1

#11
EVELIO B. JAVIER v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

DOCTRINE:

Due process of law - that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society.

FACTS:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee
of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between
the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident
naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came
to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission
on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private
respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the
assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors
that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and
installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

Petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the
matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the
guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom
election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
The petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-
buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests
involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the
importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be
heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any
of the three divisions.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

Solicitor General: the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a
contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections,
consonant with Section 3.
 2

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has violated petitioners right to due process when it ruled by a mere division.

RULING:

Yes. Article XII-C Section 3 1973 Constitution provides: The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election
cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which
was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of
travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by
assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he
had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous
regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to
send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission
on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984,
proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of
Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or
contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en
banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.

FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:

I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the decision, dated 23
July 1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as
the duly elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more accurately, must be
disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon
by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be
decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
These Sections do not distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between
"cases" and "contests."

#13
PEOPLE v. CASTILLO [289 SCRA 213 (1998)]
 3
DOCTRINE: It is a judges prerogative & duty to ask clarificatory question to ferret out the truth. The propriety
of a judges queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality & in any event, by the test of
whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning.

FACTS:

Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, flr manager of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside
the pub while talking w/ his co-worker. Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the pub and informed
him that hell be on his way home. However, when he was about an arms length from Eulogio, appellant Robert
Castillo came out from nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. As
Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand. Eulogio placed a chair
between the two to stop Castillo from further attacking Tony.

Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found
outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of Tonys
death was the stab wound on his chest.

Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto
Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony by the compound of Iglesia ni Cristo.

Judge Castillo did not appreciate Castillos defense of alibi and held that the killing was qualified by abuse of
superior strength, the accused having surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon. And although treachery was
present, it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength.

Appellant contends that the TC showed its prejudice against him by asking questions that were well w/in the
prosecution to explore and ask.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Castillos decision was biased and tainted with prejudice towards the accused.

HELD: Appellant Castillo is guilty of murder for the death of Antonio Dometita. The allegation of bias and
prejudice isnt well-taken. It is a judges prerogative & duty to ask clarificatory question to ferret out the truth.
The propriety of a judges queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality & in any
event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning.

The prosecution was unable to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. However, SC held
that the killing was not qualified by abuse of superior strength, contrary to TCs ruling. The prosecution did not
demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the stature and build of the victim and the appellant w/c would
have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim.

However, the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is committed when 2 conditions concur: (1) means,
methods and forms of execution employed left the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate,
and (2) that such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused w/o danger to his person. These requisites were evidently present when the accused appeared from
nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend. The action
rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of defense wounds does not negate treachery
because the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest and hence, rendered Tony defenseless.

Appeal denied, assailed decision affirmed. Award of indemnity to the heirs of Castillo in the amount of PhP50K.
 4
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

DOCTRINE:
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What it proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their
own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent COMELEC from implementing
certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified
voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the

Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the
term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.

RULING:

No. Section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4
of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the
disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed
with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.
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#26

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC. et al. vs. POEA

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association of licensed
Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino
seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals. They urge the Court to annul Resolution
No. 01 of the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05 which substantially
provides for the adjustment (increase) of the compensation and other benefits of seamen provided in the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.
Petitioners contention:
(1) that the POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
(2) that even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its exercise.
(3) that the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal
protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
Respondents contention:
(1) that the petition is without merit and should de dismissed because the issuance of the challenged resolution
and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of
subordinate
(2) that the resolution is not unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution
Issues:
1. Whether the POEA has the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels. YES
2. Whether the resolution is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-
impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. NO

Held:
1. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows:
. . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed
a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

2. There is no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal
protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim
discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign
employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law that
the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for
the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. 14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas
workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of
the Bill of Rights. The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice
provisions of the constitution. The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some
object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State
 6
of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or
general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be
placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. Verily, the freedom to contract is not
absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which
affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the
general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. 20 And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power
of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was
enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract
clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to
the contract clause.

#39
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

DOCTRINE:

By reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all
people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ.

FACTS:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was
illegal. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third
Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof,
but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case.
 7
Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the
motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the
decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo.

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners,
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the
SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department
of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

The SSS advances that the RTC has jurisdiction, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil
service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since
neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and
may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from
continuing with their strike.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

RULING:

No. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction
may be issued to restrain it.

#40
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. FILEMON REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994

FACTS:
 8
On 25 August 1967, private respondent obtained from petitioner a P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate
mortgage covering five (5) parcels of land in Isabela.
Private respondent defaulted; hence on 17 November 1970, petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on
the mortgage, and it acquired the encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00.
On February 15, 1971, petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for
P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, or on 18 November 1970 (or one day after the foreclosure
sale), private respondent already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property. Subsequently, additional
payments were made by private respondent.
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 27 was enacted into law that mandated an agrarian
reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it covered were the
parcels of land subject of the dispute.
On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property for P284,000.00 which was the
market and appraised value thereof fixed by petitioner bank. On 24 December 1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell
was executed between petitioner bank and private respondent.
On 25 August 1978, private respondent inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for
P284,000.00 when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for
the redemption of the property. There was no reply or response from petitioner. As of 02 November 1977, private
respondent had paid petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85.
On 20 September 1978, instituted an action for "Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum
of Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio
Genato.
On 19 March 1980, while the case was yet pending with the trial court, petitioner bank additionally
received from the Land Bank of the Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in
payment of the foreclosed parcels covered.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank declaring the foreclosure sale as valid and
dismissing the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and ordered the defendant bank to release
the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenants-beneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether P.D. No. 27 (where lands covered by the decree may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after its promulgation) had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage
contracts affecting said lands. NO

HELD:
When Presidential Decree No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil,
Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism therefor,"
was enacted on 21 October 1972, the parcels of land in dispute were clearly still subject to private respondent's
right of redemption. Thus the "title to the land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains with the mortgagor or his
grantee until the expiration of the redemption period . . ." Although the land was sold in 1970, the sheriff's sale was
registered only on October 11, 1972 and the one year redemption period begins to run from this date and not from
the date of sale.
The opinion of the Secretary of the Department of Justice has likewise deserves respect, to wit:
I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27
had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands.
There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D.
No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the
police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power,
the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like
that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the
 9
only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the condemnation
proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public
use (citation omitted). As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the
mortgagee is not left without any compensation.

ROGELIO ABERCA, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO
ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M.
LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT.
ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA, and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution and order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. XCV

Facts:
It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action
for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well'

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Plaintiffs
allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in
most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs
and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a
total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00. AT the heart of the complaint is
ARTICLE 32 of the CIVIL CODE.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito, Mendoza,
which was granted by the RTC Judge Fortun. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs . Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order
of dismissal to Judge Lising, who,w ithout acting on the motion, declared Judge Fortuns previous order as final,
the plaintiffs not having filed an MR or appeal on time. Plaintiffs filed an MR but the same was denied for lack of
cause of action except for those against Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Hence, this
petition.

At the heart of petitioners'complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 32, Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
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(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are immune from the suit because they were merely in performance of their
official functions?

Held:
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their
duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance
with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses.
But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected
by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low,
civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumarated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts
or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

Held:
No. We find merit in petitioners'contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
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suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
P.D. No. 1765 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:

'However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act,
activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year."

Petitioners have a point in contending that even aso that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.

Issue: May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and
severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated

Held: Doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicavle to the case. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been
generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The
law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly' or "indirectly' responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution5 acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax bis
vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer
for the transgressions committed by the latter against the oonstitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Pait of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
govrnment was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to some plaintiffs

Held: No. It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by "plaintiffs,
through counsel."