G.R. No.
L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to
take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that
came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico
to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on
the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the
right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated
in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman
and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various
business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the
Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was
also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of
Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his
customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about
P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to
humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of
his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor
children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has
obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove
that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report
of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta
Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day
(Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on
January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the
Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin
in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been
a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and
care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from
whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended
to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with
steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing
of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent
such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in
the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and
openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the
city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned
decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without
costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar
as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum
of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce
the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of
said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act
409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the
Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the
City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for
the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control
or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the
accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has
not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the
answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance
of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for
the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court,
and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision
of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact
Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers,
and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the
stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to
provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public
places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other
animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city;
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and
change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to
raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require
railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable
protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches,
drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage
of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive
Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition
or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917,
concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that
"the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and
national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways
and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the
Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1wph1.t
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978
LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN,
ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL
MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the
Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed
FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978
MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed
FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta
authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the
municipality.
A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the
Municipality of Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, for a death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22,
1959, and which was attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No.
159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21,
22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town
Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and
stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg
supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5-
meters by 8 meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24
bamboo posts 4 in a row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side with bamboo braces." 1
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui
employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the
evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente
Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and
many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the
play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage
was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died
in the afternoon of the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal
Council in 1959.
Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as
a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding
of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise
to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality
in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta
celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one
for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal
ordinance. 2
After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not
the defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he
arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had
exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man
to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces
beyond the control of the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not
liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed
in a decision dated July 10, 1962. 3
The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31,
1968, the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador
V. Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and
ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla
the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and
the costs. 4
The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition
stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's
governmental or public function or is it or a private or proprietary character?
1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed
with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective
municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may
inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. 5
The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the
one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those
exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the
other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial private and corporate. 6
As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally
a difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence,
for instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks
have set down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the
basis of attending circumstances.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper
has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and
private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own
community. 7
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court
of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two
fold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in
the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public
service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the
other capacity the municipalities exercise a private. proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies.
Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf
of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual capacity, and not for
the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)
In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice
Grant T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the
municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public
peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the
following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses,
markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of parks,
golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city
activities of a proprietary character. 9
2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no
recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith
or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 11 In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos
Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran
over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court
in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could
not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function
the construction and maintenance of roads and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the
death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. 12
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held
liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer
civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course
or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory
fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated,
fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to
civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ...
(Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec. 1610,1647, cited in
Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)
3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the
ho of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. fiesta may be held in each
municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal
council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed
therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations,
earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the
date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by
resolution of the council.
This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does
not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate
a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of
the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely
to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature
of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular
case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the
public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function
becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state
is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta. 15
4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held
liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence
of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. . .
On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants
(now petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces
located on the front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when
many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by
respondent appellate court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were
"mother" or "principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the
front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo
twine. 16 That being the case, it becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would
remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsuported
Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed negligence as there was lack of suspension over
the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence.
At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two
bamboo braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could
not have removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top
of the stags for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be
impractical and unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage
curtain. 17
The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only
P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela"
stage was of wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise
observe that although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24"
posts, nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the
rest?
The Court of Appeals thus concluded
The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number
of onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had
the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence.
Having filed to take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage
for the use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in
connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing
non participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage
which was not constructed to meet the additional weight- the defendant-
appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla .
(pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)
The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence
as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father
of the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion
or a gross misapprehension of facts." 18
Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence
would exercise under the circumstances of the case." 19
Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed
during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the
Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the
donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants
in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on
entertainment and stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the
weight or burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal
safety of the participants. 20 We agree.
Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942,
which was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was
descending the steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week"
and one of the features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the
general public was invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining
the award for Damages in favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district,
California, held inter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not
a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of
exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not
be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of sufficient illumination of the
premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. 21
We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The
Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a
committee in charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents
responded to the call for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente
Fontanilla was one of the participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be
exposed to danger on that occasion.
Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that
it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal
council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge
of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the
Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. 22
... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a
cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation
appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove
the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those
duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its
local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of
respondent superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879)
5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who
enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee.
The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing
material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23
In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was
negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying
Article 27 of the Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse
of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 24
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil
Code against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by
a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in
carrying out an official duty.
If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are
concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not
invoked in petitioners' brief.
In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz
Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned
as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or
necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule
51 of the Rules of Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant
case.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta
by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The
legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary
principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or
persons composing it 26 and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages
for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27
xxx xxx xxx
The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not
personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he Must be shown to have
personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher
Encyclopedia Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt 11, p. 207)
Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the
corporation merely because of their official relation to it, but because of
some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of
duty which resulted in an injury ... To make an officer of a corporation liable
for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such
a breach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, the injury; that
is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-208, Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the
corporate are not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor. (p.
211, Ibid.)
On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.
6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court.
Petitioner-municipality assails the award.
Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may
be granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although
respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees, the records
show however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an
extrajudicial compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of
assistance but failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved
family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was
believed to be a just cause. 28
We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all
is a matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar
as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal
councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993).
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997]
PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA
MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S.
YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR
AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution,
promulgated on July 15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively[1], and a declaration that
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del
Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 along the National Highway
Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities."[2]
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C.
Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11,
1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."[3]
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.[4] The complaint was later amended to include the registered
owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon
the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the
municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be
allowed to take possession of the property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective.
It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and
resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (l) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local
Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated
in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.[5] The dispositive
portion of the lower court's Order dated July 2, 1991 reads:
"WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per Official
Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989 which this Court now determines as the provisional
value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Property filed by
petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court is ordered to forthwith
place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the purpose of
ascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property sought to be taken, with
notice to all the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED."[6]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court on July
15, 1992.[7] The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from
Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not
declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October
22, 1992.[8]
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both
wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal
of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-
89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and
restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order
and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from
further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition.[9]
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for
Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the
"blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order. [10]
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8,
1995 election.[11] The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to
Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and
Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan. [12]
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the
condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the
expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose.
Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for
insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where
are 'those available lots.' Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of
petitioners' property could proceed.[13]
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.[14] It is government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose.[15] Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain
may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. [16] For
the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use
and there must be just compensation.[17]
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code[18] in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant
to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose."
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of
approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and
inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may
discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor,
it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The
effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question
in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different
factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas,[19] where we cited
significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
"The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond the powers
conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is
recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration
of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial
board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president.
Such has been the consistent course of executive authority."[20]
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right
of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No.
43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation
of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred
the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for
mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the
expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties
belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a
sketch plan.[21]
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. [22] The Supreme Court,
taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and
the public use character or the purpose of the taking[23], has ruled that the necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.[24] Government may not capriciously
choose what private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support
for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively
prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the
purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly
held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent
municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose.[25] " The accusations
of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court
holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages
is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, et al. v. Municipality of
Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72841 January 29, 1987
PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and ATTY. PABLO P. GARCIA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in A.C.
G.R. CV No. 66502 entitled "Governor Rene Espina, et. at v. Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr., et. al,
Atty. Pablo P. Garcia v. Province of Cebu" 1 affirming with modification the order of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VII, granting respondent Pablo P. Garcia's claim for
compensation for services rendered as counsel in behalf of the respondent Province of Cebu.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor
Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and
three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of
Cebu 210 province. owned lots all located in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over
380 hectares, and authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the
province. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by
Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmea,
Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was
later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of
Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its public improvement projects. The City of
Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within which to dispose of the
donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of
his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu,
considering that the latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.
To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's
League (in behalf of their respective municipalities) along with some taxpayers, including Atty.
Garcia, filed a case seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null and void. It was alleged in
the complaint that the plaintiffs were filing it for and in behalf of the Province of Cebu in the
nature of a derivative suit. Named defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu, City Mayor
Sergio Osmea, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials responsible for the donation of the province-
owned lots. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-8669 of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu and assigned to Branch VI thereof.
Defendants City of Cebu and City Mayor Osmea, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that plaintiffs did not have the legal capacity to sue.
Subsequently, in an order, dated May, 1965, the court dismissed Case No. R-8669 on the ground
that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest in the case. Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion was denied by the Court.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. announced that he would borrow funds from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and would use the donated lots as collaterals. In July, 1965,
the City of Cebu advertised the sale of an the lots remaining unsold. Thereupon, Governor
Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu, decided
to go to court. He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case
in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu.
Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which application was granted on the same day,
August 6, 1965.
The complaint was later amended to implead Cebu City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon as additional
defendant in view of Fiscal Numeriano Capangpangan's manifestation stating that on September
9, 1965, Sergio Osmea, Jr. filed his certificate of Candidacy for senator, his position/office
having been assumed by City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon.
Sometime in 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney,
Alfredo G. Baguia, to enter his appearance for the Province of Cebu and for the incumbent
Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this case.
On January 30, 1973, Alfredo G. Baguia, Provincial Attorney of the Province of Cebu, entered
his appearance as additional counsel for the Province of Cebu and as counsel for Governor
Osmundo Rama, Vice-Governor Salutario Fernandez and Board Members Leonardo Enad,
Guillermo Legazpi, and Rizalina Migallos.
On January 31, 1973, Atty. Baguia filed a complaint in intervention stating that intervenors
Province of Cebu and Provincial Board of Cebu were joining or uniting with original plaintiff,
former Governor of Cebu, Rene Espina. They adopted his causes of action, claims, and position
stated in the original complaint filed before the court on August 6, 1965.
On June 25, 1974, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the
city of Cebu. On July 15, 1974, the court approved the compromise agreement and a decision
was rendered on its basis.
On December 4, 1974, the court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement the decision dated July 15, 1974, to wit:
1. Ordering the City of Cebu to return and deliver to the Province of Cebu
all the lots enumerated in the second paragraph hereof;
2. Ordering the Province of Cebu to pay the amount of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) to the City of Cebu for and in
consideration of the return by the latter to the former of the aforesaid lots;
3. Declaring the retention by the City of Cebu of the eleven (11) lots
mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the compromise agreement, namely, Lot
Nos. 1141, 1261, 1268, 1269, 1272, 1273, 917, 646-A, 646A-4-0 and 10107-
C;
 4. Ordering the City of Cebu or the City Treasurer to turn over to the
Province of Cebu the amount of P187948.93 mentioned in Annex "A" of the
defendants manifestation dated October 21, 1974;
5. Declaring the City of Cebu and an its present and past officers completely
free from liabilities to third persons in connection with the aforementioned
lots, which liabilities if any, shall be assumed by the Province of Cebu;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu to cancel the
certification of titles in the name of the City of Cebu covering the lots
enumerated in the second paragraph of this order and to issue new ones in
lieu thereof in the name of the Province of Cebu.
For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed
through counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated April 14, 1975, praying that his statement of
claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through counsel, its opposition dated April 23,
1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are
not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province. A rejoinder to this
opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge Alfredo
Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30, 1979, in favor of private respondent and against
petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In the case of private
respondent, however, he appealed only from that portion of the decision which fixed his
attorney's fees at P30,000.00 instead of at 30% of the value of the properties involved in the
litigation as stated in his original claim
On October 18, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming the
findings and conclusions of the trial court that the private respondent is entitled to recover
attorney's fees but fixing the amount of such fees at 5% of the market value of the properties
involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of the claim in 1975. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except for the aforementioned modification that the
compensation for the services rendered by the Claimant Atty. Pablo P.
Garcia is fixed at five percent (5%) of the total fair market value of the lots
in question, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects.
Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the fixing of his
attorney's fees at 5% instead of 30% of the value of the properties in litigations as prayed for in
his claims. However, the private respondent later withdrew his petition in G.R. No. 72818 with
the following explanation:
That after a long and serious reflection and reassessment of his position and
intended course of action and, after seeking the views of his friends,
petitioner has come to the definite conclusion that prosecuting his appeal
would only result in further delay in the final disposition of his claim (it has
been pending for the last 10 years 4 in the CFI and 6 in the Court of Appeals,
later Intermediate Appellate Court) and that it would be more prudent and
practicable to accept in full the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Hence, only the petition of the Province of Cebu is pending before this Court.
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos v.
Court of Appeals(108 SCRA 728). Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the
municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
.Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any court,
except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court
or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district in question is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality, or
municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other
political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by
its council
The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in
providing that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ
a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to represent it (De Guia v. The Auditor General 44 SCRA 169; Municipality of Bocaue, et. al.
v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932) as when he
represents the province against a municipality.
The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court cases by
a government lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the local
government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker
also assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the
fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's interests, and that, as civil service
employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty (See Ramos
v. Court of Appeals, supra).
However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec
exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this exception
is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity, as well as the
exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar, require a departure from the established rule.
The petitioner anchors its opposition to private respondent's claim for compensation on the
grounds that the employment of claimant as counsel for the Province of Cebu by then Governor
Rene Espina was unauthorized and violative of Section 1681 to 1683 in relation to Section 1679
of the Revised Administrative Code and that the claim for attorney's fees is beyond the purview
of Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
It is argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial Board, through a board
resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P. Garcia as counsel of the Province of Cebu.
Admittedly, this is so.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that the rule cannot be applied.
The Provincial Board would never have given such authorization. The decision of the respondent
court elucidates the matter thus:
... The provisions of Sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code contemplate a normal situation where the adverse party of the province
is a third person as in the case of Enriquez v. Auditor General, 107 Phil 932.
In the present case, the controversy involved an intramural fight between the
Provincial Governor on one hand and the members of the Provincial Board
on the other hand. Obviously it is unthinkable for the Provincial Board to
adopt a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia to act as
counsel for the Province of Cebu for the purpose of filing and prosecuting a
case against the members to the same Provincial Board According to the
claimant Atty. Garcia, how can Governor Espina be expected to secure
authority from the Provincial Board to employ claimant as counsel for the
Province of Cebu when the very officials from whom authority is to be
sought are the same officials to be sued, It is simply impossible that the Vice-
Governor and the members of the Provincial Board would pass a resolution
authorizing Governor Espina to hire a lawyer to file a suit against
themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 2102 of the Revised Administrative Code it is the Provincial
Board upon whom is vested the authority "to direct, in its discretion, the
bringing or defense of civil suits on behalf of the Provincial Governor ___."
Considering that the members of the Provincial Board are the very ones
involved in this case, they cannot be expected to directed the Provincial
Fiscal the filing of the suit on behalf of the provincial government against
themselves. Moreover, as argued by the claimant, even if the Provincial
Fiscal should side with the Governor in the bringing of this suit, the
Provincial Board whose members are made defendants in this case, can
simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case or by refusing
to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation.
... Consequently, there could have been no occasion for the exercise by the
Provincial Fiscal of his powers and duties since the members of the
Provincial Board would not have directed him to file a suit against them.
A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf of the Province of Cebu,
seeks redress against the very members of the body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under
the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A strict application of the provisions of the Revise
Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below of redress for
a valid grievance. The provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of
special counsel becomes an impossibility. The decision of the respondent court is grounded in
equity a correction applied to law, where on account of the general comprehensiveness of the
law, particular exceptions not being provided against, something is wanting to render it perfect.
It is also argued that the employment of claimant was violative of sections 1681 to 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the Provincial Fiscal who was the only competent official
to file this case was not disqualified to act for the Province of Cebu.
Respondent counsel's representation of the Province of Cebu became necessary because of the
Provincial Board's failure or refusal to direct the bringing of the action to recover the properties
it had donated to the City of Cebu. The Board more effectively disqualified the Provincial Fiscal
from representing the Province of Cebu when it directed the Fiscal to appear for its members in
Civil Case No. R-8669 filed by Atty. Garcia, and others, to defend its actuation in passing and
approving Provincial Board Resolution No. 186. The answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf
of the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board members filed in Civil Case No. R-8669; (Exhibit
"K") upholds the validity and legality of the donation. How then could the Provincial Fiscal
represent the Province of Cebu in the suit to recover the properties in question? How could
Governor Espina be represented by the Provincial Fiscal or seek authorization from the
Provincial Board to employ special counsel? Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility).lwphl@it Neither could a prosecutor be designated by the
Department of Justice. Malacaang had already approved the questioned donation
Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule that an attorney
cannot recover his fees from one who did not employ him or authorize his employment, is subject
to its own exception.
Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the
litigant whom he purports to represent (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear
for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will be
presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his
client. (Republic v. Philippine Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where
an attorney is employed by an unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound
where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an attorney in a particular
litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence
in the employment of an attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan Lua
v. O' Brien, 55 Phil. 53). The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officials in
allowing respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit
led the counsel to believe his services were still necessary.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated
upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by
it as to which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability
has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under
such circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation
upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
 The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied
contract does not connote an enforceable obligation. Some specific principle
or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the
claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation
implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises
from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit
received by the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of
the property or services, or the compensation specified in the contract, is not
the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely
fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference
to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure of recovery.
With the known predisposition of the majority of the members of the
Provincial Board, there would have been no impediment to the extension of
the reversion date to beyond August 15, 1965. Once the date of reversion is
extended, the disposition of an the donated lots would be only a matter of
course.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and conclude that 30% or even 5% of
properties already worth (P120,000,000.00) in 1979 as compensation for the private respondent's
services is simply out of the question. The case handled by Atty. Garcia was decided on the basis
of a compromise agreement where he no longer participated. The decision was rendered after
pre-trial and without any hearing on the merits.

The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits
thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the
petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability.
The trial court discussed the services of respondent Garcia as follows:
The factual findings and applicable law in this petition are accurately discussed in the exhaustive
and well-written Order of then Trial Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice Alfredo Marigomen
We agree with his determination of reasonable fees for the private lawyer on the basis of quantum
meruit. The trial court fixed the compensation at P30,000.00 and ordered reimbursement of
actual expenses in the amount of P289.43.

... Thus because of his effort in the filing of this case and in securing the WHEREFORE, the questioned October 18, 1985 decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
issuance of the injunction preventing the City of Cebu and Sergio Osmea, is set aside. The Order of the Trial Court dated May 30, 1979 is REINSTATED.
Jr., from selling or disposing the lots to third parties, on the part of the
members of the Provincial Board from extending the date of the automatic SO ORDERED.
reversion beyond August 15, 1965, on the part of the Register of Deeds
from effecting the transfer of title of any of the donated lots to any vendee
or transferee, the disposition of these lots by the City of Cebu to third parties
was frustrated and thus: saved these lots for their eventual recovery by the
province of Cebu.

Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and Mayor Osmea.
Garcia just happened to be the lawyer, Still Atty. Garcia is entitled to compensation. To deny
private respondent compensation for his professional services would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103
SCRA 329).

The petitioner alleges that although they do not deny Atty. Garcia's services for Governor Espina
(who ceased to be such Governor of Cebu on September 13, 1969) and the original plaintiffs in
the case, "it cannot be said with candor and fairness that were it not for his services the lots would
have already been lost to the province forever, because the donation itself he was trying to enjoin
and annul in said case was subject to a reversion clause under which lots remaining undisposed
of by the City as of August 15, 1965 automatically reverted to the province and only about 17
lots were disposed of by August 15, 1965." We quote respondent counsel's comment with
approval:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that the donation was subject to a reversion clause, the same
clause gave the Provincial Board the discretion to extend the period of
reversion beyond August 15, 1965 (see paragraph 3 of donation).
[G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay
Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June
22, 1996. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No.
52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set
for March 15, 1997. Immediately upon learning of such ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta
filed two (2) Petitions with the Commission on Elections calling its attention to a pending case
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for the settlement of boundary disputes. The
Municipality of Cainta claimed that the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscite should be
suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. The
COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the
creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with
finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. However, the COMELEC ruled
differently in the other petition, dismissing the same for being moot since the creation of
Barangay Napico was already ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Hence, these two (2) petitions by the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely
because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such
issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. The Court also would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Furthermore, the Court did not agree that merely
because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the
petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The
Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan
should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of
Pasig and Municipality of Cainta by the RTC of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite
held to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; PENDING BOUNDARY DISPUTE
CASE BETWEEN TWO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS PRESENTS A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH MUST BE DECIDED BEFORE
PLEBISCITE FOR CREATION OF BARANGAYS MAY BE HELD. - We agree with
the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3 006 involving the boundary
dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the
proposed barangays may be held. The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial
question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into
play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule,
this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good
order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another
case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.- In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims
that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute
case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised
in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not
only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays. Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites,
it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final
determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEBISCITE HELD TO RATIFY THE CREATION OF
PROPOSED BARANGAY, DECLARED NULL AND VOID IN CASE AT BAR;
REASON. - Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held
in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta
has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of
Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional
Trial Court. In Tan v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the moot and academic
argument as follows - Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for
non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held
and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly
be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born,
deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetration
of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been
fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing
situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents
so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents submission will create a
dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and
indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in
the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or
alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that
this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to
bring about a fait accompli. Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of
 Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation
of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of
plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663
involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its
jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay
Karangalan in Pasig City.[1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for
June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52,
Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.[2] Plebiscite for this purpose was set for
March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission
on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)[3] and
March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. [4]According to the Municipality
of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said
pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the
said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta
and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until
after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two
municipalities.[5] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition
for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where
the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
therein.[6] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents
a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the
proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates
a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the
instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42,[7] that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one
case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions
of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to
the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[9] we held that
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the peoples welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more
prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or
not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of
the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been
rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico
are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[10] we struck down the moot and academic argument
as follows --
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot
and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners
strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that,
if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging
that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents submission will
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting
and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will
abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait
accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in

abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should
be annulled and set aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE
and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is
ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary
dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case
No. 94-300.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157714 June 16, 2009
MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated January 22, 2003,
which denied the appeal of petitioner Municipality of Pateros (Pateros) for undertaking a wrong
mode of appeal. Subject of the appeal was the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 139, dated June 14, 1996, which dismissed petitioners complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
The Facts
The property subject of this case consists of portions of then Fort William McKinley, now known
as Fort Bonifacio (subject property), currently comprising Barangays Cembo, South Cembo,
West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo (entire property). The subject property
is allegedly situated within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Municipality (now City) of
Makati (Makati) per Proclamation No. 24754 issued on January 7, 1986 (Proclamation No. 2475)
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos). Subsequently, on January 31,
1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No.
518,5 amending Proclamation No. 2475. Parenthetically, it may be noted that a similar boundary
dispute over the entire property exists between the Municipality (now City) of Taguig and
Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 63896 and pending before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
153.
As Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518 respectively stated that the entire property is situated in
Makati, Pateros, on January 18, 1991, filed an action 6 for Judicial Declaration of the Territorial
Boundaries of Pateros against Makati before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154 (Pasig RTC).
The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the subject property is
located in Makati and it should have been filed before the Makati RTC.7Heeding the directive of
the Pasig RTC, Pateros, on December 8, 1993, filed with the RTC of Makati a Complaint8against
Makati and co-respondents, Director of Lands and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), for the Judicial Declaration of the Territorial Boundaries of Pateros with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO). Pateros claimed that, based on historical and official records, it had an original area of
one thousand thirty-eight (1,038) hectares, more or less. However, when a cadastral mapping
was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1978, Pateros was appalled to learn that its territorial
boundaries had been substantially reduced to merely one hundred sixty-six (166) hectares.
Pateros opined that this disparity was brought about by the issuance of Proclamation Nos. 2475
and 518. Thus, Pateros prayed that the RTC judicially declare the territorial boundaries of Pateros
based on supporting pieces of evidence, and that it nullify Proclamation No. 2475.
Makati filed a Motion to Dismiss,9 contending that the issue was not the nullification of
Proclamation No. 2475; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
because original jurisdiction to resolve boundary disputes among municipalities situated in
Metro Manila is vested in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA); that the RTC's jurisdiction
is merely appellate; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action as Pateros failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by failing to settle the dispute amicably; and that Pateros' claims had
already been barred by laches because Makati, throughout the years, had already developed the
subject property and had spent millions on such development.
Makati also filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings,10 arguing that the bill converting Makati
into a city was pending approval before the Senate and portions of the subject property are
included in the proposed charter. Makati, thus, opined that the continuation of the RTC
proceedings would create a conflict between the judicial and the legislative branches. In its
Order11 dated October 21, 1994, the RTC granted Makatis Motion.
On July 19, 1994, Republic Act No. 785412 was enacted into law, converting Makati into a highly
urbanized city. Pateros then moved for the revival of the proceedings before the RTC,13 which it
granted in its Order14 dated March 17, 1995. However, due to the pending Motion to Dismiss
earlier filed by Makati, the RTC required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
The RTC's Ruling
On June 14, 1996, the RTC issued an Order, dismissing the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that Proclamation No. 2475 specifically declared that the subject
property is within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati and, inasmuch as the Proclamation was
not declared unconstitutional, the same is a valid and subsisting law. In the main, citing
Sections 1015 and 11,16 Article X of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to this Court's ruling
in Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal,17 the RTC held that the modification or substantial alteration
of boundaries of municipalities can be done only through a law enacted by Congress which shall
be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. Hence, the RTC opined that it is without jurisdiction to fix the territorial boundaries of
the parties. Pateros filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied by the RTC
in its Order19 dated August 30, 1996. Aggrieved, Pateros appealed to the CA. 20
The CA's Ruling
On January 22, 2003, the CA denied Pateros' appeal. The CA held that the RTC did not make
any findings of fact but merely applied various provisions of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
case presented a pure question of law, which Pateros should have brought directly to the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Section 5(2),21 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2,22 Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that it would amount to grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction if the CA insisted on resolving the issues raised
therein. Thus, by undertaking a wrong mode of appeal and citing Section 2, 23 Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA denied Pateros' appeal. Pateros filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,24 which the CA denied in its Resolution25 dated March 27, 2003.
The Issue
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.26
Pateros asseverates that the issues raised before the CA involved mixed questions of fact and
law, because Pateros sought the determination of its territorial boundaries and the nullification
of Proclamation No. 2475; that Pateros does not seek the alteration, modification, or creation of
another or a new local government unit (LGU), but is concerned only with its territorial
boundaries which, according to existing records, consisted of 1,038 hectares; that non-
presentation of evidence before the RTC does not make the appeal purely a question of law,
because the parties were prevented from presenting any evidence due to the RTC's erroneous
dismissal of the case based on lack of jurisdiction; that Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518 suffer
from Constitutional infirmity; that the alteration or modification of the boundaries of
municipalities or cities can only be made by a law enacted by Congress and approved by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; that Proclamation
No. 2475, although issued by then President Marcos during the Marcos era, was not a legislative
enactment, pursuant to Section 6 of the 1976 Amendment to the Constitution; and granting,
without admitting, that Proclamation No. 2475 is a law, it should be subject to approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, Pateros
prays that the assailed CA Decision be reversed and set aside, and that the RTC be directed to
proceed with the trial of the instant case.27
On the other hand, Makati claims that the sole issue in Pateros' appeal before the CA is
jurisdiction and as the question of jurisdiction is a question of law and as the CA lacks
jurisdiction over pure questions of law, therefore, Pateros resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.
The issues raised by Pateros do not consist of questions of fact as the RTC rendered the assailed
Order based on Makati's Motion to Dismiss and no trial on the merits was ever conducted. Makati
points out that the CA quoted the decision of the RTC's discourse in order to show that only a
question of law was involved in Pateros' appeal. Thus, Makati posits that Pateros defies the rules
on trial, evidence, and jurisdiction in a desperate bid to extricate itself from its mistake in taking
a wrong mode of appeal, i.e., by notice of appeal to the CA rather than a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure filed before this Court.
Makati submits that the dismissal of Pateros' appeal was proper, as mandated by Section 2, Rule
50 of the said Rules. Due to the availment of the wrong mode of appeal, the RTC's Order
dismissing the case already attained finality.28
The Director of Lands and the DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share
the stand and arguments of Makati. The OSG stresses that the parties never presented any
evidence before the RTC which resolved the case based on the parties' undisputed factual
submissions and the application thereto of the pertinent laws, Rules of Civil Procedure, and
jurisprudence. Hence, the OSG concludes that the appeal before the CA involved a pure question
of law.29
Our Ruling
We agree that Pateros indeed committed a procedural infraction. It is clear that the issue raised
by Pateros to the CA involves the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case.
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law; it is conferred
by the Constitution or by law. Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law. As Pateros' appeal solely involves a
question of law, it should have directly taken its appeal to this Court by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the CA under Rule 41. The CA
did not err in holding that Pateros pursued the wrong mode of appeal. 30
However, in the interest of justice and in order to write finis to this controversy, we opt to relax
the rules. Our ruling in Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III and Christine S. Dayrit v. People of the
Philippines and Daisy Afable31 provides us with ample justification, viz.:
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of
justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of the courts is a laudable objective, it
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects
and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of rules which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always
be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.1avvphi1
In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the
courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant is given the full opportunity for a just and
proper disposition of his cause.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, we have consistently held that rules must not be applied so rigidly
as to override substantial justice.
Given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we find sufficient reason to relax the rules.
Thus, we now resolve the sole issue of whether the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the boundary
dispute between Pateros and Makati.
Apart from the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is
conferred by law, it is also the rule that the courts exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint or information and the law applicable at the time the action
was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an
action cannot be cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.
Thus, the jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. 32
It is worth stressing that, at the time the instant case was filed, the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 were already in effect. Thus, the law in point is Section
118 of the LGC, which provides:
Section. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province
concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one
hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly
urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.33
Notably, when Pateros filed its complaint with the RTC of Makati, Makati was still a
municipality. We take judicial notice of the fact that there was no Sangguniang
Panlalawigan that could take cognizance of the boundary dispute, as provided in Section 118(b)
of the LGC. Neither was it feasible to apply Section 118(c) or Section 118(d), because these two
provisions clearly refer to situations different from that obtaining in this case. Also, contrary to
Makati's postulation, the former MMA did not also have the authority to take the place of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan because the MMA's power was limited to the delivery of basic urban
services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila. The MMA's governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and
municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of
basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and
other issuances, approval of a code of basic services, and exercise of its rule-making
power.34 Thus, there is no merit in Makatis argument that Pateros failed to exhaust
administrative remedies inasmuch as the LGC is silent as to the governing body in charge of
boundary disputes involving municipalities located in the Metropolitan Manila area.
However, now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the parties should follow Section
118(d) of the LGC and should opt to amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the respective
sanggunians of the parties. This has become imperative because, after all, no attempt had been
made earlier to settle the dispute amicably under the aegis of the LGC. The specific provision of
the LGC, now made applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must be complied with.
In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as envisioned under Section 118(e) of the
LGC, a certification shall be issued to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by the
Sanggunian concerned within sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned certification.
In this regard, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC shall govern. 35
Only upon failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically
provided in Section 119 of the LGC:
Section 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party
may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one
(1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute
shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
On this score, the jurisdiction of the RTC over boundary disputes among LGUs was settled
in National Housing Authority v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 36 where this
Court recognized the appellate jurisdiction of the proper RTC. The jurisdiction of the RTC was
clarified in Municipality of Kananga v. Judge Madrona,37 where this Court held that, even in the
absence of any specific provision of law, "RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power
not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only
original, but also exclusive."
Corollarily, we feel obliged to inform Congress of the need to pass a law specifically delineating
the metes and bounds of the disputing LGUs. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC,38 we held that the
existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an unsurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU.
Congress, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, could very well put an end to
this dispute. We reiterate what we already said about the importance and sanctity of the territorial
jurisdiction of an LGU:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Unit in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.39
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED, having been mooted by the conversion of
respondent Municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. The parties are hereby
DIRECTED to comply with Section 118(d) and (e) of the Local Government Code, and Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 without
prejudice to judicial recourse, as provided in the Local Government Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS,
and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between
municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not
the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do.1
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain
extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case
that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary
dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the
boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of
Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously
organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor
General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the
Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated
from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast,
by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan;
on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan
River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and
Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of
Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall
be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not
mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be
considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos'
boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the
Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the present
adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were
then a single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and
Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February
14, 1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and
Apayao, was further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to
R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao.
Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753
is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that
the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its
reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-
Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years, 7 or
only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said
resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era,
But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP,
on the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper. 9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under
R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary,
respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era
boundary, which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According
to Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt.
Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. 10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was
cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be
compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as
its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle
portion11 of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by
Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged
that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an
indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by
Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A.
No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which
should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios. 13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be
aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras.
However, based on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of
Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of
Marcos.14 This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its
position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to
dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area
consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of
the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva
Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon
a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is
indeed Mountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because
the province, specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the
East by the Province of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of
Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province.
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in
the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and
they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief and secure the benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)
The SP further explained:
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature
that is important. When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and
literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to
the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that
congress did not intend to have this absurd situation to be created when it created the
Municipality of Marcos. This body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160
otherwise known Local Government Code, so believes that respondent Nueva Era or
any portion thereof has been excluded from the ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle
of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by expressly naming
the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed
excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios
comprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the
said City, the court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law
abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City.
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our
brothers and sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with
their own rich customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the
inhabitants of Nueva Era have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With
this common ancestral heritage which unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not
be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)
RTC Decision
On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision 20 of March 19,
2001. The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as
regards its boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should
prevail.
 On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios
of the Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
agreed with the position of Nueva Era.
xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A.
3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M.
Valdez, 2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality
to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present
barrios of Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all
in the Municipality of Dingras of the same province. The seat of government
will be in the sitio of San Magro in the present barrio of Ragas.
xxxx
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected
too much because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to
comply with its obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will
not be diminished nor its operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic
development in both the mother and the proposed municipalities will be
accelerated.
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add
any area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been different only if the area
being claimed by the Municipality of Marcos is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the Municipality of
Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may be harmonized
by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for
review24 of the RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a
Government Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a
part of the newly created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is separated
from Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the boundaries of the new
Municipality of Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era. 25
The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules
Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to
Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its
own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the
description of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that
it was entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva
Era when Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law
because the law required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory. 26
In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one
for certiorari. The Decisions of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional
Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDEinsofar as they made
the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern
boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending the said boundary of
Marcos to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-
Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the
claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion of barangay Sto. Nio which should,
as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte
and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos
is only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and
refused to extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province (Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves
no room for equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
 "On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to
the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder
road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary
of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary; on the South by the Padsan River, which is at the same
time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the
West and Southwest by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac
and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos
and refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province (Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone
can do. Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era
and merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it
provided that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos
Norte and Mountain Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was
already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the
law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex sed lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-
Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by
Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the
boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would
mean annexing part of the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra
is between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From
Nueva Era's own map of Region 1, which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-
Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of
the old Mountain Province into the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain
Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the south of Kalinga
Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which is farther
south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-
Apayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern
boundary of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied.
The CA ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is separated
from its mother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and
Dingras and north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area
of Marcos as defined by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos
is laying claim to it to be integrated into its territory by the SP because it is contiguous
to a portion of said municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will
necessarily substantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos
from that defined by law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True,
the SP may substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But
this means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in relation to
another barangay within the same municipality for as long as that will not result in
any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in dispute therefore remains
to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although separated by the newly
created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local Government Code
which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based
on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions;
and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.31
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the
case to it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite
its pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating
it as one for certiorari, to wit:
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between
dismissing outright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason
that a petition for review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local
Government Code provides for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the
Regional Trial Court but not any further appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely
statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too
basic to require the citation of supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the
right of further appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or
among local government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the
adverse decision of the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the
transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive
dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari.32
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on
Appeal, since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that "An appeal
to the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional
Trial Court, without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the
Petition for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a
Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring
that MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-
Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory
beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further
East, by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel lines from
Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted
by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary
of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
Our Ruling
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or
more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the
disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the
SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem,
however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.
The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It
ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the
Local Government Code35 which provides:
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial
Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final
resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued
for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no
longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot
be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of
supporting authority."36
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of the
transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by
treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the
SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted
by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law
allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
R.A. No. 7902,38vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further
supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy
of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition
for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is
supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain
appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local government
unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. 40
The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality
to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986
EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the
past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
 consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to
serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing,
abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one
instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects
them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of
the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. 42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the creation
of a local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its
territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.
However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973
constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed
below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government
unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no
plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.44 It is the basic norm that
provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless
legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue,
the Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having
been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is
untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only
with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect
the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21,
1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that
created it. Its creation was already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further
require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given
only a prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule
otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn
even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the
Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named
in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated
from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and
natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.51 The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to
have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory
note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned
only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note
to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. 54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter
still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its
boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast,
by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and
 Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by SO ORDERED.
the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities
of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva
Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order
for its eastern side to reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse
the middle portion of Nueva Era.

Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to
its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said
description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a
compact and contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. 55 We
thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute,
and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. 56 Every section, provision or
clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law, and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 57

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the
very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the
construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the
purpose of the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes
so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."58

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and
the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.59

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.