G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006
That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22
April 1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in
toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in
Civil Case No. 2547.This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and
Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint
alleges these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot
denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy.
Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc.
Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which
is hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot
by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs
rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to
peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to
vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the
case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary
Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which
is hereto attached marked as Annex "C";
7.
defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs
were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring
expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing
acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per
appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored,
(sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious
anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that
petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of
the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the
ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more
than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the complaint failed to
comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum
shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,
ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and
occupation of the same plus attorneys fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer
because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the
same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in
petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an
allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will
support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of
prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is
deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of
unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show that they had given the
petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court
before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The
decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction. 3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30
January 1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration5:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY
MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT,
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE
IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for
unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them
the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a
case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the formers
tolerance or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an
implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.8 The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party
has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within
one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint
more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible
entry or illegal detainer, but an accionpubliciana. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial
court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts
of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. 16 As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not
doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to
lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the
result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring
suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action
which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case
against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners
as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners case
for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled 23:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under
TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was
by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had
served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate
the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer
cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC
made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and
not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to
occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent
of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land
was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs.
Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of
action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, 24 petitioners
complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated
by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for
unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been
present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that
would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of
the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1)
respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was
by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of
action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of
sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later
sought to be recovered.25
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact
that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation
of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof."
Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer
is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that
the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of
jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26848 August 17, 1981
CARIDAD O. DE GALLEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LAND AUTHORITY (Formerly Land Tenure Administration), oppositor-appellee.
GUERRERO, J.:
The petitioner herein, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the
Municipality of Paraaque , Rizal and covered by TCT No. 46402 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, seeks the cancellation of the following 'CONDITIONS' appearing in the
Memorandum of, Encumbrances of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No.
46402, to wit:
1. That the parcel of land described in this certificate of title, shall not
be sold, assigned, encumbered, mortgaged or transferred, within the
period of five (5) years from the date hereof without first obtaining the
written consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
2. That except by hereditary succession, it shall not be conveyed,
transferred to, assigned in favor of any person who is not landless and
disqualified to acquire or own land in the Philippines;
3. That violation of either of the next two preceding paragraph shall be
sufficient ground for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources or his duly authorized representative to take such action as
may be necessary for the reversion of the land to the government. (Doc.
No. 1858, page 57, Book XXVI, S. of 1954 of Notary Public of Manila,
Andres Urrutia) Date of instrument - June 28, 1954. Date of the
inscription - June 30, 1954 - 10:10 a.m.
In her Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 7, in LRC Case No. 458, it is alleged that the said conditions were entered
on June 30, 1954 and a period of five (5) years have since then elapsed so that Condition
No. 1 has long become academic; that the aforestated parcel of land formerly formed part
of a tract of land which the Government acquired for subdivision into residential lots with
the principal objective of distributing the same to the landless and thereby allow more
people to have their own homes for which reason, Conditions Nos. 2 and 3 above were
entered as encumbrances on the said certificate of title; that the area wherein the above-
mentioned parcel of land is comprised has since become commercial community,
fronting, as it does, the Manila Bay, and not only said parcel of land but the immediate
vicinity thereof now contain improvements devoted purely to commercial purposes that
by reason of the foregoing, the objective of the Government in imposing Conditions Nos.
(2) and (3) above has lost its meaning inasmuch as the value of said property has become
prohibitive to any landless who desire to establish his home therein; that to allow the said
Conditions to remain and to affect said parcel of land will only be a deterrent to the
economic development and progress of the country; and that in line with the country's
program of economic development, therefore, said Conditions should be eliminated.
Respondent opposed the Petition for Cancellation insofar as Conditions Nos. (2) and (3)
are concerned on the ground that Condition No. 2 carries with it no prescriptive period at
all and the same is considered perpetual in character and any subsequent transactions or
dealings involving the land in question must necessarily be with the written consent and
permission of the Land Authority, and that Condition No. 3 is likewise perpetual in
character. Respondent, however, agrees that Condition No. 1 may be cancelled since it
carries the five-year prescriptive period.
In his Order dated July 19, 1966, Presiding Judge Francisco dela Rosa, finding the
grounds relied upon in the Opposition to be well- taken, denied the Petition for lack of
merit.
Petitioner thru Counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging among others, that
subsequent to the filing of the Opposition, counsel made representations with the
respondent for a withdrawal of the Opposition in line with the position taken by the same
office in connection with G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig, Branch X entitled, "Sotera Duavit Vda. de Bautista, et al., petitioners,"
wherein no opposition was filed by the Land Authority to a similar petition for the reason
that the property involved was already commercial so that the Land Authority cannot
maintain inconsistent position, otherwise it may be guilty of discrimination, arbitrariness,
or grave abuse of its official discretion.
Petitioner further pointed out that as to the fact that the land in question is a commercial
property and is situated in a commercial territory, namely, fronting the Roxas Boulevard,
Paraaque , Rizal, three has been no controversy and the court can take judicial notice
thereof as a matter of common knowledge, as in fact the property is presently occupied
by the night-club "E L MUNDO" and is classified for real estate taxation as commercial.
It is likewise insisted by petitioner that the primary intention of the restriction against
transfers or conveyances of the property except to the landless and except by hereditary
succession in order to insure that more people shall own residential homes, has been lost
by the transformation of the property from residential to commercial since the landless
who may want to establish their residential homes can no longer afford to pay the
commercial price of this commercial property and following the principle that "when the
reason for the law ceases," the said restriction should be eliminated to allow the
aforementioned property to contribute to the economic development of the country.
The attention of the court a quo was also called to the fact that the petitioner who is the
wife of former Ambassador Manuel Gallego, is not a landless individual, nor was she
landless at the time when the said property was acquired by her, the fact being that the
restriction refers only to voluntary conveyances and did not comprehend sales by public
auction, as in the particular case, where the petitioner came to own the property as the
highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon. Petitioner concludes
that accordingly, the restriction cannot be intrinsically intended to limit the ownership of
this type of property to only the landless where it may be acquired by a landed owner thru
an involuntary sale.
The court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order of September 8, 1966,
hence the present appeal to this Court.
Petitioner submits a lone assignment of error, and that is, that the trial court erred in
denying the petition for cancellation and in denying the motion for reconsideration.
In Petitioner's Brief, it is pointed out that the Order dated July 19, 1966 denying the
Petition for Cancellation, as well as the Order of September 8, 1966 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration, did not express the reasons in support of said Order. Petitioner
argues that Condition No. (1) in the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 46402
had long become academic because five years have already elapsed from the date the said
annotation was made on June 30, 1954, inasmuch as the Petition for Cancellation was
filed on February 11, 1966, almost twelve years after the entry of such condition.
Oppositor Land Authority does not oppose the cancellation of Condition No. (1), hence,
finding the said cancellation to be in order, the said condition is hereby ordered cancelled.
Petitioner further contends that Conditions No. (2) and (3) have lost any sound basis in
that while the subject parcel of land was originally a residential lot, the classification of
the property had been changed to that of commercial, as evidenced by the present tax
declaration thereof (Exhibit "B"). According to petitioner, the original intention of the
controverted condition to restrict ownership of subject property by people who could
utilize the same as their residence has lost its meaning for the said property has gone
beyond the reach of any individual to acquire for purely residential purposes.
It is likewise claimed that the inhibition in Condition No. (2) is not entirely absolute
because a person who is not landless may still properly acquire the said property in a
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, as in the instant case where petitioner, who is the wife
of former Ambassador Manuel V. Gallego, is not landless and had acquired the subject
property, not by voluntary conveyance in her favor but as the highest bidder in the public
auction sale thereof in relation to a foreclosure of a mortgage involving the said property,
which argument assumes that Condition No. (2) limits the restriction only to a
conventional or voluntary sale, transfer or assignment of the property, excluding
mortgage or encumbrance whereas Condition No. (1) inhibits not only the sale but also
the encumbrance or mortgage of the subject land.
Petitioner's contentions are without merit and We reject the same.
Conditions No. (2) and (3) are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land
Registration Order No. R-3 under the subject "Rules and Regulations Governing the
Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate," approved November 15, 1951 by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. These sections provide as follows:
16. Prohibition to Alienate.-The applicant shall not sell, assign,
encumber, mortgage or transfer, his rights under the agreement to sell
or in the property subject thereof without first obtaining the written
consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and this
condition shall subsist until the lapse of five (5) years from the date of
the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor and shall be
annotated as an encumbrance on the certificate of title of the property
that may be issued in his favor.
17. Conveyance of Lands, Covered by Final Deeds of Sale.- Except by
hereditary succession, no lands acquired hereunder shall be transferred
or assigned to any individual unless he be landless and not otherwise
disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. This
prohibition shall be made a condition in all deeds of sale and shall be
annotated as encumbrance in the certificate of title.
18. Violation of the two preceding paragraphs: its effect.-Any sale,
assignment, encumbrance, mortgage, or transfer made in violation of
the provisions of the next two preceding paragraphs hereof is null and
void, and shall be sufficient ground for the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to cancel the deed of sale and to order the reversion
of the land to the government and the forfeiture of whatever payments
made on account thereof. In case, however, a deed of sale has already
been issued, the violation of the said provisions shall be sufficient
ground for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to take
appropriate action in court with a view to obtaining the reversion of the
land involved to the government. All lands reverted to the government
shall be disposed of as vacant lot.
It is pertinent to state here that pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution of the Philippines which mandated that Congress may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of land to be subdivided into small lots
and conveyed at cost to individuals, Commonwealth Act 539 enacted May 26, 1940,
authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest therein,
thru purchase or expropriation and to subdivided the same into home lots or small farms
for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bonafide
tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and
who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines (Section 1, Commonwealth
Act 539). And under Section 2 of the same Act, the President may designate any
department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government, or he may
organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of the Act, and for tills purpose, the
agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation. Commonwealth
Act 539 amended Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended by Commonwealth Act 260,
and Commonwealth Act No. 378, as amended by Commonwealth Act 420.
As indicated earlier, Sections 16, 17 and 18 of Lands Administrative Order No. R-3 dated
October 19, 1951 are the sources which gave rise to the annotation of Conditions Nos. 1,
2 and 3 on the title of subject property. The said Order was published in the Official
Gazette of December, 1951, pp. 6075 to 6078, Volume 47, No. 12, and has the force and
effect of law. (Javillonar vs. Land Tenure Administration, G. R. No. 10303, Aug.
22,1958,104 Phil. 323)
As the Administrative Order itself provides, the rules and regulations governing the
acquisition and disposition of private estates were promulgated for the information and
guidance of all concerned "(p)ursuant to the provisions of section 4, article XIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines, section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, and
Executive Order No. 376, dated November 28, 1950."
Conditions Nos. 2 and 3, having been imposed pursuant to an Administrative Order
which has the force and effect of the law, are therefore binding upon any person who
acquires title to the same, it appearing that said Conditions are annotated as
encumbrances on the back of the Certificate of Title of the land. Moreover, the said
Conditions are not contrary to law, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these
Conditions had been imposed in order to implement more effectively the main purpose of
the constitutional provision which is to break up landed estates into reasonably small
portions and to discourage the concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a
few individuals, (Republic vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New Constitution
of 1973 provided a modification of the original provision in the 1935 Constitution, thus:
"The National Assembly may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to deserving citizens.
These two encumbrances or Conditions annotated on the back of TCT 46402 imposed by
and pursuant to the Administrative Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources may not, therefore, be cancelled for under Section 39 of the Land Registration
Act,
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same
free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, and any
of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or
Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the
statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in
the registry:
Second. Taxes within two years after same become due and payable;
Third. An public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of
title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.
But if there are easements or other rights. appurtenant to a parcel of
registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such
easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such
failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or
extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other
manner. (As amended by Act No. 2011, and Sec. 4, Act No. 3621.)
Presidential Decree No. 1529, amending and codifying the laws relative to registration of
property and for other purposes, promulgated June 11, 1978, substantially contains the
same provision under Section 44 thereof, which provides:
Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate and any of the following encumberances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and
Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear
of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record;
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years
immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an
innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the
government to collect taxes payable before that period from the
delinquent taxpayer alone;
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by
law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof. if the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined;
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof
by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law
or regulations on agrarian reform.
Until and unless the law, or the Administrative Order which has the force and effect of
law, is repealed, amended, or otherwise, altered or modified, the said encumbrances must
remain, notwithstanding the contention of petitioner that a previous governor of the Land
Authority had not opposed a similar petition for cancellation in Sotera Duavit Vda. de
Bautista and Jaime Bautista, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch X, for a wrong act cannot be cured by the commission of another wrong.
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary. (Article 7, New Civil Code)
Neither can petitioner's arguments that the lot in question contains improvements, a
nightclub devoted to a purely commercial purpose, that the value of the land has become
prohibitive to any landless who desires to establish his house thereon, that to allow the
said Conditions to remain and to affect said parcel of land will only be a deterrent to the
economic development and progress of the country and that in line with the country's
program of economic development, said Conditions should be eliminated, be sustained.
The courts are not concerned with the wisdom, necessity or propriety of the law, for these
are the particular province of the legislative. As this Court said in Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-
20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450, speaking thru Justice (now Chief Justice)
Fernando citing Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, "It is well to remember,
that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' "

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Orders appealed from dated July
19, 1966 and September 8, 1966 are hereby MODIFIED in the sense that Condition No.
(1) inscribed as an encumbrance in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46402 (Rizal
Registry) covering Lot 4, Block 4, Psd-10988 Baclaran, Estate, Baclaran, Paraaque ,
Rizal, under the name of petitioner Caridad O. de Gallego, is hereby ordered cancelled,
the five-year period stated therein having already expired, and that Conditions No. (2)
and (3) shall remain as they are.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.