Dimitar Bechev-Constructing South East Europe - 2011

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Dimitar Bechev
CONSTRUCTING SOUTH EAST EUROPE
The Politics of Balkan Regional Cooperation
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Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Constructing
South East Europe
The Politics of Balkan Regional
Cooperation
Dimitar Bechev
Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations and Research
Associate, South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), St Antonys College,
Oxford
In Association with St Antonys College, Oxford

Dimitar Bechev 2011
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First published 2011 by
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Contents
List of Figures and Map vii

List of Tables viii
About the Author ix
Acknowledgements x
List of Acronyms xi
Introduction 1
Divergent views of regional cooperation 4
Bringing in identity politics 6
Outline of the main argument 9
Methodological orientations 11
Overview of the chapters 14
Part I Drivers of Regional Cooperation
1 All in the Same Boat? Regional Interdependence and
Cooperation in South East Europe 19
Functional aspects of Balkan interdependence 20
The webs of Balkan security 30
Interdependence and cooperation 39
2 Pushing for Cooperation: External Actors in Balkan
Regionalism 41
The power of outsiders: historical legacies 42
Western interventions in the 1990s 43
Back to the Balkans: international policy after the
Kosovo crisis 49
The only game in town: the EU and the Western
Balkans in the 2000s 57
The dynamics of external push 60
3 Balkans, Europe, South East Europe: Identity Politics and
Regional Cooperation 62
Identity and the study of regionalism 63
In search of Balkan identity 65
v
vi Contents
The inside-out angle: the nation, Europe and the Balkans 68

The outside-in angle: between othering and
Europeanization 74
A dichotomy revisited: identity and material interest in
regional cooperation 79
Part II Areas of Regional Cooperation
4 Building Up a Regional Marketplace: Economic and
Functional Cooperation 85
Sectors of economic and functional cooperation 86
Explaining and understanding functional cooperation 104
5 Defusing the Powderkeg: Security Cooperation 108
First steps in cooperative security after the Cold War 109
Towards a multilateral security regime 111
The new security agenda in the Balkans 120
Origins and dynamics of security cooperation in
South East Europe 126
6 Between Lofty Rhetoric and Lingering Conflicts:
Political Cooperation 129
Balkan multilateralism relaunched 130
New beginnings 137
The Balkans on the road to membership in NATO and
the EU 142
Interests, norms and identities in Balkan political
cooperation 149
Conclusion: Looking at the Big Picture 152
Appendix I 157
Appendix II 162
Notes 171
Bibliography 195
Index 207
List of Figures and Map
Figures
1.1 Trade in South East Europe 25

2.1 Institutional structure of the SP 54
Map
4.1 South East Europe: core network 99
vii
List of Tables
0.1 Factors behind regional cooperation 9

0.2 Balkan regional cooperation: factors and outcomes 13
1.1 GDP growth in selected transition countries of South
East Europe, 19902000 (%) 23
1.2 Trade figures for 1996 (million $) 26
1.3 Density and quality of roads in South East Europe (2000) 28
1.4 Density and quality of railways in South East Europe
(2001) 28
2.1 SP participants 52
2.2 The Western Balkan countries on the path to European
integration 59
3.1 External push vs. norms and identity 82
4.1 Trade flows in South East Europe in 1998 (share of total) 88
4.2 Pan-European corridors and SP funding 97
4.3 Functional cooperation a cross-sector comparison 105
5.1 SEDM/MPFSEE in facts and figures 116
6.1 The Regional Cooperation Council at a glance 147
viii
About the Author
Dimitar Bechev is a Senior Policy Fellow and Head of Sofia Office

at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is also affiliated
with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), a programme
within the European Studies Centre, St Antonys College, Oxford.
He is the sole author of the Historical Dictionary of the Republic of
Macedonia (2009) and co-editor of Greece in the Balkans (2009) and
Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational
World (2010). His reviews and articles on Eastern enlargement and
the EU neighbourhood policy, the Balkans, Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions, post-communist transitions and ethnopolitics have appeared
in leading academic periodicals such as the Journal of Common Market
Studies, East European Politics and Societies, Slavic Review, Millennium,
Nationalities Papers. He has also been involved, as Region Head for
Central and Eastern Europe, in Oxford Analytica, a leading provider
of political and economic insight. He holds a D.Phil. in International
Relations (2005) from the University of Oxford.
ix
Acknowledgements
This book was made possible thanks to the support and inspiration
by a number of individuals and institutions. First and foremost,
I am indebted to Kalypso Nicoladis, who encouraged and guided
my efforts leading to this monograph. I am also grateful to Richard
Crampton, Richard Caplan, Jan Zielonka and Spyros Economides,
who all helped me flesh out and refine my ideas along the way.
Special thanks to South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX),
a programme within St Antonys College, and personally to Kerem
ktem and Othon Anastasakis. The affiliation with SEESOX brought
me into contact with some of the leading minds in the Balkan Studies
community, to the great benefit of my research. I also wish to thank
the fellows and students at St Antonys College, my intellectual and
physical home for nearly a decade. I am also particularly grateful to
Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo for the fellowship it awarded me
in 2010, enabling me to complete the manuscript. Thanks to Ryo
Oshiba as well as to the Faculty of Law and the EU Studies Institute
run jointly with Keio University. I also wish to acknowledge the
contribution of the BISA Working Group on South East Europe,
which I co-convene together with Denisa Kostovicova and James
Ker-Lindsay, and the TRANSFUSE association. Special thanks to Ilia
Markov for helping with the Index.
I owe much to the ideas, comments and suggestions of the fol-
lowing colleagues: Milica Uvalic, Vladimir Gligorov, Ivan Krastev,
Aleksandar Fatic, Dejan Jovic, Leeda Demetropoulou, Laza Kekic,
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Duko Lopandic, Svetlozar Andreev, Nathalie
Clayer, Vesna Popovski, Peter Siani-Davies, Emilian Kavalski, Srdan
Vucetic, Alessandro Rotta, Kyril Drezov, Max Watson, Michael Taylor,
Tanja Brzel, Jonathan Scheele, Vessela Tcherneva, Julian Popov,
Svetlana Lomeva.
Last but not least, I owe a great debt to my friends and family. My
parents, Rossitsa and Christo, supported me all through my long
postgraduate years. Finally, if there is one person without whom this
book would never have been written is my wife Galya. To her I owe
my greatest gratitude and, above all, love.
x
List of Acronyms
ATMs/ATPs Autonomous trade measures/preferences

CSBMs Confidence- and security-building measures
CSCE/OSCE Conference/Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Association
CEI Central European Initiative
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies
CFE Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB European Investment Bank
EEC/EU European Economic Community/European Union
FDI Foreign direct investment
FTA Free-trade agreement
HLSG/ISG High Level Steering Group, Infrastructure Steering
Group
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
KFOR Kosovo force
MARRI Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MPFSEE Multinational Peace Force in South East Europe
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PfP Partnership for Peace
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP Stabilization and Association Process
SBDI South Balkan Development Initiative
xi
xii List of Acronyms
SECI South East European Cooperative Initiative

SEDM South East European Defence Ministerial
SEEBRIG South East European Brigade
SEECAP South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on
Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities
SEECP South East European Cooperation Process
SEEGROUP South East European Steering Group
SEEI South East European Initiative
SEETI South East European Trade Initiative
SELEC South East European Law Enforcement Centre
SEPCA South East European Police Chiefs Association
SFOR Stabilization Force, NATOs peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina replacing IFOR
SP Stability Pact for South East Europe
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
RCC Regional Cooperation Council
PROSECO Public Prosecutors Network
TINA Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment
UCTE Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of
Electricity
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
US United States of America
VAT Value added tax
WB World Bank
WT1 Working Table II of the Stability Pact
(Democratization)
List of Acronyms xiii
WT2 Working Table II of the Stability Pact (Economic

Affairs)
WT3 Working Table III of the Stability Pact (Security
Affairs)
WTO World Trade Organization
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Introduction
On a recent trip to Brussels, Mirko Cvetkovic, Serbias prime minister,

observed that [r]egional cooperation is a common value shared by
Serbia and the EU, so we will do everything which is possible to sup-
port good and friendly regional relations and to encourage coopera-
tion with neighboring countries.1 His rhetoric, meant to reassure his
hosts about Belgrades forthcoming approach to shaky Bosnia and
Herzegovina, is representative of a political shift in Europes south-
east. Regional cooperation is nowadays one of the catch phrases
in the Balkans, on a par with European integration, democratic
consolidation, reconciliation, and economic development. The
expression is present in nearly every official speech, policy paper
and media article about the areas politics. Local diplomatic jargon
abounds with barely pronounceable acronyms such as SEECP, RCC
or MPFSEE. The European Union (EU) and NATO see the promotion
of regional institutions as a core objective on their Balkan fringe.2
Social scientists, policy analysts and the commentariat of the region
discuss at length the opportunities offered to and obstacles block-
ing governments, businesses, civil society and the common people
for carrying out joint projects across borders.
Post-communist South East Europe is now halfway inside the EU,
with the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania and the efforts of
Western Balkan countries to join, and gradual normalization has fol-
lowed the decade of conflict in the 1990s. Despite numerous lingering
issues, notably the rifts opened by Kosovos unilateral proclamation
of independence on 17 February 2008 and the tensions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, South East Europe is more peaceful and integrated than
1
2 Constructing South East Europe
it was in the times of Yugoslavias bloody demise. In the autumn of

2008, not long after the declaration of the Prishtina Assembly, a rep-
resentative sociological poll, run by Gallup in the Western Balkans,
found that only a minority of the respondents believe[d] that a new
armed conflict could take place in the coming years.3
The growth of regional cooperation has been a central feature in
that story, whose starting point was the signing of the Dayton/Paris
Peace Accords in late 1995. These days myriads of intergovernmental
schemes operate across various policy areas, barriers to the free circu-
lation of goods and people have been considerably lowered, Balkan
leaders meet on a regular basis in political consultations and scholars
speak of an emergent transnational civil society.4 As of the summer
of 2008, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) operates in once
war-torn Sarajevo, regionally owned by the countries of South East
Europe after long years of tutoring by the EU and the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). We have now a Balkan peacekeeping
force, a free-trade area, an energy community, a centre on fighting
cross-border crime, and so forth. Seen from the perspective of the
summer of 1995, indelibly marked in memory by the genocide at
Srebrenica, this surely counts for something.
This process involves not only governments but also all manner of
private actors, from businesses to sports associations. (A Balkan profes-
sional basketball league with teams from Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia,
Romania and Montenegro was launched in 2008). It has been
gathering momentum, especially in the areas that once constituted
Yugoslavia. Journalist Tim Judah, covering Western Balkan affairs for
The Economist, has recently written an illuminating piece about the
re-emergence of the Yugosphere (Judah, 2009). Once embroiled in
conflict, the former federations inhabitants now travel freely inside
what used to be administrative boundaries, trade and invest in their
near abroad, attend en masse the concerts of the same post-Yugoslav
performers and watch common TV programmes and reality shows.5
To be sure, the trend towards regional collaboration is just one
among several facets of Balkan politics. When President Boris Tadic
boycotted the Western Balkan summit convened by Slovenia and
Croatia at Brdo pri Kranju on 20 March 2010, over the presence of
high-ranking Kosovar politicians, a great deal of the tensions and
festering disputes resurfaced. Cooperation and competition have long
coexisted in the region and they continue to do so, as any student of
Introduction 3
IR would expect. However, in the 1990s it was the divisions rooted in

exclusionary ethno-national identities, rather than integration driven
by functional imperatives, that set the dominant tone. The violent
break-up of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia culminat-
ing in the wars in Bosnia (19925) and Kosovo (19989) was seen
as a new instalment in a never-ending historical drama earning the
Balkans and balkanization an unenviable place in the global politi-
cal lexicon. The televised images of the Yugoslav conflict dubbed
the Third Balkan War in a reference to 191213 coupled with
entrenched associations with Kleinstaaterei, parochialism, intolerance
and aggression against minorities and neighbouring countries, ren-
dered the very notion of Balkan regionalism an oxymoron.
Why and how, then, did regional cooperation make such advances
in the space of 1015 years? This is the subject this book engages
with. From a certain perspective, it is a non-puzzle. Regional coopera-
tion belongs to a category Americans commonly call motherhood
and apple pie. Who would ever object to it, let alone problematize
and dissect it? With its virtues being a priori obvious, especially in
an area like the Balkans, regional cooperation has in fact rarely been
the target of a more systematic scholarly exploration. More often
than not, the key question has been how to make it work, not what
the relative significance of this or that variable is. This explains the
pronounced preference for policy-analytical research over lengthy
academic treatises revolving around (seemingly) trivial questions.
Yet a scholarly perspective adds fresh insights. It is very important
to sketch out the concept of regional cooperation, prior to delving
deeper into its Balkan subspecies. Regional cooperation is a type
of a collective intergovernmental action that takes place within a
geographically bounded setting, however vaguely defined or politi-
cally contestable. It denotes a process whereby three or more states
adjust their behaviour in a coordinated way to achieve certain shared
objectives.6 Outcomes might vary and may include: liberalized
trade regimes; joint economic regulation; common functional and
security projects; institutional arrangements and decision-making
procedures; denser clusters of formal and informal rules creating
stable mutual expectations in given policy-areas (regimes);7 and com-
mon responses to particular political issues. For Andrew Hurrell, a
principal voice in the field, such intergovernmental actions (labelled
regional cooperation and state-driven integration) are key aspects
of the wider phenomenon of regionalism. Key too, is the definition

of regionalism which, according to Hurrell, is the spontaneous
growth of societal integration through a bottom-up process of social
and economic interaction, and the emergence of a common regional
awareness (Hurrell, 1995; Hurrell and Fawcett, 1995).
Divergent views of regional cooperation
Such theoretical definitions, distinctions and refinements provide a

useful lens through which to re-examine the existing literature on
the Balkan case. Indeed, there are divergent accounts of what factors
are at work in regional cooperation.
The first-cut understanding of the phenomenon inevitably focuses
on the functional gains that come from regionalization. The poten-
tial of integrated markets and of facilitating state policies in flanking
areas such as transport, energy, telecommunications, and so on, as
motors of growth and development for the region, were recognized at
an early stage. Drawing on the lessons of post-1945 Western Europe,
the promotion of interdependent reconstruction and economic
upsurge was seen as a strategy for remodelling the Balkans. That was
the cornerstone of the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SP), an
EU initiative in response to the Kosovo war. The policy community
paid special attention to trade liberalization (inside the region and
with the EU) and upgraded transport infrastructure as instrumental
for forging cross-regional bonds (Emerson and Gros, 1999; Gligorov,
Kaldor, Tsoukalis, 1999; Daskalov et al., 2000).8 For instance, Milica
Uvalic, an authority on Balkan political economy, at the time saw
regional cooperation as a way to encourage trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in post-communist South East Europe (Uvalic,
2001).9 Tim Judah gives the example of retail conglomerates, such
as Konzum, Delta or Merkator, who boost their earnings by opening
outlets, across former Yugoslavia, that cater to a new generation of
shoppers who are blind to ethnic prejudice (Judah, 2009, p. 5).
Thus, inter-state cooperation is seen as a functional response to oppor-
tunities and challenges stemming from within the region. It seeks to
maximize the positive linkages running across South East Europe while
managing or containing negative externalities such as environmental
degradation or the proliferation of transnational criminal networks a
lasting legacy of the Yugoslav wars of succession and the international
Introduction 5
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.10 In other words, the causa-

tion arrow points from regionalization to regional intergovernmental
cooperation, though the opposite is also conceivable.
Yet, in the Balkans, it is hard to overlook the outside in aspects of
regionalism. Presenting local governments with incentives to work
together has been at the core of the Western strategy to stabilize
Europes volatile backyard. Regional cooperation topped the agenda in
the early 2000s, in part because it was a feature of the EUs membership
conditionality, applied to former Yugoslav republics and Albania (the
Western Balkans), and was supported by an assortment of carrots:
political concessions, market access, financial assistance. The theme of
external involvement in intra-Balkan schemes goes even further back
in time. One should mention Aurel Brauns little-read volume Small-
State Security in the Balkans (1983), which deals with the cooperation
trends of the 1970s and early 1980s. Back then, Braun investigated,
in a rather detailed manner, the constraints posed by extra-regional
alignments on the incipient processes of intergovernmental concordi-
zation, as he put it.11 Removing such hurdles, the end of the Cold War
has played a profoundly transformative role. The post-Dayton genera-
tion of Balkan initiatives exemplify the larger category of peripheral
(sub)regionalism across the former bloc divide represented by the
Central European Initiative (CEI), the Black Sea Cooperation Process
(BSEC) and, in a certain sense, the Central European Free Agreement
(CEFTA) all of which emerged in the early 1990s (Botsiou, 1998;
Shtonova, 1998).12 Balkan regionalism therefore emerges as part of
an overarching endeavour to promote security on the fringes of the
EU and NATO (the catchphrase being post-Cold War infrastructure),
with politics rather than economic development as the principal
driver (Cottey, 1999; Dwan, 1999; Clment, 2000; Pop, 2001).
There is a significant body of literature highlighting external push
as the chief determinant of regional cooperation in the Balkans. It
peaked after NATOs campaign in Kosovo, when Western actors put a
high premium on multilateral approaches. Key instances include the
policy entrepreneurship by the German Presidency of the EU Council,
which led to the launch of the SP in June-July 1999 (Biermann, 1999;
Friis and Murphy, 2000). The continuous efforts of the EU to foster
integration and reconciliation, through the cultivation of multi-
country arrangements, particularly in the Western Balkans, have been
widely acknowledged by academics and practitioners alike. Regional
cooperation has clearly been one of the hallmarks of the enlargement

strategy pursued in former Yugoslavia during the 2000s.13
Obviously, both local interdependence and external push inform
regionalism in the Balkan context. A number of scholars, mostly
coming from inside the area, seek to restore the balance between the
two. Duko Lopandic (whose monograph Regional Initiatives in South
East Europe [2001] is a valuable snapshot of the state of regional coop-
eration at the time a democratization wave swept through former
Yugoslavia in 2000), Thanos Veremis (1995), Sule Kut and Asl Sirin
(2002), and Ekaterina Nikova (2002) all underscore the fact that the
re-launch of inter-state cooperation in the mid-1990s capitalized on a
local political tradition dating back to the period 197690 or even to
the Balkan conferences in the early 1930s.14 This view underpins two
of the most detailed studies on the history of multilateral cooperation
in South East Europe by Axel Sotiris Walden (1992) and Apostolos
Christakoudis (2002). It is unfortunate that these works are available
only in their original languages (Greek and Bulgarian respectively)
and are, therefore, not accessible to a broader readership.15
The most recent wave of writings on regional cooperation (from
the mid-2000s on) has also stressed the interplay between external
and intra-regional factors contributing to the strengthening of col-
laborative institutions and frameworks already in place within the
Western Balkans. A good example is provided by the essays included
in the volume edited by Christophe Solioz and Wolfgang Petritsch,
a senior Austrian diplomat who served as the international commu-
nitys High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1999
and 2002. Written from a policy perspective, the chapters address
the question of how to make cooperation regionally owned that
is how to delegate more power to local actors to decide on the hori-
zontal issues that call for collective action (Petritsch and Solioz, 2009;
Weichert, 2009). As we shall see, the issue of regional ownership has
become one of the key nodal points in the debates surrounding the
cooperative turn in the international politics of South East Europe.
Bringing in identity politics
Of course, the above inside/outside typology is tentative, in that the

literature tends to be empiricist, averse to theorizing and therefore
not explicit about its conceptual and methodological leanings.16 In
Introduction 7
the rare cases when theory is summoned there is a conspicuous mis-

match between the hypotheses derived from this or that model for
instance New Regionalism and the actual evidence.17 One of the
striking shortcomings in the writings on Balkan regionalism, both
policymaking and scholarly, is the partial or inadequate attention
to the role of identity politics. How do collective and individual self-
images, shared by political elites, publics, and nations in the Balkans
influence the project of building up an integrated region? Prominent
students of comparative regionalism such as Amitav Acharya and
Alistair Iain Johnston have argued that group identity considera-
tions may affect the design and the membership of regional institu-
tions.18 An empirical survey of elite opinion, published by Othon
Anastasakis and Vesna Bojicic-Delilovic in 2002, showed that
definitions and expectations of cooperation varied across the pre-
sumed region of South East Europe (ex-Yugoslav republics, Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania). For instance, countries who saw themselves
as more advanced on the path to the EU and NATO downplayed or
disavowed relations with neighbours as an undesirable hindrance
(Anastasakis and Bojicic-Delilovic, 2002).
Such surveys suggest that negative or lukewarm attitudes about the
idea that the Balkans should stick together derive from grand narra-
tives connecting todays politics to past, and more recent, history of
conflict and division. These evoke vivid memories and experiences
of conflict with other countries, nations, and ethnic groups but, in
certain cases, also a sense of cultural distance from an entity known
as the Balkans. Taken in combination, identity constructs undercut
the Emanuel Adlers notion of imagined regional community or
Karl Deutschs we-ness (Adler, 1997, 2005; Deutsch et al., 1957,
p. 5).19 It is a common argument that the absence of regional iden-
tity constrains or even precludes cooperation.
The inherent disadvantage in this argument, as with so much of
the literature on the Balkans, is that it treats the boundaries that
define identity and, therefore, regionness as rigid set in stone.
Policy analysts in the 1990s would reiterate that Slovenia, Croatia
and, perhaps, Romania would identify with Central Europe rather
than their truly Balkan neighbours; but what distinguishes the
Balkans from Central Europe?20 Cultural and historical boundaries
seemed to be an immutable fact of life in the mid-1990s. Nowadays,
however, one is confounded by the resurgence of transnational
identities which criss-cross the presumed civilizational frontiers; this

is seen in such banal displays of solidarity such as the Balkan bloc-
vote in the yearly Eurovision Song Contest or the dense, resilient
societal links constituting that elusive entity, the Yugosphere.
As we well know from the study of ethnicity, identity construction
is a two-way negotiation. Internal cohesiveness is at times equally
or less significant than definition from outside. There is a rich and
ever-growing scholarship on the genealogy of regional subdivisions in
Europe, with Larry Wolffs (1994) and Maria Todorovas (1997) contri-
butions to the debate deserving special acknowledgement. One of the
interesting findings, of course, is that the internal and external dimen-
sions are linked. Todorova shows how the Balkan stigma, though
rooted in the political imagination of nineteenth and early twenti-
eth-century Western Europe, has been internalized in local discourses
on regional identity. Identity constructions are sustained by an inher-
ently dialogical exchange between a Self and Other a point that cuts
right to the core of the Constructivist school in academic IR.
How is this all related to the mundane subject of intergovern-
mental cooperation in South East Europe? One possible answer is
to posit the crystallization of a common identity as the outcome of
regionalism or, to use the language of social science, dependent vari-
able.21 Indeed, region-building has become a fashionable item in
the conceptual toolkit of IR scholarship. The emergence of a shared
sense of belonging to a transnational, geographically delineated,
community by elites and (one hopes) societies at large ranks high
in the list of requirements for turning a collection of states into a
regional grouping. At the same time, the assumed malleability of
regional identifications has given credence to facile constructiv-
ism. To paraphrase the film Field of Dreams, if you build it they will
come. The mere institutionalization of regions, by foreign ministries
and policy think-tanks, does not conjure them, in a linear fashion,
into existence. There is the telling example of the Mediterranean,
as demonstrated by the ill-fated EuroMediterranean Partnership
(Pace, 2007) or, more recently, the notion of a Black Sea region. This
is, by no means, an attempt to draw a sharp distinction between
real or artificial regional units. It is rather a salutary reminder that
viable regional constructs rest upon certain pre-existing structures
of material connectivity and shared knowledge. The significance
of cognitive resonance is indeed acknowledged by some of the
Introduction 9
poststructuralist minded theorists behind the region-building para-

digm: for example Iver Neumann (2003), who sees the emergence of
regions as an outcome of a complex interplay between external and
indigenous discourses.
This brings us to the second way in which identity politics meshes
with regional cooperation. Echoing Acharya and Johnston, it treats
constructions of a regional entity as a cause or, more broadly, a factor
or force informing regionalism. Identity comes at the outset of the
political process, though the latter may also reshape it as regional
institutions take root. This perspective is indebted, in equal measure,
to the insights of Balkan historiography and political anthropology
and to the theoretical baggage of various IR schools of thought,
notably Social Constructivism but also Rational Institutionalism.
This enquiry into the drivers of regional cooperation, and the quick
review of the extant literature, suggests that there are two sets of
factors involved: (1) material incentives deriving from inside South
East Europe or presented by external players; and (2) identity patterns
(or politics, in light of the essentially contested nature of identity)
manifest in self-images or constructions from outside. Together these
provide the ideational glue that animates, sustains and binds the
regional unit. The discussion thus far is recapitulated by the two-by-
two matrix below (see Table 0.1).
Outline of the main argument
There are two analytical levels at which one might address regional
cooperation in the Balkans. The first revolves around the rela-
tive significance of the push from outside vs. the functional
demand from within. As the empirical chapters included in Part II
show unequivocally, cooperative outcomes if not regionalism in
South East Europe as a whole have resulted from the actions and
Table 0.1 Factors behind regional cooperation

Intra-regional Extra-regional
Material incentives Interdependence External push
Identity politics Self-images Constructions from
outside
initiatives undertaken by actors external to the region, pursuing sta-

bilization, post-conflict rehabilitation and integration of a volatile
periphery. Outside impulses have largely defined the scope, member-
ship and timing of regional institutions.
Such an explanation accords a relatively minor autonomous role
to interdependence, a usual suspect when looking at the birth, insti-
tutionalization and expansion of regional frameworks. Conventional
functionalist argument usually draws attention to the balance between
supply and demand (cf. Mattli, 1999). While extra-regional forces are
expected to either advance or constrain cooperation, ceteris paribus,
a geographically contiguous grouping should be assumed to enhance
economic and functional ties in pursuit of aggregate welfare gains.
What the empirical analysis of cooperation suggests, in contrast, is
that patterns of interdependence vary from one issue to another, as
well as across subgroups within the wider South East European area.
The pull of interdependence has been much more pronounced for
pairs of neighbours or smaller clusters of proximate countries (e.g.,
the SerbiaBosniaCroatia triangle). Its explanatory power is there-
fore circumscribed when all-regional arrangements spanning from
Turkey to Croatia (sometimes even Slovenia) and from Romania to
Albania as the RCC or SEECP, come under scrutiny.
The claim that foreign tutors or nannies, to borrow a metaphor
from Ronald Linden (2002), matter more than the preferences of
Balkan pupils is hardly original. There is a legion of writings on the
crucial role of the EU in directing the course of regional coopera-
tion in South East Europe.22 What is more interesting is the implicit
distinction in the literature between politics of identity and politics of
interest. As already mentioned, conventional wisdom sees the former
as a hurdle regionalism needs to overcome. By implication, the maxi-
mization of collective self-interest in prosperity and development
represents the best hope for regional institutions. If the rational pur-
suit of welfare, rather than identity-political passions, had reigned
supreme, cooperation on bread-and-butter issues, rather than con-
flict, would have been the defining experience of the Balkans.
Yugoslavias violent disintegration in the 1990s presented a lasting
proof that ethno-national parochialism trumps economic rationality.
Regional cooperation has therefore been perceived as reflective of the
commitment by external actors and local, liberal, pro-Western elites
to rein in the perilous influence of identity politics, as translated
Introduction 11
into state-to-state rivalries, mistrust, security dilemmas and the like.

The shift from identity to utility has been the fundament of Balkan
regionalism since the mid-1990s (Bechev, 2004).
This book makes a frontal attack against the line of reasoning, just
outlined, by portraying regional cooperation as reflective of, and
indeed driven by, identity politics. Its key contribution to the field is
the elucidation of the social context shaping the multilateral institu-
tions and practices of inter-governmental collaboration leading to
the emergence of a regional unit. The chapters that follow dissect not
only structures of interdependence, putting countries in the same
boat, but also formative concepts such as region, Balkans, South
East Europe and Europe. The core argument probed in the chapters
to follow is that regional cooperation has been a symbolic strategy
to transform and to quote one-time Romanian foreign minister
Mircea Geoana to rebrand, the conflict-prone and semi-European
Balkans into part of Europe and the West.23 In the aftermath of a
brutal conflict, commonly referred to as a Balkan and not Bosnian
or Yugoslav war, a substantial segment of political elites were com-
pelled to prove adherence to the constitutive norms and practices of
the Western institutions they aspired to join. Mimicking the latter
was conditioned by the gap, whether real or perceived, between the
outsiders normative expectations and the fragmented politics and
economics of South East Europe.
Seen from the perspective of modern Balkan history, this is clearly
an instance of plus a change. The advent of regional cooperation in
the mid- and late-1990s was not unlike the continual importation of
Western (European) political, economic, social and cultural institu-
tions that had already been in place since the early nineteenth cen-
tury (van Meurs and Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). Ideational and material
structures, anchoring and pulling the Balkan periphery into the orbit
of the model societies in core Europe, have in fact legitimated, in
the eyes of the recipients, the projection of policies and institutions
by extra-regional actors aimed to de-Balkanize and Europeanize
the Balkans.
Methodological orientations
Looking at regional cooperation from the vantage point of identity

takes one to a methodological crossroads. Is the goal to understand
the ideational contents of regionalism, through the systematic

study of the discourse that shrouds cooperative institutions? Or, is
it explaining the dynamics of multilateral collaboration by govern-
ment agents in specific policy sectors? Going all the way back to Max
Webers famous distinction between Erklren and Verstehen, empirical
researchers and philosophers of social science often posit interpreta-
tion and causal analysis as two non-commeasurable, though equally
valid, modes of enquiry.24 Linking regionalism and identity might
deepen our appreciation of the cognitive structures into which
regionalization is embedded; but it is challenging, and some would
even say undesirable, to treat identity as a cause explaining political
outcomes. Material factors and constraints that is the supply of and
demand for cooperation could yield a perfectly plausible account of
the nuts-and-bolts aspects of intra-Balkan cooperation.
This book highlights identity constructions causal effects on the
contents and scope of cooperation, in addition to its deeper, consti-
tutive role. Firstly, it demonstrates that certain states have resisted
regionalist schemes because their elites have not identified with
Balkan neighbours. More importantly, it shows that collective iden-
tity considerations have actually advanced cooperation. For example,
as Chapter 6 shows, South East European countries established indig-
enous multilateral institutions, with no direct external mediation,
in compliance with a certain logic of appropriateness25, predicated
on the norms of Europeanness as a cornerstone of a new regional
self-identification. The Balkan stigma added to the salience of these
normative standards, by elevating the commitment to regionalism
into a benchmark of Europeanization. In such institutions consid-
ered authentically regionally owned, historical inertia has been
more significant than the pull of interdependence. This has been the
principal reason of their highly rhetorical, rather than functional,
output. This does not mean that loose diplomatic processes such as
SEECP are insignificant. Often blocked by the political conflicts in
the region notably the Kosovo issue it has nonetheless fostered
the practice of political consultation, produced new language of
inter-state relations, and facilitated the transition to regional owner-
ship of cooperative schemes in the latter part of the 2000s.
In sectoral cooperation, typically guided by the EU and other exter-
nal players, identity and external push have worked in tandem. Key
substantive steps in the development of regional cooperation for
Introduction 13
example trade liberalization, the creation of an energy community or

the establishment of a Balkan peacekeeping brigade are traceable to
policies and decisions pursued by the EU, NATO and US. However, they
have been legitimized via the power of the regional cooperation norm,
particularly where the external supply for cooperative frameworks
have been at odds with demand from the region. This perspective takes
into account the dual role of extra-regional agents as both providers of
material incentives and harbingers of normative standards.
The book accounts for variance in the dynamics of regional coop-
eration by investigating the interplay between the three master fac-
tors across multiple issue-areas. It contends that interdependence is
the most potent predictor of cooperation in areas of low politics
and among smaller groups of countries (less-than-regional formats)
within the wider region of South East Europe. By contrast, multilat-
eralization has, in most cases, reflected the preferences of external
actors. For their part, collective identity considerations have tended
to come to the fore depending on the level of the politicization of the
issue at hand. Understandably, they have been more salient in high-
profile fora attended by the foreign ministers or heads of state and
government of South East Europe rather than by sectoral ministries
or specialized governmental agencies. Table 0.2 provides a summary
of the main claims.
A final clarification is due regarding the focus on the intergov-
ernmental level of analysis. Pluralist-minded scholars are right that
regionalization, region-building and regionness are essentially tran-
snational processes involving a wide array of actors government or
state being just one among many. This book consciously limits itself
to the top layer, of the cake that is regionalism in South East Europe,
which is a concession to rigour at the expense of comprehensive
coverage.26 In addition, only cursory attention is paid to the
Table 0.2 Balkan regional cooperation: factors and outcomes

Issue type/Cooperation Less-than-regional Regional
format
Technical Interdependence External push
External push Interdependence
Strategic External push Identity politics
Interdependence External push
two-level games played by governments interacting with both their

regional counterparts and domestic societies. While there have been
instances when domestic interest groups have tried to block key
steps on the path of economic integration, their role has not been
so significant as to cancel the influence of extra-regional institutions
on Balkan governments. This is not to suggest that domestic politics
do not matter or, indeed, that they will be fully ignored in this story.
On the contrary, regime change in Belgrade and Zagreb, following
the demise of the semi-authoritarian rules of Franjo Tudman and
Slobodan Miloevic, in 19992000, gave a great boost to the process
at hand. Incoming elites have been more receptive to EU and NATO
norms. The caveat here, of course, is that Miloevic had been an
active participant in Balkan fora, which themselves went back to the
Cold War days when democracy was not the only game in town for
the region. Coupled with the paramount role of extra-regional insti-
tutions in steering Balkan cooperation, this is a strong argument in
favour of adopting a state-centric position and bringing in leadership
and domestic political process factors only occasionally.
Overview of the chapters
The book is in two parts; the first one explores in depth the three
general factors shaping Balkan regional cooperation: interdependence,
external push, and identity. The second part process-traces the emer-
gence and development of institutions and schemes in three differ-
ent domains: economics, military and soft-security cooperation, and
diplomacy.
Chapter 1 investigates the nature and scope of regional interde-
pendence in South East Europe, with a special, though not exclusive,
focus on the 1990s, when inter-state cooperation made it into the
policy agenda. It draws a contrasting picture between the economic
fragmentation of the Balkans a legacy of the Cold War period
amplified by the Yugoslav wars of succession and the interwoven
political and security relations between local states and societies.
The main theme of the chapter is, however, the variable significance
of cross-border linkages across various subregional clusters in wider
South East Europe.
Chapter 2 describes the role played by the external patrons of
Balkan regionalism: the US in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords;
Introduction 15
the EU, which launched a number of schemes culminating in the

SP and especially the SAP in the Western Balkans; and NATO and its
Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative.
Identity politics is the subject of Chapter 3, which posits that the
discursive orientation towards Europe, represented principally by the
model societies in the western parts of the continent, has historically
served as the common denominator in national narratives across
the region. The peripheral predicament is therefore constitutive of
a sui generis all-Balkan regional identity. The chapter discusses how
the contents of Europeanness have been redefined through political
norms such as regional cooperation projected by Western institu-
tions towards the Balkans in the post-Cold War era.
Chapter 4 takes stock of cooperation in various economic and
functional areas, from trade, to transport, to energy. Its key finding is
that regional cooperation in the Balkans has been, for the most part,
a by-product of European integration. The EUs normative projection
has facilitated the carrot-and-stick approach for the export of integra-
tive arrangements.
This is very much the story in Chapter 5, which also deals with
security affairs. NATO and the US have been the main anchors of
Balkan schemes such as the South East Defence Ministerial (SEDM),
while the EU has overseen cooperation on issues falling under the
rubric of justice and home affairs. Yet symbolic politics have mat-
tered too. Through high-profile initiatives such as the Multinational
Peace Force for South East Europe (MPFSEE) local governments have
attempted to build and sustain a positive image of the region in the
eyes of the outside world.
Chapter 6, examining multilateral diplomacy, presents the origins
and dynamics of all-Balkan fora, the first and foremost of which is
SEECP. Starting as a club of foreign ministers and heads of state and
government, the institution has long been the primary channel for
joint rhetorical action aimed at rebranding the Balkans into a South
East Europe that abides by the standards of European normalcy. The
chapter traces the slow development of a functional dimension to
the process and its institutionalization through the RCC.
Part I
Drivers of Regional
Cooperation
1
All in the Same Boat?
Regional Interdependence and
Cooperation in South East Europe
Scholars approaching regionalism from various angles treat interde-

pendence as a key factor pushing for collective action. States and sub-
state actors interact with regard to issues that, figuratively speaking,
put them in the same boat. They reap the benefits of cooperation or
compete for resources concentrated in a more or less clearly bounded
and cohesive spatial perimeter. It is shared geography that binds poli-
ties together, in both positive and negative ways, and Balkan politics
furnish countless examples of this. This chapter explores the character
and intensity of cross-border linkages across South East Europe during
the 1990s the decade when cooperative schemes took off and their
implications for the emergent regional arrangements.
Generations of academics have tried to pin down the concept of
interdependence in a systematic fashion. Following the classic work
of Keohane and Nye, in the 1970s, IR commonly associates the
concept with interconnectedness at the level of the economy and
society which, in turn, creates the demand for rules and regimes
to internalize the externalities that arise (Keohane and Nye, 1972,
1977). In a somewhat circular manner, interdependence is thus seen
as both the original cause and one of the main manifestations of
the liberal order, hinging on institutionalized cooperation among
governments, businesses, and other public and private agents. Yet
interdependence, in the broadest sense, is not the sole preserve of
theorists of progress in international affairs. It is equally embraced by
those clinging to traditional concepts of state autonomy and power
politics. Interdependent security relations are as valid an analyti-
cal vantage point as functional linkages to conceptualize the social
19
forces and structures that make a region stick together. To quote

Barry Buzan, a security complex is a group of states whose primary
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their security
interests cannot realistically be considered apart from one another
(Buzan, 1983, p. 190).1 Though functional, bottom-up dimensions
of interdependence much emphasized in the study of European
integration for instance may be contrasted with state-centric views
stressing interlocking security concerns, balance of power and the
like the two paradigms are not incompatible, as any student of East
Asia would readily testify. The sections below first explore the more
benign face of regional interconnectedness and then proceed to the
analysis of intertwined conflicts across post-Cold-War Balkans.
Functional aspects of Balkan interdependence
Legacies of economic fragmentation and stagnation

Even prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, South East Europe was a highly
fragmented economic space, owing to the diverse developmental
paths and external alignments pursued by the local states and regimes.
Beginning in the late 1940s, Bulgaria and Romania adhered to Soviet-
style economic model of central planning, rapid industrialization and
collectivized agriculture. Yugoslavia steered its own course under the
doctrine of self-management (samouprava), combining elements of
planned economy and the market. From 1965 onwards, enterprises
expanded their autonomy to trade and borrow money at home and
abroad. In the 1950s, the leadership in Belgrade had also rolled back
the ambitious and ruthlessly implemented land collectivization pro-
gramme. By contrast, Albania, an outcast from the Warsaw Pact as a
result of the Sino-Soviet split of 1961, remained faithful to the Stalinist
model and drifted towards extreme forms of autarky. Part of the Western
bloc, Greece and Turkey had, all the way to the 1980s, heavily statist
economies, based on import substitution and underpinned by large
public sectors. It was only Greeces accession to the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1981 and the reforms of Prime Minister Turgut
zal in Turkey that altered the established economic order opening
space for private enterprise and liberalization of foreign trade.2
In the Balkans, politics guided foreign economic relations. Albania,
Romania and Bulgaria became founding members of the Soviet-
sponsored Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
All in the Same Boat? 21
while Greece and Turkey, recipients of Marshall Plan aid, signed asso-
ciation agreements with the EEC in 1961 and 1963. But even Cold
War alignments failed to advance intra-bloc integration. Albania
left COMECON in 1962, while Romania sought to minimize its
dependence on the Soviet Union. It stayed outside the COMECON
specialization arrangements and fostered economic links with the
non-communist world. In 1975, the US accorded it Most-Favoured
Nation status while EEC already accounted for nearly one-fifth of
Bucharests overall trade. Both Romania and Yugoslavia concluded
preferential trade agreements with the EEC in 1980, having acceded
to the Global Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1971 and
1966.
Unsurprisingly, intra-regional trade remained low throughout the
period. In 1989, large neighbours Romania and Yugoslavia accounted
for a mere 13.4 per cent of Bulgarias overall volume. If anything
the trend was negative. GreekYugoslav exchanges dwindled once
Greece joined EEC in 1981. The crisis of the 1980s affected adversely
integration within Yugoslavia too, with republics like Slovenia con-
centrating on hard-currency exports to Western Europe (Uvalic,
2001). Weak economic ties were further hampered by inadequate or
simply non-existent infrastructure; Albanias borders were virtually
sealed off while only one crossing point operated between Greece
and Bulgaria until 1989.
The downturn across Eastern Europe in the 1980s was felt acutely
in the Balkans. Negative growth, high inflation and chronic unem-
ployment made Yugoslavia a prime target of the IMF structural
adjustment programmes (Woodward, 1995, pp. 4782). Growing
trade deficits with the West and the oil shocks of the 1970s pushed
up Romanias foreign debt. In response, the countrys strongman,
Nicolae Ceausescu, embarked in the 1980s on drastic consumption-
curbing measures, which put living standards under a terrible strain
and deprived industries of modern technology while doing little to
bolster productivity. Bulgaria and Romanias agriculture was in a sorry
state due to the outdated technology and labour shortages in rural
areas. Repression of national minorities such as the Turks and the
Hungarians, who were often concentrated in the countryside, only
worsened both countries predicament. The inefficient and resource-
consuming heavy industries, developed in previous decades, soon
too proved a liability, while the Soviet decision to stop supplying
underpriced oil cut off the opportunity for re-export one of the
few ways to earn hard currency from the West. Albanias break with
its patron China, in the late 1970s, had analogous effects, though
60 per cent of the population still lived off the land, compared to 34
in Yugoslavia and 25 in Bulgaria.
Post-communist economies in the 1990s

It is widely acknowledged that post-communist Balkan countries,
with the exception of Yugoslavia, started their transition to market
economy under initial conditions that were disadvantageous in com-
parison with frontrunners Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (dis-
solving in 1993 into the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Subsequent
external shocks, the impact of war in ex-Yugoslavia and questionable
policy choices made in the first half of the 1990s additionally widened
the gap. The demise of COMECON hurt Bulgaria, as nearly two-thirds
of its trade took place within the Eastern bloc. War-ridden Yugoslav
successors fared even worse. Bosnia and Herzegovinas industrial base
was decimated during the 19925 conflict while Serbias economy
was strangled by years of hyperinflation and international sanctions.
Cut off from its markets in former Yugoslavia, and suffering from
the economic blockade imposed by Greece in 1994, Macedonia saw
unemployment rates rise to nearly 40 per cent.
Wars and international sanctions blocked some important routes
linking the region, Turkey and Greece included, to Western Europe.
Bulgaria and Romania officially claimed billions of dollars worth of
losses incurred as a consequence of sanctions that were not lifted
by the UN Security Council until October 1996. Violence deterred
foreign investors well into the 1990s, and negligible volumes of
FDI flowed into the post-communist parts of the region at the time
when Central Europe was already becoming an attractive destina-
tion (Petrakos and Totev, 2001, pp. 75111). Halfway marketization,
benefiting predatory elites, and entrenching corruption and mis-
management became the norm across South East Europe, constrain-
ing even further investment opportunities for foreign and domestic
businesses, and ushering in periodic crises.
As a result, the overall GDP of the regions post-communist clus-
ter actually shrank over the decade. As shown in Table 1.1, growth
returned only in 1994. But even then it proved reversible and vulner-
able to new shocks such as the state collapse in Albania in 1997, the
Table 1.1 GDP growth in selected transition countries of South East Europe, 19902000 (%)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania 10 28 7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 7 8 8 6.5
Bulgaria 9.1 11.7 7.3 1.5 1.8 2.9 10.1 7 3.5 2.4 5.8
Croatia 7.1 21.1 11.1 8 5.9 6.8 5.9 6.8 2.5 0.3 3.8
Macedonia 10.2 3.2 6.6 7.5 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.9 2.7 5.1
Romania 5.6 12.9 8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 6.1 5.4 3.2 1.6
FR Yugoslavia 7.9 11.6 27.4 29.6 8.5 7 7.8 10.1 1.9 18.3 7
(Serbia and
Montenegro)
Average 8.32 14.75 11.4 5.92 4.43 6 2.97 0.3 2.33 1.45 4.97
Source: Dimitrov, Mandova and Stanchev (2002).
23
1999 war in Kosovo, the 19967 banking crisis in Bulgaria or the ina-
bility of Romanias coalition governments to implement privatization
and structural reform between 1996 and 2000. Instead of the classical
U-shape trajectory that transition economies underwent in the 1990s
(initial contraction followed by increase of output), the Balkans fol-
lowed a W-shaped pattern (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010, Ch. 5).
Trade relations
The general economic downturn in the 1990s did not augur well for
regional integration. Overall, troubled transitions accentuated pre-
existent centrifugal tendencies. The EU became the main recipient of
the limited range of exports the Balkans had to offer. In the case of
Bulgaria and Romania, the process was speeded up by the conclusion
of Association (or Europe) Agreements in 1993. Whereas in 1989 29
per cent of Romanian exports went to the EU, in 1994 the respec-
tive figure stood at 45.9 per cent.3 By the mid-1990s, Albania already
traded heavily with Greece and Italy. In 1995, Turkey completed the
Customs Union with the EU, originally envisaged in the 1963 Ankara
Agreement, which resulted into dramatic expansion of its economic
integration with the major Western-European economies.
To be sure, there were economic openings assisted by the pull of
the EU and market reforms in the countries in question. Thus Greece
became a principal trade and investment partner for Albania, but
even more importantly for Bulgaria and, to some degree, Romania.4
Turkey, likewise, expanded its presence in the post-communist
Balkans.5 The end of the Bosnian war saw Bosnia and Herzegovina,
as well as Macedonia, expanding vital exchanges with Croatia and
rump Yugoslavia. This process was helped by the presence of well-
established networks that had survived the war and the international
sanctions, and, in the case of Bosnia, by the absence of hard borders
separating local Serb and Croat communities from their kin states.
Of course, all trade figures quoted here should be taken with a pinch
of salt, since in the 1990s substantial flows remained unaccounted
for due to corruption and inefficiency in the customs and national
statistical offices across the region (Uvalic, 2001). Still, as sketchy
as they might be, the data show unequivocally the main trends
described above (see Figure 1.1).
To put the above figures in context one has to bear in mind that,
at the time, openness to trade, measured as the proportion of overall
Balkan exports in the mid-1990s (%)

100
80
60 Exports to
the region
40
Exports outside
the region
20
0
AL BG GR YU MK RO CR TR
Balkan imports in the mid-1990s (%)
100
80
60 Imports from
the region
40 Imports from
outside the region
20
0
AL BG GR YU MK RO CR TR
Figure 1.1 Trade in South East Europe

Source: Petrakos and Toter (2000); Oxford Analytica, Tarkey: Balkan Strategy6
volumes to national GDP, was relatively low, except in Bulgaria,

Macedonia and Romania, (see Table 1.2). Despite the absence of FR
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the sample, the figures for
Croatia which at the time was similarly lagging behind in terms of
trade liberalization with the EU hint at the general state of affairs
in the mid-1990s.
The resuscitation of trade in the mid-1990s did not lead to the
natural emergence of a cohesive regional space. Typically, signifi-
cant flows took place between geographically adjacent countries.
Instead of a dense regional web of trade links, one saw bilateral
connections: Greece with Albania and Bulgaria, Macedonia with FR
Yugoslavia and so forth. By the end of the decade, trade among the
(then) seven Balkan post-communist states accounted for as little as
1314 per cent of their total turnover (World Bank, 2000). Economic
links with neighbours were relatively more important for the
Table 1.2 Trade figures for 1996 (million $)

Exports Imports GDP Trade to GDP ratio, %
Albania 200 650 2,407 34.41
Bulgaria 5,500 5,500 13,400 82.08
Croatia 1,662 1,082 17,334 15.83
Greece 10,602 30,587 111,758 36.86
Macedonia 1,357 1,618 4,146 71.76
Romania 9,291 10,669 30,750 64.91
Turkey 25,150 30,050 149,300 36.97
Source: ELIAMEP and Hellenic Resources Institute (1997), Southeast Europe. Factbook
and Survey, 19961997 (Athens: Hellenic Resources Institute); Balkans: Economic
Integration, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 12 November 1997.
post-Yugoslav republics, who continued trading with the other parts

of the former federation (Uvalic, 2001, p. 63).7 In 1998, Bosnias trade
with its neighbours was greater both in imports and exports than
with the EU. The same was true of Serbia and Montenegros exports
in the same year, though not of imports where the EU was far ahead
(Gligorov, 1998).
Aside from the history of poor political relations and the gravi-
tational pull of external markets, low levels of integration had eco-
nomic roots too. Excluding Greece and Turkey, Balkan economies
were characterized by similar product structures with agriculture,
textiles and raw materials heavily represented on the export side.
The share of services in GDP was everywhere negligible (Petrakos and
Totev, 2000). Coupled with economic volatility, the lack of comple-
mentarity presented a lasting obstacle to integration that is observ-
able to this very day. The different pace of reforms was yet another
handicap. While countries like Bulgaria and Macedonia liberalized
relatively quickly their foreign trade regimes, FR Yugoslavia and
Albania were trailing behind. The closer institutional relationship of
Romania and Bulgaria with the EU, and their accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), gave a further push for reforms, which in
turn widened the gap with some of their neighbours in what was to
become (towards the end of the 1990s) the Western Balkans.
All in all, in the 1990s South East Europe saw much more eco-
nomic compartmentalization than integration. The significance of
external poles of attraction such as the EU, and individual member
states within it such as Germany, Italy, Austria and Greece, increased.
This limited local demand for institutionalized multilateral coopera-

tion within the region. The notable exception was former Yugoslavia
where, however, political divisions trumped economic consid-
erations. Loose, bilateral cooperation was the more likely course of
action for states in South East Europe.
Transport
Even if it was pulling South East Europe apart, the increasing eco-
nomic prominence of the EU presented incentives for cooperation
in sectors such as transport. Distance from key export markets in
Western Europe increased costs, as did the appearance of new borders
following the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Petrakos, 2002).8 As a
rule, border crossings bottlenecked regional traffic due to inadequate
infrastructure, equipment, human capital and pervasive corrupt
practices. The quality of roads and railways deteriorated in the course
of post-communist transition and the conflicts in the region. Not
only was South East Europe more distanced from the core of the EU
than the Central European and the Baltic countries (CEE8), but on
the average the quality of physical connections was lower too. This
is illustrated by Tables 1.3 and 1.4 below.
Yugoslav conflicts changed the pattern of regional transport.
Countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, and to a lesser degree
Albania and Romania, were dependent on thoroughfares pass-
ing through the collapsing federation. After 1991, many Turkish
Gastarbeiter chose to travel by boat to Italy instead of crossing rump
Yugoslavia en route to Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Ferry
lines between the Greek Ionian port of Igoumenitsa and Italy also
increased in importance.9 With the closure of access to Thessaloniki,
because of the Greek embargo, Macedonian businesses switched to
the port of Durrs in Albania and Burgas on Bulgarias Black Sea
coast. Similarly, during the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina lost access
to the Croatian port of Ploce. Eastwest connections were hampered
by underdeveloped infrastructure. Neither the Albanian nor the
Greek ports on the Adriatic and Ionian Sea were connected to major
cities in the Balkans. This challenge was particularly pronounced in
Albania due to its substandard even by Balkan measures roads
and railways.
NATOs bombing campaign against Serbia further damaged the
vital northsouth connections linking the Balkans with key export
28
Table 1.3 Density and quality of roads in South East Europe (2000)
Length Km/ Km per Motorways
in km 1000 km2 1 million km/1000 km
Area Inhabitants road
Albania 18,000 626 5,743 1
Bosnia and 21,846 427 5,493 1
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 37,286 336 4,691 9
Croatia 28,123 497 6,419 15
Macedonia 12,522 487 6,156 11
Moldova 12,657 375 3,478 0
Romania 198,603 833 8,852 1
FR Yugoslavia 49,805 487 4,684 8
Average 47,355 585 6,511 4
CEE8 average 122,870 1,348 13,317 2
Spain, Portugal, 284,111 1,169 14,329 13
Greece (EU S3)
average
EU12 258,827 1,238 9,819 13
(without S3)
average
Source: Christie and Holzner (2004).
Table 1.4 Density and quality of railways in South East Europe (2001)
Lines Km/ Km/ Double
in km 1000 km2 1 million track as %
Area Inhabitants of the total
Albania 447 16 143 0
Bosnia and 1,032 20 260 9
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 4,320 39 543 22
Croatia 2,727 48 622 9
Macedonia 699 27 344 0
Moldova 1,121 33 308 15
Romania 11,364 48 507 24
FR Yugoslavia 4,058 40 382 7
Average 3,221 40 443 17
CEE8 average 5,927 65 642 30
EU S3 average 6,353 26 320 23
EU12 average 10,941 52 415 39
Source: Christie and Holzner (2004).

markets. The destruction of the Danube bridges at Novi Sad blocked

traffic towards Hungary and Croatia as well as river navigation.
Added to the political isolation of the Miloevic regime, this unwel-
come development contributed momentum for the upgrade of the
eastwest links. It also highlighted the need to build up alterna-
tive northsouth routes bypassing Serbia: notably a second bridge
between Bulgaria and Romania.
The relative underdevelopment of transport infrastructure incentiv-
ized governments to act jointly. Towards the middle of the decade,
interest in trans-regional infrastructure was peaking and becoming a
high political priority. Unlike trade, where the benefits of greater inte-
gration at the regional level were seen as marginal to the gains offered
by enhanced links with the EU, in the field of transport infrastructure
the regional and EU policy vectors were highly compatible.
Energy
Similar to transport infrastructure, energy was a sector where the
external and intra-regional linkages were mutually reinforcing.
Shipping Caspian oil to Western Europe through the Balkans created
incentives for cooperation for groups of local countries. For instance,
terminals located on the Black Sea coasts of Romania and Bulgaria
provided an alternative to the heavy traffic through the Bosporus,
raising environmental concerns in Turkey. However, as we shall see
in Chapter 4, the presence of at least three potential routes for oil
pipelines resulted as much in competition as in opportunities for
collaboration (Lesser et al., 2000, pp. 936).
In contrast to oil, gas infrastructure was well developed, with
substantial facilities in place in both Romania and Bulgaria. The
Bulgarian gas network, shipping gas from Russia, gradually expanded
into neighbouring Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia. Russian gas
reached Serbia via Hungary too. Still, there was a clear deficiency in
cross-border interconnections, which would be reversible and ship
gas from the South to the North, a fact that became obvious towards
the end of the 2000s. However, as early as the 1990s, the Western
efforts to diversify supplies away from Russia located wider South
East Europe at the centre of potential alternative routes for Caspian
and Central Asian gas, presenting governments with opportunities.
There was an even stronger motive for cooperation in the sector
of electricity, owing to the relative complementarity between the
regional countries. Greece, and especially Turkey, the largest and

most dynamic economies in wider South East Europe, were lack-
ing capacity, as expanding output created further energy demand.
Insufficient supply was also a challenge for the post-Yugoslav repub-
lics and Albania. At the same time, Romania and Bulgaria had over-
capacity, due to the rapid shrinkage of their industrial sectors after
1989 (Lesser et al., 2000, p. 86). As was the case with gas, however,
the poor state or the sheer absence of cross-border infrastructure,
a problem exacerbated by the Yugoslav conflicts, emerged as an
obstacle to cooperation and market integration.
Like transport, energy was a sector where functional interdepend-
ence generated clear-cut incentives for collaborative sectoral strate-
gies. However, the spatial linkages in those policy-areas did not
predetermine an optimal institutional design of cooperation. Balkan
states could equally well attain their goals through an inclusive all-
regional body or bodies addressing and managing the issues and
through ad hoc coalitions of immediate neighbours pursuing specific
projects in a flexible, non-institutionalized manner.
The webs of Balkan security
While economic fragmentation supported the contention that South

East Europe was a region only in the geographical sense of the word,
interlocking security issues portrayed it as a single geopolitical space
in the 1990s. Indeed a great deal of the international actors efforts to
pacify the area through the encouragement of regional cooperation
rested on the assumption that the Yugoslav wars were a piece in a
larger regional puzzle. Contemporary policymakers and analysts saw
the Balkans as an integral security unit defined by a common history
of violence and traditions of enmity, but also by long-standing ties of
friendship between pairs of countries and nations.
Interlocking conflicts
The re-emergence of the Balkans as a geopolitical whole reflected
the understanding that the end of the Cold War had unearthed
the regions pre-communist past. Long marginalized by ideological
divisions, issues of borders and minorities were back on the agenda.
The Yugoslav conflict presented the ultimate proof of Balkan history
repeating itself, evoking the memories of the scramble for the spoils
of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the nineteenth and early

twentieth century and the ensuing turmoil in the interwar period.
Back then the Balkans had been a distinctive arena of power politics.
Thus the Balkan Pact (1934) signed by Greece, Turkey, Romania and
Yugoslavia was essentially a regional instrument containing the revi-
sionist aspirations of Bulgaria, Albania and, to a lesser degree, Italy,
and not an externally imposed arrangement.
The diversity of external alignments, which came with the Cold
War, made the region look much less like a self-contained secu-
rity complex. But de-regionalization certainly did not mean that
nationalism-fuelled rivalries were as completely swept aside as the
back to the future theorists of the post-Cold War era would imply.
By the mid-1950s, the GreekTurkish honeymoon under NATOs aegis
was over, thanks to Cyprus, the pogroms against the Istanbul Greeks
in September 1955, and the resulting repressions against the Turks
and other Muslims in the Greek province of (Western) Thrace.10 The
conflict deepened with Turkeys invasion of Cyprus and the dispute
over territorial rights in the Aegean that arose in the 1970s. Athens
and Ankara concentrated considerable military forces along common
borders. Greece remilitarized several eastern Aegean islands as well
as the Dodecanese, contrary to its obligations under the Lausanne
Convention of 1923 and the 1947 Paris Treaty, arguing that this was
a legitimate response to the Turkish deployments around Izmir.11
Socialist solidarity was no recipe for good-neighbourliness either.
Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists were close to creating a common
federal state after the Second World War, but after the Cominform
schism in 1948 ties became hostile despite bouts of rapprochement
like the one during Nikita Khruschevs term as Secretary-General
in Moscow. As of the mid-1960s, the ever-present dispute about
the nationality of Macedonian Slavs turned into the main bone of
contention. Both Yugoslavia and its constituent Socialist Republic
of Macedonia cultivated a separate Macedonian national identity.
They insisted that the population of Pirin Macedonia (the south-
western corner of Bulgaria) should be granted national minority
rights. The communist leadership in Sofia, by contrast, insisted that
Macedonian Slavs shared the same language, ethnicity and history
with Bulgarians. The dispute would grow acrimonious each time
Belgrade and Moscow clashed: for instance, in the wake of Josip Broz
Titos condemnation of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia.12
The Macedonian issue was a constant irritant in relations between

Greece and Yugoslavia too. Successive Greek governments opposed the
Yugoslav stance that a Slav national minority was present in Greeces
north-western provinces (Aegean Macedonia). At the same time, Tito
and the federal institutions in Belgrade pursued good political and
economic relations with Athens. The positive trend continued even
after the collapse of the so-called Second Balkan Pact (19535), under
the weight of the GreekTurkish conflict and following Khruschevs
conciliatory policy towards Yugoslavia. Belgrade tended, with varied
success, to keep at bay Macedonian irredentism, unwilling to see its
relations with Athens hijacked by Skopje. An informal agreement to
that end was reached by Evangelos Averoff and Koca Popovic, the two
foreign ministers, in July 1960 (Kofos, 1991, 712).
The period saw the security interests of erstwhile enemies Greece
and Bulgaria converging. No longer the proverbial threat from the
north, Bulgaria had abandoned its claims to the Greeces border prov-
inces. The end of the colonels regime in 1974 and Prime Minister
Constantine Karamanlis overtures to his Balkan counterparts added
further momentum to rapprochement, as did common fears of
Turkey in the wake of the Cyprus intervention of 1974. The forced
assimilation of Bulgarias Turkish minority, numbering some 800,000
in 19849, made relations with Turkey overtly hostile but cemented
the semi-formal alliance with Greece. In 1986, Greeces socialist
Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, signed with the Bulgarian
leader Todor Zhivkov a bilateral friendship agreement, which also
contained military cooperation clauses (Cviic, 1990, p. 102).
In contrast, Greeces relations with neighbouring Albania remained
uneasy. The state of war between the two countries, dating back to
the Italian invasion of Greece in the autumn of 1940, lasted until
1987, sixteen years after re-establishing diplomatic relations. Of
course, the removal of an anachronism did not lead to improvements
for the Greek community in the southern parts of Albania (Northern
Epirus). Yet it hinted at a reversal of Albanias isolationist doctrine,
in the wake of the 1985 death of Enver Hoxha, the countrys long-
standing communist leader. As early as 1948, at the time of the
Cominform crisis, Hoxha had severed all links with Yugoslavia, the
Albanian communists one-time patron, including a customs union
and a currency arrangement pegging the lek to the Yugoslav dinar. It
was only after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968
that Hoxha and Tito re-engaged. The more cordial relationship in

the 1970s conditioned the Yugoslav leaderships decision to allow
lecturers and textbooks from Tirana into the University of Prishtina,
a magnet for the intelligentsia of the large Albanian nationality
present in Kosovo, Yugoslav Macedonia and Montenegro. This epi-
sode, however, ended with the 1981 unrest in Kosovo.
Romanias policy towards the Balkans was, by and large, not
burdened by historical quarrels, and Nicolae Ceausescu, coming to
power in 1965, enjoyed a good rapport with most regional lead-
ers. Furthermore, Romania was supportive of all regional initiatives
in the 1970s and 1980s. It saw multilateral arrangements in the
Balkans as a way to secure its diplomatic independence from Moscow
(Braun, 1983). The other principal enemy of Ceausescus brand of
national communism was Hungary, especially in the 1980s when the
Hungarian minority in Romania was persecuted.
Despite diverging external alignments, South East Europe could be
treated, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, as a Buzanian regional
complex.13 The latter was comprised of several triangular security
relationships: (1) GreeceTurkeyBulgaria: the question of Turkish
and Muslim minorities, disputes over the Aegean, military deploy-
ments; (2) YugoslaviaBulgariaGreece: the ever-present and mutating
Macedonian Question; (3) GreeceAlbaniaYugoslavia: cross-border
ethnic minorities and disputed territories. Romanias involvement
was of a different nature. Rather than responding to challenges from
inside the Balkans, it aimed to balance Soviet influence.
The new old powderkeg: Balkan security in the early 1990s

The end of the Cold War put in question shaky regional balances and
created opposing expectations. For some, democratization promised
pacific inter-state relations. Others saw the bloodshed in Romania in
December 1989 as an omen. Coupled with the removal of the bipolar
straitjacket, rapid political transformation threatened to rekindle old
grievances, poisoned memories and long-standing rivalries. As early
as 1990, Stephen Larrabee wrote the Balkans have traditionally been
a region of instability and ferment, and with the end of the Cold War
conflicts are likely to re-emerge. In the 1990s, he continued, the
main threat to European security is likely to come not from Soviet
military power but from ethnic conflict and political fragmentation
in the Balkans (Larrabee, 1990, pp. 589).
The secessionist tendencies in Yugoslavia, triggered by Slobodan

Miloevics drive for centralization in Serbia, seemed to confirm
the worst of fears. The breakout of war in Slovenia and Croatia in
the summer of 1991 and then Bosnia in March 1992 set the whole
region on a downward spiral. The Yugoslav crisis was seen as a
detonator which had the potential to set a regional domino effect in
motion. Apprehensions were vindicated by the tacit Greek support
for Miloevic and the Bosnian Serbs, matched by Turkeys support for
the Muslim Bosniaks.14 In 1992, Bulgaria and Turkey were quick to
recognize Macedonias independence, which Greece interpreted as a
hostile move, given the escalating tensions with Skopje. The pursuit
of closer military links with both Macedonia and Albania by Ankara
fed a perception of encirclement (Anastasakis, 2004, pp. 12135).
Importantly, Turkey also normalized its relations with Bulgaria after
the human rights of ethnic Turks had been restored in late 1989.
Shortly after Bulgaria recognized Yugoslav Macedonias independ-
ence, Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras declared that the erstwhile
alliance with Bulgaria was over (Tziampiris, 2000).
It looked as if Macedonia, thanks to its central location, was becom-
ing again the focal point of interlinked, competing interests. In
contrast to Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, the Yugoslav Peoples Army
withdrew from Macedonia peacefully in the spring of 1992, taking
away with it all heavy weaponry; but the 40,000-strong Serb minor-
ity showed signs of radicalism. There were suspicions that Miloevic
had made an offer Greek and Bulgarian leaders to jointly partition
Macedonia.15 For its part, Greece pressured Skopje not to use the star of
Vergina, the emblem of Alexander the Great and the reigning dynasty
of Macedon, as its coat-of-arms, and to change its name and drop all
references to (Slav) Macedonians living in neighbouring countries
from the constitution. Bulgarian authorities continued the policy of
non-recognition of a Macedonian nation and language, fuelling suspi-
cions that territorial claims had not been fully abandoned. The repub-
lics domestic politics were equally fraught. In 1992, the Macedonian
Albanians organized a referendum proclaiming a Republic of Illyrida
in minority-populated areas. Many observers feared that, the New
Macedonian Question a term coined at the time by a British expert
might inflame the Balkans. Misha Glenny, a well-known observer of
Balkan affairs, called Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina twins
in a piece written for Foreign Affairs (Glenny, 1995, cf. Pettifer, 1999).
There were fears that a SerboAlbanian conflict over Kosovo could

spread south to Macedonia drawing in Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece as
in the times of the Balkan Wars (191213). Greek involvement could
in turn provoke Turkey, which had embraced the mantle of a protector
of all Balkan Muslims.16
Although the early 1990s saw the Balkans disintegrate even further in
terms of political geography, to the outside world the region appeared
as tightly-knit as back in the days of the Eastern Question. The talk
of rival alliances, and the spread of violence beyond the borders of
Yugoslavia, dominated security discourse. Ironically, nationalism
and conflict were both dividing South East Europe and contributing
to its identity as a coherent entity. In reality, the logic of historical
recidivism and interdependent enmities proved overstated. In Bosnia,
Turkey refrained from unilateral action and adhered to NATOs joint
policy. Bulgaria and Romania also supported the international institu-
tions efforts at conflict management, including the costly sanctions
imposed on rump Yugoslavia. Albania as well as Bulgaria also lent
assistance to Macedonia in the critical years of the Greek embargo.
Miloevic kept a low profile on Macedonia and distanced himself
from the inflammatory rhetoric of radicals like Vojislav eelj. Albania
supported Kosovos independence proclaimed after an informal ref-
erendum in 1991 but could do little to challenge directly Belgrades
sovereignty. Even firebrand politicians like President Sali Berisha were
immune to foreign adventurism. If anything, Albania moved closer
to the US policy in the region. The country joined Partnership for
Peace (PfP) as early as February 1994 and offered NATO its airfields for
reconnaissance operations over Bosnia.
Thus, non-involvement and reliance on outside mediation and
security provision, rather than diplomatic and military activism,
became the norm in the foreign policy of ex-Yugoslavias Balkan
neighbours. The conflict was more or less contained within the
boundaries of the former federation, both in 19915 and during the
crisis in Kosovo (19989) which spilled over into Macedonia. Security
interdependence did not translate automatically into violent conflict
as at previous historical junctures.
New transnational issues and threats

The profound impact exercised on the region by that first episode of
the Yugoslav drama had to do less with the world of diplomacy and
military balances than with the pervasive weakness of state institu-

tions. Instead of igniting a larger conflict, the wars generated a range
of soft-security problems spilling over both old and newly-instituted
borders in the Balkans. The spread of transnational organized crime,
illegal trafficking and cross-border corruption as well as forced migra-
tion affected both ex-Yugoslavia and its members. These linkages
were, admittedly, among the strongest bonds bringing together pre-
viously compartmentalized South East Europe.17
Refugees and internally displaced persons were a key issue for a number
of Yugoslav successor states. By late 1995, there were 850,000 in
Bosnia, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia as well as in Western Europe and
North America. Bosnia suffered the most: at the time of Dayton up
to a half of its population resided abroad or was internally displaced.
August 1995 alone saw the exodus of nearly 150,000 Krajina Serbs as
a result of the Oluja (Storm) operation carried out by Croatian forces
against the breakaway enclave. Miloevic tried to resettle some of the
incomers to Serbia in Albanian-populated Kosovo fuelling further
local discontent. Most of the refugees, however, flocked into the
large Serbian cities where they added to the army of unemployed.
The refugee influx was a real burden for the shattered economy.
Many new arrivals joined the thriving underworld. Very often those
were young people with considerable experience in using arms
gained during the conflict.
The growth and proliferation of organized crime was the 1990s wars
most durable legacy. Warlords like the notorious eljko Ranatovic-
Arkan took a key part in the hostilities as commanders of paramilitary
units, engaging in weapons trafficking and the sale of looted prop-
erty. Criminal networks, often bridging ethnic divisions, profiteered
through supplying necessities to the civilian populations caught in
the conflict. During the war in Bosnia, a number of free-trade zones
enabled traffickers from all sides met to exchange goods. Bosniak and
Croat groups supplied oil to the Serbs while the latter procured food
and other essentials to Sarajevo and other besieged enclaves. After
Dayton, former paramilitaries quickly reverted to criminal activities
making use of established channels and patronage networks.18
Cross-border smuggling was, at least initially, linked closely to
the process of state-building. Smugglers operated under protection
from governments. In Croatia, Franjo Tudman and the 1990s Croat
Democratic Union (HDZ) drew financial support from syndicates
originating from Herzegovina. Gojko uak, a prominent Herzegovinian

Croat migr who served as defence minister (199198), was involved
in illicit imports of weapons for both Croatia and for Herceg-Bosna,
the self-proclaimed Croat entity in Bosnia (Hockenos, 2003). Because
of the UN arms embargo, the government in Sarajevo similarly found
itself dependent, in the period 19924, on supply lines operated by
semi-criminal actors. Bosnian Serbs and Croats were in a better posi-
tion due to the absence of border controls along the Drina River and
in Herzegovina. Further south, the parallel state institutions run by
the Albanians in Kosovo were, according to reports, partly funded
by gangs trafficking heroin from Turkey into Western Europe. In the
mid-1990s, the Kosovars started smuggling weapons too. Many of the
assault rifles looted from the army depots during the 1997 riots in
Albania finally made their way into neighbouring Kosovo.
Thanks to its central position in the Balkans, Serbia connected all
the pieces of the puzzle. The sanctions aimed at the Miloevic regime
gave rise to a veritable economy based on breaking the embargo.
The authorities the leadership in Belgrade, the customs, the secret
services and the police formed and sponsored networks run in
partnership with criminals from both inside the country as well as
from Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia and Albania. In all those places,
cadres of the former regimes secret police were often in the forefront
of the operations together with government officials. Much of the
illicit trade focused on oil that was shipped into Serbia from Ukraine
and Russia over the Danube and through the countrys porous land
boundaries with post-communist neighbours who had substantially
relaxed border-crossing rules. Most of the revenues were funnelled
into the loss-making enterprises and the pockets of the pro-regime
oligarchy thereby perpetuating Miloevics hold on power.
The wars and sanctions contributed to the trans-nationalization
of crime in the region. In contrast with the interethnic wars, cross-
border criminal syndicates and smuggling networks became an
all-Balkan, and not specifically post-Yugoslav, problem. It affected
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, which otherwise man-
aged to stay out of the conflict. Criminal syndicates developed well-
functioning alliances across national boundaries. Sanction-busting
crime additionally weakened state institutions that were already
hampered by economic downturn and the common practices of state
capture. As the traffickers often enjoyed protection from politicians
and civil servants, the nexus between trans-national crime and cor-
ruption was visible.
Such cross-border networks outlived the lifting of the sanctions
in 1996. In Serbia, channels were privatized, with control passing
from the regime fully into the criminals hands. With no restric-
tions on oil imports, and hence no rent opportunities, the illicit
transactions focused on stolen goods, counterfeit money and espe-
cially excise-duty goods like cigarettes. Political elites continued to
partake in the smuggling operations, with Montenegro presenting a
vivid example. A case brought by an Italian court against President
Milo ukanovic on counts of contraband made the headlines in
2002. That was not exceptional; scandals related to links between
politicians and smugglers were not rare in Macedonia, Romania and
Bulgaria.19
Sanctions consolidated also trafficking channels that predated the
end of communist regime. Initially, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia
disrupted the so-called Balkan drug route into Western Europe, passing
Turkey, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Alternative routes linking Bulgaria
with Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania, or with Romania
and Hungary, were developed by regional criminal syndicates. The
classical route was re-opened in the mid-1990s and, according to
some estimates, 80 per cent of the heroin in Western Europe arrived
through the three Balkan corridors. In addition, there were consid-
erable amounts of amphetamines, synthesized and exported from
South East Europe by local mafias.
The wars helped new forms of criminal activities, such as human
trafficking, to take root. During the Bosnian conflict numerous refu-
gees were helped by criminals to escape into Western Europe. After
1995, these channels were used to transfer migrants from outside
the region (Kurds, Iranians, Arabs, Afghans, Chinese etc.). With its
liberal visa regime, Bosnia became, for a period of time, a home base
for the traffickers. Greeces borders with Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey
became entry points into EU territory. With the help of state-of-the-art
speedboats, outlaws from the Albanian coastal towns shipped
migrants into Italy across the Otranto Straits. Human trafficking
involved mainly women from various Eastern European countries
(typically Moldova and Ukraine but also Albania, Bulgaria, Romania)
employed the criminal-run sex industry in the West and, to a lesser
extent, in former Yugoslavia.
Interdependence and cooperation
Beyond doubt, regional interdependence is a factor that matters for

the Balkans. Whether they liked it or not, in the 1990s local states
found themselves bundled by their politics, security concerns and
geography, and to a lesser degree by their economies. Even divisive
forces such as the legacies of conflict gave coherence to the notion
of one South East Europe. In addition to common threats, interde-
pendence also meant developmental opportunities. If it did not offer
an economic structure, shared geography did offer potential gains in
sectors such as transport infrastructure and energy.
However, interdependence could be seen as a necessary, but cer-
tainly not a sufficient, condition for cooperation. It is hard to make
predictions on the scope, depth and institutional design of regional
institutions and schemes from the 1990s onwards based on this fac-
tor alone. For instance, one was as likely to see multilateral institu-
tions and schemes as ad hoc initiatives by immediate neighbours.
Taken on its own, interdependence is also a poor predictor of the
depth of institutionalization, since issues at hand could be tackled
both through loose forms of intergovernmental coordination and
regional bodies with decision-making powers.
Comparing the various faces of interdependence, one tentative
conclusion is that intra-regional demand for cooperation has varied
from one policy-area to another. It was limited in the field of trade
due to the pull effect of the EU. Balkan states had little incentive to
launch comprehensive all-regional arrangements, though improved
economic relations with larger partners in their neighbourhood (for
instance, Greece or Turkey) would be beneficial. By contrast, there
has been demand for regional projects in transport and energy. Even
there, spatial contiguity could prove a divisive factor and spurn a
competitive dynamic, with groups of countries competing on the
construction of oil pipelines.
Turning to security, interconnectedness charts at least two possible
strategies. On the one hand, in the 1990s, there was a strong incen-
tive for local states to rely on outside powers (US, EU) as guarantors
of stability. On the other, problems could be addressed through
forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation generated inside the
region. However, it is hard to see how security interdependence, in
and of itself, would automatically produce cooperation. The presence
of a regional complex is perfectly compatible with zero-sum thinking

and divergent interests inhibiting collective action. At the end of the
day, as the following chapter elaborates, external intervention set the
conditions for cooperation at the regional level. Even the assump-
tion of indivisibility of Balkan security, widely shared in the 1990s,
has not proven immune to questioning. Yugoslav conflicts failed to
draw in or seriously destabilize neighbouring countries. As a result,
all-regional solutions to problems specific to the former federation
have been bound to cause tension.
By contrast, soft security has been, in the 1990s and beyond, an area
where the demand for cooperation has been stronger. However hard
it is to measure its threat potential, trans-national crime necessitates
collective response by a wide circle of affected states and societies,
notwithstanding the argument that criminal networks have become
part of the political system and social fabric rather than a challenge
to it. To the extent they have the capacity and political will, Balkan
governments can be expected to coordinate policies. Again, the inter-
dependence cannot predict, a priori, the depth of institutionalization
or indeed the extent of membership in the schemes to arise. Due to
the complex patterns of interdependence cooperation can take place
both on a regional scale as well as in the context of all-European or
even global regimes relevant to that particular policy field.
2
Pushing for Cooperation: External
Actors in Balkan Regionalism
Whatever the significance of regional interdependence, cooperation

among Balkan states has largely been a product of external pressure or
inducement. Anastasakis and Bojicic-Delilovics 2002 survey found
that local elites saw regional schemes as designed, promoted and
implemented by powerful outside actors. That regionalism has been
an import commodity is a small wonder, given South East Europes
legacies of conflict, economic downturn and post-1989 political vola-
tility described in the foregoing chapter. This chimes well with what
Iver Neumann (1994, 2001) defines as the outside-in trajectory
of regionalism. The outside-in understanding is particularly ame-
nable to the notion of hegemony, central to both Neorealism and
Neoliberal Institutionalism arguably the dominant perspectives in
IR over the past three decades or so. The development and growth of
regimes and institutions, be they regional or global, are sustained or
facilitated by the presence and actions of (benign) hegemonic power.
In the Balkan case, one may well point at the Western interventions
of the 1990s as well as the deployment of the EUs soft power in the
following decade. Compared to anywhere else in post-communist
Europe, it is in the Balkans that regional cooperation has been sin-
gled out, most explicitly, as a precondition for joining prestigious
international clubs such as the EU and NATO.
This chapter examines the Western strategies and initiatives for paci-
fying South East Europe through the encouragement of regional coop-
eration. It traces the origins and subsequent evolution of policies and
schemes as well as the nature of the models, institutional arrangements
and material stimuli extended towards the countries of the region.
41
The power of outsiders: historical legacies
External interventions in the Balkans have a long and rich history

going back to the early nineteenth century. The concert of European
great powers nursed the birth of independent states, starting from
Greece in 1830 and finishing with Albania in 191213. Empires,
nearby or distant, such as Russia, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary
managed conflicts and orchestrated alliances between local clients,
but also occasionally obstructed local efforts at integration; the
Habsburg Monarchy, for example, vetoed a customs union between
Serbia and Bulgaria in 1905. Later multilateral initiatives such as the
Balkan Conferences of 19304, ostensibly intended to assert local
interests against outside meddling, failed due to the tensions between
the supporters and the opponents of the post-1919 territorial status
quo, each looking towards patrons beyond the boundaries of the
region. The 1934 Balkan Pact, which was shunned by Bulgaria and
Albania (Kerner and Howard, 1936), ended in a failure. Meanwhile
the economic pre-eminence of Germany, felt across the region in the
latter part of the 1930s, proved too short-lived to deepen political
and trade links across the area which the Nazi Reich saw as a source
of raw materials (Nikova, 2002; Lampe, 2006).1
As we have already seen, the Cold War parcelled the region even
further. The quarrel between Stalin and Tito stemmed the plans for
a YugoslavBulgarian federation, which could also embrace com-
munist Albania. The US-promoted Second Balkan Pact faltered,
while Albania left the Soviet orbit. Intergovernmental cooperation,
championed after 1976 by newly democratic Greece, focused on low-
sensitivity issues like transport, energy and tourism. In the 1980s, the
socialist government of Andreas Papandreou treated Balkan connec-
tions as a bargaining chip in its dealings with NATO and the EEC. Yet,
bipolarity set the limits of the process, which culminated with the
summits of foreign ministers in Belgrade (February 1988) and Tirana
(October 1990) (Lopandic, 2001, p. 55; Stojkovic, 1997, pp. 47586).
Thus, Bulgaria was unwilling to pursue closer links with neighbours
without the approval of Moscow, while Turkey was averse to the
anti-NATO slant in Papandreous policies (Braun, 1983; Kofos, 1991;
Veremis, 1995; Nikova, 2002). In that sense, the end of the Cold War
augured well for Balkan multilateralism. The collapse of Yugoslavia,
however, cancelled what little progress had been achieved and the
ministerials did not resume until the summer of 1996.
Pushing for Cooperation 43
Western interventions in the 1990s
The impact of the Dayton Accord

Western efforts in the 1990s to contain and halt the wars in
Yugoslavia were not without historical parallels. As in the past,
Balkan instability had become a target of power projection. The
maintenance of regional order emerged as a strategic imperative,
as the weak and incoherent response to the protracted conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina damaged the Wests credibility. The war cost
more than 100,000 human lives; the EU and its nascent Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was a casualty too. It was only the
19945 military involvement of NATO, led by the US, that brought
an end to the conflict and paved the way to the Dayton/Paris Peace
Accords of November-December 1995.2
Elements of a regional approach had been in place even prior to
Dayton. The governments in Sofia, Bucharest, Tirana and Skopje were
pressured to implement the UN sanctions against rump Yugoslavia. To
contain conflict spillover, and avoid a nightmarish domino scenario
in the southern Balkans, in December 1992 the UN deployed, along
Macedonias undemarcated boundary with FR Yugoslavia, the first pre-
ventive mission in its history first as an extension of UNPROFOR (UN
Protection Force) and then as UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment
Force). In 1993, the US contributed 300 troops to the mission, which
was the first such American contingent to land in the Balkans.3
The end of the Bosnian war added further layers to fledging region-
wide strategy. The Dayton Accords introduced a 60,000-strong imple-
mentation force (IFOR) under NATO to oversee the stabilization and
reintegration of Bosnia (Siani-Davies, 2003, p. 20). The countrys new
constitutional framework, adopted in Dayton, granted ample execu-
tive and legislative powers to the Office of the High Representative
(OHR); these were extended further in December 1997.4 The backing
of accord signatories Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, meaning essentially
Franjo Tudman and Slobodan Miloevic, was of paramount impor-
tance for keeping Bosnias radical Croats and Serbs at bay. In the
year following Dayton, the duo met several times, under EU and US
auspices, with Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosniak member of the tripartite
presidency in Bosnia. To be effective, regional arrangements had to
embrace the whole of South East Europe. Symptomatically, Article 5
of Annex I-B to the Dayton Accord put forward regional stability in
and around former Yugoslavia (emphasis added) as a core political
objective. As they had been in the 1980s, multilateral schemes were

once again de rigueur in the Balkans, but this time external power-
brokers played a largely positive role.
US initiatives
The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) was the main US
multilateral scheme in the region.5 Designed to reinforce the peace-
keeping effort in Bosnia, SECI was launched in July 1996 with a letter
by President Bill Clinton to all Balkan foreign ministers.6 SECI sought
to promote functional cooperation through infrastructure develop-
ment and fighting trans-national crime. The scheme relied on funds
drawn from IFIs rather than direct financial support from the American
government whose patronage was, nonetheless, considered essential.7
US diplomacy defined eligibility criteria. Originally, SECI targeted
the post-communist countries of the region, Turkey, Greece and
Hungary. Slovenia and Croatia first declined to take part fearing that
SECI was covertly recreating Yugoslavia. The US persuaded Slovenia
to join, while Croatia opted for an observer status. Originally part of
the initiative, FR Yugoslavia was excluded after Miloevics attempt
to partly annul the local elections in the autumn of 1996, in which
key municipalities such as Belgrade had been won by the anti-regime
opposition. Admitting Yugoslavia was considered again in 1998, but
the crisis in Kosovo dissuaded the US policymakers (Shtonova, 1998,
pp. 316; Lopandic, 2001, pp. 12536).
SECIs launch raised eyebrows in Brussels as the EU had its own
policies in the region. The Union vetoed the US proposal to assign
coordination to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) Secretariat in Prague. It took a year of consultations
to adopt a compromise solution, which was ratified by an inaugu-
ral conference in Geneva on 56 December 1996.8 SECIs founding
documents accepted that the scheme would play a complementary
part to the EUs Regional Approach as well as to the Pre-accession
Strategy for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.9 Formally placed under
the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the initiative
was underwritten by a coalition of Western states, notably the US,
Germany, Austria and Italy, who financed the establishment of a
coordinators office in Vienna in March 1997. It was headed by the
former Austrian Vice-Chancellor Erhard Busek, answerable to the
OSCE Chairman-in-Office.
In addition to SECI, Washington was keen to foster cooperation

among smaller groups of friendly countries. In late 1995, President
Clinton announced the initiation of the South Balkans Development
Initiative (SBDI), comprising Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, and
working towards the development of an energy corridor linking the
Black Sea and the Adriatic. The SBDI was originally instituted with
a grant from the US Trade and Development Agency, promising to
attract private investment (Hinkova, 2002, p. 21). The AMBO (Albania-
Macedonia-Bulgaria Oil) corporation was subsequently formed for the
purpose of developing a pipeline for shipping Caspian oil from the
Bulgarian port of Burgas to Vlor (Vlora), on Albanias Adriatic coast.10
AMBO, whose feasibility study was financed by the US, was embraced
by the Albanian, Macedonian and Bulgarian governments, who fol-
lowed up with regular meetings at the ministerial and heads-of-state
level to oversee implementation (Lesser et al., 2002, pp. 956).
EU and the Balkans, 19968

The peace in Bosnia presented an opportunity for the EUs Balkan
policies, following a series of humiliating failures. To guide post-
conflict reconstruction, democratization and economic develop-
ment, the Union designed a policy of incentives vis--vis Yugoslav
successor states, together with Albania: unilateral autonomous trade
measures (ATMs) to improve market access for the countries in
question; subsequently, Trade and Cooperation (first generation)
Agreements (TCAs); and financial aid under the PHARE (Poland and
Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) and OBNOVA
(renewal) programmes.11 Such benefits were made conditional on
political and market reform, post-conflict reconciliation and, impor-
tantly, regional cooperation (Papadimitriou, 2001). Collectively,
they formed the so-called Regional Approach for South East Europe
(RA). The RA excluded Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, which
were assigned to a different category in light of the more advanced
institutional relationship. In the period 19936 all three had signed
Europe Agreements and lodged membership applications, becoming,
in effect, candidates covered by the commitment extended at the
European Councils Copenhagen Summit (June 1993), and keep-
ing a healthy distance from the Yugoslav scramble.12 With the RA
at best a pre-pre-accession framework, the EU resolved that good
neighbourliness and economic integration at the regional level had
to accompany or even precede integration into its institutions. The

Union highlighted, inter alia, the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons as well as cooperation with the Hague-based
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).13
The cooperation requirement marked a shift, compared to the EU
policies of other regional clusters in post-communist Europe (the
Visegrd four/CEFTA, the Cooperation Council of the Baltic States).
True, the Balts were asked to make every effort to cooperate with
each other, and the 1996 Europe Agreement of Slovenia urged the
country to reach out to the other candidates (Phinnemore, 2003,
p. 87). The Union looked favourably at the regional institutions in
its newly acquired sphere of influence to the east. However, as the
ex-Yugoslav republics (save Slovenia) and Albania were not accession
countries, cooperation could be considered an end in itself rather than a
step towards joining the EU. By contrast, with the decision taken at
the 1997 Luxembourg Council to open negotiations with Estonia, but
not with Lithuania and Latvia, the Union indicated that each country
was to be judged on its own merits. In Luxembourg, the EU Council
abandoned, on the Commissions behest, the practice of multilateral
structured dialogue with the candidate countries that had been inau-
gurated in 1992, largely because of resistance from the latter (Smith,
1999, pp. 1323). In the Balkans, the trend was reverse: regional bun-
dling driven by security concerns trumped differentiation.
EU policies differed in their design. For instance minority issues
in Central Europe, such as, the plight of Hungarians in Romania
and Slovakia, typically involved pairs of neighbouring countries
rather than regional complexes. This reflected on the EUs approach
to inter-state cooperation, as exemplified by high-profile initia-
tives such as the Pact for Stability in Europe, which was originally
proposed by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in April 1993
(Ueta, 1997; Smith, 1999, pp. 15560). The Pact spelled out good
neighbourliness as a key accession condition. To quote the then
French Minister of European Affairs, Allain Lamasure, admission [to
the EU] is only possible for countries that maintain good relations
with their neighbours. No country with unsettled border or minor-
ity conflicts will be allowed to join.14 This would be done through
bilateral collaboration as opposed to institutionalized regional frame-
works. In 19957, the Pact led to the signing of 21 friendship treaties
between dyads of states (Gal, 1999).15 It is worth noting that, with
the notable exception of Romania, the Pact did not apply to South
East Europe.16 Bilateralism also shaped EU functional instruments on
cross-border cooperation under the PHARE programme.17 In a special
report, the European Commission pointed out that the enlargement
the strategic goal and the Union had to support only regional initia-
tives, which were compatible with the participants bilateral arrange-
ments with the EU and its members.18
The effect of the RA was therefore threefold: (1) it outlined the bor-
ders of the future Western Balkan grouping; (2) it established a con-
ditionality regime loosely linked to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria,
but with no explicit reference to accession; and (3) it made regional
cooperation a prerequisite for inclusion into its institutions and poli-
cies (Vukadinovic, 2001, pp. 4478; cf. Lopandic, 2002, pp. 312).
Yet, while demanding collective action, the new template reinforced
the pre-existing differentiation. It benefited Albania and Macedonia
whose cooperative attitude and commitment to democratization had
been rewarded, even prior to the launch of the RA, with TCAs and
early admission into the PHARE programme. Conversely, it penal-
ized Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, due to the authoritarian politics
of Tudman and Miloevic (Papadimitriou, 2001; Lopandic, 2001,
pp. 1834). Bosnia occupied a middle position, as it did not have a
TCA, but enjoyed better access to the EU market and received PHARE
assistance.
In addition to the RA, the EU considered all-Balkan multilateral
frameworks along the lines of the US-promoted SECI. The Royaumont
scheme involved Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia together with the
Western Balkans. In essence, this French initiative, adopted on
the margins of the Paris conference (December 1995) ratifying the
Dayton Accord, was an attempt to match, if not balance, US activ-
ism in South East Europe (Shtonova, 1998, pp 267). Inspired by
the Pact for Stability, it called for multilateral cooperation and civil
society. The participating states started meeting regularly at the
level of political directors, but never convened a summit of foreign
ministers. At the same time, Royaumont sponsored meetings among
parliaments, municipalities, civil society, media, trade unions and so
forth in the region, with a particular emphasis on the ex-Yugoslav
republics (Shtonova, 1998; Lopandic, 2001, pp. 11724).
Compared to both SECI and the RA, Royaumont remained of
secondary (at best) significance. It was not until 1997 that the EU
Council of Ministers appointed the former Greek minister and parlia-

mentarian Panagiotis Roumeliotis as a coordinator (Lopandic, 2001,
p. 120). Although it had been assumed that OSCE would eventually
take Royaumont, the scheme was brought under the EUs CFSP.19
As usual there was more rhetoric than substance: grants from the
European Commission and several member states did not exceed $2m.
Unsurprisingly, the initiative remained little known outside diplo-
matic and NGO circles (Lopandic, 2001, p. 124; ESI, 1999, pp. 45).
NATOs policy on regional cooperation

Like the EU, NATO, crafted its own regional cooperation policy in
the mid-1990s, under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme
aimed at the post-communist countries. Launched in January 1994,
the PfP envisioned various collaborative activities with third coun-
tries, including joint exercises and exchange of military personnel.
Through the PfP, NATO extended forms of good-neighbourliness
conditionality to the former Eastern bloc, where many sates had
identified membership in the Alliance as a principal foreign policy
goal.20 In institutional terms, the PfP model was identical to the one
by the Balladur Pact, and thus differed from the RAs multilateral
template. The North Atlantic Councils Study on NATO Enlargement
(1995) singled out two particular features:
Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and hab-

its of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which
characterize relations among current Allies; Promoting good-
neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the
Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO.21
As the EUs Enlargement policy, the PfP was, at the end of the day,
a bilateral platform involving NATO and individual partner govern-
ments. Its key vehicles were the Individual Partnership Programmes,
which focused on critical areas such as defence planning and
budgeting, civil-military relations and so forth, rather than on
such classical good-neighbourliness issues as disarmament or con-
fidence-building.22 In comparison to the EU, however, NATO-style
bilateralism accommodated multilateral cooperation more success-
fully. An example of this success was the Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) concept, which oversaw the formation of multinational units
with the participation of members and PfP states, to be deployed

in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.23 Endorsed at the
1994 Brussels Summit, which also launched the PfP, the concept was
implemented with the establishment of joint battalions by Poland
and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, and Hungary and Romania, as
well as by the three Baltic states. These PfP units took part in the
IFOR (later SFOR) contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Acceding to the PfP, in 199495 several South East European states
also signed up to NATOs multilateral agenda.24 The attraction of
NATO membership incentivized governments to implement the
entry criteria in assorted political and military policy-areas. Along
with members Greece and Turkey, these PfP countries (Romania, the
first ever state to sign a partnership agreement, Bulgaria, Albania
and Macedonia) formed a pro-NATO cluster in South East Europe
supportive of multilateral initiatives coming from Brussels and
Washington. NATOs influence was felt even in countries outside the
PfP. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alliance implemented a range
of confidence-building measures between the armies of the Bosniak-
Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, pursuant to the clauses of the
Dayton Accords. However, the NATO and PfPs regionalizing effect in
the 1990s was constrained due to the exclusion of pivotal, yet semi-
authoritarian, countries such as FR Yugoslavia and Croatia.
Back to the Balkans: international policy after

the Kosovo crisis
The war in Kosovo and the launch of the Stability Pact for
South East Europe
The Kosovo crisis of 19989 threatened the precarious stability estab-
lished in Dayton and also proved, to the Western policy-makers, that
Balkan problems were intimately interrelated. The influx of hun-
dreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia,
after March 1999, put both countries under tremendous strain and,
in the Macedonian case, raised once more the spectre of inter-eth-
nic turmoil. For its part, NATOs operation Allied Force damaged
vital infrastructure located within Serbia with adverse effects on
trade, transport and investment across the region. The campaign,
which led to the establishment of an international protectorate
in Kosovo, sanctioned by the Kumanovo Agreement and the UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), paved the way for a
relaunch of the Western policies in the Balkans based on a revamped
regional approach.
The response came by way of the Stability Pact for South East
Europe (SP), proposed by the German Presidency of the EU Council
in the summer of 1999. The Pact was intended to reassert, once more,
the Unions role, in the wake of an intervention that was, like the
one in Bosnia, heavily reliant on the US military clout.25 The EU saw
its advantage in the fields of democracy-promotion and economic
reconstruction but also aspired to engage in security management. As
noted by Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy (2000), these ambitions were
in line with the so-called Petersberg Tasks incorporated in the 1996
Amsterdam Treaty (in force as of 1 May 1999).
Germany presented the SP to the EU Council on 1 April, days
after the bombing commenced.26 Despite the echoes of the first
(Balladur) Stability Pact of 19945, a much heavier emphasis was
laid on regionalism and multilateralism, seen as the right cure for the
endemic instability in the Balkans.27 Countries previously covered
by the RA were to be given new incentives in exchange for reforms
at home and cooperation with neighbours. The German Presidency
envisioned more advanced types of association agreements extended
to the Western Balkans, on the model of the Europe Agreements of
the 1990s.
However ambitious it was, the SP was hastily assembled, under the
pressure of events. It reflected the EUs conviction that something
had to be done (Friis and Murphy, 2000, pp. 7734). This realization
helped Germanys Auswrtiges Amt sell the Pact to other member
states foreign ministries as well as to the international community.
The SP was supported by a joint IMF and World Bank conference, by
NATO and by the G8 foreign ministers meeting in May (Siani-Davies,
2003, p. 174). The scheme was put under OSCE as a way to bring
in the US and Russia. OSCEs model also inspired the Pacts institu-
tional set-up comprising a regional table and three issue-specific
subtables (see Figure 2.1 below). The negotiations were marred by
frictions. Toning down NATOs involvement was crucial for securing
Russias support. In reaction, the UK government insisted on giving
the SP a limited mandate in the field of military security, in order
to avoid competition with existing PfP programmes. Meanwhile
several EU members were voicing their discontent with the US. They
perceived that the Clinton administration was using the SP as a way

to make the EU open its doors for more membership demandeurs, in
addition to the candidates in Central and Eastern Europe.
The level of EU commitment emerged as a stumbling block dur-
ing both the planning and the intra-EU negotiation stage (Biermann,
1999, pp. 148). At the end of the day, under pressure from France
and others, the German Presidency abandoned its initial proposal to
specify EU membership as the Pacts ultimate goal; its mission was
vaguely defined as draw[ing] the region closer to the perspective of
full integration. The SP framework document contained no refer-
ence to the specific articles on enlargement, within the Amsterdam
Treaty as it was originally envisaged. To balance that, the endorsed
text mentioned the Copenhagen criteria and, in the very long run,
membership.28
The EU adopted the SP at the General Affairs Council on 17 May
but inaugurated it only after the end of hostilities, during a ministe-
rial in Cologne (10 June 1999), which was followed by a high-profile
summit in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999. The framework document and
the summit declaration outlined an ambitious set of economic,
political and security objectives.29 Regional cooperation was one of
them:
The EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full inte-
gration of these countries into its structures. In case of countries
which have not yet concluded association agreements with the
EU, this will be done through a new kind of contractual relation-
ship taking into account the individual situations of each country
with the perspective of EU membership, on the basis of the
Amsterdam Treaty and once the Copenhagen criteria have been
met. We note the European Unions willingness that, while decid-
ing autonomously, it will consider the achievement of the objec-
tives of the Stability Pact, in particular progress in developing regional
co-operation [emphasis added], among the important elements in
evaluating the merits of such a perspective.30
While regional cooperation and EU association were part of the

same package, the EU saw itself as a coalition leader, rather than
a unilateral actor. In the words of Friis and Murphy, the EU con-
sciously launched the initiative but did not own it (2000, p. 773).
The SP assembled a motley collection of states, both from South

East Europe and further afield, international organizations and
IFIs and cooperative schemes (see Table 2.1). As far as the ben-
eficiaries were concerned, the Pact targeted not only the Western
Balkans but also Romania and Bulgaria, which had concluded
Europe Agreements, had a candidate status, and were implementing
European Accession Partnerships. Unlike the RA of 19969, the SP
operated on the assumption that there were important economic,
political and security linkages and similarities that justified clustering
all post-communist countries in the region together (Biermann, 1999,
pp. 102). That included FR Yugoslavia, still under the rule of
Miloevic, which though not formally present in the initiative was
considered eligible pending a democratic breakthrough in Belgrade.31
Western-friendly Montenegro, though still part of FR Yugoslavia on
paper, participated informally in the Pact from day one.
An open-ended process rather than a regional organization, the SP
nevertheless institutionalized cooperation. It was headed by a Special
Coordinator, based in Brussels, with the senior German politician
Bodo Hombach appointed to the position.34 Funded by the EU and
helped by a small staff of officials seconded from the participating
states, the Special Coordinator was in charge of mediating between
the various participants.35 Target states met twice a year at ministerial
level within a Regional Table monitoring the Pacts activities. The
Table 2.1 SP participants

Participating states Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
(beneficiaries) Macedonia, Romania32
Participating states Hungary, Slovenia, Turkey
(non-beneficiaries)
Facilitating states EU Member States, Japan, Russia, US, Canada,
Norway (after 2000), Switzerland (after 2000)
International Financial European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank
Institutions for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
World Bank, Council of Europe Development Bank
International OSCE, EU (via the European Commission), OECD,
Organizations Council of Europe, NATO
Regional Cooperation South East Cooperation Initiative (SECI), South
Initiatives East European Cooperation Process (SEECP),
Central European Initiative (CEI), Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC)33
bulk of the work was carried out by three working tables (WTs) focus-
ing, following the CSCE/OSCE format, on: projects in the fields of
human rights and democracy (WT1), economic reconstruction and
development (WT2), and security (WT3). The Royaumont Process
merged with WT1 on account of overlapping priorities. SECI, by
contrast, continued running parallel to the SPs WT2 on economic
affairs. The WTs were co-chaired by seconded international function-
aries (coming from the international organizations and the facili-
tating countries) and the participating countries, rotating each six
months (Figure 2.1).
The SP was designed to channel reconstruction aid to the Balkans;
but it had no budget of its own. It effectively became an intermedi-
ary between donors and beneficiaries. The principal driving forces,
therefore, were those who footed the bill: notably the EU, its mem-
bers, and the IFIs, which all formed the so-called High Level Steering
Group (HSLG co-piloted by the European Commission and the
World Bank). The World Bank and the Commission co-convened two
donor conferences in Brussels (March 2000) and Bucharest (October
2001) to vet projects submitted by the Balkan governments.
The two donor conferences made WT2 the Pacts leading segment,
in line with the demand coming from the region. Infrastructure
development was the main focus of the funding agencies strategy.37
A report released by the think-tank European Stability Initiative in
2001 estimated that projects falling under WT2 accounted for 81
per cent of the a1.6bn in grants and loans pledged at the Brussels
conference as compared to a340m (16 per cent) for WT1 and a55m
(3 per cent) for WT3. An additional a800m was pledged for near
term projects under WT2 (ESI and East West Institute, 2001, p. 11).
Rather than an overarching security framework, the SP became a
road-building venture.
Still, the Pact was greeted with cautious optimism in South East
Europe, which saw it, by and large, as a symbolic step forward towards
the EU and, more generally, the West. As one Macedonian official put
it, the Stability Pact would not have had any value in itself if it did
not contain a membership perspective (Friis and Murphy, 2000,
p. 770). It was commonly argued that most of funds pledged under
the SP would have reached the Balkans anyway through programmes
run by bilateral donors.38 While the political content of the SP was
perhaps more significant than its economic impact, some anxieties
54
High Level Steering Group Special Coordinator

Co-chaired by the World Bank Appointed by the EU Council in
and the European Commission, consultation with the facilitating
finance ministers of the G8 and states and organizations.
the country holding Supported by 30 staff seconded by
the EU presidency national governments
Regional Table
Intergovernmental body chaired by the Special
Coordinator. All SP participants are represented.
Follows the work of the Special Coordinator
and the Working Tables.
Working Table I: Democracy and Human Rights

Issues and taskforces
Minority and human rights, Refugee returns,
Good governance, Gender, Media, Educatio
and youth, Parliamentary cooperation,
Szeged Process1
Working Table II: Economic Reconstruction,

Cooperation and Development
Issues and taskforces
Regional trade, Infrastructure (led by EIB), Economic
reform, Investment compact (led by OECD),
Private sector development (led by EBRD),
Business Advisory Council, e- Balkans, Environment,
Vocational training, Social cohesion
Working Table III: Security

Subtable on defence issues
Defence planning and demoblization, Arms control,
Small arms, Military contacts, Demining
(Reay Group), Disaster preparedness
Subtable on justice and home affairs
Anti-corruption, Fight against organized crime,
Migration and asylum, Human trafficking
Figure 2.1 Institutional structure of the SP36

Source: www.stabilitypact.org
harking back to the RA were very much alive, with the relationship
between regionalism and bilateralism based on differentiation being
the most prominent one.
Finally, candidate countries like Bulgaria and Romania were unsure
whether they fit into a post-conflict framework such as the SP. The
governments in Sofia and Bucharest were torn between their desire
to make a positive contribution to the Western strategy in the former
Yugoslavia and their misgivings about the negative fallout of regional
embroilment, especially after failing to secure a start of EU accession
negotiations at the 1997 Luxembourg Council.
The Stabilization and Association Process

Their grand rhetoric aside, EU policymakers were aware of the SPs
inherent limitations. Having given a green light to Romania and
Bulgaria to start membership talks at the historic Helsinki Summit in
December 1999, which also saw Turkey promoted to candidacy, they
also moved to upgrade policy vis--vis what was already commonly
known as the Western Balkans. The outdated RA was replaced by the
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), an institutionally more
advanced framework. SAP offered the Western Balkans Stabilization
and Association Agreements (SAAs) modelled on the 1990s Europe
Agreements. Such bilateral deals were made conditional on demo-
cratic and market reforms and the observance of minority rights, but
also on commitment to regional cooperation. It was, therefore, hardly
a coincidence that Macedonia, thus far spared by violent ethnic con-
flict and conducting a pro-Western policy, was the first country to
obtain a positive feasibility study from the European Commission
in 1999 for opening SAA talks.39 The outliers were Croatia, still gov-
erned by the nationalist Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) of
Franjo Tudman, and Slobodan Miloevics Serbia.
SAP sought to improve trade access for Western Balkan industrial
products covered by autonomous trade preferences (ATPs). ATPs
upgraded the system of TCAs and ATMs introduced by the RA, allow-
ing the Western Balkans to keep tariffs for EU imports for a period
of ten years, which was a much more generous offer in comparison
to what Central and Eastern Europe had obtained in the early 1990s
(Michalopoulos, 2002). Even more importantly, at the 2000 Feira
Council the Western Balkan states were recognized as potential
members.40 As noted by Milica Uvalic (2001), the membership
prospect was perhaps the most significant upgrade, as much of West

Balkan exports already entered the EU market duty-free, while sub-
stantial amounts of foreign aid was available even without SAP.
SAP developed further the RAs notion that regional integration
should go hand-in-hand with inclusion in the EU. That involved
political issues but also functional sectors as trade, cross-border infra-
structure and justice and home affairs. Readiness to engage in both
neighbour-to-neighbour and multilateral cooperative schemes was
an essential condition for the Western Balkan states for concluding
an SAA (Altmann, 2003, p. 144). Over time, it became patent that
SAP was also a step forward compared to the SP, too. Unlike the SP,
it was limited only to the (then) five Western Balkan countries and
was firmly anchored into the EUs external policies. With SAP, the
EU gradually shifted to a Western-Balkans-focused approach, treat-
ing Romania and Bulgaria as a separate case. This raised questions
as to how SAP and the SP related to one another. In 19992000, all
official documents referred to SAP as the EUs contribution to the
SP, the leading framework (Kavalski, 2003, pp. 2025). After 20012,
with the signing of the first SAAs with Macedonia and Croatia, this
changed and, as we shall see below, SAP came to the drivers seat
(Bechev, 2006).
NATO and South East Europe after the war in Kosovo

At the time of Kosovo, NATO also ripened to the idea that the Balkans
necessitated a special regional strategy. The Washington Summit of
April 1999, taking place in the middle of the allied air strikes against
Serbia, observed that there was a [a] need for a comprehensive
approach to the stabilization of the crisis region in south-eastern
Europe and to the integration of the countries of the region into the
Euro-Atlantic community.41 The Alliance unveiled its South East
Europe Initiative (SEEI) intended to supplement the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the PfP at the regional level.42 It tar-
geted all Yugoslav neighbours including Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia, which at the were outside the PfP. Many saw the initiative as
a quasi-Article 5 guarantee by NATO for the security of the frontline
states during the Kosovo war (Noev, 2002, p. 11). The SEEI featured
a strong multilateral component while the EAPC launched an ad-hoc
Working Group on Regional Cooperation. By late 2000, it produced
several projects such as SEEGROUP, dealing with border security and
illicit trafficking as well as with general security policy coordination.

Owing to NATOs high-profile role, Balkan PfP countries preferred
cooperating on security matters through SEEI/SEEGROUP rather
than SPs third working table.
The post-1999 period saw the PfP countries in South East Europe
actively pursuing NATO membership. Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia
and Romania all became part of NATOs Membership Action Plan
(MAP) initiated in April 1999 to speed up their accession prepara-
tions. They were followed by Croatia after it entered PfP in May
2000. Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro joined PfP only in December
2006 delayed by hurdles such as (the lack of) cooperation with
ICTY, the slow pace of security sector reform or the absence of an
integrated army in the case of Bosnia.43 Thus the PfP/MAP promoted
at the same time cooperation and differentiation. Its significance
declined over time as NATO enlarged towards the Balkans. Bulgaria
and Romania were invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit
(November 2002), while Albania and Croatia received an invita-
tion at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.44 Macedonia, though
formally part of that latter wave, saw its accession delayed due to
Greeces veto motivated by the so-called name dispute between the
two neighbours.
The only game in town: the EU and the Western Balkans

in the 2000s
Political changes in Croatia and especially Serbia in 19992000

strengthened immensely the EUs hand in South East Europe due to
the incoming reform-minded governments commitment to the twin
processes of integration into the Union and regional cooperation. At
the November 2000 Zagreb Summit between the Western Balkans and
the EU, leaders of the former pledged to cooperate in areas such as
political reconciliation, trade liberalization, fighting organized crime,
trafficking, and cross-border corruption, and the closing communiqu
explicitly noted that: the deepening of regional cooperation will go
hand in hand with rapprochement with the EU.45 In support of this
two-dimensional process, the EU allocated substantial funds to assist
institution-building at home, and economic cooperation with neigh-
bours. In 2001, it inaugurated the CARDS (Community Assistance
for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) programme for
the Western Balkans, which replaced PHARE and OBNOVA. CARDS

was based on a financial package of some a4.9bn to the five Western
Balkan countries in 20016, and included a regional component.46
That has continued, after 2007, with the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA), CARDS successor. For the European Commission,
overseeing such instruments, programmes funded under this enve-
lope will be complementary to national programmes and will only be
eligible if they provide an added value to the pre-accession process.
The so-called multi-beneficiary programmes were allocated a401.4m
in 20079, out of a total budget of a4.12bn.47
Thus, after the 2000 threshold, the EU has wielded the full arsenal of
instruments for encouraging regionalization within Western Balkans,
as identified by Karen Smith (2003, pp. 8693): cooperation agree-
ments, group-to-group political dialogue (EU-Western Balkans sum-
mits), economic assistance and conditionality.48 This is reflected in the
annual monitoring reports issued by the Commission each autumn
since 2002 which assess the individual countries on their commitment
and compliance with regional initiatives, institutions and projects
backed by the Union (in the section on political criteria).
By extending a clearer membership offer, SAP has allayed fears that
regional cooperation might be an alternative or delaying tactic, which
surrounded the SP. The Pact, for its part, was growingly marginalized.
The new coordinator after 2002, Erhard Busek, who once headed
SECI, pushed for streamlining the wide range of activities under the
scheme; the number of priorities was diminished and the grand rhet-
oric jettisoned.49 The Pact turned into a de facto supplement to SAPs
regional dimension.50 The relegation to a secondary role, coupled
with the new focus on regional ownership, towards the mid-2000s
paved the way to the phasing out of the Pact and the establishment
of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), in February 2008, in
partnership with the South East European Cooperation Process; this
is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
The EU put trade at the forefront of SAP. By the time of the sum-
mit, the EU had largely fulfilled its promise to grant privileged access
to the Western Balkans. In November 2000, it also extended the
relevant regulation to post-Miloevic Yugoslavia, now fully inte-
grated into SAP.51 The EU demanded that liberalization should also
include dismantling tariffs inside the region, a point to be elaborated
further in Chapter 4. The two SAAs signed, in the course of 2001,
with Macedonia and Croatia contained identical clauses whereby the

two countries were required to conclude in the following two years
FTAs with the rest of the Western Balkans. They were also encour-
aged to do so with the accession candidates, but this was not spelled
out as a mandatory condition (Article 14). Furthermore, Article 12
of the SAAs referred to cooperation on labour and capital mobility,
services, reciprocal rights of business establishment.52 Turning for a
moment back to Andrew Hurrells (1995) typology of regionalism,
this was the point where the step from intergovernmental coopera-
tion to integration was made, given Brussels insistence that the pace
of intra-Western Balkans removal of barriers have to match that of
opening to the EU.53
This did not offset the prevalent bilateralism and differentia-
tion in EUWestern Balkan relations. The early conclusion of SAAs
helped Croatia and Macedonia break away from the group, despite
the inter-ethnic conflict they went through in 2001. Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro (independent as of May
2006) all failed, for various reasons, to move at the same speed as the
frontrunners. Croatia and Macedonias progress was bolstered by the
outcome of the EUWest Balkan summit in Thessaloniki, convened
in June 2003 by the Greek Presidency of the Council. Thessaloniki
upgraded SAP into a full-fledged enlargement framework equipped
with all the political, financial and institution-building tools already
deployed in Central and Eastern Europe. In December 2005, the EU
resolved to open accession negotiations with Croatia and upgraded
Table 2.2 The Western Balkan countries on the path to European integration
Stabilization EU Candidate Accession
and Association membership status negotiations
agreement application
(SAA)
Albania 12 Jun 2006 29 Apr 2009 No No
Bosnia and 16 Jun 2008 No No No
Herzegovina
Croatia 29 Oct 2001 21 Feb 2003 18 Jun 2004 3 Oct 2005
Kosovo No No No No
Macedonia 9 Apr 2001 22 Mar 2004 17 Dec 2005 No
Montenegro 15 Oct 2007 15 Dec 2008 17 Dec 2010 No
Serbia 29 Apr 2008 23 Dec 2009 No No
Macedonia into an official candidate. The following year, Albania

and Montenegro signed SAAs. Serbia and Bosnia followed suit in the
spring of 2008 but the issue of ICTY cooperation, in the case of the
former, and policy reform, for the latter, have effectively blocked
the process. Kosovo, which proclaimed unilateral independence on
17 February 2008, is at present still only halfway involved in the
process, as it is still unrecognized by several EU members, including
Greece and Romania (Table 2.2).
The dynamics of external push
External interventions have been a recurrent feature of Balkan

politics. The conflicts in 19915 and 19989 brought into the region
various Western players, from governments to international institu-
tions, to sui generis actors like the EU, which all pushed for regional
cooperation as a means to stabilize and pacify South East Europe,
considered an interdependent whole. A major impediment for those
external initiatives was, beyond any doubt, the lack of coordination.
In 1996, the EU and the US found themselves at loggerheads, each
promoting its own pet scheme. After 1999, however, the EU emerged
as the undisputed leader in the SP and, even more unambiguously,
within the regional dimension of SAP.
Regional cooperation was advanced through a policy of incentives.
In the case of both NATO and the EU, this meant first and foremost
the promise and prospect of future membership. However, the mix
between regionalism and accession raised further complications.
With the SP and SAP, the EU attempted to craft a policy combining
regionality and differentiation but the balancing act proved elusive
and often sparked political tensions. Put eloquently by a group of
prominent observers, the EU [was] de facto dividing a region with
the left hand, while promoting multilateral cooperation among the
states of the same region with the right hand.54 The tension was
resolved only towards the middle of the 2000s when it became clear
that membership was SAPs top priority while regional cooperation
played an auxiliary, yet significant, role. Overall, NATO proved more
successful in avoiding a clash between regionalism and bilateralism.
The high-profile involvement of the US and other member states in
regional initiatives reinforced the dynamic towards opening, rather
than local ghettoization.
Though clearly a more powerful agent of regional coopera-

tion, in comparison to the indigenous linkages and structures of
interdependence examined in Chapter 1, external push varied in
intensity and scope over time. In the mid-1990s, the EU required
East European candidates (Romania and Bulgaria included) to resolve
problems and establish good bilateral relations with neighbours but
was less insistent on institutionalized cooperation on a regional scale.
In the post-Dayton Balkans, it shifted towards multilateralism, which
variably targeted Yugoslavias successors and the wider neighbour-
hood. The US, by contrast, pursued a policy of inclusiveness which
sought to engage also countries like Turkey, Greece, Slovenia and
Hungary (e.g., in SECI), and as we shall see in Chapter 5, Ukraine and
Georgia, following the wave of colour revolutions in the mid-2000s.
The SP involved the Western Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania, and
even Moldova, but SAPs more robust and comprehensive regional
cooperation conditionality, written into the individual SAAs, was
restricted to the Yugoslav successor states and Albania.
There were variations in priorities, too. In the period of 19968, the
EU focused mainly on political dialogue, while the US emphasized
sectoral cooperation in areas such as trade facilitation, cross-border
infrastructure and combating organized crime. By contrast, the SP, at
least initially, aimed to regionalize every single policy-area from the
media all the way down to cross-border water management. The SAP
marked the return to a more priority-driven, yet in-depth, approach
focused on market integration and cooperation in justice and home
affairs. This has been the case of NATO too, with its more or less
straightforward emphasis on political-military issues.
In sum, external push has been a pervasive force in a region tradi-
tionally divided by conflict and dependent on the outside world. At a
closer look, however, one sees a story about different actors pressing
and inducing different groups of South East European states to do
different things at different times.
3
Balkans, Europe, South East
Europe: Identity Politics and
Regional Cooperation
Countries belong beyond their boundaries

on a map to where their spirit takes them.
N. Iorga (1940, p. 8)
It is certain that neither regional interdependence nor external push

give a fully satisfactory answer to the question of what sustains the
Balkans as a regional unit. As noted, different external initiatives
have mapped the area in variable ways, though the centre of gravity
has been former Yugoslavia. However, South East Europe is used in
political discourse to denote a grouping spanning well beyond the
confines of the Western Balkans. We have also seen that interdepend-
ence typically binds territorially contiguous countries, yet by that
token Romania would form a region with neighbouring Hungary or
Moldova, rather than with Albania or Bosnia. Turkey and Greeces
security concerns might be interdependent but what, if any, is the
common thread that links them to, say, Montenegros relations with
Serbia and Croatia?
Geographical criteria help little in deciding where South East
Europe begins or ends. The Balkan Peninsula has no clear northern
border although the Danube and Sava rivers or, alternatively, the
Drava and the Carpathian Range are obvious candidates. The region
has an ill-defined south-eastern frontier insofar as it is hard to include
the Turkish portion of Thrace and half of Istanbul but write off the
rest of the country where one could often find people and communi-
ties with roots in what used to be known as Turkey-in-Europe.1
62
Balkans, Europe, South East Europe 63
The debates about the Balkans frontiers are not exclusively preoc-
cupied with (physical) geography but equally zoom in on history,
culture and the political legacies shaping a collective regional identity.
While received wisdom has it that the Balkans lack a common notion
of Self, because of historical divisions and present-day political frag-
mentation, this has been no obstacle for studying the region as a
relatively stable geopolitical whole. What, then, is regionness, and
how does it impact on inter-state politics, notably the build-up of
cooperative institutions in South East Europe? This chapter locates a
thin, though shared, sense of belonging or we-ness within the con-
structions of national identity in the region. Its common denomina-
tor is the notion of being on the periphery of Europe rather than a
thick, communal understanding built around references to a com-
mon indigenous culture and historical heritage. Still the identifica-
tion as peripheral, and the discourses it is articulated through, have
empowered the institutions of the EU and other Western actors to
legitimately project political standards and frame normative expecta-
tions, notably regional cooperation, vis--vis South East Europe.2
Identity and the study of regionalism
As the Introduction pointed out, positing shared identity as either a

driver or a feature of regionalism in the Balkans is in tune with various
traditions in the study of international politics. For instance, Andrew
Hurrell concurs with Emanuel Adler that regionness is rooted in
mental maps rather than being a simple reflection of material struc-
tures of connectivity or institutional frameworks. Mental maps are
the cognitive frames that assist agents in interpreting society and
politics and, in this particular instance, political geography. The key
issue is how those ideational foundations of regionalism come into
existence and play into the political process. One possible root is to
understand identity as a primordial monolith: unchangeable and
located outside time, space and social context. Such an essentialist
take, typical for nationalist ideologies in the Balkans and elsewhere,
is often also projected beyond the nation state. A clear example is
furnished by Samuel Huntingtons depiction of international conflict
and cooperation as driven by civilizational loyalties determined by
essential traits of culture and religion (Huntington, 1996).
There is no shortage of writings on Balkan cultural distinctive-

ness, authenticity and therefore cultural unity.3 Thus Fernand
Braudels disciple Traian Stoianovich views the Balkan Peninsula as
a millennia-old cultural area, part of what he describes as the first
Europe of classical antiquity (Stoianovich, 1967, 1994). In a similar
mode, early-twentieth-century anthropogographes such as Jacques
Ancel and Jovan Cvijic made much of the commonality of dress,
architecture and conceptions of space and time (Ancel, 1929; Cvijic,
1918; cf. Pippidi in Bracewell and Drace-Francis, 1999, pp. 93107).
Cvijic even went a step further, by elaborating the notion of homo
balcanicus, defined by a particular mentalit. These views have
recently been harshly critiqued, notably by Paschalis Kitromilides
who contends that the advent of national particularisms destroyed
common identities and mentalits which had been viable in the spe-
cific context of the Orthodox oecumene of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries (Kitromilides, 1996). Even more problematic is
anthropogographies amenability to the ancient hatreds reading of
the Balkans, which came to the fore with the war in Bosnia.4 If we
believe in homo balcanicus and the persistence of mentalits, why not
claim that these are the source of the Balkanites irrational prone-
ness to violence?5 Culturing regionness is fraught and, at worst,
a conceptual dead-end street.
At the other end of the spectrum are social constructivists such
as Iver Neumann, who claim that regions are invented by political
actors as a political programme, they are not simply waiting to be
discovered (Neumann, 2001, p. 58). Regional identity is taken as
an open-ended social process enacted through discourse. To quote
Charles King, an eminent student of Balkan and East European
politics,
For well-established regions, just as for well-articulated national

identities, the temptation is to read back into the past the settled
parameters of the region itself, to see the existence of the region as
analytically prior to the forms of political cooperation that emerge
within its borders. As with the existence of nations, though, it is
easy to forget that the delineations of the boundaries and char-
acteristics of the regional unit emerge from an essentially politi-
cal process: just as there were no nations before elites cultural,
political and economic came to imagine them as such, so too are
there no regions until one particular vision of the regions shape

and features manages to outstrip rival definitions.
(King, 2001, p. 57)
The methodological path charted by Neumann, King and others sug-

gests inquiring into Self-Other dialogical relationships as constitutive
of regional cohesion.6 As with nations, the presence of an Other
helps trace a common past as well as a discursive boundary around
social identities (Neumann, 1999). Thus the critics of essentialism are
interested in the dynamics, rather than the statics, of identity. This
perspective provides the conceptual tools to unpack the notion of
Balkan identity, which is the purpose of the following section.
In search of Balkan identity
Constructivist theories invite us to ask not what is regional identity

but rather who constructs it, for whom and, most importantly, against
whom it is constructed and enacted. Until recently, the scholarship
on the Balkans had relatively little to say on the latter set of ques-
tions. Comparative or transnational historiographers, seeking to
transcend parochialism and methodological nationalism, have shed
light on the commonalities and patterns of the area. Rather than cul-
ture, comparativists see regionness at the level of social structure and
process: belated and half-way modernization, peripheral position in
relation to Western Europe, the ethnization of citizenship and state-
formation, and the pervasive rifts between the state and society.
There are differences as to how far back common features reach.
For instance, Nicloae Iorgas Byzance aprs Byzance, traces regionness
to the times of the medieval Byzantine Commonwealth, whereas
others stress the Ottoman period (Iorga, 1929, 1939). To be fair,
historians remain sensitive to context and social change. Echoing
Paschalis Kitromilides, Maria Todorova reasons that the Ottoman
legacy, hence Balkanness, has been eroded by modernization,
Westernization and nation state formation (Kitromilides, 1996;
Todorova, 1997, pp. 16184).7 She seconds Alexandru Dutus (1995)
claim that the region can be taken as a meaningful whole only in
view of the common set of problems related to social development,
as well as, turning to the post-1989 period, political and market tran-
sition (Todorova, 2004).
Another group of scholars focus on the interwoven character of

Balkan politics, presenting similar arguments resembling the ones
explored in Chapter 1. Despite multifaceted divisions, local countries
have always formed an interdependent system characterized by last-
ing patterns of cooperation and conflict.8 Geographical contiguity
and overarching legacies are translated into intertwined political des-
tiny. In Stevan Pavlowitchs words, the Balkans are [a] unity imposed
by history (Pavlowitch, 1999).
Thinking on regional identity was seriously challenged by Maria
Todorovas seminal book Imagining the Balkans, which appeared in
1997, in the aftermath of the Bosnian war.9 In Todorovas view, the
critical issue is how Balkan history and societies have been stereotypi-
cally represented within, but more significantly outside, the region.
More specifically, she inquires into the ways essentializing discourses
have framed and explained violence in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as well as during the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia. Rather than an objective identity, Balkan emerges as a
discursive phenomenon woven into popular perceptions and repre-
sentations. As Leeda Demetropoulou (1999/2000) observes, the label
Balkan is, in the language of Saussurean semiotics, a signifier that
has a complex and often rather problematic relationship with the
signified. What deserves consideration is the politics of identification
with or rejection of that label.10
Todorova argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century
a negative image of the Balkans had crystallized in the Western psy-
che as the antipode of the self-congratulatory vision of enlightened
Europeanness. If Europe set the standard of civilization and progress,
the Balkans was a site of backwardness, perpetual strife, tribal warfare
and resistance to modern rationality. The entrenchment of the term
balkanization in the global political lexicon testifies to the power
of what Todorova names, with more than a nod to Edward Said, as
Balkanism. The conflict in former Yugoslavia, commonly referred
to as the war in the Balkans or even as the Third Balkan War, was
seen as a mere repetition of earlier cycles of ethnic bloodshed. Such
a reading justified non-intervention and was instrumental in demar-
cating a boundary with civilized Central Europe moulded by its
Austro-Hungarian memories and legacies. Indeed, political elites in
emerging Central Europe sought to project their closeness to Europe,
in opposition to the imploding Balkans, by flagging up their commit-

ment to Western-style democracy, tolerance and liberal values.
Todorovas analysis implies that Europe and Europeanness are
dominant reference points in the mental mapping of Balkan history
and geography. As elsewhere on the post-communist fringes, identi-
fication with Europe has had a powerful legitimating and mobilizing
effect.11 Thus, Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden investigate
how nationalists across Yugoslavia professed cultural superiority
over orientalized Balkan Others be it Byzantine-Orthodox Serbs
or Muslim Bosnians and Kosovars raising the banner of their
own imputed Europeanness and Westernness (Bakic-Hayden and
Hayden, 1992; Bakic-Hayden, 1995; cf. Said, 1979). In contrast to
those authors, Todorova maintains that Balkanist discourse places
the Balkans both inside and outside Europe, a sort of twilight zone
on the margins of the continent. While the Haydens portray the area
as Europes Other, Todorova insists on the impossibility of a fully-
fledged binary relationship, akin to the one between Edward Saids
Occident and Orient. Devoid of the Orients exotic appeal to Western
imagination, the Balkans are very much a facet of Europes Self,
a repository of the fraught memories in the collective psyche of the
Dark Continent: genocide, intolerance, war, authoritarian politics
(Todorova, 1997, pp. 178; cf. Mazower, 2000, 2001, pp. 51).
What does all that tell us about regionalism in South East Europe?
The Balkanism debate recasts regional identity as a sui generis inter-
subjective structure resting on the twin pillars of Europeanness and
Westernness. Collective identifications are built around discourses of
partial belonging or exclusion from Europe presented as an ideal, yet
often unattainable, Self. State institutions and societies in the Balkans
have persistently failed to meet the standards and norms constitutive
of Europeanness, despite their repeated claims to European past and
future. This worldview is reproduced by external, but also by inter-
nal, actors who are co-opted and indeed shaped by the Balkanist dis-
course. The latter either accept the stigma of being Balkan or project
it onto their neighbours in order to construct and uphold regional
hierarchies of symbolic power (Todorova, 1997, Ch. 2).12 Todorovas
critique offers a relevant heuristic lens through which to examine
inter-state politics in South East Europe. It reconceptualizes shared
identity as a dynamic connection between the representations of
the region from outside and the local actors self-positioning vis--vis
imaginary Europe.
The inside-out angle: the nation, Europe and the Balkans
The empirical question that arises from the foregoing section is:
How do political elites and institutions across South East Europe, the
principal dramatis personae in regional cooperation, relate to certain
understandings of the Balkans and Europe? There are at least two pos-
sible methodological approaches to cracking that question. One is to
examine how the Balkans and Europe are represented in local politi-
cal discourse and, more broadly, in the national grand narratives. The
other is to measure the perceptions of the local elites at a particular
juncture with the help of the standard sociological toolbox.
Understandably, social scientists prefer the latter approach, which
draws conclusions on the basis of empirical data. Thus Anastasakis
and Bojicic-Delilovic interviewed a non-representative sample
of more than 50 political, business and civil-society elites in the
post-communist Balkans (Greece and Turkey excluded) and found
a strong identification with the EU. They found that their respond-
ents did not consider the Balkans or South East Europe a genuine
community here one suspects that they take the nation groups as
benchmark but a product of geography, political contingency and
external engineering. Regional identifications were more warmly
embraced by the representatives of academia, business and NGOs
than by the politicians and media representatives (Anastasakis and
Bojicic-Delilovic, 2002, p. 40). Where more durable and recent
social links had been in place, as in former Yugoslavia, the survey
registered higher level of acceptance of shared identity. For instance,
the report found that elites in Bosnia associate themselves much
more readily with their former partners in Yugoslavia, including
Slovenia, than with Albania, Romania or Bulgaria (pp. 5860).
Croatian respondents predictably showed a predilection towards the
countries of Central Europe (p. 63). Finally, Romanians felt closest to
neighbouring Hungary, Moldova and Bulgaria. Of all interviewees,
those in Serbia and Montenegro matched most closely the authors
definition of regional awareness, in that they stressed links with
nearly all other countries in both former Yugoslavia and wider South
East Europe (p. 71).
To understand those perceptions and put them in perspective,

one needs to delve deeper in the social context they stem from.
While the interviewed elites did not identify strongly with a Balkan
or South East European collectivity, their responses point at mental
frames and ideas regarding Balkanness and its relationship to Europe.
Self-images make sense only when juxtaposed to grand, national nar-
ratives and historical contexts. To make a broad generalization, the
articulations of regional identity from within, while varying from
one society to another as well as across time, rest on a triple structure
of nation, regional community, and macro-region (Europe). This is
very much consistent with the nesting relationship observed by
social scientists and historians with respect to the interplay between
European and national identities within the EU.13 While the first
and third poles of this structure are relatively clearly discernable,
the second one (Balkans) remains elusive. It tends to be subsumed
by, inscribed on or nested into the other two foci. In other words,
a countrys Balkan identity is a function of how the national Self is
positioned vis--vis Europe and the West.
Since the Enlightenment, elites in Modern Greece have been
eagerly asserting their nations contribution to European civilization
(Kitromilides, 1995). The (re)discovery of ancient Hellenic heritage by
the nineteenth-century Greeks, exemplified by the adoption of a new
national name Ellhne (Hellenes) or the cultural tastes of the emer-
gent urban classes, highlighted the symbolic link of the young nation
state with western European culture, itself inspired by the legacy of
classical Greece and Rome.14 This westward orientation, however, has
not been accompanied by discursive boundaries between Greece and
the rest of South East Europe. On the contrary, Greek elites both in
the early nineteenth century and the post-Cold War era have had
little doubt as to Greeces leading role in its immediate neighbour-
hood, often as a economic intermediary and channel of Western
(European) influences. This is only partly offset by the perception of
ethno-cultural and linguistic difference intertwined with the spectre
of the threat from the north in the dominant security discourse from
the interwar period until the 1960s and, more recently, to migration
from Balkan neighbours.15 Still, the defining Other in the Greek case
is Turkey (and earlier the Ottoman Empire), seen as the epitome of
the alien and perilous Orient. This is not to ignore alternative con-
structions of Greek national identity as opposed to the interventionist
West, be it the Great Powers of olden days or more recently US

hegemony. Linked to the underdog mentality scholars have dis-
cussed at length, they came to the forefront in the foreign policy
pursued by Andreas Papandreou and Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) in the 1980s. Anti-Westernism has also underpinned the
calls for return to the countrys Orthodox roots and a rediscovery of
connections with the former Byzantine oecumene, primarily in the
Balkans, at the time of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.16
In similar ways, Albanian national narratives underline the coun-
trys natural connection with Europe. It is embedded in the myth
of Skanderbeg (Albanian: Sknderbeu, 140568) as the last defender
of Europe from the invading Ottoman hordes (Nixon, 2010). Like
their counterparts elsewhere in the Balkans, Albanian historians have
invariably portrayed the Ottoman conquest as a fateful turning point
severing Albanians link with Europe, their rightful place by virtue of
cultural attachment.17 The National Revival (Rilindja Kombtare) at
the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, culminating with
the establishment of an independent state, has been seen as a move
to mend this historical injustice.18 As in the case of Greek, Bulgarian,
Serb, Croatian and Romanian grand narratives, Albanias struggle
against Ottoman domination has been elevated into a contribu-
tion to the cause of rolling back Asiatic backwardness in the name
of European civilization. Coming out from the Stalinist regime of
Enver Hoxhas successors in the 1990s, Albania readily embraced
the return to the West discourse calling for restoration of cultural
and political ties with the EU and the US. This choice reflected in
national foreign policy, however, has rarely been accompanied with
symbolic rejection of an imaginary Balkanness and/or its externaliza-
tion onto other societies in South East Europe.19
Constructions of Romanian national identity have traditionally
overemphasized the countrys linguistic and cultural uniqueness as a
Latin island within the sea of barbaric Slavs and Magyars. At the same
time, one should not forget the oeuvre of Nicolae Iorga who invested
much intellectual energy in the study of the Romanians link to their
southern neighbours, not least through the Romance-speaking com-
munities south of the Danube, envisioning Romania as a regional
political and cultural hegemon of sorts. The Latin liaison reigned
supreme prior to 1945, when the countrys elites received their educa-
tion in France and Germany, while Bucharest was known as Le Petit
Paris.20 Later, Ceausescus brand of nationalism shifted the emphasis

by exalting indigenous roots and privileging Dacian forebears to the
Roman substrate (Boia, 2001, pp. 467). This vision was fully coherent
with an intellectual discourse of the interwar years defining Romania
as a no-mans land at the crossroads of the West and the East.
Despite all those turnarounds, the Balkans have never been at the
forefront of Romanian identity politics; but still the label itself is laden
with pejorative connotations. Thus, the inhabitants of Transylvania
and the Banat, once parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, would blame
their ills on the centralized rule by Balkan Bucharest. This pattern
of identifying closely with Western Europe and keeping a represen-
tational distance from genuinely Balkan neighbours impacted on
foreign policy too. For a good part of the 1990s, Romanian govern-
ments looked towards budding Central Europe while keeping out
from the Balkan quagmire (Zamfirescu, 1995; Gallagher, 1997).
Turkeys relationship with the Balkans has rarely been a prominent
question in the symbolic battles over national identity. The nostalgia
for the lost lands of Rumeli has been overshadowed by the ceaseless
anxiety over the countrys Western or European identity and voca-
tion. Turkey is an ideal-type case that illustrates European constructs
ideological traction towards peripheral societies. Though fuelled by
an anti-colonial rhetoric, Atatrks modernization and secularization
reforms turned upside-down domestic society, by transplanting polit-
ical and socio-economic models from Western Europe (referred to
as contemporary civilization, muasr medeniyet in Turkish), a trend
harking back to the Tanzimat era in the nineteenth century. This
gravitation towards the West is the common thread linking Turkey
with its north-western neighbours, much more robustly than the
vestiges of Ottoman legacy. However, it is worthwhile to remember
that Turkey, as posited by the Justice and Development Partys chief
foreign policy strategist Ahmet Davutoglu, is part of various overlap-
ping regional clusters: in addition to the Balkans, it also belongs to
the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean.21
Former Yugoslavias anxieties about its Balkanness came into the
spotlight with the outbreak of violent conflict in the early 1990s.
Until that time, the country had perceived itself, and indeed had
been perceived by the wider world, as the most liberal segment of
communist-ruled Eastern Europe. Its citizens enjoyed the benefits
of a self-managing economy and free travel in the West. President
Tito, moreover, claimed a role in global politics as one of the leaders

of the Non-Aligned Movement. While Balkan was widely used as a
self-designation for example in the popular film Balkan Spy (1984)
scripted by Duan Kovacevic it did not correspond to a strong posi-
tive identification with countries in the area, particularly those in
the Soviet bloc.
It was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that the stereotypical image
of Balkan otherness was most blatantly instrumentalized by national-
ism across the crumbling socialist federation. Pro-independence elites
in Slovenia and Croatia justified their cause with the popular desire
to break away from the Balkan political traditions of Yugoslavia and
Serbia and return to Europe.22 The erstwhile frontier between the
Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires was recast, Huntington-style,
as the boundary of the European civilization to which Croats and
Slovenians aspired.23 Ironically, one of the chief protagonists in the
Third Balkan War, President Franjo Tudman, was among the most
ardent exponents of the flight from the Balkans. A professional
historian, he viewed the Yugoslav state as dominated by Byzantine
Serbia, forcibly keeping Croatia apart from its authentic cultural
roots and traditions.24 Only in the post-Tudman era did the gov-
ernment in Zagreb, then dominated by the post-communist Social
Democrats, adopt a more neutral stance, conceding that Croatia was
a Mediterranean, Central European and South East European (but
not Balkan!) state at the same time.25 As we will see in the following
chapters, the politicization of regional identity had also implications
for the Croatian policy towards the Balkans.
Serb nationalism, too, justified the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia
by recourse to civilizational theories woven around the East vs
West dichotomy. Serbdom was portrayed as attached to a putative
Orthodox world facing up to and resisting the expansionist West, led
by either the US or Germany and the Vatican, the alleged patrons of
Catholic Croats. There was a burgeoning literature in the 1990s pre-
senting bold designs for a union of Orthodox nations to resist foreign
domination in the Balkans, a quintessential Serb virtue. These paro-
chial visions of Serbias identity were consistently challenged by the
democratic opposition, which fully embraced the return to Europe
rhetoric common across post-communist Eastern Europe.26 Much
in common, the regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb blamed the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism;
and therefore Serbs and Croats defended Western civilization from

its foresworn enemy.27 This common Balkan mythological line was
present, for instance, in the infamous speech delivered by Slobodan
Miloevic on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle at
Kosovo, on 28 June 1989. The closing part of the speech dwelled the
link between Europeanness and national ideology, (ironically part
and parcel of modern Albanian nationalism too):
Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field

of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time
the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and
European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only
unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about
Serbias belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe
incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its
own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived
it of dignity.28
All across former Yugoslavia, Balkan identity came to be equated with

the rapid loss of status. The 1980s and especially the 1990s saw the
slippage into social and economic crisis, disintegration and eventu-
ally fratricidal bloodshed. Yugoslavia and its successors, bar Slovenia,
did not enjoy the privileged position that they had during the Cold
War. Balkan came to signify war, destruction and isolation from
Europe as the former Warsaw Pact countries were gradually achiev-
ing what Yugoslavia had possessed and lost (Drakulic, 1993).29
As noted by Todorova, Bulgaria is perhaps the only case where the
adjective Balkan has both positive and negative connotations:
Among the Balkan nations, the Bulgarians share in all the frus-
trations of being Balkan, and yet they are the only ones who seri-
ously consider their Balkanness, probably because of the fact that
the Balkan range lies entirely on their territory.
(Todorova, 1997, p. 54).
In contrast to Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian, Slovene and Macedonian,

Bulgarian clearly distinguishes between Balkan (in singular, meaning
the Balkan range or a mountain, more generally) and the Balkani
(always in plural, meaning the region). It is only the former that
occupies a prominent place in national mental maps as the backbone

of Bulgarias authenticity and perseverance through the centuries.
Concerning the latter, while Bulgarias historical and geographical
place within the region is never challenged, the idea about Balkan
mentality as the ultimate roadblock on the way to full-fledged par-
ticipation in the prestigious and coveted club of European states and
societies has been well entrenched, both before and after the 2007
EU accession. Similar to their neighbours, Bulgarians insist on having
a European identity but often locate Europe beyond the imagined
frontiers of the Balkans. If for a Briton going to Europe means cross-
ing the Channel, Bulgarians (much like Greeks and other Balkanites)
go to Europe when their destination is past Vienna.30
In summation, the Balkan label is salient, in various degrees, in
discourses on national identity across South East Europe, save Turkey.
Whether begrudgingly accepting it or passionately externalizing it,
local elites have had to confront and handle the Balkan stigma in
different historical periods. While identity constructions vary, this
stigma emerges a pivotal locus communus. At its core is the sense of
marginality, peripheral location or outright separateness from Europe
and the West.
The outside-in angle: between othering and

Europeanization
Indigenous perceptions and discourses provide only part of the

picture and it is essential to also consider the external gaze towards
South East Europe. Contrary to what many voices in the Balkanism
debate imply, there has not been a single dominant outside narrative
on the region. Depending on the political dynamics, political institu-
tions, elites, analysts, media and popular historiography in the West
have variably read the Balkans or South East Europe as both a primor-
dial Other and a legitimate part of the European Self. Much of the
analytical work on external perceptions of the region coincided with
the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s. However, the Balkan Ghosts
imagery prevalent in the early 1990s was soon challenged by authors
with longstanding engagement with the politics and societies of the
area. Some of them, like James Gow, questioned the term Balkans
as obfuscatory, indeterminate, contested, counterproductive and
even harmful (Gow, 1998, p. 158). Other prominent scholars, such
as Mark Mazower or Noel Malcolm, have critiqued the stereotypes

of Balkan otherness by emphasizing the regions embeddedness in
the continents history (Mazower, 2001; Malcolm, 1996; Glenny,
1999). Institutional discourses, for their part, have followed shifting
international and domestic politics. If in the 1990s it was customary
to talk about the Balkans as a battlefield on the margins of Europe,
where ethnic and religious communities driven by their primordial
memories and attachments settled scores, phrases like European
vocation and European future came to the fore in the 2000s.
Continuities are arguably still present. One is that Balkans or
South East Europe, in most cases excluding Greece and Turkey, are
seen from the outside as a single grouping. On the whole, Western
perceptions have posited the post-communist cluster as a relatively
more homogenous collection of countries than the locals would
be inclined to believe. The awareness of heterogeneity has gained
ground, as NATO and the EU both have expanded towards the region
since 2004, but outside observers have not lost sight of common
patterns. In the 1990s, these boiled down to the threat of nationalist
conflict within and between states. Subsequently, shared problems
related to weak statehood, (lack of) good governance and structural
challenges to economic development and modernization informed
perceptions of South East Europe as a whole.
One has to take a particular note of discourses emanating from
the EU. It is the Union that has played an undisputed role as a ref-
erence point in identity constructions, not least by appropriating
the symbolic capital of Europe in the Balkan periphery.31 In the
post-Cold War era, the EU defined the standards of Europeanness and
Westernness and projected a set of norms, framed as membership
conditions, towards the transition countries of the former Soviet bloc.
The EUs policies have also created regional taxonomies by grouping
and bundling countries and thereby reshaping the symbolic geogra-
phy of the Balkans as well as of other peripheral regions.
It is off the mark to claim that EU-rope identified the Balkans of
the Yugoslav wars as its defining Other back in the early 1990s.
Writing roughly at that time, Ole Waever claimed that the border-
lands of Europe were populated by societies that were best charac-
terized as less-Europe, rather than as anti-Europe (Waever, 1998).
Rather than ontologically opposed and therefore constitutive of
Europe these societies both resemble and differ from the European
norm. As Timothy Garton Ash (2004) observes, Europe does not

have a boundary but it gradually dissolves as one goes eastwards, the
only undisputable Other being Europes own conflict-ridden past.32
Added to that is Europes ambiguity about its own identity, resulting
in dissonance and confusion concerning the strategic aims and ter-
ritorial scope of its eastwards engagement (Zielonka, 2006, Ch. 1).
In-betweenness, a theme explored by Todorova, is very much linked
to the inclusion-exclusion nexus that underlie relations between the
Balkans and the EU.
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Union has been pursu-
ing a policy of cautious and gradual expansion towards South East
Europe. Starting from 2000, when Bulgaria and Romania embarked
on membership negotiations, and the Thessaloniki Council of 2003,
which reached out to Yugoslavias successor republics and Albania,
the post-communist Balkans (Turkey being a rather different case)
have been inserted, step by step, into a political dynamic similar to
that of Central Europe and the Baltic in the 1990s. The Stabilization
and Association Process (SAP), firmly anchored in the enlargement
clauses of the EU treaties, redefined the Western Balkans as part and
parcel of the Unions in-group. Local states have been expected to
demonstrate adherence to the EUs functional standards (the acquis
communautaire) but also deeper, constitutive norms of democratic
governance and peaceful foreign policy. Indeed, the EU has seen
itself as norm promoter, socializing its future members, or more pre-
cisely their elites, into foundational values and principles.33
The values and norms in question were made explicit by the
1993 Copenhagen criteria, put forward for the Central and East
European candidates.34 For the most part, the criteria cover domestic
issues such as democracy, market reform and, not least, the ability
to take onboard the acquis. However, they also relate to the aspir-
ants foreign relations, which is very significant with respect to
regionalism in South East Europe. As the 1994 Pact for Stability
showed, the (sub)condition related to the observance of minority
rights, part of the first Copenhagen criterion, was interpreted more
broadly to include also the pacific resolution of inter-state disputes
and good-neighbourly relations. At the minimum, the requirement
prescribed avoidance of conflict, especially over historical issues
related to territorial sovereignty and borders that had plagued
Eastern Europe between the two world wars. The development of
EU-inspired integrative frameworks among the applicant states was

an instance par excellence of the Unions self-assumed role of a pro-
moter of regional cooperation in world politics.35 In the 1990s, the
EU was particularly keen to export forms of functional cooperation.36
Arrangements like CEFTA were meant to enhance the participants
institutional capacity to cooperate on economic matters, but also
to prove their commitment to integration as an overarching foreign
policy principle. To highlight the normative contents of inter-state
cooperation, the European Commission has habitually pointed out
that, through SAP, the Western Balkan aspirants had to establish
normal relationships between themselves [emphasis added]; coop-
eration rather than competition and the balance of power are taken
as the norm of state-to-state behaviour.37 As noted by Karen Smith,
the export of regional cooperation has altruistic (that is, normative)
dimensions, in addition to the more obvious instrumental purposes
(in this case, related to containing the undesirable effects of instabil-
ity in the Balkans) (Smith, 2003, pp. 845).
The norm of regional cooperation has been singularly salient in
South East Europe. That has to do with the greater gap or misfit
between the EU standards and the perceived level of compliance
in the Balkans, compared to the 1990s batch of candidates with
the recent experience of war, the frozen conflicts in Kosovo and
Bosnia and nationalism remaining a potent force. Initiatives by the
EU and other Western institutions, from the Regional Approach
(1996), through the Stability Pact (1999), to SAP (2000), all covered
in the previous chapters, demonstrate that regional cooperation has
been a pivotal element in the normalization of South East Europe,
alongside domestic reform and institution-building. Prior to SAP, the
norms of appropriate inter-state behaviour were articulated vis--vis
the Western Balkans, but were not institutionally enforced through
a coherent set of rewards and punishments. The case of Bulgaria and
Romania was different owing to their early insertion in the enlarge-
ment process in the 1990s, so their participation in cooperative
schemes has been more of a matter of following the norm than a
direct response to carrot-and-stick conditionality.
The principle of cooperative foreign policy was firstly promul-
gated by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) for example, Principle IX, on cooperation among states in
the Helsinki Final Act (1975) through the 1990 Paris Charter for a
New Europe. References to the Charter, along with the other CSCE
documents, were inserted in the preambles of the Europe Agreements
concluded by the EU and the Central and Eastern European can-
didates in the 1990s. OSCE, CSCEs successor, was the institutional
umbrella of both the Stability Pact I (1994) launched by France and
its Balkan namesake of 1999. The Paris Charter set forth two distinct,
though related norms: good-neighbourly relations and economic
cooperation. The conceptual linkage of political rapprochement with
functional collaboration, all the way to integration, reflects a certain
reading of (western) Europes post-1945 history. Indeed, reconciliation
through cooperative projects has been projected to the Balkans as the
European way of dealing with conflict. For instance, the Stability Pact
was hyped with multiple references to the Marshall Plan of 194751.38
In the words of first Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach:
The countries of the region recognize that the Stability Pact gives
them the opportunity and the duty to meet EU standards and
to draw the lessons of post-war European history.
(quoted in Vucetic, 2001, p. 118)
To become part of Europe, the Balkans were under the duty to re-
enact the 1950s, following the EU script of standards, and transform
from a conflict-ridden region to a zone of peace and prosperity.
This historical analogy has also gone a long way to legitimize
the EUs normative projection towards South East Europe. Regional
cooperation initiatives have been framed not merely as a matter of
expedient policy choice but as a mission to salvage the participating
countries from their haunting past. Leading politicians such as the
US President Bill Clinton and Carl Bildt, prominent Swedish politi-
cian and former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
hailed it as a bold effort to debalkanize the Balkans.39
While on the surface the language of Europeanization is polarly
opposed to the othering discourses of the early 1990s, it portrays
the Balkans in similar ways: as a self-contained grouping defined
by its distinctive historical and political characteristics. Because of
the shared historical baggage, Balkan states have been required to
demonstrate compliance with the EU norms in a collective fashion,
rather than only through bilateral measures as the Central European
candidates did in the mid-1990s. As already shown in Chapter 2, this
bundling approach adopted by Western institutions applied, to a

greater degree, to the so-called Western Balkans rather than to wider
South East Europe, including Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and
perhaps other countries like Moldova, Cyprus or even Slovenia.
The case of the Western Balkans demonstrates quite vividly that the
practices of norm diffusion by the EU and other external actors have
relied on mental maps but are also capable of remaking political geog-
raphy. Though the term Western Balkans was first put forward by the
Austrian Presidency of the EU Council, it became standard only after
1999 when Bulgaria and Romania embarked on accession talks with
the Union. The countries of the region were therefore repackaged
into segmented clusters, in contrast to other periods for example,
in 1988 when Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia
held the inaugural conference of foreign ministers in Belgrade. In the
case of the Western Balkans, the common denominator has been the
containment of conflict and inter-ethnic tensions through reconcili-
ation, cooperation with the ICTY, and, importantly, membership in
various integration schemes. The level of convergence with EU stand-
ards set apart the Western Balkans to from Romania and Bulgaria,
even prior to 2007. The latter two countries, however, have not been
labelled Eastern Balkans but considered part of Central and Eastern
Europe, another item in the post-communist taxonomy sustained by
the Western policy from the 1990s onwards.
When referring to the Western Balkans together with Bulgaria and
Romania, the EU routinely speaks of South East Europe. Greece and
Turkey are rarely included, since Balkans/South East Europe is, in
the main, reserved for countries in transition. This is striking not
least because of Athens and Ankaras participation in key indigenous
institutions such as SEECP. In the final analysis, the diverse institu-
tional links with the EU serve as an overarching criterion. The Union
exerts power not solely through appropriating the symbolic capital
of Europeanness but also through its capacity to map and remap the
political geography of its south-eastern fringe.
A dichotomy revisited: identity and material interest in

regional cooperation
Social Constructivism, a broad church within IR theory, treats

regional cooperation and regionalism as derivative of, or indeed
as enhancing, the we-feeling or we-ness of the parties involved.

Actors are animated not solely by the pursuit of utility but also by
common identities and norms constitutive of a regional community.
The institutional deepening of regional political arenas is expected
to enhance cohesiveness within the in-group, through processes of
socialization. It might also harden the symbolic boundaries that
define Others, entrenching inside-outside distinctions and hierar-
chies not unlike the process of nation-building in modern times.
This chapter has argued that the post-Cold-War Balkans have not
followed such a script. Their trajectory has been shaped by the gravi-
tation towards the model societies of core Europe. The formation
of local transnational solidarities has either remained a purely intel-
lectual project or has been confined within the bounds of former
Yugoslavia. However, the chapter also suggests that we-feeling has
a more complex sociology than what either IR scholars or empirical
surveys of elite opinion believe. The ideational traction of external
centres is a focal point of identity construction in its own right.
To put it crudely, being Balkan means being a European who falls
short of the normative expectations that make up Europeanness.
Collective identity has deep symbolic bonds with Europe, which
serves as a model, identification reference and building block in the
discursive mapping of a regional community on the periphery.
It is EU-rope that has constructed South East European countries
into a regional grouping and has legitimized the nascent forms
of multilateral cooperation, through the normative discourse of
European standards. For their part, while pursuing strategic gains
such as political stability, financial rewards, market access and voice
in Western institutions, local players have acted against the backdrop
of historically established structures of ideas and knowledge, notably
the role of the Balkan societies as recipients of models, norms and
standards from outside. If the sovereign and homogenous nation
state was the most significant import in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Europeanization in the 2000s has been framed,
inter alia, by models of economic integration and multilateralism.
The centre-periphery relationship moulding Balkan identity poli-
tics is also visible in the practices of naming. Beyond the Western
Balkans example discussed above, one should also consider South
East Europe. From the mid-1990s onwards, the label prevailed to
replace Balkans, which was laden with negative associations. This

move was consistent with the local elites efforts to transcend the
discursive boundaries drawn between them and Europe, in the early
1990s, and at least partly overcome marginalization.40
Unpacking regional identity enables us to understand and interpret
the normative clout of the EU, NATO and other Western institutions
in promoting regional cooperation and integration. Externally driven
initiatives have been legitimated by those institutions role in extend-
ing or withholding recognition as part of the Western or European
in-group. For the Balkans, the drive for recognition has proceeded
from cultural codes embedded in national and regional identities,
underpinned by the historical experience of marginality. Western
institutions are not solely a source of material gains but also symbolic
gatekeepers guarding the recognition resources of the centre.
But does identity also explain the political processes under inves-
tigation, to revisit the distinction made in the Introduction? Is it a
causal factor like interdependence and external push, dissected in
Chapters 1 and 2? The link between substantive institutional and
policy outcomes, on the one hand, and the constructions of regional
identity, on the other, is the focus of Part II of the book. It is still
possible to put together two ideal-type scenarios to distinguish ana-
lytically how the two factors manifest themselves as well as to put
forward hypotheses at the level of process.
In the case of outside push, one would look at the material incen-
tives extended by the external actor, including market access, invest-
ment, financial assistance and inclusion in decision-making. In the
case of norms as independent causes facilitated by identity construc-
tions, the likely course is voluntary compliance, often accompanied
by claims about shared identity with the external institution (EU,
NATO). These unilateral forms of compliance would not come in
response to any specific initiative from outside, and would therefore
not be contingent on direct conditionality on regional coopera-
tion reliant on carrots and sticks. In the former instance one would
observe the workings of relational power, that is the capacity of A to
induce B to deliver outcome C, whereas in the latter it would be a
dynamic informed by normative-structural aspects of power, that is,
the capacity of the agent to define standards of normalcy (Barnett
and Duvall, 2005). Table 3.1 below juxtaposes the two models.41
Table 3.1 External push vs. norms and identity

External push Norms and identity
External actor EU, NATO, US, IFIs EU, NATO, OSCE
Type of engagement Direct conditionality, Norm projection
material incentives and
punishments
Type of power Relational Structural-Normative
Logic of action Logic of consequences Logic of appropriateness
Compliance payoff Financial transfers, trade Symbolic admission into
preferences, access to the in-group
resources and
decision-making power
proceeding from
membership (in the case
of EU and NATO)
Enabling conditions Power differentials Europe-centric
between internal and constructions of
external agents national and regional
Demand for external identity
engagement
Local interdependence
Though they provide valuable analytical insight into collective

action, we should bear in mind that these are ideal-typical distinctions.
The two causal logics, that of appropriateness and that of conse-
quences, are most often present side by side. To quote the obvious
example, membership conditionality established through the EUs
Copenhagen criteria has constituted both normative expectations and
a cost-benefit structure informing actors strategies. As the second part
of the book shows, norms and identity have a legitimizing effect as
regards external push. Despite their calculations, Balkan states have
been likely to comply with external pressures to cooperate because of
the high normative standing of regional cooperation as a model. The
EUs regional cooperation conditionality has been reinforced by the
framing power of the discourse and norms of Europeanness.
Part II
Areas of Regional Cooperation
4
Building Up a Regional
Marketplace: Economic and
Functional Cooperation
Trade, investment, transport, and energy are all at the core of any
regionalist undertaking. Concepts such as regionalization and
regional cooperation the staple of the debates on New Regionalism
(Sderbaum and Shaw, 2003) are heavily biased towards forms of
functional cooperation, dismantling boundaries constraining cross-
border commercial activity and collective market governance. Not
unlike the early integration experience of Western Europe in the
1950s, the leading policy assumption in the Balkans has been that
the gradual removal of economic barriers would catalyse political
stability anchored in economic growth. This expectation has largely
materialized. Following a decade of wars and economic turmoil,
the region saw a period of expansion, particularly before the global
economic crisis struck in 2008 (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010, Ch. 5). Over
the period 20026, growth averaged at 4.74 per cent for the Western
Balkans and 5.55 for Romania and Bulgaria.1 These figures indicate
that, though lagging behind other regions in terms of growth rates,
the post-communist Balkan countries have experienced an economic
turnaround. This turnaround has been fuelled by increased domestic
spending and an influx of FDI, and has included such previously stag-
nant sectors as steel production (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010). Regional
cooperation has played a role, albeit secondary to integration into
the EU. It has helped spur economic exchanges and established func-
tional regimes in various policy-areas assisting growth.
But what has been the dominant force shaping cooperation:
functional linkages demanding collective action on the part of local
governments? Material incentives set forth by external sponsors? Or
85
the pull of EU norms and practices? Conventional IR thinking sug-

gests that cooperation may occur even in conflict-ridden regions as
long as it is concentrated on low politics; and there were modest
examples of such cooperation in South East Europe over the period
197691.2 This interpretation privileges interdependence as a causal
factor and sees cooperation, in the main, as an intra-regional, rather
than an outside-in affair. Yet, as shown in Chapter 2, the new wave of
cooperative initiatives in the Balkans, from the mid-1990s onwards,
has been underwritten by the financial resources and political clout
of Western institutions and states. To the chagrin of the advocates of
regional ownership, the demand for policies, regimes and institu-
tions, on a regional scale, has reflected existing cross-border linkages;
interdependencies have had only facilitating, as opposed to causal,
influence.
The focus on external supply and intra-regional demand suggests
that the dynamics of regional cooperation, in the economic sphere,
have been largely governed by cost-benefit considerations. However,
a purely utilitarian take on the process tells us only part of the story.
For the Balkan countries drawn into the EU enlargement exercise,
the commitment to functional cooperation, as part and parcel of
European vocation, has continually legitimized a growing number
of ever more ambitious external initiatives. It has also constrained
the local states ability to opt out of the schemes, as well as to design
their institutional features.
The present chapter is divided into two parts. First, it examines the
record of cooperation in several key policy sectors; second, it surveys
the underlying dynamics accounting for variance across issue-areas
and offers some tentative conclusions as regards the causal factors
at play.
Sectors of economic and functional cooperation
Trade
Bolstering intra-regional trade flows was singled out as an objective
for South East Europe very early on. At the Sofia conference in July
1996, Balkan foreign ministers pledged to expand and intensify
economic links. Ambitious declarations contrasted sharply with
the realities of fragmentation, and hub-and-spoke relations with
external trade partners, described in Chapter 1. Because of economic
Building Up a Regional Marketplace 87
hardships resulting from delayed marketization, political instability,

and violent conflict, across the post-communist grouping within
South East Europe, only Greece and Turkey had the potential of
becoming regional centres for trade and investment. Local countries,
however, made some tentative steps towards trade liberalization, by
way of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Macedonia was particu-
larly active; it signed such treaties with FR Yugoslavia (1996), Croatia
and Slovenia (1997), and Turkey and Bulgaria (1998). Bulgaria and
Romania liberalized their mutual trade in industrial goods with their
accession to CEFTA in 1999 and 1997 respectively. This partial lifting
of tariff barriers resulted in a patchwork of arrangements with differ-
ing scope and product coverage, and yielded only limited results. As
aptly captured at the time by Vladimir Gligorov, a respected econo-
mist and policy analyst:
[F]or many Balkan countries the other Balkan countries are not
important trading partners; that for some Balkan countries the
other Balkan countries are not trading partners at all; that for
almost no Balkan country is another Balkan country the main
trading partner; and that although the region as a whole plays a
more important role for some countries, trade with the EU is by
far more important for every single Balkan country.
(Gligorov, 1998, p. 3)
Though on the rise, regional trade flows were confined to ex-

Yugoslavia. Thus, the former members of the federation were the
second most important partner for Macedonia after the EU. In
1998, 66.6 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovinas exports and 52.8
per cent of its imports went to the region, mainly to neighbouring
Croatia and Serbia.3 In aggregate terms, intra-regional trade was low,
accounting, according to the European Commission, 67 per cent of
the overall volume (see Table 4.1).4
The initial push for multilateral cooperation on trade came from
the US-backed South East Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which
worked on fostering connections among local governments and
business communities as well as trade facilitation that is improve-
ment of the physical infrastructure and regulatory framework as
regards border crossings and customs. However, all-out liberaliza-
tion became a strategic goal only after the Stability Pact (SP) was
Table 4.1 Trade flows in South East Europe in 1998 (share of total)
EU share EU share SEE share SEE share
in exports in imports in exports in imports
(per cent) (per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
Albania 88.8 77.9 3.0 7.2
Bosnia and 21.9 29.5 66.6 52.8
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 51.7 46.5 7.7 3.4
Croatia 48.7 62.6 25.2 12.2
Macedonia 50.3 46.4 23.4 32.8
Romania 64.6 57.9 1.9 1
FR Yugoslavia 32.9 38.7 35.1 16.3
Source: Uvalic (2001).5
installed in 1999. The trade agenda of the Pact was in line with the
EUs general approach to stabilizing neighbouring regions, through
employing its own integration toolbox; for instance, the littoral
states of the Middle East and North Africa who participated in the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the so-called Barcelona Process). At
the inaugural summit in Sarajevo, SP members made a commitment
to work together to remove policy and administrative obstacles to
the free flow of goods and capital, in order to increase economic
cooperation, trade and investment in the region and between the
region and the rest of Europe [emphasis added].6 A workgroup on
trade, bringing in government official and representatives of the
European Commission, was assembled in January 2000 under its
WT2 (economic affairs). It foresaw a two-stage process: in the begin-
ning participating countries were to suspend introduction of new
tariff barriers and administrative hurdles; in the second, accompa-
nied with accession to WTO, they were to work towards a free-trade
area.
The Commission steered the process from the very start. It had
already unveiled its strategy for the Western Balkans in October
1999, envisioning the creation of a regional body charged with trade
liberalization.7 Membership in the latter body was cast as a precondi-
tion for the conclusion of a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA).8 To no ones surprise, such ideas evoked mixed reactions.
Critics asserted that trade liberalization within the Western Balkan
cluster would create a regional ghetto and also reintroduce previously
abolished barriers vis--vis the EU candidate states, including Bulgaria

and Romania. A superior scenario, preventing closure, was the
simultaneous liberalization of trade with the EU, accession to CEFTA
and WTO membership (Daskalov et al., 2000; Gligorov, Kaldor and
Tsoukalis, 1999). Meanwhile, George Soros, the prominent financier
and philanthropist, made even more radical proposals, including the
establishment of a customs union with the EU, along the lines of the
one already in place for Turkey, coupled with the adoption of a com-
mon currency first the Deutschmark and later the Euro.9
Slobodan Miloevics fall from power in October 2000 gave EU
policies a new momentum. In November 2000, the Council adopted
a regulation extending duty-free access for roughly 95 per cent of
Western Balkan products through autonomous trade measures
(ATMs).10 The concessions to the emergent reformist governments
were explicitly linked, by the Commission, with pulling down hur-
dles to trade within the region, and were intended to bring politi-
cal dividends, encourage FDI, and facilitate further market reforms
at the domestic level.11 The closing statement of the EU-Western
Balkans Summit at Zagreb (November 2000) featured a commitment
to regional cooperation, and mentioned explicitly the build-up of a
free-trade area.12 However, Balkan governments opted for a model
whereby liberalization would take place through bilateral agreements,
rather than a regional instrument, and would therefore complement
integration into the EU and WTO. This preference was articulated at
a summit in Skopje on 223 February 2001, which was attended also
by FR Yugoslavias new President Vojislav Kotunica.13
As the SP provided the institutional umbrella for what was essen-
tially an EU initiative, the regional trade bloc covered its target
countries: both the Western Balkans and Bulgaria and Romania. The
government in Sofia, headed by Ivan Kostov, resolutely opposed
the linkage, owing to fears of delay on the EU accession path.
Ultimately, Bulgaria and Romania had little choice. The European
Commission could not make use of trade concessions as leverage
due to the advanced status accorded by the Europe Agreements. Yet,
Sofia and Bucharest had already committed to deepening economic
ties with neighbours, through participation in the South European
Cooperation Process (SEECP, see Chapter 6) and SP. Persuaded by the
SP Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach, Kostov embraced the scheme
in early 2001.14 Yet tensions lingered on: in May 2001 the Bulgarian
government openly criticized Hombach and threatened to withdraw

from the Pact.15
The next critical step was marked by the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on trade liberalization, signed on 27 June
2001 in Brussels, by the SP beneficiary countries, in the presence of
the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy. It provided for a network
of bilateral FTAs to be negotiated by the regional states. To ensure
consistency, all those country-to-country deals had to contain the
following provisions:
abolish export duties, charges and quantitative restrictions;

lift import duties or charges on at least 90 per cent of mutual
trade, calculated according to the products value and tariff lines;
reduce charges on sensitive goods no later than six years after
entry into force;
bring the existing trade agreements in line with the MoU;
foresee future liberalization of trade in services.16
To calm down local anxieties, the MoU reiterated that regionaliza-

tion was directly linked to integration into the EU and the WTO.
It also highlighted the Unions acquis as the fundament of the new
regional trading bloc midwifed by the Commission.
From day one, Brussels was in the driving seat regarding imple-
mentation which, as expected, dragged on. Commission experts, as
well as World Bank and WTO staff, took part in drafting the bilateral
FTAs, as a number of governments lacked the requisite capacity to
conduct negotiations.17 Even those who had the ability, , had little
commitment, and/or faced opposition, at home, which also made EU
mediation and leadership indispensable. At the end of 2001, when
Croatia signed its SAA, the right-wing HDZ, then in opposition,
attacked Ivica Racans government for tying the countrys fortunes to
the Western Balkan group in exchange for doubtful rewards. For their
part, Racan and other key cabinet members, such as the European
integration minister Neven Mimica, though supportive of the SAA,
lambasted ambitious regional schemes such as the customs union
floated by George Soros. Foreign Minister Tonino Picula dismissed
outright similar ideas advocated by his German counterpart, Joschka
Fischer: Croatia is ready to develop bilateral relations with all of its
neighbours, but it will support and begin integration processes only
with the EU.18 The spaghetti bowl of bilateral FTAs therefore could
be read as a compromise, balancing the preferences of the EU and its
interlocutors in South East Europe.
Bulgaria and Romania, having inaugurated their accession talks
with the EU as of early 2000, took a view similar to that of Croatia.
The two governments delayed negotiations with laggards such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania until late 2002. It was only after
the positive signals from the EUs Copenhagen Council in December
2002, which set January 2007 as a target date for accession, that the
two countries paid more attention to trade talks with the Western
Balkans (Ranchev, 2002, p. 25).
The outstanding status issues in former Yugoslavia posed additional
challenges. Serbia and Montenegros negotiations with the other
signatories of the MoU stalled because the two constituent parts in
the loose federation, orchestrated by the EU High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in 2003, failed to
harmonize their separate external tariffs.19 While outward-oriented
Montenegro lacked a substantial rural sector and insisted on low
tariffs on agricultural imports, Serbia wanted to protect its farmers.
The deal between Albania and the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),
concluded in the summer of 2003, was contested by the authorities
in Belgrade as an encroachment on Serbias sovereignty.20 Because
of all these problems, the original deadline of 2003 was missed, and
full ratification of the whole package of 32 FTAs was not a done deal
until January 2004.21
The completion of the network of agreements brought the mul-
tilateralization of the incipient trade regime back to the diplomatic
table. There was the realization that the spaghetti-bowl model was
suboptimal, as it was difficult to administer and enforce. The bilateral
approach also left loopholes as regards public procurement, rules of
origin and other behind the border issues to do with national regula-
tions (Delevic, 2007, p. 58). The transition to a multilateral template
was facilitated by the imminent accession of Bulgaria and Romania
to the EU, which, in effect, left only the Western Balkans, including
UNMIK-run Kosovo, in the scheme a much more homogenous
group. As parts of the Western Balkans were already firmly on the
pre-accession path (Croatia entering membership negotiations and
Macedonia recognized as a candidate), CEFTA was seen as the most
suitable institutional shell binding together the regional and the
EU track. On 1 May 2004, the original founders from the Visegrd

group (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia) left,
together with Slovenia (member since 1995). As the founders were
set to leave, Croatia acceded on 1 January 2003 to join the remain-
ing members Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the government in
Zagreb argued that CEFTAs enlargement towards South East Europe
would be a more desirable alternative to a Balkano-centric group-
ing.22 However, the relatively high entry requirements membership
in WTO membership and EU association agreement ruled out all
other countries in the Western Balkans save Macedonia, which was
admitted in July 2006.
It was Macedonias membership application, in April 2004, that
resuscitated the CEFTA option (Dangerfield, 2006, p. 316 ff). In 2005,
the SP workgroup on trade resolved to replace the bilateral FTAs with
a regional framework a decision endorsed by the recipient countries
ministers of economy and trade gathered in Sofia in June 2005. The
new agreement, known as CEFTA 2006, was signed in Bucharest on
19 December 2006 and entered into force on 21 November 2007.
It relaxed the entry criteria, dropping erstwhile conditions such as
WTO membership and having an SAA with the EU. This is the reason
that CEFTA 2006 has been fully harmonized with WTO rules, thereby
ensuring that Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
well as Kosovo not part of the global organization are in com-
pliance. In addition to an already negotiated duty-free regime on
agricultural and industrial goods, the agreement features commit-
ments in areas such as services, investment, intellectual property and
public procurement (Chapter 6 of the agreement), as well as provi-
sions on rules of origin.23 It also marks a step forward in terms of
institutionalization. CEFTA 2006 is administered by a Brussels-based
Joint Committee with dispute settlement powers backed by a secre-
tariat. There is also an association of regional chambers of commerce
attached to the new trade institution.
The completion of CEFTA 2006 set the stage for a regional trad-
ing bloc encompassing the Western Balkans flanked by EU mem-
bers Greece, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. However, integration
rested on a political, rather than on a strictly economic rationale.
Indeed, many experts have raised doubts as to their contribution
to growth and development, as opposed to the beneficial political
effects in terms of fostering better relations between governments
and preparation for EU membership. While the region meaning

here principally the Western Balkans remains important for some
countries exports, this is rarely the case on the side of imports. There
have been concerns that, due to the different levels of regulatory
development in the area of competition policy, for example trade
liberalization would actually distort trade, by allowing monopolistic
collusion across borders, as allegedly is the case of the merger between
the Serbian retailer Delta and the Croatian Agrokor (Delevic, 2007,
p. 62). There are questions, too, regarding the potential of CEFTA
2006 to lower barriers in agricultural trade in accordance with its
Chapter 3. To protect domestic agriculture, Bosnia and Herzegovina
adopted a law in June 2009 that reintroduced previously abolished
customs duties for Croatian and Serbian imports, and breached the
agreement as well as the SAA signed with the EU.24 The law was
struck down by the countrys Constitutional Court in September
2009 amidst protests by farmers.25 The European Commission reports
that an additional protocol on agriculture to CEFTA 2006, has been
blocked due to the clashes over Kosovos independence.26
It is also worth considering the effects of trade liberalization over
time. A comprehensive report on the Balkan economies released
by the World Bank in 2008 found that over the period 20005 the
value of intra-regional (Western Balkans, Romania, Bulgaria) exports
had grown from $2.88bn to some $7.6bn, while imports expanded
from $2.70bn to $7.83bn. However, most of the flows still take
place within the Western Balkans, which accounted for 65 per cent
of the intra-regional exports and a staggering 79.4 per cent of the
intra-regional imports in 2005. Still, this did not mean that the
regional trade flows were that significant: they corresponded to 26.9
per cent of the Western Balkans total exports and 15.2 per cent of the
imports compared with 13.2 and 7.9 for post-communist South East
Europe as a whole. In the period 20005, the intra-regional chunk
of Western Balkan exports grew by 2.8 per cent and the imports by
3.2 per cent compared with 0.6 and 1.5 for the Western Balkans,
Romania and Bulgaria. The most active traders were Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Croatia
(on the side of exports) (Kathuria, 2008, pp. 368).27
The above snapshot demonstrates that, for all their political value,
the trade liberalization initiatives of the 2000s have done little to
alter the trade patterns inherited from the 1990s. What they have
also done is bolster economic ties across the territory of former

Yugoslavia (with the partial exception of trade between Serbia and
Croatia28), adding credibility to the contention that an informal
Yugosphere is being recreated. This is evidenced, inter alia, by the
high profile of Slovenia as a trade and investment powerhouse in
the Western Balkans (with the exception of Albania), a develop-
ment related to the favourable regimes established as a result of
the regions closer integration into the EU. In 2008, Slovenia was
Bosnia and Herzegovinas second most significant trade partner after
Croatia (16.8 per cent of Bosnian exports, 12.8 per cent of imports).
In 20024, half of the countrys investment outflows went to other
former Yugoslav republics (Kathuria, 2008, p. 77).
One caveat is due here. The picture of a South East Europe inte-
grated only within the confines of ex-Yugoslavia changes noticeably
if one is to include Greece in the region in focus. The country is a
leading trade partner for all its immediate neighbours to the north:
Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia. In 2008, it was the second most
important source of imports for Albania and Macedonia (12.5/12.4
per cent of the total) and third for Bulgaria (5.4 per cent). 9.9 per cent
of Bulgarian exports went to Greece (the top destination) compared
with 12.5 and 11.8 per cent for Macedonia and Albania. One should
also add Turkey, which is the third largest export market for Bulgaria
as well as a source for significant share of imports to Romania
(4.9 per cent), Albania (6.9 per cent) and Macedonia (5.6 per cent).29
Investment
Investment is a policy-area inextricably linked to trade. Lifting
trade barriers in South East Europe has been partly motivated by
the potential gains, for foreign and domestic investors, from an
enlarged marketplace home to some 55 million consumers with
a privileged access to the EU. As early as 2000, the SP (WT2) identi-
fied the development of regulatory and institutional environment as
a key area for joint action by the participating Balkan governments
and the schemes international sponsors, such as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the UK
and Austria. Cooperation was based on the Compact for Reform,
Investment, Integrity and Growth (Investment Compact) adopted
February 2000 in Skopje. A set of best practices, rather than a legally-
binding instrument, it contained a list of 587 policy measures in
ten areas, including structural reform, taxation and fiscal policy, FDI
promotion, corporate governance, competition, financial markets,
and SMEs. The process was conceived as a means of sharing experi-
ence and encouraging reform by the relevant national ministries,
not unlike the Open Method of Coordination launched within
the EU the same year. The scheme was institutionalized, in 2007,
through the SEE Investment Committee, bringing together senior
officials. Though it was notionally linked to SEECP and the Regional
Cooperation Council (RCC), the committee continued to operate
under the auspices of OECD.30
Transport
As explained by Chapter 1, the transport sector rose in importance
in the mid-1990s owing to the poor state of connections running
through South East Europe, which had been damaged further by the
conflicts, neglect and mismanagement. Because of the historical links
with external regions and countries, as well as the legacy of politi-
cal and economic fragmentation, the north-south axes were, and in
fact still remain, developed much better than the east-west vector.
In the 1990s, inadequate cross-border connections were recognized
as a major impediment to trade within the region as well as with
Western Europe; they also rendered meaningless coordinated reforms
harmonizing the transport sector legislation with international and
EU technical standards. SECI played a pioneering role in aligning
regulatory frameworks under the World Bank-sponsored Trade and
Transport Facilitation Project (TTFSE). Running between 20016 the
TTFSE helped reduce clearance time for lorries at border crossings.31
Reconstruction, upgrade and development of infrastructure were the
focal points in the strategy for post-conflict stabilization and gradual
integration into the EU, operationalized through the SP. Transport
infrastructure attracted the bulk of funds allocated by the SP donors,
as well as a hefty chunk from the total volume of financial assistance
coming to South East Europe in the wake of the Kosovo war.32 For
instance, the two funding conferences in Brussels (March 2000) and
Bucharest (October 2001) allocated nearly a4bn for 24 quick-start
and 27 near-term projects in that field.
As in other policy-areas, the EU has been the most robust driver of
regional cooperation in cross-border infrastructure development. The
European Commission co-chaired together with the World Bank the
High Level Steering Group (HSLG) overseeing the implementation of

SP projects. Even more importantly, the Union provided the frame
of reference through the so-called Pan-European Transportation
Corridors worked out at serial of ministerial involving the EU mem-
ber states and the post-communist candidate countries in Prague
(1991), Crete (1994) and Helsinki (1996).33 The process, known as
Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA), was piloted by the
European Commission as part of Agenda 2000, which was aimed at
facilitating the functional and budgetary aspects of eastern enlarge-
ment.34 As Table 4.2 below shows, a number of these corridors tra-
versed South East Europe which, in turn, stimulated cooperation at
the local level.
The TINA template also encouraged the SP recipient states in South
East Europe to link national programmes with regional priorities.
Even single-country projects, such as the highway linking Zagreb
with the port of Rijeka, were to be integrated into larger cross-border
networks. The specialized Infrastructure Steering Group, set up by the
European Commission and the World Bank, called for [the] submis-
sion by two or more countries of the region, or, in case of submission
by one country, thorough explanation about regional impact.35
However, external impetus also spurred competition, contrary to
the intentions of the Pacts patrons and the spirit of the TEN exercise.
In the 1990s, Greece launched the Via Egnatia highway (completed
in 2009), linking the port of Igoumenitsa, on the Ionian Sea, to the
border with Turkey. Backed by the US and Italy, Albania, Bulgaria
and Macedonia pledged to upgrade Corridor VIII (Black Sea and
the Adriatic), which Greek policymakers saw as a rival endeavour.36
Corridors X and IV connecting Greece and Central Europe through
Serbia and Macedonia, and through Romania and Bulgaria could also
be seen as competing.37 Occasionally, such rivalries were cushioned
through the SP: for example, the BulgarianRomanian dispute over
the location of a second Danube bridge linking the two countries. It
was through the intervention of Bodo Hombach that Vidin-Calafat,
at the westernmost section of the common border, was agreed by
the two prime ministers, Ivan Kostov and Mugur Isarescu, during the
Pacts first donor conference in March 2000, a concession to Bulgaria.38
However, neither the SP nor the HLSG could arbitrate or resolve all
similar clashes, since key players in South East Europe such as Greece
and Turkey were not present in the Pact (Lesser et al., 2000).
97
Table 4.2 Pan-European corridors and SP funding

Corridor Sections in SP quick-start projects
South East Europe
IV: Dresden/ Budapest Upgrade of the Craiova
Nremberg Istanbul Arad(1)Bucharest Turnu Severin section of
Constana Highway 6; Bucharest
(2)CraiovaSofia Cernavoda, Vidin-Calafat
Thessaloniki bridge; Electrification of the
(3) SofiaPlovdiv PlovdivSvilengrad railroad
Istanbul
V: VeniceLyv Branch B: Rijeka RijekaZagreb highway,
ZagrebBudapest Upgrade of the Croatian rail
Branch C: Ploce networks along Corridor
SarajevoOsijek Vc, Sarejevo bypass on E73,
Budapest bridge at amac (Bosnia)
VII: ViennaDanube Danube Clearance of debris near
Delta Novi Sad (Serbia)
VIII: DurrsBurgas/ Durrs Tirana Skopje bypass, Durrs port
Varna SkopjeSofia reconstruction, rehabilita-
PlovdivBurgas/Varna tion of the ElbasanLibraxh
road, rehabilitation of
the Lushnje Fier road,
FierVlor highway (branch-
ing towards Vlor, Albania),
PogradecKor
IX: Helsinki ChisinauBucharest BucharestGiurgiu road
Alexandroupolis Dimitrovgrad
Alexandroupolis
X: Salzburg SalzburgVillach Upgrade of the border
Thessaloniki LjubljanaZagreb crossing at Horgo (Serbia
BelgradeNiSkopje and Montenegro/Hungary);
Thessaloniki Upgrade of the Negotino
Branch A: Demir Kapija and Demir
Gra Maribor KapijaGevgelija sections of
Zagreb Branch B: E75 (Macedonia)
Belgrade
Novi Sad Budapest
Branch C: Ni
Sofia Corridor IV
Branch D:
Bitola Florina Via
Egnatia
Igoumenitsa
Source: www.stabilitypact.org
Much of the EU effort in the 2000s concentrated on the Western

Balkans. In October 2001, the European Commission released a
paper on road infrastructure identifying basic policies, guidelines and
principles.39 One overarching priority was to connect the Adriatic
coast of Albania, Montenegro and Croatia with the interior of the
Western Balkans, reinforcing the east-west axis.40 As in other areas,
the Commission took the drivers seat, marginalizing the SP as an
intermediary. European Investment Bank loans and grants from the
CARDS programme, succeeded in 2007 by the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), funded large projects such as the construc-
tion of new border crossings or motorways.41 For their part, the SAP
countries, urged by the EU, committed themselves to intensifying
cooperation, through the Memorandum of Understanding on the
Development of South East Europe Core Regional Transport Network
(June 2004). Beyond infrastructure (roads, railways, inland waterways,
ports, airports), the MoU concerns coordination of institutional and
policy reform in the area of transport (see Map 4.1, Core Regional
Transport Network). The CARDS regional component financed the
establishment of a South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO)
in Belgrade, tasked with providing support to the multiannual plans
implemented at the national level and, more significantly, deciding
on the relative priority of projects in need of EU funding. Starting
with a conference in Skopje (10 November 2005), the process is
steered through annual meetings of Western Balkan transport min-
isters, backed by a steering committee and various working groups
(Delevic, 2007, p. 70). The original MoU was updated in 2007 with a
new multilateral commitment backed by national multi-annual plans
for the period until 2013, corresponding to the EU budget cycle and
the operation of IPA.
There is currently an effort to institutionalize cooperation even
further. In the first half of 2008, the Slovenian Presidency of the
EU Council initiated proposals for the establishment of a Transport
Community in the Western Balkans, an entity modelled on the
pre-existing Energy Community (see below). The plan, under nego-
tiation as of November 2008, envisages regionalization through
the inclusion of the participating countries in the EUs legislative
frameworks, which would involve the early adoption of the acquis
governing the sector, with the European Commission overseeing the
process. The initiatives aim is the establishment of an integrated
market for infrastructure and land, inland waterways and maritime

transport, reflective of the true spirit of Jean Monnet, in the words
of Jacques Barrot, Vice-President in charge of transport in the first
Barroso Commission (20049).42 Yet, negotiations, scheduled to end
in late 2009, have dragged well into 2010, partly because of inter-
institutional coordination issues inside the EU and partly due to the
problem of how Kosovo should be involved in the new framework.
A similar framework has emerged in the area of air transportation.
In May 2006, the then EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania, the
Western Balkans (Kosovo included), Moldova (SP participant), and
Iceland and Norway (part of the European Economic Area) resolved
to establish a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) based on
the EUs Single Sky Agreement by 2010. Rather than launching
yet another regional forum, this initiative aims to deepen the EUs
Single Market in the area of aviation services, and to extend it to
proximate third countries. At the same time, the Commission has
been pursuing a bloc, as opposed to strictly bilateral, approach to
the post-communist countries of South East Europe.43 It is worth
Map 4.1 South East Europe: core network

Source: www.seeto.int
noting that liberalization is expected to bring tangible benefits to the

regions expanding tourist industries. Countries such as Romania,
Bulgaria and Croatia are already capitalizing on the low-cost flights
from major cities in Western Europe. As in the case of the planned
Transport Community, here regional cooperation, contingent on
internal institutional and policy reforms, is a by-product of European
integration. However, this is not a straightforward process, given the
political and institutional roadblocks. The 2009 Commission report,
for instance, found Kosovo adopting legislation that clashes with
ECAA commitments.44
Transborder waterways have also been the subject of intergov-
ernmental collaboration. In 2002, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia launched an initiative on
the Sava basin under the auspices of the SP. Transformed by the
Yugoslav disintegration into a de facto international thoroughfare,
the Sava River, together with its tributaries, account for more than
80 per cent of the water resources of the riparian states. In December
2002 their representatives, gathered in Kranjska Gora (Slovenia),
adopted a framework agreement which internationalized the Sava,
and established a navigation regime, a joint commission (not unlike
the long-standing Danube Commission) and a dispute settlement
mechanism. The commission started working in 2005 and is aided
by a permanent secretariat located in Zagreb.45
Energy
Energy has been a top priority for all countries in South East Europe,
partly because of their lack of resources and the corresponding
dependency on imports, and partly owing to the advantages of their
intermediate position between the suppliers around the Caspian Sea
and in Central Asia, and the consumers in Western Europe. Starting
from the early 1990s, governments eager to reap the economic and
security benefits have touted various schemes for the construction
of oil pipelines. Some routes have remained on paper: Burgas-Vlor
(Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia), Constanta to Omialj/Trieste
(Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Italy), and the connection of the Druzhba
pipeline with the Adria system (Hungary-Croatia). Limited resources,
technical difficulties, environmental cost and, most conspicuously,
the uncertainty of future supplies have presented serious obstacles
(Delevic, 2007, pp. 689).46 Only smaller-scale projects, such as the

pipe connecting Thessaloniki and Skopje, have been completed.
While a tripartite agreement on BurgasAlexandroupolis was signed
in Athens by Prime Ministers Kostas Karamanlis (Greece) and Sergey
Stanishev (Bulgaria) and President Vladimir Putin of Russia in March
2007, the future prospects of the project are uncertain, due to inter-
nal opposition in Bulgaria and, to a lesser degree, in Greece; also
problematic is the progress of the SamsunCeyhan pipeline, which
is located entirely in Turkish territory.
Similar to oil, gas, too, has fuelled both cooperation and competi-
tion in South East Europe.47 When, in November 2007, Gazprom
signed a deal with the Italian energy firm ENI for a gas pipeline under
the Black Sea bypassing Ukraine, which was engaged in several
political and commercial disputes with Russia Bulgaria, Greece and
Serbia hurried to jump on the bandwagon and ensure that the route
would pass through their territories. South Stream is in competition
with the Nabucco project, supported by the European Commission
and the US government, and inaugurated in July 2009 through an
intergovernmental agreement signed in Ankara by Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary and Austria. The future of both pipelines is
far from clear owing to the prohibitive costs and, similar to oil,
the uncertainty whether there will be sufficient supply of gas from
the exporters (Russia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian republics). For all
the buzz generated by grand projects worth billions of euros, regional
cooperation in the area of gas has been served best by much more
practical, lower-key, initiatives, such as the interconnection of Turkey
and Greeces networks completed in the autumn of 2007. Another
interconnector is currently under construction between Greece and
Bulgaria, while the European Commission has been drawing plans
for a Western Balkan gas ring (proposed originally in 2003 by the
Greek and Turkish public companies DEPA and BOTAS), which
involves, among other things, linking Serbias network with those of
neighbouring Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia.48 These small-step
arrangements help the diversification of gas supplies to the Balkans
and reinforce the integration of local energy markets.
Despite the political salience of oil and gas, the electricity sector has
seen the most remarkable advancement. Cooperation in that area has
been facilitated by the intra-regional complementarities. While some
have been suffering from chronic shortages (the Western Balkans,
Turkey, Greece), others, like Bulgaria (up until the closure of Units
3 and 4 of the Kozloduy Power Plant in 2007) and Romania, have
excess capacity due to the rapid deindustrialization after the fall of
communism. Until 2003, however, the two countries were not part
of the Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity
(UCTE), which brings together the EU member states.49 Serbia
and Montenegro and Macedonia, though applying the UCTE techni-
cal standards, were disconnected from the grid in the early 1990s.50
Many national grids in the Balkans were not interconnected, while
the 1990s severely damaged the transmission infrastructure in Eastern
Croatia and Bosnia. As a result, the SP tabled the connection between
Albania and Montenegro and between Bulgaria and Macedonia as
a priority, while SECI negotiated in 2001 a regional memorandum
on grid connectivity. In the 2009 regular reports, the European
Commission notes that several 400kV transmission lines have either
been completed (Gjueshevo [Bulgaria]Deve Bair [Macedonia] and
Ni- Leskovac [south Serbia, to be extended to Skopje] or are under
construction (Elbasan [Albania]Podgorica [Montenegro]).
Balkan governments made some early steps towards integration.
In SeptemberOctober 1995, the Albanian, Bulgarian, FR Yugoslav,
Greek and Macedonian authorities carried out a successful test for
a synchronous connection of national grids. In 1999, energy minis-
ters (excluding Croatia and Turkey) set 2006 as a target date for the
launch of a regional market.51 From that point onwards, the European
Commission (DG Transport and Energy), which had originally devel-
oped the plan derived from the intra-EU energy liberalization initia-
tives assumed leadership (Renner, 2009, p. 9). It set an expert body
bringing together representatives from assorted IFIs and governments
(US, Italy, Switzerland and Greece).52 Consultations yielded a detailed
technical design of the scheme which was endorsed by SEECP energy
ministers.53
In November 2002, the EU, Western Balkans (including UNMIK/
Kosovo), Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey signed in Athens a MoU,
pledging to open retail markets to operators from the other partici-
pating countries by January 2005, by implementing the EU Electricity
Directive (96/92/EC).54 This would involve the set-up of independent
national regulators, the unbundling of vertically integrated national
electricity companies, and the establishment of a transmission and
distribution system accessible to multiple market players.
The memorandum prepared the ground for the South East European
Regulatory Forum, a regulatory body with partial dispute-settlement
powers. Modelled on the so-called Florence Forum within the EU,
the body represented national regulators, and was chaired by the
Commission, and the country holding the rotating presidency, of
what came to be known as the Athens process. In December 2003,
energy ministers adopted another memorandum extending the same
framework to gas, in line with Council Directive 2003/55/EC.55
The Commission pushed for further institutionalization, through
the Energy Community Treaty signed in Athens in October 2005, by
the European Community, Bulgaria, Romania, the Western Balkan
governments (including UNMIK/Kosovo), and coming into effect in
July 2006 (Renner, 2009, p. 11). When Bulgaria and Romania entered
the Union in 2007 their status changed from Contracting Parties
to the treaty, to Participants (currently, a group of 14 EU member
states). Turkey chose to stay out of the treaty, preferring to delay
harmonization with the acquis to a future point in its membership
negotiations (Renner, 2009).
The Energy Communitys organizational structure copies that of
corresponding bodies within the EU itself. The bulk of the work is
carried out by a permanent secretariat in Vienna, with the EU budget
covering 98 per cent of the operational cost not unlike the CEFTA
2006 secretariat in the first year of its existence.56 A ministerial coun-
cil monitors its activities, aided by a permanent high-level group
of senior officials. A Regulatory Board brings together representa-
tives of the national regulatory authorities, much like the European
Regulators Group for electricity and gas (ERGEG).57 There are also
four issue-specific fora: electricity (going back to the 2002 memoran-
dum), gas (established with the 2005 treaty), social impact of energy
reform (October 2007), and oil (December 2008).58 Notionally, this
intergovernmental framework interacts with (semi-) indigenous insti-
tutions such as SEECP and RCC.59 As early as 2001, SEECP called for
regional ownership in the process; but it has always been clear that
the European Commissions role remains indispensable.60 This has to
do with the variable willingness and capacity of participating coun-
tries to implement the institutional and regulatory reforms listed in
the Athens Treaty and its annexes, which, in turn, highlights exter-
nal anchors. In October 2009, the European Commission found that
within the Western Balkans only Croatia had aligned its legislation to
a sufficient degree.61 Disputes between governments and private sec-

tor firms benefiting from liberalization and privatization of the elec-
tricity sector for example, the Austrian EVN and the Macedonian
authorities in 2009 have shown that progress is difficult. There are
multiple outstanding problems concerning continued cross-subsidies,
the lack of reliable statistical data, weak domestic enforcement, politi-
cal interference in pricing tariffs, and so on.
All in all, the Energy Community is an example of the EUs
piecemeal export of its legislation and institutional templates to a
geographical area drawn into its orbit; this is sometimes described
by the term external governance. It is a de facto extension of the
Unions policies in the Western Balkans, though other countries cur-
rently engaged in accession negotiations (Turkey), aspiring to deepen
relations with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) or already part
of advanced institutional arrangements (Norway in the European
Economic Area) are also involved as observers. Moldova and Ukraine
joined the Community in 2010 as a way to enhance energy security
a sensitive issue, given the continual spat between Kyiv and Russias
Gazprom and advance their integration with the EU.62
Explaining and understanding functional cooperation
The overview of various functional issue-areas largely confirms the

initial hypothesis emphasizing external push as a primary causal
factor. Sectoral cooperation intensified and expanded in scope after
1999, and particularly after the collapse of the Miloevic regime in
October 2000. The incentives put forward by external actors, prin-
cipally the EU but also IFIs and the US, account for the advances in
regional cooperation during the decade that followed. The leading
role of the Union is demonstrated by the variable degree of institu-
tionalization across policy-areas. As shown in Table 4.3, below, the
level of EU engagement in terms of political and financial resources
as well as the provision of legal standards which in itself is contin-
gent on the degree of integration inside the Union correlates with
the deepening of the schemes at hand.
In addition, as the case of trade liberalization suggests, the presence
of the EU as an external anchor accounts for the transition from bilat-
eral to multilateral arrangements. Finally, the variance in institutional
links with the EU dictated the format and membership in most sectoral
Table 4.3 Functional cooperation a cross-sector comparison
Outcome Degree of Input by Intensity Local
institutionalization extra-regional of EU demand for
actors involvement cooperation
Trade Bilateral FTAs, CEFTA 2006 High SAP conditionality, High Medium
policy coordination,
funding, political
pressure
Investment Set of best practices, Medium Funding, policy coor- Low Low
intergovernmental dialogue dination
Road Political framework, High Funding, policy High Medium
transport Transport Community under coordination, legal
negotiation standards
(EU acquis)
Aviation Common Aviation Area High Funding, policy High Medium
coordination, legal
standards (EU acquis)
Transborder Sava Commission High Funding, policy coor- High High
waterways international regime dination
Oil Intergovernmental Low Mediation, funding, Low High
agreements, joint companies, political pressure
policy dialogue (Russia)
Gas Intergovernmental agree- Low Funding, mediation, Medium High
ments, joint companies, political pressure
Energy Community
Electricity Intergovernmental agree- High Funding, policy High High
105
ment, Energy Community coordination, legal
standards (EU acquis)
initiatives. After 2007, multilateral cooperation was narrowed to the

Western Balkans, leaving Bulgaria and Romania incoming members
of the EU aside. Turkey and Greece, though actively involved in
Balkan affairs, are not directly implicated in cooperation on trade,
investment and transport, which are strictly limited to the EU member-
ship candidates and potential candidates in the Western Balkans.
In none of the cases has functional interdependence at the
regional level directly induced governments to independently
deepen and multilateralize cooperation. What interdependence,
hence intra-regional demand for integration, has done is to condi-
tion a more favourable local response to initiatives coming from the
EU and the IFIs. Balkan governments dragged their feet when nego-
tiating trade liberalization with neighbours, preferring an ad hoc,
bilateral approach. Thinking counterfactually, and assuming the EU
gravity pole was absent, one would expect the presence of a much
patchier regime based on neighbour-to-neighbour deals, which was
more or less the state of affairs in the 1990s. By contrast, local states
have embraced integration of electricity markets, the establishment
of common rules on aviation, or joint road infrastructure planning
as a way to accrue direct economic benefits through opening to the
region.
The dynamics of functional cooperation, therefore, is largely a
reflection of the incentives presented to South East Europe by exter-
nal players. This leaves little room to employing identity, as discussed
in Chapter 3, as a fully-fledged explanatory factor. To the extent that
it matters, it does so only in the negative sense: by making states
unwilling to engage with other states they wish to dissociate from.
Thus, Slovenia and Croatia chose to stay outside SECI in the 1990s
while President Franjo Tudman, in January 1997, went as far as pro-
posing a constitutional amendment prohibiting Croatia from taking
part in schemes that could resurrect former Yugoslavia (Vukadinovic,
2000; Vranyczany-Dobrinovic, 1997).63
Yet things look different if one shifts the mode of enquiry from
causal to interpretative analysis. Beyond its material implications,
functional cooperation at the regional level has had an intrinsic sym-
bolic value in terms of bringing Balkan states closer to the European
mainstream, through the replication of core EU norms and practices.
This link has been evident, inter alia, through the choice of institu-
tional shells for organizing cooperation. For instance, Croatia opted
for CEFTA because of its already established status of an antechamber

for EU membership evident in the cases of the Visegrd quartet,
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania (Dangerfield, 2000, 2006). In addi-
tion, governments that were sceptical about the value of Balkan
integration and prioritizing relations with the EU, have still found
it difficult to avoid regional entanglements that are seen as a test
of commitment to European ways. This was clearly the case of the
Romanian, and especially the Bulgarian, governments at the time the
SP was launched,64 as well as that of Croatia under both Ivica Racans
centre-left administration (20004) and the revamped HDZ.
While the conclusion and implementation of CEFTA 2006 has
sought to reproduce the Central European experience in the
Western Balkans, the new generation of schemes such as the Energy
Community, the ECAA, and the projected Transport Community add
a novel dimension of regionalism on the edges of the EU. In essence,
they are an extension of policies and regimes that function inside the
Union. Participation in those, formally regional, initiatives amounts
to early inclusion in the EUs functional space. From the perspec-
tive of the European Commission, it extends benefits to countries
for whom membership is only a long-term perspective (all Western
Balkan countries with the exception of Croatia and, to a lesser
degree, Turkey). However, the package on offer is not very generous,
especially in light of the financial and political costs of early imple-
mentation of onerous legislation (for example, unbundling of energy
monopolies). Benefits are often asymmetric. Thus the Transport
Community, currently under negotiation, will, in effect, open the
markets of Western Balkan to operators from the EU member states,
while restricting local firms rights to offer transport services inside
the Union because of potential low-cost competition. Local govern-
ments have subscribed to the treaty owing to the symbolic reward of
inclusion in a policy steered by Brussels and keeping integrations
momentum. This is particularly valuable at a time when enlargement
is perceived to be slowing down.65 Thus, the identity-political dimen-
sion of regional cooperation, orchestrated by the EU, trickles down
even in unlikely technical areas.
5
Defusing the Powderkeg: Security
Cooperation
Even if the rhetoric of cooperation emphasizes the economic dimen-

sion, security issues have always played a paramount role in South
East Europe. Suffice to note, yet again, that reconstruction and
integration have been conceived as instruments of stabilization in
the wake of conflicts and external interventions in ex-Yugoslavia.
However, the notion of security itself has evolved over time. In the
early 1990s, the key challenge was managing territorial conflict
between states and ethnic groups fuelled by historical animosities.
In the following decade, attention shifted to the dysfunctionality of
state institutions and the resultant deficits concerning the rule of law,
both domestically and across borders. From mitigating political ten-
sions through multilateral security arrangements, reconciliation and
economic interdependence, the focus of cooperation has shifted to
tackling transnational crime and corruption. As Chapter 1 explained,
the legacy of the Yugoslav wars has been a new set of threats, going
well beyond military security, stemming from state weakness.1
The intertwined security of the region, especially in what Eurospeak
calls Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), has created demand for policy
coordination, but also obstacles for the development of multilateral
responses in the region. Cooperation has been stymied by the diver-
gence of interests, limited resources and institutional capacity at the
regional and national level, and the entrenchment of domestic veto
players. However, after the Kosovo war, regional schemes in this
policy-area expanded in terms of issue-coverage and participants.
Though challenges persist to this day, especially in Western Balkan
hotspots such as Kosovo and Bosnia, the proliferation of multilateral
108
Defusing the Powderkeg 109
frameworks testifies that the countries of South East Europe have

gradually adopted a shared outlook and are now contributing to
regional stability.
What accounts for this shift from competition to cooperation: the
push from external actors such as NATO, EU and OSCE? the com-
mon transnational threats faced by Balkan societies and states? the
desire to redefine the regions identity as an integral part of the Euro-
Atlantic island of stability? Looking at the evolution of security coop-
eration, this chapter argues that regional institutions and initiatives
have emerged as part of individual and collective effort to integrate
into NATO and the EU. External push explains the multilateraliza-
tion of security policy, but to understand fully its impact one must
take into account the desire of local countries and governments to
cast off the negative image that stuck to them in the 1990s. Taking
up the burden of collectively managing Balkan stability, has played a
secondary role in the motivation of regional actors, who are reliant
more often than not on external anchors.
The chapter begins with an overview of the arms control and
confidence-building arrangements that were put in place in the
early and mid-1990s. It then examines the institutionalization of
politico-military cooperation under the tutelage of NATO and the
US, primarily through the South East European Defence Ministerial
(SEDM) process. Finally, it discusses various schemes and initiatives
in the field of judicial and law enforcement cooperation or, broadly
speaking, soft security.
First steps in cooperative security after the Cold War
The end of the Cold War and the ensuing disintegration of

Yugoslavia were the two events that shaped the Balkans in the 1990s.
Coupled with older conflicts in the vicinity, such as the longstand-
ing GreekTurkish tensions, the Yugoslav crisis raised the spectre of a
larger regional conflict in South East Europe. Post-Cold-War instabil-
ity aside, the end of the bipolar contest also had a positive effect on
the region, owing to developments at the European level. The 1990
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), adopted within the
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), set arma-
ment ceilings which also applied to the Balkans.2 In addition, the
CSCEs Vienna documents of 1992 and 1994 envisaged a number
of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), including

advance warning prior to military exercises, regular external moni-
toring and evaluation visits, and on-site inspections. The CSCE/OSCE
regime improved security relations between neighbouring countries.
In 19912, for example, Bulgaria and Turkey signed two agreements
that led to, among other things, the withdrawal of substantial
military units deployed along the border areas in Thrace. Bulgaria
concluded similar agreements applying the Vienna standards, and
sometimes going beyond them, with Greece, Romania (December
1995), and Albania; Turkey did the same with Albania (July 1992)
and Macedonia.3
Despite the positive trend set by the CFE and the bilateral CSBMs,
their impact on wider South East Europe was limited. For some
observers, CFE cemented already existing imbalances and exacer-
bated the military inferiority of the former Warsaw Pact countries
(Bulgaria and Romania) in relation to Turkey and Greece (Tsipis,
1996; Tsakonas, 1999). Greece itself saw the danger that the CFE
imposed quantitative, but not qualitative limits on Turkey, allow-
ing the latter the strategic advantage of modernizing its arsenals. In
addition, rump Yugoslavia, expelled from OSCE in July 1992, was
not part of the agreements, while it maintained one of the strongest
militaries in the Balkans. Understandably, that was a cause of con-
cern for all neighbours (Hirschfeld, 1994, p. 171). Conflict-ravaged
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not part of OSCE either, and only the
Dayton settlement led to the introduction of CSBMs between the
forces of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. On
14 June 1996, the two entities signed, together with FR Yugoslavia
and Croatia, an Agreement on Subregional Arms Control under the
auspices of the OSCE. Implementing the Dayton Accord, and in line
with the CFE, it reduced the number of troops and armaments in the
three countries and established an intergovernmental commission in
charge of monitoring.4 Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania remained
outside CFE, though their military weakness and peaceful foreign
policy ruled out any negative fallout.
The gap in collective security provision was clearly a concern for
the external powers involved in the pacification of the Balkans.
The Dayton Agreement envisioned arms control negotiations in
and around former Yugoslavia, but such talks never followed on
a multilateral basis. While Balkan foreign ministers referred to a
regional system of CSBMs in the final communiqus of the Sofia

and Thessaloniki conferences (SEECP), in 1996 and 1997, there were
no follow-up steps. Arms reduction talks were impossible as long as
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece refused to disarm to levels lower than
the ones under CFE, which in turn made it impossible for a Balkan-
specific regime to emerge parallel to the OSCE framework (Centre for
Liberal Strategies, 1997, pp. 336).5
A genuinely multilateral body dealing with arms control and
CSBMs was established only with the EU-initiated Stability Pact. In
October 2000, the SP launched in Regional Arms Control Verification
and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACIVAC) located near
Zagreb. Like all other SP projects, the centre relied exclusively on
contributions from donors, notably Germany, which concluded, in
September 2002, a bilateral agreement with Croatia providing the
legal basis of the centre. It was initially placed under the chapeau of
OSCE and also brought in extra-regional states as associate mem-
bers.6 As of 2008, RACIVAC was transferred to regional ownership
with local participants (essentially the SEECP membership, includ-
ing the Western Balkans, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey and
Moldova) financing its core operational costs and contributing staff
(including the Director), while donors from the associated countries
fund individual projects. RACIVAC has made a contribution to a
regional security, though its main area of activity is training defence
and security-sector experts through courses, workshop, seminars and
other joint activities.7
Towards a multilateral security regime
The South East European Defence Ministerial

It was thanks to the Clinton administration that cooperation in security
and defence matters was advanced and institutionalized. As Washington
viewed the Balkans as an inter-connected complex, it sought to supple-
ment NATOs peacekeeping effort in Bosnia with a multilateral frame-
work. US leverage was bolstered by the involvement of a number of
Balkan countries in the PfP, and their aspiration to join NATO, where
Greece and Turkey had been members since the early 1950s.
In March 1996, US Secretary of Defence William Perry proposed
the South East European Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process at a
conference in Tirana attended by his counterparts from Albania,
Turkey, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Italy. The choice of venue was not
accidental; Albania had proved a valuable ally during the Bosnian
war and showed restraint in its policy towards Macedonia and FR
Yugoslavia, both of which were home to sizeable Albanian minori-
ties.8 The American scheme raised a great deal of anxiety at first.
Displeased by the absence of Romania and FR Yugoslavia, the Greek
Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis squarely turned down the
invitation to attend the talks.9 His Bulgarian colleagues decision to
come was reluctant, and he was quick to point out that Russia would
have to be part of subsequent gatherings.10 At the time, Greece and
Bulgaria were preparing a conference of Balkan foreign ministers,
after a six-year hiatus, which they saw as the forum in which to dis-
cuss regional security.
The second defence ministerial (3 October 1997, Sofia) saw
Bulgarias new pro-NATO government backing fully the American
initiative. Russia was not invited, as Bulgarian authorities argued that
it was neither a South East European nor a NATO candidate country.
This caused a diplomatic fracas, culminating in a Russian protest
note to Bulgaria; but the US stood by Prime Minister Kostovs deci-
sion.11 The conference agreed on the membership of the new forum:
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania (PfP partners), Greece,
Turkey and Italy (NATO members) became full participants, while
the US and Slovenia chose to remain observers. The conspicuous
absence of FR Yugoslavia spurred a wave of press speculation on the
initiatives underlying objectives.12 Greece objected to what it saw
as the creation of new division lines in the Balkans, and its defence
minister, Akis Tzohadzopoulos, advocated the establishment of a
Balkan Security Council to manage regional affairs from within. In
all fairness, the PfP criterion excluded two further countries, Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Thus, from the very start, SEDM was not merely an intra-Balkan
security arrangement but an instrument of US and NATO policy.
This understanding was accepted by the PfP governments, who
underscored that the road to regional stability passed through inclu-
sion in the Euro-Atlantic structures, with SEDM perceived as a step-
ping-stone to NATO. Despite their commitment to Dayton, rump
Yugoslavia and Croatia were still mavericks, due to the authoritarian
politics of Slobodan Miloevic and Franjo Tudman. Bosnia, on the
other hand, still had no unified military or defence ministry. SEDMs
restrictive approach, premised on institutional links to NATO, was

in contrast with the inclusiveness of other political fora, such as the
South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP, see Chapter 6).
It was also at odds with the policy of re-engaging FR Yugoslavia
in regional dialogue. Aware of the dual risk of either isolating or
over-accommodating Belgrade, Bulgaria proposed a comprehensive
regional defence conference in the future (presumably under SEECP),
while SEDM was to keep its separate identity.
Despite its link to NATO, SEDM was still seen as a Balkan institu-
tion. This was why Janez Drnoveks government came under fire in
Slovenia for attending the Sofia ministerial. There was the perception
that the country risked being dragged back into the Balkans after
the hard-won emancipation from Yugoslavia. The defence minister
pointed out, in response, that SEDM would undoubtedly increase
Slovenias chances to join NATO in the second wave of expansion.
He added that although not belonging to South East Europe, the
country participated as a role model for that region.13 The observer
status was a compromise solution catering both to Slovenias identity
concerns and to its desire to be firmly on the NATO bandwagon.
The Sofia ministerial also defined the SEDMs area of activity. US
Defence Secretary William Cohen highlighted priorities such as mili-
tary personnel training and exchange, the PfP exercises, and assist-
ance in restructuring the Soviet-style armed forces in the individual
Balkan partners to make them interoperable with NATO. He also
envisaged a regional arms control agreement featuring CSBMs and
arms reductions.14 Participants agreed to hold regular meetings of
ministers and chiefs of staff, exchange personnel and data, participate
in joint exercises, and discuss the creation of a regional crisis preven-
tion council. More substantially, the delegates accepted Turkeys pro-
posal to establish a regional unit along the lines of NATOs Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF) template, which had already been applied by
the Baltic Battalion formed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well
as an ItalianHungarianSlovenian joint force. The unit could be
involved in UN or OSCE-mandated peacekeeping similar to NATOs
IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Multinational Peace Force for South East Europe (MPFSEE)

During the Sofia ministerial, a senior US defence official accompany-
ing Cohen characterized the SEDM mission in the following way: on
the one hand, including these countries more in Western institutions,

including involvement with NATO, and two, ensuring that they work
together better than historically they have.15 Negotiations around
the Balkan peacekeeping force proved that the second goal was not
easy to attain, as attitudes and expectations diverged. Some SEDM
members, such as Bulgaria, tended to see military cooperation as a way
for achieving greater degree of interoperability with NATO, and they
opposed quick deployments in areas like Bosnia, which was Turkeys
original idea. In addition, Bulgaria argued that future missions should
not be limited to the Balkans, and the force should participate in
the widest possible range of PfP activities to bring it fully into NATO
structures.
Choosing a name turned out to be almost as contentious. Bulgaria
insisted on the label South East European arguing that the alterna-
tive Balkans was laden with too many negative connotations yet
another evidence of the salience of symbolic politics. For his part,
Macedonias Minister of Defence Lazar Kitanovski objected to the
standard designation of rapid reaction or rapid deployment force
on the grounds that it could justify unwelcome interference of
one member state into another, reflecting Macedonias concerns
about its neighbours perceived irredentist designs.16 The end result,
Multinational Peace Force for South East Europe (MPFSEE), was
therefore a compromise reflecting the regional states apprehensions
(Angelov, 1999, pp. 568).
Agreeing on the units HQ proved an even more serious hurdle, as
nearly all SEDM participants put forward rival bids. Turkey wanted
the MPFSEE to be stationed in Edirne, adjacent to its borders with
Bulgaria and Greece. Greece itself preferred Kilkis, north from
Thessaloniki and close to Macedonia and Bulgaria.17 Bulgaria lobbied
for Plovdiv pointing at the citys location in the centre of the Balkans.
Hosting the force was of significance, given that the MPFSEE was por-
trayed as a key step in debalkanizing the conflict-prone South East
Europe, and many governments were keen to take credit.
GreekTurkish antagonism was also at play. From very early on,
Turkeys active involvement in SEDM was being monitored warily
by Athens. Ankaras insistence on hosting expert negotiations on the
MPFSEE led to allegations that its real goal was to marginalize Greece.
This had implications for the choice of HQ too. Although Turkey
could claim ownership of the initiative, it was conceivable that
Greece would lose interest and not send a contingent to the MPFSEE,
should the Turkish town of Edirne were chosen. At the end of the day,
the Bulgarian bid was seen as a GreekTurkish compromise, with key
stakeholders as the US and Italy, and ultimately Greece too, ripening
to the idea that a PfP country, rather than a NATO member, should
be the first host.18 Turkey finally acquiesced in April 1998, during a
meeting between Prime Ministers Ivan Kostov and Mesut Ylmaz.
Ylmaz declared Turkeys support for Plovdiv, while Kostov backed
Turkeys bid for a non-permanent place at the UN Security Council in
20001.19 As a result, Plovdiv was approved for a period of four years,
upon which the force would move to Romania, Turkey and Greece.
Turkey provided the forces commander, Brigadier General Hilmi
Zorlu, later in charge of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.20 Greece
obtained the chairmanship of SEDM and the MPFSEE Politico-
Military Steering Committee for a two-year term. Another gesture to
Greece concerned the official labelling of participating countries as
Nation 1, 2, 3 and so forth (in alphabetical order). Macedonia figures
as Nation 5 in order to avoid complications regarding the name dis-
pute with Athens.
The intergovernmental agreement on the MPFSEE was formally
signed by SEDM members (US and Slovenia stayed out but promised
to contribute military personnel) during the third ministerial held
in Skopje (26 September 1998). Despite the obligatory champagne,
the tone was understandably far from optimistic, given the escalat-
ing violence between the KLA and Serb forces across the border with
Kosovo. William Cohen remarked that the MPFSEE agreement was
bringing security and stability to the region where many people
would rather dig fresh graves than bury old hatreds.21
A rare example of a Balkan multilateral treaty, the agreement con-
tained political and military-technical clauses.22 Outlining regional
stability and interoperability with NATO as its goals, it defined the
MPFSEEs mission as participation in conflict prevention, peacekeep-
ing, peacemaking, and humanitarian operations under NATO, WEU,
OSCE and the UN.23 Decisions to deploy the MPFSEE were to be
taken by unanimity on a case-by-case basis, and each participating
country could specify its own contribution. The link with NATO was
paramount: the force had to operate in line with and supportive
of PfP programmes, within the spirit of the partnership, while all
PfP agreements were recognized as, mutatis mutandis, applicable.24
Importantly, Article 2 made it clear that the force did not imply
the formation of a military alliance against any country, which was
clearly a message to FR Yugoslavia, while the treaty was open to other
NATO/PfP states from the region (see Table 5.1 below).
Although its HQ opened in August 1999, and the first exercise
was conducted in September 2000 at the Koren military polygon
near Haskovo (Bulgaria), it took a long time before the MPFSEE was
activated. Although the US pressed for deployment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina or UNMIK-administered Kosovo, regional governments
were not forthcoming.29 They set 31 December 2000 as a target date
to render the unit operational but were cautious about its future mis-
sions. While the incoming administration of George W. Bush insisted
on the Balkan partners shouldering at least a part of the interna-
tional communitys peacekeeping responsibilities, the latter dragged
Table 5.1 SEDM/MPFSEE in facts and figures

Political components
Committee of foreign Decision on participation in peacekeeping
ministers operations.
Committee of defence Meets annually to review the initiative and
ministers discuss political and military issues.25
Committee of chiefs of staff Discusses military-technical issues and has
advisory functions.
Politico-Military Steering Meets twice a year. Makes proposals for
Committee deployment to the foreign ministers.
Rotating presidents: Greece (19992001),
Romania (200103), Turkey (200305),
Albania (200507), Macedonia (200709),
Bulgaria (200911)
Military components
Military command 6 officers from the participating countries
South East European Brigade headed by brigadier general, convening
(SEEBRIG) during joint activities; nucleus staff based in
the HQ.27
Engineer Task Force26 11 mechanized and 3 light infantry
companies (30004000 troops) stationed in
the respective home countries. The brigade
is assembled only during joint exercises.28
their feet. As this line was enunciated by Defence Secretary Donald

Rumsfeld at the Antalya ministerial (20 December 2001), it provoked
concern that the US was disengaging from the Balkans.30 Non-NATO
members considered that the MPFSEEs most important function was
to advance their relationship with the Alliance, rather than to take
ownership of regional stability (Bourantonis and Tsakonas, 2003,
pp. 789).
The conflict between the Skopje government and the guerrillas
of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army in 2001 tested
the limits of the MPFSEE. An extraordinary SEDM session was con-
vened in Skopje on 5 April to discuss possible collective responses.
According to reports, talks revolved a Bulgarian-Greek initiative to
deploy the MPFSEE/SEEBRIG in Macedonia, either independently
or as an adjunct to the Kosovo-based KFOR. The proposal resulted
from consultations between the two countries defence ministers,
followed by a visit by Prime Minister Kostov to Athens on 23
April.31 The MPFSEE military command reacted positively: on 4 April,
General Zorlu declared that the brigade was prepared to patrol the
border between Macedonia and Kosovo, yet adamantly ruled out any
engagement in the ongoing hostilities.32 The BulgarianGreek initia-
tive was, vetoed, however, by Albania whose deputy defence minister
opposed any SEDM involvement in either Kosovo or Macedonia,
arguing that NATO should remain in charge.33 This stance was
informed by suspicions that Bulgaria and Greece were biased in
favour of the Georgievski government in Skopje. Both countries
had supplied armaments to the Macedonian forces, while President
Petar Stoyanov had also spoken about sending a Bulgarian military
contingent to the conflict zone. To Albania, the SEDM option fuelled
further the crisis and, as a result, the deployment of the MPFSEE/
SEEBRIG was off the agenda.
Despite the political bickering, progress was made on the military-
technical front. In May 2001, the SEDM notified the UN, OSCE and
EU that the MPFSEE/SEEBRIG was prepared to take part in peace sup-
port operations. Parts of the Balkan brigade had already conducting
annual exercises and participated in NATO/PfP activities. In October
2002, several weeks before NATOs Prague Summit to decide on
enlargement, the Romanian SEDM chairmanship presented to the
Alliance a force package proposal of the MPFSEE capabilities available,
as well as a deployment timeframe, which was subsequently ratified
by the seventh SEDM conference (Rome, 11 December 2002).34 These

bold declarations, however, did not wholly correspond to the situa-
tion on the ground. The MPFSEE lacked, at that point, a fully func-
tioning communication and information system for two out of the
four HQ command posts located in different participating countries.
More importantly, the SEDM states were slow to allocate sufficient
funds for SEEBRIG to participate, even on short-term basis, in peace
operations.35 Several years passed before the force was judged fit to
be sent on a mission by the NATO Joint Force Command in Naples
in 2004. It was only in FebruaryAugust 2006, that the brigades
HQ, together with a Staff and a Signal Companies (350 troops), was
deployed in Kabul as part of NATOs ISAF operation. Though no
mean achievement for the Balkan unit, this is the only operational
deployment to date, while SEEBRIGs most important undertak-
ing remain the yearly exercises which are presently coordinated by
Turkey, as host of the HQ in 200711.
SEDM enlarged and deepened

SEDM enlarged towards the Western Balkans but also in the former
Soviet Union. After it joined the PfP and SEDM in 2000, Croatia
became an observer in the MPFSEE.36 When Serbia, Montenegro and
Bosnia and Herzegovina acceded to the PfP at NATOs Riga Summit
in November 2006, they all joined SEDM as observers, rendering
the institution truly regional in coverage. Serbia and Montenegro
were subsequently upgraded into full membership in 2010. Further
expansion brought in NATO hopefuls like post-Orange-Revolution
Ukraine, which became part of SEDM in December 2005, at the first
ministerial to be held in Washington. In recognition of its role, Kyiv
hosted a ministerial in October 2007. Georgia and Moldova continue
to attend as observers. All these new members therefore participate in
the political leg of the institution, but not in the military one. Still,
what is very visible is that SEDM has become, over time, a regional
antechamber of NATO adding a more advanced and multilateralized
dimension to the PfP.
SEDM has also declared its intention to expand in scope. Beyond
the MPFSEE, it currently runs several projects in fields; these include
border security and non-proliferation, a simulation network, military
education, research and technology, and interconnection of military
hospitals. Security experts such as Jeffrey Simon, of the US National
Defence University, have proposed that it should branch out into

matters of intelligence and policing, and also engage in aiding secu-
rity-sector reform at the domestic level (Simon, 2007, pp. 1401).
This would certainly raise questions about division of labour with
other regional schemes dealing with these issues, notably SECI (more
of which below). Such questions already arise with respect to the
EUs own Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which already has a
Balkan dimension thanks to the 1,500-strong battle-group, launched
by Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus (HELBROC) in July 2007
(with Slovenia joining subsequently).
All in all, SEDM and the MPFSEE/SEEBRIG started as prime exam-
ples of rhetorical or showcase regionalism. Politically, the MPFSEE
had considerable symbolic value as evidence of the Balkans shift
from rivalry to cooperative security. During the 1998 Skopje minis-
terial, William Cohen hailed the MPFSEE agreement as historic and
heralding a new era for South East Europe.37 The forums contribu-
tion to peacekeeping in the region is secondary at best, as proven
by its deployment in Kabul rather than Kosovo. Its chief function
has been to assist the PfP militaries implement NATO standards by
various means and the development of technical projects, all under
US tutelage. As an extension of NATO and Washingtons policy of
alliance-building in post-communist Europe, SEDM has proven a
magnet for other countries further afield, for example, Ukraine.
While this eastward turn dilutes the Balkan colouring of the scheme,
it underscores its embeddedness in the Western strategy of projecting
stability across Europes periphery.
Security and defence cooperation within EAPC

SEDMs activities have been running parallel to other NATO-driven
schemes inside the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). SEDM
countries launched the South East Europe Security Cooperation
Steering Group (SEEGROUP) when they met on the margins of the
Stability Pact Working Table 3 (WT3) meeting in Sofia (October
2000). Part of the reason was that the SP had turned out to be a dis-
appointment when it came to defence cooperation, since it allocated
little attention or funds in the area. SEEGROUP was embraced by
Bosnia and Herzegovina, still not part of the PfP and, after May 2001,
by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Noev, 2002). It drew support
from NATO countries (US, UK, Italy, Greece, and Norway) as well as
from Austria and Switzerland, all of whom joined as full members.

Its key achievement was the South East Europe Common Assessment
Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP),
a joint strategic document adopted in Budapest in May 2001. The
paper articulated a common security vision of the region, identifying
common threats: notably the weakness of institutions and the spread
of transnational crime.38 The paper put it clearly that no South East
European state saw its neighbours as posing a military threat, a sig-
nificant statement given the Balkans recent and more distant his-
tory. In addition, the participating governments highlighted a set of
risks necessitating joint responses.
This shared vision of Balkan security, however, was not a sufficient
reason to pursue region-specific cooperation arrangements. SEECAP
focused on Euro-Atlantic integration as the optimal way to tackle
risks. Institutionalized at the ambassadorial level in 2005, SEEGROUP
was conceived as an upgrade of NATOs South East Europe Initiative
(SEEI) that had already been running for a number of years (see
Chapter 2). The release of SEECAP helped the group launch, from
2001 onwards, various projects in assorted areas such as a compara-
tive study of defence policies, crisis management, border security
management, civil-military relations, security-sector reforms, fight-
ing terrorism and defence planning (cf. Pop, 2003, pp. 1189). With
the inclusion of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the PfP (and SEDM), however, SEEGROUP lost a great deal of its raison
dtre as a bridge between those three countries and NATO. Its role as
a regional framework also overlaps with the activities of the Regional
Cooperation Council (RCC) which sponsored, in 20089, multilat-
eral dialogue by ministries of defence in South East Europe.39
The new security agenda in the Balkans
The turn towards JHA

The launch of the SP in 1999 added new dimensions of security
cooperation in South East Europe. The NATO framework remained
the principal institutional anchor for initiatives in fields such as
defence, peacekeeping operations and so forth. But the EU and the
other backers of the Pact perceived a need to address issues like
corruption, trans-border crime, illegal trafficking, and migration
management all of which had become prominent in the region,
and had spilled over into Western Europe (see Chapter 1).40 The SPs
WT3 featured a subtable on JHA reflecting the assumption that many
challenges had to be tackled at the regional level. Due to Serbias
central position in the region, a truly Balkan set of initiatives became
possible only after Slobodan Miloevics ouster in October 2000.
The Zagreb Summit (November 2000) launched a joint EU-Western
Balkans consultative body on JHA and earmarked CARDS funds for
projects in that policy-area.
The SP initiated an expert-level forum on organized crime (SPOC)
coordinated by Austria, a country concerned about the issue owing
to its location close to the Western Balkans. SPOC was a peer-review
mechanism, which oversaw the transposition into domestic leg-
islation of international instruments such as the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, as well as its two additional
protocols on human trafficking and illegal migration.41 There was a
perceptible duplication with the tasks assigned to the US-supported
SECI. In May 1999, SECI members Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and
Turkey signed an agreement to open regional centre on cross-border
crime in Bucharest. Opened in 2001 and housed in the massive
Casa Popurului (alongside the countrys Chamber of Deputies and
other institutions), the centres task has been to help the exchange
of information among 15 liaison officers seconded by participating
interior ministries and customs authorities. Their work is supported
by a number of issue-specific taskforces as well as by a Prosecutors
Advisory Group (SEEPAG) based in Belgrade.42 While the centre
scored practical results,43 initial assessments indicated that participat-
ing countries commitment was limited, especially concerning finan-
cial contributions.44
Even under these constraints, SECI centre was, from the outset,
judged more successful than SPOC, not least because of its more
inclusive list of participants from Hungary to Turkey rather than
the Western Balkans only. It was credited, for example, with a series
of multi-country operations leading to the neutralization of human
trafficking, smuggling and drug networks over the period 20029
(Matei, 2009, p. 13). As a result, SPOC came under pressure to coor-
dinate more effectively with SECI, and in late 2003, it established a
permanent secretariat, which was hosted by the Bucharest centre.
Such efforts at streamlining were only half-successful because of the
copious bilateral programmes run by the EU, the Council of Europe

and other institutions involved in South East Europe (Pop, 2003,
p. 113).
Like SPOC, the impact of other WT3 taskforces within the SP was
limited, because their chief goal was managing bilateral donor assist-
ance rather than fostering regional cooperation. They were geared
towards common problems, as opposed to tranasnational/regional
problems requiring joint action.45 A good example was the Pacts
anti-corruption initiative (SPAI) supported by OECD. SPAI initiated
a series of projects aimed at the implementation of international
anti-corruption standards, the promotion of transparency in public
administrations, and, generally, the advance of good governance.
Its efforts were complementary to the Regional School of Public
Administration that opened at Danilovgrad in Montenegro (May
2006) with CARDS funding.46 However, SPAI was little more than a
peer-review mechanism, with limited implementation monitoring
capacity (a regional liaison office in Sarajevo), whose programmes
duplicated those of other agencies.47 This was the reason why RCC,
the successor of the SP, convened in September 2008 a conference in
Sarajevo to work out synergies by the multiple regional organizations
and initiatives involved in JHA issues, not least SPAI, which had been
renamed, as of October 2007, Regional Anticorruption Initiative in
line with the trend towards ownership of cooperation.48
Institutionalizing JHA cooperation

As soft security came to the top of the agenda, the 2000s saw move-
ment towards cooperation from within the region too. In December
2001, the interior ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and FR Yugoslavia agreed to share
police information and strengthen border controls in order to com-
bat cross-border crime.49 In the wake of the a high-profile conference
on Balkan organized crime, hosted in London on 25 November 2002
by the UK Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Belgrade organized a meeting of the regions interior ministers in
March 2003 under SEECP; this was followed by two further confer-
ences in Sarajevo.50 Subsequent annual gatherings, typically attended
also by the EU Home Affairs Commissioner, institutionalized dia-
logue among the interior and justice departments in national execu-
tives, though the implementation of joint projects was delegated to
the RCC. The RCC has sought to cooperate with the SECI centre in
Bucharest. The first outcome of this link is the upgrade of the SECI
unit into a South East European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC),
with an intergovernmental convention signed on 9 December 2009,
a project which had been underway since 2007.51 The new agree-
ment solved the data protection issue that previously had prevented
full interoperability with Europol, one of the EU agencies steering
the process.52
There is a trend towards intensified cooperation, centred on the
Western Balkans as opposed to wider South East Europe. In June
2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia signed
a special agreement along the lines of the Palermo Convention on
human trafficking; and in February 2002, the three interior ministers
agreed on a set of joint measures by the respective police forces.53
The establishment of regional bodies such as the Public Prosecutors
Network (PROSECO, established in March 2005) or the South East
European Police Chief Association (SEPCA), originally initiated by
the SP, has put those coordination efforts on a more permanent
basis.54 The RCC has also assisted the establishment of the Secretariat
of the Police Cooperation Convention (PCC) for South East Europe,
located in Ljubljana (September 2008).
It is hard to judge how successful such initiatives have been in
tackling cross-border threats. Unresolved status issues and dead-
locked reforms, such as the endless saga concerning the creation
of a unified police force in Bosnia, have created grey zones, both
in geographical and institutional terms, which in turn weaken the
impact of intergovernmental coordination. In addition, even if
corruption and crime are a trans-border issue, the key locus of insti-
tution-building and transformation remains the domestic arena.
The unequal progress towards the EU, and the variable capacity of
national governments to secure the rule of law, are also bound to
dilute cooperation. For instance, the absence of data protection leg-
islation in some Balkan countries initially prevented the exchange of
information between the SECI centre and both Europol and national
law enforcement agencies.55
However, there have been high-profile cases where intergov-
ernmental frameworks have yielded visible results. Following the
car-bomb assassination of Ivo Pukanic, a prominent investigative
journalist working the Zagreb weekly Nacional, on 23 October 2008,
Serbian and Croatian police were able to arrest members of a criminal

network operating in both countries. The trial opened in February
2010, a few days after one of the indicted surrendered to the police
in Banjaluka, Bosnia and Herzegovina.56 Another trial, against the
Serbian underworld boss Sreten Jocic (Joca Amsterdam), who is
implicated in the murder of Pukanic (who had written widely on the
Balkan tobacco mafia), is set to start in Belgrade at a special court on
serious crime.57
Cooperation in matters of justice has also made inroads into sen-
sitive issues such as the war crimes committed in the 1990s. There
is now a web of agreements between the War Crimes Prosecutor
in Serbia and the Prosecutors General in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Significantly, regional cooperation has been singled
out by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) as a precondition for delegating cases to national authori-
ties. As Milica Delevic notes, at times cooperation faces constraints.
As a rule, countries in the Western Balkans have constitutional
clauses prohibiting the extradition of their nationals. This prevents
prosecutors and judges from effectively investigating and hearing
cases, given that more often than not indictees hold the passport of
another post-Yugoslav state. In some bilateral relations this has not
been a problem: for instance, Croatia has consented to Montenegro
trying cases for war crimes committed on its territory, for example,
during the siege of Dubrovnik in late 1991 (Delevic, 2007, p. 74).
Intergovernmental agreements such as the two treaties signed by
Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia and Serbia in February 2010,
which work out measures for preventing dual citizens from evad-
ing justice by crossing the border, is certainly a step in the right
direction.58
Liberalizing visa regimes

The field of policy regarding visas and free movement of people
is of particular importance. The liberalization of travel within the
region an issue lying at the intersection between law enforce-
ment and economic integration has been, from the very outset,
tied to the question of visa-free access to the Schengen Zone, which
was instituted in 1995 and later brought into the EU framework by
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The aspiration to join the EU led to
the erection of new barriers across South East Europe. By the early
2000s, regional frontrunners like Bulgaria and Romania had imposed

visas on Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were seen
as sources and channels for illegal migrants into the EU. To align
with the EU policies, Romania introduced visas to citizens of then
Serbia Montenegro in 2004, while Bulgaria did the same at in rela-
tion to neighbouring Serbia and Macedonia only on 1 January 2007,
the date of its accession. With the 2007 enlargement, the Western
Balkans transformed into an enclave within the Unions territory.
With the exception of Croatia, their citizens needed to go through
a long and costly procedure to obtain visas and enter EU territory.
The situation mirrored that of Turkey, another membership aspirant.
Turkish citizens needed visas to enter the EU, but could access all
non-members in the Balkans (save Serbia) either visa-free or by buy-
ing a permit at the border.59
Progress towards intra-regional liberalization was slow, and was
achieved on a bilateral, rather than multilateral, basis. Benefiting
from visa-free travel into Kosovo, Albania negotiated flexible arrange-
ments with Montenegro and Macedonia, enabling citizens to obtain
entry permits issued at border crossings.60 As a goodwill gesture, the
Croatian government temporarily lifted visa requirement for citizens
of Serbia and Montenegro during the summer season of 2003, but
thereafter the arrangement was extended at the end of each year.
Croatian nationals could enter Bosnia and Herzegovina on their
ID card, and a reciprocity arrangement operated between Bosnia
and Serbia and Montenegro. In other words, for the most part, ex-
Yugoslavs moved freely across the territory of the former federation
in the 2000s.61
The EU Council launched negotiations on visa facilitation and
readmission agreements with the Western Balkan countries only in
November 2006, deciding a year later, in January 2008, that rather
than facilitation involving lower cost and shortened processing
times liberalization was the ultimate goal for Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia and Albania. After protracted negotiations, roadmaps,
and the fulfilment of a range of institutional and policy conditions
(e.g., the readmission agreements and introduction of biometric
passports) in December 2009 citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and
Macedonia were enabled to travel to the Schengen area visa-free. This
liberalized travel to the Unions member states in the Balkans, Greece,
Bulgaria and Romania. Disappointed at having been left out, Albania
and Bosnia and Herzegovina struck, in March 2009, an agreement on

the abolition of visas. EU interior ministries decided to lift the visa
requirement for the two countries in November 2010. Lacking even
a roadmap for visa liberalization, Kosovo is the only country to be
left out. Still, Kosovars, who hold mostly passports issued by UNMIK,
can travel freely to all neighbouring countries.
Origins and dynamics of security cooperation in South

East Europe
External push for cooperation has been a particularly potent factor

in the security field. Outside actors such as NATO, the US and the
EU have been closely involved in the establishment, agenda-setting
and resourcing policy initiatives and regional bodies involved in that
sector of intergovernmental action.
First, external institutional links have determined the membership
of such schemes: Croatia, FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
and Bosnia and Herzegovina were long excluded from SEDM owing
to their non-involvement in the PfP. The aspiration to move closer
to NATO and consolidate the alignment with the US, in contrast,
brought in the likes of Ukraine and Georgia.
Second, external push also defined the institutional design of
cooperation. The US played a critical role in promoting multilateral
politico-military cooperation from the mid-1990s onwards. Likewise,
the SP donors and especially the EU were the principal reasons for
multilateral structures to emerge in the policy-area of JHA in the
wake of the Kosovo war. Where it existed prior to the mid-1990s,
defence collaboration took place bilaterally and was often hard to
distinguish from the alliance-building strategies of key players such
as Greece and Turkey.
Third, the external initiatives defined the content of cooperation.
The emphasis on soft-security issues related to transnational crime,
corruption, illegal trafficking and migration was clearly linked with
the preferences of the EU and its individual member states. That in
turn has contributed to the deepening degree of institutionaliza-
tion through intergovernmental platforms such as the EUWestern
Balkan JHA dialogue, the SPs initiatives on organized crime and
corruption, the RCC, the professional associations of police and pros-
ecutors, and so on.
By contrast, intra-Balkan functional demands for cooperation,

though visible in the ministerial conferences under SEECP, have
not been a sufficient condition for cooperation to advance. Security
agendas and perceptions differ across wider South East Europe, which
has constrained a priori the formation of a truly multilateral regime
on a regional scale. For instance, while Turkey and Greece have faced
a set of traditional challenges stemming from a territorial dispute
and military balance, the Western Balkans are beset by dysfunctional
institutions concerning the rule of law, with only Kosovo remaining
a hard-security issue. Finally, the presence of overarching security
institutions such as NATO or even OSCE has limited the scope of
bottom-up regional endeavours for security-regime creation.
As in other policy sectors, interdependence has driven Balkan gov-
ernments to cooperate in smaller, more homogenous groups: a trend
evident both in the CSBM arrangements in the early 1990s and some
of the intra-Yugoslav JHA bilateral and trilateral agreements of in
the 2000s. Even where states faced common issues and threats, secu-
rity interdependence has not been limited within the geographical
borders of South East Europe. Threats like transnational crime have
spilled over into core countries in Western Europe, a reason for the
Unions attention to the subject in relation to the post-communist
Balkan countries. That is why, to be fully functional, regional bod-
ies such as the SECI centre in Bucharest have been supported by the
broadest possible array of actors, including EU agencies, member
states, international institutions, and the US. By virtue of the nature
of the transnational linkages in focus, cooperation on issues related
to the rule of law therefore has come close to the model of open
regionalism (as advocated by authors such as Christophe Solioz
[2008]), where Balkan networks are inserted into wider networks at
the European and global level.
Balkan governments have taken part in security fora such as SEDM
and SEEGROUP in order to strengthen links with NATO and the US,
advance security-sector reforms and implement military-technical
standards to meet the Alliances membership conditionality. Region-
specific objectives such as the participation in peacekeeping activities
or the development of multilateral arms control regimes have been
of secondary importance. In a similar vein, the abolition of visa
regimes with the EU has topped the agenda of South East European
countries, with the liberalization of intra-regional arrangements
coming as an afterthought and practiced on an ad-hoc, neighbour-

to-neighbour basis.
The empirical evidence presented in the chapter suggests that,
in security affairs, identity politics have played a more pronounced
role compared to the economic and functional sectors reviewed in
Chapter 4. This has to do with politicization. Highly visible initia-
tives and institutions such as SEDM (and the multinational brigade
it launched), have been underpinned by a discourse of bringing nor-
mality to the turbulent and lawless Balkans. Symptomatically, the
SEECAP paper argued that the perception of South East Europe as an
unstable area was a serious obstacle to integration and, therefore, a
sui generis security threat. Cooperation has been an instrument for
change external perceptions. In the words of a Romanian officer,
SEDM and the MPFSEE were instruments, which could slowly but
steadily change [Balkan countries] status, from security consumers
to security providers.62 In a 2002 interview, Ovidiu Dranga, the
chairman of the SEDM political-military committee, elaborated that
point further: We are all presented with the image of the Balkans
as the powder keg of Europe The results of the South-East Europe
initiative is deep agreement that they [the member nations] are not
enemies to one another.63
Eager to take credit for the initiatives, governments also discussed
at length symbolic issues, such as naming of the MPFSEE/SEEBRIG, to
ensure that the right message was conveyed to the outside world. The
contingent has never had a chance to fulfil its historic mission due
to the stakeholders reluctance to shoulder responsibilities in Balkan
hotspots. Until the 2006 deployment in Afghanistan, the MPFSEEs
significance had been related, first and foremost, to its mere presence
as a cooperative security project in a conflict-prone region. Though,
in purely functional terms, the MPFSEE has facilitated the adoption
of NATO technical standards, the PfP states could achieve that goal
by other means than a regional military force, notably through the
bilateral cooperation programmes. Regional cooperation has been a
value in and of itself not only because it has brought direct benefits
but also because it recast the Balkan states into a part of the Western
community represented by NATO and the EU.
6
Between Lofty Rhetoric and
Lingering Conflicts: Political
Cooperation
Summits and high-profile diplomatic conferences are, beyond doubt,

the most visible part of any regional endeavour around the globe.
Even if such major get-togethers do not give birth to momentous
political decisions, national leaders and top officials never miss a
chance to air a message to the outside world and their domestic pub-
lics complete with the obligatory family photo. Events of that sort
have marked the ebbs and flows of regionalism in South East Europe
since the mid-1990s. To grasp its dynamics, one must consider not
just sectoral collaboration, discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5,
but also the Balkan brand of political summitry. Originating in the
immediate aftermath of the Dayton peace accords, the South East
European Cooperation Process (SEECP) has emerged as a central arena
of intra-regional multilateral exchanges, alongside a plethora of ad hoc
consultation fora. It is now a common argument that such institutions
foster regional ownership in the multiple schemes initiated from out-
side the Balkans, not least through their contribution to the Regional
Cooperation Council (RCC). They have furthermore improved rela-
tions among states, especially in comparison to the early 1990s when
fragmentation and rival alignments were the norm. At the same time,
institutions such as SEECP, for all their rhetoric in favour of pragmatic
cooperation, have opted for open-ended dialogue rather than formali-
zation and engagement in ambitious integration schemes.
Whether one believes that Balkan diplomatic fora have made a real
difference or sees them simply as OSCE-style talking shops, it is worth
investigating their emergence, continued existence and function.
Three possible scenarios might be derived from the causal factors and
129
hypotheses pinpointed in the introductory chapter. First, interde-

pendence highlights the bottom-up convergence of interest, and the
functional benefits accrued, from joint action and policy coordina-
tion. Issues of common concern primarily economic animated
the multilateral dialogue among Balkan governments in the 1970s
and 1980s, despite the Cold War divisions and the outstanding politi-
cal disputes. Some might see a constant intra-regional demand for
common approaches and actions, coming to the forefront again in
the mid-1990s. Second, one might focus on the policies of outside
sponsors of Balkan cooperation such as the EU, NATO, the US and
the IFIs all so influential in shaping sectoral cooperation. The third
argument, going back to Chapter 3, links political multilateralism
with the aspiration to project a rebranded image of the Balkans, or
more properly South East Europe, purged of associations with ethnic
conflict, virulent nationalism and economic decay. Political coop-
eration would thus be a local reflection of a certain (European or
Euro-Atlantic) code of norms, setting scripts for appropriate state
behaviour and sustaining Balkan institutions.
In order to explore further these three perspectives, this chapter
traces the growth and development of multilateral fora in a chrono-
logical fashion. It concentrates first on the period immediately fol-
lowing the conflict in Bosnia, which was marked by the appearance of
SEECP in 1996 and which ended with the Kosovo war in MarchJune
1999. Second, it explores regional institutions response to key devel-
opments in the early 2000s, such as the launch of the SP and SAP in
the Western Balkans, and the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. Finally,
the chapter discusses the period following the 2003 Thessaloniki
Summit, which saw the acceleration of the EU and NATO enlarge-
ment in South East Europe, a new emphasis on regional ownership
of cooperative schemes through strengthening the role of SEECP, and
crucial developments such as the 2006 independence referendum
in Montenegro and the unilateral proclamation of sovereignty by
Kosovo, on 18 February 2008.
Balkan multilateralism relaunched
Multilateral dialogue after Dayton

The meeting of foreign ministers in Tirana (October 1990) marked
the end of the multilateral Balkan diplomacy of the 1970s and
Between Lofty Rhetoric and Lingering Conflicts 131
1980s. It was not until after the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords that
regional cooperation would be back, owing to initiatives such as
SECI and the Royaumont Plan introduced by the US and the EU.
Though international attention was mostly focused on the Dayton
trio, Slobodan Miloevic, Franjo Tudman and Alija Izetbegovic, who
met again in Geneva in June 1996, political consultations proceeded
more smoothly outside former Yugoslavia, where interests converged
to a greater degree.
Even before the settlement in Bosnia, on 26 August 1995, the
Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias hosted his Romanian and
Bulgarian counterparts Teodor Melescanu and Georgi Pirinski in
Ioannina, next to the border with Albania. Seen as a Greek move
to thwart Turkeys advances in the Balkans, the trilateral meet-
ing discussed economic affairs and trans-boundary infrastructure,
and issued a call for an end to the damaging sanctions against FR
Yugoslavia. Such meetings at the level of foreign ministers and also
presidents became regular and took part each year. By 1998 they had
yielded a tripartite agreement on fighting cross-border crime.1 At
the same time, Sofia and Bucharest sought to engage Greeces rival
Turkey, an important regional power and potential supporter of their
NATO bids. Annual summits of the three countries presidents kicked
off in 1997, in parallel with the trilaterals conducted with Greece. It
was not until the GreekTurkish rapprochement in 1999 that Greek
and Turkish leaders would be at ease holding four-way meetings with
their Bulgarian and Romanian colleagues.
The birth of SEECP

At the margins of the Paris Peace Conference for Bosnia
(1314 December 1995), all neighbours of ex-Yugoslavia signed
the Royaumont declaration pledging to work on good-neigh-
bourly relations. In February 1996, Bulgarias Prime Minister Jean
Videnov followed up with a proposal for a regional summit. The
idea was co-championed by Greece; it was especially dear to Foreign
Minister Papoulias, a participant in the Belgrade conference of
1988, who had been the architect of normalization of relations with
Albania in 1987 and, more recently, the Interim Agreement with
Macedonia (September 1995). The BulgarianGreek initiative was
further cemented by the long-standing links by the ruling PASOK
and Videnovs Bulgarian Socialist Party, heir to the once omnipotent
Communist Party. Sofia had been scheduled to host such a meeting

in 1991 but the breakout of the Yugoslav conflict had cancelled the
plans (Walden, 1992, p. 321).
As the conference was formally reviving the pre-1990 Balkan proc-
ess, all regional countries had to be involved, unlike parallel schemes
as SECI, which included only the pro-Western governments, leaving
out the likes of FR Yugoslavia. Videnov invited all participants in the
Belgrade and Tirana ministerials plus the newly independent post-
Yugoslav republics. The invitation to Miloevic was conveyed in per-
son, during the Bulgarian premiers visit to Belgrade in mid-February.
Miloevic was positive, not only because of Greeces involvement,
but also because the conference was yet another instance of rump
Yugoslavias return to the international stage after long years of
isolation. It was furthermore consistent with the customary rheto-
ric of the regime, which portrayed Serbia as a pivotal, strategically
important country in the region a role begrudgingly recognized by
the drafters of Dayton through the policy of engaging, if not accom-
modating, Miloevic.
Serbian attitudes were in contrast with Turkeys. The summits
original date in June coincided with the UN Habitat conference in
Istanbul thereby ruling out Foreign Minister Emre Gnensays par-
ticipation which bred suspicion of a BulgarianGreekSerbian plot
to marginalize Turkey.2 As Albanias Foreign Ministry also complained
that the meeting was coming too soon after the parliamentary elec-
tions in the country, Georgi Pirinski, the head of Bulgarian diplomacy,
postponed the conference for 6 July 1996. Turkey despatched a lower-
ranking diplomat, while Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina were
represented by their deputy foreign ministers. Croatia and Slovenia
initially declined the invitation as they saw the initiative as an inward-
looking Balkan affair, uncomfortably reminiscent of the Yugoslav past
and thus harmful for their efforts at joining the West. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Zagreb ultimately changed its stance but ensured
that Croatia was present solely as an observer. The dispute between
Athens and Skopje, however, caused the greatest embarrassment,
when Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski cancelled his trip to Sofia
at the very last minute, in response to the Greek insistence that the
prefix former Yugoslav had to be added to his countrys name.3
The Sofia conference, attended also by prominent international
functionaries such as the High Representative in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, was nonetheless a success by virtue of

having taken place at all. Symbolism ruled the day. In his opening
address, Jean Videnov called for support from the EU, stressing that
the Balkan multilateral dialogue would have a powerful positive
impact to overcome the negative idea of the region as a zone of inse-
curity and conflicts, a zone substantially falling short of European
criteria of democratic and stable development. The joint declaration
observed that South East Europe shared a legacy of multilateral coop-
eration, and set the goal of transforming the region into an area of
stability, security and cooperation in line with the general develop-
ments throughout Europe.4 In line with the CSCE/OSCE postulates,
ministers called for continuation of dialogue on four fronts:
Security through confidence-building measures, support for the

implementation of the Bosnian peace agreement;
Trade, investment, transport and energy infrastructure, telecom-
munications and the environment;
Humanitarian, social, civil-society and cultural cooperation;
Justice, combating of organized crime, illicit drug and arms traf-
ficking and the elimination of terrorism.
These laudable goals were to be pursued in tandem with the EU and

all other external actors engaged in South East Europe. According to
the Romanian and Bulgarian foreign ministers, Balkan cooperation
had to be outward-oriented and linked to broader frameworks like
the Central European Initiative, Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
SECI and Royaumont. This contrasted with views expressed by
Greece and FR Yugoslavia, underscoring the regional dimension of
the endeavour, and also echoing the populist nineteenth-century
motto Balkan Balkancima (the Balkans to the Balkanites), which had
been revived by Miloevic and nationalist intellectuals in Belgrade
during the years of international isolation. The rest of the countries
shared a more detached perspective. Albania failed to have Kosovo
mentioned in the declaration, while the Turkish representative
regretted that Macedonia was not in attendance.5
Differences aside, it was clear that the process would continue.
Greeces Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos stated in Sofia: [t]his
is the point of no-return. Balkan cooperation is here to stay.6 While
Pangalos and the Sofia declaration referred to the Balkans, from
1997 onwards the forum opted for the heading South East European
Cooperation Process (SEECP). As also testified by the South East
European Defence Ministerial (SEDM), the Balkan label was gener-
ally being avoided, as it was considered a term laden with numerous
negative connotations. South East Europe, by contrast, appeared
more neutral and inclusive, and therefore generally acceptable.7
Greece, which succeeded Bulgaria as presiding country, pushed for
energizing SEECP. It struck a compromise with Macedonia whereby
participating states would be identified solely by their flags, not
names.8 The principal goal for the Foreign Ministry in Athens was
institutionalization. Gathered in Thessaloniki (56 June 1997), foreign
ministers decided to hold regular consultations at the level of political
directors, discussing other measures such as meetings of trade minis-
ters, an association of chambers of commerce, a network of centres
for small- and medium-size enterprises and technology. However,
Romania and Bulgaria, the latter no longer governed by the Socialists,
vetoed the Greek proposal for a permanent secretariat in Athens,
preferring a loose political forum to a Greek-led regional organiza-
tion (Alp, 2000). Fears that Balkan entanglements might hamper EU
integration were paramount, and also underpinned the references to
the European orientation of [the] states of this region in the final
document.
Yet the Greek chairmanship ended in a success: the first-ever all-
regional summit of heads of state and government in Balkan history,
held on 34 November 1997 at the Cretan resort of Agia Pelagia.9
The symbolic weight of the event was reflected in the unprecedented
media interest.10 Aware of the significance of the occasion, Balkan
leaders sought to demonstrate their strong commitment towards the
standards projected by the international community and emphasize
the forthcoming enlargement of NATO and the EU:
We consider that the European orientation of our counties is an

integral part of their political, economic and social development.
We aspire to transform our region into an area of co-operation and
economic prosperity, and, to that effect, we decided to promote
good neighbourly relations and respect for International Law. We
believe that Europe cannot be complete without our countries
and our peoples representing civilisations and historical tradi-
tions which are essential to the establishment of a contemporary
European identity. European and Euro-Atlantic integration is

essential in promoting the aforementioned objectives.
This rhetoric was largely driven by a sense of exclusion that became

growingly accentuated as Central Europeans made confident strides
towards the West. After the European Commissions negative avis,
it was patent that the imminent European Council in Luxembourg
was unlikely to invite either Bulgaria or Romania the only
post-communist countries in the region that had at the time associa-
tion agreements to start accession negotiations alongside frontrun-
ners like Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and, significantly, nearby
Slovenia and Hungary. In addition, NATOs Madrid Summit (July
1997) had stemmed the hopes for the early membership of Romania,
undoubtedly the most advanced candidate of the South East European
cluster, which was furthermore governed by the centre-right, pro-
Western Democratic Convention of President Emil Constantinescu.11
However, the pro-Euro-Atlantic tone was not palatable for everyone.
There were reports that Slobodan Miloevic insisted on deleting an
entire paragraph on NATO and advocated setting up a Balkan military
alliance to manage the regions security a line that was expounded
at the time by the Greek Defence Minister Akis Tzohadzopoulos (see
Chapter 5).12 As a concession to Greece, the joint statement also men-
tioned the secretariat and called the foreign ministers to work for its
establishment.13 The procedural rules adopted by the summit neverthe-
less cast SEECP as a non-institutionalized consultative forum based on
annual conferences of foreign ministers and quarterly meetings at the
level of political directors steered by a presidency rotating each year.
Leaders also discussed hot bilateral issues. Slobodan Miloevic and
Prime Minister Fatos Nano held the first Yugoslav-Albanian meet-
ing of leaders since Josip Broz Tito and Enver Hoxhas talks in 1947
(Lopandic, 2001, p. 107). Reportedly, Miloevic committed himself
to observe the basic human rights of the Kosovar Albanians, while
Nano conceded that Kosovo was an internal Yugoslav problem,
prompting ex-president Sali Berisha to accuse Nano of serving the
interests of Athens and Belgrade.14 Other tte--ttes Miloevic
Kiro Gligorov (Macedonias president), NanoGligorov, Gligorov
Ivan Kostov (Bulgarias prime minister), and Kostas SimitisMesut
Ylmaz all led to nowhere.15 Crete would be remembered for its
political symbolism, not its political breakthroughs.
In the shadow of Kosovo

From the spring of 1998 onwards, the simmering Kosovo crisis posed
a serious challenge to Balkan regional cooperation. Compared to the
early 1990s, the response by the South East European states through
SEECP, presided over by Turkey, was much more cohesive. On 10
March 1998, a day after the Contact Group had met in London,
the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia and
Romania called for ending the suppression of peaceful demon-
strations, respect for human rights, renunciation of violence by
ethnic Albanians, implementation of the 1996 MiloevicRugova
agreement on Albanian education and the restoration of Kosovos
autonomy.16 Bulgarias Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihaylova was
convinced the declaration had a symbolic value, given the unity
of the region.17 This assessment was exaggerated. At the Istanbul
ministerial (89 June 1998), FR Yugoslavias Foreign Minister ivadin
Jovanovic vetoed a reference to Kosovo in the final declaration, and
the rest of the participants issued a separate statement expressing
their profound concern.18 Yugoslavias intransigence was hard to
swallow even for Greece; Pangalos, known for his outspoken ways,
objected that concerning human rights there was no such thing as
an internal matter.19
SEECP overcame the deadlock only after the US envoy Richard
Holbrookes eleventh-hour mission to Belgrade on 13 October. As
Miloevic agreed to halt police operations and let OSCE observers
into Kosovo, SEECPs second summit in Antalya succeeded in reach-
ing a common position, which supported both FR Yugoslavias integ-
rity and the restoration of Kosovos autonomy, in line with the UN
Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199.20 The downbeat mood,
and lowest-common-denominator output of collective deliberation,
were a far cry from the triumphant rhetoric in Crete. The Financial
Times noted that Momir Bulatovic had unsurprisingly spent, most
of the time talking on the phone with Belgrade about the latest devel-
opments in the standoff with NATO and the US.21 SEECP was soon
to be paralysed, when the Kosovo conflict exploded with renewed
power in December 1998. On the eve of the impending NATO cam-
paign against Serbia, Balkan foreign ministers held an extraordinary
conference in Bucharest (19 March 1999) not attended by either
FR Yugoslavia or Albania which urged, in vain, Belgrade authorities
to sign the Rambouillet deal and allow an international force into

Kosovo.
The war marked the end of the first period of regional coopera-
tion in the post-Cold War era. On the positive side, SEECP resusci-
tated Balkan multilateralism and gave it greater public prominence.
However, political declarations were at odds with the outstanding
conflicts cutting across South East Europe. Kosovo, in particular, seri-
ously disrupted political dialogue, preventing SEECP members from
discussing common policies on regional issues.
New beginnings
Balkan states and the Stability Pact

The war in Kosovo was a serious setback for regional cooperation.
Serbia was de facto expelled from all initiatives, while SEECP itself had
to postpone its annual ministerial in Bucharest twice. Once it took
place, on 2 December, foreign ministers made it clear that Miloevics
regime was the real problem, a point reinforced by the Romanian
Presidencys insistence that FR Yugoslavias place was only temporar-
ily vacant.22 They also hailed the Stability Pact (SP) and its promise
to boost Western involvement, economic development and coopera-
tion in the region.23 The SP was also significant, as it distinguished
Montenegro from Serbia. President Milo ukanovic did his best to
secure his countrys participation in the scheme, and even pledged to
open the hitherto sealed borders with Albania and Croatia, to pursue
common projects in the field of infrastructure and trade.
The SP urged local states to reiterate their commitment to reconcil-
iation, economic integration, and political and market reforms, as a
contribution to the international effort to de-balkanize the Balkans.
SEECP, listed as one of the institutions supporting the Pact, adopted
the Charter for Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and
Cooperation in South East Europe at its third summit (Bucharest,
1213 February 2000).24 Marking the highest level of declarative
diplomacy (Lopandic, 2001, p. 110), the Charter was a cross between
a code of conduct and an action plan. SEECPs ultimate goal was
the Euro-Atlantic values of peace, democracy, prosperity and respect
for human rights [to] take root in South-Eastern Europe. A number
of areas of cooperation, at both the bilateral and multilateral level,
were mapped out: politics and security, economics, justice and home
affairs, democratization and civil society, and environmental issues.
This ambitious agenda was rooted in the belief that political dialogue
was meaningful only if translated into actions and projects in specific
policy fields, a laudable goal, which, however, was still not in sight.25
SEECPs functional dimension remained overshadowed by the SP and
its three working tables, which were drawing international donors
resources. The institution would continue to work mostly as a high-
profile discussion forum. Still, an annex to the Charter on procedural
matters envisioned meetings by sectoral ministers, in addition to the
already established summits and foreign ministerials. At the same
time, the document reconfirmed unanimity as a principle of deci-
sion-making, and set up a troika comprising the current, past and
future chairmanship to ensure continuity.
The impact of political changes in Croatia and Serbia

After Croatian parliamentary elections, in January 2000, ended
the decade-long rule of the late Tudmans HDZ, the new governing
coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals reversed the policy of
boycotting regional cooperation.26 In July, Foreign Minister Tonino
Picula attended the ministerial convened by the Macedonian SEECP
Presidency in Ohrid. For him, Croatia no longer agree[d] to play a
passive role on the international scene, and Southeast Europe [wa]s a
region it want[ed] to be more present in than before. Picula also noted
that the very name SEECP, where Balkans was replaced by South East
Europe, was an open invitation to Croatia and its government to in
some way leave behind all prejudices and uncertainties which encum-
bered Croatia not long ago. With the proviso that Croatia was a
country bordering South East Europe, he nonetheless promised that his
country would contribute to the faster improvement of the regions
image.27 Croatia turned from observer into a fully fledged participant,
though it officially became a SEECP member only in 2004.
Macedonias chairmanship-in-office culminated in the re-integration
of Serbia into regional institutions facilitated by the spectacular
fall of Slobodan Miloevic on 5 October 2000, which was cheered
by many as the long-awaited breakthrough in South East Europe. FR
Yugoslavias new president, Vojislav Kotunica, was welcomed into
SEECP at an extraordinary summit held in Skopje on 25 October
2000 attended by the Balkan political A-list as well as the EU High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and the
US Presidents special envoy Richard Holbrooke. The summit also
welcomed Bosnia and Herzegovina as a full member.
With pro-Western governments in power across the ex-communist
Balkans, post-conflict reconstruction could give way to economic
development and integration into the EU and NATO. The EU
seemed more responsive than ever: it launched membership talks
with Romania and Bulgaria in January 2000 and offered the Western
Balkans association agreements at the Zagreb Summit in November
(see Chapter 2). A second summit convened in Skopje (223 February
2001) was held back-to-back with an economic forum attended by
the SEECP ministers of economy and trade and representatives of the
business community.28 Trade liberalization, infrastructure develop-
ment and foreign investment promotion were identified as areas for
joint action, especially after Serbia had also joined the SP as a benefi-
ciary and was made eligible for CARDS funding.
Things were more complex at a second glance. It was clear that
the SP funders, be they states or international agencies, not SEECP,
were to play the leading role regional projects. The Skopje summit
supported the Romanian initiative to hold a second donors meeting
in Bucharest during the first half of 2001 a reminder that external
actors continued to foot the bill. Bodo Hombach, the SP coordinator,
articulated a different approach, stressing the regional dimension.
His message was help yourself so that we can help you29 and he
criticized governments viewing regional cooperation as a hurdle on
the road to the EU and NATO.30 Bulgaria and Romania had already
expressed reservations about being packaged together with the trou-
blesome ex-Yugoslav republics (Stefanova, 2001). Croatia continued
to argue that any formalization of relations in the region would lead
to unwanted ghettoization.31 Regional integration could only be
a by-product of the shared effort to join the EU. The Macedonian
Parliaments Speaker, Stojan Andov captured that mood: [t]he
desired regional cooperation is not and cannot be a substitute for our
integration into European structures. After the fall of the Berlin Wall,
building new barriers is simply unacceptable.32
The crises in southern Serbia and Macedonia, 20001

The second Skopje summit had to confront the developments in
the Preevo Valley in southern Serbia, adjacent to the border with
Macedonia, where Albanian guerillas and Serb security forces were

clashing.33 While most attendees supported the peace plan proposed
by Belgrade and denounced the Albanian paramilitaries, Tirana dis-
sented.34 President Rexhep Meidani declined to participate in the
summit and dispatched Prime Minister Ilir Meta whose interven-
tion helped tone town the closing declaration.35 Meta also opposed
Kotunicas advocacy for the return of Serbias military and police to
UNMIK-run Kosovo.
Tensions rose again with the conflict between the ethnic Albanian
National Liberation Army (NLA) and the government in Skopje,
escalating in the spring of 2001. SEECP foreign ministers met
extraordinarily in Skopje on 12 April, on the initiative of the US
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and subsequently in Tirana (16 May
2001). They called on Albanian extremist groups to end violence,
release hostages and lay down arms, but refrained from using the
word terrorists despite Macedonias insistence.36 Albanian Foreign
Minister Paskal Milo supported the neighbouring countrys territorial
integrity but did not shy away from blocking its diplomatic moves.37
Ultimately, SEECP dignitaries agreed that speedy integration into the
EU and NATO was key for dealing with the crisis.38
The regional forum continued to be held hostage by neighbour-
hood squabbles. In August 2001, Macedonias Defence Minister
Vlado Buckovski accused Albania of training, and supplying arms
to, the NLA guerrillas. The ensuing cool-down of diplomatic ties was
aggravated by a further scandal. As SEECP Chairman-in-Office, Milo
issued a statement to welcome the Ohrid Framework Agreement
ending the conflict. He had consulted a number of Balkan capitals,
including Belgrade, but not Skopje. In response, the Macedonian for-
eign office sent official letters to all SEECP states accusing Albania of
hijacking the forum.39 Overall, the Macedonian crisis demonstrated
unequivocally SEECPs inherent limits as a regional pacifier, a role it
had consistently claimed over the years.
Expanding SEECPs scope

The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement under Western tute-
lage eased tensions, and the SEECP regular summit (Tirana, 28
March 2002) could concentrate on priorities such as the creation
of a regional electricity market, the interconnection of the national
power grids, and the fight against terrorism and organized crime.40
Attended for the first time by the head of UNMIK, Michael Steiner,
the summit de facto integrated Kosovo in SEECP a priority for
Albania. It was one more step in Croatias re-engagement with its
neighbourhood, as President Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic also made his
maiden appearance in the forum.
It was in Tirana that regional ownership was identified as a chief
goal for South East European institutions. In his address, Greek Premier
Kostas Simitis stated that in order to be effective SEECP should be
upgraded and turn from a political process into a full-fledged regional
body.41 The objective of making SEECP more efficient was advanced by
Serbia and Montenegro, succeeding Albania at the helm. During the
inaugural Belgrade ministerial (19 June 2002) Foreign Minister Goran
Svilanovic, a high-profile figure in the anti-Miloevic opposition of the
1990s, described the process purposes in the following manner:
we need regional responses to regional problems. In that sense,

the South-East European Cooperation Process should play a very
important role and become our common voice as an autoch-
thonous process of regional cooperation.42
He welcomed the newly launched troika formed by representatives

of the SEECP Chairman-in-Office, the European Commission, and
the SP Special Coordinator, and intended to ensure better coor-
dination among the various cooperative schemes, and he called
for an enhanced SEECP role in policy-areas like trade and invest-
ment, border security and combating organized crime.43 Serbia and
Montenegro hosted several sectoral ministerials, a practice that was
continued by the Romanian presidency in 20045, and that would
become standard and expand in the years to follow.44
While everyone subscribed to the idea to upgrade SEECP and
make the regional countries collectively responsible for managing
their own affairs45, it was still unclear how to divide labour between
the process and the externally driven initiatives (SP, SECI and oth-
ers). Despite Simitis suggestions, formal institutionalization, an idea
that had been dropped in 1997, was not in sight. SEECP did not do
much beyond providing political support for initiatives such as the
free-trade zone and the common electricity market scheme, both
proposed, designed and guided by the European Commission (see
Chapter 4).
The Balkans on the road to membership in NATO

and the EU
The year 2003 marked another turning point in Balkan regional

cooperation. With the impending eastern enlargement, South East
Europe had become even more firmly drawn into the EUs orbit.
The Greek Presidency of the EU Council, in the first half of the year,
sought to strengthen the Unions commitment to further expansion
towards the Western Balkans and an upgrade of the Stabilization
and Association Process (SAP), equipping it with the political and
technical toolbox of eastern enlargement. For their part, Bulgaria
and Romania, though separated from the 2004 entrants, had man-
aged to secure at the Copenhagen Summit (December 2002) a pledge
for accession in 2007 or 2008 at the latest. The two countries were
furthermore making confident strides towards NATO membership,
having also stood by the US in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as
part of Donald Rumsfelds New Europe.
The regions gravitation towards Western institutions reinforced
regional cooperation, as it toned down apprehension that Balkan
entanglements diverted attention from the key foreign-policy pri-
ority of joining NATO and the EU. At the same time, as discussed
in Chapter 2, developments called into question institutions, such
as the SP, that dated back to the post-conflict stage. It emphasized
flexible forms of political cooperation, notably within the Western
Balkans, as well as the shift towards regional ownership of coopera-
tive institutions through the linkage between the SP and SEECP in
the framework of the RCC.
The variable geometry of political cooperation

From the early 2000s on, the variable speed of EU and NATO integra-
tion tended to favour less-than-regional, thematic fora to the all-
encompassing SEECP multilaterals. Thus, Greece and Turkey, entering
a phase of rapprochement after 1999, launched the two-by-two con-
sultations with NATO hopefuls Romania and Bulgaria. In the run-up
to the Alliances Prague Summit (November 2002), the four countries
foreign ministers met in Istanbul (13 February) and then Athens
(29 March) to support its extension towards the south-east.46
This example was replicated by other subgroups. At the Prague
Summit, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, next in the membership
queue, proposed a joint strategy for NATO accession, modelled on the

1998 Baltic Charter implemented by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Signed by Foreign Ministers Tonino Picula, Ilinka Mitreva and Ilir
Meta, in May 2003, the new Adriatic Charter set out a programme for
coordinating policies in the security sector in order to meet NATOs
entry criteria.47 The document was countersigned by US Secretary of
State Colin Powell, who attended the launch in Tirana. The Charter
paved the way to the integration into NATO of the three countries,
with Albania and Croatia receiving invitations in April 2008, while
Macedonia was vetoed by Greece. The grouping grew over time.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro joined in December 2008,
after they entered the PfP, while Serbia has remained an observer.
Subregionalization of cooperative schemes illustrated the promi-
nence of divisions rooted in the differentiation promoted by east-
ern enlargement. The landmark EUWestern Balkans summit in
Thessaloniki (21 June 2003), convened by the Greek Presidency, elicited
a coordinated response by the target countries, but not by Bulgaria and
Romania who could already foresee the closure of accession negotiations
in 2004 and membership in 2007. In March 2003, a joint letter by Stipe
Mesic, Boris Trajkovski, Macedonias president, and Zoran ivkovic,
who had just replaced the assassinated Zoran indic as Serbian premier,
was published in Financial Times. On 2 June 2003, Trajkovski convened
a Western Balkan conference in Ohrid, which argued for an open-door
policy by the EU while pledging to step up cooperation, particularly in
areas such as fighting organized crime. This was a show of solidarity in
the run-up to Thessaloniki, but was frowned upon by Greece, which
was not directly involved in steering the process.48
The Western Balkan focus also reflected the denser webs of inter-
dependence across former Yugoslavia. Since the threshold year of
2000, some crucial steps had been made. On 11 April 2001, repre-
sentatives of the then five successor states signed an agreement in
Brussels that accepted the IMF-proposed formula for the division of
former Yugoslavias assets.49 On 27 June 2001, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia signed, under the auspices of the
SP, an agreement for the return of the refugees from the 1990s wars,
covering issues like citizenship, property rights, housing, interna-
tional assistance and reconstruction. In July 2002, Presidents Stipe
Mesic and Vojislav Kotunica met, in Sarajevo, the three members
of Bosnias collective presidency, Beriz Belkic, ivko Radiic and Jozo
Krizanovic to discuss the return of refugees, economic cooperation

and cross-border crime, and to sign an agreement on cooperation
with the ICTY. Such declarations were followed by institutional and
policy measures (intergovernmental taskforce, national roadmaps)
but, as reported by Milica Delevic, progress was slow. The goal of
2006, for solving the refugee and IDP issue, was not met, and the issue
remains unresolved. A number of issues, for example, the tenancy
rights of Croatian Serb minority members, remain outstanding a
state of affairs confirmed by the 2009 regular reports on Serbia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Montenegro by the European Commission.50
Another obstacle is Kosovos exclusion from the process, which leaves
out Serbian and Roma expellees (Delevic, 2007, p. 75).
Such moves were facilitated by symbolically important actions
such as the exchange of apologies, during a visit to Belgrade in
September 2003 by Stipe Mesic, between the Croatian president
and Svetozar Marovic (president of the loose Serbo-Montenegrin
entity that had been instituted in 20023 under EU pressure) for
the suffering inflicted in the 1990s wars. Two months later Marovic
issued a similar apology, on behalf of Serbia and Montenegro, to the
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.51 Given Marovics association
with Montenegro, much more significant were the words of remorse
offered by Boris Tadic, president of Serbia, to Bosnia and Herzegovina
on 6 December 2004, as well as the Serbian Parliaments resolution
narrowly adopted on 31 March 2010 to denounce the genocide at
Srebrenica. Newly elected Croatian President Ivo Josipovic delivered
his own apology while visiting Sarajevo on 13 April 2010; he also
acknowledged the massacre of 100 Bosniaks, by Bosnian Croat forces,
at the village of Ahmici in central Bosnia in April 1993.52
These steps towards facing up to the difficult past, catalysed by
the wish to move closer to the EU, have played a key role in deepen-
ing regional cooperation, in spite of bitter memories and lingering
grievances. Prominent examples include the genocide cases at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), originally launched by Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia against FR Yugoslavia,53 and assorted
border demarcation disputes: most significantly, those over the ter-
ritorial waters in the Gulf of Piran that led Slovenia to block Croatias
membership negotiations with the EU between December 2008 and
September 2009. Other disputes include those over the Prevlaka
Peninsula (MontenegroCroatia), the islets of Veliki and Mali Skoj
and the valley of Una River (Bosnia and HerzegovinaCroatia), the

islets of Vukovar and arengrad in the Danube (CroatiaSerbia),and
Kosovos boundaries with Montenegro.
SEECP and regional ownership

By the time Greece assumed the SEECP chairmanship in May
2005, the notions of regional ownership and streamlining regional
schemes enjoyed wide acceptance. Meeting in Sofia in May 2005,
the SPs Regional Table mandated a senior review group, chaired by
Ambassador Alpo Russi of Finland, Goran Svilanovic (since November
2004 leading WT1 on Democratization and Human Rights), Vladimir
Drobnjak (a high-ranking Croatian diplomat who had chaired
WT3 on Security), and Franz-Lothar Altmann, a fellow at Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin. The 2006 Regional Table in Belgrade
endorsed the groups report, calling for the integration of the SP and
SEECP. Elements from the SP would work as the functional arm of
regional cooperation; a substance-oriented approach, in Altmanns
words (Altmann, 2007, 114). It would furthermore institutionalize
cooperation. For its part, SEECP would provide political leadership,
in lieu of the Regional Table, which involved senior national officials
rather than ministers or heads of state/government.
A year of intense intergovernmental bargaining followed. Balkan
countries accepted that, collectively, SEECP should contribute one-
third of the new RCCs annual budget about a1m. The remaining
two-thirds were to be covered, in equal shares, by the EU and the
International Financial Institutions. This money was allocated prin-
cipally for the operational costs of the RCC Secretariat and the small
liaison office in Brussels. There were, however, squabbles over the
Secretariats seat, with Belgrades early bid being voted down. At an
informal meeting in Plovdiv (September 2007), SEECP foreign min-
isters settled in favour of Sarajevo. Serbias candidature had been in
part undermined by the Kotunica cabinets withdrawal of Svilanovics
nomination as Secretary General of the RCC. Considered a frontrun-
ner, Svilanovic had fallen out of favour with the government due to
his support for Kosovos independence, which was in the spotlight due
to his participation in the International Commission for the Balkans
chaired by Guliano Amato. (That was despite, or perhaps owing to,
his being born in the Kosovar town of Gnjilane). The SEECP yearly
summit (Zagreb, May 2007), held back-to-back with a session of the SP
Regional Table, selected Hidajet (Hido) Bicevic, a Bosniak confidante

of Croatias premier Ivo Sanader, who had been part of the Croatian
diplomatic service since 1992.54 Bosnia and Croatia, two countries that
had shunned the incipient SEECP conferences in the mid-1990s, had
now moved the centre-stage of regional cooperation.
The RCC was officially inaugurated at the closing meeting of the SP
Regional Table in Sofia on 27 February 2008. It also included new mem-
bers Moldova (which signed the SEECP Charter in October 2006 in
Bucharest, rather than in Croatia which held the chairmanship at
the time) and now independent Montenegro, formally accepted into
the regional forum in 2007. The Secretariat and the Liaison Office,
headed by Stanislav Daskalov, one-time Bulgarias ambassador to the
EU, became functional too.55 Nearly a decade after the launch of the
Pact, Balkan governments seemed to be in the driving seat of regional-
ism just at the moment when Slovenia held the Presidency of the
EU Council. SEECPs Charter was duly amended in 2007 to include a
reference to the RCC as the schemes operational branch. An ambitious
plan was drafted, singling out five areas for joint projects: economic and
social development (investment, trade, employment, health, etc.); infra-
structure and energy; JHA; security and defence; and human capital (sci-
ence, education, parliamentary cooperation.) (see Table 6.1 below).56
This upbeat assessment should be taken with a pinch of salt.
The most significant sectoral policies were largely coordinated by
the European Commission while the greatest chunk of RCC fund-
ing comes from outside South East Europe. The share is even more
significant if one takes into account the financing of specific coun-
try projects, an area where the significance of external vehicles
such as the multi-beneficiary component of EUs Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is paramount.57 As Alessandro Rotta
notes, having a Secretary General from within the region works both
ways. Erhard Busek was perceived as an impartial mediator whereas
Bicevic has arrived as a Croatian appointee (Rotta, 2008, p. 69).
SEECP in the wake of Kosovos independence declaration

That the talk of ownership and maturity was not fully substantiated
was proven by SEECPs response to Kosovos unilateral proclamation
of independence on 17 February 2008. The event exposed rifts across
South East Europe. Albania and Turkey extended recognition imme-
diately and EU members Slovenia and Bulgaria, as well as Croatia,
Table 6.1 The Regional Cooperation Council at a glance

Participants Regional countries: SEECP members, Kosovo/UNMIK
International institutions: EU (represented by the
Council Presidency, the Commission, and the
Council Secretariat), NATO, OECD, OSCE, UN,
UNECE, UNDP
Financial institutions: European Investment Bank,

EBRD, World Bank
Donor countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Germany,

Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, US
Cooperation schemes: SECI
Board Participants contributing to the Secretariats budget;

SEECP members, Austria, Czech Republic, EU,
Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Kosovo/UNMIK, USA
Secretariat 25 officials in the Sarajevo HQ; 7 at the Liaison

Office in Brussels
Process RCC annual meetings of national coordinators

(senior civil servants), quarterly meetings of the
Board prepared by the Secretary General and the
SEECP Chairman-in-Office
followed suit in March. Montenegro and Macedonia joined the pro-

independence group on 9 October. Other countries, such as Greece,
Romania and Cyprus (not a SEECP member) stood firmly behind
Serbias insistence on border inviolability, while an ultimatum by
Serb leader Milorad Dodik, to Bosniak and Croat parties, effectively
ruled out any coherent position by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As had been the case during previous moments of crisis, SEECPs
key achievement was surviving the storm rather than working
out a common stance. Kosovos independence nearly derailed the
annual summit, convened by the Bulgarian Presidency in the Black
Sea town of Pomorie on 21 May 2008, several months after Sofias
recognition. Serbian President Boris Tadic walked out of the confer-
ence room after Jolyon Naegele, representative of UNMIK yielded
the floor to the Kosovo foreign minister Sknder Hyseni. Serbian

Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic threatened to veto the closing declara-
tion of foreign ministers, and later wrote to UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon to protest what he saw as UNMIK misconduct.58 The
joint declaration, which was nonetheless adopted, indicated that
SEECP members had agreed to disagree on Kosovo.59 As a result of
the rift, UNMIK did not take part in the annual meeting of the RCC
in Chishinau on 4 June 2009, while Moldovan authorities declined
to issue visas to Kosovar officials to attend SEECP meetings during
the countrys presidency (Moldova has not recognized Kosovo and its
passports).60 Meanwhile, the Secretary General insisted that Kosovo
should continue to be listed under UNMIK/Kosovo tag in line with
UNSC Resolution 1244.61 In the section on regional cooperation,
the European Commissions strategy paper for the Western Balkans,
covering 2010, observes:
Disagreements relating to the participation of Kosovo in regional

meetings, initiatives and agreements are becoming an obstacle to
regional cooperation. The normal functioning of important struc-
tures such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA),
the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) or the Regional School
for Public Administration (ReSPA) could be jeopardised, if present
practices do not change. The Commission strongly encourages
all parties concerned to seek practical and pragmatic solutions in
order to ensure the inclusiveness of regional cooperation, without
prejudice to the differing positions on the status issue. The track
record in pursuing regional cooperation is assessed as part of the
Stabilisation and Association Process conditionality in all stages of
the enlargement process.62
The conditionality stick referred to here has not been the sole chan-
nel explored by the actors. Diplomacy and persuasion have played
an equally significant part. Reviving SEECPs mediating role has been
the ambition of Turkey, which succeeded Moldova at the helm of
the regional institution in 200910. The respected Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu, considered the architect of Ankaras policy of
engagement with all neighbouring countries and region, has taken a
special interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, beset by a prolonged con-
stitutional crisis since 2006. As tensions between Republika Srpska
and the Bosniak elites escalated, Davutoglu convened a trilateral

meeting with Jeremic and Sven Alkalaj, Bosnias top diplomat, on the
margins of a SEECP conference in Istanbul (October 2006). The meet-
ing set off a series of monthly meetings, which yielded some modest
results. The fifth trilateral, in Ankara, resulted in Bosnias decision
to send an ambassador to Belgrade, ending a three-year hiatus.63
Davutoglu also hosted a summit with Serbias President Boris Tadic
and the Bosniak member of Bosnia and Herzegovinas Presidency,
Haris Silajdic (26 April 2010).
Interests, norms and identities in Balkan political

cooperation
Unlike so many of the sectoral schemes examined in Chapters 4 and

5, SEECP and other political fora functioning in the Balkans have
been driven primarily by the local states themselves. SEECP has
been constantly praised by politicians and academic observers alike
as the authentic voice of the region, owing to its indigenous roots,
which reach as far back as the 1970s.64 Its merger with the functional
initiatives, via the RCC, has been intended to serve the purpose of
regional ownership, which became salient as Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion accelerated in the mid-2000s. Other ad hoc consultation initia-
tives have also had an inside-out character. Trilaterals pioneered by
Greece and Turkey in the mid-1990s reflected local power dynamics,
not outside push. Even when looking towards external anchors,
political cooperation has often been driven by internal causes. In
the run-up to Thessaloniki, Western Balkan leaders sought to forge
a common strategy towards the EU, not because of SAP conditional-
ity, but to maximize their voice vis--vis Brussels. External push has
been a critical factor only in the case of the US-launched Adriatic
Charter.
The autochtonous impetus for cooperation seems to privilege an
explanation centred on functional and security interdependence.
However, the causal link is disputable. All the way to the launch of
its thematic dimension (sectoral ministerials) and institutionaliza-
tion (RCC), SEECP output consisted, in the main, of rhetoric stress-
ing the value of cooperation between governments and peoples, and
the European identity and vocation of the participating countries.
For a long time, the deepening of cooperation, notably through the
formalization of SEECP, was cancelled by differing perspectives on

the institutions place in Balkan affairs. Economic fragmentation and
outstanding security issues have been tackled principally by the EU
and NATO. The transfer of responsibilities to the region itself is a rel-
atively new development, but even here the RCC institutional design
stands as a proof that external sponsorship remains paramount.
The various linkages that, figuratively speaking, put South East
European countries and governments in one boat, have often under-
mined cooperation. The crisis in Kosovo (19989), southern Serbia
and Macedonia (20001) and the unilateral proclamation of inde-
pendence of Kosovo in February 2008 have all but blocked SEECP,
whose main task should have been to build consensus on such chal-
lenges. Interdependence would also predict that Bosnia, Croatia and
even Slovenia would choose to take part of the grouping and this
has not been the case. Their original preference was to stay out, in
the case of Croatia and Slovenia largely because of SEECPs unmistak-
ably Balkan pedigree.
As neither interdependence nor political conditionality and other
push factors have been central, this singles out the pull effects
of norms and expectations in sustaining diplomatic clubs such as
SEECP. Starting from the mid-1990s, the indigenous scheme has
had a largely symbolical value as it conveyed to the West common
messages by the political elites of South East Europe. In the wake
of Dayton, this was the inviolability of borders, a proof that Balkan
irredentist nationalism had been consigned to the past. This could
be understood only in conjunction with the fears of a wider conflict,
fuelled by historical animosities and legacies of violence spilling over
the confines of ex-Yugoslavia, that were so prominent in the early
1990s.
Such normative expectations of good neighbourly relations grew
stronger with the end of the semi-authoritarian regimes in Croatia
and Serbia in 2000, when the new democratic elites pledged to
pursue their own return to Europe. In addition, to the peaceful
resolution of territorial and minority disputes, an old CSCE/OSCE
principle, NATO and the EU added a new emphasis on integration
and cooperative security. SEECP discursively embraced this credo,
symbolizing the regions transformation from a volatile semi-
European powder keg into a community governed by European
standards and practices.
The outward-oriented and rhetorical character of SEECP points in

the direction of the logic of appropriateness, discussed at the end
of Chapter 3. True, states have acted in pursuit of strategic interests.
Greece pursued a leadership position in the Balkans, while Turkish
governments claimed a stake in order to balance Greek influence,
whether real or potential. In 19968, FR Yugoslavia sought to over-
come isolation. As a rule, however, strategic gains have been made
not by SEECP, unwieldy because of its heterogenous membership and
unanimous decision-making, but by less-than-regional schemes (tri-
lateral cooperation, Adriatic Charter, Western Balkan dialogue, etc.).
In such cases, cooperation can be easily traced to the convergence of
actors interests and a structure of incentives that proceeds from the
region and, even more significantly, from outside poles of attraction
such as the EU. The perspective of identity politics gives the best ana-
lytical lens through which to understand the story of SEECP.
The rhetorical dynamic sustaining SEECP, as well as its question-
able utility as a regional trouble-shooter, does not necessarily mean
that the institution is politically irrelevant. The inevitable so what?
question should be answered with a reference to its slow, yet steady,
upgrade, manifest most recently by the RCC. Even before that, thanks
to its very existence, SEECP fostered better multilateral relations
across the Balkans, especially given the very low starting point in
the early 1990s. SEECP remains a unique institutional bridge linking
Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavias successors, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania
and Moldova. Finally, the discourse it has articulated, casting South
East Europe as an inseparable part of the European and Euro-Atlantic
community, has left its clear mark on the multi-layered process of
transformation seen in the Balkans over the past two decades.
Conclusion: Looking at the
Big Picture
Why has regional cooperation advanced and taken root in the

Balkans, after a period of wars, political instability and economic
hardship in the 1990s? This book argues that the reasons include
the push from outside and, more interestingly, the Balkans his-
torical identity as a European periphery. Exclusion has stimulated
local elites to mimic the practices of the international clubs of their
choice in order to reposition their countries on the post-Cold War
mental maps of Europe. Functional and security linkages have rarely
provided a sufficient inducement for Balkan actors to coordinate
policies and establish institutions, especially in large and diverse
groups and coalitions. Across various issue-areas, falling under both
low and high politics rubrics, deepening and widening of coopera-
tion reflected external impulses: first and foremost, the EU, but also
NATO, the US, and the IFIs. SAP, designed by the EU for the conflict-
ridden Western Balkans, deserves much of the credit.
Conflict management and reconstruction were the primary rea-
sons that external actors inaugurated regional cooperation. Their
input has been indispensable: calming down suspicions, overcom-
ing local opposition, providing encouragement both diplomatic
and financial and prescribing agendas, institutions, timetables and
targets. But why has such external imposition not been resisted,
even if governments would often recourse to lip-servicing or pro-
crastinating tactics? The argument presented here has to do with the
legitimacy of the demands and expectations vis--vis the Balkans.
The latter derive not just from the expertise or know-how of the
foreign patrons but also their capacity to harness the long-standing
152
Conclusion 153
symbolic capital of Europe as a harbinger of modernity and civili-

zation for societies on the south-eastern fringe. At the same time,
the normative contents of the centreperiphery relationship have
evolved. The EU-rope of the 1990s and 2000s is a different animal
from the Europe of sovereign nation-states that guided the vision of
Balkan nation-builders during the nineteenth and early twentieth
century.1 In that sense, regional cooperation has been not just a
functional instrument but a transformative experience, whose value
derives from the foundational norms and practices of the EU and the
wider Western community.
To what extent does the empirical material corroborate this claim?
In functional and economic sectors cooperative outcomes are clearly
explainable with reference to intra-regional demand and, even more
importantly, the external supply of policies and institutional frame-
works. Even in areas where demand has been weak, for example,
trade, outside push kept the process afloat. Normative expectations
of Europeanized foreign policy, meanwhile, have limited local
resistance, and facilitated and legitimized the actions of external
power centres, notably the EU. That has been particularly visible
with states sharing a clear preference for bilateral integration with
the EU and NATO (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, post-Tudman Croatia)
which have nonetheless complied with the standards of regional
cooperation, whether explicit or implicit.
Institutions dealing with military security and the rule-of-law issues
have followed a similar script. They have been largely an extension
of the stabilization, and subsequently, enlargement policies of NATO
and the EU. However, from the perspective of local states, such insti-
tutions have been significant conveyors of a positive image vis--vis
the outside world, and only in the second instance regional solutions
to regional problems. As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, this logic has
been tremendously significant for high-profile political platforms
such as SEECP, who speak on behalf of the region (identified as
more often as South East Europe than as the Balkans). Despite
its markedly rhetorical orientation, SEECP has strengthened trust
among countries, especially by rejecting territorial revisionism (at
least outside the special case of Kosovo), and presented evidence
of the Balkans political maturity and normalization. The latter
increasingly means also the capacity to take ownership of regional
affairs through arrangements and bodies such as the RCC.
Going back to the distinction drawn in the Introduction, iden-

tity politics advanced and sustained political and even functional
cooperation, while cost-benefit calculus has at times undermined it.
Indeed the pull of the EU has limited the extent, scope and depth of
regional cooperation in wider South East Europe (as opposed to the
Western Balkans) as it did in Central Europe prior to 2004. By con-
trast, the expectation that the backward and conflict-prone Balkans
should debalkanize in order to gain recognition by the EU, NATO
and the international community-writ-large, continue to legitimize
regional frameworks. Thus the involvement of external agents has
been both a boon and a bane for Balkan regionalism.
What is the larger significance of South East Europes case? Surely,
it cannot serve as an empirical test for the theories of regionalism and
regional integration; the sheer size of the region and its marginal to
put it mildly place in the global economy, disqualify it from doing
so. Yet the considerable attention generated by the Yugoslav wars of
succession in the 1990s makes the story significant for the IR general-
ist. It is worth reflecting on two themes in particular: the changing
paradigms of statehood and the issue of power.
The shift to regional cooperation and integration in the post-con-
flict Balkans is indicative of a evolving notion of statehood in Europe
and elsewhere. Previously fixated on exclusive territorial control and
jurisdictional autonomy, nowadays, the measure of success for a
small country in the international system is its ability to integrate and
benefit from access to larger markets at various levels: subregional,
regional, continental, and global. This notion of liberal openness
has been instrumental in the policies pursued by the international
institutions in South East Europe. As John Ruggie notes, multilateral
organizations, bodies of legal rules, institutions and technocratic
agencies have replaced the old-style diplomacy that was centred on
shifting alliances and customary norms (Ruggie, 1993). Domestically,
the triumph of democracy has redefined relations between states,
economies and societies and contributed to the exponential growth
of transnational flows in goods, services, capital and people. In
Europe, economic openness, intergovernmental cooperation and the
spread of democracy have been greeted as the pillars of a new order,
superseding the one imposed by the Cold War.2 During the 1990s,
the Balkans stood as a warning for post-1989 utopians, and illus-
trated the destructive potential of cultural particularisms, identity
Conclusion 155
politics, the pursuit of sovereignty and self-determination.3 Regional

cooperation as state practice, normative framework or even a rhe-
torical tool testifies that South East Europe has come, belatedly or
not, under the sway of the liberal wave in world politics.
However, this transformation has largely followed the operation
of power politics: a theme with which liberals are not always at ease.
US-led military interventions halted violence in ex-Yugoslavia. The
EU used its economic and political resources to engineer coopera-
tion across various policy-areas. Indeed Balkan regionalism reflects,
first and foremost, the power asymmetry between local and external
players. There are, still, two further caveats to keep in mind, both of
which touch on the effects and nature of power.
First, the external exercise of power has not compromised or
eroded the capacity to act, and the legitimacy, of Balkan govern-
ments and states. On the contrary, the intention behind the push for
multilateral arrangements has been to render local institutions more
functional and effective as regards their provision of public goods.
Regionalism has been one of the strategies to address the condition
of weak statehood, pervasive in parts of the Western Balkans, but by
no means a non-issue elsewhere in wider South East Europe. This is
particularly salient in such policy areas as police and justice coopera-
tion but also in assorted functional fields such as energy or transport.
Rather than diluting statehood and institutional capacity, regional-
ism and more broadly EU integration adds to them.
The second point concerns the very notion of power. At its most
fundamental, the Western institutions clout in South East Europe
has been rooted in such collective identity constructs as Europe,
modern civilization, and the West. In the Balkans, the desire for
recognition and inclusion has been a social force legitimating the
importation of domestic and international governance norms from
outside. To be sure, this ideological or symbolic power harnessed
by the EU, among other institutions, has not remained uncon-
tested whether by critical minds challenging the facile dichotomy
between the barbaric Balkans and civilized Europe/the West,4 or
by nationalist advocates of state autonomy and cultural authenticity,
hostile to the liberal catechism. However, the latter are rarely consist-
ent in their rejection. Long before the HDZ in Croatia, or factions
within the Serbian Radical Party, embraced the EU in the 2000s,
ethno-national entrepreneurs and paramilitaries in Bosnia or Kosovo
defended Christendom, by implication Europe and the West, from

its Islamic Other.5 Intellectual critics cannot deny that ideological
hegemony has contributed to peace in the region. Their rejection
of essentializing discourses has rarely led to an outright dismissal of
Western policies.
The EU forms a key part of this story as it is now right at the cen-
tre of this structural, centreperiphery power relationship inherited
from history. The Unions leading involvement in South East Europe
hints at the ways it has constructed, projected and employed its
power, both material and normative that is the ability to define
what counts for normal in international politics (Manners, 2002).
As Kalypso Nicoladis and Robert Howse observe, [the EUs] power
rests on the synergies between [its] being, its political essence, and
its doing, its external actions, or what some later referred to as the
contrast between its simple presence and its agency or actorness
(emphasis original) (Nicoladis and Howse, 2002, p. 771). While
conditionality and the diverse methods of regime-setting exemplify
the Unions doing mode of shaping regional cooperation in South
East Europe, the being mode is very important in understanding the
linkage between model-projection, legitimization, and, ultimately,
the diffusion of the practices and standards of regional cooperation
towards the periphery.
Animated by a complex interplay between identity and utilitarian
motives, Balkan regional cooperation reflects many of the dilemmas
salient in the era of globalization: the tension between inclusion and
exclusion, the triumph of liberalism versus the self-reproducing logic
of power, and Europes tangled quest for a place in world politics.
Appendix I
Regional Institutions in South East Europe: An Overview
Regional institution Established Participants Issue coverage Structure

Adriatic Charter Process 2003 Albania, Croatia, Security-sector reform; Ad-hoc ministerials,
Macedonia, NATO accession; joint interparliamentary
US (initiator), military exercises dialogue, conferences
Montenegro (2008), of senior officials and
BiH (2008); Serbia military staff
(observer)
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative 2000 Italy (initiator), SMEs; transport and Conferences of foreign
Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, maritime cooperation; ministers and senior
www.seadriatic.net/aii Montenegro, Albania, tourism, culture officials organized by an
Greece education; annually rotating
environment and fire presidency; secretariat
protection (2008)
Central European Free 2006 (1992) Western Balkans, Trade in industrial Joint ministerial
Trade Association (CEFTA) Bulgaria and Romania goods, agriculture committee and
(until 2007) products, services; subcommittees chaired
www.cefta2006.com non-tariff barriers; by a rotating presidency;
investment and secretariat;
intellectual property chambers of commerce
issues forum
(Continued)
158
Appendix I
Continued

European Civil Aviation 2006 EU (initiator), Western Air transport For the Western Balkans:
Area (ECAA) Balkans, Norway, bilateral Stabilization
Iceland and Association Process
ec.europa.eu/transport/air/ committees
international_aviation/ (implementation
country_index/ monitoring); civil
ecaa_en.htm aviation authorities
dialogue under the
Stability Pact/RCC;
EUROCONTROL bodies
Energy Community 2005 Parties: EU (initiator), Electricity, gas, Ministerial council;
Western Balkans, oil regulatory permanent high-level
www.energy-community.org Moldova and Ukraine; cooperation group (senior officials);
Participants: Austria, regulatory forum;
Bulgaria, Cyprus, secretariat; fora on
Czech Republic, electricity, gas, social
France, Germany, affairs, oil
Greece, Hungary, Italy,
The Netherlands,
Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, UK;
Observers: Georgia,
Norway, Turkey
Investment Compact for 2000 Western Balkans, Foreign and domestic Annual ministerial
South East Europe Bulgaria, Romania, investment reform conference;
Moldova, Investment Compact
www.investmentcompact.org OECD (initiator) Committee overseeing
implementation;
Working groups (human
capital, tax policy,
investment promotion,
regulatory reform)
Regional Cooperation 2008 SEECP members Economic and Annual meeting (senior
Council (successor to (including Kosovo/ social development; officials or foreign
the Stability UNMIK), EU, infrastructure and ministers) held
www.rcc.int Pact, 1999- donor countries energy; justice and back-to-back with SEECP
2008) and international home affairs; security; ministerials/summits;
organizations and human capital RCC board (meeting
financial institutions and parliamentary quarterly); secretariat
exchange headed by Secretary
General
Sava Commission 2001 BiH, Croatia, Serbia, Transboundary Intergovernmental
Slovenia waterways; water commission; secretariat;
www.savacommission.org management; natural permanent and ad-hoc
disaster prevention expert groups
Appendix I
and protection
(Continued)
159
Continued
160
Appendix I
South East Europe Security 2000 Albania, Austria, Security-sector reform; Dialogue of ambassadors
Cooperation Steering Group BiH, Bulgaria, threat assessment to NATO; expert groups
(SEEGROUP) Croatia, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, the
www.nato.int/seei Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia,
Slovenia, Switzerland,
Turkey, UK, US
South East European 1996 (1988) Albania, BiH Political affairs; Annual conferences
Cooperation Process (SEECP) (2000), Bulgaria, trade and economic of foreign ministers
Croatia (2005), cooperation; energy and heads of state and
Greece, Kosovo/ and transport; justice government organized
UNMIK, Macedonia, and home affairs by a rotating presidency;
Montenegro, Moldova committee of political
(2006), Romania, directors; parliamentary
Serbia , Turkey cooperation; sectoral
ministerials; meetings of
senior officials
South East European 1996 Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Cross-border Secretariat (under
Cooperation Initiative Croatia (2000), Greece, infrastructure; OSCE); Business
(SECI) Hungary, Kosovo/ trade facilitation; Advisory Council;
UNMIK, Macedonia, transnational Regional Centre for
www.secinet.info Moldova, Montenegro, organized crime Combating Transborder
www.secicenter.org Romania, Serbia Crime; (Bucharest); SECI
www.secipro.net (2000), Slovenia, PRO network
Turkey
South East European Defence 1996 Albania, Bulgaria, Security-sector Conferences of defence
Ministerial Greece, Italy, reform, peacekeeping ministers organized
Macedonia, Romania, operations, by annually rotating
www.seebrig.org Turkey; counter-terrorism, chairmanship;
Non-MPFSEE defence research and Multinational Peace
members: US development Force for South East
(initiator), BiH Europe (MPFSEE/
(2007), Croatia SEEBRIG): chiefs of staff
(2000), Montenegro committee,
(2010), Serbia (2010), Politico-Military
Slovenia, Ukraine Committee, military
(2005); Observers: command
Georgia, Moldova
Stabilization and Association 1999 EU (initiator), Western Political affairs; EU-Western Balkans
Process (regional dimension) (successor to Balkans economic cooperation; ministerial conferences;
the Regional EU integration sectoral dialogue: justice
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ Approach, and home affairs, visa
index_en.htm 1996-99) regimes, infrastructure,
energy and transport
Transport negotiations EU (initiator), Western Transport (road, rail, Ministerial conferences;
community ongoing Balkans air, waterways) South East European
infrastructure Transport Observatory
www.seetoint.org and regulatory (SEETO, 2004)
Appendix I
harmonization
161
Appendix II
Regional Cooperation in South East Europe: A Timeline
198894
256 February 1988 Balkan foreign ministers meet for a first time in
Belgrade
245 October 1990 Second conference is held in Tirana
June 1991 War breaks out consecutively in Slovenia and
Croatia
April 1992 War breaks out in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 June 1992 Black Sea Economic Cooperation established in
Istanbul
NovemberDecember Romania and Bulgaria sign Europe Agreements
1992 with the EU
223 June 1993 The EU Copenhagen Council declares the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe eligible for
membership and adopts entry criteria
1011 January 1994 NATOs Brussels Summit initiates Partnership for
Peace (PfP)
JanuaryMarch 1994 Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Slovenia join PfP
1995
201 March The EU inaugurates the Pact on Stability in Europe
22 June Romania submits EU membership application
26 August Greek, Bulgarian and Romanian foreign ministers
meet in Ioannina calling for renewal of the 1980s
Balkan ministerials
13 September Greece and Macedonia sign an interim agreement
normalizing relations
15 November Macedonia joins PfP
21 November/ Dayton/Paris Peace Accords end the war in Bosnia
14 December
13 December Launch of the Royaumont Process
16 December Bulgaria applies for EU membership
1996
19 February Presidents Tudman, Izetbegovic and Miloevic
meet in Rome and commit to implement Dayton
267 February EU Council inaugurates the Regional Approach
towards the Western Balkans
162
Appendix II 163
Continued
27 February The European Council adopts a common position

on Royaumonts objectives
21 March Balkan defence ministers establish the South East
Defence Ministerial (SEDM) in Tirana
67 July Balkan foreign ministers meet in Sofia after a
six-year interruption. SEECP is launched
15 August Tudman, Izetbegovic and Miloevic meet in
Geneva
2 October The European Commission presents an outline of
the Regional Approach
56 December The South East European Cooperative Initiative
(SECI) is activated after a US-EU agreement
1997
2930 April The EU Council of Ministers lays out its
conditionality vis--vis Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and FR Yugoslavia
910 June SEECP foreign ministers meet in Thessalonki
1 July Romania joins the Central European Free Trade
Association (CEFTA)
34 November Balkan heads of state and government meet for a
first time in Crete. SEECP is inaugurated
3 October Second SEDM ministerial in Sofia
1213 December In Luxembourg, the EU Council invites certain
candidate countries to start membership
negotiations. Bulgaria and Romania are excluded
while Turkey not recognized as candidate
1998
February Violence in Kosovo escalates
10 March Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Macedonia and Turkey
reach a common position on the unfolding Kosovo
crisis
89 June FR Yugoslavia blocks a joint SEECP position
26 September In Skopje, SEDM ministers agree to establish a
multinational peace force (MPFSEE)
13 October SEECP Summit in Antalya supports Kosovo
autonomy within FR Yugoslavia
12 November EU Council integrates Royaumont into CFSP
1999
January Bulgaria joins CEFTA
MarchJune War in Kosovo
(Continued)
164 Appendix II
Continued
May 1999 Agreement on the establishment of a SECI regional

centre on transnational crime in Bucharest
10 June Stability Pact for South East Europe (SP) is adopted
by the EU Council in Cologne
30 July SP unveiled in Sarajevo, German politician Bodo
Hombach is appointed special coordinator
August 1999 MPFSEE stationed in Plovdiv
27 September SP work plan adopted stressing regional
cooperation
September Greek-Turkish rapprochement begins after the
earthquake in western Turkey
1011 December The EU Helsinki Council decides to start
membership negotiations with Bulgaria and
Romania as well as to grant Turkey candidate
status
2000
January Croatian elections bring to power a centre-left
coalition led by Ivica Racan
January SP group on trade liberalization convened
7 February Bodo Hombach brokers a deal on a second Danube
bridge between Bulgaria and Romania
1213 February SEECP Charter on Good-Neighbourly Relations,
Stability and Cooperation adopted in Bucharest
16 February SP starts its anti-corruption initiative (SPAI)
March SP environment reconstruction programme
2930 March SP donors pledge a2.4bn in grants and loans to
Balkan countries
1920 May The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative is inaugurated in
Ancona
25 May Croatia joins PfP
1920 June The EU Feira Council declares the five Western
Balkan countries
potential candidates for membership
14 July Croatia attends a SEECP ministerial for a first time
18 September The EU adopts a regulation liberalizing trade with
the Western Balkan states
5 October SP initiative on organized crime (SPOC)
5 October Miloevic falls from power
October South East Europe Security Cooperation Group
(SEEGROUP) is launched
20 October Regional Arms Control Centre (RACVIAC) opens
in Zagreb
Appendix II 165
Continued
256 October Extraordinary summit in Skopje welcomes Serbia

back into SEECP. Serbia joins SP
24 November First EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb
15 December EU CARDS programme for the Western Balkans is
activated
2001
223 February In Skopje SEECP adopts an economic action plan.
Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a full member.
FebruaryMarch Conflict erupts in Macedonia
5 April Balkan states fail to agree on deploying MPFSEE in
Macedonia
9 April Macedonia signs a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the EU
11 April Successor states reach an agreement on dividing
former Yugoslavias assets
1 May MPFSEE is declared operational
27 June SP beneficiaries sign a memorandum on trade
liberalization
27 June SP launches regional agenda on refugee return
28 June Moldova joins SP
13 August The Ohrid Framework Agreements ends the
conflict in Macedonia
256 October Second SP donor conference held in Bucharest
30 October Croatia sings a SAA with the EU
28 November Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR
Yugoslavia agree to internationalize the Sava River
and establish a joint regulatory commission.
20 December At a SEDM meeting, the US urges participating
states to deploy MPFSEE in peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans
2002
1 January Erhard Busek appointed SP Special Coordinator
13 February Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania launch
the two-by-two cooperation linked to NATO
expansion
28 March SEECP Summit in Tirana calls for deepening
economic cooperation
15 July In Sarajevo, Presidents Stipan Mesic and Vojislav
Kotunica and the three members of Bosnias
collective presidency agree to cooperate on refugee
returns, ICTY, economic matters and organized crime
(Continued)
166 Appendix II
Continued
6 November Intergovernmental conference on Balkan organized

crime in London
11 November Energy ministers initiate the integration of regional
electricity markets in South East Europe
212 November Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are invited to join
NATO at the Prague Summit
1213 December The EUs Copenhagen Council sets 2007 as target
for Bulgaria and Romanias Accession
2003
21 February Croatia applies for EU membership
March Croatia joins CEFTA
3 March SEECP interior ministers meet in Belgrade
9 April SEECP sixth summit held in Belgrade. Bosnia and
Herzegovina assumes chairmanship
16 April Cyprus, Malta and eight Central European and
Baltic states sign EU accession treaty in Athens
2 May Albania, Croatia and Macedonia sign the Adriatic
Charter aimed to facilitate their accession to NATO
June Croatian government announces lifting the visa
requirement for citizens of Serbia and Montenegro
for the summer season. As of December 2004, it
extends the arrangement on an annual basis
3 June Western Balkan presidents sign a joint declaration
calling the EU to speed up their integration
21 June EU-Western Balkans summit at Porto Carras near
Thessaloniki
10 September Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia
extend mutual apologies for atrocities committed
by each side during the wars of the 1990s
13 November The completion of bilateral FTAs is announced at a
trade ministerial in Rome
8 December Second Athens memorandum calling for the
establishment of an energy community in South
East Europe
2004
21 April SEECP summit in Sarajevo. Romania assumes
chairmanship
1 May EU enlarges to eight post-communist countries,
Malta and Cyprus
11 June Western Balkan ministers sign a memorandum
on Core Regional Transport Network. Transport
Observatory (SEETO) established in Belgrade
Appendix II 167
Continued
18 June Croatia recognized as a candidate country

6 December President Boris Tadic offers apology to Bosnia and
Herzegovinas citizens
2005
January The governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia and Croatia launch an initiative on refugee
returns in Sarajevo (3X4 initiative)
March Public Prosecutors Network (PROSECO)
established
11 May Summit in Bucharest. Greece assumes SEECP
chairmanship
June Trade ministers adopt CEFTA 2006 agreement
3 October Croatia invited to start membership negotiations
with EU
October Energy Community Treaty is signed in Athens
December Ukraine and Moldova join SEDM
17 December Macedonia recognized as candidate country,
2006
FebAug SEEBRIG HQ is deployed in Kabul
11 March EU-Western Balkans ministerial conference at
Salzburg
4 May SEECP summit in Thessaloniki welcomes Moldova
as a full member. Croatia assumes chairmanship
European Common Aviation Area is launched
SEE Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA) established
in Vienna
Regional School of Public Administration opens
Danilovgrad, Montenegro
21 May A majority of Montenegrin citizens vote for
independence at a referendum
9 June Treaty on the European Civil Aviation Area signed
12 June Albania signs SAA
26 June Regional Framework for Investment adopted by
the Investment Compact countries in Vienna
July Macedonia joins CEFTA
November Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina join
PfP
1314 November EU foreign ministers approve visa facilitation and
readmission agreements with Western Balkan
countries
1 December SEETO ministerial in Brussels
(Continued)
168 Appendix II
Continued
December Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia

ratify the Energy Community Treaty
19 December CEFTA 2006 is signed in Bucharest
2007
1 January Bulgaria and Romania join the EU
EU launches the Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance (IPA)
March 2007 Prime Ministers Putin, Karamanlis and Stanishev
sign an agreement on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis
oil pipeline in Athens
11 May Summit in Zagreb. Bulgaria assumes SEECP
chairmanship
1 July Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus establish a
joint batallion (HELBROC)
September Visa facilitation and readmission agreements
signed
15 October Montenegro and EU sign SAA.
SEE investment committee established
October Energy Community social forum set up
November Gazprom and the Italian energy firm ENI
sign an agreement on the South Stream gas
pipeline
4 Dec Tirana ministerial of SEETO
2008
28 Jan EU launches structured dialogue on visa
liberalization with Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro
and Albania
February Transport Community proposed
17 February Kosovo Assembly declares independence from
Serbia
February Regional Cooperation Council is inaugurated
289 March Slovenia hosts a EU-Western Balkan Summit at
Brdo pri Kranju
29 April Serbia signs SAA
21 May SEECP summit in Pomorie sees serious frictions
over Kosovo. Moldova assumes chairmanship
16 June Bosnia and Herzegovina signs SAA
19 June The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative inaugurates its
secretariat in Ancona
September RCC convenes a conference on streamlining JHA
initiatives
Appendix II 169
Continued
September The Police Cooperation Convention (PCC) for

South East Europe opens a secretariat in Ljubljana
December Energy Community oil forum established
4 December Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro join the
Adriatic Charter Process
15 Dec Montenegro submits membership application
2009
March Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania remove
bilateral visa regime
1 April Albania and Croatia join NATO, Macedonias entry
is deferred because of the unresolved name issue
with Greece.
29 April Albania submits membership application
1 June Serbia and Turkey sign a FTA
5 June Summit in Chisinau held back-to-back with
RCC annual conference. Turkey assumes SEECP
chairmanship
13 July Nabucco pipeline agreement signed in Ankara by
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria
31 July Prime Ministers Jadranka Kosor and Borut Pahor
reach agreement to settle border dispute between
Croatia and Slovenia. Slovenia unblocks its
neighbours EU membership negotiations
9 October Unofficial SEECP summit in Istanbul
9 December Convention on SEE Law Enforcement Centre
(SELEC) signed in Bucharest by SECI members
19 Dec Schengen visas for short-term travel abolished for
citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia
23 Dec Serbia submits membership application
2010
January Serbia becomes full member of SEDM
February Bosnia and Herzegovina signs extradition treaties
with Croatia and Serbia
17 March Moldova joins the Energy Community
20 March Boris Tadic boycotts Western Balkan summit in
Brdo pri Kranju
31 March Serbian parliament adopts by a narrow majority a
resolution condemning the Srebrenica genocide
13 April Croatian President Ivo Josipovic apologizes for his
countrys involvement in the Bosnian war
23 June Montenegro assumes SEECP chairmanship
170 Appendix II
Continued
22 July The International Court of Justice rules that

Kosovos 2008 proclamation of independence was
legal
30 August National railways of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia
establish a joint company, Cargo 10
8 November EU grants abolish visas for Albania and Bosnia
Herzegovina
9 November European Commission recommends that
Montenegro be given official candidate status
Notes
Introduction
1. BalkanInsight.com, 5 March 2010.
2. There is no single agreed definition of South East Europe, as there are dif-
ferent, often clashing, criteria including geography, political history, cul-
ture, economic development and so forth (see Chapter 3). This book opts
for inclusiveness and covers Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Romania, and
Turkey. Slovenia, Moldova, Hungary and even Ukraine are also occasion-
ally brought into the narrative to the extent that they have taken part in
certain regional institutions.
3. The number of those who thought so was highest in Macedonia (29
per cent) and Serbia (29 per cent). Gallup, Balkan Monitor. Insights and
Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans, 2008, p. 62. <http://www.balkan-
monitor.eu, accessed 30 April 2010>.
4. On transnational civil society, see Sotiropoulos (2005).
5. Judahs starting point is the post-Yugoslavs reference to our countries,
pp. 1ff. Similar observations had been made earlier by Tihomir Loza in
Yugoslavia: Rising from the Ashes, Transitions Online, 7 March 2007.
6. This definition draws on Keohane and Axelrod (1993, p. 85).
7. Following the definition given by Krasner (1983, p. 2).
8. For a snapshot of the issues at hand in the period before the Kosovo con-
flict, see Centre for Liberal Strategies (1997).
9. For a sceptical assessment of the economic value of regional cooperation
see Simic (2001). See also his chapter in van Meurs (2001, pp. 7293).
10. For the argument that regional challenges, including organized crime,
necessitate regional responses, see Altmann (2003).
11. Radovan Vukadinovic (1994) has taken an even more radical position,
positing these initiatives as an extension of external patrons alliance-
building strategy, rather than resulting form an indigenous impulse.
This viewpoint is in contrast with the perspective of Greek scholars
emphasizing intra-regional drivers and not least the leadership role of
Konstantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou in the 197080s
(Kofos, 1991; Veremis, 1995, pp. 3251).
12. Alison Baylis, one-time fellow at the WEU Institute for Security Studies
(now EUISS), has famously characterized those groups as the Cinderellas
of European security. See Sub-regional Organisations: The Cinderellas of
European Security, NATO Review, 45 (2), March 1997, pp. 2731. On the
case of CEFTA in the 1990s, see Dangerfield (2000).
13. For a detailed account, see Delevic (2007).
171
172 Notes
14. See also Minic (2000, pp. 6986), Lopandic (2002). Other authors seeking
a balance between inside-out and outside-in perspectives include Tsipis
(1996) and Tsakonas (1999).
15. Other contributions deserving a mention include Dinkov (2002) and,
concerning the 197080s period, Colt (1983) and Lipatti (1988).
16. There are, of course, some important exceptions. Florian Bieber (2003)
has made a set of interesting theoretical observations on regional coop-
eration in reference to the Stability Pact.
17. Charalambos Tsardanidis (2001), for instance, brings in insights from the
literature on new regionalism in International Political Economy. He,
however, arrives at the conclusion that Balkan regional cooperation does
not represent an instance of new regionalism, which begs the question
of why use it as a yardstick in the first place.
18. Amitav Acharya and Alistair Iain Johnston, Comparing Institutions:
an Introduction, in Acharya and Johnston (eds) Crafting Cooperation.
Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2007, pp. 189.
19. Idem, Imagined (Security) Communities, Millennium, 26 (2), 1997, pp.
24978;
20. As early as 1990, Christopher Cviic (1990, p. 126) foresaw the forma-
tion of two integration blocs in South East Europe, Balkania, defined by
Byzantine and Orthodox heritage, and Kleinmitteleuropa where Austro-
Hungarian and Catholic traditions prevailed.
21. Cf. Vucetic (2001). Vucetic assesses the Balkan case against the
(neo)Deutschian paradigm proposed by Emanuel Adler and Michael
Barnett (1998).
22. For an excellent recent addition, see Rotta (2008).
23. Mircea Geoana, statement at the ministerial meeting of the South East
European Cooperation Process, Belgrade, 19 June 2002.
24. In the context of IR, see Hollis and Smith (1990). While Hollis and Smith,
as others, posit explaining and understanding as fundamentally different
modes of studying a phenomenon, there is still a strong case for combin-
ing the two. Cf. King, Keohane and Verba (1993, pp. 3643).
25. The concept of appropriateness is taken from James March and Johan
Olsen (1989) who distinguish utility-maximizing behaviour (logic of
consequences) from norm following (logic of appropriateness).
26. On transnationalism in the region see Kostovicova and Bojicic-Delilovic
(2009).
1 All in the Same Boat? Regional Interdependence and

Cooperation in South East Europe
1. Cf. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, pp. 159).
2. On Greece and Turkey, see respectively Pagoulatos (2003) and nis
(1999).
Notes 173
3. G. Petrakos and S. Totev, Economic Structure and Change in the

Balkan Region. Implications for Integration, Transition and Economic
Co-operation, paper presented at the conference European Space and
Territorial Integration Alternatives, Thessaloniki, 1618 October 1998,
p. 18.
4. Albanias exports/imports to and from Greece increased from 3 per cent
to 7.2 per cent in 1994 to 10.4 per cent/24.3 per cent in 1994. The same
figures for Bulgaria were at 1.3 per cent/0.4 per cent (1989) and 7.8 per
cent/ 4.8 per cent (1994).
5. Turkeys trade with Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia,
Greece and FR Yugoslavia increased from $900m in 1992 to $1.75bn in
1995 (3 per cent of its overall volume). The bulk of economic exchange
took place with Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia. Turkey: Balkan
Strategy, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 16 April 1998.
6. Data for Greece and Macedonia cover 1994, for Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania, Croatia, and Turkey 1995, for FR Yugoslavia 1996.
7. Of course, politics had a lasting impact on economics too: FR Yugoslavias
trade with Croatia was negligible.
8. G. Petrakos (2002), The Balkans in the New European Economic Space,
Problems of Adjustment and Policies of Development, Eastern European
Economics, 40(4), JulyAugust, pp. 630.
9. Greece was likewise interested in linking its electricity transmission grid
with that in the Italian province of Puglia as its access to Serbia was lost.
10. The Muslim population in Greek (Western) Thrace is 150,000 in number.
Predominantly ethnic Turkish, it also includes Slav-speaking Pomaks and
Roma. While Turkey insists on the term Turkish minority, Greece points
at the 1923 Lausanne Conventions religious definition and reference to
Muslims. Cf. Poulton and S. Taji-Farouki (1997).
11. For an overview of Greco-Turkish relations, before and after the 1999
rapprochement, see Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem (2009).
12. See the introductory essay in Bechev (2009).
13. Buzan and Waever saw the Balkans as a separate regional complex in the
early 1990s that, with the Kosovo conflict of 19989, became a subset of
the larger European unit (2003, pp. 3956).
14. On Greek policy towards the Yugoslav conflict in the early 1990s, see
Michas (2003).
15. Miloevic extended an offer to Greece for a confederation which was
rumoured to have contained a secret annex on Macedonias partition. Wall
Street Journal, 26 June 1992; Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 20 June 1992.
16. For the different scenarios on the future of Macedonia floated in the early
1990s, see S. Troebst, Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?, RFE/ RL Research
Reports, vol. 3, no. 4, 28 January 1994, p. 33.
17. For the nature and the origins of the phenomenon, see the essays in
Athanassopolou (2005).
18. An in-depth analysis of the Bosnian wars impact on smuggling and orga-
nized crime in Hajdinjak (2000).
174 Notes
19. In Bulgaria, the government of the Union of Democratic Forces was blamed
for providing political cover for smugglers operating across the common
boundary with Serbia. In 2000, the Romanian President Constantinescu
accused former Prime Minister Theodore Stolojan of involvement in a
sanctions-breaking scheme. Coalition partners Ljubco Georgievski (VMRO-
DPMNE) and Arben Xhaferi (Democratic Party of the Albanians) were said
to have divided the control over smuggling channels through Macedonias
northern border. For further on this see Hajdinjak (2000).
2 Pushing for Cooperation: External Actors in Balkan

Regionalism
1. On the great powers impact on the Balkans throughout history, see
Glenny (1999).
2. For a study of the international diplomatic efforts to stop the Yugoslav
war (19915), see Lucarelli (2001).
3. On UNPREDEP, see Siani-Davies (2003, pp. 10520).
4. That extension of OHR powers was agreed during a summit of the Peace
Implementation Council held in Bonn in December 1997: hence, the
Bonn powers.
5. For an overview of US policy in the Balkans in mid-1990s, see Larrabee
(1997).
6. The initiative was steered by Richard Schifter, special adviser to the US
Secretary of State.
7. SECIs Statement of Purpose defined it as a regional forum at political
and expert level for the discussion of regional economic and environ-
mental issues (Shtonova, 1998, p. 33).
8. The full texts of the Common Points and SECIs founding declaration can
be found at www.secinet.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
9. Point 7 of the document put it bluntly: SECI will focus on projects which
will not compete with those of other international initiatives or institu-
tions, including particularly the EUs policies and projects in the region
(for example, Regional Approach, Pre-accession Strategy). SECI will be
informed of the projects developed by the Union, the U.S. and others,
but will not have any oversight of them. SECI will ensure that the EU
and others providing assistance are informed of SECIs work. To boost
cooperation, the coordinators of the EUs Royaumont initiative and SECI
started, in 1998, co-chairing a working party on the Future of South East
Europe at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).
10. US Trade and Development Agency, Executive Summary Albanian
Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Pipeline Corporation (Trans-Balkan Pipeline
Project), 1 May 2000. <http://www.tda.gov/summaries/pdfs/99-70008A.
pdf, accessed 30 April 2010>.
11. The EC launched PHARE in December 1989. Originally aimed at Poland
and Hungary, the programme was later extended to all Central and
Notes 175
Eastern European countries. OBNOVA (meaning renewal) was an

instrument initiated in 1996 to help the reconstruction efforts in former
Yugoslavia.
12. On Slovenias relations with the EU in the 1990s, see Brinar (1999). On
Romania and Bulgaria, see respectively Phinnemore (2001) and Dimitrov
(2000).
13. 1903d General Affairs Council Conclusions, 26 February 1996, PRES/96/33,
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament COM (96) 476 final, 2 October 1996. The conditional-
ity principle was also established vis--vis the three main Yugoslav succes-
sors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FR Yugoslavia by the General
Affairs Council during its meeting on 2930 April 1997, PRES/97/129
of the 2003rd Council Meeting General Affairs Luxembourg, 2930
April 1997.
14. The Economist, 18 March 1995, p. 55.
15. Besides the agreements, the Stability Pact convened multilateral regional
tables in Central Europe and the Baltic area, but these were not institu-
tionalized and had a secondary importance.
16. For instance, the GreekAlbanian dispute over Northern Epirus remained
outside the scope of the Pact, as it involved a member state and a non-
associate country (cf. Smith, 1999, p. 157).
17. On INTERREG, see Centre for Liberal Strategies (1997, pp. 569).
18. Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional Cooperation in Europe,
Brussels, 1 December 1997, COM (97) 659 final, points 20 and 21, p. 6
19. Roumeliotis was later promoted to the position of a Special Representative
under Javier Solana.
20. Partnership for Peace: Invitation, Press Communiqu M-1(94)2, issued
by the Heads of State and Government, participating in the Meeting of
the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 1011 January
1994.
21. North Atlantic Council, Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels,
September 1995.
22. Jeffrey Simon, Partnership For Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit
and Kosovo, National Defense University Strategic Forum, No 167, August
1999.
23. A cornerstone in the so-called European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI), CJTFs principal goal was to enable European allies to act alone in
humanitarian crises drawing, on a case-by-case basis, on NATO assets.
24. Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Slovenia joined PfP in JanuaryMarch
1994. Macedonias accession was delayed by the dispute with Greece over
its name and national symbols. It finally joined PfP on 15 November
1995, after a compromise agreement was signed with Athens. Croatia
became part of the initiative on 25 May 2000 after the change in govern-
ment four and a half months beforehand. Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia
and Herzegovina joined in December 2006.
25. C. Bildt, Dj vu in Kosovo, Financial Times, 910 June 1998.
176 Notes
26. Some momentum towards a similar initiative had been built during the
Austrian Presidency in the latter part of 1998. The Vienna Council (1112
December 1998) adopted a Common Strategy on the Western Balkans in
a bid to upgrade the available instruments (Biermann, 1999, pp. 123).
27. As Joschka Fischer put it at the time, [t]he previous policy of the interna-
tional community vis-a-vis former Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It
concentrated on the consequences instead of on the sources of conflict,
and it tackled the problems of the region individually and separately
from the ones in other parts of Europe. Speech by Joschka Fischer, at the
Conference of the Foreign Ministers concerning the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999. Quoted in Biermann (1999, p. 6).
28. The formula was reached at the General Affairs Council on 17 May 1999.
29. Here is a shortlist of the Pacts objectives: (1) preventing and putting
an end to tensions and crises as a prerequisite for lasting stability; (2)
bringing about mature democratic processes; (3) encouraging regional
confidence building measures; (4) preserving the multinational and mul-
tiethnic diversity of countries in the region, and protecting minorities;
(5) creating vibrant market economies; (5) fostering economic coopera-
tion in the region and between the region and the rest of Europe and the
world; (6) promoting unimpeded contacts among citizens; (7) combating
organized crime, corruption and terrorism and all criminal and illegal
activities; (8) preventing forced population displacement; (9) ensuring
the safe return of all refugees; (10) creating the conditions, for countries
of southeastern Europe, for full integration into political, economic and
security structures of their choice. Point 10, Stability Pact for South East
Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999.
30. Point 20, Stability Pact.
31. Point 10, Stability Pact.
32. Since 1999, Montenegro has participated in the Pact as an observer
(Guest to the Chair). Yugoslavia joined the SP in October 2000. Moldova
became the ninth beneficiary state by joining the Pact in June 2001.
33. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established in 1992 on Turkeys
initiative. Its members included the six riparian countries, Albania,
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Armenia. BSEC was institutionalized
and became an international organization in 1999.
34. Greece pushed initially for the appointment of Panagiotis Roumeliotis. It
reversed its position only when Thessaloniki, and not Prishtina as origi-
nally proposed, was chosen to be the seat of the European Agency for
Reconstruction (Friis and Murphy, 2000, p. 776).
35. The non-EU staff members in the Special Coordinators office were sec-
onded from participating states and organizations. The overall budget of
the Brussels office was a2m (ESI and EastWest Institute, 2001, p. 9).
36. All priority areas under the SP are given as they appeared at its inception
in 1999. There were introduced certain changes in all three Working
Tables during the following years.
37. The Thessaloniki Agenda for Stability highlighted the following issue-
areas where joint action was necessary: the return of refugees and
Notes 177
internally displaced persons, strengthening education, and media inde-

pendence (WT1); reform of the business and investment environment,
private sector development, trade cooperation and liberalization, and
infrastructure development (WT2); security sector reform, fight against
corruption, and organized crime (WT3). Stability Pact for South East
Europe, Regional Table, Thessaloniki Agenda for Stability, Thessaloniki,
8 June 2000. The programmatic document underpinning the SPs
economic was prepared by the World Bank (2000).
38. Interview with Nikola Todorcevski, National Coordinator of the SP,
Macedonia, Skopje, September 2003.
39. The SAAs cover areas like trade, legal harmonization, and political dia-
logue. Unlike the European Agreements, they put a great emphasis on
regional cooperation (see below). For a comparison between the Europe
Agreements and the SAA concluded in 2001 with Macedonia and Croatia
see Phinnemore, 2003, pp. 77103.
40. Point 67, Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European
Council, No. 200/1/00, 19 and 20 June 2000.
41. Point 15, Washington Summit Declaration, 24 April 1999. For an account
of the EU efforts to build an international coalition in support of the SP,
see Friis and Murphy (2000) and Biermann (1999).
42. EAPC succeeded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It was inaugu-
rated at the Sintra Summit (1997).
43. The hurdle for Bosnia and Herzegovina was the absence of a federal min-
istry of defence, while Serbia-Montenegro was delayed mainly due to the
issue of high-profile extraditions to The Hague-based ICTY.
44. On NATO enlargement policy in South East Europe, see Perry and Keridis
(2004).
45. Point 3, EU-Western Balkan Summit Declaration, Zagreb, 24 November
2000.
46. Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000, 15 December 2000. Furthermore,
CARDS focused to a great extent, on a regional cooperation element. Its
strategy paper singled out several priorities including (1) multilateral
trade facilitation measures (integrated border management to tackle
existing bottlenecks, mutual recognition of standards); (2) infrastructure
development and air-control cooperation; (3) the environment; (4) sta-
tistical cooperation. The programme allotted a197m for those priority
areas in the period 20024. European Commission, External Relations
Directorate, CARDS Assistance Programme for the Western Balkans, Regional
Strategy Paper 20022004, Brussels, 2001, pp. 1416, 2024.
47. European Commission, Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) Multi-
annual Indicative Financial Framework (20082010), Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM689
final, Brussels, 6 November 2007; Commission Decision 2007/2205 estab-
lishing a Multi-Beneficiary Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document
(MIPD) 20079, 29 May 2007.
48. For a detailed catalogue of the EU initiatives covering more than 90
measures, see European Commission, EU Regionally Relevant Activities in
178 Notes
the Western Balkans, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2009)128 final,

Brussels, 3 February 2009.
49. Stability Pact for South East Europe, Building a More Effective Stability Pact
Strategy and Approach of Working Table II, December 2002.
50. For an overall assessment of the Pacts performance as well as its rela-
tionship with SAP, see H. Brey and C. Hopf (2004). The volume contains
contributions from some of the SP chief architects and functionaries
including Joschka Fischer, Bodo Hombach and Erhard Busek.
51. Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2000, 18 September 2000; Council
Regulation (EC) No 2563/2000, 20 November 2000.
52. The argument about the transition from cooperation to integration
within the SAP was made originally by Martin Dangerfield, Integrating
South-East Europe: The Role of Subregional Economic Cooperation,
paper presented at the Annual UACES Conference, London, 5 April 2003.
Cf. Phinnemore (2003, p. 88).
53. CARDS Strategy Paper, p. 6.
54. The Club of Three and Bertelsmann Stiftung, The Balkans and the New
European Responsibilities, Conference Report, 2000, pp. 1920.
3 Balkans, Europe, South East Europe: Identity Politics

and Regional Cooperation
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica takes the opposite view: [t]he European por-
tion of Turkey is physiographically, but not politically, part of the
Balkans, because it belongs to a non-Balkan state. The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, vol. 1, 15th edn, 1994.
2. The reader will note that the concepts of Europe and the West are used
here often interchangeably, which might be a problem as they coincide
only partly. The argument in favour of coupling the two by default is the
fact that in the identity discourses of South East Europe (as elsewhere in
Eastern Europe) they are, as a rule, inextricably linked. On the notion of
the West, see Garton Ash (2004).
3. An overview is in Bracewell and Drace-Francis (1999, pp. 546).
4. The two key texts representing the ancient hatreds genre in the accounts
of ethnic violence in South East Europe are West (1941) and Kaplan
(1993). For a critique with reference to the Bosnian case, see Malcolm
(1996, pp. xixxxii).
5. To quote one example, Stjepan Mjetrovic seeks the roots of the war in
former Yugoslavia in the character of the Dinaric man, a notion intro-
duced by Cvijic. (Mjetrovic, 1993).
6. This approach is, in many ways, inspired by Frederik Barths classi-
cal study of ethnic identity formation, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries
(1969).
7. See also Todorovas debate with Holm Sundhausen, a critic of her con-
structivist take on the Balkans specificity (Sundhaussen, 1999, 2002;
Todorova, 2002).
Notes 179
8. See, for example, narrative histories of the region like B. Jelavich (1983),
History of the Balkans, vols I & II, Cambridge: Cambridge UP; M. Mazower
(2001), The Balkans, London: Phoenix; J. Lampe (2006), Balkans into
Southeastern Europe. A Century of War and Transition, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
9. Although John Allcock (1991) should be credited for his pioneering
efforts, it took Todorovas work to launch a debate of major intellec-
tual and political significance. Other important contributions include
Skopetea (1992); Goldsworthy (1998); Bjelic and Savic (2002); Mishkova
(2004); Hammond (2004).
10. For further on identification, as opposed to identity, see Brubaker and
Cooper (2000).
11. Consider, for example, the case of the Ukrainian nationalist discourse of
belonging to the West/Europe and therefore sharing a different identity
from Asiatic and Oriental Russia (Kuzio, 2002).
12. A good illustration of this dynamic is contemporary Bulgarian histo-
rian Ivan Ilchevs description of how competing claims of belonging
to the European civilization were raised at the time of the two Balkan
wars in 191213, During the [1912] Balkan War, the [Bulgarian]
Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs instructed its representatives
abroad to propagate the claim that the Balkan peoples, the Bulgarians
in particular, were fighting for the cause of European culture. The
Serbs emphasized that without their culture the European one would
not be the same. The Romanians were especially keen to persuade the
Westerners that Romanian culture purportedly stood much closer to
the West than to the East. Romania is neither Turkey nor Bulgaria
She is, more clearly, a sentinel of the Western civilisation. In a
similar vein, Athens tried to equate the Ancient Greek culture, which
formed contemporary Europes civilization, with modern Hellenic and
European culture. See I. Ilchev, Hlopaneto na vratata na Evropa kato
balkanski sindrom [Knocking on Europes Door as a Balkan Syndrom],
Sega Daily, 18 November 2000.
13. See for instance Checkel and Katzenstein (2009), especially. Ch. 5 by
Holly Case (East-Central Europe) and Ch. 9 (Conclusion).
14. Here the key point of reference is the work of the nineteenth-cen-
tury founding father of Greek national historiography Konstantinos
(Constantine) Paparrigopoulos, devoted to tracing the continuity between
Ancient and Modern Greece: Istoria tou Ellinikou ethnous: apo ton archaio-
taton chronon mehri kathemas [History of the Greek Nation: From Ancient
Times to the Present] published between 1860 and 1874.
15. On the identity interactions between Greece and its northern neighbours
through history, see Tziovas (2003); Anastasakis, Bechev and Vrousalis
(2009).
16. For a general discussion of Greek identity politics, see Hirschon (1999);
Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002, pp. 22763).
17. For a comprehensive exploration of Albanian identity politics, see
Schwandner-Sievers and Fischer (2002).
180 Notes
18. These themes are central in the Bulgarian national narrative too. There
are striking parallels between the Bulgarian and Albanian case as far as
the concept of a National Revival period is concerned.
19. Maria Todorova notes this, although she is also able to find examples to
the contrary (Todorova, 1997, pp. 456).
20. For an interesting analysis of how nineteenth-century Romanian liberal
leaders instrumentalized the mythological discourse of European belong-
ing, see Mishkova (2004).
21. On Turkish identity and foreign policy, see Robins (2006). On identity
politics in Turkey more generally, see ktem, Kerslake and Robins (2010).
Davutoglus policy towards the Western Balkans is discussed further in
Chapter 6.
22. As early as 198990, Slovenian communists rallied under the slogan
Evropa zdaj! (Europe now!) (Lindstrom, 2003). On the Croatian case in
the 1990s, see Lindstrom and Razsa (2004).
23. Early 1990s graffiti in Ljubljana put the idea of parting with the Balkan
past and heading towards Mitteleuropa very bluntly: Burek? Nein danke!.
Burek, a word of Turkish origin (borek), is a type of pastry common across
the Balkans.
24. Despite his portrayal of Croatia as Europes bulwark against Eastern bar-
barism, Tudmans conservative nationalism fuelled his deep distrust of a
united Europe as a model of integration and supranational governance.
I am grateful to Susan Woodward for alerting me to this point.
25. The desire to establish a symbolic distance from the Balkans is
reflected even in the work of Western authors. Titles such as Croatia:
Between the Balkans and Europe (Will Bartlett, London: Routledge, 2003)
unambiguously illustrate the salience of the issue in Croatian identity
politics.
26. Hence the notion of the two Serbias in the 1990s, one traditionalist and
nationalistic, associated mainly, but not exclusively, with the Miloevic
regime; the other liberal and European. See Slobodan Naumovic,
National Identity Splits, Deep Rooted Conflicts and (Non)Funcitoning
States: Understanding the Intended and Unintended Consequences of
the Clash between the Two Serbias, research paper published by the
Nexus project, Sofia, Centre for Advanced Studies, 2003.
27. Croat and Serb nationalisms differed little in that respect. In the
words of a shrewd commentator, Belgrade and Zagreb propaganda []
instantly claimed that once again Islam was threatening Christianity.
Christianity and Europe needed to be defended against the new aggres-
sors. Croatian propagandists declared that for centuries their country
had been the Antemurale Christianitatis, the bulwark of Christianity.
Serb propagandists claimed that their people had defended Europe
from a Turkish invasion at the Battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389,
three days after which the bells of Notre Dame in Paris had rung to
celebrate the Christian victory. As usual the supine consumers of the
propaganda did not question these assertions. Vidosav Stevanovic
(2003, p. 84).
Notes 181
28. English translation in H. Krieger (2001), The Kosovo Conflict and

International Law: An Analytical Documentation 19741999 (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP), 101.
29. Other studies of the usage of the Balkans in the post-Yugoslav context
include Sakaja (2001) and Balaloska (2002).
30. On the Bulgarian case, see Daskalov (1994).
31. For an interesting discussion of the legitimizing role of Europe in
Bulgarian politics, see Dimitrova (2002).
32. Cf. Rumelili (2004, p. 33).
33. On the relationship between the strategic-action and identity aspects of the
process, see Schimmelfennig (2000) and Kavalski (2008, Chs 5 and 6).
34. To quote the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit, mem-
bership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for protection of minorities.
35. The EU has also projected this norm at the global level. To quote the
European Parliament, regional cooperation is one of the consistent
elements of European integration itself [and] serves to bring about
peaceful cooperation, economic development and democratisation and
has therefore repeatedly been advanced and promoted by the EU as a
successful example and development model for other regions of the
world European Parliament, Resolution A4-0127/97, Official Journal of the
European Communities, C167, 2 June 1997, p. 0143. Cf. Alecu de Flers and
Regelsberger (2005); Smith, (2003, Ch. 4).
36. European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional
Cooperation in Europe, Brussels, COM (97) 659 final, 1 December 1997.
37. European Commission, SAP Annual Report 2002, COM(2002)163,
Brussels, 4 April 2002, p. 4.
38. For a critical view of the analogy with the Marshall Plan: Gligorov
(2001).
39. Clinton quoted by CNN, 2 June 2000; Bildt (2001).
40. Yet South East Europe is not a new coinage. It has been in use by
German, Romanian and, to some extent, Anglo-American scholars at
least since the late 1890s (vob-Djokic, 2001, pp. 3545; W. Bracewell and
A. Drace-Francis, 1999, pp. 11728).
41. When it comes to the second mode, T. A. Brzel and T. Risse (2008) draw
a distinction between socialization and, following Habermasian social
theory, persuasion, depending on whether the external actor promotes
ideas through simply providing an authoritative model or legitimating it
through reason-giving.
4 Building Up a Regional Marketplace: Economic and

Functional Cooperation
1. Averages for the individual countries are: Albania, 5.3 per cent; Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 5.1 per cent; Bulgaria, 5.1 per cent; Croatia, 4.7 per cent;
182 Notes
Macedonia, 1.7 per cent; Serbia and Montenegro, 5.1 per cent (Kathuria,
2008, p. 2).
2. Intergovernmental cooperation made progress in that period precisely
because it concentrated on low-sensitivity issues like transport, science,
communications, and environmental protection. A. Sotiris Walden
characterizes that time as the golden era of Balkan cooperation, point-
ing at 30-odd meetings at the ministerial and expert levels in 199091
(Walden, 1992, p. 319; Christakoudis, 2002, pp. 65130; Lopandic, 2001,
pp. 535).
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, however, was far from being integrated
in terms of trade flows. Up until late 1999, the two entities had separate
customs policies. The new customs legislation terminated the separate
preferential agreements which Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat
Federation had concluded with Yugoslavia and Croatia respectively. Trade
between Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia declined after 1998 due to a
dispute concerning the exchange rate between the Yugoslav dinar and
the Bosnian convertible mark. Inter-entity trade rose sharply in the early
2000s (van Meurs, 2001, pp. 20810).
4. European Commission, Report from the Commission The Stabilisation and
Association process for South East Europe First Annual Report, Brussels, April
4, COM (2002) 163 final, p. 3
5. Uvalic uses data from IMF Statistics Quarterly, IMF, September 1998. The
data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia were obtained respec-
tively from the Bosnian Central Bank and the Federal Statistical Office.
6. Sarajevo Summit declaration, 30 July 1999, Point 10.
7. European Commission, Enlargement of the European Union Composite
Paper, October 1999.
8. This was in tune with the World Banks strategic paper for the Western
Balkans prepared for the SP. It focused on multilateralizing the bilateral
trade concessions, concluding association agreements with the EU, and
international assistance for the trade-related institutional reforms in each
country (World Bank, 2000, pp. 5271).
9. Financial Times, 23 November 2000.
10. EU Council Regulation 2563, 29 November 2000. Significantly, the ATMs
covered agricultural imports from the Western Balkans.
11. Report from the WT2s Third Meeting, Istanbul, 1617 October 2000.
12. Final Declaration, point 3. Zagreb, 24 November 2000.
13. Regional Action Plan, SEECP Fifth Summit, Skopje, 223 February 2001.
Section II: Trade Development. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and
Montenegro were still outside the WTO.
14. RFE/RL Newsline, 19 January 2001.
15. Sega Daily, 5 May 2001. For the first time, senior Bulgarian politi-
cians hinted about withdrawing from the SP in November 2000. They
attempted to link continued membership in the Pact with the abolition
of Schengen visas for Bulgarian citizens.
16. The memorandum also called for the removal of non-tariff barriers, the
establishment of common rules of origin, border crossings procedures,
Notes 183
transport documentation and trade statistics all in line with the rel-
evant EU acquis. In the midterm, the document envisioned cooperation
on implementing EU health and safety rules, environmental and other
technical norms, harmonization of company and banking law and WTO-
compatible reform of intellectual property laws trade-related aspects.
17. For an insiders account on the trade liberalization task force, see
Bogoevski (2002).
18. Duanka Profeta, No to the Balkans, Transitions Online, 17 September 2001.
19. Montenegrin leadership adopted an independent economic and trade
policy from the federal government in January 1999. In November
Montenegro introduced the German mark as official currency.
20. AFP, 8 July 2003.
21. Workgroup on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation, Ministerial Statement,
Rome, 13 November 2003. The initiative included also Moldova which
joined the Stability Pact in June 2001.
22. Government of the Republic of Croatia, Information Bulletin, no 1314,
NovemberDecember 2001.
23. In 2008, all Western Balkan countries, apart from Croatia and Kosovo,
became part of a scheme for diagonal cumulation of rules of origins with
the EU as well as Turkey (for products covered by the Customs Union
with the EU). CEFTA 2006 contains provisions on cumulation among its
signatories.
24. European Commission, 2009 Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brussels, 14.10.2009 SEC(2009) 1338, p. 23; BalkanInsight.com, 28 April
2009.
25. Reuters, 25 September 2009.
26. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 20092010, Communication to
the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2009) 533, Brussels 14
October 2009, p. 6. Officials in Prishtina complained in early 2009 that
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina had charged duties on imports from
Kosovo, in breach of CEFTA 2006 rules. BalkanInsight.com, 9 January 2009.
27. For a sceptical assessment of intra-regional trades potential to stimulate
growth, see Grupe and Kuic (2005).
28. Kathuria (2008, p. 25). Cf. Bajic and Zdravkovic (2009) who contend that
Croatia and Serbia, as the two largest and most diversified economies in
the Western Balkan cluster, are likely to garner the most benefits proceed-
ing form CEFTA 2006.
29. See <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, accessed 30 April 2010>.
30. See www.investmentcompact.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
31. In April 1999, SECI members adopted a memorandum on road freight
transport, originally proposed by Greece. It foresaw the gradual liber-
alization of the truck-quota regimes in accordance with EU standards,
the harmonization of the road taxes, weights and dimensions limits,
and visa-issuance procedures for drivers, establishing a Regional Road
Transport Committee to monitor implementation (Lopandic, 2001,
pp. 1301). TTFSE, for its, part reported threefold decrease in clearance
times for trucks at customs offices (Kathuria, 2008, p. 73).
184 Notes
32. Stability Pact, Agenda for Stability, Thessaloniki, 8 June 2000, Point 21. For
a critique of the Pacts emphasis on physical infrastructure, see Gligorov
(2001).
33. On TEN/TINA, see Transport Policy and EU Enlargement, Briefing N 44,
European Parliament, Luxembourg, 28 July 1999, pp. 125.
34. European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union,
Communication to the Council, DOC/97/6, 15 July 1997.
35. Report of the Chairman of the ISG, Second Regional Conference of the
Stability Pact for South East Europe, Bucharest, 25 October 2001, p. 2.
For the complementarity requirements, see the SP strategic paper (World
Bank, 2000).
36. In 2000, Italy also launched the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative: see Appendix 1.
37. European Investment Bank, Basic Infrastructure Investment in South
East Europe. Regional Project Overview, paper presented at the SPs
Regional Funding Conference, Brussels, 2930 March 2000, p. 15.
38. RFE/RL Newsline, 28 March 2000. Romania obtained, in return, the lower-
ing of previously prohibitive transfer charges for supplying electricity to
Greece. Bulgarian policymakers saw the northern neighbour as a com-
petitor at the regional export market for electricity. See M. Chiriac, Power
War between Romania and Bulgaria, Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
2 November 1999. It was not until May 2007 that the actual construction
began.
39. European Commission, Transport and Energy Infrastructure in South
East Europe, Brussels, 15 October 2001. The paper was presented to the
SPs Regional Table in May 2001.
40. See the strategic study supporting the Commissions programme, Agence
Franaise de Development and European Conference of Ministers of
Transport. Transport Infrastructure Regional Study in the Balkans, Final
Report, prepared by Louis Berger SA, March 2002.
41. For instance, Muriqan-Sokobine at the AlbanianMontenegrin border or
the motorway between the Albanian city of Durrs and Kuks in Kosovo.
42. Commission Press Release, IP/08/382, 5 March 2008.
43. Facts about the SEE FABA. The South East European Functional Block
Approach, 15 March 2007. www.stabilitypact.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
44. European Commission, 2009 Progress Report for Kosovo, Brussels, 14.10.2009
SEC(2009) 1340, pp. 201.
45. For further details see www.savacommission.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
46. BalkanInsight.com, 16 November 2006.
47. States Vie for Pipeline to Bypass Bosphorus, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief,
20 July 2000.
48. BalkanInsight.com, 25 March 2010.
49. UCTE was formerly known as UCPTE as it dealt not only with electricity
transmission but also with production.
50. Before the 1990s, former Yugoslavia was integrated in the southern
branch of UCTE, known as SUDEL. Bulgaria and Romania participated in
the United Power Systems (UPS) within COMECOM. Romania left UPS in
1994 (Centre for Liberal Strategies, 1997, pp. 789).
Notes 185
51. To help the intergovernmental consultations, the EU funded, through

PHARE, a multi-country study on the issue. European Investment Bank,
Basic Infrastructure Investment, p. 52
52. WT2, Report from the Second Meeting, Istanbul, 1617 October 2000.
53. European Commission, Strategy Paper on the Regional Electricity Market in
South East Europe and Its Integration into the EU Internal Electricity Market,
11 November 2002, p. 8. SEECP Energy Ministers, Energy Coordination
and Policies in SEE, paper prepared by the Albanian Presidency of the
SEECP, October 2001, points 913.
54. Replaced by Directive 2003/54/EC (the Second Electricity Directive).
55. Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Energy Market in South
East Europe and its Integration into the European Community Internal
Energy Market (Athens Memorandum 2003), 8 December 2003. <http://
www.stabilitypact.org/energy/031208-mou.pdf, accessed 30 April 2010>.
56. The CEFTA 2006 secretariat is now co-funded by the Commission and the
participating states, who contributed 30 per cent of the cost in 2009/10
and 50 per cent in 2010/11. Decision of the Joint Committee of CEFTA
No. 2/2008, 8 October 2008. www.cefta2006.com, accessed 30 April 2010.
57. Ibid. The Regulatory Board makes recommendations to the ministerial
council regarding disputes but is generally envisioned as a counterweight
to the intergovernmental arm of the Energy Community.
58. http://www.energy-community.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
59. Annual Report of the Secretary General of the RCC, 20082009, Sarajevo, 14
May 2009, p. 31.
60. Energy Coordination and Policies in SEE, October 2001, point 7.
61. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 20092010.
62. Moldova and Ukraine completed technical negotiations for joining the
Treaty in 2009. Moldova formally joined on 17 March 2010.
63. Slovenia later joined SECI under US pressure, but Croatia opted for
observer status (Lopandic, 2001, p. 126).
64. Interview with Antoinette Primatarova, former Bulgarian Chief Negot-
iator and Ambassador to the EU, Sofia, September 2003.
65. Interview with a European Commission official, October 2009.
5 Defusing the Powderkeg: Security Cooperation

1. For a theory-informed analysis of the multiple meanings of Balkan secu-
rity, see Economides (2002).
2. During subsequent talks on CFE, Bulgaria and Romania showed readiness
to set even lower ceilings, with a view to their NATO membership bids.
Turkey was prepared to follow suit, in case all other Balkan states limited
their arsenals, while Greece declined to revise its CFE ceiling.
3. At the time, Albania was still not a member of OSCE and was not a signa-
tory to CFE and the Vienna documents.
4. Full text available at <http://www.morh.hr/hvs/SPORAZUMI/tekstovi/
SSKN-engleski.pdf, accessed 30 April 2010>. Cf. McCausland (1997).
186 Notes
5. Centre for Liberal Strategies, Current State and Prospects, pp. 336. On OSCE
role in South East Europe in that period, see Ghebali and Warner (2001).
6. As of 2010: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Canada, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine and the US are observers.
7. For an overview of RACIVACs activities see www.racviac.org, accessed
30 April 2010. Another significant SP project in the field of security is
the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms
and Light Weapons (SEESAC), launched on 8 May 2002 in Belgrade and
funded by the UNDP. SEESAC is guided by the OSCEs Document on Small
Arms and Light Weapons, notably provisions on regional co-operation.
www.seesac.org, accessed 30 April 2010.
8. During his visit to Tirana, Perry also announced that the US was going to
grant Albania a military aid package worth $100m, ten times more than
the sums the country had received in the preceding four years. AFP, 2 April
1996.
9. RFE/RL Newsline, 26 March 1996.
10. BTA, 31 March 1996.
11. For Secretary of Defence William Cohens comments, see AFP, 3 October
1997.
12. Angelov (1999, p. 55) drawing extensively on sources within the
Bulgarian Ministry of Defence.
13. Nadja Podobnik, Turnek Slovenia is in Central Europe and will remain
there, STA, 3 October 1997.
14. AFP, 3 October 1997.
15. Ibid.
16. Interestingly, Macedonias stance was backed by Bulgaria. The inevitable
issue about the name to be used by Skopje surfaced too. As a result, the
signatures of the ministers of defence of the SEDM countries on the
MPFSEE agreement were not followed by clarification of which state they
represented.
17. Greece even established a training center in Kilkis for the purposes of the
Balkan force.
18. Foreign Minister Pangalos supported the Bulgarian bid after a meeting
with the head of the Bulgarian Parliaments Foreign Affairs Committee
Assen Agov on 14 April 1998. RFE/RL Newsline, 14 April 1998.
19. Anatolian Agency, 25 April 1998.
20. In 2001, General Zorlu was succeeded by the Greek General Andreas Kouzelis.
Next in line were Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Macedonia.
21. RFE/FL Newsline, 28 September 1998.
22. The text of the Skopje agreement is available on the website of the
Romanian Chairmanship of the SEDM <http://sedm.mapn.ro, accessed
30 April 2010>.
23. In addition to peace-support operations, it listed joint training activities:
reconnaissance, command post/field training, and crisis management
exercises conducted according to commonly agreed-upon plans and
programmes.
Notes 187
24. The agreement stipulated that the unit should operate according to
NATO standards, rules and regulations.
25. The Thessaloniki conference (October 2000) added a permanent coordina-
tion committee (SEDM-CC) to the institutional structure. The body was to
be chaired by the country presiding over the MPFSEE Steering Committee.
26. The ETF was established with the Second Additional Protocol to the the
MPFSEE Agreement signed on 30 November 1999 during the Bucharest
Ministerial. It was originally conceived as a separate unit, but later incor-
porated in the SEEBRIG.
27. The legal status of the HQ was settled by the Third Additional Protocol to
the MPFSEE Agreement adopted by the SEDM deputy defence ministers
in Athens on 21 June 2000.
28. The bulk of the personnel came from Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria.
Details in George Christian Maior and Mihaela Matei, Defence Policy
Developments: Old and New Missions for the Armed Forces, Occasional
Paper 1/2002, Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military
History, Bucharest, 2002. <http://www.ispaim.ro/pdf/Op1.pdf, accessed
30 April 2010>.
29. At the regular SEDM meeting held in Thessaloniki on 9 October 2000,
William Cohen pointed out that the brigade had to be deployed at the
earliest opportunity, Reuters, 9 October 2000.
30. Balkan Times, 21 December 2001.
31. Institute for Security and International Studies (Sofia), Balkan Regional
Profile, May 2001.
32. RFE/RL Newsline, 4 April 200, Reuters, 4 April 2001.
33. This same view was expressed again several weeks later by Albanias Head
of General Staff during a visit to Bulgaria. ISIS, Balkan Regional Profile,
May 2001.
34. Romania presided over the SEDM and the MPFSEE coordination com-
mittees in 20013. In September 2003, the forces HQ moved to the
Romanian port of Constanta.
35. At the 2001 Thessaloniki ministerial, the defence ministers approved a
budget of $500,000 for the year 2002.
36. Croatia joined the SEDM during its fifth ministerial taking place in
Thessaloniki on 9 October 2000.
37. Factiva Newswire, 26 September 1998.
38. SEECAPs full text is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/
comm/2001/0105-bdp/d010530b.htm, accessed 30 April 2010>.
39. Other RCC-affiliated projects, largely inherited by the SP WT3,
include the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI),
Southeastern and Central Europe Catastrophe Insurance Facility, and
Firefighting Regional Centre. See 20082009 Annual Report of the
Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council in South East Europe,
RCC, Sarajevo, 14 May 2009, pp. 303. <www.rcc.int, accessed 30 April
2010>.
40. Stability Pact for South East Europe, Agenda for Stability, Thessaloniki,
8 June 2000, point 21.
188 Notes
41. The SP even set up a taskforce on human trafficking together with the OSCE
(September 2000). SP participants signed a special declaration in support.
Among the actors involved in the taskforce were the OSCE Commissioner
for Human Rights, the International Organization on Migration, UNICEF,
the Council of Europe, the International Catholic Migration Committee
and others. The taskforces activities partly overlapped with those of the
Regional Centre for the Fight against Illegal Trafficking, set up by Albania,
Italy, Greece and Italy in the town of Vlor.
42. Issues include trafficking in human beings, stolen vehicles, small arms,
radioactive and dangerous substances, and drugs, as well as commer-
cial frauds, financial and cyber crimes, terrorism, and valuation frauds.
SEEPAG was launched in NovemberDecember 2003 by the SEECP mem-
bers and Slovenia. Further details can be found at <www.seepag.info,
accessed 30 April 2010>.
43. In 2001 alone, the centre reported 3112 exchanges of information
(Hajdinjak, 2000, p. 65).
44. Mihai-Rzvan Ungureanu quoted in Xenakis (2004, p. 211).
45. For the distinction, see European Stability Initiative and East-West
Institute (2001, p. 28).
46. www.respaweb.eu, accessed 30 April 2010.
47. Even SPAIs multilateral activities overlapped with those of the Group of
States against Corruption (GRECO) within the Council of Europe. ESI and
East-West Institute, Democracy, Security, p. 15.
48. See <http://www.rai-see.org/, accessed 30 April 2010>.
49. RFE/RL, Crime, Corruption and Terrorism Watch Bulletin, vol 1, no. 7, 13
December 2001.
50. Tanjug, 3 March 2003.
51. The other leading project of the Centre is the Common Threat Assessment
on Organized Crime for the South East European Region (OCTA-SEE),
originally proposed by the Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council in
October 2007. Starting from 2001, Slovenia has been hosting meetings on
organized crime and terrorism attended by government representatives
of the Western Balkans, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Austria, and
Hungary (the so-called Brdo Process).
52. European Commission, Western Balkans: Enhancing the European
Perspective, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council,
COM(2008) 127, 5 March 2008, p. 13.
53. Balkan Times, 5 February 2002.
54. A Police Cooperation Convention for South Eastern Europe was signed in
Vienna in May 2006.
55. Gabriela Konevska, Director of the SECI Centre and Head of the SPOC
Secretariat, Europe by Satellite TV, 21 November 2003. Transcript avail-
able at <http://www.seetv-exchanges.com, accessed 30 April 2010>.
56. BBC News, 3 February 2010.
57. EUObserver, 4 February 2010.
58. Javno.hr, 10 February 2010.
Notes 189
59. Nationals of all South East European countries can now enter Turkey
visa-free or by buying a permit. Albania and Turkey abolished visas in
November 2009.
60. Macedonia and Albania concluded a visa-free travel agreement in 2008.
61. This has been accompanied by intensifying of cooperation in the area
of migration policy. In November 2008 Western Balkan countries signed
a memorandum of understanding towards setting up a system for shar-
ing statistical data on illegal migration, and participating in the regional
system of advance notification. It complements the activities of the
Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), originally
launched by the SP in 2003 and steered by a centre in Skopje <www.
marri-rc.org, accessed 30 April 2010>.
62. SEDM Adapting to the New Security Environment, Presentation by
Gabriel Rilla, Captain SEDM-CC Secretariat at the EAPC / SEEGROUP
Workshop Civil-Military Interaction in Security Management: The Case
of South East Europe, Sofia, Bulgaria, 278 June 2002.
63. Quoted in Elizabeth Brook, Multi-National Brigade Set to Deploy
in Balkans Southeastern European Nations Train together for Peace
Operations in the Region, National Defence Magazine, December 2002
<nationaldefence.ndia.org, accessed 30 April 2010>.
6 Between Lofty Rhetoric and Lingering Conflicts:

Political Cooperation
1. Protocol between the Governments of Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
on Enlarged Trilateral Co-operation in Fighting Crime, in Particular
Cross-border Crime, Sofia, 8 September 1998. During the Sinaia Summit,
the three presidents signed an agreement on cooperation in the field
of tourism, as well as a declaration on the creation of a free-trade zone.
2. Reuters, quoting Western diplomats in Sofia, 22 May 1996. Importantly,
Bulgarian authorities were accused of turning a blind eye on the pro-PKK
activities of Kurdish migr organizations based in the country.
3. BTA, 19 July 1996.
4. The declarations text and Videnovs address are available at <http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-211.htm, accessed 30 April
2010>.
5. BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, 8 July 1996.
6. Reuters, 6 July 1996.
7. Interview with Dr Dinko Dinkov, advisor on foreign policy issues at the
Bulgarian Council of Ministers, September 2003.
8. Importantly, Croatia was absent, while Bosnias Foreign Minister Jadranko
Prlic, who was to be indicted by ICTY in March 2004 for his actions dur-
ing the war, chose to take part as an observer. Allegedly, this decision was
pushed by Bosnian Croats adopting Tudmans line. The Turkish Foreign
Minister again did not attend, which fed Greek hopes of becoming the
190 Notes
leader in the newly formed group. The ministerial took stock of the
regional developments for the past year: the government changes in
Bulgaria and Romania and the collapse of the Albanian state triggered by
the breakdown of the financial pyramid schemes. The appeal for restor-
ing order in Albania was the highlight of the declaration adopted by the
foreign ministers. Reuters, 10 June 1997.
9. The summit was attended by: Presidents Kiro Gligorov (Macedonia),
Slobodan Miloevic (FR Yugoslavia); Prime Ministers Victor Ciorbea
(Romania), Ivan Kostov (Bulgaria), Fatos Nano (Albania), Kostas Simitis
(Greece) and Mesut Ylmaz (Turkey); Foreign Ministers Ismail Cem
(Turkey), Blagoja Handiski (Macedonia), Nadezhda Mihaylova (Bulgaria),
Paskal Milo (Albania), Milan Milutinovic (Yugoslavia), Theodoros Pangalos
(Greece), Adrian Severin (Romania), and Mihovil Malbaic (Assistant
Foreign Minister of BiH, participating as an observer). Croatia was not
present at the summit in any capacity, claiming that it had received no
official invitation.
10. The point was well understood at the time. As a senior Western diplomat
discussing the impact of the Salonika meeting put it, [the event] is a
remarkable step forward not only is it the first time such a meeting has
taken place, it is the first time most of these people have actually met,
and there is now an opportunity for personal diplomacy, which we tend
to take for granted elsewhere. Norman Abjornsen, Bosnian Security Gets
Big Rethink, Canberra Times, 15 June 1997.
11. Bill Clinton came to Bucharest on 11 July, two days after the Madrid
Summit, a first high-level visit since President Richard Nixons unprec-
edented summit with Nicolae Ceausescu in August 1969.
12. Tsardanidis (2001, p. 5). Commenting on the Crete declaration, the offi-
cial press agency Tanjug pointed out that the document was welcomed
by participants in the conference as a proof that the regional countries
are capable of cooperating and ready to cooperate without foreign
powers interference. BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans,
3 November 1997.
13. The Bulgarian National Radio reported that Prime Minister Ivan Kostov
spoke against this initiative, stressing that it would be better to use the
money and efforts needed for the establishment of such structures for
the financing of infrastructure projects and the transport corridors and
for eliminating customs duties. BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe &
Balkans, 5 November 1997.
14. AFP, 4 November 1997; RFE/RL Newsline, 4 November 1997.
15. This was the first visit to Greece by a Turkish prime minister since Turgut
zals summit with Andreas Papandreou nine years before, and it fol-
lowed soon after the Imia/Kardak crisis in late 1996, which saw the two
countries moving to the brink of military escalation.
16. BTA, 12 March 1998.
17. Bulgarian Press Digest, 11 March 1998.
18. Athens News Agency, 10 June 1998.
Notes 191
19. Athens News Agency, 9 June 1998.

20. After some initial hesitation, Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic
signed the joint statement, describing it as balanced. Reuters, 13 October
1998.
21. Financial Times, 14 October 1998.
22. The Yugoslav leadership was even banned from entering Romania, which
was a direct signal that multilateral dialogue was closed for Belgrade.
Comments on a news conference at the Romanian Foreign Ministry
quoted by Rompress, 15 September 1999.
23. The inaugural meeting in Sarajevo (July 1999) had been attended
by nearly all of the regions dignitaries: Presidents Franjo Tudman,
Sleyman Demirel, Petar Stoyanov, Rexhep Meidani, Milo ukanovic,
Alija Izetbegovic (together with his Croat and Serb colleagues in Bosnias
collective presidency), and Prime Ministers Costas Simitis and Zlatko
Matea, accompanied by their respective countries foreign ministers.
24. The summit was attended by President Emil Constantinescu (Romania),
Prime Ministers Blent Ecevit (Turkey), Ljubco Georgievski (Macedonia),
Mugur Isarescu (Romania), Ivan Kostov (Bulgaria), Ilir Meta (Albania) and
Costas Simitis (Greece), Ministers of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem (Turkey),
Aleksandar Dimitrov (Macedonia), Nadezhda Mihaylova (Bulgaria),
Paskal Milo (Albania), George Papandreou (Greece) and Petre Roman
(Romania), as well as Deputy Foreign Ministers Jadranko Prlic (BiH) and
Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) as observers and Bodo Hombach, Special
Coordinator of the SP, as a special guest of the Chairman-in-Office.
25. As already noted, this was the standard line promoted by the European
Commission. Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional
Cooperation in Europe, Brussels, 1 December 1997, COM (97) 659 final.
26. During the Bucharest summit, the Croatian representative Vladimir
Drobnjak reaffirmed the unwillingness of his country to join SEECP as a
full member, arguing that the initiative was Balkan in character and that
Croatia did not consider itself a Balkan state. Hina, 11 February 2000.
27. Picula, talking to news reporters, Hina, 18 July 2000.
28. Reuters, 22 February 2001.
29. Patrick Moore, Security Issue Overshadows Balkan Summit, RFE/RL
Balkan Report, vol. 7, no. 16, 27 February 2001.
30. Reuters, 23 February 2001.
31. Goran Granics speech at the first Skopje Summit. Hina, 25 October
2000.
32. Comment made at the SEECPs Second Parliamentary conference. Alban
Bala, Mixed Messages at Balkan Parliamentary Gathering, RFE/RL Balkan
Report, vol. 6, no. 13, 15 March 2002.
33. The crisis coincided with an agreement signed at the summit by Kotunica
and Trajkovski that dealt with the demarcation of the two states com-
mon border, both in Kosovo and east of it. The Kosovars objected to the
deal and accused Yugoslavia of usurping their right to negotiate them-
selves the boundaries of the province.
192 Notes
34. The closing declaration condemned the violent and illegal terrorist
actions, by the ethnically motivated extremist armed groups in South
Serbia which could have the effect of destabilising the situation in the
region, Summit Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of
South East European Countries, Skopje, 23 February 2001.
35. According to Tanjug, the original wording of the declaration contained
a condemnation of the Albanian terrorists in southern Serbia, which
prompted Meidanis last-minute decision not to go to Skopje. RFE/RL
Newsline, 23 February 2001.
36. AFP, 16 May 2001.
37. RFE/RL Newsline, 17 May 2001. There were also reports about further
controversies between Macedonia and Albania, regarding the wording of
the joint declaration. While Skopje insisted on the use, in a certain part
of text, of the pronoun such, which amounted to a condemnation of
the NLA, Paskal Milo firmly opposed the term. Finally such was replaced
by this which was taken to be more neutral. Arian Leka, Diplomatic
meeting in Tirana jeopardized by one pronoun, Alternative Information
Network (AIM), 19 May 2001.
38. Despite the Macedonian crisis, the conference was marked by certain signs
of hope. One hope was clearly for the restoration of the diplomatic links
between Albania and Yugoslavia, severed during the Kosovo crisis. In fact,
Goran Svilanovic was the first Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs to visit
Tirana since Budimir Loncar attended the Balkan summit of 1990. The
conference also called for a meeting of ministers of education to discuss a
concerted policy on the bad neighbour images in the books of history.
39. Arian Leka, Peace in Skopje accompanied by a chill in the relations with
Tirana, AIM, 31 August 2001.
40. Reuters, 28 March 2002. During the meeting, Albania presented a plan
envisioning the set-up of multiple working groups in various issue-areas
from trade to organized crime and democratization.
41. ANA News Daily Bulletin, 29 March 2002.
42. Hina, 19 June 2002.
43. UNMIKs head Michael Steiner proposed the establishment of a regional
police network (with the participation of Kosovo) to carry out joint inves-
tigations and the exchange of information. Hina, 19 June 2002.
44. A meeting of the SEECP trade ministers was held in October 2002, and
ministers of interior met in March 2003. The Belgrade ministerial scored
some success on the political side. Just before it, the foreign ministers of
Yugoslavia and Albania agreed to establish diplomatic ties and exchange
ambassadors. The closing declaration mentioned cooperation in the
educational sphere, and a future meeting of the ministers of culture to
discuss strategies to deal with interethnic prejudices and bad neighbours
stereotypes called for bilateral consultations on the issue. Like the Tirana
Summit, the ministerial also condemned in strongest terms the destruc-
tion of cultural monuments in Kosovo, which was put on the agenda by
the host country.
Notes 193
45. Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SEECP, Belgrade,
19 June 2002. Text available at http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_
policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/perifereiaka/belgrade.html, accessed
30 April 2010.
46. The ministerials were followed by meetings of the chiefs of staff on 24
October and defence ministers on 16 September and 13 November 2002,
just a few days before the Prague Summit. A similar informal quadri-
lateral meeting was held by Paskal Milo, Solomon Passy, Ilinka Mitreva
(Macedonias foreign minister) and George Papandreou on 25 August
2001 in the Greek town of Florina.
47. Joint press conference by Powell, Picula, Mitreva, and Meta, Tirana, 2
May 2003. <http://www.usembassy.it/file2003_05/alia/A3050209.htm,
accessed 30 April 2010>.
48. Interview with an official from the Office of the President of the Republic
of Macedonia, Skopje, September 2003.
49. 46 tons of Yugoslav gold worth $440m was split as follows: FRY 36.52
percent, Croatia 28.49 per cent, Slovenia 16.39 per cent, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 13.12 per cent, and Macedonia 5.4 per cent. Subsequently, a
deal was reached on the distribution of the former federations embassies
around the world. One issue still to be resolved concerns the deposits of
citizens of various ex-Yugoslav republics in Slovenias Ljubljanska Banka.
50. SEC(2009) 1336 (Montenegro), p. 19; SEC(2009) 1338 (Bosnia), p. 22;
SEC(2009) 1339 (Serbia), p. 21, all published on 14 October 2009;
51. B92, 13 November 2003.
52. BalkanInsight.com, 14 April 2010. Following the visit to Ahmici, Josipovic,
accompanied by the heads of the Bosnian Catholic Church and the
Islamic Community, went to Krizancevo Selo, where Bosniak troops had
killed Bosnian Croat civilians on 28 December 1993.
53. The ICJ delivered its judgment on Bosnias application on 26 February 2007.
While it found that genocide had taken place, it judged that Serbia, consid-
ered FR Yugoslavias lawful successor, had only failed to prevent it and had
not actively committed it. ICJ [2007] Judgment, ICJ General List No. 91.
Croatia filed its own case against rump Yugoslavia in 1999. The judgment
is still pending. Serbia lodged a counter-case on 4 January 2010.
54. The Secretary General has a three-year mandate, with a possible exten-
sion for another two years.
55. Hido Bicevic, Regional Ownership and Beyond Setting up the Regional
Cooperation Council, Concept paper prepared by the Secretary General
of the Regional Cooperation Council SEECP Summit, Pomorie, 20 May
2008. Another body, established earlier in 2007, was a permanent secre-
tariat in Sofia, overseeing the regular meetings of speakers of parliament
and other exchanges of national legislatures, a priority area for RCC. See
<www.rspcsee.org, accessed 30 April 2010>.
56. Regional Cooperation Council, Strategic Outlook at the Priority Areas of
Cooperation in South East Europe, Supporting Document to the Strategic Work
Programme of the Regional Cooperation Council, Pomorie, 20 May 2008.
194 Notes
57. 20089 Annual Report of the Secretary General of the RCC, p. 10.
58. In October 2008, Macedonia and Montenegro recognized Kosovos
independence. As a result, the Serbian government proclaimed the
Macedonian and Montenegrin ambassadors personae non gratae, and
withdrew its own representative, in January 2009, after Podgorica
established diplomatic links with Prishtina. However, Serbias ambas-
sadors returned to Croatia and Bulgaria in November 2008, after being
recalled in February. Serbia accepted ambassadors from Macedonia and
Montenegro in April and July 2009 respectively.
59. Sofia Echo, 22 May 2008. The summit produced more optimistic news
items too: Bulgaria and Montenegro had agreed that Montenegrin
citizens could seek consular assistance at Bulgarias offices in Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
60. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite not having recognized
Kosovo, has been issuing visas, on a case-by-case basis, to Kosovar offi-
cials involved in the work of the RCC.
61. 20082009 Annual Report, p.6. UNMIK has signed, on behalf of Kosovo,
all-important regional agreements and initiatives: CEFTA 2006, the
Energy Community Treaty, the ECAA agreement, SEETO, etc. See Ch. 4.
62. European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges
20092010, p. 6.
63. Zaman, 3 March 2010.
64. For two academic observers treatments, see Hyde (2004) and Tsardanidis
(2001).
Conclusion
1. For the shifting ideas of territoriality and sovereignty in (Western)
European history see Maier (2002).
2. This ideological paradigm has been aptly described by Jan Zielonka (2001,
pp. 5145) as a neo-medieval religion established upon the Holy Trinity of
democracy, free markets, and peace. See also Russett and Oneal (2001).
3. The mood was very well captured in a speech made by none other than US
President Bill Clinton. Speaking at the US Naval Academy on the occasion
of the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day, he observed that the Cold Wars end
lifted the lid from a cauldron of long-simmering hatreds. Now, the entire
global terrain is bloody with such conflicts. Quoted in Washington Post, 26
May 1994. The argument was further elaborated by Robert Kaplan, whose
earlier book Balkan Ghosts reportedly influenced Clintons early policy
towards the Bosnian conflict. See Robert Caplan, The Coming Anarchy,
The Atlantic Monthly, 273 (2), February 1994, pp. 4476.
4. For example, Goldsworthy (2002).
5. On the anti-liberal appropriation of Europe in Romania, see Katherine
Verdery, Civil Society or Nation? Europe in the Symbolism of
Postsocialist Politics, Chapter 5 in Verdery (1996).
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Index
Adler, Emanuel 7, 63, 86, 172 167, 176, 177, 178, 180, 182,
Adriatic Ionian Initiative 157, 164, 188, 195, 198200, 202203
168, 184 Balkan Pacts
Albania 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 1934 31, 42
32, 33, 34, 171 1952 32, 42
Domestic politics 20, 22, 26, 27, Berisha, Sali 35, 135
28, 30, 37, 38, 70, 190 Bildt, Carl 78, 133, 175, 181
Economy 2026, 30, 88, 94, 98, Bicevic, Hidajet (Hido) 146, 193
173, 181 borders
Foreign policy 5, 7, 10, 2025, cultural 1, 93
3134, 37, 42, 45, 49, 57, state 1, 21, 24, 27, 3031, 36, 38,
59, 70, 91, 96, 110112, 116, 47, 76, 150, 196197
117, 121122, 125, 132133, Bosnia and Herzegovina 34, 171
136137, 140143, 146, 157, conflict, 19925 24, 27, 43, 110,
160, 162, 166169, 175176, 162, 167
185186, 189, 192 domestic politics 110, 144, 147,
Identity 3134, 70, 179 167, 177, 183
Altmann, Franz-Lothar 56, 145, economy 88, 93, 173, 181183,
171 193
Anastasakis, Othon 7, 34, 41, 68, foreign policy 52, 56, 59, 9193,
173 100, 118121, 123126, 132,
Arkan, eljko Ranatovic 36 139, 143144, 147148, 163,
Arsenis, Gerasimos 112 165169, 175, 177, 182183,
Austria 26, 27, 44, 94, 101, 120, 194
121, 147, 158, 160, 169, identity 68
186 Bulatovic, Momir 136, 191
Austria-Hungary 42, see also Bulgaria 73
Habsburg Empire Domestic politics 20, 24, 3132,
3738, 125
Balkans, notion of Economy 2030, 85, 8788,
Balkan mentality 74, 201 9193, 173, 99104, 107
Balkanism 66, 67, 74, 201 Foreign policy 2026, 3235,
homo balkanicus 64 3738, 42, 4445, 47, 49, 52,
Orientalism 204 5557, 61, 68, 7677, 79,
Western Balkans 2, 5, 6, 15, 26, 8789, 9193, 96, 99104,
47, 50, 52, 5559, 61, 62, 107, 110114, 117, 121122,
7680, 85, 88, 8994, 98107, 125, 135, 139, 142144, 146,
111, 118, 121127, 130, 139, 157161, 162168, 171,
142143, 148, 152155, 157, 173175, 179, 181, 184191,
158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 166, 194
207
208 Index
Busek, Erhard 44, 58, 146, 165, 178 Dayton/Paris Peace Accords 2, 43,
Bush, George W. 116 131, 162
Buzan, Barry 20, 33, 172 Delevic, Milica 91, 93, 98, 100,
124, 144, 171
Cem, Ismail 190 indic, Zoran 143
Central European Free Trade ukanovic, Milo 38, 1367, 191
Agreement (CEFTA) 5, 46, 77,
87, 89, 9193, 103, 105, 107, Energy 2930
148, 157, 163, 166168, 171, electricity 2930, 101104, 105,
183, 185, 194, 196, 198 106, 140, 141, 158, 166, 173,
Ciorbea, Victor 190 184185
Clinton, Bill 445, 51, 78, 111, infrastructure 29, 30, 133, 184
181, 190, 194 gas 2930, 101, 103, 105, 158,
Cohen, William 113, 115, 119, 168
186187 oil 2122, 29, 3639, 45, 101,
Cold War 5, 1415, 2021, 3033, 103, 105, 158, 168, 169, 174
42, 69, 73, 75, 80, 109, 130, European Common Aviation Area
137, 152, 154, 194, 197, 199, (ECAA) 99, 100, 107, 158,
206 167, 194
COMECON 2022 Energy Community 2, 13, 98, 103,
Confidence building measures 49, 104, 105, 107, 158, 166, 167,
133, 176, 199 168, 169, 185, 194, 204
Constantinescu, Emil 135, 174, Europe
191 Europeanization 12, 74, 78, 80
Constructivism 8, 9, 79 history 4243, 67, 75, 78, 174,
Conventional Forces in Europe 179, 197, 200, 203
(CFE), Treaty on 10911 identity 614, 7576, 80,
Cooperation Council of the Baltic 134135, 149, 178, 197, 202
States 46 South East Europe 30, 6263,
Croatia 171 6870, 7479
Domestic politics 34, 36, 72, 90, European Bank for Reconstruction
138, 150, 155, 180, 183, 201 and Development
Economy 23, 2526, 28, 88, 94, (EBRD) 52, 54, 147
173, 181, 183 European Union
Foreign policy 2, 10, 24, 26, Amsterdam Treaty, 1997 5051,
36, 4344, 47, 49, 52, 5559, 124
87, 9094, 98103, 106107, and regional cooperation 56,
110112, 118, 122126, 132, 1011, 1213, 15, 4548,
137, 139, 142147, 150, 153, 51, 55, 5761, 7778, 104,
151161, 162167, 169, 173, 107, 142145, 154, 181, 196,
175, 177, 183, 185, 187, 203205
189190, 193, 205 Association Agreements 21, 50,
Identity 7, 68, 72, 180 51, 5556, 135, 139, 182,
Cvijic, Jovan 64, 178 203
conditionality 5, 47, 58, 61, 77,
Dangerfield, Martin 92, 107, 171, 8182, 105, 148149, 156,
178 163, 175
Index 209
Common Foreign and Security Zagreb Summit, 2000 57, 121,

Policy 43, 48, 91, 163, 205 139
Council of Ministers 48, 163, 189
Customs Union 24, 8990, 183 Fischer, Joschka 90, 176, 178
Enlargement 47, 51, 59, 7677, Frckovski, Ljubomir 132
86, 107, 125, 130, 134, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 4,
142143, 148, 153, 182185, 22, 85, 89, 95
194, 198, 203, 205 France 51, 70, 78, 147, 158, 186
Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership 8, 88 Garton Ash, Timothy 76, 178
European Commission 4748, Georgia 61, 104, 118, 126, 194
5255, 58, 77, 8789, 93, Georgievski, Ljubco 117, 174, 191
9596, 98, 101, 102103, 107, Germany 26, 27, 42, 44, 50, 70,
141, 144, 146, 163, 175, 177, 72, 111, 147, 158, 186
181185, 188, 191, 194 Glenny, Misha 34, 75, 174
European Investment Bank 52, Gligorov, Kiro 135, 190
98, 147, 184185 Gligorov, Vladimir 4, 26, 87, 89,
financial assistance 181, 184
CARDS 5758, 98, 121122, Granic, Goran 190
139, 165, 177178 Greece 171, 195, 201
IPA 58, 98, 146, 168, 177 Domestic politics 6970, 186
OBNOVA 45, 57, 175 Economy 20, 2430, 87, 9496,
PHARE 45, 47, 58, 174, 185 101102, 173, 183184
identity 75, 81, 109, 202 Foreign policy 21, 2430, 3135,
membership negotiations 76, 39, 44, 49, 60, 92, 9496,
91, 103, 144, 163164, 167, 101102, 110117, 119,
169 121122, 125127, 131,
norms 11, 14, 7576, 78, 82, 133136, 142143, 145147,
86, 106, 130, 153, 155, 183, 149151, 157161, 162163,
196 165, 167169, 172173, 175,
Regional Approach 4445, 77, 183184, 185, 188, 189, 202,
161163, 174 205
Royaumont Process 14748, 53, Identity 6970, 179, 200
131, 133, 162163, 174
Stabilization and Association Habsburg Empire 31
Process (SAP) 15, 5556, Hegemony 41, 70, 156, 198
5861, 7677, 98, 105, 130, HELBROC 119, 168
142, 149, 152, 158, 161, 178, Hombach, Bodo 52, 78, 89, 96,
181 139, 164, 178, 191
Stabilization and Association Hoxha, Enver 323, 70, 135
Agreements (SAA) 5556, 59, Huntington, Samuel 63, 72
88, 90, 9293, 165, 167168,
177 Interdependence 6, 9, 10 14,
Thessaloniki Summit, 2003 59, 1920, 30, 35, 39, 4041,
76, 130, 143, 149, 166 6162, 8182, 86, 106, 108,
Trade and Cooperation 127, 130, 143, 149, 150, 172,
Agreements 45, 47 200, 204
210 Index
International Criminal Tribunal Macedonia

for Former Yugoslavia conflict in 2001 139140, 150
(ICTY) 46, 57, 60, 79, 124, domestic politics 3435, 3738
144, 165, 177, 189 economy 2229, 87, 9194,
International Monetary Fund 100104, 110, 173
(IMF) 21, 50, 143, 182 name dispute 115, 134
Investment Compact 54, 94, 159, foreign policy 3235, 45, 47,
167 49, 52, 5556, 5759, 87,
Iorga, Nicolae 62, 65, 70 9194, 96, 100104, 110,
Isarescu, Mugur 96, 191 112, 114,116, 117, 121122,
Izetbegovic, Alija 43, 131, 162, 125, 130131, 134, 136, 138,
163, 191 142143, 157, 160161,
Italy 2427, 31, 38, 44, 96, 100, 102, 162163, 165169, 171,
112, 115, 119, 147, 157158, 173175, 177, 182, 186,
160161, 184, 186, 188 189194, 196, 203205
identity 3134, 196
Jocic, Sreten 124 Mazower, Mark 67, 75, 179
Jovanovic, ivadin 136 Moldova 28, 38, 61, 62, 68, 79, 99,
Judah, Tim 2, 4, 172 104, 111, 118, 121, 146, 148,
justice and home affairs 15, 54, 56, 151, 171, 176, 183, 185
61, 108, 138, 159161 Meta, Ilir 140, 143, 191, 193
Mihaylova, Nadezhda 136, 190, 191
Khruschev, Nikita 312 Milo, Paskal 140, 190, 192
King, Charles 645 Miloevic, Slobodan 14, 29, 3437,
Kitromilides, Paschalis 645, 69 43, 44, 47, 52, 55, 58, 73, 89,
Kofos, Evangelos 32, 42, 171 104, 112, 121, 131, 132, 133,
Kosovo 171 135, 136, 137, 138, 141,
conflict, 19989 35, 24, 35, 162164, 173, 180, 190, 202,
44, 49, 56, 130, 136137, 205
150 Milutinovic, Milan 190
domestic politics 60, 100, 126, Mimica, Neven 90
130, 163, 168 Minorities 3, 21, 30, 33, 112, 176,
economy 103 181
foreign policy 59, 60, 99, 103, Mitreva, Ilinka 143, 193
125, 133, 147148, 159160 Montenegro 171
identity 12, 33, 36 Domestic politics 38, 124, 130,
Rambouillet talks, 1999 137 183
status 12, 91, 99, 130, 133, 135 Economy 9193, 182
Kostov, Ivan 89, 96, 112, 115, 117, Foreign policy 52, 57, 59, 62,
135, 190, 191 9193, 118, 120, 124125,
Kotunica, Vojislav 89, 138, 140, 137, 143147, 157, 160161,
143, 145, 165, 191 166169, 175176, 194
Kouzelis, General Andreas 186 Identity 33
Multinational Peace Force in South
Lopandic, Duko 6, 25, 42, 478, East Europe 15, 113, 114,
135, 137, 172, 182, 185 161, 163, 197
Index 211
Nano, Fatos 135, 190 Karamanlis, Constantine 32, 168

National Liberation Army Karamanlis, Kostas 101
(Macedonia) 117, 140 Marovic, Svetozar 144
Nationalism 31, 35, 65, 71, 72, 73, Melescanu, Teodor 131
77, 130, 150, 172, 180, 195, Mesic, Stjepan (Stipe) 141,
199, 201, 202 1434, 168
NATO Papoulias, Karolos 131
Adriatic Charter 143, 149, 151, Pirinski, Georgi 1312
157, 166, 169 Samaras, Andonis 34
CJTF concept 48 eelj, Vojislav 35
Conditionality 48, 82, 127 Stanishev, Sergey 101, 168
Enlargement 48, 117, 130, 134, Putin, Vladimir 101, 168
153, 175, 177 Videnov, Jean 1312
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Paris Charter 77, 78
Council 56, 119 Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Partnership for Peace 15, 35, Europe (CFE) 109, 110, 111,
4850, 5657, 111120, 126, 185
128, 143, 162, 164, 167, 175 Ottoman Empire 69, 72, 204
Peacekeeping operations 49, 116, zal, Turgut 20, 190
161, 165
South East Europe Initiative Pangalos, Theodoros 133, 136,
(SEEI) 5657, 120, 128 186, 190
SEECAP 120, 128 Papandreou, Andreas 32, 42, 70,
SEEGROUP 5657, 119120, 127, 171, 190
160, 164, 189 Papandreou, Geogrios
Neoliberal Institutionalism 41 (George) 191, 193
Neumann, Iver 9, 41, 645 Passy, Solomon 193
New Regionalism 7, 85, 172, 202, Perry, William 111, 177, 186
205 Picula, Tonino 90, 138, 143, 191,
Northern Epirus 32, 175 193
Powell, Colin 193
Organization for Economic power 31, 155, 196
Cooperation and military 33
Development (OECD) 52, relational 13, 39, 41, 81, 82, 156
54, 94, 95, 122, 147, 159 soft 41, 155
Organization for Security and structural 81, 82
Cooperation in Europe Pukanic, Ivo 123, 124
(OSCE) 44, 48, 50, 5253,
78, 82, 109111, 113, 115, Racan, Ivica 90, 107, 164
117, 127, 129, 133, 136, 147, Realism 41, 200
150, 160, 185186, 188, 199 refugees and IDPs 36, 38, 46, 49,
CSCE 53, 77, 78, 109, 110, 133, 143144, 176177, 189
150 Regional Arms Control Verification
Cyprus 312, 79, 119, 147, 158, and Implementation
166, 168 Assistance Centre
Josipovic, Ivo 144, 169, 192 (RACIVAC) 111, 186
212 Index
Regional Cooperation Council 2, 159161, 165169, 175, 194,

58, 95, 120, 129, 147148, 202
159, 168, 187, 193, 195 Identity 68, 7273, 180
Regionalism 314, 19, 41, 50, 55, Simitis, Kostas 131, 145, 190, 191
59, 60, 63, 67, 76, 79, 85, Slovenia 171
107, 119, 129, 146, 154155, Domestic politics
172, 196197, 200, 202, Economy 21, 94, 98100
205 Foreign policy 21, 34, 4447, 52,
Forms 5, 7 61, 68, 87, 9294, 98100,
theories of 4, 7, 9, 19, 59, 63, 79, 106119, 132135, 144150,
85, 127 157161, 162, 165169, 175,
Romania 7, 171, 196, 201 180, 185186, 188, 193,
Domestic politics 2024, 111, 197
125, 190191 Identity 68, 72, 113, 201
Economy 2030, 85, 8789, Solana, Javier 91, 139, 175
9194, 99104, 173 Soviet Union 21, 118
Foreign policy 1, 2033, 35, South East Europe Transport
3738, 4447, 49, 52, 5558, Observatory (SEETO)
6062, 79, 8789, 9194, 9899(T), 161, 166168, 194
96, 99104, 107, 110112, South East European Cooperation
117, 121122, 125, 134137, Process (SEECP) 1, 10,
139, 141143, 147, 151, 153, 12, 15, 52, 58, 79, 89, 95,
157160, 162169, 173, 175, 102103, 111, 113, 122, 127,
184189, 191 129131, 134142, 145151,
Identity 7, 68, 7071, 179180, 153, 159160, 163169, 172,
194, 199 182, 185, 188, 191193, 205
Roumeliotis, Panagiotis 48, 175 Summits 134135, 140, 145,
Russia 29, 37, 42, 50, 52, 101, 104, 146, 149
105, 112, 179, 186 Institutionalization 131,
134135, 141, 145
Sava Commission 105, 159 regional ownership 145
Security 5, 15, 3038, 3940, South East European Cooperative
108113, 119120 Initiative (SECI) 4445, 47,
Conflicts 3033, 56, 6061, 77, 52, 53, 58, 61, 87, 95, 102,
180 106, 119, 121, 123, 127,
Military 50, 108 131133, 141, 147, 160,
Soft security 14, 36, 40, 109, 163164, 169, 174, 183, 185,
120124 188, 205
Serbia 171 South East European Defence
Domestic politics 22, 36, 49, 91, Ministerial 109, 111, 134,
174, 192 161
Economy 2229, 49, 9194, Stability Pact for South East
100102, 183 Europe 4, 4955, 111,
Foreign policy 26, 35, 42, 49, 137138, 164, 176, 177, 178,
5562, 9194, 100102, 184, 188, 203
118126, 132, 137150, 157, donor conferences 53
Index 213
WT1 53, 145, 177 158, 160161, 163165, 169,

WT2 53, 88, 94, 177, 182, 185 172173, 176, 188189
WT3 53, 57, 119, 121122, 145, Identity 71, 180
177, 187 Tzhohadzopoulos, Akis 112,
Stoyanov, Petar 117, 191 135
Agriculture 20, 93, 157
free trade agreement 36, 87, Ukraine 378, 49, 61, 101, 104,
148 1189, 126, 171, 185
industrial goods 5556, 87, 92, United Nations
157 Peacekeeping operations
liberalization 3, 4, 13, 20, 57, UNPREDEP 43, 174
8789, 93, 104106, 139 UNPROFOR 43
non-tariff barriers 157, 182 Security Council resolutions 50,
services 26, 59, 90, 92, 99, 107, 136
157 UNECE 44, 147
uak, Gojko 37 United States 1315, 21, 35, 39,
Soviet Union 201, 323, 42, 72, 42 47, 50, 52, 6061, 70, 72,
75, 113, 118 78, 82, 87, 96, 101, 102, 104,
Svilanovic, Goran 141, 145, 192 109119, 126127, 130131,
136, 139, 140143, 147, 149,
Thrace 110 152, 155, 157, 160161,
Eastern (Turkish) 62 163165, 174, 185186, 194,
Western 31, 173 201
Tito, Josip Broz 31, 135 Balkan initiatives 1315, 42, 44,
Todorova, Maria 8, 657, 73, 76, 47, 111113, 115, 149
178 Uvalic, Milica 4, 21, 24, 26, 55,
Trade 2, 15, 2427, 58, 8694 88, 182
Trajkovski, Boris 143, 191
transport 2729, 95100, 168, Veremis, Thanos 6, 42, 171, 173
184 Visegrd cooperation 46, 92,
air 99, 158 106
rail 161, 197
road 105, 183, 197 World Bank 25, 50, 52, 53, 54, 90,
transborder waterways 100, 105 93, 95, 96, 147, 177, 182, 184,
Transport Community 98, 100, 200, 206
105, 107, 161, 168 World Trade Organization
Tudman, Franjo 14, 36, 43, 55, 72, (WTO) 26, 8890, 92, 182
106, 112, 131, 191
Turkey 171 Ylmaz, Mesut 115, 135, 190
Domestic politics 2022, 87 Yugoslavia
Economy 2022, 2430, 8789, disintegration of 10, 42, 66, 73,
94, 100107, 173, 203 109
Foreign policy 21, 2430, 3044, Federative Republic of,
49, 55, 6162, 79, 8789, 94, 19922003 3, 2228, 36,
100107, 110 118, 121127, 4344, 47, 49, 52, 8788, 110,
131132, 136, 142, 146151, 112113, 116, 122123, 126,
214 Index
Yugoslavia continued Socialist (Peoples) Federative

131133, 136, 143144, 151, Republic of, 194592 3,
163, 165, 173, 175, 182, 2022
190 Yugosphere 2, 8, 94, 200
Serbia and Montenegro,
200306 5, 23, 68, 93, 100, Zielonka, Jan 76, 194
102, 118119, 125126, 141, ivkovic, Zoran 143
144, 166, 182 Zorlu, General Hilmi 115, 117, 186

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St Antonys Series

In Association with St Antonys College, Oxford

List of Figures and Map vii

The inside-out angle: the nation, Europe and the Balkans 68

1.1 Trade in South East Europe 25

4.1 South East Europe: core network 99

0.1 Factors behind regional cooperation 9

Dimitar Bechev is a Senior Policy Fellow and Head of Sofia Office

ATMs/ATPs Autonomous trade measures/preferences

SECI South East European Cooperative Initiative

WT2 Working Table II of the Stability Pact (Economic

On a recent trip to Brussels, Mirko Cvetkovic, Serbias prime minister,

it was in the times of Yugoslavias bloody demise. In the autumn of

IR would expect. However, in the 1990s it was the divisions rooted in

of the wider phenomenon of regionalism. Key too, is the definition

Divergent views of regional cooperation

Such theoretical definitions, distinctions and refinements provide a

sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.10 In other words, the causa-

cooperation has clearly been one of the hallmarks of the enlargement

Bringing in identity politics

Of course, the above inside/outside typology is tentative, in that the

the rare cases when theory is summoned there is a conspicuous mis-

identities which criss-cross the presumed civilizational frontiers; this

poststructuralist minded theorists behind the region-building para-

Outline of the main argument

Table 0.1 Factors behind regional cooperation

initiatives undertaken by actors external to the region, pursuing sta-

into state-to-state rivalries, mistrust, security dilemmas and the like.

Looking at regional cooperation from the vantage point of identity

the ideational contents of regionalism, through the systematic

example trade liberalization, the creation of an energy community or

Table 0.2 Balkan regional cooperation: factors and outcomes

two-level games played by governments interacting with both their

Overview of the chapters

the EU, which launched a number of schemes culminating in the

Scholars approaching regionalism from various angles treat interde-

forces and structures that make a region stick together. To quote

Functional aspects of Balkan interdependence

Legacies of economic fragmentation and stagnation

Post-communist economies in the 1990s

Source: Dimitrov, Mandova and Stanchev (2002).

Balkan exports in the mid-1990s (%)

Balkan imports in the mid-1990s (%)

Figure 1.1 Trade in South East Europe

volumes to national GDP, was relatively low, except in Bulgaria,

Table 1.2 Trade figures for 1996 (million $)

post-Yugoslav republics, who continued trading with the other parts

This limited local demand for institutionalized multilateral coopera-

Source: Christie and Holzner (2004).

Source: Christie and Holzner (2004).

markets. The destruction of the Danube bridges at Novi Sad blocked

regional countries. Greece, and especially Turkey, the largest and

The webs of Balkan security

While economic fragmentation supported the contention that South

of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the nineteenth and early

The Macedonian issue was a constant irritant in relations between

that Hoxha and Tito re-engaged. The more cordial relationship in

The new old powderkeg: Balkan security in the early 1990s

The secessionist tendencies in Yugoslavia, triggered by Slobodan

There were fears that a SerboAlbanian conflict over Kosovo could

New transnational issues and threats

military balances than with the pervasive weakness of state institu-

originating from Herzegovina. Gojko uak, a prominent Herzegovinian