aG.R. No.

L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the
income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary
from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from
October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were
jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a
rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought
up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United
States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue,
our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home
his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand
pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto
case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according
to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto
case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at
least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We
quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by
the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer)
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will
have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al.,
44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would
lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a
statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the
suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of
the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
 connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not
contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate
it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on
a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe
that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the
old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the
decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full
salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his
income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax
comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been
decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income
tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in
advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not
receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say,
twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or
P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months)
we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685,
which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of
receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving
P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his
salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law
was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income
tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court
of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers,
like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on
Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service
Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these
officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other
judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court
and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs.
Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but,
like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to
promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of
the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and
the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its
spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as
P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be
derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional
exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much
less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by
the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life,
on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he
does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of
exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit.
They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less
afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be
real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is
based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in
cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in
the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark
or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making
such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used
exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].)
Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest
they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of
the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army
who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax.
(Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the
Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No.
35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his
income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying
taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence
of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a
ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power
granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such
implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to
freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970,
the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a
week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is
intended to explain more fully our decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to
him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of
speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would
seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day,
this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not
later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3,
1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent
on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful
for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on
November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena
arguing in behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely
a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such
a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction
placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its
validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion
was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its
aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory."4

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order.
We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its
being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that
fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a
statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score.9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which
this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot
be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power
of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It
overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by
the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although
independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision
of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding
of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any
authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12Our
decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may
its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is

permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance
with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice
Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any
ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain
place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting
upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound
system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that
there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."

Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of
election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12
of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern
day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent
Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.

Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech
and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far
beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary.

Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is
concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of
section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that
respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the
candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not.
The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges
unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such
"jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters'
sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of
the candidate's same constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable
as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest
pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's
limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another
person with his knowledge and consent.