[G.R. No. 126376.
November 20, 2003] In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO
VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and
FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA
BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN,
SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES
ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE
JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] to annul the Decision[2] dated 26 June
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Decision[3] dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (trial court) in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case
after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that
the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children
are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their
co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to
wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin,
for a consideration of P6,000.00 (Exh. C), pursuant to which TCT No.
[36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. C-1);
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin,
for a consideration of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. D), pursuant to which TCT No. S-
109772 was issued in her name (Exh. D-1);
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel
Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh.
E), pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. E-1);
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio
Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of P[54,3]00.00 (Exh. F),
pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. F-1); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas
Joaquin, for a consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. G), pursuant to which
TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. G-1).
[6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a
consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. K), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779
was issued in his name (Exh. K-1).]
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes C, D, E, F, and G, [and K] are simulated as they are, are
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx
over the properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in
the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times
more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the
parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar
of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the
properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by
defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the
consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with
sufficient factual and legal basis.[4] (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant
spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.[5] Instead of filing an Answer with their co-
defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.[6] In granting the
dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that compulsory heirs
have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only
from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.[7]
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will
show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion
must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against
defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their
parents.The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime, the value of
the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil
Code).Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of
the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their
parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court
ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case,
which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant
brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and
Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of their
defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the
latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties,
provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do
they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be
considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either for gross
inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the
parties.In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101
SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by
the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and
sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, the legitime of a compulsory heir is
computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-
appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN
ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS
GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS
OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED
AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF
THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of
Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross
inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest
over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint,
petitioners asserted that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(plaintiffs herein) of their legitime. Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale
declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent
parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings
will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary succession.[11]
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject
of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The
trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.[12]
[T]he question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those
who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are
prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the
detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did
not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase
present substantial interest more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be
protected in a payment to or recovery by him.[13]
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is
merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death. While still living, the parents of
petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard
their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their
siblings does not affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots
reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices
stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to
declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual
contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the
minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the
contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that
manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale
is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to
the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is
void.[14] Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is
simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment
of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment
or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents
the existence of a valid contract.[15]
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely
simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony
stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a
lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase
price.[16]The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price
credible. Petitioners failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack
of knowledge of their respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the questioned
lots.[17] On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence
plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the
purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of
the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent
father.[18]
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly
inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue
influence.(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as
may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470
of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there
is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of
sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they
gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:[19]
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,
protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the
effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are
not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or
overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may
do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by
them indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and
restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law
knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the
situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties
and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial
court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly
erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[20] In the instant case, the trial
court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant
children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of
Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a factual finding
that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO
MANONGSONG, petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO,
EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO
ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA
NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA
CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 26 June 1998
and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the
property in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children,
namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents
Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters); (3)
Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother
of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda
Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz,
Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela
Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente
Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las
Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters (Property). The
records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The
Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390[3] as bounded in
the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by
San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna Lopez, et
al.[4] However, the improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831
San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the name of Filomena
J. Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.[5]
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint [6] on 19 June 1992,
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the
Property.Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,[7] petitioners prayed for the partition and
award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing
market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon
Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died
without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five
children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the
Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share
in the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras
children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they
can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs, ranging in
size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants
not occupying any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz,
and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and
Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz
family), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of
Facts and Compromise Agreement[8] dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement), petitioners
and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an
equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to
issue an order of partition to this effect and prayed further that those who have exceeded
said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have less and those who have
none shall get the correct and proper portion.[9]
 Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each
occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the
Agreement.[10] However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners
claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the
mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez
Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 [11] for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel
of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las
Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street
to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax
Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez"
stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA[12] (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na
matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL
ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION
BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO
(P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni
ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las
Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing
halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT
INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili,
ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang
walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o
mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing
lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994
that the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and
Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October
1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx.[13] The certification further stated that Atty.
Andrada was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the
Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The
Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier,
either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached
legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 whenManongsong
was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision[14] of 10 April 1995 ruled in
favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent
evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to
defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of
Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta,
which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong
debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is
however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila
Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No countervailing proof was
adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was
solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not
mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was
made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the
legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion
of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1(sic)] did not at
all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect
against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren,
by right of representation, as described in the order of intestate succession.The same
Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The
compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly
specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against the
Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J.
Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately
partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area
in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for
having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum
of P10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the
first time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate[16] of Guevarra, which stated that
Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an
affidavit[17] from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by
name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years with
Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and
affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered
these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission
that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina
Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was
the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum
averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA
NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the
other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this
is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper
document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners either
by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship
of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the
common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that the
parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of
Justina Navarro. xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina
Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the
Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as
follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property
of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject
property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not
supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation
purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the
paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in
so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.[19]
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and
resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to certain
procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its Resolution
of 31 January 2000.[20]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON
THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE
REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND
SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-
HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF
PETITIONERS.[21]
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove,
by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property
and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only
questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual
findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to
review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. [22] This is
precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of
evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v.
Court of Appeals :[23]
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course
of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or
the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-
owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her
father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally belonged to
Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property.
As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof
to establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.[24] Otherwise the authenticity and due
execution of the document should be upheld.[25] The trial court itself held that (n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents
legality or its validity.[26]
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document
and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2)
found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.[27]
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property
was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not
agree.The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[28]
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property
during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed
that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros name. [29] This
tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in
the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed
to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for
valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of
values,[30] that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in
money or its equivalent.[31] The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of
the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.[32]
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the
alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners could
easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal without
any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence
these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.[33] To admit these documents now is contrary to due process, as it deprives
respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert
Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely
that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with
her.[34] Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was
indeed the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the
Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an
impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below,
he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the
other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [35]
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine
petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the
Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latters
children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for
petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other
hand, this would not undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on the
sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed
to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able
to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarras
estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the
Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio
Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN,
MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF
EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming
with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et
al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these
proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however
reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the
respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due
course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with
the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the
provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three
(3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to
his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners
Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of
riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to
his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908.
Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had
inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented
by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however
was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens
System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed
cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina
Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew
and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the
spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall
have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4 Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In 17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was 19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney favor of Mariano Locsin
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate 1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage Rosario whose maternal
with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7 grandfather was Getulio
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Locsin
Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria 2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the Rosario but the rentals
titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted from bigger portion of
her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her Refinery were assigned to
niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house. Cornelio
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and
(9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully nieces and others:
cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces: (6,825 sqm. when
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES resurveyed)
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481 24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
favor of Mariano Locsin in favor of Francisco M.
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000 Maquiniana
Jose R. Locsin 26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello favor of Francisco
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian Maquiniana
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509 27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor Aurea Locsin, favor of Ireneo Mamia
Matilde L. Cordero 28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
and Salvador Locsin favor of Zenaida Buiza
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045 29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor Aurea Locsin, favor of Felisa Morjella
Matilde L. Cordero 30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
and Salvador Locsin favor of Inocentes Motocinos
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059) 31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor Aurea Locsin, favor of Casimiro Mondevil
Matilde L. Cordero 32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
and Salvador Locsin favor of Juan Saballa
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio 25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco of Rogelio Marticio
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto - ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her
favor of Aurea B. Locsin own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto - need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under
favor of Aurea B. Locsin the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive,
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto - except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador
Aurea Locsin Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and
nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate,
filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152)
to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,
alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely
to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not
join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian),
and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and
Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and
exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the
inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and
void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties,
subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives
therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered,
and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the
estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and
where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that
might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for
the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also
with legal interest from the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00
each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to
any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants.9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered
its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those
properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time.11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other
persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to
which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in
her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers
were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not
inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to
her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended
that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired
by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was
an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives
who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled
to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when
she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have
been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's
nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had
already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she
received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew
and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed
away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The
next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian
Locsin.15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other
respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution
of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the
partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion
be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins,
she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the
Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before
her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22,
1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin.19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives
and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza
Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio
Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don
Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make
that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally
competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife,
from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate
consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of
Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the
time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42
are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better
than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is
safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under
oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court
of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and
counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory
that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to
inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don
Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their
respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the
trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would
not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's
nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador
Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-
Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco
and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property
which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage
to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a
completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for
the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to
make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian,
daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-
law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and
donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal
adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated
November 19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is
married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married
to another niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on
July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those
circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary
acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.
Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years
after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions
were recorded in the Registry of Property,28 whether considered an action based on
fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents
may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was
constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City,
is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G.
NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings
of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and
Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo
Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his
widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of
10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by
TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00),
evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT
NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was
issued to Estrellita.[2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to
Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five
Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year,
Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated
at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the
proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and
her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident
popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted
by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela,
Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of
Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless,
petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas
parents.The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties
of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and
Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The total
value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of
Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The
settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita
and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name
of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to
petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael
and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs [7] in the
said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and
the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad
litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition[9] dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed
instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed
another opposition[10] alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela
property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00)
before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the
legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his
children,[11] Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and
Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all
the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.[12] Ramon stated
that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower
of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.[13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as
the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of
Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be
included in the estate.[15] Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994,
removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without
the courts knowledge and permission.[16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten
(10) days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the
pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita
de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing
tha the was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no
interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
dated February 2, 1994.[17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated
February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and
asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of
the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial
court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and
considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. [19]
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon
opposed.[20] On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration. It provides:
xxxxxxxxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then
financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the
property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses
Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral
home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on
the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-
factoseparation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after
the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy
the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been
engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment
manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably
support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from
Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father
was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the
proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21] (Underscoring
added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of
Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals[22] denied
the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the
Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).[23] Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the
Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent
Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael
to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of
the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass,
the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to
law and the will of the testator.[24] Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. [25] The purpose for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on
account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs
equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. [26] Collation does not impose
any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought
to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the
time it was donated,[27] the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs.Article
887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and
2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As such, petitioner may
not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or
allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, [30] which
petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the case at bench, however, we note
that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to
determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and
Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter
outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an
appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or
intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.[34]
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation
is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has
been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59
Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions
of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that
the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and
prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence
of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate
court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by
reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.[36]The
order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
inheritedand is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels
heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who
does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque
property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by
the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent
the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument,
voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir [38] in
the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died
ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela
property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by
the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA
NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant
laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December
11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at
Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the
private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario
along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured
in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and
operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his
passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the
incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of
the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance
Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia
Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she
received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims,
and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the
damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an
affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting
any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident
on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido
Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that
during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives
promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be
indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason
thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private
respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their
promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife
of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be
ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and
exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs
and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents,
the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants
(petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial
court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted
by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives,
successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages
being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered
these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said
that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents)
that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident.
Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their
testimony . . . 11 Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were
likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the
appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was
denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of
P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and
the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article
1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the
accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not
Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom
payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any
person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with
respect to their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all
classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and
that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of
Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in
settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural
guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido.
Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as
an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the
expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of
the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-
judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's
widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of
fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint
of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de
la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy
Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias
Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first
marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399
and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre,
the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second
marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio
Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register
of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners
pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-
indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of
her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the
whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la
Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A,
the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and
Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua,
also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct
suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for
the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981
of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually
the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous
title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all
of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias
Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue;
his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de
la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios
Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva
troncal whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his
father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court
said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito
Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the
legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting
from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the
lot in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the
New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question
is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As
explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does
not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or
does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the
essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure
generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the
record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a
hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D")
of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la
Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor
de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental,
I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas
propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la
Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y
cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-
indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New
York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in
the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of
the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and
the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the
court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co.
of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject
to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the
respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition
based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that
the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents'
answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of
the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's
brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With
the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been
probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project
of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the
adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias
Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias
Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any
issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-
indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property
was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within
the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are
the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed
on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners
herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de
la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate
of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias
Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD
F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages
and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena
Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as
follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June
17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased
son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The
said properties consist of the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit
balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a
1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243
(7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201,
48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry
of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of
deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in
TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No.
41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and
improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry
of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the
Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of
deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as
co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y
Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y
tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente
comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que
yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
 La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa;
proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda
Races. 1wph1.t Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
(Sgd.)
FILOMENA
ROCES
LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-
G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that
said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro
and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of
her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in
the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs.
Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by
estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December
16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for
review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only
the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the
only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those
issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of
her six children.
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees
in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the
second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt
was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability
to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be
useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal,
familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting
on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion
legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from
being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation
(which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which
situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization
of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship,
is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas
has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891,
which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes
que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o
de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido
por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del
tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3)
the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to
the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance
or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a
posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor
to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia
Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the
death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his
maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of
article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and
for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977,
78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil.
392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por
el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide
personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902,
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan,
the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name
but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law,
should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share
of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When
Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto
Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was
held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto
Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot,
sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from
which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480;
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs.
Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil.
601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo
vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA
39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186,
190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his
hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They
cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives
within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule
of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of
the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs.
Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil.
944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property
is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property.
(J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
 Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the
ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to
prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to
the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose
of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo
vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries,
Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs.
Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in
the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res
judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of
the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of
ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of
another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's
lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said
property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an
inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to
the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part
of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited
properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited
by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter
Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased
husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon
and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes
Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de
Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father
Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by
this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of
the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six
reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case
the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the
reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased
ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have
survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by
the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that
the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her
will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the
third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the
non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of
the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said
properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal
and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged
that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter
Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties
which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda,
who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as
required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of
title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna,
one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and
decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22,
1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881,
and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro
Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things:
Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to
the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed
through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan,
likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance
from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been
adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his
brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code,
for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a
very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree
of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter
acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a
brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to
the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance
from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law,
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling
that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in
accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question
have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a
valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first
instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro
Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil
Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the
opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents'
renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and
without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the
appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother
became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the
Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these
lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case
presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the
son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption
is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and
not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All
the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property,
all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would
have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the
hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly
dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be
reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party
has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of
her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be
admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by
operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by
operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was
acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to
the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it
from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the
trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to
my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked
about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that
Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it
cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such
lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to
her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action.
The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment
of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required
by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as
such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of
Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law
has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are.
Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted
from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be
reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are
entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled
to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property
registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they
have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be
recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property
registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the
applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the
effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has
prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by
law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code,
which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the
Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that
from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently
of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country;
that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it
has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to
reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor
the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the
right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the
right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and
loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the
Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the
only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of
error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the
property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly
organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some
rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights
required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most
essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one
of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines.
The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the
modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in
the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the
renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight
day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code,
as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a
seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the
first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the
deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a
valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on
December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved
by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those
laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in
favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second
marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set
forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to
secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the
spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to
 be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the
legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction
from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set
forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or
intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general
with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions
in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the
law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to
that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the
supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and
978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists
and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are
found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July,
1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons
entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must
make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and
978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has
married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right
reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty,
under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of
what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the
Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the
applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of
said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read
thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the
Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to
be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who
should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose
favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as
set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of
the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article
199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the
property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to
reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the
period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the
mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved,
has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by
noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the
Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the
right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the
reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court
the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may
demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of
article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted
within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the
inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed,
the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age;
and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by
prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement
thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the
annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled
to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against
the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action
for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as
the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of
action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to
instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the
property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case,
to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because
of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant
and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot
be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of,
and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete
ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will
have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct
title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first
two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is,
the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct
expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title
belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the
person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem
to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court
of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22,
1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the
fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become
obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that
the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for
other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to
make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid.,
238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use,
enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the
hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in
the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the
possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third
degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective.
The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the
condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery,
does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the
opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who
has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish
institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article
968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary
property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except
that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article
480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form
prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But
the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the
father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property
they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in
whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act
whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve
the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by
the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at
his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants
of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation
thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and
without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation
subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right
of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in
the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the
right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition
subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the
right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right
should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be
no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law
having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the
alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently,
the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or
will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to
circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of
article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who
contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first
marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make
the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved,"
in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law
to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the
right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation,
and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their
heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things
according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon
the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner
in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974
and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of
the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which
are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the
clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the
third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the
children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required
to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law,
such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit,
whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the
property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property
at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely
dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to
conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may
alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he
has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him,
and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives
within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while
the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs,
unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required
by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of
the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in
fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set
forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has,
under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and
to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has
been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title
of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it
to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants
to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing
more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void,
for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is
impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law
to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his
dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should
that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter
vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose
favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in
ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party
acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title
subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of
disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of
the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a
family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have
remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot
attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of
land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is
equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil
Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved
are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the
usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely
academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two
heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the
predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to
usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a
condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of
the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be
made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land
be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the
vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art.
1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he
has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a
condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be
terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right
to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever
more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the
vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition
subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in
the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the
consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate
the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry
that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to
be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is
reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law
would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the
provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his
favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land
which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right
required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan
and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void
the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to
appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros;
and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of
P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any
knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea
Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void
on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter
thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as
the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor
of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered
together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18,
1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias
had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1)
that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses
Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed
for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is
also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable
property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of
Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale
of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana
Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he
had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which
does not clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to
Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the
name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered
the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and
paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29,
1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she
sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded
from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise
to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their
name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and
thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141
(Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in
question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from
his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it
was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this
connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving
her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates
two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934).
This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but
subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive,
the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor
of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to
a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a
real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana
Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to
reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior
to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we
are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the
reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the
vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs,
and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have
against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera and Paredes, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of
ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against defendant:
 a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided
into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant.
From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the
burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of
defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards,
donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate
property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned
in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the
estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half
(1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the
first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving
relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife
Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in
Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria
Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired
during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban,
Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister
lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia
and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother
and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he
died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with
Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for
the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out
the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the
deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the
late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to
the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent
a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading
to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her
counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an
amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she
be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition
of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she
was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was
done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her
sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's
side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund
the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole
heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and
other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO
VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98,
Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion
for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial,
Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No.
13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in
favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending
appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In
her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of
the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No.
09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review
wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain
Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while
the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in
Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in
favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's
side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she
had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the
estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's
action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while
the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to
the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al.,
L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole
heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a
matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the
settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss
Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from
the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose
any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17,
1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single,
without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His
nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his
late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living
with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby
declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana,
who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement
of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First
Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir
and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl.
Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial
to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of
a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a
co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a
separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion
or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the
inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of
the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil.
388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the
decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action.
(Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v.
Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding
(Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive
and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his
share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari
v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and
re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz,
L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-
14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the
plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children
by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit
his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of
his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court,
we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court
in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and
terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was
allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-
heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside
the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of
Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper
and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of
the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic
fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in
Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended
complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or
conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the
controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents
a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or
one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself,
but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if
through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was
induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an
available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment
was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in
court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such
judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31,
1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela
v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral
fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of
a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
(Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling
Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318,
323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to
be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and
Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary
proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus
paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the
late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least
effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall
initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and
other obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and
thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the
plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the
estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p.
2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed
away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's
mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as
the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time
and place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3,
Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the
hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan
Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26,
1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court,
published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3
and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of
the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia
was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she
had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out
by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five
months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly
published as required by law, despite which the present movant only
came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her
alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition
for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate
court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities
are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third
degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the
honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his
father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful
heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole
heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so
state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which
would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as
will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing
Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King
City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144,
1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be
filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of
Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject
to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on
his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891
which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
 relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted
from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which
the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title
and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation
of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property,
for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia
Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his
inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should
apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which
provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the
decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore,
shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,'
and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57,
Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the
estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen
and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No.
2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been
visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other.
(p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her
inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but
deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission,
it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18
SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v.
Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did
not even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were
supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law,
Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement
between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife
did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was
established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg.
No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships
for such deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West
Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the
Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements
Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious
vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the
advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational
endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this
foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token
of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to
determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally
said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care
of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park,
Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State
College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of
the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible.
Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his
mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every
February and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and
October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and
financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the
funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or
such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such
endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage,
pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in
 any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every
kind and description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper
for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or
which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of
the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and
attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature
in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its
eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV
graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors;
one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez
award for teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay
High School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The
School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for
Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would
be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional
Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the
Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor
students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It
gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban
Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana
Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for
teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious
civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of
the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably
with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of
the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana
Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees,
and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the
probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to
terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS,
MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS
MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P.
DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE
MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE,
TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA
P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and
CECILIA M. MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area
of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and
1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No.
1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to
Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion,
Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes,
Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins children. Petitioners alleged that
the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on
to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went
to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after
Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim
that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must
now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not
originate from petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and
Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio
from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who
was in possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners
claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the
RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3)
parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in
the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of
the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to
Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of
Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and
reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorneys fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido
and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming
that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to
reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria
predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING
AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the
properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that
They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it
Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13 sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga,
Ruling of the Court determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Exequiel.
general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CAs findings are (1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the Court the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the (2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
two issues that arise one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties (3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property
and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties. from the prepositus by operation of law; and
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code: prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor. 16
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the from Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than
property came. (Emphasis ours) such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property.17It was
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute
the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the
and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
be relatives within the third degree from which the property came. 15 Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
The lineal character of the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
reservable property is reckoned transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything
from the ascendant from whom the in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that
prepositus received the property by the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
gratuitous title (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not Ascendants, descendants and
applicable. collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants, and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a
common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1wphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and
italics ours)
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-
grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one,
would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias
ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In
determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of
Julias collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her
mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and
Leonors parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within the third degree and not
her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person
from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved
by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree
relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as
Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third
degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in
the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives
of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called
reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit
of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are
within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring
ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in
character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article
891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregorias relatives within
the third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should
be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution
of Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution
of Gregorias estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their
complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any
determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregorias entire estate
and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed specifically for
that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTCs disposition of
the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the
reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names.
What the RTC should have done, assuming for arguments sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondents titles.
In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable
character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from
a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance
by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of
ownership belong to him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes,
by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any event, the foregoing
discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation
of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694
insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of
Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of
the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
[PADURA v BALDOVINO on separate document]
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname
Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for
Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad,
and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of
the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during
the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel,
Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on
becoming a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he
had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his
eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the
deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo;
that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita
Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion
are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will
before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned
ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he
declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among
all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino
III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the
complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay,
some personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891;
that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the
complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino;
that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of
her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described
in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son,
the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said
Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands
described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described
therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in
paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to
deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable
motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for
its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the
lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn
at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of
fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition
to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not
gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they
pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs
had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the
aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino
and her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in
question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be
condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with
the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause
of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the
property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn,
inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation
to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry
after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by the
plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but that
established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the
aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those
extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow
Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon
(property which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the
hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos
son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said
property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother
(Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case
because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded
to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de
Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of
reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with
the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the
law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void,
inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino
is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is
no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the
property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that
the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the
instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime
of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could
not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing
in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4,
1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs
would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively
to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said
defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the
property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the
Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a
new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the
corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk
of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of
the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period
prescribed by the rules undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor
change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed
as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question
reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the court the said
judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the
costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the
complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the
judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead
of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy
between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the
same which the defendants would allege in their answer those dealing with a mere
question of law which the courts would have to decide and that, the demurrer having
been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist they could do no less upon alleging the
same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards
set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs
in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely
lack the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary as
in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties the appellate court will
now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the
legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy so that unnecessary
delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary
proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and
terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its
determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to
the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the
property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of reservable
property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article
811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who
inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his
father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the
relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two
children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino
III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a
will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the
posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned property
enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited
the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole
heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took
possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in
said inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said
posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if
Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and
forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its
reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants,
Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by
operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his
brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of
the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within
the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but
its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to
reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said
ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such
property came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in
the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) said property reverts
to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-
reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is
reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living,
within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a
fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his
own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime,
according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the
third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby
converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his
legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios,
who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property
came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives
of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship,
nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within
the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said
deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of
the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion,
Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are
both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son,
Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father,
Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother;
and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their
legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the
first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that
this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at
the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to
wit, his three children of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three
children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children
respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the
plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within
the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his
nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his
relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which
came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by
inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge
refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants,
absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely
inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino
survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II;
that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the
fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as
the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of
strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs
of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into
existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil
Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the
plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right
to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant
Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which
provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases
expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or
substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the
surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining
whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio
Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was
received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without
any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the
death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of
his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in
accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same
should not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of person other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced by
the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact
clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de
Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion
or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary
obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her
deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter,
Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not
form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes
his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died
(reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own
property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But
whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from
her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the
other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is
unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to
the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by
operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz
de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to
Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive
property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant
Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of
legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within
the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino,
coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and
impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled
to a part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which
serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the
third degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are
at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable
and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be
granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter
Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character,
previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore,
had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the
deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already
stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only
daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the
legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to
her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which
she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable
property, held before the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took
possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers.
But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no
reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the other reservatarios,
the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the
precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property
which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently
of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime
of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected
in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not
been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and
was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third
degree of the person from whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the
hands of the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the
former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an
exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her
relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the
delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of
any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second,
the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal part of the reservable
property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-
sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the
quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the
complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the defendant
Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision
appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property,
inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within
the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the
defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-
sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity
claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings
as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and
the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-
Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had
a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as
shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral
part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate
sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by
her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D,
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of
land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by
his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them
plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late
Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,
the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven
(7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as
his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a
 reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate,
and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned
were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving
husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-
Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal
advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon
the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said
claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-
indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said
parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this
case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in
question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half
pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from
his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-
half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of
land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to
be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate
taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and
have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and
in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they
hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other
than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable
Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions,
rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties,
the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land
involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said
parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties
expressly waived all their claims against each other for damages
including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal
interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment
adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165,
T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to
make an accounting of all rents received by her on the properties
involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests
which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of
the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the
lower Court, all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line
succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of
the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the
line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be
controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a
share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with
Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case
of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving
the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and
the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews
of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews
of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from
this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree
there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the
jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon
the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should
pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol.
20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor
of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when
there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation
cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on
the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the
third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva
and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers
and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews
are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of
the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by
the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish
the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en
aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan
fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new
Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded
from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to
him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where
Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters
of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also
and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that
immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus,
Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or
nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the
surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters
and nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving
spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
 spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter
vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the
reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries,
Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests
upon the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the
reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is
the reservable property part of thereservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee
in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no
part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the
debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under
the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise
to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-
appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and
the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT
COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO,
DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed
BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated
cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as
follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties
subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated
in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case
No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-
seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in
paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described
properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which
provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he
tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la
Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul
Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles
situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia
abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property
described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by
a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently
sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December
30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and
assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The properties are
presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties
described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties
in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are
presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do
not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also
all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another
brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover
the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to
a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject
matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the
same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to
convey to the plaintiffs
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in
paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of
this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land
described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2)
and three (3) of this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein
ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa,
Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3)
of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for
and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties herein
ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income
being for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the
properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay
plaintiffs
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the
court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the
appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for
value and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of
litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable
interest of the reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title subject of
litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the
plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the
appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to
petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also
called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal
advice of their family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien
annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo,
the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of
self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil
Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the
subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the
reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated
that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son,
who died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which
properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that
they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains
however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of
the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in
accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A.
496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing
or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713,
cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v.
CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980,
95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
 destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge
of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that
he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take
notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule
must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the
mere entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not
sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six
cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine
in this jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v.
Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and
involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon
execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary
registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons
even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of
deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of
voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the
holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized
and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same
time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering
the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to
perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the
Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the
reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This
matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third
(1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo
dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition
above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I
inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance
of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no
such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of
the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long
time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors,
the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case
were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother,
and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo.
Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no
need to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the
reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case
of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main
issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the reservation established by Article
811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant
reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives
within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction
legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children.
However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if
upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status
provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in
accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the
nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case,
need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of
succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the
efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the
vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the
reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The
purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to
the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . .
(p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601,
603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva
viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878,
September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons,
Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record
in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee
simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and
Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all
incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was
advised not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not
inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this
conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does
not arise that he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from
the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also
from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother
 Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina
had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan
Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to
note the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this
effect in the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the
reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who
inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant)
has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right
reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529,
which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the
registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons
shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the
private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not
commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon
the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within
the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of
ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor.
Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the
reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in
the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree
(See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The
reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full
ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten
(10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-
22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the
New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein
private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the
reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the
New Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what
rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate
the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.