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Controlling State Power : An Interview with Vice President lvaro Garca Linera
Linda Farthing
Latin American Perspectives 2010 37: 30
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X10370174
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What is This?
Linda Farthing has written extensively on Bolivia as well as other parts of Latin America.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 173, Vol. 37 No. 4, July 2010 30-33
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X10370174
2010 Latin American Perspectives
30
Downloaded from lap.sagepub.com at TEMPLE UNIV on January 3, 2012
Farthing / CONTROLLING STATE POWER 31
You have lived almost all your life in opposition to the existing government. How
has your perspective changed in your role as vice president?
Could you discuss the challenges of decolonizing a state after 500 years of colonial
processes? What are the specific challenges that 20 years of neoliberalism have brought?
How do you understand the differences between a party led by social movements
and a traditional leftist party?
Look at Marx in the rebellion of 1848: He did not speak of a political party that
was highly defined. He spoke of a party made up of workers. While Lenin wrote
How do you explain the current weaknesses of the right in Bolivia after its failure
in the August 2008 recall referendum and the passage of a new constitution?
One must never take a self-satisfied approach to a victory over the right.
Even when the left wins, as we have, the right will always find a way to
regroup, attempt to take power, and impose its agenda once again. Our real
problems with the right began once we started attacking their privileges and
particularly those who have massive landholdings in the eastern part of the
country. By this point, the right was mostly bankrupt in terms of a viable
national project and had no new ideas to offer. However, it was successful in
appropriating the banner of regional autonomy, which is a long-standing and
legitimate demand in Bolivias regions, and effectively rallied people around
it. During this time, as the right was gaining power, we had compelling evi-
dence that the United States was actively involved in supporting it, and this is
what precipitated our asking Ambassador Goldberg to leave the country in
September 2008.
The right also made concerted efforts to destabilize the country and bring
down our government by attempting to cut off food supplies produced by
large agricultural enterprises in the east. But we quickly established relation-
ships with small producers and provided them credit and other supports to
strengthen their sector and ensure that the government could never again be
subject to threats by the large producers. Then the right invested a huge effort
to undermine the Constituent Assembly, using racist attacks to broaden its
support. We took a rather passive role during this time, convinced that it was
likely to hang itself with its own rope.
The rights first effort to reestablish itself on the national stage was
the recall referendum that called for a vote of confidence in the president,
vice president, and departmental prefects, held in August 2008. It lost
decisivelywe increased our support from 54 percent in the 2005 national
election to 67 percent, and two departmental prefects associated with the
right lost their seats. Then, in September 2008, the right provoked a massacre
of indigenous protesters in the northern Amazonian department of Pando,
and this event combined with sporadic racist violence turned the bulk of
public opinion against them.
This was what I call a point of bifurcationa point where a political situa-
tion comes to a head and significantly changes the future course, much as it
did in another September, that of 1986, when 15,000 miners marched on La
Paz in the March for Life and were forced to turn back before they reached the
city because the government deployed a huge number of the military to block
their way. Both cases, one a victory for the right that marked the defeat of state
capitalism by neoliberalism and the other a decisive loss, involved not the
deployment of the states monopoly on coercion and violence but rather the
threat of it. In 2008, we seized the opportunity of the recall referendum to
retake the initiative and demonstrated clearly to the right that we were willing
to take aggressive action against it. Prior to this we had acted pretty leniently,
but we learned the hard way that you cannot leave your enemies only half
defeated.