CHARLIE TE v. AUGUSTO V. BREVA[ GR No.

164974, Aug 05, 2015 ]

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as respondents in the
petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) to annul and set aside the order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) denying the petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against him.

Antecedents

It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the petitioner upon the application of
respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of the Saranggani District Office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI SARDO) on the basis of his finding of probable cause for a violation of Section 2(b) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1865, for hoarding large quantities of liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases). The
application for the search warrant was filed at the instance of Pryce Gases through its letter dated September 28,
2003 to the NBI SARDO complaining about the collection and hoarding by the petitioner of embossed or name-
plated Pryce Gases' LPG cylinders in violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293
(Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).

On October 14, 2003, the petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence
and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising therein the lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single
offense committed, illegality of the nighttime search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and
inclusion of other offenses.

In his order of November 20, 2003,[1] respondent Presiding Judge denied the petitioner's Omnibus Motion to
Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items by observing that he had issued
the search warrant for one specific offense; that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant; that the
search began late in the day and continued into the night, but the actual seizure was carried out in the daytime of
the next day; and that the seizure of the blue cylinders with the markings and logo of Pryce Gases was justified
under the plain view doctrine because they were found among the large stockpile of cylinders in the petitioner's
warehouse.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 5, 2004.[2]

Decision of the CA

The petitioner assailed the order of November 20, 2003 on certiorari,[3] mainly positing that respondent
Presiding Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction:
x x x in issuing the November 20, 2003 Order by ruling that the search warrant was issued based on the
existence of probable cause in connection with a specified offense and validly implemented even if the same
was served starting at nighttime and including the seizure of blue colored steel cylinders and steel cylinders of
different brand names despite the fact that the steel cylinders were either empty or effectively empty having
been received and possessed by petitioner in the ordinary course of his business being a legitimate dealer of
Shellane brand LPG, a petroleum product of the Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. and thereafter in issuing the
Order dated January 5, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration.[4]
However, the CA promulgated the first assailed order on March 25, 2004,[5] dismissing the petition for
certiorari for failure to implead the People of the Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a
copy of the petition had been served on the OSG, to wit:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court for the
following reasons:
 1. the People of the Philippines is not impleaded as a respondent;

2. no proof that a copy of the petition was served on the Office of the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,[6] arguing that impleading the People of the Philippines as
respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed against him with only the application
for the issuance of the search warrant having been made; and that serving the copy of the petition on the OSG
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court was not indispensable. Nevertheless, he attached to his
motion for reconsideration the affidavit of service executed by one Salvador R. Dumaop, Jr. presumably to
conform with the rule on proof of service to the respondents, whereby the affiant attested that the copy of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration were served on the OSG by registered mail.

On July 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration[7] on the ground that although the
petitioner had served on the OSG copies of the petition and the motion for reconsideration he did not file the
appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the petition and to actually amend the petition in order to implead
the People of the Philippines as respondents. The CA ratiocinated that:
We call the petitioner's attention to the fact that Section 1, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides hat
"a search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it
before the Court." A search warrant is issued in the name of the People of the Philippines because there is a
finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In legal contemplation, the crime or offense had been committed
against the State - the People of the Philippines - and this is the State interest in the proceedings. If the petitioner
wishes to contest the finding of probable cause or any other aspect of the issuance of the search warrant, then he
must implead the entity who in legal contemplation made the finding and in whose name the finding was made;
otherwise, there can be no final determination of the case because the party indispensable to its resolution had
been omitted.[8]
Hence, according to the CA, it was left with no choice but to deny the motion for reconsideration.

Not satisfied, the petitioner has come to the Court on appeal to reverse and set aside the aforesaid resolutions by
insisting that the failure to implead the People of the Philippines was not a fatal defect.

Issue

In this appeal, the petitioner relevantly avers in his petition for review on certiorari,[9] as follows:
xxxx

20. It is humbly submitted that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition by ruling that the failure to implead the People of
the Philippines as an indispensable party is a fatal defect. The petition has shown a grave violation of a
constitutional right that must necessarily override a rule on technicality, assuming it is applicable and correct.

21. Specifically, it is submitted that it is not a necessary requisite and an indispensable condition that the People
of the Philippine (sic) be impleaded in a petition filed assailing the denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
And that such failure to so include it as an indispensable party is not a fatal defect more so with the fact that
there was a showing of a gross violation of a constitutional right.[10]

xxxx
However, on November 8, 2004, the Court denied the petition for review,[11] viz.:
G.R. No. 164974 (Charlie Te vs. Augusto Breva, etc., et al.). - The Court Resolves to DENY the motion of
petition for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file
petition for review on certiorari, for failing to pay the balance of P330.00 representing docket and other legal
fees and deposit for costs within the reglementary period under Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c),
Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court further Resolves to DENY the ex-parte motion of petitioner to accept payment of fee amounting to
P300.00, the payment being insufficient.

Pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or which comply strictly
with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On the basis thereof, the Court further more
Resolves to DENY the instant petition for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 2004 and July 21, 2004 for late filing as the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days fixed in Sec. 2, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(a), Rule 56.[12]
Upon the petitioner's motion for reconsideration,[13] the Court reinstated the petition for review and required the
respondents herein to comment within 10 days from notice on February 9, 2005.[14] On May 19, 2005, the
respondents filed their compliance,[15] and attached thereto their comment dated April 20, 2005,[16] with
annexes. On July 4, 2005, the Court noted the compliance ofthe respondents and the submission ofthe comment
on the petition for review on certiorari; and required the petitioner to file his reply within 10 days from
notice.[17]

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari did not need to implead the People of the Philippines
because there was yet no criminal case commenced in court, averring:
To restate, a search warrant proceedings is not a criminal action, much less a civil action (WASHINGTON
DISTILLERS INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 260 SCRA 821, quoting Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232
SCRA 249). While a search warrant is issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, the application is
made not by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party or parties. In this instant case, it is the
NBI-SARDO (through respondent SI Bahinting) and Pryce Gases, Inc. It is humbly submitted that since there is
no criminal case filed and pending when the search warrant application was made, the People of the Philippines
is not yet a proper party to be impleaded as respondent as required under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.[18]
The argument of the petitioner is untenable.

Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not depend on whether or not an
actual criminal action had already been commenced in court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the
search warrant in question had been issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered
the People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the
questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note that the impleading is further expressly
demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. a concise statement of the
matters involved. the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. (n) (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition was fatal.

The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of the Philippines is imposed by
Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Search warrant defined. -- A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal action; and that
the application for the search warrant was not of the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search
warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of discovery
employed by no less than the State to procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or
tool, issued under the State's police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of
the Philippines.[19]

Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant[20] and the search warrant itself[21] were upon
the behest of the People of the Philippines. It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend,
therefore, that the application against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested
party or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

The petitioner could have quickly rectified his omission by the immediate amendment of the petition. However,
although made aware of the omission as a fatal defect, he did not cause the amendment but continued to ignore
the need to amend. He thereby exhibited his adamant refusal to recognize the People of the Philippines as
indispensable parties, which impelled the CA to aptly remark in its denial of his motion for reconsideration,
thusly:
We note that while the petitioner furnished the OSG with copies of the petition and the motion for
reconsideration, he did not attempt to cure the defect of the petition - i.e. the failure to implead the People of the
Philippines - by filing the appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the petition and by amending the
petition to implead the Republic of the Philippines as a party to the proceedings. Hence, the first ground upon
which we based our dismissal of the petition still holds and we are left with no choice but to deny the present
motion.[22] (emphasis supplied)
With its dismissal of the petition for certiorari being proper and in accord with the pertinent rules of procedure,
the CA did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction.[23] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[24]

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolution of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on March 25, 2004 (dismissing the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
82797); and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 189669

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioners,

- versus -

ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision

of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution

dated September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are:

Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing the duly registered trademark and device of
respondent Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who sent their people to investigate.
The investigators went to respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty
cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's employees then
refilled said empty cylinders at respondent's refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought to the Marketing
Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that respondent was not authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal
with Petron LPG products, and/or use or imitate any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting
establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron
and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of Section 168,

in relation to Section 170

of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, and/or Section 2

of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks,
Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.

The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane
cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. They also witnessed trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility
loaded with Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places, one of them a
store called "Edrich Enterprises" located at 272 National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought
Shellane and Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.

Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate
Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1,

in relation to Section 170

of R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an Order
granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the NBI served
the warrants at the respondent's premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the
warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only
grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy
to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a
third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21,
2003, the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.

However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only
in said motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search
Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC-Iriga City. Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling
reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the
commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner
opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the
venue of the filing of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.

In an Order dated July 28, 2003,the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby
quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28.

Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated March 13,2009, affirmed the RTC Order
quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated
September 14, 2009.

Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner presents herein the following issues:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL
CASE.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASHIS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY NOT
BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:

SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)

The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant in this case should
have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City,
considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed
and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature,
requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of
persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who
would be enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed
insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the
application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.

Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the more pressing question that would
determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect
in resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very first time? The record bears
out that, indeed, respondent failed to include said issue at the first instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus
motion rule cover a motion to quash search warrants?

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available
objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the
court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations.

It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to
motions to quash search warrants.
Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People,
that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x."

In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not
raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search
warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the
application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if
the newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.

In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent's motion for reconsideration was an issue of
jurisdiction, the CA rationcinated, thus:

It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.

Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,

and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines,

to wit:

x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process,"
rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with
the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal
process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is
reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the
issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not
a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. x x x

(Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the
proceedings for applications for search warrants with criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court,
proceedings for said applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply
thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent
in all courts.

Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken into consideration an
issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.

Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,

that:

We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining supplemental motions x x x which raise grounds that are
already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in
order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the
Resolution dated September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to quash, is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1934 dated February 11,
2015.
G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant, petitioner,

vs.
QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA",
respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code
(IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder? This is
the issue we grapple with in this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink giants;
petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the
respondents, of hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its operation in
Bicolandia.

BACKGROUND

The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in
Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed
that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents. 1 In
support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel
John Ponce said he was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi compound and
had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was
hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed
by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's
yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.2

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint deposition of the
witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-013 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at
Pepsi's Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.4 The local police seized and brought to the MTC's
custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for
smaller (eight and 12 ounces) empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga a
complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.5 The
named respondents, also the respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E. Galicia (Galicia)
and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez).

In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers
who included them in their return to make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining
beforehand the return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles
in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and Regaspi's statements are hearsay as they had no personal
knowledge of the alleged crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of empty bottles; and that
the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their favor.
Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook, Lirio
did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.

The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search warrant. They contended that no
probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and
their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi used the shells in
hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the
IP Code, and that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and
other similar containers.

THE MTC RULINGS

On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order6 denying the twin motions. It explained there was an
exhaustive examination of the applicant and its witnesses through searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima
facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the respondents.

In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the warrant as the MTC did not conduct a
probing and exhaustive examination; the applicant and its witnesses had no personal knowledge of facts surrounding the
hoarding; the court failed to order the return of the "borrowed" shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant was issued
based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure of the shells was illegal because they were not included in the warrant.

On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second assailed order,7 explaining that the
issue of whether there was unfair competition can only be resolved during trial.

The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the ground that the subject search warrant was issued without probable cause
and that the empty shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the perceived crime.

THE RTC RULINGS

On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the crime of unfair
competition, even as it implied that other laws may have been violated by the respondents. The RTC, though, found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.8 Thus,

Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on
July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga
City dated September 19, 2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The City
Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed to return to the Petitioner the properties seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.

SO ORDERED.9

In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the petitioner stressed that the decision of the
RTC was contradictory because it absolved Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant, but
at the same time nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have dismissed the petition when it found out that Judge
Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the RTC. Essentially, the petition raises questions against the RTC's nullification
of the warrant when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge.

THE PETITION and

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents' petition for certiorari because it found
no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in issuing the search warrant. The petitioner further argues that the IP Code was
enacted into law to remedy various forms of unfair competition accompanying globalization as well as to replace the
inutile provision of unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 168.3(c) of the IP Code does
not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to
include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another."
The inherent element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large quantities of a competitor's empty
bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that its Bicol bottling operation was prejudiced by the
respondents' hoarding and destruction of its empty bottles.

The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper because it complied with all the essential
requisites of a valid warrant. The empty bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to prevent discovery while they were
systematically being destroyed to hamper the petitioner's bottling operation and to undermine the capability of its bottling
operations in Bicol.

The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own examination, he gravely erred and abused
his discretion when he ignored the rule on the need of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and
convincing evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition; the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not
cause actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged criminal acts do not show
conduct aimed at deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles or pass them off as the respondents'
goods.

The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as the acts penalized must always
involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding does not make them liable for unfair competition as there was no deception or
fraud on the end-users.

THE ISSUE

Based on the parties' positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is whether the Naga MTC was correct in
issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from Pepsi's yard for probable violation of
Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the substantive issue of whether the
application for search warrant effectively charged an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code; and the
procedural issue of whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court in the issuance of search
warrants.

OUR RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is more in the result than in the reasons
that supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying the search warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive
basis - the acts imputed on the respondents do not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the
present petition.

The issuance of a search warrant10 against a personal property11 is governed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
whose relevant sections state:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with the affidavits submitted.

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. - If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with a specific
offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his or her witnesses. This is the
substantive requirement in the issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a
personal task of the judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath or
affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of "searching questions and answers" in writing and under
oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and procedural aspects. Apparently, the RTC
recognized this dual nature of the requirements and, hence, treated them separately; it approved of the way the MTC
handled the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect
wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the warrant, without however expressly declaring that the MTC gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the warrant applied for. The RTC's error, however, is in the form rather than the substance of the
decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave
abuse of discretion was committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below will show.

Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported
by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting
it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.12 Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In other
words, the acts alleged, taken together, must constitute an offense and that these acts are imputable to an offender in
relation with whom a search warrant is applied for.

In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged - alleged to be hoarding of empty Coke bottles -
constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. Section 168 in its entirety states:

SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. -

168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his business
or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the
goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other
property rights.

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass
off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair
competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which
they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such
appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent
vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the
false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the
mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other
act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.
 168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29,R.A. No.
166a)

The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it
expands the meaning of unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit
the goods, business or services of another." Allegedly, the respondents' hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is one such
act.

We do not agree with the petitioner's expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).

"Unfair competition," previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with R.A. No. 166 and Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by Section 168 of the IP Code as this Code has expressly repealed R.A.
No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on the definition of unfair competition.
The law does not thereby cover every unfair act committed in the course of business; it covers only acts characterized by
"deception or any other means contrary to good faith" in the passing off of goods and services as those of another who has
established goodwill in relation with these goods or services, or any other act calculated to produce the same result.

What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides specifics of what unfair
competition is "without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition." Part of these particulars is
provided under Section 168.3(c) which provides the general "catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase,
a person shall be guilty of unfair competition "who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated
to discredit the goods, business or services of another."

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon
the public the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of
deceiving the public. It formulated the "true test" of unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are
calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the
particular trade to which the controversy relates.13 One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair
competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before the right to recover can exist. 14 The advent of the
IP Code has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its
entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements that must be present for
unfair competition to exist.

The act alleged to violate the petitioner's rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding which we gather to be the collection of
the petitioner's empty bottles so that they can be withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the circulation of the
petitioner's bottled products. This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith - a conclusion that, if true, is
indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act
of hoarding; what is critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, "is of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services" of the petitioner.

We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the contemplation of the IP Code.

The petitioner's cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a very specific subject - intellectual
property. Aside from the IP Code's actual substantive contents (which relate specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks,
trade names, service marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the intellectual properties that these
protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its "Declaration of State
Policy" which states:

Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The State recognizes that an effective intellectual and industrial property
system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts
foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of
scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when
beneficial to the people, for such periods as provided in this Act.
 The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the State shall promote the diffusion of
knowledge and information for the promotion of national development and progress and the common good.

It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering patents, trademarks and
copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology, and to enhance the enforcement of
intellectual property rights in the Philippines. (n)

"Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the Code to consist of: a) Copyright and
Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c) Geographic Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-
Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.

Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question arises on whether a matter is covered
by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property as defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code
may be negated.

A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property right as defined above, is whether it
falls under the general "unfair competition" concept and definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The
question then is whether there is "deception" or any other similar act in "passing off" of goods or services to be those of
another who enjoys established goodwill.

Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction giving particular attention, not so
much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a
sociis," when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.15

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person who has earned goodwill with
respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the Code, with or without a registered mark.
Section 168.2, as previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other
hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the
appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that his or her goods or services are that of
another who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3 being a "catch all" clause whose coverage the parties
now dispute.

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by the petitioner - does not fall
within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name
or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner. Nor
are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently "passing off" their products or services as those of the petitioner. The
respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to
confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an act
foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by
seeking to limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use for these sales.

In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No. 623 - covers, to wit:

SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral
or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other
similar containers, with their names or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership
stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used
by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance
of trademarks.

SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller
who has successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding
section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the
 purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, or
to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than that registered by the
manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine or not more than one
hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.

As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may overlap or be affected by the
provisions of Part II of the IP Code on "The Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names." What is certain is that
the IP Code has not expressly repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a special type of
registrants - the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other
lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers - who are given special protection
with respect to the containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law of specific coverage and application, compared with
the general terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of unlawful use of
containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction - a matter that escapes the IP Code's generalities
unless linked with the concepts of "deception" and "passing off" as discussed above.

Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the parties did not consider at all in the
search warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its search warrant application since the "one
specific offense" that the law allows and which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in
our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not
by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the disputed search
warrant at once becomes apparent.

Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of this Court penned by Mr. Justice
Bellosillo is particularly instructive:

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since
there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements
and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues
raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null
and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established
jurisprudence.16

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioner's search warrant should properly be
quashed for the petitioner's failure to show that the acts imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense. There
could not have been any probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant because no crime in the first place was
effectively charged. This conclusion renders unnecessary any further discussion on whether the search warrant application
properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a "hoarding" in bad faith aimed to prejudice the
petitioner's operations, or whether the MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-
01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 *
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
 G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA,
Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA,** J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated November 12, 2012 of petitioner
People of the Philippines as represented by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012
quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually
dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.

The facts follow.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, which
reads, in part, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIt appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath SPO1 RONEL
P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the
applicant herein, and his witness that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that JOEFREY JIL
RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control the following
items, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS you are hereby ordered to make an

immediate search at any time of the day or night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential place of
JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-described
items to immediately bring him, thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of
the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran, Cagayan.2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing
residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino located in Aparri,
Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in
Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3chanrobleslaw

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and within, the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody one (1) big zip-lock transparent
plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, one sachet
with traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous drag, while the other sachet gave negative results to said tests, the said accused
knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the
quality of the purity thereof, unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by
respondent Judge Castillo.

Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched; No compelling reason for
MTC Gattaran to issue warrant

xxxx

No probable cause to issue Search Warrant

xxxx

No searching question elicited from deponent

x xx x

No particularity in the places to be searched

xxxx

Irregularity in the implementation of the search

x x xx

Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which
partly reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond
imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to
issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void. [Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in
virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied upon by the accused to buttress his motion
and the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor are deemed mere surplusage.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered
QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered
SUPPRESSED. There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the above-captioned cases are hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its Joint Order7 dated September 24,
2012.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent Judge Castillo with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the Municipal
Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search and seize
the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same second judicial region in violation of R.A.
9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear and try the offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25, 2016, claims that the petition was filed in
violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the petition should have been filed by the State,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B, Sagucio.
Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does not show that the assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This Court finds merit to the petition.

Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the petition, certain procedural issues have been
pointed out by private respondent that need to be tackled. According to the private respondent, the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck down as it violates the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
Private respondent further argues that petitioner did not provide any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also averred that the petition should have been filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor because the petition is in the nature of an
appeal and the former is vested with the power of representing the people before any court.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when
there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment the acts of the lower court or agency.11 Its
principal office is only to the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.12chanrobleslaw

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in questioning the quashal of the
search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his
allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts authorized to issue a search warrant,
petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant was patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had
allowed even direct recourse to this Court13 or to the Court of Appeals14 via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial
court's quashal of a search warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
Howevever, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner involves an
application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution17 regarding
the jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve the present
petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the
Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.18
It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review
of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.19 In certain cases, this Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions for certiorari and considered the
said petitions as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this Court ruled that
an exception exists to the general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the
RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a
petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor
General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a
lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case
against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by
the parties.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private complainants and deemed them as if filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor.

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense
in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 22 Necessarily, a
motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched
or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.23chanrobleslaw

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search wan-ant and eventually dismissed the case based merely on
the fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of
R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe
to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that
alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime
was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to
issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place
that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found
probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling
reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have
jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls
here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction,
and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no
criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated November 12, 2012, of petitioner
People of the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court of
Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent
Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), J., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188526 November 11, 2013

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., MING SENG CHINESE DRUGSTORE, XIANG JIAN CHINESE
DRUG STORE, TEK SAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, SIM SIM CHINESE DRUG STORE, BAN SHIONG TAY
CHINESE DRUG STORE and/or WILCENDO TAN MENDEZ, SHUANG YING CHINESE DRUGSTORE, and
BACLARAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 31, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952 and the Resolution2 dated July 2, 2009, which denied reconsideration
thereof. The CA reversed the Order3 dated September 25, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati
City, quashing Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043, and the
Order4 dated March 7, 2007 denying reconsideration thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy,5 is the sole distributor and
registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap as shown by Certificate of
Registration 4-2000-009881 issued to her by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for a period of ten years from August
24, 2003.6 On November 7, 2005, her representative, Ping Na Lau, (Ping) wrote a letter7 addressed to National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, through Atty. Jose Justo Yap and Agent Joseph G. Furing (Agent
Furing), requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which were selling counterfeit whitening papaya
soaps bearing the general appearance of their products.

Agent Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit8 stating that: he conducted his own investigation, and
on November 9 and 10, 2005, he, together with Junayd Esmael (Esmael), were able to buy whitening soaps bearing the
trademark "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" with corresponding receipts from a list of drugstores which
included herein petitioners Century Chinese Medicine Co., Min Seng Chinese Drugstore, Xiang Jiang Chinese Drug
Store, Tek San Chinese Drug Store, Sim Sim Chinese Drug Store, Ban Shiong Tay Drugstore, Shuang Ying Chinese
Drugstore, and Baclaran Chinese Drug Store; while conducting the investigation and test buys, he was able to confirm
Ping's complaint to be true as he personally saw commercial quantities of whitening soap bearing the said trademarks
being displayed and offered for sale at the said drugstores; he and Esmael took the purchased items to the NBI, and Ping,
as the authorized representative and expert of Worldwide Pharmacy in determining counterfeit and unauthorized
reproductions of its products, personally examined the purchased samples, and issued a Certification9 dated November
18, 2005 wherein he confirmed that, indeed, the whitening soaps bearing the trademarks "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE
OF A LEAF" from the subject drugstores were counterfeit.

Esmael also executed an affidavit10 corroborating Agent Furing's statement. Ping's affidavit11 stated that upon his
personal examination of the whitening soaps purchased from petitioners bearing the subject trademark, he found that the
whitening soaps were different from the genuine quality of their original whitening soaps with the trademarks "TOP-
GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" and certified that they were all counterfeit.

On November 21, 2005, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 143, Makati City, against petitioners and other establishments for violations of Sections 168 and 155, both in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines. Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition; while Section 155, in relation to Section
170, punishes trademark infringement.

On November 23, 2005, after conducting searching questions upon Agent Furing and his witnesses, the RTC granted the
applications and issued Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, and 05-038 for unfair competition and Search Warrants
Nos. 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043 for trademark infringement against petitioners.

On December 5, 2005, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants.12

On December 8, 2005, petitioners collectively filed their Motion to Quash13 the Search Warrants contending that their
issuances violated the rule against forum shopping; that Benjamin Yu (Yu) is the sole owner and distributor of the product
known as "TOP-GEL"; and there was a prejudicial question posed in Civil Case No. 05-54747 entitled Zenna Chemical
Industry v. Ling Na Lau, et al., pending in Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon City, which is a case filed by Yu against
respondent for damages due to infringement of trademark/tradename, unfair competition with prayer for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction.

On January 9, 2006, respondent filed her Comment/Opposition14 thereto arguing the non-existence of forum shopping;
that Yu is not a party- respondent in these cases and the pendency of the civil case filed by him is immaterial and
irrelevant; and that Yu cannot be considered the sole owner and distributor of "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF."
The motion was then submitted for resolution in an Order dated January 30, 2006. During the pendency of the case,
respondent, on April 20, 2006, filed a Submission15 in relation to the Motion to Quash attaching an Order16 dated March
21, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001 filed by respondent against Yu, doing business under the name and
style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, proprietor of South Ocean Chinese Drug Stores for trademark
infringement and/or unfair competition and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. The Order approved therein
the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise Agreement filed on March 8, 2006. We quote in its entirety the Order
as follows:

The Compromise Agreement between the herein complainant and respondents provides as follows:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE
OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on
August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the
exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M"
ISSUED " OVER THE LETTER "CA") as registered under Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued on November
17, 2000, as well as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on
papaya whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid but after having realized that
Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid
tradename and trademark and further undertake not to manufacture, sell, distribute, and otherwise compete with
Complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name
identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP
GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.

4. Respondents further undertake to withdraw and/or dismiss their counterclaim and petition to cancel and/or
revoke Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued to Complainant. Respondents also further undertake to pull out
within 45 days from approval of the Compromise Agreement all their products bearing a mark or name identical
or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA &
MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, from the market nationwide.
 5. Respondents finally agree and undertake to pay Complainant liquidated damages in the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php500,000.00) PESOS for every breach or violation of any of the foregoing
undertakings which complainant may enforce by securing a writ of execution from this Office, under this case.

6. Complainant, on the other hand, agrees to waive all her claim for damages against Respondents as alleged in
her complaint filed in the Intellectual Property Office only.

7. The Parties hereby agree to submit this Compromise Agreement for Approval of this Office and pray for
issuance of a decision on the basis thereof.

Finding the Compromise Agreement to have been duly executed and signed by the parties and/or their
representatives/counsels and the terms and conditions thereof to be in conformity with the law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is DISMISSED as
all issues raised concerning herein parties have been rendered MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.17

On September 25, 2006, the RTC issued its Order18 sustaining the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned search warrants were not supported by probable cause, the
Motion to Quash is GRANTED. Search warrants nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043
are ordered lifted and recalled.

The NBI Officers who effected the search warrants are hereby ordered to return the seized items to herein respondents
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

So Ordered.19

In quashing the search warrants, the RTC applied the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights.20 It found the existence of a prejudicial question which was pending before Branch 93 of
RTC Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, on the determination as to who between respondent and Yu is
the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there
was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu before the IPO which
was pending at the time of the application for the search warrants. It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the filing of the
application for the search warrants, there is yet no determination of the alleged right of respondent over the subject
trademark/tradename. Also, the RTC found that petitioners relied heavily on Yu's representation that he is the sole
owner/distributor of the Top Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 from the
IPO for a term of 20 years from November 17, 2000 covering the same product. There too was the notarized certification
from Zenna Chemical Industry of Taiwan, owner of Top Gel MCA, with the caveat that the sale, production or
representation of any imitated products under its trademark and tradename shall be dealt with appropriate legal action.

The RTC further said that in the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an
offense exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant or the quashal of the one already issued. In this case, respondent
failed to prove the existence of probable cause, which warranted the quashal of the questioned search warrants.

On November 13, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Release of Seized Evidence.21

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order22 dated March 7, 2007.

Respondent then filed her appeal with the CA. After respondent filed her appellant's brief and petitioners their appellee's
brief, the case was submitted for decision.

On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed in this
case and SETTING ASIDE the Order dated March 7, 2007 issued by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati City in the case involving Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-
038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043.23

In reversing the RTC's quashal of the search warrants, the CA found that the search warrants were applied for and issued
for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the
applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal actions which are to be instituted against petitioners;
thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It also ruled that the basis for the applications for
issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and unfair competition was the trademark TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent was the registered owner of the said trademark, which gave her the
right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it by seeking assistance from the NBI.

The CA did not agree with the RTC that there existed a prejudicial question, since Civil Case No. 05-54747 was already
dismissed on June 10, 2005, i.e., long before the search warrants subject of this appeal were applied for; and that Yu's
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, 2005 with no appeal having been filed thereon as evidenced by
the Certificate of Finality issued by the said court.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 2, 2009. Hence, this petition filed
by petitioners raising the issue that:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING
THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND HELD THAT THE LATTER APPLIED THE
RULES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS.24

(B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT BASED
ITS RULING ON THE ARGUMENT WHICH WAS BROUGHT UP FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
RESPONDENT LING NA LAU'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF.25

Petitioners contend that the products seized from their respective stores cannot be the subject of the search warrants and
seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of any crime, infringed product nor intended to be used in any crime; that
they are legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the same, since those genuine top gel products bore the original
trademark/tradename of TOP GEL MCA, owned and distributed by Yu. Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's order
to release the seized TOP GEL products, not one had been returned; that one or two samples from each petitioners'
drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need to present them in a criminal prosecution, and that confiscation of
thousands of these products was an overkill.

Petitioners also argue that the issue that the RTC erred in applying the rules on search and seizure in anticipation of a civil
action was never raised in the RTC.

The issue for resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search warrants.

We find no merit in the petition.

The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155 and 168, both in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation to
Section 170, penalizes unfair competition, to wit:

Sec 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the same
container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods
or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

While

Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.

xxxx

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following
shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or
dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or
words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that
the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise
clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any
subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

And

SEC. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts
mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Subsection 169.1 [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation].

Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and
Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable in this case as the search
warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights
under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and search
warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL
T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of
the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal
actions that are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.

Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs the issuance of the assailed Search Warrants, provides, to wit:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."26 And when the law
speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may
present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance
being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.27 The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules
and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.28 As implied by the words
themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need
not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man,29 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.30

The RTC quashed the search warrants, saying that (1) there exists a prejudicial question pending before Branch 93 of the
RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, i.e., the determination as to who between respondent and Yu
is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; and
there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu pending before
the IPO, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001; and (2) Yu's representation that he is the sole distributor of the Top
Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued by the IPO to Zenna Chemical
Industry as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL MCA & DEVICE MCA for a term of 20 years from
November 17, 2000 covering the same product.

We do not agree. We affirm the CA's reversal of the RTC Order quashing the search warrants.

The affidavits of NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling, clearly showed that they are seeking protection
for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF" registered to respondent under Certificate of Registration
4-2000-009881 issued by the IPO on August 24, 2003, and no other. While petitioners claim that the product they are
distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOP GEL MCA and MCA DEVISE under Certificate of Registration 4-
1996-109957, it was different from the trademark TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF subject of the application.
We agree with the CA's finding in this wise:

x x x It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search warrants on grounds of trademark
infringement and unfair competition is the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private complainant-
appellant was issued a Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August 24, 2003 by the
Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the lawful holder of the said trademark. Being the registrant and the
holder of the same, private complainant-appellant had the authority to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights
over it. This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents of the NBI, who thereafter conducted a series of
investigation, test buys and inspection regarding the alleged trademark infringement by herein respondents-appellees.
Subsequently, Ping Na Lau, private complainant-appellants representative, issued a certification with the finding that the
examined goods were counterfeit. This prompted the NBI agents to apply for the issuances of search warrants against the
respondents-appellees. Said applications for the search warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining
under oath the applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R. Ismael.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied with and
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged violations committed by respondents-
appellees upon the intellectual property rights of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24, 2003 by
the Intellectual Property Office.31

Notably, at the time the applications for the issuance of the search warrants were filed on November 21, 2005, as the CA
correctly found, Civil Case No. Q-05-54747, which the RTC found to be where a prejudicial question was raised, was
already dismissed on June 10, 2005,32 because of the pendency of a case involving the same issues and parties before the
IPO. Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order33 dated September 15, 2005. In fact, a Certificate of
Finality34 was issued by the RTC on January 4, 2007.
Moreover, the IPO case for trademark infringement and unfair competition and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction filed by respondent against Yu and Heidi Cua, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, would not also be a
basis for quashing the warrants.1avvphi1 In fact, prior to the applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants
on November 21, 2005, the IPO had issued an Order35 dated October 20, 2005 granting a writ of preliminary injunction
against Yu and Cua, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby issued against Respondent, Benjamin Yu, doing
business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, Proprietor of South Ocean Chinese Drug
Store, and their agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in their behalf, to cease and desist
using the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya whitening
soaps they manufacture, sell, and/or offer for sale, and otherwise, from packing their Papaya Whitening Soaps in boxes
with the same general appearance as those of complainant's boxes within a period of NINETY (90) DAYS, effective upon
the receipt of respondent of the copy of the COMPLIANCE filed with this Office by the Complainant stating that it has
posted a CASH BOND in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php100,000.00) together with the
corresponding Official Receipt Number and date thereof. Consequently, complainant is directed to inform this Office of
actual date of receipt by Respondent of the aforementioned COMPLIANCE.36

To inform the public of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, respondent's counsel had the dispositive portion
of the Order published in The Philippine Star newspaper on October 30, 2005.37 Thus, it was clearly stated that Yu, doing
business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing, his agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all
persons acting in his behalf, were to cease and desist from using the trademark "TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or
any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya Whitening soaps they manufacture, sell and/or offer for sale. Petitioners, who
admitted having derived their TOP GEL products from Yu, are, therefore, notified of such injunction and were enjoined
from selling the same.

Notwithstanding, at the time of the application of the search warrants on November 21, 2005, and while the injunction
was in effect, petitioners were still selling the alleged counterfeit products bearing the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF. There exists a probable cause for violation of respondent's intellectual property rights, which
entitles her as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL and DEVICE OF A LEAF to be protected by the issuance
of the search warrants.

More importantly, during the pendency of petitioners' motion to quash in the RTC, respondent submitted the Order dated
March 8, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, where the writ of preliminary injunction was earlier issued,
approving the compromise agreement entered into by respondent with Yu and Cua where it was stated, among others,
that:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE
OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on
August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the
exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M"
OVER THE LETTER "CA") as registered under Registration No 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000,
as well as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on papaya
whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid, but after having realized that
Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid
tradename and trademark, and further undertake not to manufacture, sell and distribute and otherwise compete
with complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name
identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of the tradename and trademark TOP GEL
MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.38
Hence, it appears that there is no more controversy as to who is the rightful holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF. Therefore, respondent, as owner of such registered trademark has the right to the issuance of the
search warrants.

Anent petitioners' claim that one or two samples of the Top Gel products from each of them, instead of confiscating
thousands of the products, would have sufficed for the purpose of an anticipated criminal action, citing our ruling in
Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals,39 is not meritorious.

We do not agree.

The factual milieu of the two cases are different. In Summerville, the object of the violation of Summerville's intellectual
property rights, as assignee of Royal playing cards and Royal brand playing cards case, was limited to the design of
Summerville's Royal plastic container case which encased and wrapped the Crown brand playing cards. In the application
for the search warrant which the RTC subsequently issued, one of the items to be seized were the Crown brand playing
cards using the copyright plastic and Joker of Royal brand. Thus, numerous boxes containing Crown playing cards were
seized and upon the RTC's instruction were turned over to Summerville, subject to the condition that the key to the said
warehouse be turned over to the court sheriff. Respondents moved for the quashal of the search warrant and for the return
of the seized properties. The RTC partially granted the motion by ordering the release of the seized Crown brand playing
cards and the printing machines; thus, only the Royal plastic container cases of the playing cards were left in the custody
of Summerville. The CA sustained the RTC order. On petition with us, we affirmed the CA. We found therein that the
Crown brand playing cards are not the subject of the offense as they are genuine and the Crown trademark was registered
to therein respondents names; that it was the design of the plastic container/case that is alleged to have been utilized by
respondents to deceive the public into believing that the Crown brand playing cards are the same as those manufactured
by Summerville. We then said that assuming that the Crown playing cards could be considered subject of the offense, a
sample or two are more than enough to retain should there have been a need to examine them along with the plastic
container/case; and that there was no need to hold the hundreds of articles seized. We said so in the context that since
what was in dispute was the design of the Royal plastic cases/containers of playing cards and not the playing card per se, a
small number of Crown brand playing cards would suffice to examine them with the Royal plastic cases/containers. And
the return of the playing cards would better serve the purposes of justice and expediency. However, in this case, the object
of the violation of respondent's intellectual property right is the alleged counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A
LEAF papaya whitening soap being sold by petitioners, so there is a need to confiscate all these articles to protect
respondent's right as the registered owner of such trademark.

Petitioners next contend that the CA's ruling on the applicability of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that the search warrants
were issued in anticipation of a criminal action was only based on respondent's claim which was only brought for the first
time in her appellant's brief.

We are not persuaded.

We find worth quoting respondent's argument addressing this issue in its Comment, thus:

In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the Rule correctly applicable to the subject search warrants was
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners fault the appellate court for ruling that the Regional Trial Court incorrectly
applied the Rules on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights on the basis of
an argument that private respondent brought up for the first time in her Appellant's Brief.

A cursory perusal of the Appellant's Brief shows that the following issues/errors were raised, that: (1) the Honorable Trial
Court erred in holding that the "Rules on Search and Seizure for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights" apply to the
search warrants at bar; (2) x x x.

It must be remembered that there was no trial on the merits to speak of in the trial court, and the matter of the application
of the wrong set of Rules only arose in the Order dated 25th September 2006 which sustained the Motion to Quash. A
thorough examination of the Appellee's Brief filed by petitioners (respondents-appellees in the Court of Appeals) reveals,
however, that petitioners NEVER assailed the first issue/error on the ground that the same was raised for the first time on
appeal. It is only now, after the appellate court rendered a Decision and Resolution unfavorable to them, that petitioners
questioned the alleged procedural error. Petitioners should now be considered in estoppel to question the same.40

Indeed, perusing the appellee's (herein petitioners) brief filed with the CA, the matter of the non-applicability of the rules
on search and seizure in civil action for infringement of intellectual property rights was never objected as being raised for
the first time. On the contrary, petitioners had squarely faced respondent's argument in this wise:

Appellant (herein respondent) contends that the rule (SC Adm. Memo 1-06, No. 02-1-06, Rule on Search and Seizure in
Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights) does [not] apply to the search warrants in the [case] at bar,
for the reason that the search warrants themselves reveal that the same were applied for and issued for violations of
"Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293" and violations of "Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA
8293," and that a perusal of the records would show that there is no mention of a civil action or anticipation thereof, upon
which the search warrants are applied for.

Appellees (herein petitioners) cannot agree with the contention of the appellant.1wphi1 Complainant NBI Agent Joseph
G. Furing, who applied for the search warrants, violated the very rule on search and seizure for infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights. The search warrants applied for by the complainants cannot be considered a criminal action.
There was no criminal case yet to speak of when complainants applied for issuance of the search warrants. There is
distinction here because the search applied for is civil in nature and no criminal case had been filed. The complaint is an
afterthought after the respondents-appellees filed their Motion to Quash Search Warrant before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 24. The grounds enumerated in the rule must be complied with in order to protect the constitutional
mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law." Clearly, the application of the search warrants for violation of unfair competition
and infringement is in the nature of a civil action.41

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2009 and the Resolution dated July 2,
2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above I
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On direct appeal before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Case No. 99-174439 finding appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Section 16, Article III in relation to Section
2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425,1[1] as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.

The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:

That on or about June 14, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by
law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied transparent plastic bag containing TWO
HUNDRED FOUR (204) grams of white crystalline substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.

Contrary to law.2[2]

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 3[3] Subsequently, at
the pre-trial conference on August 10, 1999, the parties stipulated that (1) the subject Search Warrant is valid;
and (2) the Forensic Chemist conducted only a qualitative examination on the subject specimen. 4[4]

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Edwin Zata, Forensic Chemical Officer
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) PO2 Gerardo Abulencia (PO2 Abulencia); (3)
SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez); and (4) SPO1 Ver M. Serquea (SPO1 Ver Serquea) whose
testimonies sought to establish the following facts:

On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test buy operation
at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they purchased from
him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5[5] The police officers did not immediately
arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for appellants residence from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City6[6] based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his
house.7[7]

On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with PO2
Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez,8[8] proceeded to appellants above-said residence armed
with Search Warrant No. 99-00389[9] issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City commanding them to make an
immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants residence and to seize and take possession of
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds
of the above crime.

Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at around 6:00 in the evening, 10[10] they, to enable
them to gain entry to the two-storey house, sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants Toyota Corolla GLI car which
was parked outside.11[11] Jack Go, appellants son and the only one present at the house at the time, thereupon
opened the door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him that they had a
warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1
Serquea and PO2 Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained outside. 12[12]

On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea left to summon barangay officials to witness the search.
SPO1 Serquea returned five minutes later with Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro (Kagawad Lazaro) and
Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad Manalo) who were advised by SPO1 Fernandez to be witnesses to the search and
to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
As instructed, the two barangay kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of appellants house with SPO1 Serquea
and PO2 Abulencia.13[13] While SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the sala,14[14] instructed the
handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search, the latter refused since there will be no more left in the sala of the
house anyway there is a barangay official.15[15]

In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening,16[16] Kagawad
Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance17[17] from the drawer of a cabinet.

Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) one plastic bag containing yellowish
substance18[18] found by SPO1 Serquea;19[19] (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1 Fernandez; (c) assorted
documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals
and (j) stamp pads;20[20] (k) Chinese and Philippine currency;21[21] (l) and appellants Toyota Corolla GLI22[22] car
(the car).
The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Fernandez as EGF-A-1, while
the plastic bag with the yellowish substance was marked as EGF-A-2.23[23]

With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the ground floor of
appellants house for inventory.24[24]

In the meantime, appellants wife Shi Xiu Ong and his friends Samson Go and Peter Co arrived one after the
other at the house.25[25] Appellant himself arrived at 9:30 in the evening when the search was almost
through.26[26]

After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory Receipt27[27] and a
document captioned Affidavit of Orderly Search,28[28] the contents of which he read to appellant. On instruction
of SPO1 Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the documents to appellant who then signed them as
did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go as witnesses.29[29]

The police officers then brought appellant, his wife, son and friends, along with the seized items, to Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for verification and investigation.

Appellant was detained while the others were eventually released. 30[30] The arresting officers jointly prepared
an Affidavit of Arrest dated June 15, 199931[31] which, among other things, contained an enumeration of the
seized items identical to that in the handwritten Inventory Receipt. And SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Return of
Search Warrant 99-0038 dated June 18, 1999 and a referral paper 1st Indorsement32[32] with the same
enumeration of seized items.

Also on June 15, 1999, SPO1 Serquea brought the plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance
(Exhibit A) and the plastic bag containing the yellowish substance (Exhibit B) to the PNP Crime
Laboratory33[33] together with a request for laboratory examination.34[34] Upon examination, Exhibit A was
found to contain 204 grams of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug.35[35] Exhibit B, on the other hand, was found negative for any prohibited and/or regulated
drug.36[36]

Meanwhile, the seized documents, passports, dry seals and stamp pads were brought to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation,37[37] while the bank books were forwarded to the corresponding banks for
verification.38[38]

The prosecution presented in evidence the Yamato weighing scale,39[39] claimed to have been recovered by
SPO1 Fernandez from the top of appellants refrigerator,40[40] although it was not among those listed in the
handwritten Inventory Receipt, Affidavit of Arrest or Return of the Search Warrant. 41[41] Also presented by the
prosecution, as a hostile witness, to corroborate in part the foregoing facts was Kagawad Lazaro. He claimed,
however, that the first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt submitted in evidence had been substituted
with another, asserting that he and the other witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of the
first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt which they were asked to sign whereas that submitted in court
did not bear their signatures.42[42]

Kagawad Lazaro further claimed that the first entry on the first page of the Inventory Receipt, whereon he and
his co-witnesses affixed their signatures, reading Chinese Medicine had been replaced with undetermined
quantity of white crystalline granules;43[43] that what was recovered from the room of Jack Go by PO2
Abulencia was Exhibit B, the plastic bag containing the yellowish powder, and not Exhibit A, the plastic bag
containing the suspected shabu; and that Exhibit A was not even among the items seized and inventoried.44[44]

The defense, which adopted the testimony of Kagawad Lazaro, presented appellant, his son Jack Go, and
Kagawad Manalo whose version of the facts of the case follows:

In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by SPO1 Serquea and
another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of money amounting to more
than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could not charge him with anything.45[45]

On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after hearing
somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the house, one of whom
handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched for about thirty (30) minutes.
46[46]

At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1 Fernandez
formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2 Abulencia, with Kagawad Lazaro
to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with Kagawad Manalo to serve as witness.47[47]

PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea, accompanied by
Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents, passports and assorted papers.
SPO1 Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed by PO2 Abulencia and
Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the policemen seized documents, passports, bankbooks and
money.48[48]

After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing passports,
money and assorted Chinese medicine.49[49]

When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m.,50[50] SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe (kaha de
yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks, Chinese currency
and pieces of jewelry.51[51]

The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were inventoried by
SPO1 Fernandez52[52] during which the barangay kagawads did not see either Exhibit A, the plastic bag
containing the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.53[53]

After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he asked Jack
Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both documents without having
read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two barangay kagawads also signed both pages of
the Inventory Receipt as witnesses.54[54]
When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the Inventory Receipt
without having been able to read its contents.55[55] Jack Go was prevented from explaining its contents to
him.56[56]

The first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt presented in court, which includes an undetermined quantity
of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent plastic envelope as among those seized from the
residence of appellant, does not bear the signatures of appellant, the kagawads and Jack Go, hence, it is not the
same first page of the handwritten Inventory Report on which they affixed their signatures.57[57] In fact the
policemen did not leave a copy of this Inventory Receipt with either appellant or the barangay kagawads.58[58]

The policemen continued to search appellants residence until around 11:00 p.m. when they brought appellant,
Jack Go, Shi Xiu Ong, Samson Go and Peter Co, together with the seized items, to Bicutan. 59[59]

On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter that the
policemen wanted P10,000,000.00 from him or he would be charged with possession of illegal drugs. The
amount demanded was later reduced to P5,000,000.00, then to P2,000,000.00, and finally to P500,000.00.
Appellant refused, however, to heed the policemens demands since he did not commit any crime.60[60]

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the appealed Decision on June 7, 2000, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered rendered finding the accused Benny Go guilty of the offense
charged in the information and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition, upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.61[61]

His Motion for Reconsideration62[62] of the decision having been denied by Order of July 24, 2000,63[63]
appellant lodged the present appeal. In his Brief,64[64] he assigns the following errors:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING THE POLICE OFFICERS THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE SEARCH WARRANT
BASED ON THEIR TESTIMONIES, THERE BEING CONVINCING PROOFS TO THE CONTRARY.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 204 GRAMS OF SHABU WAS RECOVERED
FROM THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON JUNE 14, 1999 BASED ON THE TESTIMONY
OF PO1 GERARDO ABULENCIA AND THE SUPPORTING INVENTORY RECEIPT, BOTH OF WHICH
WERE COMPLETELY CONTRADICTED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS BARANGAY KAGAWAD
GASPAR LAZARO AS WELL AS BY DEFENSE WITNESSES.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) GRAMS OF SHABU AS
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE (sic) PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND A FINE OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), INSTEAD OF
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.65[65] (Emphasis supplied)

During the pendency of the appeal, appellant filed a verified Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle
and Paraphernalia dated September 10, 200166[66] praying for the release of the following seized properties:
 a. several pcs. transparent plastic envelopes

b. one (1) unit Toyota Corolla GLI with PN UTT 658

c. Cash amounting to Fifty Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different
denominations

d. Twenty-Five Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00)

e. Sixty-Seven (67) pieces of Chinese passports

f. Twenty-Eight (28) pieces of assorted bankbooks

g. Two Hundred Eighty Five (285) pieces of assorted checks

h. Fifty-Three (53) pcs. rubber stamp and related paraphernalia

i. One (1) piece Underwood typewriter with SN 9861952

j. One (1) piece check writer

k. Two (2) pieces of dry seal

m. Five (5) boxes of assorted documents

n. Three (3) bags of assorted documents67[67]

This Court is thus called upon to determine (1) whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt; and (2) whether the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle
and Paraphernalia, which items are allegedly not among those particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-
0038, should be returned to him. These issues shall be resolved in seriatim.

Illegal Possession of 204 Grams of Shabu

As appellant questions the legality of the search of his residence, the actions of the police officers, as agents of
the State, must be carefully considered in light of appellants right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution.68[68]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from
a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.69[69]

Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution,70[70] courts must cautiously weigh the evidence before them. As early as in the 1937 case of
People v. Veloso,71[71] this Court held:

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions
under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held,
must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the
full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.72[72] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and seizure
is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:

x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.73[73]

In arriving at the appealed decision, the trial court placed greater weight on the testimony of the police officers
to whom it accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, viz:

Coming to the first issue raised, the Court gives credence to the testimonies of the police officers and
accords them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The Court has observed the
demeanor of the witnesses and finds the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses. x
xx
On the other hand, there is no showing that the police officers had ill motive when they applied for and
secured the Search Warrant, raided the house of the accused and arrested him. Accused is a Chinese
national who appeared to have no quarrel with the arresting police officers and thus the police officers had no
reason to fabricate or trump up charges against him. Hence, there appears to be no reason the police officers
should not be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. As held by the
Supreme Court, (L)aw enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty, in the absence of
the evidence to the contrary. x x x We see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling in People vs.
Capulong, (160 SCRA 533 {1988}) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duty in the
absence of convincing proof to the contrary. The appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by any improper motive other than that of accomplishing their mission. (People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Said Sariol Y Muhamading, accused-appellant, 174 SCRA 238).74[74] (Emphasis supplied)

At the same time, the trial court based its finding that the search of appellants residence was proper and valid on
the so-called Affidavit of Orderly Search.

On the second issue raised, the validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of Orderly
Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses Salvador Manalo and Gaspar
Lazaro. Such Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled with the testimonies of the police officers have clearly
established the propriety and validity of the search.75[75] (Emphasis supplied)

The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in a position to observe
the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses,76[76] is not absolute and does not apply when a careful
review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence reveal vital facts and circumstances which the
trial court overlooked or misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter the result of the case.77[77]

In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities in
the manner by which the search of appellants residence was conducted.

By PO2 Abulencias own account, in order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers deliberately
side-swiped appellants car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the regular knock and
announce procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly Section 6), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.78[78]
Q Mr. Witness, how did you enter the house of Benny Go?

A Its really heard (sic) to enter the house. Before the door, there was a still (sic) supporting the door and they
will not allow us to enter because they dont know us. Then, in order that we could enter the house, we side
swept (sinagi) a little the vehicle that was parked in front of their house. And their neighbor knocked at
the house of the subject and thats the time that we were able to enter.79[79] (Emphasis supplied)

Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to
conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service
of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellants car was
unreasonable and unjustified.

Also by PO2 Abulencias own account, upon entry to appellants residence, he immediately handcuffed Jack Go
to a chair. Justifying his action, PO2 Abulencia explained that not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and
unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating procedure:

Pros. Rebagay:

Now, what happened on June 14, 1999 at 6:00 p.m. when you were armed with the Search Warrant issued
by Judge Lilia Lopez?

A We entered inside the house of the subject and we were able to see (nadatnan naming) Jack Go, the son
of Benny Go, sir.

xxx

Q And what was the reaction of Jack Go, if any?

A We introduced ourselves as police officers and we have a Search Warrant to conduct a search to the above
subject place and also we handcuffed Jack Go to the chair, sir.

Q Why did you do that, Mr. witness?

A Hindi naming kakilala iyong mga tao, sir kaya ganoon ang ginawa namin para hindi kami maano,
eh hindi naming kabisado iyong ugali, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:

And is that an (sic) standard operating procedure Mr. witness, when you are serving a search warrant?

A Yes, sir.80[80] (Emphasis supplied)

There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen entered appellants
residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under
similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his continued
restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.

While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038 authorized the immediate search of appellants residence to seize
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds
of the above crime, the policemen, by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, seized numerous other items, which are
clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia:

Q In the presence of the barangay officials, what are those items which you seized or your raiding team
seized, if any?

A With the permission of the Honorable Court, Your Honor, can I take a look at my notes.

Court

Proceed.

Witness

Thank you very much.

A Seized or confiscated form the said residence are: (1) undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules
placed inside the transparent plastic envelope, (2) undetermined quantity of yellowish powder placed inside the
transparent plastic envelope; (3) several pieces of transparent plastic envelopes; (4) one unit Toyota Corolla GLI
with Plate No. UPT-658; (5) P52,760.00 in different denominations; (6) 25,000.00 Chinese Yuan; (7) 67 pieces
of Chinese passports; (8) 28 pieces of assorted bank book; (9) 285 pieces of assorted checks; (10) 53 pieces rubber
stamps and related paraphernalia; (11) one piece Underwood typewriter with Serial No. 9861952; (12) one piece
checkwriter; (13) two pieces dry seals; (14) 5 boxes of assorted documents; (15) 3 bags of assorted documents;
and I will add another one Your Honor, a weighing scale.81[81]

While an inventory of the seized items was prepared, also by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, it did not contain a
detailed list of all the items seized, particularly the voluminous documents:

Q Why is it that you did not make a detailed inventory or receipt of the passports? Why did you not give any
detailed receipt or inventory on the passports.

A There were lots of documents during the time on the table, voluminous documents that I was not
able to make a listing of the said passports.

Q And it was only this October 8, 1999 or four months after that you made a detailed receipt of those
seized items, am I right?

A Yes, sir.

xxx
Q Is it your standard operating procedure that when there are voluminous seized items you will not
(sic) longer made (sic) an inventory report, am I right?

A Its not an SOP.

Q Why did you not make a detailed inventory or receipt?

A As Ive said earlier, its voluminous. 82[82] (Emphasis supplied)

In Asian Surety And Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera,83[83] this Court stressed the necessity for a detailed receipt
of the items seized in order to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of the person searched:

Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of
the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes B B-1,
B-2, B-3 and B-4 of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire
registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders;
bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind
of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In
the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away
private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents
virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their
passport.84[84] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his signature85[85] without
any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel.
Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced with similar circumstances,
this Court in People v. Gesmundo86[86] stated:

It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in
her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPATUNAY previously prepared
by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in
violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The
records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither
was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as
evidence against her.87[87] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

In People v. Policarpio,88[88] this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property
allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent,
viz:

What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may
refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement
unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was
made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by
signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold
to Pat. Mangila.

Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect
are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made
to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who
should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to
remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his
right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.89[89] (Emphasis
supplied)

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellants
custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team
conducted the search of appellants residence.

At the same time, it is unclear whether appellant was furnished a copy of the Inventory Receipt as mandated by
Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.90[90]

Q Now, while you were making an inventory of that, am I right, that you did not give a copy to Benny Go,
am I right?

A I gave them a xerox copy. I remember I gave them a xerox copy.

Q Is there any proof that they received an inventory report?

A Nothing, sir.91[91]

Moreover, an examination of Exhibit Z, the Return of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 submitted by SPO1
Fernandez to Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City was not verified under oath,92[92] as required by Section 12 (a)
(formerly Section 12), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.93[93]

The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by
interested parties.94[94] Under Section 12 of Rule 126,95[95] the judge which issued the search warrant is
mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property
received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items
seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

Given the foregoing deviations from the normal and prescribed manner of conducting a search, as disclosed by
the members of the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the trial court on the disputable presumption that
the police officers regularly performed their official duty was evidently misplaced.

The Affidavit of Orderly Search is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not having been
executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which the raiding team brought with
them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as
he did instruct Jack Go, Kagawad Manalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.

More importantly, since the Affidavit of Orderly Search purports to have been executed by appellant, the same
cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for he was admittedly not present when
the search took place, he having arrived only when it was almost through.

Q And while your officers and the barangay kagawad were searching the house Mr. Benny Go is not yet
present in that house, am I right?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you made to sign Benny Go in the inventory receipt when the search was already over, am I right?
A He was already present when I was making the inventory. He arrived at around 9:30.

Q Yes, and the search was already finished, am I right?

A Almost through.96[96]

In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged Affidavit of Orderly Search,
prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who searched his residence and eventually
arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question.

On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellants residence failed to comply
with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house,
room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. (Underscoring supplied)

As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor,
which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the
presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who
was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are
prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter
of the law:

Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in
which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala
together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito na. Apparently, the search of the
accused-appellants house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This
requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said
rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.

As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein
members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the
only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other
members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the
law.97[97] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no
moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose
presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search
should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of
appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The
police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.

The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to witness the
search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway barangay officials were present,
cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 98[98]
Furthermore, the presumption is always against the waiver of a constitutionally protected right. 99[99]

While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after the search was
completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. 100[100] All alone and confronted by five police
officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be considered to have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to witness the search of the house. Consent given under such intimidating,
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. 101[101]

The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different from that in
People v. Del Rosario102[102] where this Court observed:

We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or
confiscated at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers
conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence
of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and
detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched
two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the policemen had already
entered accused-appellants residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen
had more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Sec. 14 (2), Article III,
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances
of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco,
76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653 [1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The
facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.103[103] (Emphasis supplied)
The raiding teams departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, taken
together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellants residence, tainted the search
with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the
seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Courts solemn duty to be
ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.104[104]
In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will that wrong be repressed.105[105] (Emphasis supplied)

In all prosecutions for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition
sine qua non for conviction since the dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime.106[106] With the
exclusion of Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the shabu allegedly recovered from appellants residence by
the raiding team, the decision of the trial court must necessarily be reversed and appellant acquitted.

What is more, a thorough evaluation of the testimonies and evidence given before the trial court fails to provide
the moral certainty necessary to sustain the conviction of appellant.

In particular, Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo, the two witnesses to the search chosen by the police
officers in substitution of Jack Go, both categorically testified under oath that no shabu was recovered from
appellants residence by the police. Thus, Kagawad Lazaro testified that the plastic bag containing white
crystalline granules, later found positive for shabu, was not recovered from the room of Jack Go:

Atty. Reyes:

You were shown a while ago by the prosecution of (sic) an Inventory Receipt allegedly prepared by
Officer Fernandez which includes the list of the items seized from the premises of Benny Go, now, you said that
theres no white crystalline granules included in that list which you signed during the inventory?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you recall what was the first item included in that list which you signed in the first page?

A Chinese medicine, sir.

Q Now, you also testified that you were with Officer Abulencia when you conducted the search inside the
room of Jack Go, now, did you recover anything from the room of Jack Go?

A PO2 Abulencia recovered one small plastic in the drawer of Jack Go and Naphthalene balls, sir.

xxx

Atty. Reyes:

If that small plastic will be shown to you, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Reyes:

I have here a plastic which contained yellowish powder. Could you go over this and tell us if this was the
one recovered from the room of Jack Go?

A This is the one, sir.

Q I have here another plastic containing white crystalline substance marked by the prosecution as
Exh. A. Will you tell us if this is also recovered from the room of Jack Go?

A No, this was not recovered from the room of Jack Go, sir.

Q During the preparation of the inventory of the seized items, was this also included?

A I did not see that, sir.107[107] (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Kagawad Manalo testified that neither the plastic bag of shabu nor the weighing scale was among the
seized items inventoried by the raiding team:

Q You said that you were present during the time when SPO1 Fernandez was preparing the inventory of all
the items taken from the premises of Benny Go, can you recall what are these items?

A Yes sir, assorted Chinese medicines, assorted documents, papers, passports, stamp pad, bankbooks and
checks and it was placed in five (5) boxes and three (3) ladies bag.

Q What about a weighing scale? Is there a weighing scale, Mr. Witness?

A I did not see any weighing scale, sir.

Q How about drugs or shabu contained in a plastic pack?

A I did not see any also.108[108] (Emphasis supplied)

On rebuttal, SPO1 Fernandez alleged that the two barangay kagawads were lying when they claimed that no
shabu was recovered from appellants residence, and implied that they had been asked to falsify their testimonies
in court:

Pros. Rebagay:

Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified before this Honorable Court when he was confronted with
Exh. B which is the inventory receipt the said witness denied that the first page of Exh. B" was genuine on the
fact that his signature and likewise [that of] his co-colleague did not appear on the first page of the said inventory
receipt, what can you say to that statement made by Salvador Manalo?

A Well, it has not been our practice to let the witness sign on the first page of the 2-page inventory receipt
and with regards to the said inventory receipt that he signed on June 4, it is the same inventory receipt that I
prepared, sir.

xxx

Q Likewise, Mr. witness, the said witness Salvador Manalo also denied that the shabu which is the
subject of this case has never been recovered by them, what can you say to that?

A Well, its a lie, sir.

Q Why do you say that?

A Because when the illegal drug was found by PO2 Abulencia, he was accompanied by Gaspar Lazaro
at that time. Then he called my attention and he also called the attention of SPO2 Serquea as well as the
attention of Mr. Salvador Manalo. When I went upstairs, they were already inside the said room so the five
of us saw the illegal drugs, sir.

xxx

Pros. Rebagay:

Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified here on cross-examination, he mentioned that after the search of the
house of Benny Go, a certain investigator, a policeman pretended that he is making a follow-up with respect to
the search made by you and your team, will you please tell us if immediately after the incident or after the
investigation conducted by the City Prosecutors Office when you had an occasion to meet Salvador Manalo after
that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened to that meeting with Salvador Manalo after the preliminary investigation?

Witness:

Because during the preliminary investigation, we were surprised why our witness has taken side, it
is on the side of the accused Benny Go so I decided to pay him a visit that day after that confrontation on
June 23 and I asked him what happened, tinanong ko siya kung ano ang nangyari bakit mukhang nakampi
na siya roon sa kabila. Ang sagot niya sa akin ang sabi sa amin ni Atty. Galing kakausapin ka rin niya.
That is the exact words.

Atty. Reyes:

We will object to that for being hearsay. May we move that the latter portion be stricken off the record.

Court:

Let it remain

Pros. Rebagay:

And will you please tell us exactly when this incident occur (sic), Mr. witness?

A That was after June 23, sir.

Q Where?

A At his store in A. Linao Street, Paco, sir.

Q And what was your response after you heard that answer from Salvador Manalo, if any, Mr.
witness?

Witness:

Siyempre nagtaka ako, bakit ganoon ibig sabihin implied baka nagka-aregluhan na, iyan ang iniisip
ko, sir.109[109] (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, no further evidence, aside from the foregoing allegations and suspicions of SPO1 Fernandez, was
ever presented to substantiate the claim that the two kagawads had deliberately falsified their testimonies. On
the contrary, it appears that the police officers did not actively pursue their complaint for obstruction of justice
against the two kagawads with the Department of Justice. Moreover, to completely discount the testimonies of
kagawads Lazaro and Manalo would be tantamount to having no witnesses to the search of appellants residence
at all except the police officers themselves, a situation clearly contrary to the tenor and spirit of Section 8 of
Rule 126.

The prosecutions attempt to introduce the weighing scale, supposedly seized during the search, only casts more
doubt on its case. Said weighing scale was conspicuously absent from the enumeration of seized items in the
handwritten Inventory Receipt, the Return of the Search Warrant and the Affidavit of Arrest prepared by the
police officers. SPO1 Fernandezs claim that the omission was an honest mistake, to wit:

Pros. Rebagay
Q Mr. Witness, a while ago you added another item which was not included in the inventory list and this
was the weighing scale. Please tell us, why is it only now that you are adding it to the list of those items that you
seized?

A Well, with all honesty Your Honor, I cannot offer any alibi except to say that I committed an honest
mistake when I did not include that weighing scale in the inventory receipts.110[110]

does not inspire credence. Neither does SPO1 Serqueas explanation:

Q What was the search warrant all about? It commands you to search and seize what items?

A Regarding drugs, drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the crime, sir.

Atty. Reyes:

What else?

A Weighing scale, sir.

Q Weighing scale is included in the search warrant. So the warrant specifically commands you to seize drugs,
drug paraphernalias and weighing scale?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you read this Affidavit of Arrest before you signed this. Did you notice that the weighing scale is not
included here?

A Yes, sir. Now I noticed.

Q No, during the time that you signed this?

A No, sir.

Q You did not notice that?

A No, sir.

Q As well as the time when Officer Fernandez was preparing this Inventory, you did not call his attention
that there are some items missing in that Inventory?

A I did not call his attention. Honestly speaking (unfinished)

xxx

A Honestly speaking, we confiscated so many evidence including papers, boxes, voluminous quantity of
evidence recovered and only one officer is conducting the Inventory. We cannot conduct Inventory two at a time
or three at a time, only one. Because maybe, you see, hes only one. Maybe he did not list it because of that so
many evidence confiscated.

Atty. Reyes:

But the weighing scale is not a small item, is that correct? Its a big item?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you want to tell us that you missed that item?

A I was not the one who missed it, sir.

Q How about your Affidavit of Arrest?

A Officer Fernandez prepared that Affidavit, sir.

Q So you are not the one who prepared this? You merely signed it?

A I signed it in their presence, sir.111[111]

The foregoing explanations are improbable and far from persuasive. Considering that a weighing scale was
among the items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, it would be expected that the police
officers would be actively searching for it and, if found, they would take care to include it in the inventory and
the return of the search warrant. But while numerous seals, stamps, checks and documents not described in the
search warrant were seized and carefully inventoried by the raiding team, none of the five police officers
bothered to point out that the weighing scale had not been included in the inventory.

The implausibility of the story put forward by the police officers leads to no other conclusion than that the
weighing scale was introduced as an afterthought in order to bolster the case against appellant.

With the persistence of nagging doubts surrounding the alleged discovery and seizure of the shabu, it is evident
that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. It is thus not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, this Courts constitutional duty to
acquit him. 112[112] Apropos is the ruling in People v. Aminnudin,113[113] viz:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. 114[114]

Return of Seized Property Not Described in the Search Warrant

Turning now to the Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, the general rule is
that only the personal properties particularly described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.
Thus, in Tambasen v. People,115[115] this Court held:

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be
committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]; Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).116[116] (Emphasis supplied)

There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through
a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.117[117]

To be valid, therefore, the seizure of the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia must fall within the ambit of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 or under any
of the foregoing recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.

In this regard, the raiding team sought to justify the seizure of the car, the Fifty Two Thousand Seven Hundred
Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different denominations, and the Twenty Five Thousand Chinese Yuan
(CY25,000.00) as either proceeds of the offense or means of committing an offense within the purview of the
warrant. Thus PO2 Abulencia testified:

Q And how about the money, Mr. witness? Why did you confiscate the money?

A Its considered as proceed of the crime, sir.

Q How about the vehicle, Mr. witness? Why did you took (sic) custody of the vehicle when it was not listed
in the search warrant?

A This is part and parcel of the evidence, sir. Because its being used in transporting drugs, sir.118[118]

Similarly, with respect to the car, SPO1 Fernandez stated:

Q This vehicle, Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. PNU-TT-658, where was it during the time that you. . .
(unfinished)

A It was parked in front of the house of Benny Go.

Q And you seized it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why?

A Because during the surveillance operation we saw some known pusher riding in that car?

Q Who are these drug pushers?

A One of those guys is Mr. Peter Co, also a subject of our investigation.

Q Which (sic) you released after the arrest, after he was invited for investigation in your office on June 14,
1999?

A Yes, sir.119[119]

The foregoing rationalizations are unacceptable. Admittedly, neither the money nor the car was particularly
described in the search warrant. In seizing the said items then, the police officers were exercising their own
discretion and determining for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were proceeds of
the crime or means of committing the offense. This is absolutely impermissible. It bears reiterating that the
purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. 120[120]

At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks,
checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain view. 121[121]

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.122[122] This Court had the opportunity
to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the recent case of People v. Doria, supra, to wit:

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(Underscoring supplied; citations omitted)123[123]

Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the passports, bankbooks,
checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other assorted documents does not fall within the
plain view exception. The assertions of the police officers that said objects were inadvertently seized within
their plain view are mere legal conclusions which are not supported by any clear narration of the factual
circumstances leading to their discovery. PO2 Abulencia could not even accurately describe how the raiding
team came across these items:

Q This Box A marked as Exhibit G, in what part of the room did you recover this?

A We recovered all the evidence within our plain view, sir. The evidence were scattered in his house. I
cannot remember whether Box A or Box B, but all the evidence were within our plain view thats why we
confiscated them, sir.

Q What do you mean by plain view?

A Nakikita namin, sir. Yung kitang-kita namin.

Q Where in the premises of Benny Go did you see all these documents?
A Ground floor and upstairs but mostly in the ground floor, on the table and on the floor, sir.

Atty. Reyes:

This Box A marked as Exh. G contains what documents again?

A Can I see my notes, sir?

Atty. Reyes:

Go ahead.

A Box A contains different bundle of pieces of document, NBI and BI clearances, Application of Chinese
National, different papers, sir.

Q Can you remember where in particular did you recover these documents?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q All of these documents were recovered primarily on the ground floor and on the second floor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where in particular at the second floor, there are three to four rooms there?

A Sir, nandoon sa mesa lahat iyan eh don sa taas rin may mesa din doon at saka doon naming nakuha ang
ibang mga dokumento.

Q Is (sic) that room belongs (sic) to Jack Go?

A I dont know, sir, but all these (sic) evidence were recovered from the house of Benny Go.124[124]

SPO1 Fernandezs account of how he came across the dry seals, rubber stamps and papers is just as opaque:

Q For how long have you been inside the house of Benny Go when you noticed these dry seals?

A I think more than an hour, I dont exactly remember the time.

Q But during the time you have not yet noticed the documents which you brought to this Court, what call
(sic) your attention was these dry seals first?

A Well, actually the dry seals and the rubber stamps were all placed atop the table and as well as the
documents because the box where the documents were placed are half opened. They are opened actually thats
why I saw them.

Q So, you first saw the rubber stamps and the dry seals, is that correct? Because they are atop the table?
A Yes, sir.

Q And then later on you also saw the documents?

A Yes, sir its beside the table.

Q Contained in a box half opened?

A Yes, sir.

Q Which did you touch first, the rubber stamps, the dry seals or the documents?

A I did not touch anything, I only inventoried that when the searching team were through with what they are
doing. Now, all the evidence were placed atop the dining table, located also at the sala of the house or at the dining
area. Then, thats when I asked some of my co-members to place all those document and the other confiscated
items atop the table also.125[125]

The foregoing testimonies are clearly evasive and do not establish how the police officers became aware of the
seized items which were allegedly within their plain view.

Finally, it appears from the testimony of SPO1 Fernandez that the supposed illegal character of the items
claimed to have been seized within the plain view of the policemen was not readily and immediately apparent.
Rather, the suspicions of the policemen appear to have been aroused by the presence of the numerous passports
and immigration documents which they discovered in the course of their search. After they confirmed that
appellant was not operating a travel agency, they concluded that his possession of said documents and passports
was illegal even though they could not identify the alleged law supposedly violated.126[126]

To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against appellant for alleged possession of instruments or
implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellants residence.127[127]

However, the illegal character of said dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been immediately
apparent. For SPO1 Fernandez had to first make an impression of the dry seal on paper before he could
determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. 128[128] The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned over to the Chinese
embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1
Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage point in the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the plain view doctrine
to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not
specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to
him.129[129]

Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to
be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,130[130] they may not be returned and are hereby
declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law.131[131] Moreover, the various
bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.132[132]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, convicting appellant Benny Go
of violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Appellant Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.

Appellants Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN PART, and
the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject premises which belong to
him as listed in said Motion.

The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to deliver
and/or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

The two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation are likewise ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on leave.