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite (1) Whether the loss of the When a fortuitous event occurs, Article 1174 of the Civil Code absolves any party
TRANSPORT & clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside cargoes was due to a from any and all liability arising therefrom:
BROKERAGE and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel fortuitous event,
CORPORATIO Pipe Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired independent of any act of ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
the services of respondent Transport Venture negligence on the part of declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
N, petitioner, vs.
Incorporation (TVI)s tugboat for the hot rolled petitioner Black Sea and of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
TRANSPORT steel sheets in coil. Coils were unloaded to the TVI, and or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
VENTURE, barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to
INC., the pier. (2) If there was negligence, In order, to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the
INDUSTRIAL whether liability for the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with
INSURANCE Due to strong waves caused by approaching storm, loss may attach to Black his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to
COMPANY, the barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized Sea, petitioner and TVI. foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be
LTD., and washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
BLACK SEA executed a subrogation receipt by Industrial the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free
SHIPPING AND Insurance after the formers filing of formal claim. from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against both
DODWELL now

15 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
INCHCAPE petitioner and respondent herein. The trial court
SHIPPING held that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly
SERVICES, and severally liable for the subrogation.
respondents.
CINCO v Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for
CANONOY recovery of damages on account of a vehicular
accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by
respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by
respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the
driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for
the respondents moved for the suspension of the
civil action pending determination of the criminal
case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion
This Court holds then that petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the
cargoes.
TVIs (Common carrier) failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase
the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation,
but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not
leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a
precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any
power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was
nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging
overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for
tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. x x x [O]ne might ask further, how then
must the liability of the common carrier, on one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A
contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Whether or not there can The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
be an independent civil broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It
action for damage to makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property during the property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done
pendency of the criminal and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it
action? includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal
but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
upholding the decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-
16 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
and ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the
Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
the civil action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance dismissed
the petition; hence, this petition to review on
certiorari.
Nancy GO v CA In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted
with Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding.
After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about
their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet
ready. She advised them to return for the wedding
video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so
but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer
produce the said wedding video because the copy
has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages.
Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The
trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and
awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral
damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said:
that they erased the video tape because as per the
terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed
to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the
wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said
wedding tape because they only made their claim
after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.
delict until after the criminal action is finally terminated.
On Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in
nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in
Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.
Whether or not petitioners ART. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action
acted only as agents of a against the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons
certain Pablo Lim and, as against the principal. In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the
such, should not have been person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except
held liable? when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Petitioners argument, using the above provision, that since the video equipment used
belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between private
respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration.
In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video
coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the object of the
contract was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video
equipment of another person is of no consequence.
xxxxx
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract
whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the latters wedding and deliver to
them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide
private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening
their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for damages.
17 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
AIR FRANCE v. Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group
RAFAEL of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
CARRASCOSO on March 30, 1958.
The defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff
a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila
to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was
to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly
gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
RAFAEL pouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta,
ZULUETA v with their daughter boarded a PANAM plane from
PAN Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was
AMERICAN Wake Island. While on stopover, Mr. Zulueta found
the need to relieve himself and after finding the
xxxx
Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts
holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary
liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered into the contract with
private respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest.[12]
We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article
73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage
in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced
that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private
respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for
the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect
only as between the parties who execute them
Whether or not petitioners Using Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code, a contract to transport passengers is quite
violated the contract of different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because
carriage? of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs testimony about what he did
upon reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct
evidence about said alleged quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would not
have walked back from the beach to the terminal before the plane had resumed its
flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the full view of those who were
18 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
terminals comfort rooms full, he walked down the
beach to do his business. Meanwhile, the flight was
called and Mr. Zuluetas absence was noticed.
Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, You
people almost made me miss your flight. You have
a defective announcing system and I was not
paged.
Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane,
however, the airport manager stopped plaintiff and
asked him to surrender his baggages for inspection.
Refusing to comply with the order, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane. His wife and daughter
were able to proceed but were instructed to leave
their baggages behind.
Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of
damages against respondents for breach of contract.
The defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs
reason for going to the beach was not to relieve
himself but because he had a quarrel with his wife.
LOADMASTER Columbia insured its shipment of electric copper
S CUSTOMS v cathodes with R&B Insurance. The shipment then
GLODEL arrived at Manila. Columbia engaged Glodel for the
BROKERAGE withdrawal/release of the cargoes and their delivery
to Columbias warehouses. In turn, Glodel engaged
the services of Loadmasters to transport the
cargoes. 12 trucks owned by Loadmasters driven
by its employed drivers with its employed truck
helpers were tasked with the delivery. However,
one truck failed to make the delivery. Later, the
truck was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Columbia claimed from its insurance with
R&B.
The insurance company then filed damages against
looking for him.
Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of plaintiff, it appears
that Captain Zentner received information that one of the passengers expressed a
fear of a bomb on board the plane. As a result, he asked for the plaintiffs bags to
verify the bomb. Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The Captain failed to
explain why he seemingly assumed that the alleged apprehension of his information
was justified. Plaintiff himself intimated to them that he was well known to the US
State Department and that the Captain was not even aware of the informants name
or any circumstances which may substantiate the latters fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence for
failure to reboard the plane within the 30 minutes announced before the passengers
debarked therefrom. This may have justified a reduction of the damages had plaintiff
been unwittingly left by the plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or
even, wittingly, if he could not be found before the planes departure. It does not,
and cannot have such justification in the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up
before the plane had taken off and he having been off-loaded intentionally and with
malice.
With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled to damages from respondent
company.
Whether or not YES, it is liable although not as an agent but a tortfeasor. Loadmasters claim that it
Loadmasters is liable with was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia
Glodel? or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct
contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
This Court has previously held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a
contractual relationship. The act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. In connection, Art 2180 provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters
19 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
both Glodel and Loadmasters. The RTC found
Glodel liable. On appeal, the CA held that as agent
of Glodel, Loadmasters was likewise liable with
Glodel, hence the petition to the SC. Loadmaster
argued that it should not be held liable as agent of
Glodel.
HUANG v PHIL. This case involve petitioner who was invited by her
HOTELIERS friend to Dusit Hotel. She and her friend decided to
swim in the Hotels pool where the accident
happened.
They exceeded on staying in the pool area. The 2
went to the shower room adjacent to the swimming
pool to take a shower and dress up. When they
came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming
pool area was already pitch black and there were the
only ones there. The doors were also locked. After
some time, Huang saw a phone behind the
lifeguards counter. As she went inside, the wooden
countertop fell on her head and knocked her down
almost unconscious.
Whether or not Respondent
Hotel is liable for damages
due to injuries incurred by both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of the complaint evidently
petitioner?
prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and Dusit can
whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for
the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence but not
on any breach of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action can be based
shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict (negligence). It is
evident from the complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance was
on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents, through their
management and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it
is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant,
otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed.
As Huangs cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to
be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Second element is Absent.
In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents.
Other than her self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotels swimming pool
area were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a
way out and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her
injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Even her own
20 | P a g e
TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
companion during the night of the accident inside the hotels swimming pool area
was never presented to corroborate her allegations.

Res Ipsa Loquitur & Respondeat Superior:

With regard to Huangs contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.

Res ipsa loquitur - The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of
absence or presence of negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that
respondents staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding
wooden counter top would still not fall on Huangs head had she not lifted the same.
Records showed that she lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually
fell and hit her head.

Doctrine of respondeat superior also finds no application in the absence of

any showing that the employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this
case, the trial court and the CA found no negligence on the part of the employees of
respondents, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence.
Third element: On the issue on whether Huangs debilitating and permanent
injuries were the result of the accident she suffered at the hotels swimming pool
area, the Court holds that there is no cogent reason to depart from the lower courts
findings.
PERSONS LIABLE FOR QUASI-DELICT

21 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
REYES v This case involves a criminal case against Romeo
PEOPLE Dunca, driver of Petitioner Reyes Trucking
Corporation.
Upon arraignment, the offended parties made a
reservation to file a separate civil action against the
accused from the offense charged. The parties also
filed a complaint against petitioner, as employer of
the Dunca, based on quasi-delict.
Later on, private respondents withdrew the
reservation to file separate civil action and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil
aspect in the criminal action but they did not
withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi-
delict against the petitioner as employer.
The trial court rendered Dunca guilty for the crime
and ordered petitioner to pay for damages and
dismissed the civil case under Art. 2176. From this
decision, private respondents moved for amendment
of the dispositive portion as to hold petitioner liable
subsidiarily in the event of the accuseds
insolvency. This was considered.
During the pendency of the case, the accused
jumped bail and fled to a foreign country; the CA
dismissed petitioners appeal. Hence this case.
BASILIO v CA In this case, petitioners driver/employee was
convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in damage to property with double
homicide and double physical injuries.
When the conviction became final, petitioner filed a
Special Appearance and Motion for
DOUBLE RECOVERY
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action under
Article 100 for civil liability and (2) separate action for quasi-delict under Article
2176. Once the choice is made, the injured party cannot avail himself of any other
remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same act.
In this case, the offended parties elected to file separate civil action against
petitioner for quasi-delict. Under the law, the vicarious liability of employee is
founded on at least 2 specific provisions:
(1) Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 allows an action against employer and
necessitate only preponderance of evidence here, the liability is direct
and primary does not require the employee to be insolvent since the
liability is SOLIDARY
(2) Article 103 of the RPC, in which the employer may be held liable when the
employee is convicted of a crime done in performance of his work and is
insolvent.
HELD:
1. Petitioner may not be held subsidiarily liable for damages because of the
foiling of a separate civil action based on 2176 in view of the reservation
to file, the subsequent filing of the civil action, the same was not instituted
with the criminal action.
2. Likewise, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because
the civil action for recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal
action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer.
Requisites of Article 103 of the RPC to warrant subsidiary liability
1. Existence of an employer-employee relationship
2. The employer is engaged in some kind of industry
3. The employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and committed in the
discharge of his duties
4. Said employee is insolvent
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Reconsideration praying that the judgement be set
aside in so far as it affected him and subjected him
to subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the case.
This was denied and a writ of execution of award of
civil indemnity was issued.
Hence, this case.
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the
opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove
the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between him and accused. Nor that, alternatively,
the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as
an employee at the time of the incident. While these
assertions are not moved, we shall give them due
consideration.
CASTILEX v Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda
VASQUEZ motorcycle and Benjamin Abad manager of
Castilex Industrial, registered owner of the Toyota
Hi-Lux Pick-up. They collided with each other
causing severe injuries because the latter
overlapped the formers path. Vasquez died. Sps.
Vasquez, parents of the deceased filed a suit. RTC
ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Abad and
Castilex Industrial to pay damages. CA affirmed.
INSTANCES WHEN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP MAY BE
PROVEN:
1. During the criminal proceeding
2. During the proceeding in the execution of judgement
In both instances, petitioner must be given the opportunity to be heard which is the
essence of due process.
In this case, Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused
because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the
insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for
the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene
in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the
prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the
convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and
executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that
petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the
criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he
chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time.
Whether or not Castilex is NO. Article 2180, par. 4 and 5, applies to employers.
vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the Par. 4, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise and Par. 5, to
negligent operation by employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. Par. 4
Abad of a company-issued covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches
vehicle outside working or on the occasion of their functions, while the Par. 5 encompasses negligent acts of
hours? employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime and thereafter went
to Goldie's Restaurant, which is about seven km away from the place of business. At
the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was
when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. To
the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2am, way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended and his overtime work had already
been completed.
23 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
FILAMER Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the
CHRISTIAN Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as the
INSTITUTE v school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every
CA morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school
president and at the same time he was the schools
jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at
about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their
homes, Masa returned to the school to report and
thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he
could fetch the students early in the morning
Funtecha had a student drivers license so Masa let
him take the drivers seat. While Funtecha was
driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan
which led to his hospitalization for 20 days.
Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent
civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
PHI. RABBIT v Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by
PHIL. AM Phil-American Forwarders] along the national
FORWARDERS highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the
PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus
depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for
damages against Phil-American Forwarders,
Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was
not Pineda's employer.
MERRITT v Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura
GOVT Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was
for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masas
WON the terms
"employers" and "owners
and managers of an
establishment or
enterprise" embrace the
manager of a corporation
owning a truck, the
reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from
which the damage arose?
1. Did the Government, in
enacting the Act 2457,
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought
by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person,
against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot
be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions
of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
drivers position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly
house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school
transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve
Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.
NO.
Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered
from the context of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question,
because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-
American Forwarders.
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
24 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe
injuries rendering him unable to return to work.
The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing
Merritt to file a suit against the Government in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which he is entitled.
After trial, the lower court held that the collision
was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
AMADORA v In April 1972, while the high school students of
CA Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun.
The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died.
Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued
the school for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial
court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as
well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable.
The school appealed as it averred that when the
incident happened, the school year has already
ended. Amadora argued that even though the
semester has already ended, his son was there in
school to complete a school requirement in his
Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last
paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and
trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic
schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the
plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable
for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance?
Whether or not Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, an
academic school, is liable
under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code for the tortuous
act of its students?
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy
to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed.
A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a
special agent; thus the Government is not liable.
Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts
and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL
schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article
2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or
not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who
should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because
historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are
more hands on to their students.
25 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
PALISOC v In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years
BRILLANTES old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio
Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in
the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and
trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing
around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to
slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight
ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows
that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of
Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly
liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of
school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school
year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence
of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of
a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline
of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school,
to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised
the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and
there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable.
Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school
cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of
the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue,
respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants
for the death of the latters minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the
schools laboratory room.
No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
schools board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While
plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant
26 | P a g e
TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and
the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit
against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only
Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton,
Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because
under Article 2180, they are only liable so long as
they [the students] remain in their custody. And
that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of
Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments
are only liable for the tortious acts of their students
if the students are living and boarding with the
teacher or other officials of the school which
Daffon was not.
Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had
been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as
thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child.
This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that
of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during
the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in
their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school. As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article so long as (the students) remain in their custody means
the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde)
on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of
27 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
SALVOSA v IAC Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic
institution. However, it is also an institution of arts
and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-
vocational department offering Communication,
Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well
as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive
Mechanics courses.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit.
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being
an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary
from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a
commerce student of the BCF.
One day, in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B.
Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon
Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for,
and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF.
Whether or not BCF
should be held subsidiarily
liable?
the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-
delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latters having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties.
NO.
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in
the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as
to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the [student]."
Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be
in "recess" thereat. A" recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment
of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and
is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts.
28 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
UNIVERSAL The chemical plant of Universal Aquarius, Inc.
AQUARIUS v (Universal) is adjacent to the depot of Marman
TAN Trading (Marman) owned by Conchita Tan. Q.C.
Human Resources Management Corporation
(Resources) supplied Universal with manpower.
Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general
counsel/national president of Obrero Pilipino -
Universal Aquarius Chapter, sent a Notice of Strike
to Universal.
They picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry
and exit of Universal's chemical plant and
intercepted Universal's delivery trucks. Marman's
depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, suffered a
similar fate. Universal and Tan filed a Complaint
against the strikers and Resources before the RTC
for breach of contract and damages suffered due to
the disruption of their respective business
operations. Universal forged an Agreement (To End
Labor Dispute) with Obrero Pilipino.
Universal and Tan then filed a Notice of Dismissal
as against the strikers. Resources filed a motion to
dismiss but was denied by the RTC. The MR was
likewise denied. On appeal, CA dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action.
MERCURY This case involves the collision of a 16 wheeler
DRUG v DEL truck driven by the driver of petitioner Mercury
ROSARIO drug and a Sedan causing paralysis to the driver.
It appears that at the time of the accident, the driver
has no drivers license.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for
committing gross negligence and reckless
(ito yung di daw liable yung school kasi nung namaril sia nagtatrabaho na sia sa
ROTC unit and acted not as a student)
Whether Tan has cause of Employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious
action against Resources? conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment.
NO. Tan has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the
allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly
springs from the strike effected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that
an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment.
The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is
engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his
own. An employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or
omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably, when Resources'
employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of
their employment.
Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its
employees. Hence, the petition was partially granted.
Whether or not Petitioner Petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario is liable under Articles 2176
should be held liable for and 2180.
the negligence of its
employee? The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee,
or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with
the employee.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury
Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident was respondent
Stephen Huangs recklessness.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29,
2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del
Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses, which the CA affirmed with
modifications.
EQUITABLE On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by
LEASING v Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of
SUYOM Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the
house was destroyed which caused death and injury.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
and multiple physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation
Office, it was known that the registered owner of
the tractor was Equitable Leasing
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim.
On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul
Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable
Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for
damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already
been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the time
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in
the supervision of the performance of his duties.
Requisites:
In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.
With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for their breach.
To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.
Whether or not the The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the
petitioner was liable for intention of the parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the
damages based on quasi subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the
delict for the negligent vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.
acts?
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of
Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by
Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident. The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not
escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the
negligence of the driver.
30 | P a g e
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
under Atty. Nelson Logronio
By: Dennie Vieve Idea & Robert V. Bulayungan, Jr.
(New Era University College of Law)
of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an
employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
FILCAR v Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The
ESPINAS other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but
Espinas was able to get its plate number.
After verifying with the Land Transportation
Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other
car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar. Espinas
filed a complaint for damages against the latter.
Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of
the car that hit and bumped Espinas car, the car
was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty.
Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar
further stated that when the incident happened, the
car was being driven by Atty. Flors personal
driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed
that the incident was not due to its fault or
negligence since Floresca was not its employee but
that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor.
Whether Filcar, as
registered owner of the
motor vehicle which
figured in an accident, may
be held liable for the
damages caused to
Espinas?
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and
is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil
Code
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a
person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not
by another. The law, however, provides for exceptions that an employer is made
vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code states:
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer
who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made
primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
Filcar is not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing
on the blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his
alleged driver, Floresca.
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