The Role of the United Nations in Rakhine State: Recommendations for Strategy and Next Steps Richard Horsey, 6 Apri! 2017, revised 8 May 1 Introduction Ml. AChallenging Environment for the United Nations. ll, A Changing Context in Rakhine State IV. AUnited Nations Strategy for Rakhine State... The Context for UN Action. Toking Forward the Framework for UN Support to Rakhine State Dealing With Dilemmas. Coordination Structures Enhancing United Nations Capacity V. Working More Effectively with Government and Society - Fundamental challenges Working in partnership with the Union Government. Greater engagement with the Rokhine State Government. Recommendations to the United Nations for Strategy and Next Steps on Rakhine State. Annex: List of Consultations — oD 2B 16 7 181 Introduction 1 2 This report provides analysis and recommendations of the UN's role and strategy in addressing the complex humanitarian and development situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The terms of reference gave the following background: The situation in Rakhine State is the result of a complex web of protracted ethnic and Communal crises compounded by serious challenges including high levels of poverty, underdevelopment, lack of investment and high incidence of natural disasters affecting all the communities. The situation is critical for more than one million Muslims, most of whom call themselves ‘Rohingya’, whose citizenship status remains unresolved and who continue to bbe subject to discriminatory policies and practices. This situation was heightened in 2022, after the violent communal nots between members of Muslim and Rakhine communities erupted in various parts of the state and in 2016, with the security operation following the attacks against the Border Guard Police (BGP) in the north of Rakhine. To respond to the multi-faceted situation in Rakhine State, in 2015 the UN RC/HC established the position of the UN Senior Advisor to Rakhine in the RCO sub-office Sittwe to coordinate the work of the UN and promote a comprehensive approach of UN to respond to the situation in Rakhine State, In November 2015, the UNCT adopted the Framework for UN Support to Rakhine State with the objective to create favourable conditions for political solutions by facilitating inclusive human development, and meeting essential humanitarian needs in an environment of progressive respect for human rights and dignity, In this contest, the UN established 2 network of partnerships with the Rakhine State Government, religious and social leaders, civil society and local NGOs which created opportunities for UN support in Rakhine. The UN also played an important role in promoting. coordinated international assistance to Rakhine State with broad support from diplomatic missions, development partners and INGOs. Since taking office in 2016, the NLD has attempted to address the situation in Rakhine with various initiatives including the establishment of the Central Committee for Implementation of Peace, Stability, and Development in Rakhine State; the formation of the Advisory Commission for Rakhine State chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan; the resumption of the citizen verification programme and the invitation to the UN and development partners to assist the Rakhine State Government in developing its five year socio-economic development plan While these initiatives show that Rakhine State isa priority for the government, none have yet resulted in any serious change on the ground. The attacks on the security forces in Maungdaw District on 9 October 2016 truncated all these initiatives and the situation degenerated, {In this context, itis important to reflect on what practical steps the UN can take concerning its engagement with the Government and the people of Rakhine State, In light of this background, the Scope of Work was as follows Based on the above, external assistance is requested to do some research and analysis on the situation and the role of the UN in Rakhine State during ths critical phase and to recommend a strategy with concrete steps for the RC/HC to coordinate the UN humanitarian and development work of the UN and to address more effectively the needs and challenges of all the communities in Rakhine, in ine with the Framework for UN Support to Rakhine StateThe recommendations will be consulted with all parties in Rakhine State to ensure that the LUN can work in coordination with the Government and the people of Rakhine, as well as ‘other national and international humanitarian and development partners, When preparing the recommendation for the UN strategy and next steps, the consultant may bbe guided by (but not limited to) the following questions © Recommended next steps for the UN RC/HC to move forward on the Framework for UN Support to Rakhine State: political solutions, peacebuilding and social harmony; hhuman rights and rule of law; development for all communities; and continued humanitarian action for those in need + What particular measures can the UN take to engage with Government in promoting political solutions toward peace and social harmony in Rakhine State? ‘© What practical steps can the UN take to enhance synergies with national and international humanitarian and development partners in Rakhine State to advance ‘the UN Framework on Rakhine? ‘© What practical steps can be taken to help bring about a situation where the Government (both at Union and State levels) assumes greater leadership and accountability in planning for and responding to the needs of all communities in Rakhine State, with attention to the needs of the most vulnerable populations and displaced people? = What are the main issues to consider? (e.g. future of the IDP camps; durable solutions for IDPs; isolated communities; equitable access ofall communities to essential services irrespective of ethnicity, religion and citizenship status; removal of restrictions on freedom of movement) = How to get the Government to fund a greater percentage of the costs related to Its policies of keeping people in camps, restricting movements ete.? (bearing in ‘mind possible further reductions in international funding in the future) + What are the options for the Government and humanitarian actors, and what are the associated risks and mitigation measures? + What are the incentives for the civilian and military sides of the Government? + What are the key steps that need to be taken and how to move forward on the options? = What are the operational implications for the UN and its partners? ‘The consultant will be expected to provide feedback to the UNCT and HCT on findings and recommendations, 3. This report is based on a desktop review of background documentation, as well as extensive consultation with a broad range of relevant stakeholders, including, © In Sittwe, the Chief Minister and his Cabinet, the Development Affairs Minister, the Security and Border Affairs Minister, the State Secretary and the State police and immigration chiefs; members of the Rakhine State Hluttaw from the Arakan National Party and the Union Solidarity and Development Party; representatives of UN agencies and entities (including RCO office); INGOs; as well as CBOs and community leaders. © In Naypyitaw, the Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement; and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, immigration and Population.* In Yangon, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and members of her : office; heads of UN agencies and entities; heads of INGOs; embassy and donor representatives; and other individuals and organizations with expertise on the situation in Rakhine State F M.A Challenging Environment for the United Nations 4, Myanmar represents a particularly challenging context for the UN, and those challenges are especially clear in Rakhine State. After decades of authoritarianism and armed conflict, the country is going through a major process of transition. Following 2015 elections that were seen as broadly credible and reflecting the will of the electorate, Myanmar is now governed by an administration de-facto led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who has a huge electoral mandate and very high levels of domestic and international support and legitimacy. The donor assistance envelope has rapidly expanded, and the country’s relations with the international community ~ including, aid modalities ~ are normalizing 5. At the same time, the country continues to face enormous challenges. The 2008 constitution established not a fully democratic government, but a diarchy where the military retains a significant political role, autonomous control of the security apparatus, and a major influence over the bureaucracy. Myanmar’s legacy of authoritarianism and civil war means that its transition continues to be punctuated by episodes of violence and serious armed conflict as well as ongoing state-sanctioned discrimination against minority populations, in particular some Muslim communities, These issues engage fundamental human rights and IML principles and responsibilities of the UN under its Charter, and require a carefully-calibrated strategy of engagement and advocacy that is far more challenging than a typical development context with a strong and legitimate government. 6. InRakhine State, the symptoms of extreme poverty and underdevelopment are linked to, and inseparable from, underlying drivers of the crisis: * a toxic mixture of historical _centre-periphery tensions and serious intercommunal/inter-religious conflict with minority Muslim communities that erupt periodically into violence; and * serious anti-Muslim discrimination, both societal as well as by government authorities through abusive or discriminatory regulations or bureaucratic procedures and practices. 7. The situation in Rakhine State is thus a protracted crisis of politics and governance, affecting the whole state and all of the communities living there. The core challenge in meeting the needs of all communities in the state is therefore not — as it has often been presented by national as well as international stakeholders ~ one of balancing, coordinating and integrating humanitarian and development interventions. Rather, it is the challenge of building and sustaining peace and inclusive governance. This is a multidimensional challenge that must integrate peacebuilding, development, human rights, humanitarian and protection initiatives. It is an intrinsically political endeavour, saenenmmaiati acacia i aac10. 11 This is an environment that, in Myanmar, the UN is not well-positioned to navigate Unlike many such difficult contexts around the world, there is no UN peacekeeping or political mission that would be headed by an in-country SRSG with the mandate and diplomatic clout to bring coherence across the political and technical dimensions of a UN response, in collaboration with an RC/HC functioning as deputy SRSG. Previously, this situation was mitigated to a certain extent through the appointment in New York of a Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (SASG) for Myanmar, most recently filled by Vijay Nambiar, who provided a centre of gravity for Myanmar policy at headquarters (even if in practice it never led to the required degree of coherence and coordination between political, peace and development tracks). However, with the end of successive annual General Assembly resolutions on Myanmar that provided the mandate for the Special Adviser role, the position lapsed at the end of 2016. In the absence of any clear plan for the transition to a post-Nambiar context - complicated, no doubt, by the contemporaneous transition to a new Secretary-General ~ there is currently no clear centre of headquarters leadership on Myanmar, or political-level interface with the government, apart from the designation of ASG Jenéa as the senior focal point within the Department of Political Affairs. (As one concrete example of this, there is little coherence evident between the statements of senior UN figures, such as Nambiar’s final statement, the Special Rapporteur’s report and the statements of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; although these represent different mandates that will inevitably produce different perspectives, they should at a minimum be coordinated rather than sending mixed messages.) All of this puts the RC/HC in an impossible position. As the most senior United Nations official in-country, the expectation of the UN system and donors is that the RC/HC will assume the political responsibilities of a leadership role on Rakhine State and other crises, without the mandate, institutional authority or policy and political support to do 50, or any government acceptance of such a broader role. There is thus an inherent contradiction between the explicit development coordination mandate of the RC and the political nature of the responsibilities placed upon the position in Myanmar, and in particular as regards Rakhine State. There is a widely-held perception that this has led to trade-offs between advocacy and access that have in practice de-prioritised human rights and humanitarian action, which are seen as complicating and undermining relations with government. (This perception is disputed by the RCO, Which points to its Human Rights Up Front Strategy, common human rights advocacy messaging under the Global UN “Roadmap” and consistent RC/HC advocacy with the government and military, including regular notes verbale and letters on human rights and humanitarian concerns.) It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, UN headquarters identifies ways to improve overall coherence in the UN system’s approach, beyond the current Permanent Monitoring Group on Myanmar (an Under-Secretary-General-level group that looks at operationalization of the Executive Committee's policies on Myanmar). Careful consideration should be given to the possibility of the Secretary-General appointing a representative or special envoy to bring the necessary policy coherence and coordination to UN System-wide efforts on Rakhine and Myanmar as a whole, and to interface with the government at the political level.#9 Contest in Rakhine Stote * Fresalation in Rathin state ha ted considerably over the past Hon, This 7 etic ane of ower one Ang Sn ued adnan Ths narancantiy altered the politcal dynamics in Rakhine State, where the in most conti Arakan National Party (ANP) won a landslide victory net attwencies, but was prevented from forming the Rakhine State Govern! a innen the President exercised his constitutional prerogative to appoint an th Foren fom the minonty bioc as Chief Minister, who then formed the conmament This has set the ANP and popular Rakhine Buddhist sentiment on a ceuitin COurse with the Rakhine State Government and the Union Government Annu Dated by specie policy decisions in recent months, particularly on the Kofi ganar led Advisory Commission and on citizenship verification, These. new games impact on the envionment in which the UN works and need to be understood icond the 9 October 2016 attacks on Border Guard Police bases, together with ene 2ecunty response and accompanying abuses, Ths has redefined the secarity tock ees Well as local and national views of the conflict, and thrust Myanmar SEEK nto the international spotight This culminated in OMCHR's 3 Febroaty 2017 [flash Report that found the ‘very ikely commission of cranes againot hononity BY Government security forces, andthe adoption by the Humen fights Covell on 24 March Of a resolution inter alia establishing an internations! fact finding, OF nagar Bovernment and many in society, these attacks also raised the spectre of Possible violent Islamist extremism in Myanmar. These developments hace Senificantly impacted the scope of the UN response locally, and retramed ie strategic imperatives, 15, Detaled analysis on how perceptions and realities on the ground have shifted, and how international assistance actors might consider navigating this new environment 3t the local level, have been the subject of detailed research by CDA Myanmar, set out in their 6 April 2017 report, Novigating change: Crisis and crossroads in the Rakhine state context, which is worthy of careful consideration 14. Mier 9 October it has become even clearer than before that Rakhine State is broadly 15. divided into three separate areas that are on very different ~ and eves divergent ~ poliical-economy trajectories: the southern, central and northern parts of the state, At the same time, the 9 October attacks and their aftermath have served as a wake. up call for government, security forces and Rakhine society that may provide an rmortunity that did not exist earlier to address some of the fundamentals of the crisis in the state. These events have focussed attention on the fact that the status quo in Rakhine State will perpetuate a cycle of violence, displacement and internationalcondemnation that are fundamentally incompatible with the political and economic future that the government and the peoples of Rakhine State aspire to. 16. Similarly, while the post-9 October environment has certainly complicated the task of the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission, established in August 2016 with a one year mandate to look at the root causes of the crisis, it may also have provided it with e additional political momentum. The Advisory Commission released its interim report and recommendations - likely to be the main substance of its work - on 16 March. Unlike the Human Rights Council resolution (which Myanmar dissociated itself from) and fact-finding mission (which it has indicated it is unlikely to cooperate with), the government immediately and enthusiastically embraced the report and recommendations of the Advisory Commission. While this may have been driven partly by political expediency in the context of the unfolding Human Rights Council debate, it also appears to reflect genuine political will on the part of the government to cooperate with the Advisory Commission and use its recommendations to help drive substantive policy changes. The government's stated commitment to implementing the recommendations therefore provides an important framework for action on fundamental issues affecting Rakhine State. Thus, while the recommendations cannot be a substitute for a UN strategy on Rakhine, they do provide an important reference point for the development of such a strategy. IV. A United Nations Strategy for Rakhine State The Context for UN Action 17. In such a context, the challenges for the UN in defining and implementing a UN System-wide Rakhine strategy should not be underestimated. There are several overarching considerations: « The inherent difficulty of the task: Rakhine State is an enormously difficult crisis to address, where there are no obvious solutions to what is a virtually intractable set of interlocking issues. } The dynamic nature of the context in Rakhine State, which any strategy must be { flexible and resilient enough to adapt to (and recognizing that major events such as the 9 October attacks may require the adjustment of any strategy). Examples of recent disruptive events include the 2014 census which led to protests and violence in Rakhine State, attacks on UN and INGO premises in Sittwe, and the non-enumeration of nearly all Rohingya; serious floods in 2015; and the 2015 elections and extended period of power transfer, which significantly shifted the political dynamics in Rakhine State. © The post-9 October realities, together with a new Secretary-General who is placing emphasis on holistic responses — mutually-reinforcing linkages between the peace and security, sustainable development and human rights pillars of the UN system - and the Human Rights Up Front initiative, implies the need for a coherent UN strategy on Rakhine that gives greater emphasis and priority than in the past tohuman rights and humanitarian action, and integrates these with sustainable development initiatives * As noted in section 1! above, there are significant structural impediments to the elaboration and implementation of such a coherent strategy in the absence of the UN political architecture and Neadquarters leadership required * The development of a UN System-wide strategy, and its successful implementation, will depend critically on relations with both Union and Rakhine State governments and alignment, where necessary and appropriate, with their Policies and approaches. However, there is as yet no clear overarching Government strategy on Rakhine, and no clear government policy focal-point for Rakhine policy. This presents a major challenge for the UN but it also makes it all the more important that the UN have a clear strategy for its ongoing work in Rakhine State 18. Taken together, the significantly altered parameters for the UN and Myanmar - a new UN leadership at headquarters, new realities on the ground in Rakhine State, unprecedented international concern over allegations of crimes against humanity, a strong and more intrusive Human Rights Council resolution, the end of SASG Nambiar’s mandate, and a one-year-old NLO government that is still defining its Fesponse to the Rakhine crisis with advice from the Kofi Annan Advisory Commission = mean that there is an urgent need to reset the relationship between the United Nations and Myanmar. This can only happen through discussions at the highest political level, which may not take place for some time. 19. Notwithstanding this, itis important that the UN at the country-level - who see most Clearly the different dimensions of the situation and what would be required to address them ~ takes the initiative at this moment to define a credible UN System-de strategy on Rakhine State. Consideration should be given to the kind of support that would be required from UN headquarters to successfully implement it. 20. Since the first draft of this report was finalized, the RCO has provided the additional information that the UN System in Myanmar has for the last several years been pursuing a “simple implicit 4-pronged high-level strategy” on Rakhine State and which it views as remaining valid today: + Press/urge the government (both civilian and military parts) to resolve the political and human rights crises in Rakhine State (including statelessness, restrictions on freedom of ‘movement, discriminatory policies and practices, brutality by security forces, corruption, and so on); + Forge relationships of greater trust and credibility between the UN and government, with the Rakhine and other key stakeholders in Rakhine State; + Tothe extent possible, in the absence of political solutions, try to ripen the situation on. the ground in Rakhine State and within the international community for solutions; = Mitigate negative impact of UN engagement in Rakhine State on the UN's overall work and image nationallyToking Forward the Framework for UN Support to Rakhin 21. The current elaboration of UN thinking on its operations is the Framework for UN Support to Rakhine State. This document was initially developed in 2014, completed in January 2015, updated in April 2016 and has in recent weeks been going through a further updating process. In the absence of an UNDAF for Myanmar, the Framework falls under the “Strategy for Repositioning the UN in Myanmar (2015-2017)"; however, given the current preparation of an UNDAF, it will be important to ensure that any strategy on Rakhine State is consistent with the UNDAF and, to the extent possible, reflected in that document. The Rakhine Framework states that it brings together the four main areas of UN work in Myanmar ~ peacebuilding, human rights, development and humanitarian ~ “into a Rakhine State level response by the UN System”. It consists of two sections: the first setting out the context; and the second elaborating “broad elements of a strategy”, including subsections on political solutions/peacebuilding, human rights, humanitarian assistance, human development, and information/advocacy/strategic communications. 22, While the Framework has undoubtedly improved somewhat through successive rounds of recent updating, and it provides a good overview of the context in Rakhine State, the document continues to have significant weaknesses in terms of both content and process. On content: + It does not convey any compelling strategy or the “broad elements of a strategy” that the document promises, consisting mostly of a series of desiderata, neither concrete nor prioritized, along with brief descriptions of some existing interventions. It fails to set out clearly what the UN wants to achieve and how it can realistically do so; how the different pillars can be developed in a way that 1s integrated and mutually-reinforcing; and how the funding environment might constrain such efforts. Nor does it give a frank assessment of how far the totality of current efforts falls short of this, and the reasons why. ‘© There is no recognition of the fact that assistance to Rakhine State continues to be deeply politicized, and the UN instrumentalized; nor of the risks of the UN substituting for government responsibilities and how this can be mitigated Without recognition of these realities, it is impossible to develop a credible or effective strategy. ‘© There is no real discussion of the serious dilemmas that the UN is presented with = for example, the need to provide safe and dignified living conditions to IDPs versus the risks of complicity in ghettoization ~ no guidance on how these should be approached, and no red lines established. (For more detailed discussion of these dilemmas, see paragraph 31ff, below.) ‘* The UN does not work in isolation, but the Framework fails to reflect this reality. The document makes virtually no mention of other key actors, in particular INGOs, who are the main implementing partners for the UN. It also fails to take account of the presence of other important actors such as the World Bank and the private sector.23, The process for updating the Framework was misguided, being neither consultative ‘nor inclusive. For those who were consulted, including UN Agency heads, turnaround times were unfeasibly short. Crucially, there was almost no involvement of UN field staff in Sittwe, who were mostly unaware that an updated strategy was being finalized. INGOs were not consulted. 24. This updating process not only failed to generate the necessary buy-in, it also undermined the quality and credibility of the document. The UN has highly capable and experienced field staff in Rakhine State, who grapple with the realities of the crisis. ‘on a daily basis and who could have made valuable substantive contributions that ‘would have made the Framework less generic and more reflective of the situation on the ground. The same is true of INGOs, whose operational reach and depth gives them Unique insights. Even if this were not the case, failing to consult them is a strategic error: as one senior INGO staff member put it, “INGOs cannot be expected to implement a UN strategy that has been developed without them’, 25. This lack of outreach and consultation is not an issue that is specific to the Framework process, but rather reflects a more general phenomenon. UN field staff in Sittwe do not feel sufficiently consulted or empowered by the UN at the country level; conversely, the UN at the country level feels that field staff do not always provide the concise options papers required to make informed decisions on the issues of concern that they raise, This disconnect should not be surprising ~ such capital-provincial divides are commonly seen in other contexts around the world ~ but the gravity of the challenges in Rakhine State, and the unusually senior and experienced team that the UN has assembled on the ground there, mean that improving the interactions should not be very difficult, and should be a priority. (Some thoughts about how to do this are provided in paragraphs 36-37 below.) 26, Without a clear strategy or any buy-in, itis highly unlikely that the Framework, as it stands, will have any real impact on UN action in Rakhine State. Yet, it can be a useful starting point for a series of consultations aimed at developing and building consensus for a Rakhine State strategy. Itis therefore recommended that the Framework be kept asa draft document, and that it be utilized as the starting point of a strategy-building process, rather than the end point of one. That strategy-building process would not bbe aimed at updating or improving the draft Framework ~ which would likely lead to a weak drafted-by-committee output. Rather, it would aim to stimulate and focus reflection on. ‘© What the UN system should be aiming to achieve in Rakhine State, in terms of collective outcomes: detailed, coherent, system-wide objectives rather than a series of sectoral or agency-by-agency plans; The key obstacles, challenges and dilemmas that the UN system and its partners will face in doing so, and how these might be overcome; '* Building a consensus around these, and on a way forward, 27. Such a process can be the foundation for a strategy that is both credible and has broad buy-in. It is recommended to initiate this with a one- or two-day workshop, preferably 102 2 oS held in Sittwe, that would need to be well prepared ~ including, potentially, with short input papers on different strategic issues ~ and include HCT and Rakhine Coordination Group participation The interim recommendations of the Kofi Annan Advisory Commission should also be a key reference point. This workshop can be seen as a preparatory step, to generate ideas and build consensus, the results of which can then be used as a basis for consultations and discussions with government (at state and/or Union level), as appropriate .Rakhine State represents a defining example of the need for a humanitarian- development-peacebuilding nexus. It is therefore a test of the UN system's ability to work in close cooperation with other relevant actors (including NGOs, the World Bank and donors), and with the government at both Union and Rakhine State levels, to define collective outcomes and integrated responses, through multi-year joint planning. It is therefore an opportunity to demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of the humanitarian-development-peacebutlding nexus concept at the heart of the joint UN-World Bank commitment to a “New Way of Working” . The importance of working in close cooperation with these other partners is currently not reflected in the Framework (or “high-level strategy”), nor in the current coordination mechanisms at the Yangon level. There are many potential avenues of cooperation with the World Bank, for example, that could be explored, including: * Consideration of how the Myanmar National Community Driven Development Project could be expanded in Rakhine State (something the government is urging) in a way that would be sensitive to the realities of Rakhine State, could benefit all communities, and possibly address some of the particular humanitarian- development-peacebuilding challenges such as the livelihoods of Muslim communities in Zone 1 who have lost access to food support following resettlement; « Joint needs assessments (also together with government) and economic assessments that can highlight the cost to Rakhine State of discriminatory policies; * How the World Bank’s large health and education projects (and potentially other large projects, such as electrification and others) could contribute to addressing humanitarian-development-peacebuilding challenges. |. In terms of working more closely with the private sector, there are three particular areas that may be worth exploring: © Exploring collaboration and synergies with the large ODA providers to Myanmar, much of which supports infrastructure, tendered to the private sector. By far the largest providers of ODA are the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and JICA. Much of this support bypasses Rakhine State, but it is worth exploring if such projects can be implemented in ways that are conflict-sensitive, without excessive risk, and ensuring that they are to the benefit of all communities. ¢ The largest investments in Rakhine State in the coming years will be from the private sector. These include the Kyaukpyu port and special economic zone (a 11Majority Chinese investment), and significant investments in offshore hydrocarbon exploration and production by multinatianal oil and gas Companies The latter offer considerable opportunities for (particularly southern) Raking State, as they are currently in the process af shifting from the early exploration phase with limited investment (mostly, offshore seismic work conducted hy vessels operating out of, and re-supplied fram, nan Myanmar ports), to the test drilling phase, with much larger investment. For example, the development of offshore supply bases in Rakhine State offers possibilities far employment and subcontracting work. The apening in 2017 of the Indian developed port in Sittwe offers similar opportunities There would be value in ensuring that benefits, including jobs, accrue as much as possible to peaple fram Kakhine “ate, and to the extent possible, fram all communities * As multinational companies increase their footprints in Rakhine State, they will invest larger amounts in social investment programs Collaboration with these companies on ways to ensure that these investments are a5 beneficial and inclusive as possible, and exploring synergies with UN system programming, is an avenue worth exploring. Dealing With Dilemmas 31. In formulating its Rakhine strategy, the UN will have to tackle head-on a number of 3 s moral dilemmas, including the humanitarian dilemma of responding to acute needs without the power to effectively influence the political causes of those needs; and the development dilemma of supporting longer-term government solutions that may be intended to entrench segregation and discrimination, in violation of fundamental human rights standards. . In this regard, three specific dilemmas stand out © Upgrading the camps. After nearly five years, the IOP camps represent an unacceptable living environment in terms of health, welfare and dignity. Yet upgrading the camps, in addition to presenting considerable technical challenges relating to space, land ownership and so on, and financial ones (several tens of millions of dollars per year is currently being spent on substandard camps), could be interpreted as supporting 4 government segregation or internment agenda. «The future of the camps, The government is hinting that, while leaving open the rhetorical possibility of return (or resettlement), local integration will be the de- facto solution for most IDPs in camps around Sittwe. According to the Rakhine State Government, “village plans” are already being drawn up for some of these camps. However, support to such a solution ~ in terms of infrastructure, services and alternative livelihoods, say ~ while restrictions on freedom of movement remain in place, could be interpreted as supporting 4 government policy of ghettoization or apartheid. © Responding in northern Rakhine. There has been significant international assistance to this area for 25 years, since the repatriation process following the last major exodus from Rakhine State to Bangladesh in 1992. Despite a significant 2 iil\eternational operator for rentegraton of returnees and stabizaton of host communities, with large vestments, ng condtions and basic humantaron \ndicators such 25 global acute mairatrtton nave hardy mproved, and have some cases decined. The pokcy and governance enwronment ~nctding enous ‘iscrmination, restrctons on freedom of movement, format taxabon and extortion, an other abuses the key reason forts. poues umwe challenges liven that £5 very ferent from the situation anpurere ae the country. Ths ‘ses senous questons about the medum- and long-term efficacy of amy ‘response tothe serious needs that hove aries the mate of he recent 25s ~ and posse comowety wth persecution ~ unless there are fundamenta changes 1 the governance and human rghts Stuation, a5 wel 25 humantarian acess, ‘which the UN continves to advocate for 33.For a of these lemmas, and many others facing the assistance communty, there te no simple answers of movaly lez” solvtons, uncomfortable and wmpertect ‘compromises wil ikly be required This why 30 critical to have frank, formed 2nd incisive detberatons on these issues (mcuding not pst UN and partners. but {350 IDPs themselves, both to determine the optima (a least problemat) sution, {2nd to document the process of deiberation and decision. Such documentations ta tm order to respond t future cams that sks were not adequate) considered of that responses were moray nselensble Res ines sould be Setnes for exam. OP camps are re gazetted 25 vilages. what suppor should the international comemuricy be wiling to prowde the commun cortinues tobe dened eesom of movement? ‘what support to the Socio-Economic Development Plan if approoriate # Msi ‘communities are ce facio excluded rom mast of te benefits wows Sang? What lets Should there be on suporing future segregates Mextneare? 34. without such deliberations, there is another sk: that he defaut response wil bean nertical continuation ofthe status quo, and that eiffiut decisions wil be put off = oF even justified wath relerence to vague nations af humantanan prince. & important that superficial reference to ‘principles’ does not become an excuse for ‘action or for avoiding the aficit decisions that may have to be taken. A wholly unacceptable status quo inthe IOP camps has occasional been justified onthe Bases ofa princiled reluctance to suppor segregation, but without a sufficienty ngorous ‘examination ofthe options to just such a conclasion asthe Best alternative Coordination Stsctures 35. Coordination of international eHors to adeeess the situation ia Rakhine State Is somewhat agmeated, which compicates the development and implementation ofa taherent strategic response Thee are a numberof different structures ad intatves ‘that discuss Rakhine State, which are pataly eupicatve, including ‘+ Heads of Mision (HOM) Group. This sa diplomatic initiative on Rathine State, led by the Oanish Ambassador. grew out of ambassador breakfast meetings hatred by the RC/HC in 2014-15 and was established by the RC/HC and Danish “Ambassador. brings together key embassies (Denmark, US, UX, EU, Turkey) with key UN agency heads (RC/HC, UNHCR as well 8 UN Senior Coordinator n Site) a> f and INGO representatives (Save the Children and ORC). The aim is to discuss ang coordinate the more political aspects of the issue together with advocacy and strategic communications, both towards government, and to shift’ the international narrative. (In addition, the RC/HC convenes occasional briefings for the whole diplomatic corps, with government representation, to brief on various issues, principally Rakhine; these are well attended, including by ASEAN/G77 ambassadors.) * Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). This brings together the UN agencies, international and national NGO partners, ICRC and donors. HCT meetings are co: chaired by the HC (or Deputy HC) and an NGO co-chair. The donor community has a standing invitation to send two observers to HCT meetings (one from an OECD- DAC country and one from a non-OECD-DAC country); the latter slot remains unfilled so far. The HCT holds its main Quarterly Review meetings every three months, and additional ad hoc HCT meetings to discuss specific topics are convened as needed (there is a ‘standby’ meeting slot reserved every month). Some members have noted that — perhaps inevitably given the mandate, format and composition ~ HCT meetings do not lend themselves either to frank debate or strategic discussion; they have an often congested agenda, and are fully minuted. Notwithstanding this, the HCT performs an important role, and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator position is broadly welcomed as having enhanced the functioning of the HCT. * Humanitarian Breakfast, This informal gathering, convened by the INGO Forum and held under the Chatham House Rule, has been meeting for a little over a year. Membership is loosely defined, but consists of a broad group of INGOs and donors, plus OCHA and the Deputy HC. Given its informal nature (no minutes or official status) and broad membership, it has emerged as a space for more frank and open discussion of challenging issues ~ including, but not limited to, Rakhine. It has de facto evolved into something of a parallel HCT ¢ Rakhine Theme Group. The group has a UN-only membership, and meets on an irregular basis, as needed, to discuss Rakhine issues. In the past, it had sometimes been opened up to INGO and donor representatives, and was involved in some strategy development work in 2015 on how a coherent development, recovery and humanitarian approach could be devised. Meetings of the UN Rakhine Theme Group are chaired by the UN Senior Adviser in Rakhine State. They are used to discuss and agree on policy issues and to provide updates on developments in Rakhine; discussions with authorities in Rakhine and at the Union level; issues discussed at the HOMs Group; issues related to the Advisory Commission on Rakhine, and so on. 36. At the field level in Sittwe, the key coordination mechanism is the Rakhine Coordination Group (RCG). This is headed by the UN Senior Adviser in Sittwe, a senior official (D-1) with political as well as operational experience. It was established in 2016. It brings together the heads of all UN agencies and INGOs in Rakhine State, meeting monthly; it has also established a number of working groups on specific issues. While by no means perfect — no coordination structure ever will be - the RCG 1437, 38. thas broken new ground in bringing humanitarian and develupmert agencies toyether in a joint coordination body The BEG is ienavatine in nelioe ont inchvenee ie membership, which is to the great credit ty the UN system in Dhyanerer ‘nbc, she could be 2 model worth exploring tor other challenging contents wiuwesnce. The #5 has had @ concrete positive impact, © Greatly improved UNANGO interactions, compared to an anu comghene breakdown in trust and communication ducing wane yerote io the yack ie tex than a year, the RCG has turned fragmented comunity who 3 watecane BoM that is able to forge consensus around ailicult ond Bicone rues, © Agreement on a set of objectives and priorities tor the #OG's wore # 2017 represents the first ever concise, consenwus field-sevel agrectnent on prints tor assistance organizations in Rakhine State, an important sccomplicherseet, The RCG represents a valuable resource for the UN sytem land wmernatione) actors working on Rakhine State issues more broadly) 96 seeks to detinw aie wegen @ Coherent strategy on Rakhine State. This is not limited 19 ienpleenueee ation art tai level coordination, The RCG includes a number of indonduals with mare veruarny ang experience than would normally be found in sub-national hitb, 21 well a1 wine te skills to forge consensus. This is an enormous asset, which shouie te fatiy stilines 5 recommended that the RCG be empowered a5 much a+ poxsible, inciusing Srey greater delegation of responsibilities, and that its inputs be unstematically sos se key issues. The UN Senior Adviser reports directly to the BLIMC De facto, this aise means that information from the BCG flows through the Senior htwiner to the RL/MC. OCHA is responsible for ensuring that humanitarian naves Biscussed 1 the HG are brought to the attention of the HCT. Some stakehoiders tave called (or clearer linkages between the RCG and other fora - the HCT on humanitarian moves, 25 well 25 HOMs and donors. It is also recommended that information-sharing oranocais between the RCG and Yangon be clearly defined and communicated: this will hep % respond to concerns (or perceptions) from some agencies and donors thet information is not always shared in # systematic way, and will also hei 10 institutionalize the RCG structure, The high priority that the UN system must give to Rakihine State, the high level of scrutiny on the issue, the strong (perhaps unreasonable) expectation among embassies/donors that the UN should take the leadership role. and the inierent difficulty of the challenges, ail call for 2 coordination mechansm that is strategic amd inclusive, including both humanitarian and development actors. ideally what mous Be required is some combination of the more formal status and UN leadershio of the Riakhine Theme Group, together with the inclusive membership and possibility tor open and frank discussion afforded by the Humanitarian Breakfast. «recommenced that the Rakhine Theme Group be revamped with broader membersie (at 2 minimum, to include INGO and donor representation), convened Dy the UN on 3 regular basis as a strategic discussion and coordination forum - to lead the process of developing a Rakhine strategy, and then to help guide implementation. would be complementary to - and would liaise with - both the HOMs Group and the ACT. i Could meet periodically in Yangon, but aiso from time-to-time im Simtwe, which would 1saltow itt perform the important function of interfacing with the Rakhine State Government, as well as enhancing coordination between Yangon and Sittwe. One MONE severai potential options woul be for the group to Continue to be chaired by the UN Senior Adviser in Rakhine State, with a smaller ‘contact group’ under the Buidance ov leadership of the RC/HE to have more systematic engagement with the Union Goverment. (At the same time, itis perfectly iegitimate - indeed important ~ for there to de a UNJnternal group on Rakhine; the point of the above recommendation is not to Question that, but rather to highlight the importance of ‘Having 2 forum that beings together doth development and humanitarian actors on Rakhine that is broader than just the UN.) Enhancing United Nations Capacity 33. comparison to the range and ‘complenity of the responsibilities placed upon it, the RC Office is understaffed and under-resourced. This is evident across the board, including for example strategic communications and political analysis capacity. There {S also no dedicated international statt member in the RC Office in Yangon for Rakhine Sate issues. Donors should de urged to fund the necessary capacity, including a Rakhine focal point. Preferably this should be in the form of muiti-donor pooled funding, covering both salary and other related costs. Such pooled funding is important for continuity and to ensure that staff are perceived to be independent, particularly important in a content such as Rakhine State 40. im Sittwe, the RCG structure has reduced staffing compared to the past. Additional capacity is needed for context/contlict analysis, which is vital to informing both ‘operational and advocacy decisions, and in providing an improved understanding of the protection environment. Capacity is also required for enhanced local NGO, CBO and community outreach; this is something that focal civil society leaders have remarked on, and noted that they would welcome greater engagement. It is recommended that donors fund this additional capacity. Ways should also be found to have more detailed discussion in the RCG on development/recovery activities and how they can be strategically integrated with humanitarian interventions; this does ot necessarily require more staffing capacity in the RCG. 41, Particular thought needs to be given to the important question of capacity and coordination in northern Rakhine State. Coordination functions are currently being carried out by UNHCR, which as the lead agency in the area for 25 years has considerable institutional memory and capacity, and whose mandate covers both humanitarian and development activities. However, this is not an ideal medium-term arrangement, for a number of reasons: UNHCR have been planning for some time to reduce their activities and hand over to other agencies; their refugee return and stabilization/reintegration mandate means that nearly all of their senior local staff are Musiim, fimiting their capacity to engage with other communities; and they have capacity constraints to being able to carry out the various functions required, including hosting regular diplomatic visitors and providing information management and regular reporting capacity. Conflicts of interest may also arise ~ actual or perceived - for an operational agency to lead coordination in such a complex and politically fraught context. (There is also a monthly Northern Rakhine State Coordination Group 16in Sittwe, with Maungdaw-based representatives joining by Skype. This helps ensure that their perspectives are understood in Sittwe, although there are mixed feelings about how effective this is; some still feel that despite this good initiative, there often remains a poor understanding in Sittwe/RCG of the realities of northern Rakhine.) 4 s . In light of this, it is recommended that the RCG structure under the UN Senior Adviser in Sittwe be extended to northern Rakhine State. This could take the form of a deputy to the Senior Adviser, based in Maungdaw. This would ensure that an integrated approach - incorporating humanitarian, recovery/development and human rights/protection interventions - can be crafted already at an early stage of the response, under the existing framework of the RCG, and that there is an international staff member with seniority and experience to engage with government in Maungdaw, ideally assisted by a senior national officer from outside Rakhine State. In addition, analytical, information management and reporting capacity is needed in Maungdaw. In the interim, it will be important that the UN Senior Adviser travel regularly to Maungdaw, to provide the leadership required, to liaise with government and security forces, and to visibly project his “whole of Rakhine” mandate. (Since this report was initially drafted, the RC/HC has decided that the UN Senior Advisor in Sittwe and his team are to provide overall coordination of the response in northern Rakhine State, in close collaboration with all humanitarian and development partners ‘on the ground; UNHCR will continue to be the focal point for specifically humanitarian issues.) 43. A further relevant observation in this context is that the very regular visits of embassy and donor personnel to Sittwe and Maungdaw (often several visits per week since 9 October) creates an enormous workload for agencies, in particular the UN Senior Adviser and his staff who are the key focal points, as well as agency staff in Maungdaw. While this is partly the unavoidable consequence of the current very high level of international political and donor concern and scrutiny of the situation in Maungdaw, diplomatic missions should be strongly advised to coordinate and combine these visits as much as possible. These large number of visits, most of which have a human rights and humanitarian focus, can also have unintended negative consequences — for example, reinforcing the sense among local government officials that the international community is biased towards humanitarian assistance and support to Muslim communities, as well as potentially making it easier for the government to present a misleading picture of the extent of humanitarian access to the area — and should be encouraged to be cognizant of these when planning their trips. ; V. Working More Effectively with Government and Society Fundamental challenges 44, Consideration of how the UN system can work more effectively with the government on Rakhine State must confront some fundamental challenges. The Union government is in essence a diarchy, composed of civilian and military parts, between which there is almost no coordination. Although it is not clear that these two halves of government have significantly differing perspectives on Rakhine State, it is hard to imagine positive 17progress in the situation in the state without coordinated action between them around an accepted strategy. The prospects of this appear remote for the foreseeable future 45. The Rakhine State Government is fundamentally disempowered, for two reasons First, because it does not have any real political constituency, except in southern Rakhine State. Itis not seen as legitimate by much of the Rakhine population ~ being formed from a party (the NLO) that most did not vote for, and fiercely opposed by the Arakan National Party, who won a landslide in the state. Second, because under the current government, the centre of decision-making on Rakhine State has shifted decisively to Naypyitaw, undermining the authority of the Chief Minister and the state government. 46. itis also far from clear that the government, either at the Union or Rakhine State level, is interested in or would welcome any real and comprehensive dialogue with the UN system that encompasses political solutions, human rights, humanitarian action and human development. This is not to suggest that efforts should not be made ~ they "must be; or that those efforts cannot be successful - they can be. But it will require a carefully-devised approach that uses all of the levers at the UN’s disposal, both in country and at the global level. As noted in section II above, itis not clear that the UN system is currently configured in a way that would facilitate this. Working in partnership with the Union Government 47. Notwithstanding the above challenges, it isimportant that the UN system makes every effort to step up its engagement and partnership with government on the full range of issues of concern, taking into account the following considerations: ‘+ The UN system has an obligation to prioritize engagement with government, working in partnership with government, and ensuring that the government is put in the lead role in national development planning. The government is sovereign, hhas high levels of domestic legitimacy and a huge electoral mandate, as well as. strong international support, * Some stakeholders have suggested that given the realities, it is inappropriate to work in partnership with the government on Rakhine State. However, it must be recognized that working in partnership with government does not imply uncritical support for government agendas. This is particularly clear in Rakhine State, where discriminatory and abusive government policies are at the core of the humanitarian and development challenges, where 5 years on from the intercommunal violence there has been almost no progress on desegregation, and where the government currently stands accused of possible crimes against humanity. Yet, addressing these policy issues also requires the UN system to prioritize engagement with government: the only way to push the government to meet internationally-accepted principles and live up to its obligations to all ‘communities in Rakhine State is though principled engagement * Success in this endeavour hinges on enhancing the UN system's credibility with government. This does not equate to enhancing the UN's popularity or the 18smoothness of the working relationship, Dialogue at the senior level should be intended not necessarily to make the government's view of UN more positive, but tomake it more accurate and to give the government a more detailed appreciation Of the UN's views and concerns about Rakhine State The RC/HC does regularly ‘aise issues of concern, including sensitive topics, with senor levels of government, and has developed working relationships with senior levels of government and military that no doubt facilitate this. (Nevertheless, there persists a common Perception in government circles that, in Rakhine State in particular, the UN 1s neither impartial nor effective.) + Such a dialogue obliges the UN to be frank, and not to shy away from difficult topics, The Human Rights Up Front initiative should be at the core of how the UN operates, and there can be no silence on human rights and protection concerns. ‘The UN has a particular responsibility under its Charter to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized populations. The only way that the UN system can reconcile the need to partner with government with the risk of being co-opted into supporting unacceptable government agendas in Rakhine State is through collective agreement on, and clear articulation of, red lines ~ and to be ready to engage in advocacy on these with the government. Credibility also requires that silent diplomacy be combined with clear public messaging, ‘+ This in turn requires the UN system to have unity of purpose. Without this, there is a risk of “mandate shopping”, where the government prioritizes relations with ‘agencies having more amenable mandates or those who engage less robustly on sensitive topics. The responsibility for frank discussions with government cannot rest on the shoulders of the RC/HC alone, but requires headquarters leadership and greater collective action, including with diplomatic missions. 48, t must also be recognized that however assiduous the UN system is in encouraging partnership with government on Rakhine State, that the government may have little interest in more robust relations with the UN or in taking greater leadership or accountability for certain issues, such as assistance to Muslim IDPs ~ due to both capacity issues and domestic political incentives. It may be very difficult to get the government to prioritize certain issues of concern to the UN (for example, gender based violence in Muslim communities) 49. In this regard, the interim report and recommendations of the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State offer an important entry point. These recommendations are particularly valuable because they cover a wide range of issues, including sensitive ones; because they have been strongly endorsed by government, with a commitment to implement them; because the international community will be closely scrutinizing how quickly and effectively the government implements them; and because they form a package of measures to address the situation, that do not lend themselves to selective implementation. They therefore provide a political basis and analytical justification for comprehensive engagement with the government on the broad range of issues in Rakhine State, including sensitive ones. Any mechanisms established by the government for implementation of these recommendations would also be obvious points of engagement for the UN system. 19